Türkiye'nin Stratejik Kültürü
Strategic Culture of Turkey

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Öz

Türk siyasetinde son 15 yıl içerisinde meydana gelen hızlı değişimlerin aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin dış politika bakışında da derin etkileri oldu. Bu yeni hareketlilik, askeri güç konuşlandırmayı merkeze alan Türk Dış politikasının geleneksel ilkelerinin gözden geçirilmesine yol açtı. Bu yeni gelişmeleri daha iyi anlamak için, ulusal sınırların dışında askeri güç kullanımı kapsayan norm, düşünce ve görüşlerin oluşturduğu Türk stratejik kültürünün temeli incelenmelidir. Bu bağlamda, Türk yetkililerinin güvenlik meseleleri ile ilgili karar vermek zorunda kaldığı ve güç kullanımı konusunda kafa yordukları tarihsel olaylar, Türkiye'nin stratejik kültürü üzerine teorik görüşlerin oluşturulması için kuramsal bir arka plan sağlayabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Stratejik Kültür, Dış Politika, Güvenlik, Karar Alma Süreci, Dış Politika Analizi, Askeri Güç, Diplomasi

Abstract

Rapid changes that occurred in the Turkish politics in the last 15 years also had a profound impact on the foreign policy vision. New dynamism resulted in revision of traditional principles in the Turkish foreign policy where views on deployment of military power has been occupied a central place. To understand these new developments we should grasp the nature of Turkish strategic culture, i.e. views, ideas and norms surrounding military power use outside national borders. Historical cases when Turkish decision-makers had to deal with security issues and were pondering over use of power may provide a factual background for formation of theoretical views on strategic culture of Turkey.

Keywords: Strategic Culture, Foreign Policy, Security, Decision-making Process, Foreign Policy Analysis, Military Power, Diplomacy

Introduction

The changes that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to massive erosion of power balance in all major regions of the world. With a new political leadership under Justice and Development government Turkey in 2000s managed to bring about a number of important political and economic changes. This allowed Turkey to adapt to new realities in the world and come out as a strong power with regional and international claims and ambitions. New activism of the Turkish government was spearheaded by new ideas in its foreign policy and was marked by new forms of interaction between main groups of elites and institutions responsible for foreign policy decisions.

This activism and openness to more engagement with the outside world further deals with the questions of what future Turkish foreign policy eventually will look like, what place a military force as a political tool will take in it, what views future Turkish political elites will have on the use of force abroad and, finally, whether legacy of the past will still have an impact on the Turkish foreign policy. Attention to a military power and its deployment beyond national borders is justified by theoretical views on the nature of state and its sovereignty within the context of the international relations dominated by states. This, in turn, may imply that we can grasp the nature of a given state by analysing its foreign policy through thorough study of its strategic culture.

To be more specific, in order to be able to understand the Turkish foreign policy we should first understand what role a major element in a foreign policy of any nation, a military force, plays in it. Understanding of Turkish strategic culture may substantially contribute to understanding of the Turkish foreign policy.

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Aim of this article is to define main parameters of the Turkish strategic culture by outlining its evolution throughout Turkey's history spanning from 1950 till 1998, main strategic traditions existent within this culture and to demonstrate how strategic culture is intertwined with the decision-making process, in which issues of force deployment outside Turkish borders are scrutinized. This will allow not only to see the changes in distribution of main political forces in the decision-making process in Turkey, but also will show central trends in the Turkish society and general views on what place Turkey occupies in the international relations.

Author will try to define several cases of strategic dilemmas when the Turkish government had to face in the period from introduction of a multiparty system in 1950 till today. Selected cases ideally should represent different time episodes, domestic political constellations, international environment examples and different instances of military power deployment as a political tool or when its use was considered as one of the strategic choices.

Cases to examine are those that deal primarily and exclusively with times when Turkey had to decide on deployment\threat\demonstration of military force abroad as a foreign policy tool. After outlining main strategic options Turkish decision-makers had at hand during these periods, author will try to demarcate continuity of some strategic traditions that tend to move to the forefront or fall into the background but nevertheless occupy important place in the agenda of state apparatus, thus, forming the Turkish strategic culture.

Relevance of research on the Turkish strategic culture can be explained by several reasons that deal mainly with the issue of how Turkey is progressively becoming a more powerful regional player with bigger assets and resources for a more active foreign policy. To understand what strategic traditions underlining Turkish foreign policy and what different sets of strategic priorities interact with each other is to be able to predict general lines along which Turkey is going to conduct its foreign policy in the next few decades.

This research can contribute to better understanding of the Turkish foreign policy through definition of changes occurring in strategic culture. In turn, a better understanding of the Turkish strategic culture may contribute to efforts to provide and secure stability in many regions that witness Turkey's increasing involvement and active foreign policy.

Concept of Strategic Culture

Before exploring the concept of strategic culture we should first elaborate on its composing concepts like culture and strategy. Culture in its broader sense encompasses social norms and values that are relevant for society's functioning as a rigid and coherent body, cover all sphere of social life, exert distinct character of continuity through time and generations, and, finally, serve, among other things, the purpose of interpretation of the outside world (Ferris & Stein, 2008, pp.96-97). In practical sense, culture can be described, following Ann Swindler's words, as a "tool kit" of habits, skills and ideas from which people construct strategies of action (Swidler, 1986). On the other hand, strategy will be used in this work as defined by the Encyclopedia Britannica, which stipulates that strategy is state-directed efforts, usually large scale, undertaken in cases when a given nation prepares, wages a war or deals with its results (Cohen, 2017).

For the first time the concept of strategic culture as an analytical tool was used in 1977 by Jack L.Snyder in the work titled *The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (1977). Snyder attempted to find certain patterns of behaviour and sets of motives and limitations of elites when they had to deliver a decision over strategic issues, primarily when a military force, in case of Snyder's research – a nuclear weapon, is justified to

be deployed either in real warfare or as a means of politics within the power calculus (1977, p. 22).

It is, however, not clear if strategic culture can be related to realms of conventional warfare. According to Snyder, during socialization general views, ideas, perceptions of the surrounding world that form the heart of strategic culture are transmitted from generation to generation of elites and groups responsible for strategic decision-making (1977, p. 4). In other words, we can see that those very elites project society's multiple worldviews to the outside world, though to some extend refracted, and eventually transform them into real life choices that serve to find a suitable solution to the challenges coming from that outside environment.

Basing on Snyder's findings on how historical factors impact the formation of strategic culture we can speculate that historical development of a state, formation of its foreign policy and ideological views on the world and international order, development of mechanism of an elite change and technological advancement also exert considerable influence in the process of evolution of strategic culture.

In a more nuanced analysis of which elements forming strategic culture in David R. Jones' work *Soviet Strategic Culture* (1990) we can trace logic behind explanation of how such factors as geography, ethno-cultural factors and history can influence the formation of strategic culture. On the other hand, a Professor of Strategic Leadership at the Naval War College, Carnes Lord (1985) in his study *American Strategic Culture* is more prone to focus his attention at the military forces, which are organized and employed by a society in the service of its political goals.

A study on the American nuclear strategy by a historian Bradley Klein (1988) sets an example of such efforts. In his work Klein tries to demonstrate how political elites and state institutions instrumentalize culture: we can observe that it is necessary to distinguish between what was said on the strategic dilemmas and what was really implemented (1988, p.136). For Klein, for example, a state, which is solely responsible for developing of a strategy, naturally tends to extend its own sphere of domination by all available means (1988, p.134). It is, thus, logical to assume that "strategic culture is more than mere military style, for it emerges from an infrastructure of technology and an armaments sector. Most importantly, it is based upon the political ideologies of public discourse that help define occasions as worthy of military involvement" (Klein, 1988, p. 36)

A political sociologist Robin Luckham (1984) in his attempts to decipher the power relations encoded in the strategic discourse focuses his attention at the technological, military and security aspects in *Armament Culture* tries to show that debates on national security are being driven primarily by the elites who are interested in keeping its power positions and getting more resources. In a similar vein a Professor of Cultural and Political Geography at Durham University David Campbell (1992) in his book *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* suggests that formulation of strategic priorities and particularly foreign policy goals is driven to a great extent by political considerations of the given political elites.

In his analytical article "Thinking about Strategic Culture" Iain Johnston (1995, pp.32-64) provides a concise conceptual framework for analysis of strategic culture. Johnston emphasizes that strategic culture perfectly fits with the notions of limited rationality: it simplifies reality, sets ranked preferences and narrows options and, finally, it guides choice by providing historical choices, analogies, metaphors and precedents. In regard to the methodology, based on Johnston's argumentation, we should pay attention to the "culture-bearing" units such as strategists, military leaders and national security elites; weapons designs

and deployments; war plans; images of war and peace portrayed in various media; military ceremonies; even war literature (1995, p. 49). Analysis of these units would provide us with set of preferences when use of force abroad is discussed.

To sum up, the review of the existing literature on strategic culture shows us several important points that are relevant for our research. There is an accent among these works on the fact that strategic culture is a product of the historical process, it is developed evolutionally with changes take places either instantly, as a result of shocks, or gradually, through the natural development of political process of a given nation. It renders thus factors of change very important for any analysis: be it a structure of political elites, a type of political system and openness of a political system.

As noted above, closer look at the political regime may reveal factors that impact strategic culture. It shows how far population participates in the political process, therefore, how good communication channels between national elites (a nation's decision-makers) and general public function. Besides, analysis of the political system provides an opportunity to grasp the state of affairs between the civil government and military, i.e. two institutions that shape strategic culture with their decisions on the issue of power use abroad. Moreover, any analysis of political realities gives a chance to see the state itself with its system of checks and balances that framework the decision-making process of strategic culture, among other things. Finally, examination of political conditions in a given nation sheds light on a role of charismatic political leaders and ideologies in the decisions in the foreign policy.

Turkish Foreign Policy: Looking for Long-Term Patterns

Active foreign policy of Turkey in its neighbourhood and especially in the Middle East in the last 10 years has opened the doors to discussions on what really constitutes Turkey's foreign policy vision and if its core principles undergo any changes.

An interesting contribution to the debates over the determinant factors of the Turkish foreign policy was made by Kaan Renda Kadri (2011), who in his work *Learning New Roles and Changing Beliefs: Turkish Strategic Culture in Transition* claimed that Europeanization can be seen as a contributing factor to the foreign policy through Turkey's adaptation of new norms, roles and changes in the domestic decision-making structures and its adaptation to new narratives about the past and geopolitical thinking.

A fundamental work of a Turkish historian and political scientist Baskın Oran on the Turkish foreign policy contributed to understanding that Turkish foreign policy is driven, among other things, by several structural factors. Oran (2002) offers several major factors by grouping them in four major categories. First, cultural factors include the fact that Turkish society enjoys a very strong Asiatic cultural component with its implication on views on the world, power and state. The same goes with Islamic legacy and worldview. Finally, Oran defines aspiration for the Western standards of living and westernization in general, most apparent in the Kemalist rhetoric, as another major factor (2002, pp.27-29). We see that historical dimension includes secularization efforts initiated in the Ottoman Empire and nation-building modernization policy that was implemented from the above, creating a permanent effect on the decision-making process in the Turkish foreign policy. A strategic factor mainly deals with Turkey's geopolitical situation between major political, economic and cultural areas which renders Turkey a very important international players and therefore affects its foreign policy by introducing unique opportunities and challenges. Finally, Oran connects domestic political constellations with the national foreign policy by showing how national question and ideological competition in Turkey has been contributing to the Turkish foreign policy choices (2002, pp. 139-142).

Ulman and Sander (1972) in their article *Defining factors of the Turkish foreign policy try* to shed light on how political elites that are responsible for the foreign policy in fact serve as a conduit for certain societal worldviews and values to exert influence on the decision-making process. We can state that authors demonstrate this relation through analyzing how security-based foreign policy conduct for many years was promoted by the Kemalist elites whose worldviews were formed in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and War of Independence when hostile foreign powers were trying to disremember the Turkish state using every possible opportunity to inflict instability inside the Turkish society (1972, pp.245-252).

Another interesting work that touches upon the Kemalist legacy in the Turkish foreign policy is Okutan and Ereker's *Regime in Manifestation of the Turkish Foreign Policy* (2005) where the authors draw a connection between existing political regime's logic and ideals and current foreign policy. Both Okutan and Ereken argue that Atatürk's attempts to create a nation and modernize the Turkish society under constricted and hostile environment create a peculiar foreign policy which is marked with a cautious activity outside national borders, distrust to the neighbouring countries and security-based approach to foreign policy dilemma solving (2005, pp.192-194).

Onur Erpul's (2012) work on Turkey's foreign policy focuses on the international environment that can either permit or restrict a state's foreign policy. Erpul argues that due to its historical experience Turkish decision-makers had long had a security-centric and statist Weltanschauung, according to which international politics was seen primarily in conflictive terms. As a result, Turkey had been for years displaying a defensive and hostile foreign policy posture, particularly towards the Middle East (2012, pp.85-88).

Focusing at the evolution of the national security culture and pondering over historical traumas Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire, Ali Karaosmanoğlu (2000) suggested that while the most of the Cold War Turkey was confined to the security-centred and offensive security culture, the post-Cold War realities and developments in the military-civil government relations allowed her to experiment or rather moderate its traditional foreign policy of non-intervention and transform its reactive and defensive realpolitik into proactive foreign policy.

A nuanced work of Erol and Ozan *Political Regime as a Continuity Factor in the Turkish Foreign Policy* (2011) delves into the issue of how political regime in Turkey and its characteristics can be regarded as one of the determinants in the Turkish foreign policy. Authors base their evaluation on the constructivist approach of analysing political realities when claiming that the way how political regime defined themselves, see their place in the international system and finally perceive the outside world affects how a foreign policy is formulated (Erol & Ozan, 2011, pp.21-22).

An attempt to track patterns of foreign policy behaviour to the Ottoman times was undertaken by Ömer Kürkçüoğlu (1980) in his work title *What is Foreign Policy. Its Past and Present in Turkey*. Kürkçüoğlu argues one should consider late Ottoman ruling elites' efforts to creatively use military force and diplomacy to save the Empire in constant balancing between major European powers (1980, p.314). Finally, Kürkçüoğlu points out that Turkish foreign policy is heavily influenced by political leaders who enjoy either considerable power over state institutions or\and legitimacy in the society thus having opportunities to express personal values and views on the decision made on the foreign policy issues (1980, p. 321).

Another major work that sheds light on Turkish strategic culture was written by Malik Mufti (2009) who came out with a concept of changing strategic culture paradigms in his book *Daring and caution in Turkish strategic culture: Republic at sea*. Before proceeding to description of the work it is important to note here that Mufti tends to use strategic culture in a

sense of a foreign policy tradition, thus, moving away from a classical definition of the term with its accent on the use of power and relations between military power and diplomacy, Mufti insisted that the prevailing and dominant strategic culture of Turkey, which he calls Republican, manifests itself through a conviction that outside world is dangerous, unpredictable and threatening to Turkey's internal stability and social cohesiveness (2009, pp.17-20). While the Republican paradigm of strategic culture was prevalent throughout most of the years, another paradigm of strategic culture expressed itself at times. For Mufti, this alternative "Imperial" paradigm reveals itself through more active foreign policy, optimism about Turkey's ability to shape the state of affairs in its environment and more openness to the world (2009, p.96).

The novelty of Taşpınar's research is in his proposition that Turkey is experiencing the convergence of the two grand strategies mentioned above into a new one, which Taşpınar titles as Turkish Gaullism (2012). This new grand strategy is fed by shared strong sense of patriotism and attachment of the Turkish nation-state, whereas Turkish foreign policy is steered to unite the polarized society around a sense of Turkish grandeur and national strife for a full independence (Taşpınar, 2012, p. 133).

Before proceeding to the analysis of Turkish strategic culture, we should first understand how long-term defining factors of Turkish foreign policy can be applied to our subject. As it follows from the literature on the structural factors and patterns of the Turkish foreign policy there are several points that can be incorporated in current research. One of the distinguishing features of the Turkish foreign policy is its close relations on Turkey's international environment. Because of its geopolitical location, Turkey traditionally has been a focus point of many global and regional political processes. Another important factor is Turkey's political system or, to be more exact, political constellations between national elites and general populations, military and civil government and, finally, relations between forces representing different political ideologies. By applying vies on foreign policy and recent findings of the above-mentioned works on the analysis of Turkish strategic culture we will be able to focus our attention on few but very important areas relevant for the issue of use of military power, relevant ideas and views about it.

Cases

The Korean War

Turkey's decision to participate in the Korean war 1950-1953 as part of the UN efforts ended decades-long policy of Turkey's non-involvement in any regional or global conflict. The Kemalist elite, both in the RPP and Democratic Party, were aware of the increasing tensions between US and Soviets, who had been showing intentions to reconsider its relations with Turkey and existing treaties. Alliance with the US and its security guarantees could be used to diplomatically counter balance increasing Soviet threats: in March 1945 Moscow announced that the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between Turkey and the Soviet Union would not be renewed unless Ankara reviews the status of the Straits and the Soviet-Turkish border in the Kars and Ardahan provinces. Closer relations with the West could also be used by the ruling elites to curb the rival political forces aligned with the socialist Moscow inside Turkey (Brown, 2006, pp. 89-108).

An alliance pact with the US could also bring necessary economic resources, technologies and investments for the Turkish economy, especially after the Kemalist elites understood that state driven policy of economic development hadn't brought tangible results. In addition to the economic benefits, closer relations with the USA and the West in general could be used by the Turkish political establishment to legitimize current political regime and

Kemalist nation-building project by pointing at the fact that Turkey is accepted by the world's leading powers as an equal partner (Yılmaz & Bilgin, 2006, pp. 39-59).

By the end of July 1950 Turkey dispatched its first 4500 troops for the UN Command in Korea. The Turkish troops saw their fight in December after completion of training under the US supervision. After the Armistice Agreement was signed, Turkish brigades counted more than 700 men dead, Turkey's first deployment of its army units in the foreign states with such a high toll of casualties. But still, the political elites considered it a price for being accepted in the NATO, the only real security guarantee against the Soviet threat. Indeed, after Turkey became a NATO member, the Soviet government in the spring of 1953 (after Stalin's death in March) announced its readiness to renew the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, thus signalling it had dropped all claims to the Turkish territories.

Apparently, the increasing pressure from the rapidly expanding Soviet presence on the Turkish borders was present years before the Democratic Party came to power. A civil war in a neighbouring country, namely Greece between 1946-1949, rise and fall of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (1946–1947) and the Azeri Azerbaijan People's Government (1945–1946) in Iran and Soviet diplomatic support for Syrian independence from France in 1946 made Turkish political elites anxious about possible Soviet ambitions in Turkey. Territorial claims, raised by the Soviet government, finally forced Turkey into the sphere of influence of the western security mechanisms. For the NATO, in turn, Turkey represented a valuable element in its own strategy of containment of the Soviet expansionism in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Both political parties favoured Turkish participation in the UN-led efforts in Korea. For the Republican People's Party this step was a necessary condition for broader legitimization of the existing political regime, while for the Democrat party participation meant securing ties with the West and democratic world and therefore, securing its own political position in the newly established multiparty system where the Democrats were under constant threat from the hard-line Kemalists in bureaucracy and the military. Moreover, the DP's decision to send troops to Korea was dictated by its designs to secure economic and military aid to the country that eventually would be converted to electoral support and positive attitudes among the young army officers craving for technical modernization (Kalkan, 2007).

Interesting enough that leader of opposition, İsmet İnönü came out to criticize the DP's decision to send troops. Main concern was not the fact that troops are to be send but the way how decision was made. The RPP voiced opposition that the Parliament was not consulted. Another point of concern was about alternation of other foreign policy lines in regards to the Middle East (Akkaya, 2012).

A stronger alliance with the Western interests doesn't seem to be an issue for the Turkish military since, on the one hand, by the 1950s the Turkish army was in a bad shape in terms of military equipment and knowledge and, on the other hand, it was still loyal to the Republican Party led by Atatürk's comrades. After the introduction of the multiparty system there were voices in the military claiming that the Democrat Party should be toppled in case the Kemalist principles are openly challenged including active involvement of Turkey in the Middle East, but the RPP's leadership was against any such moves (Açıcı, 2009). Moreover, the military leadership, promptly changed by the Law 7527 in June 1950, was aware that closer relations with the NATO would mean for the military increased economic, technical resources and, with an active role of Turkey in the military plans of the West against the USSR, - higher position in the political constellations at home. And these motives were further grounded in the army's desire to protect the Republican political regime against both outside and inside challenges.

It is, therefore, possible to say that the decision to send troops to Korea was made for the sake of the national interest – preservation of the national sovereignty. The move was undertaken within the ideology that facilitated closer relations with the West and wasn't in its effect directed against the Western global order.

The case of Turkish participation in the Korean War is enlightening from several perspectives. First of all, for the first time Turkey had a choice to be made in the framework of the global power politics. In these circumstance military power in pursuit of own security was deployed as a part of the Western alliance's efforts to curb the Soviet expansion. It must be mentioned that sending troops to Korea was the first radical decision in the military history of the Republic of Turkey. Before that, one of the main principles of Turkish military history was not to engage to the war unless there was a threat to Turkish security. For example, Turkey abstained from taking side during the Second World War mainly due to absence of a direct threat to its own security. The case of Korean campaign suggests that analysis of the Turkish decision-makers' choice on whether to use military power abroad must begin with the clear realization how political establishment perceives existing threats and, at the same time, how global balance of power may contribute to improvement or deterioration of national security.

On the other hand, the Korean War case demonstrates that deployment of military power far away from the national borders (under internationally legitimate UN-mandate) can be viewed as part of the Turkish diplomatic efforts to preserve stability in its immediate neighbourhood. The logic can explain why there was an unanimity among national elites (including the military, which back then was loyal to the Kemalist RPP) on sending of Turkish troops to Korea despite the İnönü's criticism of how the decision was made. In other words, for Turkish strategic culture a division between near and far-away territory is always important, because deployment elsewhere beyond the adjacent political space maybe have in the eyes of Turkish decision-makers a non-military utility, especially when national security is challenged by global threats.

The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus 1974

A history of tensions between two island communities on the Cyprus goes back to the 1950s when nationalist feelings were fuelled by prospects of Britain's demise as an imperial power which had been controlling the island since 1878. To regulate tensions and formalize Greece and Turkey's role as participating sides, Britain agreed to sign the Zurich and London agreements in the 1960s, though intercommunal violence didn't abate. As a response to the incidents of attacks on the Turkish community in the late 1963 and early 1964, Turkey announced its intention to use army to invade the island in accordance with the provision of the agreements between Greece, Turkey and Britain. The US President Lyndon Johnson's reaction on the Turkish statement and following diplomatic steps of Washington forced Ankara to give up on the idea of invasion, thus, angering the Turkish people and alienating political elites. Another similar episode occurred in 1967, when Turkey again unwillingly was forced to toe the line and cancel plans on invasion to secure the island Turkish communities.

The new wave of tensions took place in the mid-1970s when in July 15 the National Guard of Cyprus, acting under the orders of the Greek junta in Athens, overthrew President Archbishop Makarios III and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, a Cypriot Greek ultranationalist who headed the movement struggling for a unification with the mainland Greece. Unlike the events of 1964 and 1967, international opinion in 1974 was on the Turkish side, blaming the junta-led Athens for escalation of violence on the island.

Cyprus was important for Turkey not only due to feelings of sympathy to the ethnically relative Turkish Cypriots, but, more importantly, due to the island's location that allows for an effective control of maritime routes and the southern waters of Turkey.

Domestically, in 1974 Turkish government, like it was the case in 1964 and 1967, faced with a serious public pressure with major opposition political parties demanding resolute measures to stop violence on the island. Furthermore, a ruling Republican People's Party, which was in a coalition with the Islamist National Salvation Party, felt that invasion could be a great opportunity to boost its own popularity and get rid of its ideologically rival coalition partner before the elections (Adamson, 2011, pp. 277-303).

After the first phase of invasion in July 1974 Turkey secured its foothold on the island and proceeded to securing its achievements on the diplomatic arena. After the Geneva talks didn't bring concrete results and feeling that international opinion started to tilt in favour of Greece, Turkey decide to advance its positions in August 1974, effectively capturing 40% of the island. In 1975 Turkey decided to preserve its presence on the island and establish separate political entity that would secure Turkish positions there.

The case of the Cyprus operation of 1974 demonstrated a prominence of Turkish experience of dealing with the outside world and how this experience, in turn, may shape decisions on use of military power beyond its borders.

On the other hand, for principle decision-makers in Turkey their experience in dealing with the Western interests over the Cyprus issue in 1964 and 1967 was seen in 1974 in purely negative terms (Asmussen, 2008). Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and secure Turkish interests over Cyprus in the 1960s turned out to be futile mainly through the international resistance to concede to the Turkish demands. In addition, Turkey in the 1960s was in a much hostile environment in terms of the bipolar confrontation when the immediate threat from the Soviet Union that meant Turkey's heavy reliance on the Western security guarantees (Artamonova, 2011).

During the Cyprus crisis Turkey's political landscape was fragmented with unstable governments and marked with disproportionally large influence of the smaller parties with radical agendas and distinguished by the broader participation of the society in the debates of Turkey's general foreign policy course.

Politically unstable governments were further influenced by presence of the military's cloud in the decision-making process, especially in terms of strategic choices (Birand, 1985). But despite the fact that the military favoured military option and broader layers of society demanded immediate action to secure lives of the Turkish Cypriots, the civil government under Ecevit both was given a freeway and was willing to try every diplomatic opportunity to resolve the issue. Then Prime-Minister Bülent Ecevit was hoping to secure civil authority's position vis-à-vis the military by using diplomatic channels, the stakes were, however, very high and repetition of a diplomatic fiasco could, on the contrary, inflict immense harm on unstable democratic process in Turkey by further weakening civil government due to loss of popular support as it was in the 1960s under the Demirel government (Adamson, 2001, p. 284).

A closer look at the Cyprus case can give us further details on Turkish strategic culture. First of all, in cases when Turkish diplomacy suffers serious setbacks decision-makers tend to incorporate the idea that limited use of military power under favourable circumstance may contribute to diplomatic efforts. Unresolved issues that have serious political implications for the domestic political process, especially in terms of national identity, lead to changing of views on preference of military power as a means of foreign policy.

Another important finding is that, once again, Turkish strategic culture foresees use of military power as a supplement element of diplomacy. These two elements of Turkish foreign policy are not equal per se. Even the military gives preference to diplomatic means by letting the civil government handle the issue and step in and contribute to protection of national security only when diplomatic efforts need to change the negotiating circumstances in favour of Turkey.

The Gulf War 1991

In the early 1990s Turkey was experiencing not only political and financial instability within its own borders, it was also facing with a rapidly changing international environment as well. Since the 1980s Turkey had been trying to secure its positions in the global politics mainly by sticking to the West (in its completion against the global socialist camp) and developing ties with third world countries. As the Gulf War of 1991 shows, there was growing realization among the political elites of Turkey that they can't afford ignoring its surrounding if they want stability at home, in other words, a growing number of political leaders came to conclusion that a change of foreign policy vision is necessary if Turkey wants to succeed and thrive in a new world order (Hale, 1992).

Prior the commence of the US-led operation against Iraq in January 1991, there were intensive debates in Turkey as if it should allow Washington to use Turkish soil to conduct an operation in Northern Iraq which eventually could speed overall operation against the Saddam troops and expel Iraqi army from Kuwait. This period witnessed an active involvement of the then Turkish president Turgut Özal, who had been campaigning for allowing the US to use Turkish territories. The president's main arguments were that Turkey would be able to have a say in the post-war Iraq, define state of affairs vis-à-vis the Kurds and finally and most importantly raise its profile in the Middle East and strengthen ties with Washington. Özal was legally tied in using Turkish troops abroad without parliament's approval, however he deployed all his political resources to influence decision-making in the government and ministry of foreign affairs.

The Turkish army and political opposition were against deployment of the Turkish troops referring to the traditional stance on the Middle East affairs claiming that Turkey ought to keep neutrality in the upcoming war since any involvement could potentially hard Turkey's relations with the region. After a long political trade-off and debates Turkish parliament finally approved only limited use of Incirlik base for the coalition air forces, while Özal using its powers deployed around 100,000 troops with support and 35,000 reservists to the border, effectively hampering a considerable number of army units in northern Iraq and therefore helping the coalition military efforts in Kuwait (Brown, 2007).

When the crisis had just broken out, the initial reaction of the Turkish decision-makers was cautious non-involvement. Considering that Iraqi authorities enjoyed close relations with Turkey over coordination of mutual efforts against the Kurdish separatism, domestic instability in Turkey, mainly caused by the continuing Kurdish militant insurgency, could further intensify in case the Iraqi state disintegrates or the central government loses its control over the Iraqi Kurdish territories. Any negative consequences in Iraq's position on the Kurds inevitably could lead to escalation of violence inside Turkey. Turkish political establishment couldn't further allow itself to be involved in the anti-terrorist campaign using harsh methods as it caused sharp criticism in the West, especially in the European capitals, complicating Turkish efforts to develop full-fledged economic and political ties with the West and thus to contribute to the success of the Kemalist nation-building and modernization process.

Another point to review was continuing feeling of scepticism on part of the Turkish decision-makers, especially, of the military, about Turkey's commitment to the Western efforts elsewhere after the US put in question its NATO obligation to protect Turkey when Ankara indicated that it was about to invade Cyprus in attempts to prevent further communal violence and protect Cypriot Turkish minority on the island in 1964. Since then Turkish decision-making process and by extent strategic culture was influence by substantial calculations between Turkish war efforts and commitments and Western declared promises (Kuniholm, 1991).

The leading figure behind Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf crisis was the Motherland Party's leader Turgut Özal who through his dynamic foreign policy engagement to show that closer alliance with the Western interests in the new post-Cold war order would require new ideas and approaches in the foreign policy. Following the Özalist framework, Turkey has to ride the challenges, to be both interesting and important for the West as a conductor of the Western norms and ideas and interests, and at the same time to try to seize opportunities and establish itself deeper within the neighbouring regions and thus become a regional leader and influence developments on the ground and thus, once again, to gain importance in the eyes of the Western partners. By comparing Turkish efforts in support of the UN-sanctions during the Gulf crisis with the Turkish war commitments during the Korean war, Özal effectively made it clear that development of Turkey's ties with the Western world enjoys higher priority than the traditional non-involvement in the Middle East (Zürcher, 2004, p. 440).

The post-Cold war period witnessed international trends towards more democratization of civil-military relations and decrease of external challenges to national security and concurrent neoliberal practices that put additional pressure to the military's involvement into the politics and economy. This partly explains why Turkish military tried to reconfigure its influence in the political process through reformulation of the Turkish army's duty of protection of the Turkish nation from solely from outside threats to the mixture of domestic and international challenges (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 145).

Özal attempts to civilize relations between the government and the army were largely successful judging by the initiatives in limiting army's interference in the decision-making an curbing army's bureaucratic autonomy. Another indication of changes within the relations was interference of Özal in the process of command change and creation of parallel agencies responsible for home security issues. These developments were the background of the decision-making process during the Gulf crisis (Çalış, 1998).

The military was anxious about possible consequences of the direct Turkish involvement mainly due to the fact that it would further contribute to deterioration of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, army command also indicated that deployment of troops would not bring considerable political and strategic benefits to the Turkish nation as such move is not consistent with long-term interests.

Even though there was coordination between the military and civil authorities in regard to the production of a proper response to the crisis, in the heyday of the war, the military was effectively sidelined by Özal , forcing the Defence Minister Sefa Giray and Chief of the Staff Necip Torumtay to resign. Resignation was seen as the best way to influence the government, influence by the President Özal, in conditions when the direct interference of the military would be met with enthusiasm and when the government and elected president enjoy democratic mandate (Laçiner, 2009, p. 174).

The political clout of Özal was created in the 1980s during which political landscape was influenced by absence of charismatic politicians like Demirel and Ecevit. Özal paid great attention to liberalization of the political and economic sphere in hopes that the unleashed social

forces would eventually contribute to democratization of military-civil relations and strengthening of his Motherland Party's rule.

The return of charismatic politicians after the military-imposed ban was annulled as a result of referendum in 1989 made Özal anxious about his ability to continue liberal reforms via pure party politics as not only his Motherland Party now was forced to deal with the Kemalist forces, but also because there was a rising opposition inside the party. Only his election to the presidential post could let Özal to further concentrate resources on implementing his vision of the foreign policy (Feroz, 2002, p. 200).

On the other hand, rapid changes in the world, shifts of power to the Western powers, instability and expanding globalization demanded from the Turkish decision-makers tangible strategies. Turkey had been long conducting negotiations with the European Community on its membership and Europe was considering changing the scope of cooperation with Turkey after the collapse of the Socialist camp. Security issues also dominated Turkish-NATO relations and Turkey was interested in presenting itself as a reliable partner for the alliance even in a new international environment. Political instability in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East raised the anxiety in Ankara, the military and majority of political forces, who by default relied on the traditional foreign policy framework, were in acute opposition to any idea that presupposed Turkish military involvement abroad without clear manifestation that any such deployment, though most likely serving the Western interests of providing security and political stability under the Western political leadership, would pursue Turkish interests as well.

On a more theoretical level the Gulf crisis showed that a major element of the Turkish strategic culture – deployment of troops outside Turkish national borders within the framework of the Western war efforts – is accompanied by manifestation of how such deployment can serve immediate Turkish national interests other than long-term alliance with the Western world. Another major element of the Turkish strategic culture that had played a role at the decision-making process during the Gulf crisis was consensus among the political elites that deployment of troops in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood would be politically dubious endeavour as it can put a direct challenge to the domestic security

Turkish military base in Qatar

The post-Cold war environment in the Middle East was further marked with failure of nation states to modernize without falling back to authoritarian rule. The early 2000s witness increased interest of the Republican neo-con administration in Washington that had set to reform regional dynamics on its agenda for the Middle East. Globalization and promotion of democratic norms, often with disregard with local political and social characteristics, made US administration to look for allies in regional political forces that were enjoying legitimacy and trust of the American political elites.

With the Justice and Development party at the helm, Turkey since 2002 has been demonstrating an increasing interest in the Middle East affairs. Turkish moderate Islamist and allied political elites by then had already established good relations with American decision-makers, mainly through close cooperation in the Central Asia and the Balkans, where US administration needed partners who would be embraced by local actors as promoters of positive changes and legitimate trust-worthy.

The Arab Spring events offered a great opportunity for the Western interests to promote democratic agenda as part of positive changes. Within this framework, international community was paying much attention to applicability of the Turkish model of democratic government in a Muslim-majority society. Skepticism on success of such endeavour prevailed when both

events in the Middle East led to deeper armed and political crisis in major countries of the region and destabilization of political situation in Turkey itself in 2013.

Turkey and Qatar have been most vocal supporters of changes in the region, claiming that public participation in political process must be further supported from the outside. Both states have been enjoying relations since 1972, since the early 2000s political leadership in both states has been expressing vocal support for deepening of mutual ties. Political solidarity on multiple regional issues was further reinforces by desire to include military cooperation. Since 2002 Turkey and Qatar have been involved in technical and arms deals with the biggest contract so far signed in 2017 on deliveries of Turkish armored vehicles for Qatari army.

Since 2014 we can witness increasing defence cooperation as well: both states signed agreement to expand their relations to mutual military assistance and establish first Turkish military facilities in Qatar. Military presence was reinforced by establishment of the High-level Strategic Cooperation Council in January 2015. In 2017 Turkish officials signaled that Turkey and Qatar, taking into account regional dynamics, agreed to expand Turkish military base and increase its capacity to host naval, air and ground forces with hosting of up to 5000 Turkish Army servicemen.

Our decision to take the case of Turkish military base as a case in our study of Turkish strategic culture is dictated by desire to show what factors contributed to this step. The international setting for the move could be a primary area of interest. Turkish-Qatari rapprochement has been proceeding on the background of rapidly declining US desire to commit more attention and resources to the Middle Eastern affairs. On other hand, American political establishment has been trying since 2008 to establish network of alliances among regional actors to counter-balance radicalism and Iranian influence in the region, especially in areas where US and Israeli interest are at stake. Primary spheres of US interest is stability in the Gulf, a main trade route for oil supplies to the global economy.

In this sense, Turkish ruling political elites would like to secure positive relations with the Western world by increasing its capacity as a regional actor. Turkey is interested in developing hard power capacity in critical areas of the Middle East. This would give Ankara not only tools to influence its relations with the West, by attaining greater utility, it also would improve diplomatic and soft-power arsenal of Turkey. This logic is evidence by coherence observed in decisions to establish physical presence in other critical spots like Somali or Iraq (Harunoğlu, 2016).

Speaking about relevance of the military-civilian relations in Turkey as a factor for decision to establish presence in the Middle East, we should notice that this policy has been maturing during the process of democratization in Turkey. On the one hand, Turkish military would like to have improve capacity for power projection in the region for the sake of improving capacity to better react and withstand challenges to Turkish national security in its proximity like Syria, Iraq or Iran (Phillips, 2007). On the other hand, we should remember that these decisions were made by political elites, therefore, fundamental reasons for expansion of military bases in the Middle East must be looked for in the realms of domestic politics.

Deeper involvement of Turkey in the political process of the Middle East has become a cornerstone of the AKP foreign policy. The decision to establish military base in Qatar was criticized by Turkish political opposition as a move that would hurt Ankara's role as an unbiased and impartial mediator. For the ruling party, however, this initiative would symbolize increasing role of Turkey as an independent regional power who can challenge existing setting and promote national interests in accordance with its ideological view. It is, furthermore, important to underline here that Turkey has been investing in Qatar's security because two

nations together can better handle challenges by aligning their potentials. Having an Arab ally behind its back, Turkey would have more opportunities to determine environment in its neighbouring Arab countries like Iraq and Syria (Antonopoulos, 2017).

The case of Turkish military case reveals that today military-civil arrangements have change and clear way for purely civilian political considerations over power use abroad. This case showed first example of power use beyond Turkey's geopolitical environment. We should, however, interpret this decision as an attempt to improve Turkey's non-military capacity for influence in its neighbourhood. Witnessing further US decline in the region, rise of instability on Turkish borders where traditional state fail to provide security (Işıksal, 2017) and rising differences on security priorities between Turkey and its traditional Western allies prompt Ankara to find better opportunities and develop alternative ties via regional security arrangements that would make use of power on Turkish borders less essential.

Conclusion

Analysis of cases when Turkish decision-makers were forced to deal with major foreign-policy crisis reveals several crucial notions on Turkish strategic culture. A closer look at how Turkish political establishment and officials were deciding on how to approach the issue at stake and what political tools to use to alleviate the crisis may help us understand what role of military power plays in the Turkish foreign policy.

The first major finding of this research on Turkish strategic culture was a notion that Turkish decision-makers perceived military power as an extension and a supplement of diplomacy. Turkish Republic has never waged an aggressive war throughout its history and deployed a military force only in cases when international law allowed to do so. This notion seems to correlate with theoretical findings of Kürkçüoğlu about a well-established tradition in the Turkish foreign policy to rely heavily on diplomatic tools (1980). Moreover, when talking about political elites' deciding whether to use diplomacy or military action to cope with a rising challenge Turkish decision-makers don't neglect military option per se. In Johnston's words, it is rather fair to talks about "a strategic preferences" to use military power only within the diplomatic efforts.

There are several possible explanations for this preference for diplomacy over war. Following Campbell's idea that Turkish foreign policy demonstrates close connection to the competition of rival political identities in Turkish domestic politics, we can suggest that preference for diplomacy may be rooted in the Kemalist perception of its political reality and ties with the outside world (1992). Kemalist ruling elite since the foundation of the Turkish Republic have been pursuing a goal to get legitimacy of its political regime in the eyes of the Western world. Kaan Kadri's notion of Turkish foreign policy being influence by the desire to stick to the western principles of behaviour may suggest that preference for diplomatic means in resolving the crisis could be a way to get legitimacy for the regime by proving its peaceful and non-threatening (to the Western interests, including in the Middle East) character (2011).

Finally, it is the Kemalist regime's notion of Turkey's neighbourhood that played a formative role in Turkish strategic culture that prefers diplomacy over military action. Erpul's idea that Turkish ruling elites have been avoiding military escalation with the neighbouring states for the fear that any such conflict may result in the rise of anti-Turkish revisionist aspirations and destabilize national borders may shed light on why Turkish strategic culture attaches great importance to diplomatic tools over military actions (2012).

It would be, however, wrong to say that there military power occupies no place in Turkish strategic culture. One should turn back to Jeffrey Lantis' notion of acceptable norms of

behaviour in foreign policy and its relation to strategic culture to understand that Turkish political establishment sought ways to use military power when it was both necessary and acceptable (2002). We are talking here about creative use of power in advancing own diplomatic positions or in resolving existing foreign policy issues.

Creative use of military power in the framework of Turkish strategic culture manifests itself in cases when Turkey uses its military power far away from its national borders to gain security guarantees of the global players in regards to the political and military situation on its own borders. Another example of that creative use of military power may be revealed when Turkish decision-makers allow a foreign power, usually Turkish security partners, to use the Turkish soil to face existing challenges that seem to threat, among other things, Turkish interests. In this regard, we should not forget related problem of competition of ideas in Turkish foreign policy, according to Brown, between national independence and need to make concession to foreign interests (2007, p. 91).

It is interesting to note here that creative use of military power in Turkish strategic culture was a result of Turkey's position within the global political arrangements throughout its history. In this regard, Aydın's notion of importance of the geopolitical realities on the Turkish foreign policy makes sense: Turkish decision-makers enjoy a relatively wide range of choices due to the fact that Turkish national interests tend to overlap with many global interests (1999).

Important place in Turkish strategic culture is filled by the views on conditions, when military power can be legitimately deployed. This research seems to confirm Johnston's idea on a prominent influence exerted by negative experience on willingness to avoid repetition of diplomatic failures. Turkish strategic culture seems to opt out for military power only in rare cases when diplomacy fails to resolve the issue and when global conditions seem to favor such a move (1995). Once again, as mentioned above, any use of military power is considered to be a part of efforts to advance diplomatic positions of Turkey, not to replace diplomacy outright.

Second important finding of this research deals with interaction between domestic political process and manifestation of Turkish strategic culture. In this regard, findings of Makovsky and Sabri on close interplay between political struggle in Turkey and country's foreign policy application provide a good theoretical foundation for further analysis of Turkish strategic culture (2000). On the other hand, Klein's notion of utilization of discourse on use of military power abroad by political actors seeking to advance their own political at home is helpful as well (1998).

There are two major instances when this interrelation between domestic politics and debates on use of power becomes evident. The first one is linked to the Turkish military's influence in the political system: political parties and ruling elites who seek to diminish the army's influence in the politics usually try to conduct a peaceful foreign policy by decreasing the chances when the military legitimacy can demand deployment of military power, thus, again drawing national resources and boosting its domestic support. The second instance is dealing with cases when political parties may use bellicose rhetoric or seek power deployment to boost its own political positions vis-à-vis its rivals. The latter is especially evident when political forces may seek to utilize nationalist feelings to gain electoral votes and to defeat ideologically rival parties.

It is important to note, however, that although political forces in Turkey eagerly engage in debates on immediate use of military power when national interests are threatened, Turkish decision-makers are seriously limited in their actions. Among the limitations that create obstacles on the way to power deployment in the Turkish adjacent neighbourhood are potential

challenges to domestic stability in Turkey coming from the regions due to close connection between regional and domestic political processes.

Finally, the last major contribution of this research was discovery that political leaders in Turkey may seriously influence decisions on use of military power, thus, playing a great role in Turkish strategic culture. Analysis of cases when single political figures used their clout to push through desired decisions on foreign policy seems to confirm Snyder's notion on considerable impact that strong leaders acting within weak political institutions may have on strategic culture. Again, use of power is perceived as a political tool that can be used against rivals. Democratic mandate seems to give such claims a legitimate entourage, but weak institutions fail to limit single politicians in deploying troops when such move can result in destabilization on the national borders of Turkey and, by extension, at home as well.

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