

China's Hajj Affairs under the Perspective of National Security*

Song NIU**

Abstract

Since the founding of People's Republic of China (PRC), China has formed a Hajj management mode which is led by the government and underscores the securitization of the Hajj. This is not only a reasonable choice under specific historical background, but also an important bond in the relationship between PRC and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, with the development of the times, the difficulties for Chinese Muslims obtaining the Hajj chance has become an indisputable fact. The consequently securitization of the Hajj and de-securitization of the Hajj should have to be arranged according to the change of times. Only to clarify the specific functions of the relevant departments as well as the introduction of market mechanisms on the management and organization of the Hajj, that is, government making macro policy, the Islamic associations providing ancillary services, and travel agency launching specific business for Hajj, can truly solve the contradiction between the "difficulties in the Hajj" and the maintenance of China's national security.

Keywords: Hajj, National Security, Securitization, De-securitization, China

Ulusal Güvenlik Açısından Çin'in Hac Sorunu

Öz

Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin (ÇHC) kuruluşundan bu yana, Çin devletin öncülüğüyle Hac ziyaretlerini idare eden bir düzenleme getirip, Hac yolculuklarının güvenli hale getirilmesine girişmiştir. Bu ÇHC ve Suudi Arabistan arasındaki ilişkilerde belli tarihsel koşullar altında makul bir tercih olmanın ötesinde, önemli bir bağıdır. Bununla birlikte zaman içinde Çinli Müslümanların Hac yolculuğu yapma olanağına ulaşmada yaşadıkları zorluklar su götürmez bir gerçeğe dönüştü. Neticesidne Hac yolculuklarının güvenli hale getirilmesi ve güvenli olmaktan çıkması, dönemsel değişimlere göre düzenlenmesi gereken olgulardır. Hac seferlerinin idaresi ve düzenlenmesinde piyasa



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** Ph.D., Professor of Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, research fellow of Center for the Study of Religion and China's National Security at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, E-mail: phd_niusong@163.com [ORCID ID](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-746X) <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-746X>

mekanizmalarının getirilmesi dışında, ilgili bakanlıklara ait belli işlevlerin net bir şekilde tanımlanmasıyla, yani devletin makro politikaları belirlemesi, İslami derneklerin tali hizmetleri yerine getirmesi ve seyahat acentalarının Hac seferleri konusunda hizmet vermesiyle, "Hac seferlerinde yaşanan zorluklar" ile Çin'in ulusal güvenliğinin devamlılığı arasındaki çelişki ortadan kaldırılabılır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Hac, Ulusal Güvenlik, Güvenileştirme, Güvensizleştirme, Çin

I. Hajj Diplomacy: Bond in PRC-Saudi Arabia Relations

The Hajj is one of the "five pillars" identified by the Islamic religious classics, that is, an annual event that Muslims all over the world attend in a specified time (8th -12th in Islamic calendar *Dhu al-Hijjah*) and at a specified city (the holy city of Mecca), which is a sum of a series of religious activities carried out in the *Ka'bah* shrine, Mina Valley, and the Arafat Plain. The events which believers come to Mecca at any other time of a year and complete some major ceremonies are called *Umrah* or "Lesser Hajj". In terms of religious status, *Umrah* is not equal to the Hajj at all. On the basis of the succession of the ancient Mecca pilgrimage activities in the pre-Islamic era that had existed for a long time in Arabia Peninsula, the Prophet Mohamed made the pilgrimage Islamization and he also set a good example of himself. This leads to the formation of current Hajj. In a word, the Hajj is a religious obligation for Muslims, defined by the *Koran* in clear words. Every adult Muslim who has the economic and physical capability should come to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj for at least once in their life.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China's new regime and Saudi Arabia had failed to establish a formal diplomatic relation in a long period of time. In 1990, Saudi Arabia eventually cut off its diplomatic relationship with Taipei (the so called Republic of China, ROC). At that time, Beijing and Saudi Arabia formally established diplomatic relations. Before this, there were no Saudi diplomatic organization in mainland China, so individual Chinese Muslims could not directly get the Hajj visa from relevant departments of Saudi Arabia; also, Beijing has no diplomatic organization in Saudi Arabia, so it could not effectively provide diplomatic protection for Chinese citizens, including Muslims, who visited the country due to personal reasons. Therefore, the Hajj mission of Chinese Muslim was mainly composed of very few venerable Muslim scholars and officials led by the government. In addition, although the Saudi Arabia would like to invite more Muslims from mainland China to visit Mecca for the Hajj based on the religious considerations, due to the complex relations among Saudi Arabia, Taipei and Beijing (three sides of two nations) and the interference of Taipei which still kept diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia till 1990, mainland China's Hajj activities can only be under the non-official frameworks.

The Hajj led by the PRC government can be divided into two stages. The first stage is from the Bandung Conference (1955) to the outbreak of Cultural

Revolution (1966). At the beginning of the founding of the new regime, the diplomatic activities of "promoting official relation by carrying out civil diplomacy" (*yi min cu guan*, 以民促官) played special advantages. In 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai met with the Saudi Arabia Prince Faisal during the Bandung Conference. Zhou seized the opportunity to facilitate the mainland China's first official Hajj mission to Mecca. Since then, every year, mainland China sent an official Hajj mission to the Saudi Arabia until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. The second stage is from the "reform and opening up" (end of 1970s) to present. After the "reform and opening up", mainland China recovered Hajj mission activities to Saudi Arabia.

Since 1985, self-financed Hajj has been allowed in mainland China. This has formed the China's Hajj management mode in which Muslims covered their own Hajj expenses under the auspices of government. Since then, there have been two main approaches for the Hajj of Chinese Muslims: the first is the official-led Hajj paid by Muslims themselves, namely, the so-called "official Hajj" (*gong chao*, 公朝). According to the provisions, quotas are implemented to the "official Hajj", so the Hajj applicants are required to participate in the selection. The first around of selection is "political examination" (*zheng shen*, 政审); others include "starting from the composition of the Hajj mission, under the premise of ensuring ordinary Muslims can complete their religious worships, to properly include some Muslim elites in it."¹ The "official Hajj" led by government has its historical inevitability, and it is the appropriate choice under the specific historical condition. Chinese Muslims are mainly resident in the relatively less developed area of Northwestern China. Before the "reform and opening up", the vast majority of Chinese Muslims did not have the economic ability to afford the tour to Mecca. In addition, before the "reform and opening up", China implemented strict policy of foreign exchange centralized planning and management. The PRC government carried out universal management of foreign trade and foreign exchange, and foreign exchange revenues and spending were under management of directive plan. All foreign exchange revenues must be sold to the government, and the use of foreign exchange was subject to a planned distribution.² In this case, the limited foreign exchange was very difficult to fully take into account the Hajj. The second is the "scattered Hajj" (*lingsan chaojin*, 零散朝覲), namely, the so-called "private Hajj" (*si chao*, 私朝). According to the *Notice on Certain Regulations of the Self-Financed Hajj* that enacted in 1995, "Scattered Hajjis, should be under the management of Provinces or Autonomous Regions of their own. All localities should take effective measures to minimize the number of scattered personnel to visit Saudi Arabia for the Hajj. Especially in Xinjiang, it should suspend the examination and approval of relatives-visiting application to Saudi Arabia and relevant countries before or during the period of Hajj, take comprehensive

¹ Lirong Ma, "Promote Economy through Culture': Cultural Diplomacy of Ningxia with Arab World," *Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies*, No.3, 2011, pp.19.

² PRC State Administration of Foreign Exchange, "History of the Management on Foreign Exchanges," http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/sy/jgznl_sygz.

control measures to reduce the number of people collecting passports in the name of relatives-visiting to visit Saudi Arabia for the Hajj. At the same time, it should dispatch competent staffs to actively carry out education and management work towards the scattered Hajjis inside and outside of the border."³

Overall, the "official Hajj" led by the government is not only a rational choice under specific historical conditions, but also has played an important role for maintaining and developing bilateral relations between Beijing and Saudi Arabia after the establishment of PRC. Before the "reform and opening up", the Hajj was almost the only open foreign exchange activities in PRC-Saudi Arabia relations. After the "reform and opening up", China recovered the dispatch of Hajj mission, and restarted the civil diplomatic activities towards Sino-Saudi Arabia. After that, Chinese goods began landing in Saudi Arabia; in the second half of 1980s, with the establishment of military relations between PRC and Saudi Arabia, China began to provide long-range missiles to Saudi Arabia.⁴ Obviously, in the development of pluralistic relations with Saudi Arabia, the Hajj plays a key role as an "ice-breaker". In short, the Hajj led by PRC government has been reasonable and conducive to optimize the allocation of limited resources in quite a long period of time, from the view of objective and subjective limits. It has also deeply embedded the Hajj into the overall layout of China's diplomacy with Saudi Arabia.

II. Securitization of the Hajj in China and Its Influence

Religious pilgrimage activities in the world are a phenomenon since the origin of religion. It should be said that, among the world's three largest religions and their pilgrimage activities, except the Hajj of Muslims, transnational pilgrimage of other religions did not become political "problems" in China. Chinese Christians can visit Rome, Jerusalem and other places to perform the pilgrimage on their own in the name of tourism. Local governments are also actively upgrading hardware and software facilities to attract Buddhists or followers from around the world to join the religious tourism activities with the purpose of performing pilgrimage in China. However, the Islamic pilgrimage (Hajj) is still a political problem that is highly relevant to national security in China. This is closely related to the Hajj itself and the worldwide spread of Islamic extremist forces.

First of all, in terms of the Hajj, the Islam (mainly refers to Sunni which is in dominant position) have obvious differences with other religions in China and in the world. First, the Hajj institution is unique. The *Koran* expressly defined the Hajj as Muslim's obligation, and listed it as one of the "five pillars". Therefore, its importance is self-evident, and to perform Hajj is a basic

³ PRC State Administration of Religious Affairs, "Notice on Certain Regulations of the Self-Financed Hajj," January 28, 1995, <http://www.sara.gov.cn/zcfg/bmgz/6601.htm>.

⁴ Naser M. Al-Tamimi, *China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990-2012: Marriage of Convenience or Strategic Alliance?* New York: Routledge, 2014, p.1.

institutional arrangement of the Islam. The desire of Muslims to perform Hajj is far stronger than that of other religious believers. Second, the Hajj is only carried out in Mecca. The Islam clearly stipulates the *Ka'aba* of Mecca is the center for the Hajj; the main rites are completed in the holy city of Mecca; the mainstream Sunni does not allow any other religious shrine or saint's tomb to be the object of the Hajj, and this is closely related to the prohibition of idolatry; the Shiite also recognizes Mecca as the most important pilgrimage place. Third, the time of the Hajj is unique and fixed. The Islam expressly identified "the date of the Hajj is December 8 to 12 of the Islamic calendar. Religious journey in other time of a year to Mecca is called "*Umrah*" or "lesser Hajj", and its religious effect is far less than the Hajj. Because the vast majority of the Chinese Muslims are Sunnis, therefore, there could not be any Islamic holy place of within Chinese territory. Chinese Muslims can only gather with Muslims from other countries annually at the specific time and place in the holy city of Mecca to perform Hajj. Chinese Muslim's Hajj activities has become a part of the largest annual transnational religious movement in the world, which have caused great attention of the PRC government.

Secondly, the global revival of the Islam, the following Islamic extremist forces and terrorist forces has an impact on the national security of China, which forces China to securitize the activities related to the Islam. When China embarked on the path of "reform and opening up" at the beginning of 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Masjid al-Haram event in Mecca took place in the same year, marking the beginning of the global revival of the Islam. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan on the 1979 Christmas Day triggered an eight years' global Islamic jihad against the Soviet Union; the Al Qaeda began to sprout. Just a few months after the establishment of diplomatic relations between PRC and Saudi Arabia in 1990, the Gulf War broke out. In January 1991, the US-led multinational forces were invited to send troops to Saudi Arabia. This resulted in that Islamic extremism transferred their targets from the atheism Soviet Union to the Christian America. The Islamic radical forces, with Ben Laden as the symbol, could not tolerate the existence of Americans and non-Muslims in the Islamic world, especially in the holy cities of Saudi Arabia, "these problems ultimately have their roots in the continuing US military presence in the Holy Land", "A US warship is both a symbol and a physical manifestation of this very 'armed infidel' presence."⁵ Because Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to settle its troops in its territory, the Saudi Arabia royal family also has been regarded as a strike target by the Islamic extremism. On the one hand, the Saudi Arabia royal family needs the military protection from the US; on the one hand, in order to alleviate the hostility of Islamic extremist forces, the country chooses to actively support many Islamic extremist groups around the world, for example, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has gained diplomatic recognition and many forms of support from Saudi Arabia. "The 'Islamic Corridor' in East-West direction and the 'Global

⁵ Alex Mintz, "Applied Decision Analysis Procedure," in Ami Pedahzur, ed., *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, New York: Routledge, 2006, p.168.

Christian' in North-South direction constitute China's most basic global geographic religious environment"⁶, the Muslim inhabited areas in the northwest China and individual Muslims scattered elsewhere are components of the territory of "Believing in Islam", which has formed the intercross of "Believing in China" territory and "Believing in Islam" territory mainly in the northwest China region. "In terms of geographic religion, China is far away from hotspot areas of regional and international religious conflicts, and maintains a good relationship with the broad Islamic world", but Afghanistan and the Central Asia countries within the "Islamic Corridor" which borders with China, have become the military training camp and base of the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" ethnic separatists under the banner of Islam.

Based on the analysis above, to treat the Hajj with securitization consideration and to upgrade it to the level of national security have its rationality. However, the high degree of securitization and politicization of Hajj has inevitably resulted in the difficulties of obtaining the "admission ticket" of Hajj.

After the "reform and opening up", the overall development China has been under great changes; numerous Muslims' willingness and ability for the Hajj have achieved a huge boost. The first reason is with the economic and social development, the Chinese Muslims' economic capability has been improved comprehensively; more and more Chinese Muslims can afford their Hajj expenses. At the same time, as China government re-implements the "freedom of religious belief" policy, religious believers' legal religious activities and places, including the Muslims', are protected by the law; and the willingness of Hajj is also respected by the law. In addition, with the establishment of normal diplomatic relation between PRC and Saudi Arabia, the direct docking and interaction of both religious administrations on the Hajj management institution have laid foundation for the China's Hajj mission. However, before the self-financed Hajj in 1985, the Hajj led by PRC government was a complete elite project, which was characterized as "fewer people but fine quality", most of the hajjis were Islamic leaders and renowned Muslim scholars in Chinese Islamic community. For example, the first Hajj mission sent by the mainland China in 1955 had only 20 people with Da Pusheng as the team lead; the Hajj mission with Burhan al-Shahidi as the head in 1956 had only 37 people; in the ten years from 1955 to 1964, only 132 (or times) Chinese Muslims were dispatched for the Hajj.⁷ After the implementation of self-financed Hajj in 1985, the mechanism was still actually lead by the government; although there was an increase in the number of quota, it still could not meet the demand. According to statistics, in the ten years from 1985 to 1994 there were just more than 20,000 Chinese Muslims that performed the Hajj; after 1995, the number of Hajjis were growing by 2000 people annually; in the six

⁶ Yihua Xu, Lei Zou, "Geographic Religions and China's Foreign Strategy," *International Studies*, No.1, 2013, p.35.

⁷ Lirong Ma, "The Origin, Characteristics, and Impact of civil Exchange Mode between China and the Arab Countries," *Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies*, No.1, 2013, p.42,44.

years from 2001 to 2006, there were only over 20,000 Muslim pilgrims in total.⁸ After 2007, the number of Hajjis was more than 10,000 every year.⁹ But compared with the total population of 21 million Chinese Muslims, the number of selected Hajjis is far less than that can meet the demand.

Based on the imbalance between supply and demand of Hajj quota, the registration and selection of the "official Hajj" have expanded the space for the rent-seeking powers.

First, the rent-seeking power in the household (*hukou*, 户口) registration institution. At present, the household registration institution is the basis for Chinese Muslims' application for the "official Hajj" quota. Since the "reform and opening up", the settlement pattern of Chinese Muslims have changed a lot, and they more and more tend to live scattered throughout the country. Many Muslims are actually in the mode of "separation between the household register and population" (*ren hu fenli*, 人户分离). At present, the registration and the allocation of the "official Hajj" quota are in charge by the China Islamic Association (CIA). The "official Hajj" quota is allocated to the localities by the CIA, and the local Islamic association is responsible for organizing the registration of "official Hajj". Because the quota allocation does not take into account the different scales of Muslim population in various regions or places, the Northwest China--Chinese Muslims' inhabited area—has been facing the shortage of quota for a long time. In accordance with the current regulations, the local Islamic association only accepts "official Hajj" application of qualified Muslims with local household; and the quota for each region cannot be allocated to other places. These not only provides a rent-seeking power space for the selection of participants for the "official Hajj", but also in fact have caused the phenomenon of "Hajj immigration". In recent years, the relevant management departments gradually have introduced the online registration, which has increased the fairness and transparency of the "official Hajj" registration, but whether it can be convenient to get access to internet is still a major challenge for many Muslims in poverty-stricken areas.

The second is the rent-seeking power brought by the issuance of passport. Since 1990s, with the number of Chinese citizens travelling abroad for private reasons increased sharply, the public security departments have gradually relaxed the requirements for application of private passports. At present, in most areas of China, people can apply for passports "according to need", but in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Qinghai Province, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (except for Yinchuan and Shizuishan), Zhangjiachuan Hui Autonomous County and Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County in Gansu Province, dozens of cities and counties in Henan Province, and Tibet Autonomous Region, local citizens can not apply for passports "according to

⁸ Changan Xu, "China Additionally Sets up an Organization for the Hajj, In Order to Serve Chinese Muslims' Hajj to Mecca," May 12, 2006, <http://www.chinanews.com/news/2006/2006-05-12/8/728533.shtml>.

⁹ PRC State Administration of Religious Affairs, "Guide to China's Religions," November 12, 2012, <http://www.sara.gov.cn/zwgk/17839.htm>.

need". Take Gansu Province as an example. In September 2007, the Entry & Exit Administration Bureau of the Department of Public Security of Gansu Province issued the *Controlling Measures for the Application of Private Ordinary Passport for Citizens in Special Areas* (hereinafter referred to as "Controlling Measures"). In February 2008, the full text of the "Controlling Measures" was distributed to the entire Gansu Province after the approval of the PRC Ministry of Public Security. The implementation areas of the "Controlling Measures" mainly include Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Zhangjiachuan Hui Autonomous County, and Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County.¹⁰ According to the "Controlling Measures", citizens of Hui and Tibetan ethnic groups, as well as other potential pilgrims are subjected to very strict restraints for the application for a passport. On the one hand, these measures have brought a lot of inconvenience for the normal activities of local Muslims in terms of studying, business and other activities abroad, which fail to have the understanding of local Muslims. On the other hand, the cooperation between the relevant passport management authorities and travel agencies creates a loophole for the strict management of the passports, resulting in the alienation of the purpose of "Controlling Measures" to a large extent. It becomes an indisputable fact that extra money is needed to get a passport.

In addition, the "scattered Hajj" free of quota restrictions has become a helpless choice of Chinese Muslims. And without sufficient management, the "private Hajj" has brought more unpredictable security risks.

III. De-securitization and the Solution to the Problem of Hajj in China

The difficulty of obtaining an "admission ticket" for Hajj is an indisputable realistic problem, but how to solve this problem? We should start from the root of thought. As mentioned earlier, the securitized treatment of the Hajj is a reasonable choice of the PRC government, which has been formed in the historical process. However, with the development of era, the security issues related to the Hajj should also be subject to more realistic considerations.

In fact, the time and place for the Hajj are fixed; this is a grand meeting for global Muslims, and the Hajj itself does not have a direct impact on China's national security. On the contrary, when the hajjis all over the world gather in Mecca, it will create a serious challenge for the security of Saudi Arabia. In the official views, the potential threat of Hajj activities on China's national security is mainly the potential penetration, interference and damage from the "hostile enemies".¹¹ It includes two specific aspects: first, the potential security threats

¹⁰ Longxi County People's Government, "Controlling Measures for the Application of Private Ordinary Passport for Citizens in Special Areas,"
<http://www.longxi.gansu.gov.cn/zwgk/xxxs.asp?lbid=4&wzid=2857>.

¹¹ PRC State Administration of Religious Affairs, "Ambassador Li Chengwen Looked up Hajjis in Mecca," October 12, 2013, <http://www.sara.gov.cn/ztzz/yyslzjz/2013yslzjz/31022.htm>.

in "scattered Hajj" via a third country. With regard to the current route selection of the Hajj, the "official Hajj" charters non-stop flights, thus the whole trip is in a relatively close environment, and hajjis have limited contact with others; there is almost no insecure factors in the trip. However, the hajjis of "scattered Hajj" holds tourist visas; they need to travel through a third country with the assistance of travel agent; after obtaining a Hajj visa, the hajji stills need to travel to Saudi Arabia via various routes; they will experience time-consuming steps. Travelers will have potential contact with many foreign people, so it is more unpredictable. Second, hajjis may be "permeated" by the foreign "hostile enemies" during their Hajj in the holy cities.

However, the possibility of the existence of the risks above is not high. First of all, the Saudi Arabian government takes very strict management measures on Hajj every year. Due to the large number of hajjis, the Saudi Arabian government basically implements a management policy of separating hajjis into different units according to the countries or regions they come from. There are special residential places for them. The completion of a series of Hajj rites is also mainly in collective activities; all hajjis complete a variety of rites during the Hajj by turn. Secondly, Saudi Arabia itself is a victim of Islamic extremist terrorist attacks; its political institution and ideology do not allow the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism during the Hajj in its territory, as well as various political thoughts and activities, including the spread of ethnic separatism. Thirdly, according to the doctrine of the Islam, it is not allowed to engage in any political activities during the Hajj. Although the Islam is highly politicalized, the Hajj is an exception, "according to the tradition of Islam, Mecca during the annual Muslim pilgrimage is a city open to all Muslims, in which all forms of strife and bloodshed are forbidden. The peace of Mecca is a concept so rooted in Arabia that even predates Islam, and was observed by sojourners in Mecca before the Arabian Shrine became the center of Muslim faith."¹²

Based on the above factors, in terms of control over the Hajj, from the living environment of hajjis during the Hajj, to the specific completion process of the Hajj rites, the friendly relations between China and Saudi Arabia, political institution of Saudi Arabia, and the de-politicalized requirements during the Hajj by the highly politicalized Islam, these all provide a relatively effective guarantee to effectively prohibit the advocacy of political or religious dissent during the Hajj.

In addition, the religion plays a dual role as the "messenger of peace" and the "root of conflict" in the international relations. In the field of national security, the religion may endanger national security, but also may safeguard national security. It shouldn't turn a blind eye to the security problems brought by religions, and should remain vigilant in terms of the Hajj, but "the generalization of security often leads to unnecessary use of a lot of social resources, resulting in the dilution, fuzzy, or even deviation of the established strategic target of a country, and finally makes the securitization free of effect

¹² Martin Kramer, *Arab Awakening and the Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideals in the Middle East*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009, p.161.

and significance."¹³ Moreover, with the development of Arab countries' "Looking East" strategy and China's "Going West" strategy, more and more Arabs come to China for business and study. Yiwu in Zhejiang Province and the northwest region have become major residence for foreign Muslims. In specific, there are more than 3,500 Arabs living in Yiwu, some of them get married here and gave birth to children.¹⁴ China's policy on Muslim has become an issue receiving more and more attention from the Muslims all over the world. How to protect the rights of Muslims' Hajj and travel abroad is relevant to people's livelihood in Muslim inhabited area. Therefore, to better solve the Hajj problem is not only to help with the life important matter and the ultimate demand of Muslims who follow the "possession of two worlds" in practice, but also an issue associated with China's national image.

Based on this, we can solve the difficulties in Hajj from the following specific tactics.

Firstly, to moderately increase the amount of the annual Hajj quota under the framework of the existing management institution. In recent years, the Hajj quota for Chinese Muslims has been increasing every year, although since 2007 the amount of Hajj quota has exceeded 10,000, it is still less than the 1‰ of a total population of 21 million Muslims in China. At present, according to the provisions of Saudi Arabia, the Hajj quota for Islamic countries is 1‰ of the Muslim population in the country; non-Islamic countries are not subject to quota restrictions. Take Britain for example, its Muslim population is only 2.6 million, but the average number of Muslims to attend the annual Hajj is about 23,000.¹⁵ Before 1985, the Hajj mission led and financed by the government is the only way for Chinese Muslims to participate in the Hajj, but the scale of this kind of Hajj mission is very limited. From 1965 to 1978, the mainland China Hajj mission even completely suspended. Since the implementation of self-financed Hajj in 1985, the increase in the number of Hajj quota is still very limited. Therefore, for many Muslims born in 1940s and 1950s, with the increase of their age, the needs and willing to perform Hajj are becoming more and more urgent. If the annual Hajj quota remains just about 10,000, many people will lose their chance of performing Hajj. Under this circumstance, Muslims with the needs of performing Hajj will inevitably fail to understand or have dissatisfaction with the existing institution. However, if the government adjusts the Hajj quota allocation according to the 1‰ quota for Islamic countries arranged by Saudi Arabia, the quota will be increased to 21,000, and then intention between supply and demand of the Hajj quota will be obviously alleviated. At the same time, to enhance the flexible arrangement of quota nationwide, to allocate extra quota in non-Muslim communities to Muslim

¹³ Yihua Xu, Qian Liu, "Security and the United Front: Double Interpretation of the Religious Policies of PR China," *Studies in World Religions*, No.6, 2011, p.8.

¹⁴ Wen Wang, Wu Wang, "The Sale of Goods Brings Exotic Atmosphere, International Marriage Tells Romantic Stories: Thousands of Arabs Settle in Yiwu," *Global Times*, October 20, 2006.

¹⁵ Seán McLoughlin, "The Politics of Hajj-going in Britain," October 10, 2013, <http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/the-politics-of-hajj-going-in-britain-2/>.

communities, and to avoid the waste of quota, are also important to improve the utilization rate of the existing quota.

Secondly, to turn the inversely proportional relationship between the "official Hajj" and "private Hajj" into coexistence of self-financed and state-sponsored Hajj within the organization of the country. The so-called "official Hajj" is actually the Hajj absolutely led by the government but paid by individuals, and the "private Hajj" is the scattered type at their own expense. Because there is no difference between the "official Hajj" and "private Hajj" in terms of the source of funds, the lack of supplying capacity of "official Hajj" can only lead to "private Hajj". On the one hand, there is the "official Hajj" subject to strict control; on the other hand, there is the "private Hajj" completely out of control. Based on this, it can achieve effective management of the Hajj activities through two lines. First, turn the "official Hajj" into state-sponsored. Through strict selection of a certain number of Muslim elites, they are funded by the government to attend the Hajj, but they must undertake the civil religious diplomacy tasks in the maintenance of national security and exhibit a good national image. Second, in the premise of increased Hajj quota for Chinese Muslims, to gradually abolish the controlling measures on passport based on household registration and other restrictions, so as to enhance the Muslim's sense of equality in the Hajj. For example, to allow Muslims to register for the Hajj with residence permits but not in their domiciles, to grant a passport according to the needs, and allow freedom in international travels, etc.¹⁶ Third, the role of the government should change from "leading" to "guidance", under the premise of guarantee on implementation of national religious policies, disconnecting the specific matters relating to the management of Hajj with local government's achievements, and letting the Islamic associations play a more leading role in the Hajj issue. The China Islamic Association should establish a more reasonable Hajj quota allocation plan based on the dynamic study on the distribution of Muslims in different areas. At the same time, the government should strengthen the policy guidance of travel agency on the Hajj affairs.

Thirdly, introducing the market mechanism into the organization process of Hajj and eliminating price monopoly. According to the characteristics that the Hajj is primarily paid by hajjis themselves, the introduction of market mechanism and the elimination of the price monopoly constitute is a "peoples' livelihood" project, as well as a "popularity-winning" project. Taking Ningxia as an example, in 2012, the cost of a male hajji in the Ningxia Autonomous Region was 36,549 RMB yuan, and a female hajji was 36,450 yuan, and they must pay 40,000 yuan in advance.¹⁷ According to the Yinchuan research team of PRC National Bureau of Statistics, in 2013, the per capita income of urban residents in Yinchuan City ranks No.1 in Ningxia, with

¹⁶ In order to reduce the difficulty of management, Saudi Arabia also have certain restrictions on the "scattered Hajj" visas.

¹⁷ The Islamic Association of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, "Annual Balance Sheet for Hajj in Ningxia 2012," *Ningxia Muslim*, No.4, 2012, p.56.

only 23,776.4 yuan.¹⁸ Therefore, the cost for "official Hajj" is more than 1.5 times more than per capita annual income of urban residents of Yinchuan, and the gap between per capita income of Yinchuan and that of other regions in Ningxia, especially the rural residents, is greater. The Hajj is essentially a faith-based tourism activity, if registration and organization of the Hajj are completed by civil travel agency certified by Saudi Arabia, with market competition of the Hajj tourism, the independent market competition can reduce the cost of the Hajj trip. Of course, once China opens the Hajj tourism market, the Islamic associations will face important transformation. At present, the calculation and collection of cost of the Hajj tourism are performed by the Islamic associations under the guidance of the government, but there is a lack of corresponding market assessment. In this regard, it is worthy of further in-depth study on how to better play the role of the China Islamic Association on the Hajj affairs.

In a word, it should both to maintain national security and create a good national image, but also alleviate the problems of difficulties in the Hajj opportunities; this is a huge systematic project, and should keep pace with the times to let Hajj return to its faith-based cross-border tourism as it originally was. In terms of the Hajj management and organization, it should clarify the specific functions of the relevant departments, introduce market mechanisms, and respect Muslims' rational choice. It can consider the mode that the government making macro policy, the Islamic associations providing ancillary services, and travel agency launching specific business for Hajj, in order to make the Hajj more convenient and affordable for Muslims, reduce rent-seeking power opportunities, gradually eliminate the soil for the "scattered Hajj" which is out of management, and better safeguard national security and national image of China.

IV. Conclusion

In the management of Chinese Hajj, the "official leading model" is reasonable for a long period of time. Nevertheless, the highly political and security implication of Hajj also inevitably brought about disadvantages of "difficulties in the Hajj", and resulted in a series of rent-seeking problems on the aspects of household registration management and passport processing. Therefore, with the development of the times, it is necessary to reconsider the safety problem of the Hajj, and make "de-securitization" adjustment of the existing Hajj management institution, including measures of increasing the amount of Hajj quota, providing official funding for selected Hajj personnel, introducing in the market mechanisms and eliminating price monopoly etc., in order to effectively combine governmental management with market mechanism, to adapt the administrative policies to the status of Chinese Muslim communities, and to resolve the national security problems in Hajj project, thus

¹⁸ Shijun Huangpu, "Yinchuan Urban Residents' Disposable Income Ranks the First in Ningxia, with 23,776.4 Yuan," *Yinchuan Evening News*, January 28, 2014.

giving full play to the role of Hajj in the implementation of the freedom of religious belief policy, the consolidation of national unity and the promotion of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations.

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Özet

Çin'in Hac idaresinde "resmi başat model" uzun bir süre boyunca makul bir yöntem olarak varlığını sürdürdü. Buna rağmen Hac'ın politika ve güvenlikle ilgili etkileri, kaçınılmaz bir şekilde "Hac sorunları" gibi önemli bir dezavantaj yarattı. Bu durum da nüfus kayıtlarının idaresi ve pasaport işlemleri bakımından bir dizi rant sorununu beraberinde getirdi. Dolayısıyla yeni gelişmelerle, Hac'ın getirdiği güvenlik sorununu yeniden değerlendirmek zaruri hale geldi. Bunun yanında mevcut Hac idaresinin kurumsal olarak "güvenleştirilmesine" dönük çabalar da önem kazandı. Bu idarenin alt unsurları bugün Hac kotasının miktarı, seçilmiş Hac personelinin resmi olarak fonlanması, piyasa mekanizmalarının sürece dahil edilmesi ve fiyat tekelinin kaldırılması olarak sayılabilir. Bu alt unsurlarla amaçlanan şey bu sorunun giderilmesinde devletin idaresiyle piyasa mekanizmalarının etkili bir şekilde bir araya getirilmesidir. Bu birliktelik sayesinde Hac seferlerinde yaşanması muhtemel güvenlik sorunları çözülecek, ulusal güvenlik sorunları azalacaktır. Ayrıca Hac seferlerinin bu şekilde düzenlenmesiyle dini inançlara tanınan özgürlük daha da genişletilecek, farklı dinlere sahip vatandaşlar arasında birliktelik sağlanacak, Çin ve Suudi Arabistan arasındaki diplomatik ilişkiler geliştirilmiş olacaktır.