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## THE NATIONAL VIEW MOVEMENT AND DA'WAH DISCOURSE IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE: ETHNICITY-NEUTRAL NATIONAL ISLAMIC IDENTITY\*

*Milli Görüş Hareketi ve Türk Sağında Dava Söylemi: Etnisiteden Arındırılmış Milli ve İslami  
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**Abstract:** This study analyzes the historical development of the da'wah discourse and the National View Movement in Turkish political life, evaluating its ideological, political, and social impacts. Focusing on the cause discourse of the National View Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) under Necmettin Erbakan's leadership, it examines how this discourse established a pragmatic balance between Islamism and nationalism, shaping itself as a distinctive political narrative within the Turkish right. Findings reveal that da'wah discourse has restructured itself through historical continuities and ruptures, forming a strong link between the national cause (nationalism) and the Islamic cause (ummahism). Moreover, state preservation has emerged as a central element in both ideological and political contexts, enabling the integration of national identity and religious values. The study explores the transformation of the cause discourse within the contexts of modernization, secularism, and nation-state ideology, elucidating its effects on the contemporary Turkish politics. Additionally, it details how the cause discourse has adapted to and transformed in response to challenges posed by modernization, secularization, and the nation-state. Ultimately, study highlights the critical role of the cause discourse in shaping modern Turkish politics and provides an in-depth understanding of the intersection of religion and nationalism within the National View Movement.

**Keywords:** Ideology, Islamism, Da'wah, National View Movement.

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**Öz:** Bu çalışma, Türk siyasal hayatında dava söylemi ve Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin tarihsel gelişimini analiz ederek, bu söylemin ideolojik, siyasi ve toplumsal etkilerini değerlendirmektedir. Araştırmada, Necmettin Erbakan liderliğindeki Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin dava söylemi konu edinilerek; dava söyleminin İslamcılık ve milliyetçilik arasında kurduğu pragmatik dengenin, Türk sağına özgü bir siyasi söylem olarak nasıl şekillendiği incelenmiştir. Bulgular, dava söyleminin tarihsel süreklilik ve kopuşlarla yeniden şekillenerek, ulusal dava (milliyetçilik) ve İslami dava (ümmeçilik) arasında güçlü bir ilişki oluşturduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. İlaveten, devletin korunması, hem ideolojik hem de siyasi bağlamda dava söyleminin merkezinde yer almış ve söylem, ulusal kimlik ile dini değerlerin bütünleşmesini sağlamıştır. Araştırma, dava söyleminin modernleşme, laiklik ve ulus-devlet ideolojisi bağlamındaki dönüşümünü ele alarak, günümüz Türk siyasal iklimindeki etkilerini açıklamaktadır. Ayrıca, modernleşme, sekülerleşme ve ulus-devlet ideolojisinin getirdiği zorluklara yanıt olarak dava söyleminin nasıl uyum sağladığını ve dönüştüğünü de detaylı bir şekilde ilişkilendirmektedir. Sonuç olarak, araştırma dava söyleminin modern Türk siyasi ikliminin şekillenmesindeki önemli rolünü ortaya koymakta ve Milli Görüş Hareketi bağlamında din ile milliyetçiliğin nasıl kesiştiğine dair derinlemesine bir anlayış sunmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İdeoloji, İslamcılık, Dava, Milli Görüş Hareketi.

## INTRODUCTION

Chilton (2005) emphasizes a fundamental distinction in defining discourse. According to Chilton, discourse is conceptualized as the use of language or language in use, thus indicating a clear separation between language and discourse. Today, social and political studies focus extensively on multilingualism, demonstrating that language use establishes belief and thought systems within societies, constructs related socio-cultural structures, and organizes the hierarchy of asymmetrical power relations. Returning to the theoretical background, Gramsci (1986) explains the hierarchy of power relations and the struggle to establish hegemony in Marxist political theory through the constructive mission of discourse via ideology. Thus, it is understood that attitudes and approaches to language cannot be limited solely to language as a means of communication (Blackedge, 2005, p. 134).

The link between language and ideology is closely associated with the emergence of new spaces shaped by nation-state ideology. The perceptive connection between language and nation creates new contexts that allow discourse to be articulated with different ideologies. In this respect, hegemony, national consciousness, and identity construction can be linked to discourse. The importance of a shared sense of belonging in the construction of national identities is underscored, and more specifically, the primary reason underlying political organizations aligning with nation-state ideology is the use of language within the intersection of discourse and ideology (Blackedge, 2005, p. 41). According to Althusser (2000, p. 43), ideology materializes through language, thereby forming its content and structure. In this sense, it reflects the establishment or institutionalization of the political sphere through subjects constructed as a result of cognitive processes.

Discourse fundamentally expresses the reality of the world in which individuals live through the meaningful interpretation of language in social and political contexts (Wodak, 2001, p. 65; Durna and Kubilay, 2010, p. 489). In this context, the concept of discourse related to the "Da'wah" becomes significant as it denotes a level of consciousness that enables Muslim societies to organize and preserve themselves. According to Dijk (2008, p. 115-118), discourse can be analyzed by examining its relationship with belief and thought systems and their transformations. This is Da'wah; theoretically, discourse constructs and influences social and political reality. The emphasis Dijk places here is on the constructive mission of discourse through its intellectual and historical dimensions. Therefore, it becomes necessary to interpret the contextual processes that represent and share all meanings embedded in social memory. The contextual knowledge in which discourse emerges holds great importance. The foundation of these analyses lies in situating historical continuity and ruptures, and in basing assumptions on language and culture, ideology, and power structures. The notion that knowledge not experienced a priori does not define social practices or include action-determining images does

not imply that it cannot be considered an empirical finding (Laclou, 1998, p. 114-115). Saussure (1998, p. 74) suggests that a discourse can display ruptures, and by breaking from its context, it may be radically affected by the historical process, thus implying that meanings can change through language, reconstructing reality in social and political spheres.

Based on this theoretical framework, it is understood that examining the intellectual and historical roots of the Da'wah discourse also reveals the contexts of the Da'wah discourse. The definition of Da'wah discourse, contextualized historically through empirical and practical applications, indicates that local-cultural, religious, and de facto spheres influence this discourse. This, in turn, raises the question of how the Da'wah discourse, rather than representing a universal order, has evolved through the modernization process.

The motivation arising from the modernization process in Da'wah discourse has been identified as fostering national unity, independence, and patriotism, legitimizing Islamic lifestyle and rights claims in the public sphere, and aiming for power through grassroots organization. This historical finding can be traced back to the Islamic concept of revival observed in social and political life from the fifteenth century onwards, particularly as a response to Western colonialism. This also highlights the concepts of Islamic revival and Islamic organization, which materialize Da'wah discourse in language, as phenomena closely related to modernization and carrying political orientation. These phenomena are significant in terms of their intellectual and historical impact on Da'wah discourse. The de facto definition of new social and political spaces—as practical rather than ideal—relies on these phenomena. Moreover, Da'wah discourse, situated in a new spatial plane between the idea of the ummah and the citizenship construct of the nation-state ideology, has generated unique contextual knowledge, interpretations, and representations of these aspects in Turkish political life and in other Muslim societies' socio-political spheres.

The projection of the rupture in Da'wah discourse within the context of Turkish political life led to the encounter with the concept of Dava-ı Milli. The Da'wah discourse in Turkish political life, like in other Muslim societies, has generated situational and multi-layered representations through the articulation of ideologies, following the Islamic Da'wah's mission of establishing an Islamic order. The integration of national unity and independence, national and cultural nationalism, into Da'wah discourse within Turkish political life has been seen as a result of the articulation between Islamism and nation-state ideology in the historical conditions of the twentieth century.

Consequently, it is thought that this analysis may elucidate how Da'wah discourse materialized in Turkish political life, how action-determining images/representations have been interpreted as findings, and how they were produced. The cultivation of national unity, independence, and patriotism—the initial phenomenon of Da'wah discourse in the modern era—has consistently aligned with the place of Da'wah discourse in Turkish political life, as seen in the third section. Since the Tanzimat period, the issue of state continuity has been a recurring theme discussed by Islamic thinkers and prominent writers. This development has opened a path for testing the findings from previous sections and has provided explanatory clarity regarding the relationship and definition of Da'wah discourse within the ideology of Islamism.

The representation of Da'wah discourse within the Turkish right has been systematically categorized in relation to the ideological tension between Kemalism and Islamism, as evidenced by the political and social decisions from the National Freedom War to the Single Party and Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) periods. This period, in which the Islamic lifestyle and rights claims were excluded from the public sphere, saw Da'wah discourse evolve from a form of social opposition to a form of political opposition. Following the Democrat Party, the accumulation of situational and multi-layered representations marked a new phase in Da'wah discourse. This trajectory, defined as the aim of achieving power through grassroots

organization, allowed for the categorization of empirical and practical findings in Da'wah discourse.

The relationship between Da'wah discourse and the National View Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) has been established based on the phenomenon of aiming for power through grassroots organization, identified as a core finding. The National View Movement, viewed as a Da'wah movement in light of analyzed documents, emerges as the political expression of the organizing aspect within the mission of Da'wah discourse. The movement has intentionally distanced itself from a narrow definition as an opposition to secularism or anti-Islamism within the collective memory surrounding religion, politics, and society in opposition to Kemalism.

The examination of the party manifestos and primary documents of the National View Movement's affiliated political parties has been limited to the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. The significance of the National View Movement lies in its role in defining and describing the Da'wah discourse within Turkish political life, marking it as the organized political or Islamic movement within this discourse. The movement's manifestos and documents from its self-definition as a Da'wah movement in 1969 to 2007, when Erbakan's health permitted his active leadership, have been scrutinized. Consequently, the representations linked to the Turkish right have been coded as thematic codes based on the findings in the literature.

This study aims to analyze the historical development of the Da'wah discourse and the National View Movement in Turkish political life, examining its ideological, political, and social impacts. Throughout the research process, the Da'wah discourse was the central subject of analysis, focusing on how it established a pragmatic balance between Islamism and nationalism and evolved into a distinctive political discourse within the Turkish right. The findings reveal that the Da'wah discourse has been reshaped through historical continuities and ruptures, forming a strong relationship between the national cause (nationalism) and the Islamic cause (ummahism). Furthermore, the preservation of the state has been positioned at the core of the Da'wah discourse in both ideological and political contexts, facilitating the integration of national identity and religious values. The study examines the transformation of the Da'wah discourse within the frameworks of modernization, secularism, and nation-state ideology, elucidating its influence on contemporary Turkish politics. Additionally, it explores in detail how the Da'wah discourse has adapted to and transformed in response to the challenges posed by modernization, secularization, and the nation-state ideology.

### **Islamic Symbols and Discourse of Da'wah in the Literature**

Islamism took shape in the distant peripheries of the Ottoman Empire during the 18th and 19th centuries. Especially from the 1870s onward, it became a strong ideology and ideological behavior within the boundaries of the empire and at its center (Aktay, 2005, p. 71; Görgün, 2011, p. 234). The aspect of Islamism associated with modernity and its political orientation refers to its ideological nature. As an ideology, Islamism represents a political thought based on doctrine and practice, advocating divine duties and a clearly defined mission in historical writing. Through its doctrinal and practical aspects, Islamism aims to revive global civilization, tracing back to early figures like Ibn Taymiyyah (Black, 2010; Çağlayan, 2011; Peter, 2014). On the other hand, by the 19th century, Islamism was grounded in the ideal of Islamic unity under a single political central authority. In this context, it is attributed to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who believed that establishing Islamic unity across the Muslim world was the only way to resist colonialist Western powers (Karpas, 2001; Dökmeciyan, 2003). With the onset of colonial activities by Western imperial powers against Muslim communities in the Middle East, a counter-struggle emerged in the 1880s, reaching its peak in the 20th century with Islamic political organizations. By the 1900s, Islamism gained popularity as an ideology, transcending the boundaries of the Islamic world (Voll, 2014, p. 45). In 1903, the Pan-Islamic Society was founded in London by Abdullah El Sherif. Additionally, Shiites and Sunnis, often in conflict,

united under the umbrella of Islamism through publications to oppose imperial powers. In the 1920s and 1930s, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Caliphate, Islamic organizations continued their structures outside central authority. During this historical process, Islamism remained more localized and culturally focused. As a result of this historical fact, following World War II in the 1940s, the centers of Islamic thought and organizational activism shifted to Pakistan, India, and Egypt, through translation movements and various forms of organizational structures (Guidere, 2012, p. 268). The slogan of the Islamic Da'wah, "Islamic Order" or "Islamic Liberation," since the second half of the 20th century, has emphasized Islamic lifestyles and demands in the public sphere rather than Islamic unity. The integration of Islamism into broad, reactionary masses without distinguishing a specific class layer also corresponds to this recent history (Black, 2010, p. 387).

As the social classes, political, and economic institutions shaped by production relations defined by Western imperialism and the hegemony of modernization penetrated Islamic societies, legitimacy crises emerged within Islamic organizations in the 20th century due to the absence of a central authority capable of representing Islamic unity. Consequently, these legitimacy crises were addressed through historical and social elements. As Dökmeciyan (2003, p. 57) states, the rise of Islamism, based on the interpretations of revelation and Sunnah practices, began with its enveloping of national and cultural values and the consciousness-raising effect of Islam on the societal condition and identity. As Voll (2014, p. 40) highlights, it is possible to discuss the processes of Islam's politicization, pointing to the late 18th century. This situation also represents the historical roots of Islamism's alignment with the ideology of the nation-state, showcasing its political orientation, while also marking one of the modern political era's fractures in the discourse of the Da'wah.

Islamist thinkers and writers, referring to this historical process, have defined Islamism as a modern political thought. However, a fundamental distinction has been drawn; Islam is a religion, while Islamism is a political thought or movement dependent on time and space (Çağlayan, 2011, p. 60-61). Accordingly, in social and political practice, Islamism exists as an ideology on the level of discourse, with the potential to remain ambiguous, producing different representations, mentalities, and related outcomes depending on time and space.

During the late period of the Ottoman Empire, administrative disintegration and collapse against Western imperial powers gave rise to many reformist Islamist reactions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. According to Dökmeciyan (2003, p. 36), the most prominent of these movements was led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) and Rashid Rida, who advocated Pan-Islamic solidarity and local-regional resistance through a return to Islam in an environment of scientific progress (Yüce, 1988, p. 465). Concerns about establishing Islamic unity began during the reign of Abdulhamid II, prior to the abolition of the Caliphate. It was observed that autonomous mechanisms gained strength in regions far from the administrative center of the Ottoman Empire, which was weakening against the West, and that Islamic unity was also eroding internally (Karatepe, 2001, p. 53). In response to this situation, Abdulhamid invited Jamal al-Din al-Afghani to Istanbul in 1892, calling for unity to address internal divisions. However, it is said that Afghani, who came to support the Sultan-Caliph's call and Pan-Islamic policies, was actually anti-monarchist and even sought an Arab Caliphate (Karpas, 2001, p. 367-371).

Afghani, along with Abduh and Rida, represented the phenomenon of Islamic awakening and were modern Islamist figures with political identity and agency. Their primary sermons highlighted the technological and cultural superiority of the West and its impact on Islamic states and societies. Historically, Western imperialism's colonial activities in the Islamic world continued even after World War II, leading to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. All these reactions and motivations, which shaped the discourse of the Da'wah, were represented by modern Islamism, which adapted Afghani's religious principles to political,

social, and economic realms according to the times and its own tendencies. Additionally, traces of Afghani's thought can be observed in another anecdote. Following the abolition of the Caliphate, Rashid Rida (in 1935) proposed a new type of caliphate model. According to this view, a joint authority assumed by the authorized representatives of the Islamic community was advocated. The Islamic state was described as the best of all states and was argued to be good not only for Muslims but for all humanity. Rida's political model envisioned that the Islamic state would "ensure equality, respect everyone's interests, establish good governance, and prohibit evil (...) thus providing a solution to the social calamities inherited from atheistic materialistic governments confined to Bolshevism and anarchy" (Merad, 1993, p. 67). These ideas laid the groundwork for party-like organizations and Islamic movements with Islamic references in the 20th century.

However, the historical and intellectual rupture marked by the abolition of the Caliphate was the elimination of the idea of centralized unity. The regulatory and adaptive positive normative and institutional structure of the nation-state ideology became dominant over Islamism, and the ideal of an Islamic state was replaced by political authority that would govern with Islamic references. As Merad (1993, p. 63-65) noted, for centuries, Ottoman sultans presented themselves as caliphs. These sultan-caliphs not only managed the political affairs of the empire but also undertook religious duties as defenders of Islam and its Da'wah. Due to these characteristics, they were widely regarded as unique leaders within the Islamic community. However, following Sultan-Caliph Abdulhamid II, the representation of the Pan-Islamic ideal could not be centrally embodied in any organization. A significant rupture in the Islamic world occurred with the Wahhabi uprising, where the Saudi clan seized and controlled important holy lands, disrupting the Caliphate's policies under Ottoman rule. According to Rejwan (2000, p. 251), Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab's (1703-1792) significance lies in having prepared a crisis environment with the Wahhabi movement, which would later evolve into the ideology of the nation-state in the Islamic world (Hilmi, 1974, p. 603-605).

As a result of the historical erosion of the moral foundations of the Ottoman Empire, the Grand National Assembly decided on November 2, 1922, to abolish the Sultanate, followed by the abolition of the Caliphate on March 3, 1924, to eliminate the traces of defeat from the newly established Republic of Turkey. This decision, recorded as one of the most revolutionary and radical in the political history of the Islamic world, was made within the framework of the logic of nation-state ideology (Merad, 1993, p. 66). According to Dökmeciyan (1980, p. 2), the secular and constitutionally safeguarded sovereignty of the nation-state, centered on citizens, Da'wahd a crisis for Islamism as an ideology. Consequently, sovereignty reached a level of representation that transcended its physical existence, achieving an encompassing abstract entity, which led to an erosion of the conceptual world of Islamism. The idea of a transnational ummah became impossible. Thus, the end of the Ottoman Caliphate and the abolition of the Caliphate institution Da'wah Islamic organizations to lose their central authority, leading them to become entangled in ethnic and local socio-cultural elements. For this reason, nation-state ideology subjected Islamism, a significant fabric of which was the ummah, to a crisis, compressing it into decentralized organizations with a "nativist" and localist character.

During the Republican era, "dava-ı milli" (the national Da'wah), symbolizing national sovereignty, became an expression of the Da'wah discourse in Turkish political life with the proclamation of the new regime. Through "dava-ı milli," the Da'wah discourse diverged from the representation and rhetoric of the Islamic Da'wah, which aimed at the dominance of a universal Islamic order, as it did in other Muslim societies. In Turkish political life, the Da'wah discourse was now ready to produce its situational and multi-faceted representations with its specific values. In this context, "dava-ı milli" provided a unity of discourse. In Turkish political life, it played a crucial role in fostering national solidarity, democratic social-political opposition, and the attainment of power. Additionally, it explained the alignment of Islamism with the nation-state ideology and its analysis as the dominant ideology of social-political

opposition. "Dava-ı milli" emerged in Turkish political life as a result of the historical process of the Da'wah discourse's division into local-cultural and religious de facto domains in the 20th century. Within the context of its motivations, the Da'wah discourse also reflected the struggle against anti-imperialism, which necessitated defining its new spatial dimensions with specific boundaries through the integration of Islamism and nation-state ideology. The Caliphate, deeply connected with the past and Islamism, was also considered during the transition to the Republican era. The necessity of abolishing the Caliphate arose with the proclamation of the Republic and the establishment of a new Turkey based on nation-state ideology and nationalism. Islamism and the ummah, which contradicted the ideology and sovereignty framework of the nation-state, always became an "other" for the new ideology.

On November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly decided to abolish the Sultanate. Decisions regarding the Caliphate institution were deferred, given the recognized importance of Islamism during the national struggle (Lewis, 1988, p. 258-260). It was thought that the spiritual and emotional ties to the Sultanate and Caliphate were felt socially and politically and even within the Assembly. Moreover, the cultural belief that only an esteemed authority could govern led to no haste concerning the Caliphate institution. However, despite the presence of opposition politics within the Assembly, Islamism, the Caliphate institution, and the Sultanate continued to create political crises for the nation-state beyond its borders. Although the institutional ties of the Caliphate had significantly weakened, it was always understood that its ideological existence continued throughout the Islamic world (Ahmad, 1995, p. 76). For this reason, a decisive action was deemed necessary by Mustafa Kemal and government cadres. The abolition of the Sultanate aligned with national sovereignty and paved the way for the abolition of the Caliphate. As Tunaya (2007, p. 140) stated, for Islamists, the social and political power of the Islamist movement, which rose with the Constitutional Era, was eliminated, and with the proclamation of the Republic, the representation of opposition was embraced by Islamists. Islamist reactions spread across religion, politics, and society in Turkish political life during the Republican era.

Chronologically, key reforms such as the Law on the Hat (1925), the Law on the Closure of Dervish Lodges, Shrines, and the Prohibition of Certain Titles (1925), the designation of Sunday instead of Friday as the weekly holiday, the adoption of a new time system (1925), the adoption of the Calendar Change (1926), the acceptance of the Turkish Civil Code (1926), the adoption of international numerals (1926), the adoption of the Latin alphabet (1926), and the removal of Arabic and Persian languages from educational programs (1929) specifically targeted Islamic lifestyles and the role of religion in public life, as stated by Kara (2009, p. 32). Among these reforms, the institutionalization of religious and worship-related matters under the Directorate of Religious Affairs, affiliated with the Prime Ministry in 1924, is considered the most significant. In the subsequent process, by 1928, the phrase "the religion of the state is Islam" was removed from the constitution, and in 1937, the principle of "secularism" was enshrined as an unchangeable article of the constitution (Tunçay, 2009, p. 92).

On January 30, 1932, for the first time, the call to prayer (adhan) was recited in Turkish rather than Arabic at Istanbul's Fatih Mosque. Muslims flocked to mosques to witness such an event for the first time, and the press at the time featured headlines informing the public about which mosque and which reciter would perform the Turkish adhan. By 1941, the recitation of the adhan in Arabic was prohibited under the Turkish Penal Code. Until the Democratic Party era, strict supervision over public manifestations of Islamic life was enforced under this law. During the transition to multi-party politics, many political parties included promises in their programs and declarations to make Islamic practices in public life more viable, particularly concerning the recitation of the adhan in Arabic. This issue of the Turkish adhan became a focal point linked to the single-party era (Ayhan & Uzun, 1995, p. 40).

Positivism and secularism emerged as the central axis of the tension between Islamism and Kemalism in the modernization process of Turkish politics. The general framework of the representations of the discourse of the Da'wah, within the context of religion, politics, and society, has also been defined in collective memory as "irreligion, opposition to religion, or anti-Islamism." Among these two main concepts, which signify an epistemological and ontological rupture, secularism has been interpreted as the renewal of social norms through secularization, the elimination of religious sensitivities from society, and the subordination of religion to the state. In envisioning a secular Turkey, the founding cadres' approach to modernization not through a Western historical perspective but through a historicist positivist perspective, defining it as a universal category, played a decisive role (Kurtoglu, 2005, p. 205–206). In this context, Kemalism adopted the discourse of creating a new secular, modern, and Westernized Turkish identity and the unfragmented, homogenous, and harmonious unity of the Turkish nation. Thus, the place of religion within the nation-state ideology under Kemalism was left ambiguous and uncertain. The newly established institutional structures of the nation-state ideology had to derive their legitimacy by overcoming the tension with traditional institutions linked to Islam. It was envisioned that Islamic practices would be confined to the private sphere, where ambiguous and undefined boundaries could be drawn (Çelik, 2009, p. 87). Kemalism positioned itself against religion within the context of societal conditions. It was intended to be engaged in a stance of hostility toward religion, and Kemalism, which embodied the republican reforms, was perceived by Islamists as closely related to opposition to religion. This perception stemmed from the radical nature of the reforms implemented during the single-party era.

Since the proclamation of the Republic, the process of the emergence of the discourse of the Da'wah has facilitated the Turkish right's entry into the political platform, which was trapped between these dualities. From the single-party period onward, the accumulation of social opposition, coupled with the integration of ideology and discourse, sought a form of political opposition. The transformation of Islamic practices in the public sphere into a struggle for rights opened the way for political movements to organize according to their own unique values. While the establishment of the Democratic Party and the transition to a multi-party system enabled its rise to power, it is not possible to define the Democratic Party as an Islamist party. However, the significance of the Democratic Party for the Turkish right lies in its ability to enable Islamist movements to organize from the grassroots, find opportunities for Islamic practices in the public sphere, and secure rights. According to Mardin (1991, p. 31), as the social opposition that began in the 1940s spread, Islamist groups gained ground both within the ruling party and opposition parties by 1948. Although the Democratic Party stood out due to the historical connection established between its rise to power and the transition to a multi-party system, many political parties favoring traditionalism, which garnered strong support from Islamists, were established during the same period. Among these, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) became a focal point of interest for Islamists. The inclusion of religious education in schools and the establishment of theological schools were explicitly stated in the Nation Party's program (Edip, 1950, p. 7). However, despite not evolving into strong political opposition against republican reforms, Islamists found a moderate outlet within the consolidated structure of the Democratic Party. The concessions made regarding secular policies during the single-party period between 1945 and 1950 were achieved through this process.

The first issue addressed during the Democratic Party's tenure was the amendment of regulations concerning the recitation of the adhan (call to prayer) in Arabic. After 18 years of being recited in Turkish since Ramadan in 1932, the adhan was once again recited in Arabic during Ramadan in 1950. Within Democratic Party circles, the practice of reciting the adhan in Turkish was seen as being fundamentally incompatible with the conscience of society. For Adnan Menderes, the leader of the Democratic Party who was referred to as the "savior of Islam," certain republican reforms had not taken root. In Islamic literature, the issue was referred to as "the great day of judgment that would separate the faithful from the faithless,"



marking May 14 as such a day (Edip, 1950, p. 3). On June 16, 1950, with the Menderes government officially reinstating the recitation of the adhan in Arabic, the Democratic Party was greatly exalted by Islamist publications and circles. This event, referred to as a demonstration of the "Turkish nation's loyalty to its faith" and the "victory of the ummah," was followed by the lifting of radio broadcasting bans on July 5, 1950, which allowed for Quranic recitations to be broadcast on the radio.

The rejection of traditionalism, idealized through a new approach to religious education, encompassed matters beyond "headscarves" and mosques, framing institutions like Imam Hatip schools as formal educational entities within the public domain. This context, considering the political and social contradictions within Turkish right-wing politics, demonstrates how the discourse of the Da'wah has served as a strong representation across all eras for political parties on the right.

In the 1930s, 29 Imam Hatip schools were opened in Turkey; however, their number dwindled over time due to insufficient demand, leading to their eventual closure (Eski, 1991, p. 14). After the unification of education and instruction, religious courses were included in school curricula. By 1932, religious education at the middle school level was removed, and in 1935, it was entirely abolished from all schools (Turan, 1999, p. 101). Until 1948, religious education was not officially provided in Imam Hatip schools or any other schools. Starting from the 1950s, coinciding with the rise of Islamism during the transition to multi-party politics, a notable increase in Imam Hatip schools was observed. Initially, 8–10-month religious education courses and Imam Hatip courses were established by Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) deputies. By 1951, with the efforts of Celalettin Ökten, the Democratic Party government approved the establishment of Imam Hatip schools, institutionalizing and expanding religious education (Akşit & Coşkun, 2005, p. 398–400).

As institutions of religious education, Imam Hatip schools were seen by Islamists as the true framework for Islamic revival in Turkish political life. These schools, along with foundations like the Imam Hatip School Building Associations and the determination of families to send their children to these schools, became a central agenda item for right-wing political parties from the 1960s and particularly in the 1970s, especially within the context of anti-Communism. While the official ideology and rigidly secular political parties defined them as institutions that trained "militants, mujahideen, and individuals devoted to the Da'wah" for the establishment of a "theocratic state," some Islamist circles and strict religious orders viewed them as institutions within the Kemalist system producing "enlightened religious scholars." Among these circles, there was even a claim that prayers performed behind "state-trained imams" were invalid (Akşit & Coşkun, 2005, p. 394). This perspective originated from the purpose outlined in the Law on the Unification of Education, which aimed to "establish a faculty of theology within Darülfünun to train experts in religious sciences and open separate schools to train officials responsible for performing religious duties such as imamate and preaching" (Çakır, Bozan & Talu, 2004, p. 57).

Since the 1960s, the attitude shaped by the discourse of the Da'wah has determined the political reactions and organizational movements of Islamists (Taşkın, 2008, p. 618). With the representation of Turkish right-wing politics by the Democratic Party and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) coming under debate among nationalist and Islamist circles, new political movements emerged, advocating statist, developmentalist, local-cultural, and national values (Akın & Coşkun, 2017, p. 9).

In the general framework of political life and institutions, defining the Turkish right has been challenging. The primary reason for this is that the right in Turkish political life, as an extension of a tradition, has been trapped between dualities such as progressive-regressive and secular-Islamist. However, examining the discourse of the Da'wah within Turkish political life reveals that Islamism and the spatial dimensions of the Da'wah discourse cannot be narrowly confined

to the ideological and discursive framework of the Turkish right. The process of the emergence of the Da'wah discourse since the proclamation of the Republic has enabled the Turkish right, squeezed between these dualities, to enter the political platform. Since the single-party period, the accumulation of social opposition through the integration of ideology and discourse has sought a form of political opposition. The transformation of Islamic practices in the public sphere into a struggle for rights has paved the way for political movements to organize according to their own unique values. The National Vision Movement represents these political movements, initially finding space within the Democratic Party during the transition to multi-party politics and later consolidating under a unified structure, such as the Justice Party, after May 27 (Mısıroğlu, 1979, p. 3).

### **The National View Movement in Turkish Political Life**

The ideological foundation of the discourse of Da'wah has led to the National View Movement's emergence as a Da'wah-driven initiative representing the Turkish right. Necmettin Erbakan's slogan, "creating a nationalist and sacred Turkey," during his candidacy in the 1969 elections, has been deemed significant in establishing the movement's representation of the Turkish right (Sarıbay, 2008, p. 576). The political transformations during the Democrat Party era enabled social segments with Islamic lifestyles to transition into political life as civil society elements through Islamic sects and communities. Although the Justice Party, which came to power in the 1965 Turkish General Elections, maintained its government despite a decline in its vote share, it lost its position as the overarching party of the Turkish right.

The alignment of nationalist-ideological masses with the Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), coupled with the Justice Party's focus on liberal-economic priorities, paved the way for Islamic movements and their social base to diverge from the Justice Party. This divergence resulted in the formation of a more effective and socially grounded political party with a distinct constituency (Çakır, 1995, p. 215-216).

The establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) marked the emergence of a political party in Turkish political life that brought religious issues referencing Islam and public demands for Islamic lifestyle rights into the realm of political legitimacy. In a public speech in 1970, Necmettin Erbakan highlighted the connection between the discourse of Da'wah within the Turkish right and the National View Movement (Yorgancılar, 2012, p. 428). Positioned in direct opposition to official ideologies such as Westernization, Kemalism, and secularism, the National Order Party became the far-right extension of the center-right. Erbakan's independent and oppositional stance in the political sphere also brought his power struggle with Süleyman Demirel into the open. Despite applying to run as a Konya Member of Parliament under the Justice Party led by Süleyman Demirel in the 1969 Turkish General Elections, Erbakan's candidacy was vetoed by the party (Yorgancılar, 2012, p. 53). This veto was attributed to Erbakan's strong emphasis on moral and religious values. The National View and Erbakan's Da'wah-oriented discourse became a new center of power, signifying its organizational consolidation as a political party and mass movement (Çakır, 2011, p. 545). However, the consolidation of Kemalism following the March 12, 1971, memorandum led to the closure of the National Order Party (Bulaç, 2009, p. 110). Sarıbay (2008, p. 579) described the March 12 period as characterized by "the bureaucracy asserting its dominance over the government, carrying traces of Kemalist ideology."

The National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) was established on October 11, 1972, as the successor to the National Order Party and the second political party of the National View Movement. It can be stated that the National Order Party frequently referred to the representations of the Da'wah in terms of ideology and discourse. However, compared to the National Salvation Party (MSP), it presented Islamism in a more conciliatory manner within the

context of Kemalism and secularism. This approach, which would later culminate in a coalition between the Republican People's Party and the National Salvation Party, was also partly shaped by the brief experiences of the National Order Party. A rigid Islamist stance against Westernization, Kemalism, and secularism had resulted in negative outcomes.

From its inception, the influence and support of Necip Fazıl were evident both in the declarations of the National Salvation Party and in the speeches of Necmettin Erbakan (Çaha and Baykal, 2017, p. 793). However, the coalition period was perceived as a retreat of the discourse of the Da'wah in the face of the nation-state ideology. The subdued representation of the Da'wah within the Turkish right left the National View Movement in a challenging position in subsequent elections. Nevertheless, the ability to adapt to political circumstances proved limited against the founding and organizing mission of the discourse of the Da'wah. Süleyman Arif Emre, the first chairman of the National Salvation Party, summarized this situation by highlighting the structural transformation in Turkish political life, the dissolution of mainstream mass parties, and the significance of the ideologically driven organization of the National View Movement (Sarıbay, 2008, p. 580).

The Jerusalem Rally, which led to the prosecution of National Salvation Party leaders in the martial law courts following the September 12 coup, stands as a vivid expression of a strong consciousness of the Da'wah in Turkish political history. The rally reflected the significant influence of a grassroots movement driven by an Islamic lifestyle, which brought radical changes and targeted political power within the Muslim communities of the period (Çakır, 2013, p. 759). The rally became historic for slogans such as "Sharia or Death," "Islamic State," and "One Caliph, One State, One Nation" (Ahmad, 2007, p. 495-496).

Before the September 12 coup, the National View Movement, which strongly emphasized the discourse of the Da'wah, sought to integrate Islamism into political life as an independent path. However, in the post-September 12 period, it disciplined its organization to function not as an Islamic movement but rather as a political party with Islamic ideas (Tekin and Akgün, 2011, p. 659).

Following these developments, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) gained significant momentum, with Necmettin Erbakan assuming the position of party chairman in 1987. In the 1995 Turkish General Elections, the Welfare Party emerged as the leading political party, securing power. Particularly in the 1994 Turkish Local Elections, the strategies it employed—rooted in its ideology, Da'wah consciousness, and legitimacy derived from its Da'wah-oriented methods—paved the way for its success in the general elections. Historically, the Welfare Party marked a turning point for the discourse of the Da'wah within the Turkish right, transitioning from advocating for Islamic lifestyle rights in the public sphere to grassroots organizing and achieving political power.

Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, who possessed a strong charismatic appeal, the Welfare Party brought a significant representation of the discourse of the Da'wah to the forefront of Turkish right-wing politics. Among its primary agenda items, the "headscarf" or "turban" issue gained prominence, reflecting the party's stance. Positioned within the tensions between Kemalism and secularism, Islamism sought to chart a distinct course, detaching itself from the nation-state ideology through heightened social and political mobilizations. However, the methods and rhetoric of the Welfare Party and its leader, deemed "contrary to the revolutionary laws" and "violating the principle of secularism," ultimately led to the party's closure in 1998 (Çakır, 1994).

In anticipation of the potential closure of the Welfare Party in 1997, another party affiliated with the National View Movement, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), was established under the leadership of İsmail Altpekin. However, the Virtue Party, which had a relatively short lifespan, also faced closure due to the "headscarf" issue, framed through debates on reactionaryism and

religious extremism. The catalyst for its closure was Istanbul MP Merve Kavakçı's appearance in the parliamentary oath-taking ceremony wearing a headscarf. Despite this, the Virtue Party explicitly declared its principle of "prioritizing human rights in matters of secularism" emphasizing the right of individuals to believe and live as they wish, as long as they do not infringe on the rights of others (Fazilet Partisi 1999 Seçim Beyannamesi, p. 39).

Following the February 28 process and Necmettin Erbakan's political ban, Virtue Party Chairman Recai Kutan engaged in dialogues with Western countries, institutions, and organizations to challenge the domestic perception of "reactionaryism." However, the grievances stemming from the February 28 process did not yield significant results in the 1999 political elections. The Virtue Party lagged far behind its political ascent during the Welfare Party era, finishing as the third party after the Democratic Left Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (Çakır, 2013, p. 774-775).

The Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), the most recent and current political party of the National View Movement, was established in 2001 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, with the emblem of a "crescent and five stars." Recai Kutan was appointed as the party's first chairman. Following the closure of the Virtue Party, its members of parliament joined the Felicity Party, although the party failed to achieve significant success in subsequent elections. In 2008, Numan Kurtulmuş became the party's chairman, but in an extraordinary congress held shortly before his passing in 2010, Necmettin Erbakan was re-elected as chairman.

Çakır (2013, p. 776) notes that the historical trajectory of political parties affiliated with the National View Movement indicates that an anti-system Islamist movement cannot sustain itself in Turkey, and such political parties associated with the National View Movement do not pursue such an aim. In response to the exclusion of the representation of communities embracing traditional and Islamic lifestyles since the establishment of the Republic, the National View Movement's organization of its cadres has been observed as a reflection of its grassroots mobilization efforts aiming for political power.

### **Method and Key Findings**

The methodology of the study is based on descriptive and explanatory qualitative research methods. The central question is, how does ideology manifest itself, and in what forms does it become visible in the everyday practices of political life? This question is considered the methodological core question required by qualitative methods. The research question, in turn, is derived by tailoring the methodological question to the specific subject and purpose of the study: What are the representations that frame the discourse of the Da'wah within the Turkish right, and through what means do these representations embody the ideology?

In this context, the historical trajectory of the discourse was first constructed through the concept of "Da'wah." A conscious framework was developed from the sequence of events, revealing how the Da'wah transformed into a discourse. The qualitative method of the research transitioned from descriptiveness to an explanatory phase. At this stage, the Da'wah was addressed as a discourse based on its historical and intellectual background, and causal relationships that influence Turkish political life through its ruptures were established.

These causal relationships, aligned with the research question, facilitated the creation of the research design, which is a sub-phase of the methodology. Accordingly, the research transitioned from situational determination of the reality of events and phenomena to their interpretation. The objects of analysis were identified to address the need for obtaining research data. Accordingly, General Election Manifestos, viewed as historical texts and recorded documents, were selected as objects of analysis. A chronological arrangement was made to ensure data consistency and depth. Based on the historical analyses that formed the background, the objects of analysis were categorized and standardized. Repeated data were eliminated, and

expressions unrelated to the context of the discourse of the Da'wah, the main focus of the study, were excluded.

Since 1969, the political texts of the National View Movement's affiliated political parties, as well as those of the movement's leader Necmettin Erbakan, have been classified as objects of analysis. As a result of these classifications, 1,109 reference data points have been obtained.

However, it should be noted that; the method employed in this study goes beyond a simple frequency analysis of concepts within the discourse; instead, it aims to uncover the critical aspect of the discourse and identify action-determining images. Rather than merely measuring how often certain concepts appear, the analysis focuses on the contexts in which these concepts are used, the semantic relationships they establish, and the ideological framework they construct. Specifically, within the Da'wah discourse, the study examines how certain images and forms of representation contribute to shaping an ideological structure and how this structure guides political actions. Accordingly, this study does not merely provide a descriptive analysis of the discourse but also evaluates its structural and action-oriented dimensions to reveal its ideological framework.

After obtaining the raw data, the qualitative research software NVivo 12 was utilized to perform correlations on the data. Content and structural congruence, measured using the Jaccard coefficient, were deemed significant as they approached a value of 1 on a scale from 0 to 1. Positive relationships were sought within the correlation analysis. Representations of the discourse of the Da'wah, as expressed in everyday practices, were also examined through a comparative method during the descriptive phase.

The primary reason for choosing the Jaccard correlation coefficient in this study is to measure the degree of similarity between representations and ideological elements within the discourse and to identify the commonly used conceptual frameworks. The Jaccard coefficient calculates the ratio of intersection and union between data sets, allowing for an assessment of content and structural consistency. This enables an analysis of how the Da'wah discourse has evolved over different periods, which concepts have been consistently used, and whether the discourse maintains ideological continuity. Particularly in discourse analyses conducted on historical documents and political texts, the Jaccard correlation provides a powerful method for revealing the extent to which specific themes have been preserved or transformed over time. In this regard, the methodology of the research consisted of multiple stages, historical analysis, situational assessment, document-based conceptual and discourse analysis, and explanatory methods.

### **The Thematic Hierarchy and Conceptual Coordinates of the Da'wah Discourse**

The thematic hierarchy presented in the table reveals the fundamental structures and themes embedded within political, rhetorical, and ideological discourses. Each main category (Political Discourse, Rhetorical Discourse, and Ideological Discourse) represents a unique yet interconnected dimension of thought, ideology, and societal influence. This thematic categorization allows for a better understanding and analysis of the related discourses. Political discourse emphasizes the interplay between religious, cultural, and political ideologies. The subcategories in this framework reflect an effort to balance Islamic principles with socio-political realities. For instance, Religious and Cultural Elements such as Arabic, Adhan (Call to Prayer), Hagia Sophia, and Jerusalem represent symbolic and spiritual aspects that form the backbone of the discourse. Within the context of Spiritual Path and Guidance, themes such as Sirat al-Mustaqim (The Straight Path), Virtue, Welfare, and Salvation emphasize the need for individual and societal guidance. The Social Solidarity and Identity subcategory highlights concepts like Unity, Nationalism, and Ummah, bringing the importance of social cohesion and identity construction to the forefront. In the domain of Political Ideology and Governance, concepts such as Kemalism, Secularism, Democracy, and National Will reflect the quest for

balance within the modern state structure. Rhetorical discourse showcases a structure that blends historical and political contexts with religious concepts. Themes like Caliphate, Jihad, and Independence represent the understanding of Islamic leadership and struggle within historical contexts, while concepts such as Mujahid, Virtue, and Prophetic Traditions (Hadith) act as carriers of cultural and spiritual values. The Organization and Solidarity subcategory represents the quest for Islamic organization and political authority. Modern Ideological Criticisms, including Anti-Zionism, Anti-Capitalism, and Anti-Communism, illustrate the discourse's critiques of the modern world order. Ideological Goals, such as Proclamation of God's Word (Ila-i Kalimatullah), Monotheism (Tawhid), and Order, combine religious and societal aims. Ideological discourse provides an understanding that integrates Islamic Da'wah and Ideology with social and global struggles. Da'wah, the Islamic Da'wah, and Islamic Revival reflect the revival and existential purpose of the Islamic community, while Social and Global Struggles, including Anti-Imperialism, East and West, and Islamic Unity, contextualize global struggles and conflicts. In the dimension of Education and Raising Generations, themes like Religious Education, Imam Hatip Schools, and Education represent a vision for building the future. The Political and Social Organization subcategory, through concepts like Preservation of the State, National Da'wah, and Indigenous and National Values, targets the preservation of traditional values and the continuity of the political order. These findings explain the thematic connections between discourses and the ideological foundations of the concepts. The analysis demonstrates that political, rhetorical, and ideological discourses interact with one another and play a significant role in shaping social order.

Main Category	Subcategory	Related Concepts and Descriptions
<b>Political Discourse</b>	Religious and Cultural Elements	Arabic, Adhan (Call to Prayer), Hagia Sophia, Jerusalem
	Spiritual Path and Guidance	Sirat al-Mustaqim (The Straight Path), Virtue, Welfare, Salvation
	Social Solidarity and Identity	Unity, Nationalism, Ummah
	Political Ideology and Governance	Kemalism, Secularism, Democracy, National Will
	Slogans of the National Vision Movement	Islamic Unity, State, Freedom
	Justice and Criticisms	Justice, Western Imitation, Criticism of Westernization
	Islamic Life and Order	Islamic Faith, Islamic Way of Life, Islamic Order
<b>Rhetorical Discourse</b>	Historical and Political Context	Caliphate, Jihad, Independence
	Cultural and Spiritual Values	Mujahid (Fighter for Islam), Virtue, Prophetic Traditions (Hadith)
	Organization and Solidarity	Organization and Authority, Islamic Organization
	Modern Ideological Criticisms	Anti-Zionism, Anti-Capitalism, Anti-Communism
	Ideological Goals	Proclamation of God's Word (Ila-i Kalimatullah), Monotheism (Tawhid), Order
<b>Ideological Discourse</b>	Islamic Da'wah and Ideology	Da'wah, Islamic Da'wah, Islamic Revival
	Social and Global Struggles	Anti-Imperialism, East and West, Islamic Unity
	Education and Raising Generations	Religious Education, Imam Hatip Schools, Education
	Political and Social Organization	Preservation of the State, National Da'wah, Indigenous and National Values

**Table 1.** The Thematic Hierarchy and Conceptual Framework of the National View Movement's Da'wah Discourse

The discourse of the National Vision Movement is deeply rooted in religious and cultural elements, emphasizing Islamic identity and values such as Sirat al-Mustaqim (The Straight Path), Islamic faith, Islamic way of life, Islamic order, monotheism (Tawhid), and the proclamation of God's word (Ila-i Kalimatullah). Historical and spiritual symbols like Arabic, the call to prayer (Adhan), Hagia Sophia, Jerusalem, the caliphate, jihad, and the figure of the

Mujahid (fighter for Islam) further reinforce this identity. Social solidarity and identity play a critical role, with concepts like unity, the Ummah, nationalism, and indigenous and national values highlighting community integration. These are supported by notions of organization and authority, as well as Islamic organization, reflecting the movement's emphasis on structured solidarity. Politically, the movement engages with governance and ideology through concepts such as Kemalism, secularism, democracy, national will, and justice, while offering critiques of Western imitation, Westernization, anti-Zionism, anti-capitalism, and anti-communism. The slogans of the National Vision Movement, such as Islamic unity, state, and freedom, encapsulate its aspirations, complemented by its ideological goals of national Da'wah, Islamic Da'wah, and Islamic revival. The movement also prioritizes education and generational development through religious education and Imam Hatip schools. Its global and social struggles are evident in its opposition to imperialism, its framing of the East-West dynamic, and its calls for independence and Islamic unity. Finally, the historical and rhetorical context of the movement is grounded in a framework of historical symbols and ideological narratives, including the caliphate, jihad, and independence, which collectively shape its vision and discourse.

### Correlation Analysis of Nationalism and Ummahism in Turkish Right-Wing Political Discourse

The discourse of the Turkish right-wing, often referred to as the "discourse of the Da'wah", represents a synthesis of two foundational ideological components, nationalism and Islamism. This synthesis aims to establish a cohesive ideological framework by merging the principles of national independence and Islamic solidarity. Through correlation analyses using Jaccard coefficients, the relationships between key ideological components are quantified, providing insight into the structural dynamics of this discourse.

Code A	Code B	Jaccard's Coefficient
National Da'wah	Da'wah	0.951839
Islamic Da'wah	Da'wah	0.881478
Islamic Da'wah	National Da'wah	0.822155

**Table 2.** The Relationship Between National Da'wah, Islamic Da'wah, and General Da'wah

The data reveal a near-complete overlap between the National Da'wah and the broader Da'wah, as evidenced by a Jaccard coefficient of 0.951839. This high correlation underscores the centrality of national independence and state preservation within the overarching of the Da'wah discourse. Similarly, the 0.881478 correlation between the Islamic Da'wah and the Da'wah highlights the pivotal role of Islamic values in shaping the discourse of the Turkish right. The 0.822155 correlation between the Islamic Da'wah and the National Da'wah demonstrates the successful integration of Islamic principles into the framework of national independence. These relationships confirm that the discourse effectively balances national and religious priorities, creating a unique ideological synthesis.

Code A	Code B	Jaccard's Coefficient
Ummahism	Nationalism	0.803782

**Table 3.** The Relationship Between Ummahism and Nationalism

The correlation coefficient of 0.803782 indicates a strong relationship between ummahism and nationalism. While ummahism promotes solidarity among Muslim communities globally, nationalism emphasizes the protection and promotion of the Turkish national identity. The strong correlation suggests that these two ideologies are not contradictory but are complementary components within the broader discourse. Particularly within the National View Movement, these ideologies are harmonized through shared references to history, culture, and faith.

Code A	Code B	Jaccard's Coefficient
Nationalism	Islamic Unity	0.625
Islamic Unity	Unity	0.571429
Ummahism	Unity	0.571429

**Table 4.** The Relationship Between Nationalism, Islamic Unity, and Unity

The relationship between nationalism and Islamic unity, with a coefficient of 0.625, reflects a moderate alignment. While nationalism prioritizes a sovereign Turkish identity, Islamic unity represents a transnational solidarity among Muslim nations. The moderate correlation suggests that nationalism occasionally incorporates elements of Islamic unity, especially during periods of heightened geopolitical pressure on Muslim nations. The equal correlation of 0.571429 between Islamic unity, ummahism, and unity signifies a shared vision of collective solidarity within the discourse.

Code A	Code B	Jaccard's Coefficient
State Preservation	National Da'wah	0.886106

**Table 5.** The Relationship Between State Preservation and National Da'wah

The strong correlation (0.886106) between State Preservation and the National Da'wah underscores the centrality of the state as a core value within Turkish right-wing discourse. The concept of state preservation resonates deeply within the *dava söylemi*, serving as a unifying theme that aligns both religious and nationalistic priorities. This relationship reinforces the importance of safeguarding state sovereignty as a critical pillar of both national and religious ideologies.

The correlation analysis highlights the nuanced interplay between nationalism and Islamism in the Turkish right-wing discourse. The high degree of integration between these ideologies reflects a pragmatic approach to addressing both domestic and international challenges. This synthesis allows the discourse to adapt to varying political and social contexts, ensuring its relevance across different historical periods.

**Dynamic Ideological Balance:** The strong correlation between National Da'wah, Islamic Da'wah, and State Preservation illustrates a deliberate effort to balance nationalistic and Islamic priorities. This balance is not static; rather, it shifts depending on geopolitical and sociopolitical contexts, as evidenced by historical documents from the National View Movement.

**Adaptation to Geopolitical Shifts:** The correlation between ummahism and nationalism demonstrates how the discourse incorporates transnational Islamic solidarity during periods of global crises, such as the Cold War and post-9/11 era. This adaptability enhances the discourse's ability to address both domestic and international concerns.

**Historical Contextualization:** The high correlations observed between key components of the discourse are consistent with historical narratives presented in Turkish political history. From the anti-communism rhetoric of the 1970s to the anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism of the 1990s, the discourse reflects an evolving response to external threats while maintaining its core ideological framework.

## CONCLUSION

This study provides a framework for understanding the historical, ideological, and practical transformation of the Da'wah discourse and the National View Movement in Turkish political life. The findings reveal that the Da'wah discourse has established a pragmatic balance between Islamism and nationalism, creating a unique political discourse for the Turkish right. Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the National View Movement demonstrated how Islamism



was integrated into modern nation-state ideology through the Da'wah discourse, redefining the boundaries between national identity and religious values in this process. The research highlights that the Da'wah discourse has undergone a transformation within the contexts of modernization, secularism, and nation-state ideology, reshaping itself through historical continuities and ruptures. This transformation indicates that the Da'wah discourse evolved from being merely a discourse of opposition to a powerful tool for organizational and political mobilization, aiming for political authority. The theme of state preservation played a central role in synthesizing nationalist and Islamic elements, becoming a decisive factor in managing ideological tensions in Turkish politics.

The ideological foundations of the National View Movement demonstrate that the Da'wah discourse embodies a multilayered structure comprising Islamism, nationalism, anti-imperialism, and social solidarity. The movement developed a discourse that simultaneously encompassed religious and national identities, integrating Islamic values into the modern political system. In this process, the Da'wah discourse emerged as a significant instrument for redefining Islamism in both local and global contexts. The study's findings provide important insights into the positioning of the Turkish right in the historical context of secularism, Kemalism, and Westernization. Particularly, the Da'wah discourse functioned as a balancing element in reconciling the secular structure of the state with Islamic values. Nonetheless, the place of religious values in the public sphere has consistently been a subject of debate during the modernization process, shaping the political narratives of the National View Movement.

The key findings of the research show that the pragmatic balance established by the Da'wah discourse between Islamism and nationalism has played a critical role in synthesizing both national and religious identities. In this context, correlation analyses based on the Jaccard coefficient have significantly contributed to understanding the ideological structure and internal connections of the discourse. The strong relationship observed between national Da'wah (nationalism) and Islamic Da'wah (ummahism) (Jaccard coefficient: 0.822) indicates that the National View Movement successfully represented both national independence and Islamic unity, harmonizing these ideologies. The high correlation (Jaccard coefficient: 0.886) between state preservation and national Da'wah underscores the mission of the Da'wah discourse in safeguarding state sovereignty and stability within Turkish political life, serving as a shared ground for Islamic values and the sustainability of the nation-state. Furthermore, the strong link (Jaccard coefficient: 0.803) between ummahism and nationalism reveals the Turkish right's ability to combine Islamic solidarity with national identity. The moderate relationship (Jaccard coefficient: 0.625) between national unity and Islamic unity suggests that during periods of crisis, national interests were prioritized but formulated in ways that did not contradict Islamic values.

The findings indicate that the Da'wah discourse has functioned as both an ideological and political tool, synthesizing national and religious values while acting as a stabilizing force during Turkey's modernization process. The themes of state preservation, national independence, and harmony between religious and national values have emerged as central pillars of the Da'wah discourse. In this regard, the National View Movement employed the Da'wah discourse not merely as a tool of opposition but also as a method of pursuing political power. By uniting religious and national values within the Turkish right, the movement has served as a balancing element against ideological polarization. The correlation analysis based on the Jaccard coefficient has provided a valuable method for understanding the complex and multidimensional nature of this discourse.

This analysis demonstrates how the Da'wah discourse has become a transformative force in modern Turkish political life, evolving into a political strategy that addresses both local and global contexts. The research lays a critical foundation for understanding the dynamics of this discourse and its potential future impacts. In this regard, future studies on the continuity and

transformation of the Da'wah discourse in Turkish political life could further illuminate the ideological and political changes within this context.

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