

RECOGNITION OF THE TALIBAN'S GOVERNMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

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Abstract

Despite American-mediated efforts, the prolonged Taliban-Afghan government-U.S. negotiations in Doha failed. Shortly afterward, on August 15, 2021, the Taliban seized control of Kabul, marking the beginning of its second controversial term in power. The Taliban's connections to international terrorism, human rights violations, and its rise to power through illegitimate means—by force and violence—raise numerous questions under international law. The critical question now is: "Should the Taliban government, which came to power under these conditions, be recognized by the international community?" This study examines the potential dangers and risks that recognizing the Taliban could pose for Afghanistan and the global community. In particular, it addresses the Taliban's stance on human rights and its approach to counterterrorism. The findings indicate that, although the Taliban exercises effective control over Afghanistan, it will not be recognized by the international community until it adheres to principles such as human rights protection, countering international terrorism, and establishing an inclusive government.

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Keywords

• International Law • Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan • Legitimacy • Recognition of Government • Taliban

TALİBAN HÜKÜMETİNİN TANINMASI: ULUSLARARASI HUKUK PERSPEKTİFİNDEN BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

Öz

Amerikan arabuluculuğunda yapılan çabalara rağmen, Doha'da gerçekleştirilen uzun süreli Taliban-Afgan hükümeti-ABD müzakereleri başarısızlıkla sonuçlandı. Bu gelişmenin hemen ardından, 15 Ağustos 2021'de Taliban, Kabil'in kontrolünü ele geçirerek iktidardaki ikinci tartışmalı dönemine başladı. Taliban'ın uluslararası terörizmle bağlantıları, insan hakları ihlalleri ve güç ve şiddet yoluyla meşru olmayan yöntemlerle iktidara gelmesi, uluslararası hukuk bağlamında pek çok soruyu gündeme getirmektedir. Şu anda kritik soru şudur: "Bu koşullar altında iktidara gelen Taliban hükümeti, uluslararası toplum tarafından tanınmalı mı?" Bu çalışma, Taliban'ın tanınmasının Afganistan ve küresel toplum için yaratabileceği potansiyel tehlike ve riskleri incelemektedir. Özellikle Taliban'ın insan haklarına yaklaşımı ve terörle mücadele konusundaki tutumuna odaklanmaktadır. Bulgular, Taliban'ın Afganistan üzerinde etkin bir kontrol sağlamakla birlikte, insan haklarının korunması, uluslararası terörizmle mücadele ve kapsayıcı bir hükümet kurma gibi ilkelere uymadıkça uluslararası toplum tarafından tanınmayacağını göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Afganistan İslam Emirliği • Hükümetin Tanınması • Meşruiyet • Uluslararası Hukuk • Taliban

INTRODUCTION

Recognition of governments has two dimensions: political and legal. Whether the Taliban government should be recognized by the international community is also evaluated within these two dimensions. In the context of Afghan history, no government—regardless of how undemocratically it came to power—has generated as much controversy as the Taliban government. Two key reasons stand out: first, the Taliban's widespread use of violence, and second, its connections to terrorist organizations.

On August 15, 2021, the Taliban seized control of Kabul, prompting the elected president, Ashraf Ghani, to flee the country. After establishing control over Afghanistan, the Taliban announced a new government and cabinet. However, no country has yet officially recognized this Taliban government, although some states, like China and Russia, continue discussions on the matter. While certain states have openly declared they will not recognize the Taliban, others are adopting a “wait and see” approach. The main reasons for non-recognition include the Taliban's human rights violations, concerns over its post-recognition approach, and its stance on international terrorism. The Taliban was listed as a terrorist group by the UN Security Council from 2001 to 2011. Although removed from this list in 2011, many high-ranking Taliban officials remain on the UN Security Council's Consolidated Sanctions List. Notably, the interim cabinet the Taliban formed on September 7, 2021, includes individuals on the sanctions list, including the acting Interior Minister, Serajuddin Haqqani.

The international community has repeatedly stated that they will not recognize the Taliban government unless it meets certain conditions. But what are these conditions for recognition by the international community? Additionally, what does recognition mean under international law, and how does it differ from state recognition?

This study explores the concept of recognition in international law in general and examines the specific case of recognizing the Taliban administration. It begins with a brief overview of the Taliban's place and role in Afghan political history, followed by a discussion of the recognition of states and governments and the differences between the two. Finally, the paper addresses the recognition of the current Taliban administration.

I. THE ROLE OF THE TALIBAN IN AFGHAN POLITICS

Since its emergence in the early 1990s, the Taliban has played a central and controversial role in Afghan politics, occupying the agenda of Afghanistan and the world with its ideological, political, and military aspects.

This section examines the ideological foundations of the Taliban organization, its role in Afghan politics, and its two periods of government (1996–2001 and 2021).

A. Taliban in Afghan Political History

The word “Taliban” is the plural of Talib in Pashto, meaning “student.” The Taliban was originally established in the early 1990s by young Afghan men who were educated in Islamic religious schools (Madrasas) in Pakistan. Ideologically, this movement is based on a strict conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam, which can be said to lean towards Wahhabism. It is relevant to note that this Wahhabism ideology was influenced by Saudi Arabian teachings in the Pakistani madrasas where they studied.

The Taliban emerged in response to the civil war, chaos, and lawlessness that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, promising to end the civil war, eliminate corruption, and establish an Islamic justice system. The Taliban gained control of southern Afghanistan in 1994 and captured the capital, Kabul, in 1996, establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

From 1996 to 2001, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan controlled most of the country, enforcing an extremely conservative and strict version of Islamic law that left a profound impact on Afghan politics:

- **Serious Human Rights Violations:** This included denying women the right to education, enforcing severe punishments for crimes like theft (amputation of limbs) and adultery (stoning), and banning news media such as television.

- **Exclusion of Ethnic Groups:** The Taliban centralized power and pushed other ethnic groups out of the political sphere, implementing strict discrimination and repression against Hazaras, a group primarily affiliated with Shia Islam.

- **Lack of International Recognition:** No state formally recognized the Taliban government except Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The lack of recognition weakened the Taliban diplomatically and led the country into economic crisis. Furthermore, hosting terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda eventually led to the government’s downfall.

• **Destruction of Cultural Heritage:** The Taliban caused significant damage to the country's historical assets, most notably destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001.

After the September 11 attacks, the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the U.S. In response, a coalition led by the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban regime. After being overthrown, the Taliban retreated to rural areas, where they launched terror attacks and established shadow governments in defiance of the newly formed Afghan government. Although the Taliban began peace negotiations with the Afghan government in 2010, these efforts were unsuccessful. Eventually, in 2020, the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement led to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

B. The New Taliban Government (Return to Power, 2021-Present)

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, combined with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's reluctance to combat the Taliban and the weakening of the Afghan National Security Forces, enabled the Taliban to seize Kabul and reestablish dominance over the country. However, the Taliban government has not been officially recognized by any state.

The return of the Taliban to power has raised national and international concerns and issues. Although the Taliban claims to be more moderate than during its first period of rule, in practice, they continue to adopt strict policies regarding human rights and former security personnel.

II. RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

In terms of international law, "recognition of state" and "recognition of government" are different concepts.

A. The Recognition of States

State recognition has been the subject of extensive theoretical debate by academics and jurists¹. Consequently, there are many different definitions of state recognition. One of these is the recognition by existing states of the emergence of a new or existing entity with international legal personality². However, there is no universally accepted principle governing the concept of “statehood³” in international law. For example, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) stipulates four qualifications for an entity to become a state with international legal personality: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) an established government; and (4) the capacity to establish relations with other states⁴.

B. The Recognition of Governments

Government recognition, on the other hand, refers to the transition of power or government within a recognized and continuing state or country. By recognizing the new government, other states accept that it has the capacity and authority to represent the country internationally and to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states. Changes in government do not change the essence of a state, and “the state does not cease to be an international legal person because its government is overthrown”. The difference, according to Malcolm Shaw, is that “recognition of a state will affect its legal personality, whether by creating or acknowledging it, while recognition of a government affects the status of the administrative authority, not the state”⁵.

¹ **KELSEN**, Hans, “Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations”, *American Journal of International Law*, V. 35, No. 4, 1941, p. 605, 605–617; **LAUTERPACHT**, Hersch, “Recognition of States in International Law”, *Yale Law Journal*, V. 53, No. 3, 1944, p. 385, 385–458.

² **SHAW**, Malcolm, *International Law*, 9th Edition, 2021, p. 387.

³ MENDES, Errol, *Statehood and Palestine for the Purposes of Article 12 (3) of the ICC Statute: A Contrary Perspective*, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/NR/rdonlyres_/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B1-ACC0-B41706BB41E5/281876/OTPErrolMendes-NewSTATEHOODANDPALESTINEFORTHEPURPOS.pdf (last visited: Mar. 21, 2023).

⁴ Convention on the Rights and Duties of States as adopted in the Seventh International Conference of American States, art. 1, Dec. 12, 1933, CLXV L.N.T.S. 3801–3824.

⁵ **SHAW**, p. 387.

In the absence of a clear set of principles and established practice in international law, recognition of government is a more controversial, enigmatic, contextual, discretionary and unresolved issue than recognition of states among states. When changes in government are often routine and ordinary, recognition of the status of the new government is easy and rarely requires serious efforts. In this case, usually, interactions between governments continue to imply that the new government has the appropriate qualifications. However, the problem of recognition only arises when changes in government are not routine or ordinary. For example, the issue of which group or party is entitled to represent the state in the event of a forcible overthrow of a government or a civil war raises the question of which group or party has the right to represent the state⁶.

Historically, states have considered various criteria when recognizing a government, such as effective control or legitimacy. One of the most influential criteria that guides states in their decision to recognize governments has been "effective control"⁷. The effective control doctrine holds that recognition should be granted if the government seeking recognition exercises foreseeable, continuous total or significant control over all or a large part of the territory and population of a state⁸. The second most important criterion for states to recognize governments is "legitimacy"⁹. States consider two types of legitimacy when assessing whether a government is legitimate: constitutional legitimacy and democratic legitimacy. According to the constitutional legitimacy doctrine, governments that seize power through extra-constitutional actions such as by force or coup d'état should not be recognized by other states. The democratic legitimacy doctrine, on the other hand, ties the recognition of governments to democratic processes such as elections and compliance with

⁶ **RAHIMI**, Haroun/ **HAZIM**, Mahir, "International Law and the Taliban's Legal Status: Emerging Recognition Criteria?", *Washington International Law Journal*, V. 32, 2023.

⁷ **SHAW**, p. 388.

⁸ **MACCHESNEY**, Brunson, "Recognition of States and Governments in International Law Studies", *International Law Studies*, V. 62, 1980, p. 693.

⁹ **SHAW**, p. 388.

human rights norms¹⁰. In practice, states are not obliged to comply with these criteria.

However, a treaty or a binding resolution of the UN Security Council may impose an obligation on states not to recognize a government¹¹.

Finally, government recognition is two types: explicit or implied. When the recognizing state clearly declares and officially communicates its decision to recognize by publishing a declaration or by establishing diplomatic channels, recognition is said to be “explicit.” However, if the recognizing state takes some action, such as establishing diplomatic or consular relations, but does not expressly declare its intention to formally recognize the other state, this recognition is “implied”¹² (B’nicco 2021: 15).

III. RECOGNITION OF THE TALIBAN UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 has raised numerous legal, political, and ethical issues for the international community regarding its recognition as a government. The most critical question is whether the Taliban government is considered legitimate under international law.

As of now, no state has officially recognized the Taliban government. However, some countries, such as Uzbekistan, Russia, and China, continue individual negotiations while maintaining embassy operations. In this regard, countries like Pakistan, Uzbekistan, China, and Russia were the first to transfer their Afghan embassies and consulates to Taliban

¹⁰ B’NICCO, Liselotte Kasse: Recognition of Governments in International Law: A Case Study of the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis, Masters dissertation, 2021, https://libstore.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/003/007/761/RUG01-003007761_2021_0001_AC.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2024).

¹¹ Recognition of States and Governments in International Law, Karabakh, <https://karabakh.org/articles/recognition-of-states-and-governments-in-international-law/> (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

¹² B’NICCO, p. 15.

representatives¹³. Iran¹⁴, Turkey¹⁵, and the United Arab Emirates¹⁶ also handed over Afghanistan's embassies and consulates to the Taliban administration between February and May 2023. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has claimed that Taliban diplomats are currently operating in 14 countries as of March 24, 2023¹⁷ (Binesh 2023). However, these 14 countries, which have transferred their embassies and consulates to Taliban officials, have repeatedly emphasized that these actions do not imply formal recognition of the Taliban regime. For example, after Iran transferred Afghanistan's embassies and consulates to Taliban representatives, the country's Foreign Minister clarified that they do not recognize the Taliban government but only established relations focused on trade and common challenges faced by both countries¹⁸.

Meanwhile, most Western countries, except the United States, continue their relations with Afghan embassies and consulates that represent the former Afghan government. In March 2022, the United States closed

¹³ **RAHIMI/HAZIM**, p. 236.

¹⁴ **GUL**, Ayaz, Iran Hands Over Afghan Embassy in Tehran to Taliban, VOA, 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-hands-over-afghan-embassy-in-tehran-to-taliban-/6980784.html> (last visited: August 25, 2024).

¹⁵ Taliban Announce Taking Over of Afghan Consulate General in Istanbul, Afghanistan International, 2023, <https://www.afintl.com/en/202302275594> (last visited: August 25, 2024).

¹⁶ Taliban Opens Consulate in UAE, The Balochistan Post, 2023, <https://thebalochistanpost.net/2023/03/taliban-opens-consulate-in-uae/> (last visited: August 25, 2024).

¹⁷ **BINESH**, Banafsha, Islamic Emirate Has Diplomates in 14 World Countries: Mujahid, Tolonews, 2023, <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-182651> (last visited: August 25, 2024).

¹⁸ Wazir Khareja Iran: Hanoz Hukumat Taliban Ra Ba Rasmeyat Nameshnasaim [Iran's Foreign Minister: We Have Not Recognized the Taliban Government Yet], Tolqun News, 2023, <https://tolqun-news.com/fa/2023/01/14/%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8/> (last visited: August 25, 2024).

Afghanistan's embassies and consulates within its borders and assumed control of these diplomatic buildings¹⁹.

Finally, Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have adopted a "wait and see" policy, indicating they are waiting for recognition by Western countries, particularly the United States.

The United Nations, meanwhile, has yet to recognize Taliban diplomatic representatives, and it continues its relations with representatives from Afghanistan's previous government.

This section will discuss the criteria for Taliban recognition worldwide and explore potential options for the international community based on the above explanations.

A. Criteria for the Recognition of the Taliban Government

As noted above, no state has yet formally recognized the Taliban government, citing multiple reasons that also form the criteria for its recognition. These criteria include legitimacy and respect for human rights.

1. Adherence to International Obligations

Throughout its history, Afghanistan has been party to numerous agreements and has certain obligations to the international community. The Taliban's reluctance to comply with these obligations, particularly those related to human rights and counter-terrorism, significantly affects its chances of being recognized. The Taliban's continued sheltering of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan demonstrates its failure to meet these obligations.

2. Effective Control and Inclusive Government

This criterion can be divided into two components: effective control and inclusive governance.

- **Effective Control:** The government must exercise actual control over the territory it governs, including enforcing laws and maintaining public order. The Taliban has achieved control over most regions of

¹⁹ LEE, Matthew, US Takes Control of Afghan Embassy, Consulates in NY, CA, Associated Press, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-government-and-politics-united-states-taliban-d27a667b6b8c763eb33cb3a133f5ec45>(last visited: August 25, 2024).

Afghanistan and has been relatively successful in maintaining public order.

- **Inclusive Government:** A government must be inclusive to reflect the diversity of Afghanistan, a country with nearly 30 ethnic groups, various religious sects, and numerous social and political factions. However, approximately 95% of Taliban members are from a single ethnic group, the Pashtuns²⁰, and do not represent the full spectrum of Pashtun viewpoints, as many Pashtuns do not align with the Taliban's strict ideological interpretation of Islam²¹. Thus, the lack of inclusivity remains a significant barrier to the Taliban's recognition by other nations.

3. Legitimacy

In order for a government to come to power, it must have followed constitutional means. However, since the Taliban seized power by force, it constituted an unconstitutional act.

During the Doha peace talks, many countries, especially the UN and the United States, warned the Taliban that they would not be recognized as a legitimate government if they did not seize power by force²². However, despite the ongoing Doha talks, the Taliban continued to intensify their attack on the Afghan government and thus ignored the warnings²³. The Taliban ignored the peace talks and returned to power by force in August 2021²⁴.

Another reason to describe the Taliban as illegitimate is that the will of the Afghan people is ignored. Since the Taliban did not come to power through democratic methods and elections, they are considered illegitimate by world countries by ignoring the Afghans' right to self-determination.

²⁰ GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, *The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns*, CIGI, 2010, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121069/Afghanistan_Paper_5.pdf (last visited: August 25, 2024).

²¹ RAHIMI/HAZIM, p. 244.

²² Security Council Presidential Statement, 2021/14596, Aug. 6, 2021 (last visited: August 25, 2024).

²³ NOORZAI, Roshan/HAMDARD, Bezhan, *Afghans 'Disappointed' One Year into US-Taliban Deal*, VOA, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_afghans-disappointed-one-year-us-taliban-deal/6202621.html (last visited: September 15, 2024).

²⁴ RAHIMI/HAZIM, p. 239-240.

4. Respect for Human Rights

Under today's international norms, commitment to human rights is a foundation of legitimacy. The Taliban's previous rule from 1996 to 2001, which severely restricted the rights of women and minorities, imposed harsh punishments, and ignored basic human rights norms, poses a significant obstacle to recognition. As of 2021, the Taliban has continued to raise serious concerns over restricting women's education and some acts of murder. In addition, the Taliban has violated human rights norms by suppressing dissent, restricting the media, and perpetrating widespread repression of ethnic minorities in the country.

5. Ties with International Terrorism

The Taliban's alliance and partnership with international terrorism from its emergence until today has significantly hindered its recognition by world states²⁵. The Taliban continues to shelter Al Qaeda and other international terrorists in Afghanistan today, just as it did during its first term in power²⁶. The most important evidence for this is the killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a US drone strike in Kabul in May 2022, which revealed the Taliban's continuing relationship with international terrorists²⁷. According to some reports there are at least twenty active terrorist organizations in Afghanistan²⁸.

In light of the above evidence, the UN and a number of states have imposed numerous sanctions on the Taliban government. For example, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267 (1999) imposed comprehensive and strict sanctions on individuals, organizations, groups and enterprises associated with the Taliban. In that resolution, the UNSC cited

²⁵ **RUBIN**, Barnett, Leveraging the Taliban's Quest for International Recognition, USIP, 2021, p. 2–6, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan-Peace-Process_Talibans-Quest-for-International-Recognition.pdf(last visited: September 15, 2024).

²⁶ **DAWI**, Akmal, Taliban Counterterrorism Commitments Face Growing Doubts, VOA, 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-counterterrorism-commitments-face-growing-doubts-/7004663.html>(last visited: September 05, 2024).

²⁷ **PLUMMER**, Robert / **MURPHY**, Matt, Ayman Al-Zawahiri: Al-Qaeda Leader Killed in US Drone Strike, BBC, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62387167>(last visited: September 01, 2024).

²⁸ **DAWI**.

the Taliban's human rights violations, mistreatment of religious and ethnic minorities, failure to protect UN personnel, attack on the Iranian Consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif and continued support for Al-Qaeda. In its Resolution 1333 (2010), the UNSC reiterated the above points and also referred to the Taliban's links to drugs trade²⁹.

If the sanctions were to continue after the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan in 2021 and took control of all institutions of the Afghan state, this could have serious negative effects on Afghanistan, which is heavily dependent on international aid. In order to prevent such negative effects, the UN Security Council resolution 2615 (2021) decided that "that humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan are not a violation of paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 2255 (2015), and that the processing and payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources, and the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of such assistance or to support such activities are permitted"³⁰. In addition, in the said resolution, the UNSC "strongly encourages providers relying on this paragraph to use reasonable efforts to minimize the accrual of any benefits, whether as a result of direct provision or diversion, to individuals or entities designated on the 1988 Sanctions List, and further decides to review the implementation of this provision after one year"³¹.

B. Options for States

Recognizing the Taliban government would have several legal and political implications. Legally and politically, it would allow Afghanistan to access its frozen assets, establish commercial relations, and engage with national and international institutions. It would also grant legitimacy to an otherwise illegitimate government.

In practice, no state has yet officially recognized the Taliban government, and there is no consensus within the international community on this matter. However, countries such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and

²⁹ RAHIMI/HAZIM, p. 242-243.

³⁰ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2021/2615.

³¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2021/2615.

Uzbekistan have established de facto relations through diplomatic discussions.

On the other hand, the United States and European Union countries have refrained from recognizing the Taliban, citing concerns over human rights, terrorism, and the Taliban's discriminatory approach. Some states have adopted a "wait and see" approach.

As observed, especially Western countries are keeping the recognition of the Taliban government off their agendas. This stance is primarily due to the fact that many high-ranking Taliban officials remain on the UN Security Council's sanctions list. Furthermore, the Taliban's poor human rights record, ties to terrorism, and lack of an inclusive and democratic approach remain significant barriers to its recognition.

CONCLUSION

Recognition is a concept that varies from country to country, and states typically make such decisions based on their own interests. However, regarding the recognition of the Taliban administration, global states are paying attention to certain criteria. The primary criteria include effective control, legitimacy, ties to international terrorism, and respect for human rights.

Although the Taliban exercises effective control over Afghanistan, this alone is insufficient for international recognition. In a country as diverse as Afghanistan, a government's lack of inclusivity undermines the principle of effective control. While Afghanistan is home to more than 30 ethnic groups, the fact that approximately 95% of the government consists of Pashtuns is neither just nor equitable. The Taliban's discriminatory stance on ethnicity and gender is a significant barrier to its recognition by the global community. Similarly, generals who come to power through military coups may exercise control, but they lack legitimacy. The Taliban is also expected to establish an inclusive government that represents all ethnic and sectarian groups within the country. Therefore, inclusivity and democratic legitimacy are prerequisites for the Taliban's recognition.

Another essential condition for the international community's recognition of the Taliban government is that the Taliban must sever all ties

with terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, cease harboring them in Afghanistan, and actively combat these groups. Afghanistan's territory must not be used in ways that endanger global peace and security. In addition to its connections to other terrorist organizations, the fact that many senior Taliban officials remain on the UN Security Council's sanctions list presents a significant barrier. The Taliban government does not meet most of the criteria set by the international community for recognition.

Consequently, states are in no hurry to recognize the Taliban government. They are instead expected to monitor the Taliban administration, adopting a "wait and see" approach to observe whether it meets the above conditions before making a decision.

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