THE EU'S SECURITIZATION OF TÜRKİYE: SECURITIZATION AS A DISPOSITIF OF HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY*

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Abstract

This article proceeds from the conception of masculinity as a form of power relations. Based on this starting point, it aims to provide a second reading of the securitizing EU discourse regarding Türkiye in the period 2005-2013. The article argues that the EU's securitizing discourse on Türkiye in this period can be regarded as a dispositif of its hegemonic masculinity. The article utilizes the perspective and tools of post-structuralist feminist theory to examine how the EU's securitizing discourse on Türkiye leads to an unequal/asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship between the two parties in which the EU sets the conditions, and Türkiye is expected to fulfil them without a clear prospect of membership. The article further examines the EU's securitization of how it shapes the identities of both actors in terms of various masculinities. In order to provide a second reading of Türkiye-EU relations within this context, methodologically, the article mainly analyzes the official documents of the European Commission, EU Commissioners' statements on Türkiye, European Council Conclusions, written and verbal statements of EU Member States' Heads of State in terms of primary sources.

Keywords: *hegemonic masculinity, securitization, post-structuralist feminism, Türkiye-EU relations, identity.*

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AB'NİN TÜRKİYE'Yİ GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRMESİ: HEGEMONİK MASKÜLENLİĞİN BİR DİSPOSİTİFİ OLARAK GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRME

Öz

Bu makale bir güç ilişkisi biçimi olarak ele aldığı maskülenlik kavramından hareket etmektedir. Bu hareket noktasını temel alarak, belirli bir dönemdeki Türkiye'ye yönelik güvenlikleştirici AB söyleminin bir ikinci okumasını yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Makale, AB'nin bu dönemde Türkiye'ye yönelik güvenlikleştirici söylemini, hegemonik maskülenliğin bir dispositifi olarak değerlendirmektedir. Makale, AB'nin Türkiye'ye yönelik güvenlikleştirici söyleminin iki taraf arasında nasıl eşitsiz/asimetrik ve hiyerarşik bir ilişkiye yol açtığını açıklamak amacıyla post-yapısalcı feminist teorinin perspektifini ve araçlarını kullanmaktadır; bu ilişkide AB koşulları belirlemekte, Türkiye'den ise net bir üyelik beklentisi olmaksızın bu koşulları yerine getirmesi beklenmektedir. Makale ayrıca AB'nin güvenlikleştirmesinin her iki aktörün kimliklerini çeşitli maskülenlikler açısından nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin ikinci bir okumasını sağlamak amacıyla, makalede metodolojik olarak araştırma birincil kaynaklar bakımından Avrupa Komisyonuna ait resmî belgeler, AB komiserlerinin Türkiye'ye yönelik demeçleri, AB Zirvesi Sonuç Bildirgeleri, AB Üyesi Devlet Başkanlarının yazılı ve sözlü beyanlarına dayandırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *hegemonik maskülenlik, güvenlikleştirme, post-yapısalcı feminizm, Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, kimlik.*

Introduction

EU-Türkiye[1] relations have been characterized by a pattern in which the parties have sometimes become quite close and, at other times, have become increasingly distant to the degree of a standstill. Türkiye's long journey towards EU membership has brought along an exclusionary European discourse dominated by threat and fear in the construction of Türkiye as Europe's other (Neumann, 1999; Mozorov and Rumelili, 2012; Aydın-Düzgit, Chovanec and Rumelili, 2021). In this process, Türkiye has either been securitized by the EU to oppose – or normalized/de-securitized to support – its membership prospect. Türkiye's identity has been ambiguous for the EU as the country has had different characteristics. It has even been constructed as a threat that could undermine the

[1] In 2021, at the Turkish government's request, the country's name at the UN was changed from Turkey to Türkiye. In this article, "Turkey" is used in direct quotes.

EU if it became a member[2]. Türkiye's construction as an existential threat pertains to the securitization of this country by EU. Securitization is a *dispositif* (an apparatus) to further governmentality, and, in many cases, it leads to domination by the securitizing party as it forms an asymmetrical relationship between the securitizer and the securitized (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). This can be explained in terms of masculinity because domination inevitably pertains to a masculine practice (Cheng, 1999). Thus, Türkiye's securitization by EU becomes a "critical case" for analyzing the EU's hegemonic masculinity.

This article aims to provide a second reading of the EU's securitizing discourse towards Türkiye in the period between 2005 and 2013. It takes masculinity as a form of power relations and argues that the relationship that the EU establishes with Türkiye can be read/interpreted as hegemonic masculinity. This argument is based on the main definitions of masculinity in the literature. The definition of masculinity is not confined to men having power over women, but, broadly speaking, it mainly pertains to power hierarchies (Carver, 2014: 114). Thus, masculinity as a form of relationship is a concept that shows the emergence of an unequal/asymmetrical situation in power relations. In many cases, masculinity goes hand in hand with hegemony (Connell, 1995).

On the other hand, securitization is a practice that creates an asymmetry between the securitizing party and the securitized, as the former produces the security speech act and uses security measures against the other, in many cases depoliticizing or passivizing it (Edkins, 2007). When this happens between actors such as Türkiye and the EU, it is evident that the asymmetry in the relationship creates a situation of hierarchy in which the EU positions itself as superior because on the one hand, it securitizes Türkiye and on the other due to Türkiye's quest for membership in the Union, it can apply its conditionality on the country. This inevitably brings about domination as the EU imposes conditionality on Türkiye while keeping its membership prospect open-ended/ambiguous partially as a result of its securitization of the country. It is the claim of this article that such practice can also be read through the concept of hegemonic masculinity. Because conditionality paves the way for the EU to develop dominance over Türkiye with its transformative and rule-making structure. Based on the definitions of masculinity, it can be claimed that wherever there is a relationship of dominance, there is a masculine practice (Cheng, 1999).

This article focuses on the EU's securitizing discourse on Türkiye in the period between 2005 and 2013. It examines how the EU's securitization of

[2] For example Giscard d'Estaing stated, "Its [Türkiye's] capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population live outside Europe, it is not a European country. […] In my opinion, it [Türkiye's membership] would be the end of Europe" (BBC News, 2002).

Türkiye has masculine features in constructing the EU's and Türkiye's identity. The theory used for this analysis is post-structuralist feminism, and the article attempts to deconstruct the EU's securitizing discourse on Türkiye through a second reading. Derrida summarizes deconstruction as "always being deeply interested in the other of language" (Kearney, 2004). He locates a deconstructive reading in the gap between what the author wants to say and the meaning found in the text against their will and states that a deconstructive reading should produce this gap (Derrida, 1997: 158). This gap is achieved through the stages of traditional reading and second reading. While the first reading is repetitive and expresses the meaning that the author wants to give the reader, the second reading offers a productive and critical perspective in which the reader's interpretation is included (Devetak, 2013: 197). The method of deconstruction is to study what is not contained within the text, what is 'written between the lines' (Kronsell, 2006: 115). From this point of view, deconstruction is not a kind of destruction, and it shows how the argument relies on what it excludes (Edkins, 2007: 97).

Methodologically, the period between 2005 and 2013 is specifically chosen as the period between the start of the accession negotiations and the year when relations significantly deteriorated. Türkiye's EU membership perspective was still on track during this period. Despite certain obstacles such as the suspension of the opening of certain chapters (and the closing of all of them bar the provisionally closed Chapter 25 – Science and Research) in the accession negotiations, Türkiye's willingness to continue this relationship is essential for this article. This also means that the EU could go on exercising its transformative power over Türkiye as the EU maintained its domination over Türkiye by initiating the accession negotiations and intensifying EU conditionality. Therefore, the link between securitization and conditionality stems from the fact that Türkiye is a candidate country in the process of negotiations with the EU. The conditionality dispositif reinforces the hegemonic masculinity of the EU through the hierarchical relationship and hegemonic status it creates and sustains through its contribution to the securitization dispositif.

The article relies on a second reading of primary sources such as the official documents of the European Commission, EU Commissioners' statements on Türkiye, European Council Conclusions, written and verbal statements of some of the EU Member States' heads of state and government from 2005 to 2013. The European Commission is chosen for the discourses subject to analysis here, because of the characteristics of its institutional structure (being composed of appointed officials and acting in the European interest rather than in the interest of the member states) and because it is the leading institution that carries out the accession process. The speeches of the Presidents of the Commission and the Commissioners for Neighborhood and Enlargement are also scrutinized in this context. The European Council Conclusions and the statements of heads of state

and government of some of the EU member states are analyzed as the European Council represents the highest and intergovernmental level of decision-making in the EU which also has the right to approve/endorse the accession of candidate countries.

The article consists of four main sections. The first section presents the theory and concepts used in the article. The second section focuses on the EU's hegemony and hegemonic masculinity. The third section provides a brief history of EU-Türkiye relations with a view to revealing how the EU's securitization of Türkiye has been instrumentalized in the EU's shaping of Türkiye's identity and nurtured its hegemonic masculinity. In the fourth section, a second reading of EU discourse is made to demonstrate how the EU's securitization of Türkiye between 2005 and 2013 can be interpreted as a dispositif of the Union's hegemonic masculinity.

Post-Structuralist Feminism, Securitization and Masculinity as a Power Relationship

Finlayson defines feminism as "a theory which identifies and opposes what it calls sexism, misogyny or patriarchy[3]", and "a way of living and struggling against the status quo" (Finlayson, 2016: 4). Feminist IR theories, on the other hand, problematize women's "absence from traditional IR theory and practice" (Smith, 2018). Almost all feminist approaches aim to identify sources of gender inequality and to put forward strategies to eliminate it (Tickner, 1992: 15). On the other hand, feminism is not only gender-based, but also focuses on power relations and inequalities caused by power relations (Davies and Gannon, 2011: 312), as in post-structuralism.

Post-structuralist theory in IR is strongly tied to other areas of research, and many feminist authors have used post-structuralist philosophers in their toolkits (Edkins, 2007: 97). Young (1981: 8) argues that post-structuralism "involves a critique of metaphysics (of the concepts of causality, of identity, of the subject, and of truth), of the theory of the sign, and the acknowledgement and incorporation of psychoanalytic modes of thought". Edkins (2007: 88) takes poststructuralism as "a worldview (or even an antiworldview)" and contends that poststructuralists "examine in detail how the world comes to be seen and thought of in particular ways at specific historical junctures" and "study how particular social practices – things people do – work in terms of the relations of power and the ways of thinking that such practices produce or support".

[3] "'Patriarchy' names a system in which men rule or have power over or oppress women, deriving benefit from doing so, at women's expense" (Finlayson, 2016: 6).

Post-structuralist feminism "troubles the binary categories male and female, making visible the constitutive force of linguistic practices, and dismantling their apparent inevitability"[4] (Davies and Gannon, 2011: 312). Scott (1998: 33) contends that post-structuralism is "a theory that will break the conceptual hold [...] of those long traditions of (Western) philosophy that have systematically and repeatedly construed the world hierarchically in terms of masculine universals and feminine specificities". Thus, "post-structuralist feminism breaks with theoretical frameworks in which gender and sexuality are understood as inevitable, and as determined through structures of language, social structure and cognition" (Davies and Gannon, 2011: 313). Scott (1988) argues that the theoretical infrastructure needed by feminism can be provided by post-structuralism. For example, according to Grosz (1990: 7), it is more meaningful to examine the construction of women/femininity in and by culture not only through feminist theory but also through the tools of post-structuralism. This also suggests that masculinities can be better explored within this theoretical framework. Thus, post-structuralist feminism provides the theoretical basis of this article.

Drawing on poststructuralist feminism, this article takes securitization as a dispositif of the EU's hegemonic masculinity. A *dispositif* can be defined as an instrument of governmentality[5] that helps frame the power-knowledge relationship and pursue that governmentality (Foucault, 1980). While governmentality provides a detailed explanation of techniques, hegemony explains their strategic deployment, and it contributes to the interpretation of power relations; thus, overlap can be mentioned between the two concepts (Joseph, 2014: 8). Based on this, hegemonic masculinity represents governmentality in this article and aims to show the power relationship it creates. In Foucault's view, the dispositif is also "a sort of—shall we say—formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need" (Foucault, 1980: 196). This function of the dispositif to respond to an emergency at a given historical moment can also be seen as a connection with securitization as the latter pertains to the intersubjective framing of something as an existential threat and urgently dealing with it through the use

[4] Post-structuralist feminism, "shows how relations of power are constructed and maintained by granting normality, rationality and naturalness to the dominant term in any binary, and in contrast, how the subordinated term is marked as other, as lacking, as not rational" (Gannon and Davies, 2011: 312).

[5] Foucault (2009:144) refers to governmentality as "the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument".

of extraordinary measures with the logic that if we do not deal with it now, then it will be too late (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 24).

Securitization refers to the framing of an issue as an existential threat through the employment of the security speech act, the acceptance of this by an audience and the spread of a sense of emergency, resulting in the use of extraordinary measures (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 24). In short, securitization is the practice framing something as a security issue (Wæver, 1996: 106). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998: 31) contend that in this practice of securitization, the "relationship among subjects is not equal or symmetrical, and the possibility for successful securitization will vary dramatically with the position held by the actor". Thus, security is "very much a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security" (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 31). Here, the link between securitization and hegemonic masculinity can clearly be established because, as Kuteleva and Clifford (2021: 303) contend, securitization represents and reproduces hegemonic masculinity. Threats are not something that exists independently, they are shaped by those who say they do (Campbell, 1992: 1). Post-structuralist feminist analysis is also interested in how subject positions constructed through discourses are silenced by referring to gender (Kronsell, 2006). Indeed, the state of being silenced creates a hegemonic relationship in which one is superior to the other. This situation may also mean that securitization ignores the silenced. However, when viewed from a post-structuralist perspective, the analysis of the practice of securitization will be able to clearly reveal the silenced. Indeed, the relationship between securitization and masculinity has been associated with "security as silence" by Hansen (2000) in this respect. This dichotomy is a reflection of hierarchy/asymmetry in terms of power relations. This article thus argues that the EU's securitization of Türkiye reflects its hegemonic masculinity. To understand this contention better, it is necessary to clarify how the terms hegemony, masculinity and hegemonic masculinity are understood here.

Masculinity is a dynamic and multifaceted construct. Building on Whitehead and Barret (2004) "masculinity" can be defined as "languages and practices, existing in specific cultural and organizational locations"; the behaviours, social roles, and relations of men within a given society as well as the meanings attributed to them[6]. However, masculinity does not necessarily have to be solely about the power exercised by men as it mainly refers to a power relationship that involves an unequal/asymmetrical situation in the relations between/among the

[6] "The term masculinity stresses gender, unlike male, which stresses biological sex" (Kimmel and Bridges, 2011).

sides, where one side imposes power on the others and dominates. Different masculinities can emerge within a constant network of relations. "Global politics offers an arena featuring variations of masculinities, while power relations are enacted through and between different expressions of masculinity" (Kronsell, 2016a: 109). The most frequently cited concept in masculinity research is that of hegemonic masculinity.

Gramsci (1971) defines hegemony as an ideological synthesis in the capitalist economic system achieved through the practice of struggle between opposing and subordinate classes, with one main class taking other allied classes with it, ultimately allowing the system as a whole to be reproduced. In international relations, different theoretical approaches define the notions of hegemon and hegemony differently. Despite the varying definitions, Antoniades (2018: 597) contends that a common element in these approaches is "a great capacity for coercion and/or a great degree of influence or control over the structures of the international system and the international behavior of its units". However, this "excludes situations where we have the establishment of relations of direct and official control over foreign governments or territories" (Antoniades, 2018: 597). Post-structuralist IR studies especially focus on hegemony as the imposition of power "that universalizes a particular, contingent representation of the reality: an order established by an act of power comes to be accepted as true and natural by most members of the community" (Mozorov, 2021: 4). Hardt and Negri (2001: 14) argue that global hegemony assumes a "dominant position in the global order", and they call it an "empire". Lacau (2000), on the other hand, considers hegemony as discursive, with a universal meaning assigned to a particular subjectivity.

Connell's (1995) notion of hegemonic masculinity delineates the pinnacle of the gender hierarchy, a system that perpetuates masculine dominance. In this context, hegemonic masculinity can be viewed as a form of superiority within power dynamics. For example, Abrams (2013: 567) states that "the theory of hegemonic masculinity defines dominant masculinity as synonymous with power". Hegemonic masculinity, as defined by Connell (1998a) and rooted in Gramsci's concept of hegemony, is a nuanced and layered construct. Building on Gramsci, Connell (1987:184) describes hegemonic masculinity as "a social ascendancy achieved in a play of social forces that extends beyond brute power into the organization of private life and cultural processes". In Connell's hegemonic masculinity, this ascendancy is associated with coercion, employing intellectual tools (Groes-Green, 2009: 295-296). Similarly, Yang (2020: 325) defines hegemonic masculinity as a "consensual relation of domination between dominant and subordinate masculinities"[7]. In his view, "hegemonic masculinity

[7] Gramsci (1971) posits that hegemony involves both coercion and consent.

is the dominant masculinity in a hegemonically hierarchized ordering of masculinities, subordinating other masculinities with a combination of force and consent" (Yang, 2020: 325).

Hegemonic masculinity is characterized by multiple traits such as domination, aggression, competitiveness, bravery, resilience and control (Cheng, 1999: 298). Connell (1998a: 247) states that hegemonic masculinity is a competitive way of existence and an acquired superiority, thus, it is different from a general male gender role and that it does not indicate a personality feature or a real male character but an ideal form of masculinity. Therefore, the masculinity referred to here is not a sex but a norm (Kronsell, 2006: 109). Simply put, "hegemonic masculinity" as a concept offers a gendered interpretation of the Gramscian approach of hegemony, which includes the dialectic of consent and coercion and expresses a masculine, hierarchical situation that emerges. "When distinct cultural norms and institutions mutually support a specific masculinity, this masculinity is considered dominant or hegemonic" (Connell, 1995: 77; Kronsell, 2005). Furthermore, with this hierarchical structure that it establishes, hegemonic masculinity contains a binary structure, one superior to the other, as in the concept of gender. Kronsell (2005: 281) states that if masculinity is to be hegemonic, it must be supported by institutional power. Indeed, in today's world order, hegemonic masculinity is related to who controls the dominant institutions. Connell (1998b: 16) conceptualizes this situation as "transnational business masculinity".

The EU's Hegemony and Hegemonic Masculinity

Diez (2013: 195) calls the EU as a normative hegemon, contending that if hegemony is considered from a Gramscian rather than a realist perspective, and if the focus is shifted from brutal power to normative power, then the concepts of hegemony and normative power be used interchangeably. The reason behind this is Diez's belief that some problematic statements about the EU's normative power can be explained through the concept of hegemony. Furthermore, by underlining the concept of consent, Diez (2013) establishes a relationship between Manners' (2002) definition of normative power Europe and Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Similarly, but with a different perspective, Rogers (2009) associates the process of the EU's transformation from a civilian power to a global actor[8] with hegemony. He points to "the importance of power in the creation of hegemonic political formations, such as grand strategy" and stresses that this "gives prominence to the comprehensive nature of discourse, which

[8] The 2003 European Security Strategy is a clear example of this transformation in the EU's foreign policy. Javier Solana emphasizes this transformation in this text (2003), and the EU's future task is presented as "to make Europe a global power; a force for good in the world."

should be considered as more than 'just words', by incorporating all forms of meaning, whether conceptual or material" (Rogers, 2009: 835).

Drawing on Manners' concept of normative power, Haukkala (2008: 1602) claims that the EU can be seen as a normative hegemon based on its enlargement policy: "the EU can be envisaged as a regional normative hegemon that is using its economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help to facilitate an active transference of its norms and values". In his view, defining the EU with "the label of regional normative hegemon" would be appropriate: "normative, as its foreign policy agenda is laden with norms and values, and a hegemon, as it seeks and seems to enjoy a monopoly on defining what those norms entail and thus creates the boundaries of normality and European-ness" (Haukkala, 2008: 1606). The EU's enlargement is important in this regard as the EU can impose its power on others legitimately through the consent of the others that seek to have membership in the Union (Haukkala, 2008: 1608). This argument is closely related to the hegemonic masculinity of the EU. This relationship can be established considering that in today's world, hegemonic masculinity is in the hands of whoever dominates the institutions.

Kronsell (2016a: 109) states that there is a distinct difference in the EU's masculinity in international relations. The theory of hegemonic masculinity defines dominant masculinity as synonymous with power, and the EU is a unique power in the international system. Considering the image of an actor that represents and carries universal norms and values and the values based on gender equality that it holds, the evaluation of the EU's practices as masculine might be ignored at first glance (cf. Kronsell, 2016a). However, at the same time, this identity of the EU carries it to masculine practices in which it establishes a superiority over others. This is because power is concentrated in the hands of a single actor regardless of gender, and this actor dominates over all other actors in a masculine way. This is linked to the masculine nature of domination. Parag Khanna (2004) relates the EU's foreign policy to the concept of "metrosexual masculinity". Metrosexual masculinity is a method of exerting power that includes features and methods that are socially accepted as feminine, but dominates the other with a superiority (Khanna, 2004). In other words, metrosexual masculinity can be considered as a type of hegemonic masculinity. Kronsell (2016a: 109) argues:

> "While there is a certain distinctness about an EU masculinity in global politics, masculinity expressions seem highly pliable – even ephemeral. Global politics offers an arena featuring variations of masculinities, while power relations are enacted through and between different expressions of masculinity. It is difficult to define one masculinity as hegemonic for global politics."

On the other hand, Ali Bilgiç (2015) argues that the EU displays a hybrid hegemonic masculinity in Euro-Mediterranean security relations. Bilgiç (2015: 324) describes the EU's masculinity, which has a liberal and democratic approach to security, with the "bourgeois-rational model of masculinity" and states that actors who adopt this masculinity transnationally emphasize the superiority of liberal values and aim to provide their own security "as a model" for others. Bourgeois-rational masculinity is explained by Charlotte Hooper (2001: 98) as a "less aggressive, more egalitarian and democratic" masculine model compared to the patriarchal model. According to Bilgiç (2015: 326), "notions of security (meaning, ideas and practices about what to be secured and how to be secured) are constitutive to the construction processes of hegemonic Western and subordinate non-Western masculine identities". Building on this statement, it is possible to say that when the EU prioritizes its own liberal and democratic norms, it reconstructs its own masculinity by exhibiting a bourgeois-rational masculinity in its securitization of Türkiye.

Bilgiç (2015: 323) argues that in terms of power relations, the global Western and non-Western divide is advanced "through the construction of hierarchical hybrid gendered identities" in order to support certain security interests of the West, and that security relations between Europe and the Mediterranean are gendered. In this framework, the EU has hybridized the Southern Mediterranean identity in terms of gender to justify its intervention in the region and support its security interests (Bilgiç, 2015: 323). In this context, while the hegemonic masculinity of the EU exhibits a hybrid character, the representations it produces for the southern Mediterranean reproduce a hybrid subordinated masculinity (Bilgiç, 2015: 328). This hybrid hegemonic masculinity of the EU can also be observed in its relations with Türkiye. Bilgiç (2015: 328) argues that Türkiye is also "white but not quite" in the eyes of the EU. The continued construction of Türkiye as an imperfect and incomplete masculinity has brought the racist approach to the surface more strongly and associated it with a sub-masculinity. Bilgiç (2016, 5) states that "the power hierarchy between the West (as Europe or the USA) and the non-West (Turkey) has been historically (re)constructed through the gendering of Turkey (human, historical with its politics and economy)" as both "object and subject". In his view, "Turkey has been marked as subordinate, which generates a constant need to 'catch up' with the West, become 'like the West', or prove its worth to the West by highlighting its 'difference' along with its deep 'dislike' towards the West" (Bilgiç, 2016: 5-6).

On the other hand, as hegemony overlaps with normative power (Diez, 2013: 195), masculine hegemony can also be seen in the gendered nature of the hierarchy that is established and revealed. So much so that "every time the EU is defined as normative, the other country is inevitably constructed as non-normative that needs the EU's help to assume European values" (Cebeci, 2015:

53). Therefore, the EU's discourse that sets norms and provides a road map for compliance with these norms makes it easier to read the masculine nature of hegemony. This is because while the EU tries to ensure that Türkiye "becomes like itself", at the same time, it produces a form of relationship where the EU sets the conditions and helps the country to fulfil them. In this relationship, the EU plays the role of supervisor while Türkiye is the one to be helped. Whereas the EU's guiding position makes it easier to associate it with patriarchal power, at the same time, the positioning of Türkiye as the one in need of help constructs the "protector masculinity" (Kronsell, 2016b) of the EU.

Europe's Identification of Türkiye: A Brief History of EU-Türkiye Relations

The history of bilateral relations is essential for this article to understand the power relations between the parties. Although the study focuses on the productive power of a particular discourse in a specific historical period, it should be noted that Türkiye-EU relations have a broad background. As Tocci (2013: 98) puts it, the course of Türkiye-EU relations and the membership perspective differs from the EU's relations with other candidate states regarding Türkiye's specificities. Tocci (2013: 98-99), while listing Türkiye's specificities as size, level of development and political nature, emphasizes subjective elements as well as objective ones. In this framework, the subjective challenges to Türkiye's membership are characterized by debates shifting from how its accession will take place to whether it should become a member (Tocci, 2013: 100). These debates also constitute a backdrop against which securitization practices can be traced in which Türkiye is marginalized and started to represent as a threat. In fact, according to Schimmelfennig (2009: 413), Türkiye's membership constitutes one of the EU's most contentious foreign relations issues.

Müftüler-Bac (1997: 242) asserts that Turks have been part of Europe since they arrived in Anatolia in the 11th century, and the diplomatic and legal recognition of their Europeanness took place in the 19th century with the Paris Conference of 1856. With the Paris Conference, the Ottoman Empire was recognized as a permanent part of the European balance of power (Neumann, 1999: 40). On the other hand, the new order created by the Paris Conference did not mean equality for the Ottoman Empire (Neumann, 1999: 56). Indeed, throughout history, the Turks faced an identity problem within the European state system and were not fully characterized by either a European Christian identity or an Islamic Arab identity (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 3). In this respect, it is possible to argue that there is a "hybrid identity" attributed to Türkiye that feeds into the othering and securitizing discourses of the EU (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012: 41). This identity attributed to Türkiye does not stem from its natural characteristics but instead is a contextual product of specific discourses (Rumelili, 2012: 505). This also supports the claim that the dominant other in the

history of the European system of states is the "Turk" (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 330). In addition to all these, when it comes to Türkiye's EU process, identity has been the central concept at the forefront. It has constituted an important reference point in Türkiye-EU relations (Alpan, 2015: 7).

The current representations of Türkiye in the eyes of Europe carry with them the memory of its previous representations, and this is among the factors influential in today's Türkiye-Europe discourse (Neumann, 1999: 62). Throughout history, what Europe is has been defined in part by what it is not, and the European other has played a decisive role in the development of European identity (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 329). Moreover, Turks have maintained their position over the other for the longest time (Neumann, 1999). While Europe regularly differentiates itself from certain aspects of Turkish identity, this differentiation establishes a normative superiority/inferiority relationship between the parties (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012: 32). In this sense, it is possible to mention several elements that came to the fore in the historical process.

First, the European perception of Türkiye as an Islamic country has played an essential role in constructing Türkiye as a cultural other (MacMillan, 2010: 448). Furthermore, historically, the argument that Türkiye's geographical proximity to Europe and its military power created a fear in Europe and it was represented a political and religious challenge (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 330; Kösebalaban, 2007: 98). On the other hand, post-Cold War developments are thought to have caused cultural diversity to be seen as a threat (Kösebalaban, 2007: 100). Migration to Europe and the population structures that have changed or are likely to change with this migration have also been effective. The perception of culture as a threat, has established a masculine superiority relationship between cultures. In an increasingly globalized world, large-scale social processes such as global market relations and migration are becoming more important for understanding gender issues in general (Connell, 2005: xxi). This is because regulations and discourses on migration directly relate to hegemonic masculinity regarding the physical boundaries between self and others (Abrams, 2013). In other words, Türkiye has started to be seen as a part of the East rather than the West in the eyes of the EU and has been perceived as culturally inadequate.

EU-Türkiye relations began in 1959 with Türkiye's application for an association agreement with the European Economic Community, which led to the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. This Agreement is a document that set out how relations would progress at certain stages, with the ultimate goal of full membership, although this is not automatic. In 1987, Türkiye applied for full membership in the European Communities. In 1989, the Commission issued its opinion declaring Türkiye eligible for membership but advised Türkiye to follow the path laid out in the Ankara Agreement. The Türkiye-EU Customs Union, an essential phase of the Ankara Agreement, entered into force in 1996 with an

Association Council Decision in 1995. Türkiye was officially declared a candidate country to the EU at the Helsinki Summit of the EU in 1999.

After the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) enlargement came to the EU agenda as an important development. The EU's response to this new situation was to set specific criteria for membership, namely, the Copenhagen Criteria[9], in 1993. The 1990s were also the period in which Türkiye's membership in the EU and its compatibility with the Union started to be debated widely. These debates mainly revolved around whether the country could fulfill the Copenhagen criteria/accession criteria. Furthermore, the country was heavily securitized by the EU in terms of its membership prospects. Anything from Türkiye's culture to its population, from its troubled neighbourhood to the military's impact on Turkish politics and foreign policy became subjects of this securitization.

In 2004, the Brussels European Council set 2005 as the start of accession negotiations for Türkiye. According to Thomas Diez (2005: 633), this decision was driven by the EU's urge to preserve its identity as a normative power and, therefore, to keep its word rather than see Türkiye as part of the EU. Because "Turkey's ongoing constitutional reforms, which started after the Helsinki decision, also bring obligations flowing from the normative argument for the EU: its identity as a normative power would be undermined if it decided to pursue semi-detachment forever, and therefore was seen as not keeping its promises" (Diez, 2005: 633). Thus, the start of accession negotiations can be seen as a way for the EU to legitimize its transformative power, i.e. its dominant position, over Türkiye as a candidate country. At this point, it is important to mention the asymmetry created by the accession negotiations in terms of their content.

The process of a country's accession to the EU is different from any international negotiation and briefly refers to the determination of the timeframe of harmonization of this country with the EU acquis and rules (Müftüler-Bac,

[9] The Copenhagen criteria are: "political criteria as stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economic criteria as a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis and ability to take on the obligations of membership" (European Commission, n/a). In addition to these, absorption capacity is another condition for the Union. Absorption capacity can be summarized as the capacity of the Union to absorb new members. It was also decided that the EU would "reserve the right to decide when a candidate country meets these criteria and when the EU is ready to accept the new member" (European Commission, n/a). In other words, even if a candidate country fulfilled all criteria, it would still not be admitted if the EU had decided that it did not have the capacity to absorb its membership.

2006: 8). The candidate country can only negotiate under which conditions and in which timeframe it will harmonize with the determined rules or, if there are rules that it cannot harmonize with, it can request a transition period and derogation (Müftüler-Bac, 2006: 8). This situation leads to an asymmetrical relationship between the candidate country and the EU. The "candidate country's position as a *demandeur* enables the EU to establish a dominative relationship (Cebeci, 2012: 96). Because the candidate country wants to become an EU member, it accepts (consents to) the rules set by the EU that are in line with its goal. Thus, a relationship of superiority, hierarchy and domination is formed between the candidate country and the EU. Its position in the accession negotiation process places the EU in a superior position vis-à-vis the candidate country in terms of "transnational business masculinity" due to its institutional position. In other words, this produces the EU's hegemonic masculinity in its relationship with the candidate country. In the case of Türkiye, the "open-ended nature of the negotiations for the first time with the Negotiating Framework Document" (Nas and Özer, 2017: 95) has been another factor that deepens this hegemonic status of the EU.

In the period 2005-2013, Türkiye's accession negotiations were hampered by the blocking of the opening of some chapters by the Council of Ministers, France and Southern Cyprus and the closing of others by the Council of Ministers, and EU-Türkiye relations became increasingly asymmetrical. The interruption of a candidate country's accession negotiations by the Council and some EU member states can be considered as another indicator of the EU's institutional superiority, i.e. its hegemonic masculinity. Another element that deepened the hegemonic masculinity of the EU in this process is its conditionality. Its conditionality places the EU in a superior position and renders its opponent inferior and imperfect (Cebeci, 2015: 48). Indeed, conditionality has fueled the hierarchy of superior and inferior in EU-Türkiye relations (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012: 38), as Türkiye is the case where the EU's conditionality has been applied most intensively. Nas and Özer (2017: 95-96) argue that conditionality was not raised for other accession countries (during the enlargement negotiations in 2004, 2007 and then in 2013) to the extent that it was raised against Türkiye. In this framework, it is possible to say that Türkiye is the candidate country where the EU has deepened its hegemonic masculinity the most through conditionality. These characteristics increase the importance of analyzing the relations of the period 2005-13 as focused on in this article.

In 2013, with Croatia's accession to the EU, speculations about the EU's conditionality started to emerge. Balfour and Stratulat (2012: 5) argue that with Croatia's accession, there has been an increase in the view that conditionality is being used as an excuse to keep the door closed to new entrants. This, they argue, has made Türkiye less ambitious about joining the EU (Balfour and Stratulat,

2012: 5). Ülgen (2012) also asserted that Türkiye's "prospects for EU membership [are] more uncertain than ever".

The European Commission's 2013 Progress Report on Türkiye criticized the country in terms of the most fundamental values, positioning below European standards and almost - due to the emphasis placed on it - even against them. Kaymaz (2014) argues that the 2013 Progress Report on Türkiye was "the EU's most aggressive official text on Turkey since the 1999 Helsinki Summit" (Kaymaz, 2014). On the other hand, these negative developments and the uncertainty involved in the process meant a setback for Türkiye's EU membership perspective and weakened the EU's transformative power over Türkiye; i.e. the EU's transformative, disciplining and dominating power over Türkiye declined due to its diminishing expectations regarding EU membership.

The EU's Securitization of Türkiye and Its Hegemonic Masculinity

On October 3, 2005, the start of accession negotiations between the EU and Türkiye brought about a series of changes in the EU's discourse on Türkiye. Although the EU started gradually losing its transformative power over Türkiye, the hierarchical tone of the EU documents continued. The EU still had a considerable impact as it controlled the accession negotiations. By nature, accession negotiations are asymmetrical in that the accession country must adopt the EU acquis as a whole (i.e., it cannot negotiate the content), and it can only negotiate the pace of this process. This asymmetrical relationship is thus reflective of the EU's hegemonic masculinity which is not specific to Türkiye but applies to all accession countries. What is specific to Türkiye in this regard (as different from other accession countries) is the open-ended nature of the negotiations, which is explicitly stated in the Negotiating Framework Document. The document reads: "The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand" (Council of The European Union, 2005). This shows that even if Türkiye fulfils all conditions, it may not still be accepted as a member by the EU. This clearly demonstrates of the asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship between the two sides, which is interpreted in this article as reflective of the EU's hegemonic masculinity. The EU is dominant in Türkiye-EU relations because EU institutions decide Türkiye's membership and its conditions. In 2005, the start of the negotiation process made this type of relationship more visible.

Regarding the accession negotiations, former European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn (2005a) stated: "During the process, Turkey will have to change and reinforce the rule of law in all spheres of life". This statement shows the asymmetry in the relationship as Türkiye is depicted as the one that "has to change" to meet the EU's standards and conditions. This can be interpreted as

the EU's dominating (thus, masculine and hegemonic) position in the relationship. Furthermore, the emphasis that Türkiye "has to change" also automatically constructs it as imperfect.

Between 2005 and 2013, although the accession negotiations were continuing (albeit with the suspension of several chapters), the EU's securitizing discourse on Türkiye focused intensively on the country's EU membership, economy, demography, and culture (including its democracy). In addition, Türkiye-Greece relations and the Cyprus issue have been critical focal points of both securitization and blocked relations. The structural features of Türkiye's economy and demographics were associated with and pointed out as risks in this period. The following example is valuable as it shows that the population and its economic characteristics are concretely evaluated as a problem:

> "Europe will need more workers to maintain its lifestyle. Where are they to come from? How well prepared are we for their integration into our societies and culture? The anxiety over Turkish accession to the EU highlights the issues involved. […] It is no longer a question of wider or deeper. Although membership of the Union remains an important way of cementing fundamental democratic values, we have to deal with the reality of what citizens expect and what the Union can cope with." (McCreevy, 2005).

This statement by Charlie McCreevy, Former European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, represents Türkiye as a problem "to deal with" rather than seeing it as an opportunity in terms of population, size and culture. Through the representation of Türkiye's accession as a source of "anxiety", the country is depicted as a threat. Another striking element in the second reading of the text is the characterization of EU membership.

Oli Rehn repeated the representation of Türkiye as something to be "dealt with" in 2006. Rehn stated: "I am often asked what is the best strategy for the EU to deal with Turkey? […] we should be both fair and firm" (Rehn, 2006a). Expressions such as fair and firm in this discourse evoke masculine characteristics. "Firmness" is directly associated with masculinity (Bourdieu, 2015: 31). Connolly (2007) also associates concepts such as reliability and virtue with masculine rhetoric. Considering their relationship with masculinities, such concepts can be considered as signifiers of masculine superiority. However, the most important point here is the continuity of the representation of Türkiye as something to be "dealt with"; i.e., as a problem. Here, the EU's discourse of superiority promotes its hegemonic masculinity and constructs Türkiye as subordinate.

A review of the Progress Reports on Türkiye for the years 2005-2013 shows that in almost all of these reports, unemployment in the country is seen as a

challenge, and the increase in youth unemployment is especially emphasized. The 2005 Progress Report on Türkiye states: "despite high economic growth rates, imbalances, such as high unemployment for the better educated part of the work force, high youth unemployment and low female employment remain a problem" (European Commission, 2005). Similarly, the 2013 Progress Report states that "the situation of the long-term unemployed remains a concern, as does the very high rate of young people not in employment, education or training" (European Commission, 2013). Similar statements were observed in other reports during the period under analysis. Thus, there is a continuity in the consideration of this issue in the documents.

The EU's securitization of Türkiye through these issues as a country whose citizenship carries risks and challenges can be read as an attempt to shape and discipline Türkiye rather than solve its economic and demographic problems. This suggests that the EU has developed a masculine practice of domination over Türkiye. Indeed, according to the CROME Group (2005:148), all of the EU's accession criteria carry neoliberal solid overtones. In terms of "rewarding and promoting capitalist values", the "global business masculinity" and economic criteria are the most easily traceable aspects of the EU's masculinity in terms of conditionality (CROME, 2005:148). CROME Group's works see the EU as representative of neoliberal globalization, and at this point, it should be underlined that since masculinities structure the neoliberal global system, it is a natural consequence that the tools it uses are also masculine. Neoliberal globalization can also be regarded as carrying characteristics of hegemonic masculinity (Elias and Beasleys, 2009: 282). This kind of masculinity "should not be seen as a monolithic form of patriarchal power over women, but rather as a set of interlocking hierarchical social relations that are continuously constructed and contested", and this is reconstructed in the practices of actors in international relations (Elias and Beasleys, 2009: 285). It is essential to emphasize the variability and discontinuity of the masculinities produced in the context of EU-Türkiye relations within this framework. Indeed, historically, the degree of masculinities in Türkiye's relations with EU-Europe has been observed as sometimes equal and sometimes hierarchically superior to each other.

On the other hand, culture is another prominent element in the EU's securitization of Türkiye. The following example shows how different components can be combined in a securitizing discourse.

> "Europe needs Turkey as a key player, as a bridge and as a proactive moderator. Turkish accession should set a powerful counter-example to the alleged 'clash of civilisations' Turkey is also *essential* for the stability and security of one of the *most unstable and insecure regions in the world*. […] If Turkey succeeds in its reforms and meets the

> criteria of accession, it will become an ever-stronger bridge of civilisations" (Rehn, 2006b, emp. added).

In this text, Türkiye is called a "key player", a "bridge" and a "moderator", while its EU membership is presented as a powerful counter-example to the "clash of civilizations". However, according to Aydın-Düzgit (2015), the construction of Türkiye as a bridge reproduces the clash of civilizations thesis and securitizes Türkiye in the eyes of the EU. Because the bridge meant here creates a distance and a binary opposition between Europe and Türkiye (Aydın-Düzgit, 2015: 39). Also, Türkiye's geographical location is associated with "instability and insecurity" in the excerpt. In this way, "the non-West as a geographical space is produced and instrumentalized for the political, economic and social reproduction of the West within the West/non-West gendered power hierarchy" (Bilgiç, 2015: 325). The statement that Türkiye needs to become like the EU maintains the masculine superiority of the EU over Türkiye. Despite the positive tone of the text with regard to Türkiye's several characteristics, the country's existing state is seen as problematic. The statement that it can only become a stronger bridge if it succeeds in its reforms and fulfilment of EU accession criteria, makes it problematic not to be like the EU. Furthermore, the labelling of the country as a "bridge" is problematic as it clearly shows that it is not considered as an essential part of the self but is rather seen as a bridge which is neither the self nor completely the other (Aydın-Düzgit, 2015). The necessity of Türkiye's transformation and continued harmonization with the EU constructs superior masculinity through the state of domination it creates. This necessity, supported through the securitization of the country, feeds the hegemonic masculinity of the EU.

On the other hand, the identification of Türkiye's geographical location with an unstable and dangerous region and its association with a specific culture that is alien to EU-Europe, which carries the potential of a clash of civilizations, is also problematic. This means that Türkiye's geography is securitized on the axis of culture. The CROME Group (2005: 141) note that the questions at the heart of racism in Europe, such as "what is Europe, who is European and who is more European, who is the other, are often partly about whose masculinity is purer or superior". In its relationship with the EU, Türkiye is constructed with subordinate masculinity through its incomplete and imperfect construction as a country that needs to change to attain EU standards and that can only achieve such change with the EU's help.

A remarkable example of the securitization of Türkiye through identity belongs to former French President Nicholas Sarkozy. He states:

> "Turkey's entry [into the EU] would kill the very idea of European integration. Turkey's entry would turn Europe into a free trade zone

> with a competition policy. It would permanently bury the goal of the EU as a global power, of common policies, and of European democracy. It would be a fatal blow to the very notion of European identity" [10] (Sarkozy, 2007).

The first reading of Sarkozy's speech is that Türkiye's EU membership clearly represents a danger. In the same speech, Türkiye's difference from the EU is expressed because it will not be able to align with common policies, in other words, shared values. This is reinforced by the emphasis in the text that the goal of European democracy would be "buried". The statement that this would be "a fatal blow" to the concept of European identity clearly frames Türkiye not only as different but also as a threat. Of course, all emphases on death are clear securitizations. On the other hand, Sarkozy's statement is an example of the securitization tendency to see Türkiye's EU membership as a security threat to the continued existence of the EU (Macmillan, 2010). In the second reading of the text through masculinities, in addition to all these, the representation of Türkiye as an obstacle to the EU's becoming a "global power" revitalizes the image of Türkiye as a lower masculinity that will disrupt the hegemonic masculinity of the EU.

Türkiye is portrayed negatively in cultural terms, whereas it is also described positively only to the extent that it resembles the EU – otherwise, it is associated with being flawed. In the period 2005-2013, the discourse on Türkiye as culturally imperfect was often used in conjunction with the discourse of "Türkiye as a bridge of civilizations"[11]. The expression of Türkiye as a "bridge", "gate", or "ally" has also been an influential element in the liminal[12] identity vis-a-vis the EU (Lindgaard, Uygur Wessel and Stockholm Banke, 2018). Thus, the "liminality" discourse serves the supremacy and hegemonic masculinity of the EU. Bilgiç's (2015:328) claim that the hybrid masculinity developed by the EU on Türkiye is constructed as "white but not quite" gains importance here. Hybrid masculinity occurs when men want to distance themselves from hegemonic masculinity, and in this case, men can perform different types of masculinity. This is symbolic distancing and can conceal hegemonic masculinity (Bridges and Pascoe, 2014).

Conclusion

This article has aimed to make a second reading of the EU's securitizing discourse on Türkiye in the period 2005-2013 through hegemonic masculinity. It has put forward the argument that the EU's securitizing discourse on Türkiye in

[10] MacMillan (2010: 459) also includes the same quote.
[11] See (Rehn, 2004b), (Rehn, 2005a), (Rehn, 2006b) for examples of discourse on this issue.
[12] Rumelili (2012: 506) argues that in the eyes of the EU, Turkey is constructed as a liminal state, a state that is only partly European in nature and does not fully adapt to European norms.

this period can be regarded as a dispositif of its hegemonic masculinity. The article has first explained the definition of hegemonic masculinity. It further examined the meaning of the EU's hegemony and hegemonic masculinity. Then, a brief history of EU-Türkiye relations has been presented, the distinctive features of the selected period have been shown, and the power relationship between the parties has been outlined. Finally, a second reading of the selected discourses/practices has been made with a view to revealing how the EU's securitization of Türkiye serves as a *dispositif* of the EU's hegemonic masculinity.

Türkiye has been one of Europe's most prominent historical others, constructed as imperfect, incomplete, and disciplinable. A similar pattern in relations can be observed between 2005 and 2013. Through securitization, the EU has constructed Türkiye as a dangerous other while at the same time placing itself in a superior position. This is the basis of the asymmetrical situation in the relations. This asymmetrical situation created by the EU has a gendered nature as it is about domination. A hegemonic relationship has developed between the parties with the duality of consent and coercion, in which Türkiye has tried to fulfil specific conditions in line with its goal of membership in the EU and in this relationship the EU has set the rules, suspending some chapters of accession negotiations or slowing down the pace of the relationship when Türkiye – allegedly – could not meet its conditions. The concept of consent is closely related with masculine domination and hegemony and it is possible to trace this link in Türkiye-EU relations as well.

This article has found out that in the process of accession and in the EU's securitization of Türkiye, the EU associates Türkiye with sub-masculinities such as subaltern masculine characteristics whilst representing itself with ideal/superior characteristics. Those ideal traits that are employed to define the EU point to an ideal type of masculinity in terms of identity construction. However, a second reading would suggest that the EU's practices (both its securitizing discourse and its conditionality, the open-ended nature of accession negotiations, etc.), pertain to hegemonic masculinity, which through the discourse of helping Türkiye achieve democratic transformation, etc. puts the EU in a superior position as the relationship between the parties is asymmetrical and hierarchical. The EU constructs itself as reliable, fair, firm, instructive and superior – i.e., with masculine characteristics. Türkiye, by contrast, is represented as imperfect, other, to be controlled, to be dealt with, and even conflictual. These constructions all serve the EU's hegemonic masculinity as they help establish a hierarchical/asymmetrical relationship that favors the EU.

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