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Factors Affecting Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy: South Africa-Türkiye Relations¹

Apartheid Sonrası Güney Afrika Dış Politikasını Etkileyen Faktörler: Güney Afrika-Türkiye İlişkileri

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ABSTRACT

Foreign policy and decision-making approaches in international relations are closely related issues. Decision-making approaches serve as an important lens in understanding the background of foreign policy decisions. This study explains the foreign policy of the Republic of South Africa after the apartheid regime, which was officially overthrown in 1994, and South Africa's relations with Türkiye through leaders, state and non-state institutions, using Graham Allison's decision-making models. For South Africa, Türkiye has the largest trade volume among Central and Eastern European countries. Türkiye did not establish diplomatic relations with South Africa until the end of apartheid practices based on racial discrimination. However, after the collapse of the apartheid-based regime in South Africa, relations between the two countries could not be brought to the desired level. This article analyses the factors that have affected post-Apartheid South African policy, and more specifically, how these factors affected the post-Apartheid South Africa-Türkiye relations, in the context of Allison's foreign policy decision-making models. The study adopted a qualitative research method and utilized the statements of official institutions as well as published documents, reports and news articles. The main research question of this study is how South African decision-makers make decisions regarding foreign policy and how these decisions are reflected in relations with Türkiye. In addition, this research examines the active actors in South African foreign policy and the impact of these actors on relations with Türkiye.

ÖZ

Uluslararası ilişkilerde dış politika ve karar verme yaklaşımları birbirleri ile yakından ilişkili konulardır. Karar verme yaklaşımları, dış politika kararlarının arka planını anlamak açısından önemli bir merceğe görevi görmektedir. Bu çalışma, Graham Allison'un karar verme modelleri üzerinden 1994'te resmi olarak yıkılan, ırk ayrımına dayalı apartheid rejimi sonrası Güney Afrika Cumhuriyeti dış politikasını ve Güney Afrika'nın Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerini liderler, devlet ve devlet dış kurumlar üzerinden açıklamaktadır. Güney Afrika için Türkiye, Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri arasında en büyük ticaret hacmine sahip bir ülkedir. Türkiye ise ırk ayrımına dayalı Apartheid uygulamaların ortadan kalkmasına kadar Güney Afrika ile diplomatik ilişki kurmamıştır. Ancak ırk ayrımına dayalı rejiminin Güney Afrika'da yıkılmasından sonra iki ülke ilişkileri istenilen seviyeye çıkarılamamıştır. Bu çalışma, apartheid sonrası Güney Afrika dış politikasına ve dış politikayı etkileyen faktörlere odaklanarak, Allison'un dış politika karar verme modelleri bağlamında apartheid sonrası Güney Afrika-Türkiye ilişkileri analiz edilmektedir. Çalışmada nitel bir araştırma metodu benimsenerek resmî kurumlarının açıklamalarının yanı sıra yayımlanan belge, rapor ve haber makalelerinden faydalanılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın temel araştırma sorusu, Güney Afrika karar vericilerinin dış politikaya yönelik olarak nasıl karar aldıkları ve bu kararların Türkiye ile olan ilişkilere nasıl yansıtıldığıdır. Ayrıca bu çalışma ile Güney Afrika dış politikasındaki etkin aktörler ve bu aktörlerin Türkiye ile olan ilişkilere etkisi araştırılmaktadır.

¹ This article is extracted from author's doctorate dissertation entitled "South Africa-Türkiye Relations in the Context of Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy (1994-2019)", (Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, 2021).

Introduction

The people of South Africa obtained their democratic rights with the onset of the liberation movements, which led to negotiations that started in 1990, and culminated in the first multiracial democratic elections on April 27, 1994. This was the signal for a new era in South Africa where a once imprisoned leader had become elected as a South African President with mass public support. In this new period with no apartheid, South Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela started to develop relations with other countries within the broader umbrella of democratic values and principles. It is at this juncture in time that South Africa also took the initiative to build its relations with Türkiye. However, the relations between the two countries did not reach the expected level. Various issues and differences emerged that limited and stalled further deepening of relations. These included the Atatürk Peace Prize crisis, the reciprocity issue, embargoes on defence industry, approach to the PKK and Öcalan and finally the matters around FETÖ structures. Additionally, the limited development of the relations between the two countries can be partly attributed to the lack of knowledge of South African and Turkish decisions maker about one another. In this regard, decision makers have inadequate knowledge to build up relations as they are not aware of each other sensitivities and diplomatic approaches.

With the dismantling of the bans imposed by the Apartheid administration on the African National Congress (ANC) and other parties as well as with the release of Nelson Mandela on February 11, 1990, South Africa – Türkiye relations entered a period of positive mutual diplomatic exchanges. A milestone during this initial period was the mutual inauguration of the Consulate Generals in both countries in August 1991. This era became complicated by the first significant crisis between the two countries. Nelson Mandela's decision to decline the Atatürk Peace Prize, which is a valuable award provided by Türkiye to internationally prominent and respected figures, created an impediment in the relations. The issues have not been limited to this, and other topic of tension have constrained the development of relations such as embargoes on the defence industry, PKK, and Ocalan problems within the context of the Kurdish issue, reciprocity issues and finally issues with the FETO organization.

The present article aims to use the decision-making model's approach in foreign policy to explain the factors that affected the post-apartheid foreign policy in South Africa, and to analyse the relations between South Africa and Türkiye within this framework. The article aims to enrich the literature on South Africa and Türkiye relations since it is currently limited. It aims to shed light to both areas studies and foreign policy literature and policy makers. The first of the study will present and delve into a discussion on decision-making models in foreign policy to build the theoretical framework for the ensuing sections of the article. The following section will explore the factors affecting decisions in the post-Apartheid foreign policy of South Africa to pull out the significant and dominating factors. Upon this, the ensuing section will examine South Africa and Türkiye relations in the post-Apartheid period and by building onto the knowledge developed in the earlier sections. The study will conclude with a discussion and summary of the finding.

Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Approaches

Despite having a variety of conceptualizations and definitions, foreign policy is commonly defined as the sum of the official foreign relations in the international sphere which is conducted by states as independent actors (Hill, 2003, p. 3). Moreover, foreign policy can also be defined as a decision-making process in the external relations of states. In that regard, Goldstein and Pevehouse define decision making as a steering activity which takes place with the context of the feedbacks received from the outer world (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014, p. 127).

Decision making approaches are an important lens for the study of international relations. A review of the literature shows that the first focus on decision making approaches in foreign policy starts with the work of Snyder, Sapin and Bruck, where they attempted for the first time to explain factors that affect decision making in foreign policy. They attracted attention to the decision making process in foreign policy as a key area to analyse and understand (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962, pp.14-185; Erişen, 2013, pp. 8-9). In other words, this approach assumes that decisions are made rationally by real/legal people who are the ones making foreign policy decisions. Since these decision makers act on behalf of the “state”, their behaviours and decisions are turned into foreign policy behaviours, characteristics, and directions. Thus, to understand the foreign policy of states, it becomes critical to understand and explain approaches of the decision makers, which is the foundational block and starting point for foreign policy behaviours.

Various decision-making models are suggested in the literature. A common model is that of Graham Allison, which distinguishes between three decision-making approaches to foreign policy studies. The three models classified by Allison are the Rational Actor, the Organizational Behaviour and the Bureaucratic/government policy models (Allison, 2012, pp. 273-274). To overcome some of the limitations in Allison’s approach, Irving Janis introduced “Victims of Groupthink” in his work to emphasize the precedence of the group and being part of it rather than the individual when decisions are made (Janis, 1972, p. 13).

The Rational Actor Model assumes that decision makers focus on a target and make decisions as a whole, meaning the individual rational actions of actors work collectively to produce foreign policy behaviour. In this respect, this model examines a government or those with ability to influence the decision making process. The objective here is to examine the process and the consistency between decisions and practices rather than the behaviour of a single whole rational actor. In other words, the Rational Actor Model upholds a harmony which increases the value of rational selection between fixed alternatives, functionality, and result (Allison, 1971, p. 31). In addition, states act to protect and develop their benefits as they are unitary actors carrying out rational analyses of benefit and cost (Neack, 2008, p. 34).

The Organizational Process Model looks at the different constraints and rigid structures in bureaucracy where decisions are made in a hierarchy and with authorization at different levels. This model emphasized standard operating procedures (SOPs) in foreign policy of decision making processes. Decision in this model is heavily standardized due to the strict processes in place. This use and adherence to SOPs determines the rules and boundaries of behaviour. Here, leaders do not tackle the whole crisis on their own but compartmentalize and delegate the issue to relevant bodies. It is assumed that the different powerful components work together in a consistent manner to produce decisions. Radical decision making in this model is rare due to the mentioned bureaucratic rigidity. An individual according to this model support consistency by following and acting in line with the procedures (Brewer, 1980, p. 38).

Unlike and an alternative to the rational actor model, the Bureaucratic/Government Policy Model argues that state organizations and their separate and competing nature are beneficial in foreign policy decision making process (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014, p. 128.). This model highlights the various actors and negotiations in a competitive framework among various actors such as decision makers, bureaucracy workers, non-governmental organizations, media, and public opinion. A process of independent actors competing seriously within a state, particularly top politicians, bureaucrats, and managers, emerges in decision making of foreign policy. There are multiple players from different entities focusing on an issue or part of an issue, rather than a single player or strategy. The major addition of this model is its emphasis on different in bureaucracy and government competing and bargaining to finally come to a consensus between all entities on a decision. In this model, the ultimate goals of organizations

and individuals are effective and important in the decision-making process, and their roles are highlighted in the mind of the decision maker and the components join to ultimately make a decision (Allison and Halperin, 1972, pp. 40-79).

Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy of South Africa and the Factors Affecting Decisions

Ensuing the elections on 27 April 1994, South Africa abolished the Apartheid regime, abandoned the racist and security-based foreign policy. In addition, the new government under the leadership of the Nelson Mandela adopted an egalitarian, peaceful, and rational foreign policy based on respect for democratic values and human rights.

A principal component of South Africa's post-Apartheid foreign policy was based on the principles of growth and development of the African economy along with South Africa. Moreover, it gave importance to dialogue of the South-South and North-South cooperation as well as active participation in global governance structures and networks (Bayram, 2020). South Africa also during this period attempted to strengthen its bilateral relations with a number of countries. At the domestic level, a number of issues also needed to be solved. These needed South Africa to open and follow a different foreign policy. For this reason, South Africa's foreign policy goals included the strengthening of multilateral and bilateral cooperation for the development of services for unemployment, health, education, security, anticrime and rural development, which rank among the top national problems for South Africa (Landsberg, Wyk, Zondi and Masters, 2015, p. 4; SA Embassy in Ankara). The motivation behind these approaches and principles of South Africa are based on the document published by the ANC before coming to power in 1993. The post-Apartheid foreign policy of South Africa is framed with the principles of development, human rights, growth and democratic values with the goal to provide better conditions domestically.

A number of factors affect the foreign policy of South Africa. These can be categorized as leaders and institutionalized structures. This section examines leaders in foreign policy decision making while in institutional structures it explores state and non-state institutions and their effect on foreign policy decision making.

Leaders

Leaders played a key role in shaping the post-Apartheid foreign policy of South Africa. These leader personalities, their perspective on life and their experiences influenced the future direction and frame of South African foreign policy. Hence, when examining the foreign policy of South Africa, it can be grouped into four periods in parallel to the terms of leaders and presidents in office. The first period is that of Nelson Mandela's, which can be characterized as a universal symbol of peace and reconciliation. The second period is that of Thabo Mbeki, a leader who gave more importance and orientation to foreign policy. The third period is that of Jacob Zuma, where the central attribute of the Ubuntu diplomacy is highlighted. The final period is that of Cyril Ramaphosa, who brought a novel approach with his discourse of new dawn.

Nelson Mandela served as the first black President between 1994 and 1999 and he became known as the symbol of peace and reconciliation in addition to his heroic international reputation. An important indication of Mandela's leadership is highlighted in his action to form a government sharing power with opposition representatives despite his landslide victory in the elections (Özkan, 2011). This was a clear signal showing the peace and reconciliatory approach of Mandela. In regards to foreign policy, Mandela was in the forefront of the decision-making process; however, a closer look shows that Mbeki, the Deputy President, played an effective role in foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, the foreign policy under Mandela in South Africa

is distinguished by the Pan-Africanist ideals and values including the prevailing emphasis on human rights and democratic values.

In the period between 1999 and 2008 under Mbeki, South Africa underwent a comprehensive institutional building process with the main focus on the Presidential offices and the foreign policy mechanisms. Mbeki as a leader was more active and involved in foreign policy and he was engaged in deciding the international priorities of South Africa. Mbeki determined these to be the mainstreaming of the ideals of the African Renaissance, transforming the structure of the Africa Union (AU) and NEPAD-New Partnership for Africa's Development. Additionally, a defining foreign policy characteristic of this era is the active participation of South Africa in the international networks, such as the south-south framework dialogue and the quiet diplomacy with many different platforms. Mbeki was able to increase his influence in foreign policy through structures such as Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), Forum of South African Directors General (FOSAD), Director General (DG) and advisers' forum (Nieuwkerk, 2006, pp. 100-118; Nieuwkerk, 2018, p. 29). During the Mbeki period, South Africa stood out as a regional and continental power.

With Zuma's Presidential period between 2008 and 2017, the foreign policy of South Africa was affected by the discourse of Ubuntu diplomacy. The decision maker believed that a better world was possible through a better Africa and South Africa. Following the financial crisis in 2008, South Africa turned its attention to China and joined the BRIC upon the invitation it received in 2011. The decision to join the BRIC was a major turning point in the foreign policy of South Africa. An example highlighting this is the parallel resolutions South Africa has had with China and Russia in the interim membership to the UN Security Council. In Mbeki's period two new instruments were initiated to increase his impact on the foreign policy decision making process - these were South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) and South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) (Nieuwkerk, 2018, pp. 33-35). On the other hand, Zuma's period enabled a greater role for advisors. Foreign policy in this period in South Africa was also influenced by the Marikana events, Dalai Lama, Omer al Bashir, and xenophobia incidents and decisions. The decisions taken after these events prioritized national interests instead of the values in foreign policy.

The foreign policy approach of Ramaphosa, who became the president in December 2017 differed from the approaches of the other leaders. Although it is not possible to have appropriate evaluations as he has just come to power, it is considered that Ramaphosa will be influential in both domestic and foreign policy with the steps he has already taken and the positive atmosphere he has created in the country when he took office. Ramaphosa started his office with the motto "New Dawn" and instilled a sense of hope with his performance. He also attended important international summits. Ramaphosa's history in worker movements and vast knowledge of the business world is an indication that he will pursue a more active national and international policy. Ramaphosa is expected to review and revise the foreign policy of South Africa with his new dawn discourse and put forward fresh approaches to regain the international prestige of South Africa as in the time of Mandela, the legendary leader (Wyk, 2018, p. 114).

State Institutions

South Africa is constitutionally a democratic parliamentary presidential system. The constitutional make-up of South Africa has consequences and influences for both domestic and foreign policy. The Constitution of 1996 prescribes a democratic administration system upholding the rule of law against racism and sexist approaches and guaranteeing human rights and liberties particularly including human dignity (The Constitution of RSA, 1996, p. 3). This constitutional framework of South Africa leads to a foreign policy shaped on democratic values and principles with emphasis placed on human rights.

The Presidency as a state institution is undoubtedly the leading institutional factor affecting the post-Apartheid foreign policy of South Africa. The Presidential Office was redesigned into an integrated system approach in the period of Mbeki, which then began to play more of an active role in foreign policy decisions (Nieuwkerk, 2006, pp. 103; Chikane, 2001, p. 7). According to the 1996 Constitution, the presidency as the highest representative body of the state has the power to coordinate the institutions and manage the national policy. It is also empowered to form governments and to appoint and dismiss deputy presidents, ambassadors, and diplomatic missions. The Presidential Office stands out as the most effective institutional structure determining the foreign policy in South Africa. This is the consequence of the President being both the head of state and leader of the ANC, the ruling party for a sustained duration.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in South Africa also serves as a vital institutional state actor in shaping foreign policy decisions. The name of the Ministry was changed in 2009 to Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and it is responsible for the formulation, publicity and management of foreign policy. The Ministry is tasked with coordinating foreign policy of South Africa, observing the international developments and providing foreign policy recommendations to the government in addition to the important role of defending national interests in all international platforms (SA Election, 1994). With institutional expansions in South Africa, including Public Participation Program (PPP) and SACOIR, regulation were implemented that were citizen and public opinion centred, and were intended to increase democratic participation. This led to the creation of public opinion platforms where citizens, civil society, academia, business world, and other institutions and organizations can partake in the process of creating and deciding on foreign policy decisions.

Another institution affecting foreign policy is the Department of DTIC (Trade, Industry and Competition). DTIC manages the foreign trade and investment relations of the country. There is a convergence between the responsibility areas of DIRCO and DTIC. On one hand, DTIC has the financial diplomacy role for the promotion, diversification, protection and increase of exports, while DIRCO on the other hand has the coordination role in foreign relations (Mthembu, 2018, pp. 189-190). The close relations between the two institutions highlight the importance of technical specialist support to diplomats and diplomatic missions abroad regarding the importance of export and import of South Africa (Mills and White, 2003, p. 237).

Department of Defence (DoD) is another important state organization to analyse when looking at foreign policy in South Africa. Starting with the negotiations in 1992, the DoD was transformed and adapted to the democratic South Africa. The DoD's influence over foreign policy arises from its military intervention processes. Before any military intervention can take place to another country, the DoD is a significant actor in the decision making process due to its role to evaluate the security situation and technical elements. The final decision for example to join the peace force operations in both its region and internationally lie with the DoD; however, it is observed the politicians do not notify the military accordingly about foreign policy processes of concern for the armed forces (Le Pere and Nieuwkerk, 2004, p. 135-148; Roux, 2003, p. 165). This information gap itself points to the fact that politicians in South Africa are the dominant decision makers in foreign policy. The lack of communication between the decision makers and the DoD officials during the Lesotho intervention in 1998 can be shown as an example to this.

Although the Parliament is an important institution, its influence on foreign policy decisions is limited. In the field of foreign policy, the Parliament is given the power by the 1996 constitution to ratify international agreements that is negotiated by the President. The Parliament of South Africa is also involved in foreign policy through its diplomacy efforts

within the Parliamentary Group for International Relations (PGIR) (Ahmed, 2009, pp. 291-310). The supervision of the activities of DIRCO by the Selecting Committee for Trade and International Relations (SCTIR) has a limited effect while the foreign policy participation of the Portfolio Committee for Foreign Relations (PCFA) in the parliament does not have the desired level (Ahmed, 2009, p. 300). Democratic steps were taken to increase the influence of public opinion in the PCFA process. The dominance of political parties in the parliament and their political election concerns serve as an obstacle to taking the ideal decisions. Another issue showing the weakness of the parliament is that it is bypassed while deciding on some international affairs. The Lesotho intervention and the withdrawal from the international criminal court can be shown as examples where the decision was made, and parliament was bypassed.

Non-state Institutions and Organizations

The leading non-state factor affecting foreign policy is political parties. The ANC is undisputedly the leading political party in South Africa. ANC is a political structure founded on two important trivets including the SACP (South African Communist Party) and COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), and it is structured as the roof organization of the freedom movement established in 1912 under the name of South African Native National Congress (SANNC) (Ajam, Kevin, Lebogang, Smith and Thakali, 2019, p. 3). It is the only party that has won all the general elections since 27 April 1994 with a landslide victory. The ANC therefore has had the power to form the government on its own since 1994. It is effective in foreign policy just as it is with domestic policy. ANC has a pioneering role in the making and implementing policies since the head of party is the president, cabinet members are from the party and the bureaucracy consists of party members. The ANC's approach towards foreign policy is generally characterized by its African nationalism, anti-colonial and anti-apartheid stance, anti-war, solidarist and Marxist views (Zondi, 2018, pp. 12-32). With the document published before the 1994 elections, ANC revealed its basic principles and approaches towards its foreign policy of South Africa. Even though, the ANC existed as a political party separate from the government and state, it still holds heavy influence over foreign policy decision makers. "Top six" within the party are the most effective executive body while National Executive Committee (NEC), National General Council (NGC) and National Working Committee (NWC) are important committees affecting the decision-making processes. The formation of foreign policy decisions is played by the subcommittee known as "International Relations Rapid Response Task Team" in addition to "International Relations Committee" the current version of Department of International Affairs (DIA) which was effective in the freedom movement process (Masters, 2012, p. 27). With these committees, the ANC focusses on the main and important foreign policy issues while the relatively less important subject matters to the ANC, such as the environment, tourism and climate change are allocated to the decision process of DIRCO. Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are the other important parties in the Parliament. DA presents a centralist and liberal approach while the other party, known as EFF, is defined to be a socialist nationalist hybrid party. Although the foreign policy approaches of this party and other parties are in parallel to their main ideas, they have minimal effect on the current South Africa foreign policy.

Among the non-state factors, the media is the leading element affecting foreign policy. The media can be a two-sided coin. It can serve to introduce and get acceptance for a foreign policy decision from the public, but it can also be a source of opposition against government and foreign policy decisions. When it comes to South Africa, the effect of the media is observed to be relatively limited in its impact on foreign policy. An example is the publication of the quarterly Ubuntu magazine and its distribution to the relevant organizations within the framework of the "Ubuntu diplomacy" works of DIRCO. Particularly after 2011, the activities

of the 24-hour live Ubuntu Radio had an essential role in the formation of South Africa foreign policy. With such instruments, the government shares the process with civil societies including the parliament, think-tanks, unions, business world and academy (Graham, 2018, p. 64). The media and the actors receiving information from it can create effects that are could be limiting during the foreign policy formation process. It can also be a source of legitimization of foreign policy decisions in the eyes of the public.

The influence of public opinion on foreign policy decisions of South Africa are limited. Although a wide array of actors and organizations are effective in forming public opinion in South Africa, such as including NGOs, business world, faith groups, academia, companies, think-tanks and individuals, there major concern is domestic political issues and discussions. Established think-tank organizations such as African Institute of South Africa (AISA) and South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) assume important roles regarding foreign policy. In addition, think-tanks including the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the Southern African Liaison Office (SALO), the African Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and also took active roles in foreign policy issues. In 1990, even if limited, the CRR had an impact on the formation of foreign policy decisions in the Burundi mediation process, and took an active participation of ACCORD in the conflict crisis management in Congo and Sudan; in addition to active roles of IGD in the democratization process in Nigeria and in the process of contacting civilian actors in the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 (Masters, 2012, p. 35). In this regard, decision makers do not want to stand against public opinion because of elections, protests and similar processes.

Pressure and interest groups are other factors affecting the foreign policy of South Africa. Particularly, workers union are able to influence foreign policy. For example, COSATU, one of the main components of the ruling ANC, is one of the significant actors as the biggest workers' union in the country. COSATU organized various protests and demonstrations in front of the Embassy of Morocco regarding the West Sahara Problem, in front of the Embassy of Zimbabwe during the Zimbabwe crises, and in front of the Embassy of USA due to the problems in the Middle East (Peete and Bateman, 2006). These sorts of protests and upheavals intend to attract public attention to influence decision-makers and influence foreign policy. Other workers' unions have also organized similar activities for the same purpose of impacting foreign policy. An important network is created by the leading organizations of the business world including South Africa Chamber of Business (SACOB), Business South Africa (BUSA) and Black Business Council (BBC). BUSA and BBC want to play active roles in both the development of business and in the decision-making processes by joining the presidents in their overseas visits.

South Africa - Türkiye Relations in the Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy

Historically, the relations between South Africa and Türkiye date back to the 19th century. Relations with started with business dealings between the two countries with the Angora goat and tobacco. Later, the relation evolved into a period where diplomatic exchanges were institutionalized with the consulate undertakings of the Ottomans in South Africa. Relation became diversified with the inclusion of education and cultural activities which were initiated by Abu Bakr Effendi (Ebubekir Efendi) in 1863. The military relations and its depth are exemplified by the presence of Ottoman soldiers like Major Aziz Bey in South Africa, which was to observe the Anglo-Boer Wars. The society in South Africa was not indifferent to the material assistance and the moral support provided by Sultan Abdulaziz and Sultan Abdul Hamid II with the demands coming from the Muslim population of the region. These supports were in the field of education, religion, and culture. Moreover, Ottoman subjects such as Christian and Jewish communities along with South African Muslims organized campaign to

send aid to Istanbul and Ankara in their times of struggle during the Balkan Wars, Tripoli Battle, World War I and its National Struggle (Uçar, 2008; Argun, 2000; Orakçı, 2011; Gençoğlu, 2016).

During the period under apartheid, South Africa and Türkiye had no official diplomatic relations. However, there were instances when Türkiye delivered statements in various international platforms, including the UN, condemning and protesting the racist regime in South Africa. Ensuing the Presidency of De Klerk in 1989, South Africa entered into a trajectory towards democratisation which could not be reverse any longer. The implications of this were seen in 1990 with the lifting of the bans on particularly the ANC and other political parties and the release of Mandela from 27 years imprisonment on 11 February 1990. During this phase, South Africa started to initiate democratic relations with a number of countries, aiming to slowly recover from the years of international isolation.

Among these countries South Africa was developing relations with was Türkiye. Particularly, with the official declaration on June 30, 1991 of the abolishment of the Apartheid regime, the first ever decision was taken to open a diplomatic mission in South Africa and Türkiye on August 12, 1991. The first of these relations were the opening of consulate in Istanbul and Johannesburg. The decision to open embassies in the two countries was taken in 1992; however, they were opened in the capital cities of South Africa and Türkiye in 1993 to heighten the relations (Wheeler, 2005, pp. 3-9). After the inaugural of the two Embassies, both countries closed their Consulate General offices and move them to the city with the Embassies. Despite the closing of the South African consulate general in Istanbul, the relations developing steadily made the decision makers in South Africa to look for an honorary Consul in Istanbul. For this, the businessperson Ishak Alaton was appointed due to his business centred qualities fit for Istanbul. In addition to Istanbul, South Africa also appointed honorary consuls in Izmir and Mersin. Türkiye appointed a retired diplomat in Cape Town to serve as its honorary consul in South Africa. In 2020, the Republic of Türkiye assigned the first Consul General in Cape Town, South Africa, which could be seen as an indicator of the importance Türkiye places to Cape Town (Biskin, 2020).

The changes in South Africa culminated in the 1994 democratic elections, which also led South Africa back to the international arena with democratic values. In this context, South Africa started to improve its relations with Türkiye. However, the desired level of cooperation and relations has not been at the level expected. The reason for this failure is complex and multifaceted. Yet, a few critical and noteworthy events have been at the forefront for the limited development in relations. Particularly, these are the Atatürk Peace Prize crisis, reciprocity problem, view on the Kurdish and FETO issues, embargoes on the defence industry products and the differences in the period of coalitions with political instability in Türkiye between 1993 and 2002. Africa was secondary for Türkiye during these periods because it had to deal with the domestic and regional issues encapsulating its energy and consuming its time. It was in 2002 when the Justice and Development Party came to power that Africa was categorized as a priority for the foreign policy of Türkiye. Upon this, various comprehensive strategies, policies and plans were put forth to strengthen Türkiye's ties with Africa.

Looking at the chronologic of events of foreign policy issues causing problems between South Africa and Türkiye, the first one is known to be the Atatürk Peace Prize Crisis. President of Türkiye at the time Süleyman Demirel, deemed Nelson Mandela to be worthy of the Atatürk Peace Prize due to his universally accepted personality of peace and praising statements about Atatürk when the two leaders met at the Davos summit. Proceeding this, Mandela was notified by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he had been selected by the Atatürk Higher Council of Language and History as the recipient of the Prize (Wheeler, 2005, pp. 13-14). On 19 May 1992, Mandela was invited to Türkiye to receive the Atatürk Peace Prize. With a reply

letter, Mandela's office stated that he was too busy to attend this year due to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and that a visit could be possible in the coming year. Following subsequent engagement for a clarification on their response, the ANC headquarters issues press statements declining to receive the prize (Milliyet, 1992, p. 7). The reason for the rejection argued by the ANC was that Türkiye's attitude was unacceptable in the trial of Dr. Dikerdem, who was a former Ambassador and a Chairman of the anti-Apartheid movement, for 12-year imprisonment for his opposition to the military administration in Türkiye (Bulger, 1992, p. 1). Other reasons included claims that the policies of Türkiye were in the Gulf War against Kurdish minorities were not acceptable and that the prize was given to coup plotters and people with military background in the past. The decision was also influenced by the Greek Cypriots who migrated to South Africa. Nevertheless, Dr. Dikerdem was eventually acquitted in the Peace Association trial by the military coup administration of September 12, 1980. Additionally, Türkiye argues that Iraqi Kurdish minorities took refuge in Türkiye and Türkiye hosted thousands and millions of refugees without discrimination on ethnicity or background. Moreover, the humanitarian aid sent to Iraq from South Africa in 1991 were delivered by the Turkish Red Crescent to Kurdish communities in Northern Iraq, who were the victims of the Gulf War (Milliyet, 1991, p. 11).

The uncertainty shadowing the exact reasons for rejection were clarified by Mithat Bereket, a journalist, in his interview with Nelson Mandela in 1994. Mandela in this interview stated that the preparation was not sufficient, and the atmosphere was not convenient to receive such and award. Nelson Mandala explained that he used to be the leader of the Freedom Movement at the time, but now he became the President in South Africa, and that he wanted to develop positive relations with Türkiye. He mentions in the interview that he might be able to accept the prize if it is offered again (Bereket, 1994). In line with Mandela's view, it is important to note that the preparation and kitchen works of the Prize process was not managed accordingly. For such prizes, there must be preliminary talks with the awardee to understand their approach and acceptance. As Well, Turkish authorities were not able to foresee the manipulation conducted by small structure within the ANC that has close engagement with the PKK organization in Europe, which was proven during their days in exile. This also indicates that Türkiye was insufficient in delivering the correct information to the ANC leaders and allowed for the manipulation to be realized in the ANC. For example, Türkiye with all its capacity opened its door without any discrimination to all migrants, specifically Kurds from Northern Iraq, and hosted them generously. However, Türkiye was not able to show and present itself to the international community sufficiently. In numbers, there might be a Kurdish minority group in Türkiye; yet, this does not stand true in Türkiye as Kurds are among the fundamental building blocks and social fabric of Türkiye just like Turks. The Turkish constitutions does not set an ethnic definition to being a "Turk". Rather, it defines a civic citizenship by considering anyone who is bound to the Turkish state is considered a Turk by citizenship. To highlight this, an ethnic Arab, English or South African who posse's Turkish citizenship can be defined as a Turk. Looking at these elements, the claims against Türkiye do not stand strong in reality. Even further, Türkiye was vocal in all international platforms showing its support to the African Liberation Movements and declared its siding with local communities against colonialism on many occasions.

In addition to the Prize issue, a reciprocity issue became evident between the two countries leading to foreign policy delimitation. This problem may have roots in historical protocol and approach of each country. Generally, the long and steady foreign policy experience of Türkiye stretching few hundred years, has made Türkiye give importance to rules, protocol and reciprocity. The source of the problem is believed to be the reception of the South African Ambassador in Ankara by the Turkish President before leaving Türkiye. Türkiye's state

tradition does not have this practice of reception, which caused a problem, although not a big one, in the relations. This problem is manifested by the waiting periods in the appointment process of ambassadors (Wheeler, 2005, p. 34). This reciprocity problem, which has no contribution to the relation of the two countries, is maintained within the framework of diplomatic practices while the decision process is carried out within the framework of the institutional decisions of the ministries of foreign affairs.

Defence relations are an essential element in foreign relations. After 1994, Türkiye signed a technical assistance agreement for the maintenance and equipment of military helicopters from South Africa; however, the South African Ministry of Defence abolished this agreement (Wheeler, 2005, p. 17). Further, South Africa placed an arms embargo on Türkiye from April 1995 to 1996. Then, a 260 million dollars' worth of defence industry sales were planned but never realized (Milliyet, 1997, p. 19). Various reasons were purported for the as to why the deal was not realized. These included Türkiye's dominant position in the region, capture of the parts of Cyprus in 1974 and Türkiye's human rights record as justifications. In 1997, Türkiye was informed about the "standard criteria" instituted by the National Conventional Arms Control (NCACC) Committee regarding the sales of military material. Türkiye stated that it respects the standard criteria decision taken by South Africa, but in response, Türkiye placed South Africa on the military red list (Wheeler, 2005, p. 18). Ensuant to the change of political power in Türkiye in 2003, cooperation and collaboration between South Africa and Türkiye in the field of military started to develop. In 2005, South Africa was removed from the military red list by the decree of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Milliyet, 2005, p. 17). This led to the talks to on possible cooperation in the defence sector.

Within the framework of the Kurdish issue, the approaches of the two countries to PKK and Ocalan impacts the decisions and approaches of the decision makers who are effective in foreign policy in South Africa. Strong and influential decision makers in South Africa view the PKK and Ocalan topics from the perspective and framework of democracy and human rights. It has been documented that some of the top ANC representatives banned during the freedom movement process, met with PKK representative while in exile in Europe. Moreover, some PKK sympathizers aim to influence decision makers in the country on their relations with Türkiye. Sympathizers of the PKK, which is officially listed as a terrorist organization by the EU, US and Türkiye, try to influence ANC decision makers by drawing similarities between Kurds and Turks with the apartheid regime. They argue that Kurds are subject to racist treatment, cannot speak their native tongue, and deprived of education, cultural opportunities, basic rights, and freedoms in Türkiye like the condition of black people under white dominance during apartheid. Within this framework, they believe they can attain these rights through and armed struggle.

Another momentous period in the foreign policy relations between South Africa and Türkiye was when there was a potential for the PKK leader Ocalan to go to South Africa from Kenya to escape capture. After diplomatic traffic between South Africa and Türkiye, a crisis was prevented when South Africa stated that it would not accept Ocalan. Even though Ocalan's capture with a Greek passport, South Africa framed Ocalan's capture in Kenya to be an abduction from and African country; however, this was not reflected in the official discourse and processes (Wheeler, 2005, pp. 21-25). This is exemplary of South Africa's approach to the Ocalan issue. Together with this, influencer who were not aware of the developments of the relations between the two countries, tried to create a negative image of Türkiye by using human rights and democratization arguments. An enabling factor for the discourse was the fact the Türkiye in the past did not have the functional institutions and organizations to transfer knowledge about the realities in Türkiye. An example of this is Türkiye's democratizations efforts and achievement after 2003, especially with regard to its human rights record and

democratic rights reforms. However, Türkiye was not able to deliver and present these developments to decision makers influential in South African foreign policy. Before the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister to South Africa in 2005, Aziz Pahad, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, stated that there were no problems in the relations of the two countries and that the Kurdish issue should be dealt with within the framework of the dynamics of the Middle East (Pahad, 2005). The Deputy's statement shows that South Africa is open to solutions to overcome the challenges between the two countries. This is also reflective of the fact that South African decision makers are aware that Kurds in Türkiye have basic human rights and freedoms and are in a much better condition than they are in other parts of the Middle East.

A more recent and vital issue between the two countries is about the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO) and its web of networks and structures (Ulgen, 2019). This problem clearly emerged after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt by the FETO organization in Türkiye. This issue is closely monitored by both countries as it has international relevance and existential threat to Türkiye. No official decision has been made by South Africa, but their approach shows a understanding for Türkiye's concerns and displays behaviour in line with state-to-state foreign relations.

The relations between the two countries peaked when the Presidents of both countries met at the BRICS Leaders' Summit held in South Africa on July 25-27, 2018. A trajectory of cooperation began between the ruling parties in South Africa and Türkiye, which led to stronger party-to-party diplomacy initiatives in 2019. In addition, the two leaders met at the Turkish House in New York during the 78th UN General Assembly and discussed regional and global issues (Kaya, 2023). To support the genocide case filed by South Africa against Israel, Turkish leader Erdoğan held a telephone conversation with South African leader Ramaphosa and expressed his satisfaction with the case filed by South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice to punish the crime of genocide committed against the oppressed Palestinian people (Tosun, 2024). This shows that relations are sustained at a peak point and moving forward.

Conclusion

The discussions indicate that the President is the leading factor affecting post-Apartheid South African foreign policy. The influence of the President over foreign policy is closely related to the president being both the Chairman of the ANC and the Head of Government. DIRCO functions to coordinate foreign policy within the framework of the decisions and policies determined by the government. However, it also produces alternative foreign policy recommendations to the government. Its influence over foreign policy relations is significant as it has expertise and coordination power. DTIC is able to influence and guide the government on trade policies relating to foreign policy. Conversely, the DoD has limited effect as it generally functions to execute decisions rather create policy. As with the DoD, the impact of the parliament on foreign policy decisions is limited even though it is an important institution and element of democracy.

Among the non-state institutions and organizations, the ANC as the umbrella organizations of the freedom movement is the leading factor influencing foreign policy when compared to others. The ANC is critical because the President is also the Chairman of the Party; therefore, domestic, and foreign policy are significantly shaped and formed with the influence of the ANC. With the restructuring of the state institutions, in addition to being involved in foreign policy through the COSATU and SACP formations, the International Relations Committee and Rapid Task Group were also established. In that regard, the ANC is the most effective non-state structure influencing foreign policy decisions. Other factors, although not in

dismissible, had limited impact on foreign policy decision making process. These include interest and pressure groups, civil society, think-tanks, media and public opinion.

Taking into consideration the post-Apartheid South Africa and Türkiye relations, the decision-making models of Allison are exemplary. The table below utilizes Allison's model to frame the post-Apartheid relations between the two countries.

Table 1: Allison's Models of Decision Making, South African Foreign Policy responses to the crises towards Türkiye.

	Rational Actor	Organizational Process	Bureaucratic Policy
Atatürk Peace Prize Issue	No	Yes	No
Problem of Reciprocity	No	Yes	Partially
Arms Embargoes	No	Partially	Yes
Removing of the Arms Embargo	Yes	Partially	Partially
Ocalan Decision (1998)	Partially	Partially	Yes

The decision of the ANC, which was representing the freedom movement, although not in power, its decision makers rejection of the Atatürk Peace Prize in 1992 was based on a statement made by the headquarters of the party. In this period, it can be observed that Mandela's decisions were not central and that the ANC displayed an organizational behaviour which on this issue superseded the individuals decision makers. In this respect, the organizations behaviour of the ANC can be classified to be within the framework of the organizational process model as it demonstrated the standard operation system of the structure.

Examining the reciprocity issue shows that its displayed element of the bureaucratic policy model. The bureaucratic practices of the state involved in this issue highlights how the bureaucracy can be a limiting and influencing factor in relations. Moreover, this issue can be seen to have elements of the organizational process model since the decision were also made in parallel to the standard operating procedures.

The arms embargo decisions are an example of the bureaucratic policy model because it created a competitive environment between state institutions and administrators. Conversely, the decision to lift the embargo can be interpreted within the paradigm of the rational actor because the decision is made by whole of the state and through utilize the different bodies such as the defence ministry, defence industry companies and revenue requirement of the general budget. There are also components of the bureaucratic policy model as the different institutions and organizations were competing to influence the decision. As with the other issues, it also has elements of the organizational process model due to adherence to the standard operation system decisions.

Finally, the Ocalan decision taken by South Africa can be considered to be a group decision. This is because it was the advisors in the Presidential office along with top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs influential in the decision despite opposition by some ANC members. They had a positive approach towards Türkiye's offer and did not accept Ocalan into South Africa acting within the framework of bureaucratic group approaches to which the individuals belong with a state responsibility. Regarding the FETO issue, South Africa has shown understanding, but no action has yet to be taken.

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