

AN EVALUATION OF THE US DEFENSE CONCEPT OVER THE TURKISH STRAITS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR

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Abstract

Throughout history, the Mediterranean and its surroundings, the core of many empires and home to several civilizations since antiquity, witnessed nations, states and empires struggle to dominate, thereby becoming an important factor in determining their foreign policies. While the region had an important role in the making and sustaining of the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman empires, the colonial Britishers saw it as a prerequisite for controlling their colonies in Asia. During the Cold War, it invited attention from the Americans and Soviet Russians alike as they competed to establish their dominance in the region because of its growing importance in energy transportation. Parallely, with the Turkish straits being key to the Mediterranean, it also brought the attention of Cold War actors to Turkey. This paper mainly examines why the United States (USA) increased its attention over the Turkish Straits and its respective policies toward Turkey at the beginning of the Cold War. Also paper evaluates the economic presence of the USA at the Turkish Straits by using data’.

Keywords: Turkish Straits, Turkey, Cold War, USA, USSR

Öz

Soğuk Savaş’ın Başlangıcında Türk Boğazları Üzerindeki ABD Savunma Konseptinin Değerlendirilmesi

Tarih boyunca, Akdeniz ve çevresi, antik çağlardan beri birçok imparatorluğun merkezi olmuş ve çeşitli medeniyetlere ev sahipliği yapmış, ulusların, devletlerin ve imparatorlukların hâkimiyet kurma mücadelesine tanıklık ederek dış politikalarının belirlenmesinde önemli bir faktör haline gelmiştir. Bölge, Roma, Bizans ve Osmanlı imparatorluklarının oluşumunda ve devamlılığında önemli bir rol oynarken, sömürgeci İngilizler için Asya’daki kolonilerini kontrol etmek adına bir ön koşul olarak görülmüştür. Soğuk Savaş sırasında, enerji taşımacılığındaki artan önemi nedeniyle, bölge hem

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Amerikalıların hem de Sovyet Rusların dikkatini çekmiş ve burada hâkimiyet kurma yarışına girmişlerdir. Paralel olarak, Türk Boğazları Akdeniz'in anahtarı konumunda olduğundan, Soğuk Savaş aktörlerinin dikkatini Türkiye'ye de yöneltmiştir. Bu makale, esas olarak, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) Soğuk Savaş'ın başlangıcında Türk Boğazları'na olan ilgisini neden artırdığını ve Türkiye'ye yönelik politikalarını incelemektedir. Ayrıca makale, veriler kullanılarak Türk Boğazları'ndaki ABD'nin ekonomik varlığını değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Boğazları, Türkiye, Soğuk Savaş, ABD, SSCB

Introduction

Three main factors primarily affect the foreign policy of any country when evaluated from the perspective of contemporary international relations. These are (1) key international objectives; the perception of the world, especially of the leaders who manage states under the one-person rule, (2) the political, military, and geo-strategic power in the world, the nation-state transformation process within a country, and (3) the effect of military interests in foreign policy making; national military capacity and capabilities ¹.

Since the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the main rival of the US over the Turkish Straits during the Cold War, it is necessary to evaluate the USSR's foreign policy throughout history. The USSR, or simply Soviet Russia, was a communist federation for close to three-quarters of the century from the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 till its dissolution at the end of the cold war in 1991. While the USSR emerged as a political successor to Tsarist Russia, it was succeeded by the Russian Federation as the communist bloc dissolved. From the Tsarist period onwards, the Russians pursued a cyclical foreign policy and formed alliances to secure their foreign policy interests, even if that meant setting aside their ideological precepts, like with England after the French Revolution, with France during 1807-1812 (the first period of the Napoleonic Wars), and with England and France between 1894-1917. Similarly, the Soviets developed close friendship relations with Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Pasha [Ataturk] between 1919 and 1922, then the Turkish Republic between 1925-1939 and 1941-1943, the German Republic between the years 1922-1933, the Third Reich under Hitler from 1939-1941, and China between 1924-1927 and 1937-1949 ².

The Tsarist foreign policy was closely influenced by Europe's balance of power following the French Revolution (1789) and the Napoleonic Wars, which was strengthened by exploiting the power vacuum created after Napoleon's death. As naval power became a dominant component of foreign pursuits, control over major maritime routes became necessary. This became a factor in Tsar Peter's pronouncing the pursuit of dominance over the Turkish Straits as his state policy for unhindered navigation in the Mediterranean. While this doctrine took its final shape ahead of the Napoleonic Wars during Catherine II's reign, it was practised in accordance with the reshaped system after these wars. This period also marked the first change in the Strait's policy of the Tsarists.

¹ Garthoff 1961, p. 243-44.

² Black 1962, p. 19.

An Evaluation of the Us Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

The intention and determination of the Tsar to establish a naval base in the Straits are highlighted in a Russian note attached to the Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty (1833)³. This demand for a maritime base was justified as a necessity for protecting Russian naval assets and interests and continued being raised during different periods, like in 1888 by Ambassador Aleksandr Nelidov in Istanbul and Stalin and Molotov in 1945⁴.

Post-tsarist Russian foreign policy was shaped by the priority for security from 1921 to 1947. When World War II ended, all Slavs formed a political union for the first time, providing Russia with an important opportunity for economic growth. The post-WWII dynamics bear similarities with the European balance of powers established with the Congress of Vienna, with an important difference as an order not governed by force but based on power and organized along two blocs emerged.

In the first period, the Bolsheviks accomplished internal order through totalitarian rule, which eventually coalesced into Stalin's one-person dictatorship that sought international acceptance. During this first period, a conflict existed among communists between the intellectual bloc led by Bukharin, Kamenev, Radek and Trotsky and the political bloc led by Lenin, Sverdlov and Stalin⁵. Despite this internal bickering, the Soviets pursued restoration of relations during the interwar period (1919-1939) as their foreign policy, only for the expansionist policies of the Tsarist period to return in the post-WWII period⁶. The pre-and post-WWII periods also marked a second but macro change in the Soviet foreign policy towards the Turkish Straits⁷. During this transformation, the Soviets predictably repeated the Tsarist era demands for sovereignty over the Turkish Straits. However, even though this successor political structure of the Tsarists never fully accepted the Montreux regulations, it did not oppose either because of the rising German and Italian threats.

As much as the communist leadership despised it, their values, approaches, priorities, and policies were largely shaped in light of the historical experiences of the Tsarists only. It was as evident in the negotiations before WWII as during and after. The territorial demands that Stalin made from Nazi Germany, England and the USA towards the end of the war, the desire for a base and control in the Turkish Straits was based on security priorities and geopolitical, as pursued by the Tsarists with minor modifications and any such perceptible differences.⁸ Given this continuity, the post-1945 Soviet policy needs to be evaluated in this context. The Baltic, the Black Sea and Balkans not only formed Russia's natural border with Europe but also became frontlines during crisis times. Following the Czar's footsteps, Stalin established sovereignty over these regions before pursuing dominance over the Turkish Straits. As with the states, diplomatic pressure, supported by military force, was a standard recourse at their disposal. This is well supported by the documents, which reveal that Stalin did not intend to coerce Turkey

³ Crowe 1973, p. 8.

⁴ Crowe 1973, p. 9.

⁵ Carr 2001, p. 17.

⁶ Morgenthau 1993, p. 84–87.

⁷ Black, 'The Pattern of Russian Objectives', 3.

⁸ Lederer 1962, p. XXI.

by using force even as it sought its interests. However, the perceived threat from any state is more decisive than the intention in foreign policy making. According to British intelligence reports, during this period, the Soviets maintained 945 land bases, 40 of which were Mig-15, that could be used in a possible attack on Turkey, of which 135 bombers could take off from sea vehicles⁹.

As did other great powers of the day, the Tsarists adopted coercion in effecting policy changes within the Ottoman Empire during its last years, including forcing the dismissal of grand viziers or foreign ministers by pressurizing the Sublime Porte. The Soviets adopted similar measures as manifested by their post-WWII demand to replace the Saraçoğlu Government for opposing their demands regarding the Straits in 1939. The Turkish Foreign Ministry is reported to have harshly condemned the communication sent informally by Moscow via Bulgarian authorities in January 1946, with Ankara even briefing the British and American ambassadors about these Soviet overtures.¹⁰ Even though these developments do not feature in the official records, however, the then Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Feridun Cemal Erkin, confirmed the development¹¹. Apart from Bulgaria, the Soviets are reported to have communicated such demands through other channels. The Soviet demand was a stark reminder of Prince Menchikov's 1853 trip to Istanbul at the behest of Tsar Nicholas I, during which he had sought the dismissal of Kececizade Fuad Pasha, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Sublime Porte, wishing to maintain stability on the Russian front, acceded to this demand leading to Fuad Pasha's resignation. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether it was only the Tsarist pressure or if other factors existed to force the minister's ouster. History appeared to repeat itself with the resignation of the Saraçoğlu government in August 1946, which Recep Peker's government replaced¹².

As Stalin settled in the Balkans near the war's end, Turkey was forced to make major concessions in the Straits. Amidst the threatening and mutually distrusting environment, the world got divided into capitalist and communist blocs. As much as the capitalist bloc alleged that the Russians were attempting to destabilize the world by re-exporting communism, the communist bloc condemned the US-led capitalist bloc for seeking their destruction. In this global political struggle, extending from the Pacific to the Urals and South America to the Chinese steppes, while on paper the Turkish Straits appeared insignificant, however, its geostrategic nature as a key to the Mediterranean and the oil-rich Middle East increased its importance manifolds. This drew Stalin's intense diplomacy, including implementing threat policies to settle in the Straits during the last three years of WWII.

Consequently, the Turkish suspicions towards this northern neighbour and its foreign policy because of the hysterical historical repetitions made it incumbent for the Turks to guard against any Soviet misadventures. It further followed the developmental trajectory of Moscow, particularly its military power, to have a long-term view of the

⁹ *FO 371/104356*, General HQ, 1953.

¹⁰ *FRUSDP, The Near East and Africa 1946....*, s. 809-810.

¹¹ Erkin 1980, p. 276-77.

¹² *TCRG*, S. 6386, 15 Ağustos 1946. s. 11089-11097.

An Evaluation of the US Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

socialist system's sustainability. The 1946 intelligence reports from the Soviets revealed increased corruption and political oppression in the communist federation, with more people going hungry, slow-paced technological development, ever-decreasing wages, and inefficient scientific studies. These determinations of the period following WWII also encouraged the pro-US attitude of İnönü's administration, whose developmental story was perceived positively against the Soviet stagnation.¹³

Turkey, which did not participate in the Second World War, was one of the countries most affected by the war. On the one hand, the economic difficulties and on the other hand, the demands of the Soviets left Turkey in a difficult situation. In such an environment, the Turkish government, which approved Marshall aid to get rid of Russian pressure, got closer to the western bloc led by the USA. Thus, Turkey has turned into a field of struggle between the USA and the USSR. However, due to its geopolitical location, its proximity to the energy resources in the Middle East and its connection between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits have become an important place for both the Soviets and the USA. Thus, in the early years of the cold war, a political and economic struggle began between the USA and the Soviets over the Turkish Straits. In this study, the historical process of the US foreign policy, the rapprochement of the USA with Turkey and the subsequent effect of the USA on the Turkish Straits were evaluated in the light of archival sources and data.

1. US Foreign Policy and the Turkish Straits

The USA implemented six different security strategies since its establishment, categorized as (1) Continental Defense concept until the Napoleonic Wars between 1783-1815, (2) Continental Defense and Commercial Posture until the Spanish War between 1815-1898, (3) 1906 Concept for controlling the Atlantic Ocean during which Monroe Doctrine became the source of legitimacy for American isolationism, (4) Concept of establishing defense in the Northern hemisphere 1938-1941, (5) Concept of Perimeter Defense in Depth between 1943-1949 during and after WWII, though not been fully implemented, and (6) The Concentrated Defense in Depth during the Cold War, 1950-1989, which was directed at the Soviet Union and North Korea¹⁴.

Towards the end of World War II, the Eastern Mediterranean stood out with its historical importance and having more than $\frac{3}{4}$ (three-quarters) of the world's oil reserves. As the Turks and Soviets continued their hostility over the Straits, Washington strengthened its domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. This also saw the growing convergence of Turkish and American interests in the region, with Washington seeking to keep to contain the communists and Turkish state control over the Straits.

Put into practice immediately after WWII, this aimed to dominate the Mediterranean, which was deemed as an extension of their area of influence of the Atlantic Ocean. For its effective implementation and securing American national interests, including access to energy resources, it became necessary to exercise control

¹³ BCA, 20.12.1946/30100.101.624.12.

¹⁴ Pettyjohn 2012, p. 62.

over the Eastern Mediterranean, the core of the Middle East, and keep the Soviets away, both militarily and ideologically. The American naval forces began patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean as part of this strategy ¹⁵.

The Americans took tangible actions to mark their presence permanently to contain the spread of communism in the immediate neighborhood of the Eastern Mediterranean and its interiors. It included dispatching a naval force under the Sixth Fleet sent to the region towards the end of 1946 by James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy. It was also decided that the Sixth Fleet would maintain a permanent task force to ensure peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. When the Sixth Fleet took over, with the exchange of notes with the Soviets, Ankara restrained from any action but stood guard against Soviet machinations. The Sixth Fleet was equipped with a nuclear pre-receptive response mission against the Soviets in 1950. During this period, the US Navy maintained 15 larger and more powerful warships than their counterparts, which could be classified as capital ships within limits set under the Washington Treaty of 1921¹⁶.

From the 1920s onwards, the different American administrations prioritized protecting its interests, including strengthening American oil companies' position in the Middle East. During WWII, President Roosevelt entered a Lending and Lease Agreement with oil-rich Saudi Arabia in exchange for regime security, providing exclusive oil exploration rights to American companies like Aramco. This kind of agreement not only provided the US with credible allies in the form of Arab monarchs and drove its economic, military and political supremacy in the region but also fostered its domination of the global energy market, including its production, transportation and prices. This extensive regional presence allowed the US to keep the Soviets under check, both in the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. The strategy succeeded with the Americans, by the 1950s, establishing their dominance over Middle Eastern oil through five of the seven oil companies in the region, except Iran, where British Petroleum (BP) prevailed. The oil politics gained notoriety in the region when CIA and MI6 succeeded in overthrowing Iran's Mohammad Mossadegh's government in 1953 to protect the western oil concession in that country after he nationalized the Iranian oil industry¹⁷.

In the first ten years of the Cold War, the United States maintained its military presence in 35 countries, dispersed from the northern to the southern hemispheres, aimed at containment around the Soviet Union. Seven of these bases were established in the countries on the Mediterranean coast. This included Turkey and Greece, which were important in keeping the Soviets militarily off the Eastern Mediterranean ¹⁸. Stalin's policy of threatening Ankara toward seeking Soviet presence around the Straits allowed the Americans to court the Turks in their sphere of influence.

President Truman, in a radio address on August 9, 1945, illustrated that the US sought to extend its dominance beyond the Eastern Mediterranean into the Danube and the Rhine, deemed a prerequisite for establishing a network of sea lines opening into the

¹⁵ Er, Korkut, and Er 2003, p. 24–25.

¹⁶ Herrington 1969, p. 4–9.

¹⁷ Kaufman 1977, p. 937–39.

¹⁸ Pettyjohn 2012, p. 68–70.

An Evaluation of the US Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

Black Sea, and from there to the broader world through the Turkish Straits. The commercial connection lines were to be established in concurrence with England and Russia, and access to the North Sea was to be granted through the channels. The plan implementation related closely to the transition regime applicable in the Straits¹⁹. At the same time, given how this policy implementation would unfold lacked any clarity in the absence of a credible strategy on the part of Washington, it stayed clear of taking any clear position on the Straits. Henry Kissinger's account supports this assertion, which notes there lacked consensus in the American administration over it by the end of 1945²⁰. In September 1945, the Americans even sought the British government's views on the Soviet demands for Iran, Iraq, Kars, Ardahan and the Straits²¹.

Washington's policy orientation marked a gradual shift with the appointment of George Marshall as the Secretary of State and following an 8,000-word long telegram from George Kennan, its diplomat in Moscow, on February 22, 1946. In his cable, Kennan highlighted how a synthesis of ideological communist imperialism and Tsarist expansionism shaped the post-war Soviet foreign policy. The telegram further highlighted that the communist Soviet regime, like its predecessor Tsarists, was seeking a gateway to the Black Sea, as evidenced by their requests for a base in the Dardanelles²². The telegraphic cable has been considered the beginning of the cold war and the division of the world into two blocs, organized around the US as the capitalist bloc and around the USSR as the communist bloc.

2. Straits and US-Turkey Rapprochement: US Defence Perception

After prioritizing its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, Washington started backing Turkey from 1946 onwards, given the latter's geostrategic location and the significance of the Turkish Straits for its regional interests. An exaggerated campaign by the American press against the Soviet military manoeuvres also influenced the US administration's decisions^{23 24}. Despite not being a signatory to the Montreux Convention, Washington understood the significance of the Straits to its Middle East policies. In this context, Article 3 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, in force since October 1, 1929, between the US and Turkey, assumed importance as it guaranteed the American merchant ships free navigation in the Turkish waters and the Straits under the principle of reciprocity. A second treaty, including a provision concerning the Straits, entered into force on November 20, 1939. The treaty Article 6 stated that "the two states would treat other's merchants under the principle of the most permissive nation." Though

¹⁹ Knight 1977, p. 241.

²⁰ Kissinger 2015, p. 427.

²¹ CAB121/569, Secret telegram No. 6127 from Washington to Foreign Office. 9 September 1945.

²² Kissinger 2015, p. 429.

²³ LAT, 'Soviets U.N.O. to Solve Own Problems', *Los Angeles Times*, 3 January 1946.

²⁴ CDT, 'Hears Russian Tanks and Cavalry Rush Toward Tehran and Turkey', *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 13 March 1946.

without explicit reference, it also regulated the passage of American ships through the Straits.²⁵

Within two months of George Kennan's cable from Moscow (February 22, 1946), the US government sent the body of Turkish Ambassador Münir Ertegün, who had died in Washington during the war, to Istanbul onboard the US Navy's capital ship Missouri Battleship²⁶. The Americans used the Missouri warship, which departed from the US on March 22, 1946, and anchored in Istanbul on April 5, 1946, as a symbolic gesture to extend an olive branch of solidarity to Ankara, given Japan's surrender treaty was signed aboard the ship on September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay²⁷. This act of American solidarity attracted Turkish appreciation, including from Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu²⁸.

The US decision to support Turkey radically changed the power balance in the Straits and the broader Middle East from 1946 onwards. These developments surprised the Soviets, led by Stalin, who did not expect such a radical shift. In this way, Turkish Foreign Policy started shadowing the Americans 116 years after the 1830 Treaty of Navigation and Friendship between the Americans and the Ottomans²⁹. The Soviets could blame only themselves as Stalin's threats forced Turkey into an alliance with the US, which continued influencing Turkish foreign policy for decades.

With the increased American influence in the region, the Soviets led by Khrushchev started catcalling Turkey, Greece, Pakistan, Australia and even Socialist Sweden as the American imperial satellites for their alliance with Washington³⁰. The Truman Doctrine, which envisaged aid to Turkey and Greece against Soviet expansionism, came into force on March 12, 1947. Before the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey had to endure the rumors of British reconciliation with the Soviets on the Straits and a bargain with Syria over Alexandria, only to be refuted by London³¹. This manifested Ankara's close guard and concern over the developments in the north and south of the country before entering into an agreement with immense consequences for the region.

Given its importance, the Soviets left no opportunity to bring back the Turkish Straits on its agenda. It successfully ratcheted the issue when the dispute over the status of the Spitzberg Archipelago off Norway resurfaced in the mid-1940s. This archipelago, discovered in 1595, became an international issue with multiple claimants, including Russians, from the 1870s onwards and was categorized as terra nullius land until 1920, only to be given under Norwegian control in 1927³². However, the Soviet claims over the Straits were misplaced as there lacked any similarity between these cases, with the

²⁵ CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030004-2-1947, *The Problem of Turkish Straits*. s. 28.

²⁶ BCA, 06.04.1946/30100.11.65.2.

²⁷ NYT, 'The Mighty Missouri Casts off and Heads for Turkey', 23 March 1946.

²⁸ BCA, 06.04.1946/30100.11.65.2.

²⁹ Köse 2015, p. 241–76.

³⁰ Brynes 1962, p. 129.

³¹ FO 501/1, Document No. 7, despatch No. 49, from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Sir D. Kelly, 3 March 1947.

³² TBMM TD, B. 35, O. 1. 24 January 1947. s. 49-50.

An Evaluation of the US Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

Turkish administration having maintained uninterrupted control over the Straits for 494 years.

As Britain declared in February 1946 that it would be unable to fulfil its security commitments towards Greece and Turkey, Americans emerged as the natural successor to the English and implemented the Truman Doctrine in letter and spirit. For Washington, having Turkey, with its strategic location and control over the Straits, on its side assumed importance to control the Middle Eastern oil, limit the Soviet access to the Eastern Mediterranean and its surroundings, and contain the spread of communist influence to Turkey and Greece. Consequently, the US government sent a delegation of technicians and experts to Turkey in April 1946 for aid allocation³³. The road experts in the delegation examined the existing road infrastructure. While a group was examining the roads in Thrace, their main area of interest was concentrated on the Mersin-Maraş line. The Turkish government even gave the Americans unhindered access to its secret military sites, including confidential information³⁴. The expert delegation impressed the Turkish government on stopping the Soviet expansion. The Soviet threats to Turkey over the Straits eventually lost their efficacy by 1947³⁵.

With the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, Ankara feared that the Soviets might increase their belligerence over the status of the Straits following Moscow Conference amongst the allied foreign ministers on Germany's political establishment in March 1947. The Turkish fears were reinforced by the prevalent communist propaganda in the Soviet dominated eastern bloc countries, which described their demands around the Straits as non-rescindable and a matter of prestige³⁶. It was further exacerbated by the intelligence reports to the General Staff claiming that the Soviets were preparing to ratchet their Straits demands, even though no such development took place. The Soviet policy of threats only facilitated the implementation of the American strategy³⁷.

Within the Western bloc, the continued Soviet intimidation along the Straits threatened British interests in Turkey, forcing London to take necessary security measures, including sending a British military delegation which conducted inspections at the military facilities in the Marmara, Bosphorus and Çanakkale, as well as the secret Turkish military facilities³⁸. During this period, the American press ran a pro-Turkish campaign to shape public opinion in favour of Washington's new defense doctrine³⁹, which included playing on the fear of Soviet rhetoric around the Straits⁴⁰. The Turkish press similarly worked to legitimize Ankara's foreign policy shift towards America.⁴¹

³³ *BCA*, 28.04.1947/30100.268.806.11.

³⁴ *BCA*, 07.08.1948/301812.117.59.1.

³⁵ *Vatan*, 'American Delegation in Ankara (Amerikan Heyeti Ankara'da)', 13 April 1947.

³⁶ *BCA*, 25.03.1947/30100.111.700.3.

³⁷ *BCA*, 25.03.1947/30100.111.700.3.

³⁸ *BCA*, 21.01.1947/301812.112.87.15.

³⁹ 'Turkey Held Hurt by Own Ineptitude', 10 November 1947.

⁴⁰ *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, 'Rendova Aircraft Carrier Arrives in Istanbul on April 28 (Rendova Uçak Gemisi 28 Nisanda İstanbula Geliyor)', 13 April 1948.

⁴¹ *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, '5 Ships Full of Material Are Coming from America (Amerika'dan Malzeme Dolu 5 Gemi Geliyor)', 25 March 1948.

As expected, the Soviets had asked Faik Zihni Akdur, the Turkish ambassador to Moscow since 1946, to inform Ankara to refrain from any conversation about the Straits with the western governments. Given that the maximum pressure policy of the Soviets on Ankara backfired, a detailed report of 1947 from Moscow by Memduh Tezel recorded that Stalin deeply regretted its consequences as it strengthened the Turkish alliance with Americans. Reportedly, Moscow even acted against some diplomatic officials it deemed responsible for the breakdown in the relations. Consequently, at the beginning of 1948, Moscow removed Sergei Alexandrovich Vinogradov, its ambassador to Turkey, who had acted like a colonial administrator in Ankara from 1945 onwards, including demands to access German documents, dictations the Turks deeply resented. The new ambassador in Ankara was Alexander A. Lavricef, who had previously served as the Soviet ambassador in Sofia and Head of the Balkan Affairs Department⁴². However, these steps failed to re-establish trust between the two countries, with Prime Minister Recep Peker, within two months of the Truman Doctrine's implementation in May 1947, asserting that the withdrawal of Russian demands was a prerequisite for any significant thaw in their relations⁴³. Moscow eventually withdrew its demands only after Stalin died in 1953.

Americans fortified their Middle Eastern presence by exploiting the Soviet-Turkish schism. As discussed, the Soviet threats pushed Turkey to align its foreign policy with the American axis and join its regional security architecture. However, the American grand strategy for the region lacked any provision for helping Turkey industrialize or transform into an independent regional military power. It considered Turkey an appropriate medium-sized actor that could prioritize American interests, guard Arab oil, and meet Europe's agricultural needs. During the Cold War, though Turks tried to contest this designated role multiple times, it proved futile to challenge Washington. The downsides of this new approach, devoid of balance, control, foresight and evaluation, which started with the CHP under İsmet İnönü and continued with the DP under Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, were experienced in the coming years.

A month before the Truman Doctrine's proclamation in February 1947 and four months after its acceptance in August 1947, the American General Staff actively engaged with British allies to evaluate and determine the available policy alternatives in case of a war with the Soviets. These meetings resolved that should war break; the US-led alliance should control the Straits, ensure the security and logistics of the American Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, and keep away the Soviets from Middle Eastern oil. At a meeting in November 1947, the military and diplomatic officials from the US and Britain described Greece and Turkey as vital to Western interests in their joint assessment of the prevailing situation⁴⁴. In the context of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey provided the necessary depth of security for both the Sixth Fleet and the Arab oil fields. Even as the Americans sought to ensure Turkey's pro-American stance in the face of a possible war, Turkey remained neutral despite all the pressure and insistence.

⁴² *BCA*, 18.02.1948/30100.60.369.8.

⁴³ *Vakit*, 'For a Permanent Friendship, Russia Should Take Back Its Demands (Devamlı Bir Dostluk İçin Rusya Taleplerini Geri Almalıdır)', 28 May 1948.

⁴⁴ Rosenberg 1976, p. 55–56.

An Evaluation of the US Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

In the archive documents, it is seen that London was openly worried that the Soviets would invade Turkey in 1951 and that Kuwait would come under Soviet threat⁴⁵. This information was shared with the USA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Government thought, or so it was intended to be believed, that the US had created a common defense concept with Turkey. However, the defense planning in Washington was designed to protect the Middle East oil and not Turkey. It was believed that in case of a possible USSR attack, by the time the Soviets could be stopped south of the Taurus Mountains, the communists would be all over Anatolia. With the American road experts also assessing in Thrace, it was believed that preventing the Soviets from advancing to the Mediterranean would require closing the Straits. Whereas this defense strategy was unfavorable to Turkey, it raises questions over the integrity of the political will and the ignorance of the military staff that acquiesced to such policies unquestionably. An overwhelming electoral victory in the May 1950 general elections witnessed Adnan Menderes-led Democrat Party (DP) de-seat Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party) government. As stated, the perceptible Soviet threats influenced the Turkish government to provide American military and civilian experts unhindered access to secret military sites and confidential information to conduct investigations in its different regions until 1950⁴⁶.

The financial and military aid component accrued a significant position in Turkish-US relations. Notably, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the Turkish Army had failed to modernize to the level where it could fight Soviet threats in the context of the Cold War and hence required imminent modernization, which required American aid⁴⁷. In this context, a US delegation arrived in Ankara in 1951 to discuss major economic issues and financial assistance for Turkey. For Ankara, the aid component it received under the US Marshall Plan of 1948 for the post-war European reconstruction was insufficient and hence needed additional assistance. The plan details methods for grants, loans and cash purchases. Only food, clothing, construction, health and social aid materials were included in the grant⁴⁸. The costs of the materials in question were not very high and had a kind of post-war rehabilitation application. As Turkey refrained from active war participation, it was not included in the program initially to only join later voluntarily⁴⁹.

Contrary to popular belief, a significant portion of the Marshall Program allocation was not grants but low-interest loans with long-term payments of 15 years. These loans were not gratuitous, though "help" made it look like so. The most disadvantaged aspect of this plan was that the aid was allocated to areas the US commissions deemed appropriate, with the materials only purchased from the Americans. It started with İnönü Government and continued with the DP government making the Turkish economy and

⁴⁵ *DEFE 5/40*, Proposed expansion of the oil refinery, The Defence of Kuwait in War. 5 December 1951.

⁴⁶ *BCA*, 14.03.1949/301812.118.105 .3.

⁴⁷ *BCA*, 06.03.1951 / 30100 . 60.373.3.

⁴⁸ Aydınalp 1948, p. 163–73.

⁴⁹ *BCA*, 28.06.1948/30100.219.476.18.

industry externally dependent and, importantly, making the Turkish military dependent on American hardware.

While seeking additional assistance, Ankara insisted that Turkey endured the weakest economic situation and the lowest standard of living in the Western Bloc, with the lowest number of calories and subsistence per capita. In the first years of the CHP, it became impossible to eliminate the shackles of backwardness resulting from aphorism, unfair practices during the war, extortion, black marketing, undeserved enrichment, and uncontrolled administration, which left the Atatürk's industrialization process inconclusive. Additionally, a large part of the state budget, between 40% and 60%, was allocated to military expenditures due to post-war security concerns, a burden reflected in the reports of the Paris Economic Organization⁵⁰.

During this period, though the Soviet threat had lost its effect on Turkey, it continued to be an obstacle to US regional interests. Resultantly, US General Bradley, during his October 1950 visit to Ankara, asserted that the American military aid to Turkey would continue. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes sought support for producing small arms in Turkey, which the US, French and British military representatives welcomed. During this period, more than 300,000 active-duty soldiers and nearly 30 thousand officers were under arms in Turkey. Turkey demanded increased aid to ensure the security of the Middle East, the Balkans and NATO's right wing⁵¹.

Financial aid, given according to the Snoy-Marjolin formula, to Turkey was 2.2% of all foreign aid till the beginning of 1951. Of this, only 1.1% of this aid was in the form of direct aid. During the intensive aid of 1949-50, Turkey received \$59 million direct and \$74.5 million circulation rights from the Marshall Aid fund. It was not a grant but a long-term low-interest loan obliging the purchase of American goods. Though the US Congress began to reduce the amount of aid from the 1950s onwards, Turkey continued demanding an import surplus that could provide it with a new income of \$336 million in addition to \$88 million worth of military supplies⁵².

One of the reasons for the aid issue to come to the fore was that Washington had announced reorganizing Marshall Plan Aid and determining the aid rates accordingly by considering the military contribution of participant states. Consequently, first, the Ministers of State and Finance and then Prime Minister Menderes met with the Mission Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which Congress established to manage the Marshall Plan. During the meeting, American representative Dorr stated that a part of Turkey's budget deficit should be covered through emissions (printing money), which Ankara refused⁵³. Until 1953, Turkey received \$1 billion in aid from the United States, of which \$850 million was for military expenditures and \$150 million for other expenditures⁵⁴.

⁵⁰ *BCA*, 06.03.1951/30100.60.373.3.

⁵¹ *BCA*, 14.10.1951(?)30100.60.373.8.

⁵² *BCA*, 1953/30100.103.646.9.

⁵³ *BCA*, 06.03.1951/30100.60.373.3.

⁵⁴ *BCA*, 1953/30100.103.646.9.

An Evaluation of the US Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

At the same time, Turkey and Greece were admitted to NATO despite some opposition in the US Senate⁵⁵. In these years, American warships frequently navigated the Straits and docked in Istanbul, though they did not go to the Black Sea. The aircraft carriers arriving in Istanbul navigated within the Montreux conditions⁵⁶. Without violating Montreux conditions, the ships from American Sixth Fleet routinely patrolled the Black Sea every six months and displayed the American flag to establish their supremacy even as the Soviets closely watched⁵⁷.

In addition to the rapidly rising American influence in Turkey and the region, Britain wanted to include Turkey in its Middle East command, and consequently, intense diplomatic activity was initiated⁵⁸. Through this, Britain could secure its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and maintain its control over the Middle East⁵⁹. Soviets considered the Middle East Command a threat to its security. A naval force stationed in the eastern Mediterranean could easily pass through the Straits and launch an unexpected, sudden attack against the Soviets like those carried out during the Tsarist period.

Though the Soviets were not wrong in their concerns, the threat was unlikely to come from Britain's Middle East Command but the US activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Evidently, American Sixth Fleet continued efforts to establish its comprehensive control network in the Eastern Mediterranean during this period. In this context, a NATO exercise, with the Sixth Fleet in participation, was conducted in the Aegean between 13-16 March 1953. Dumlupınar Submarine represented Turkey in the exercises. It was believed that in the event of a sudden Soviet attack, the Sixth Fleet would pass through the Straits and defend Turkey with aircraft and ships, regardless of Montreux⁶⁰. Two weeks later, on April 1, Dumlupınar participated in the second exercise called Mavideniz and participated in the manoeuvres accompanied by the Sixth Fleet. While Dumlupınar was returning to its base on April 4, it collided with the Swedish flag Naboland freighter off Çanakkale Nara Cape and sank, leaving 81 Turkish naval soldiers dead⁶¹. The accident's cause revealed the freighter was navigating in the wrong lane. For reasons addressed above, Turkish Naval ships actively participated in the exercises with the Sixth Fleet. However, it has been observed that the US and NATO's post-cold war defence plans were framed to counter such a possible attack, not in the Straits or the Black Sea, but on the Maraş-Urfa line.

2.1. The Situation of Trade Ships of the US and USSR in the Turkish Straits

Aside from the access to Middle Eastern hydrocarbon resources, the military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean was deemed vital for securing American merchant

⁵⁵ *BCA*, 18.03.1952/30100.61.374.7.

⁵⁶ *BCA*, 14.10.1953/301812.133.82.20.

⁵⁷ Ackley 1972, p. 55.

⁵⁸ *BCA*, 12.06.1952/30100.102.635.1.

⁵⁹ *DEFE*, 5/41, Middle East Defence Organization, Copy of letter from FO to Secretary Chief of Staff Committee. 27 August 1952.

⁶⁰ *TBMM TD*, B. 69, O. 1. 16 Nisan 1953.

⁶¹ *TBMM TD*, B. 69, O. 1. 16 Nisan 1953.

ships and the Straits from any Soviet domination. Since its independence, the USA, a mercantilist state, had failed to break the British maritime trade monopoly until WWII. The Britishers controlled around 31 per cent of global maritime trade and one-third of shipping lines by 1937, with the largest number of civilian ships navigating through the Straits⁶² (see Table I). However, by 1945, this balance of trade in the seas changed in favour of the USA because of its intensive ship production during the war, new technologies and the American monopoly in oil transportation. In the next 25 years of the American establishment of hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean, the world maritime transport, primarily oil, increased sixfold from 490 million tons in 1948 to 3.2 billion tons in 1973, whereas oil transport jumped ninefold, constituting 60 per cent of all the transportation.⁶³ This pushed the Turkish Straits to the centre of cold war politics between the US and the USSR.

The transit figures shown in Table I explicitly highlight how the commercial importance of the Straits increased manifold from the pre-Cold War period, when the American share of trade was at its lowest through the Straits, to the Cold War period, with the US turning into hegemonic military power and dominating the trade, naval fleets and economy. In the period between 1872-1941, of which recorded details are available, the average annual transit through the Straits was approximately 10,461,221 tons, which translates into an average daily transit of around 1062 tons. The daily log in the Table shows an average of seven ships passing through the Turkish Straits per day till 1935, including mostly from England, Italy, Greece and Russia, with the American-origin ships remaining insignificant.⁶⁴

The transition figures reflect why the Turkish Straits assumed importance for the Britishers before and after WWII and the Americans after the war. In 27 years, the sources, though not fully verified, reveal that the 5 million tons weightage of the USA's merchant ships through the Straits was significantly lower than Britain's 50 million tons, Italy's 48 million tons, Greece's 33 million tons, Russia's 12 million tons and Germany's 10 million tons. The recorded data appears irregularly on account of wars and blockades during the 1872-1941 period, making it difficult to calculate all the tonnages, even as an average weightage could be projected from the transition figures. During the first 20 years of Montreux, 47,267 merchant ships weighing 102,077,734 tons passed through the Straits, excluding Turkish-flagged ships and warships. In the 15 years after Montreux until 1956, the annual average passage through the Straits was recorded at 3.151, which is 8.6 ships/day. The WWII period of 1941-1945 is excluded from the above calculations as the navigation of merchant ships through the Straits remained either limited or near nonexistent.

The available data shows that the maritime traffic through the Straits jumped upwards with increased American engagements in the region. In the pre-war five-year period after the Montreux signing, the annual average of the US merchant ships through the Straits was 73 ships, weighing 223,037 tons. This doubled to 151 ships weighing

⁶² Harlaftis 2014, p. 242.

⁶³ Harlaftis 2014, p. 242.

⁶⁴ Emanet 2003, p. 40-41.

An Evaluation of the US Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

626,095 tons during 1946-57. Interestingly, the number of Soviet ships averaged 219 weighing 526,004 tons, in the first five years after Montreux, which witnessed an almost one-and-half-times increase to 320 ships per year, weighing 824,935 tons, in the first 11 years after the war.

During the same period, the average daily transit of Greek-flagged ships through the Straits was 913, weighing 1,004,612 tons, in the six years after Montreux, which came down by $\frac{1}{3}$ (one-third) to 226 ships per year, weighing 378,710 tons, after the war. However, it should not be overlooked that Greece endured a civil war during the first part of this period. Finally, the annual average number of English commercial ships through the Straits after Montreux stood at 552 ships, weighing 1,721,902 tons, which marginally decreased to 532 ships weighing 846,665 tons. The transition data details and annual transition rates are shown in Table 1.

For the first three years after the war, 1945-1947, the Straits recorded the navigation of the highest number of US merchant ships. The post-war transition rates show that the US policy of establishing control in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean started yielding results rapidly⁶⁵. Despite the Soviet attempts to interpret Montreux to their advantage in 1939 and 1945 and their power policy attempt in 1945-1946, Moscow avoided actions prejudicial to the Montreux convention post-WWII and continued sending tonnage notifications to Ankara uninterrupted during the cold war, as mandated by the convention for its shipping passages through the Straits despite tense Turkish-Soviet relations between 1945-1953.

Conclusion

The USA and the USSR, which acted together against the Axis powers in the Second World War, entered into a great conflict in the post-war period. In this period, the USA and the USSR came face to face in many parts of the world. One of these areas of struggle has been the Turkish Straits. The USA developed a defense concept over the Turkish straits in order to protect its interests in the Middle East and to surround the USSR from the south. Against the increasing Soviet threat, Turkey got closer to the western bloc and became a close ally of the USA with the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan. Thus, the USA gained significant power over Turkey and the Turkish Straits.

The increased American shipping traffic through the Turkish Straits and its growing interests in the region showed that it could not abandon the Eastern Mediterranean and its surroundings as the cold war picked up and consequently made substantial military and economic gains amidst growing Soviet threats. During this intense rivalry period, the military priorities outweighed the commercial significance of the Turkish Straits as oil and natural gas transportation remained minimal, which only picked up in the post-cold war era.

⁶⁵ Rozakis and Stagos 1987, p. 11.

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An Evaluation of the US Defense Concept Over the Turkish Straits at The Beginning of the Cold War

Table 1: Trade Ship Passes Through the Turkish Straits Between 1872-1956 by Nationality⁶⁶

NUMBER OF SHIPS	Ottoman Empire* Türkiye	USA	Germany	Austria-Hungary	Bulgaria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Netherlands	England	Italy	Norway	Poland	Romania	Russia * Soviet Union	Greece	Others	Total			
1872	33.103	4	1781	1.155	--	38	8	272	26	2.379	1.596	230	---	---	822	3.468	---	10.179			
1882	22.447	---	51	500	---	43	17	374	1	3.155	779	77	---	---	651	2.357	13	8.158			
1911	8.158	78	442	1.124	234	234	101	491	122	4.831	698	133	---	40	1.301	2.908	77	13.180			
1914	7.794	66	303	566	138	178	35	429	150	2.007	704	106	---	328	675	1.159	123	6.957			
1932	6.895	43	135	---	72	33	31	145	95	482	668	47	5	196	311	320	143	2.726			
1935	16.255	43	143	---	108	9	7	73	54	535	458	36	59	230	85	182	111	2.133			
Trade Ship Tonnages Passed by Nationalities Between 1872-1941																					
1872	1.020.425																3.858.095	4.878.520			
1882	624.401																5.010.050	5.634.451			
1911	864.578																19.306.487	20.171.065			
1913	906.416	---	733.600	1.615.293		295.038		572.730	199.034	5.370.781	370.302	288.203		350.302	1.428.435	1.958.201	---	14.088.335			
1914	1.080.607																Total foreign tonnage			10.852.742	11.933.349
1920	77.331	266.679	---		---			231.318	46.419	557.353	329.491	---	---	138.537	256.375	331.203	238.109	2.472.815			
1921	18.453	300.277	38.508		---			500.062	121.488	204.065	385.684	---	---	172.885	64.371	559.338	360.277	2.725.408			
1922	29.668	589.778	38.311		---			644.073	210.754	1.488.171	759.062	---	---	284.925	31.042	614.804	473.162	5.164.650			
1923	296.322	222.481	167.651		---			632.087	380.817	1.994.689	1.513.180	---	---	457.564	68.498	276.283	490.606	6.500.178			
1924	715.103	159.938	260.863		87.183	36.173	48.876	570.412	396.799	1.984.783	1.518.052	112.773	5.191	364.134	172.402	827.000	---	7.646.550			
1925	774.000	154.000	469.000		92.000	31.000	151.000	627.000	323.000	2.242.000	1.802.000	169.000	9.000	479.000	196.000	1.270.000	---	9.178.000			
1926	---	126.941	464.337		83.701	143.154	---	825.039	---	2.499.471	2.463.861	362.186	---	550.873	188.022	2.122.861	---	10.643.812			
1927	---	166.809	540.817		87.041	91.422	---	831.429	---	2.080.330	2.624.822	---	---	432.331	295.004	1.539.795	---	9.897.579			
1928	---	203.110	576.943		103.509	22.780	106.509	866.010	397.654	1.915.053	2.214.568	689.853	6.335	468.183	468.891	779.950	---	9.218.371			
1929	---	287.187	643.566		117.673	64.948	112.402	897.847	422.436	2.778.946	3.538.205	905.048	7.197	489.164	572.095	1.243.082	---	12.767.012			
1930	---	468.850	806.860		90.016	167.770	113.968	889.318	531.458	3.669.816	4.551.027	1.108.512	6.916	547.6250	612.713	3.400.512	---	17.864.753			
1931	---	370.802	813.099		---	---	---	1.109.469	669.618	3.604.132	5.016.973	1.451.169	---	605.816	324.472	3.351.389	---	19.198.346			
1932	2.896.385	196.717	619.064		---	---	---	1.011.056	503.676	2.847.770	4.230.477	2.104.843	---	643.038	752.340	2.469.396	---	17.514.641			
1933	---	175.850	655.566		91.143	124.841	103.406	524.625	562.884	2.616.755	4.160.918	2.232.632	---	770.399	985.961	2.974.505	---	17.445.427			
1934	---	147.048	573.083		130.873	101.906	73.454	518.136	423.356	2.586.817	3.414.456	2.165.998	---	749.895	912.792	2.294.990	---	15.504.374			
1935	3.158.885	189.252	452.073		135.792	6.080	45.619	394.250	353.357	1.986.232	2.527.164	968.032	---	654.786	1.614.564	1.861.400	---	12.322.012			

⁶⁶ US Report, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, T-515, January 6, 1945. p. 22-27; Baltali 1959, p. 16-23.. The pieces and tonnage in 1936 are the records kept since August when Montreux came into effect.

İsmail KÖSE - Yasemin KUTLU YÜRÜK

193	2.315. 981	108.51 2	375.32 3		133.0 22	---	24.8 61	291.20 1	152.8 52	923.79 6	798.15 6	229.48 0	235. 264	474.05 9	338.41 0	341.92 9	58.964	4.781.2 32	
6	---	35 pieces	---		---	---	---	88 pieces	---	448 pieces	440 pieces	90 pieces	---	---	160 pieces	384 pieces	---	1.645 ad.	
193	---	207.01 3	754.43 4		180.3 79	57.43 8	30.3 04	1.261. 999	569.1 65	2.601. 497	2.167. 770	959.65 8	187. 289	709.52 6	1.111. 351	1.648. 211	75.584	12.957. 364	
7	---	65 pieces	---		---	---	---	158 pieces	---	1.195 ad.	1.050 ad.	304 pieces	---	---	407 pieces	1.128 pieces	---	4.307 ad	
193	2.875. 777	275.54 5	627.38 4		154.4 13	67.84 0	22.8 81	408.07 3	372.8 42	2.890. 184	1.604. 666	743.70 0	196. 998	647.39 1	740.09 8	1.576. 094	---	10.762. 266	
8	---	89 pieces	---		---	---	---	151	---	1.235 pieces	785 pieces	291 pieces	---	---	333 pieces	1.292 pieces	---	4.176 pieces	
193	3.154. 522	311.35 6	372.81 8		179.7 98	79.97 7	39.2 87	295.44 4	370.7 03	1.501. 004	1.601. 067	546.93 7	7.25 5	845.13 6	314.75 4	930.14 2	---	7.720.2 53	
9	---	103 pieces	---		---	---	---	118 pieces	---	797 pieces	876 pieces	178 pieces	---	---	139 pieces	989 pieces	---	3.200 pieces	
194	2.970. 880	212.75 8	26.263		181.4 82	30.17 0	28.1 33	169.31 2	82.67 0	693.04 0	479.05 1	46.083	---	546.81 6	125.40 9	526.68 2	---	3.238.9 74	
0	---	73 pieces	---		---	---	---	86 pieces	---	282 pieces	420 pieces	13 pieces	---	---	60 pieces	775 pieces	---	1.709 pieces	
194	1.636. 513	---	128.51 0		18.18 3	5.750	---	---	---	138.70 5	11.280	---	---	175.18 0	146.43 8	225.46 4	---	2.575.6 68	
1942	---																		
1943	---																		
1944	---																		
1945	---																		
Second World War																			
194	---	797.12 6	---		---	---	---	20.613	---	797.12 6	19.538	72.399	---	---	495.84 3	142.95 0	---	2.345.5 95	
6	---	181 pieces	---		---	---	---	9 pieces	---	181 pieces	35 pieces	29 pieces	---	---	177 pieces	79 pieces	---	691 pieces	
194	---	787.49 5	---		---	---	---	---	---	228.17 3	127.75 5	125.25 6	---	---	739.70 6	142.54 6	---	2.150.9 31	
7	---	180 pieces	---		---	---	---	---	---	92 pieces	136 pieces	55 pieces	---	---	217 pieces	82 pieces	---	762 pieces	
194	---	753.25 3	---		---	---	---	---	---	834.44 9	571.60 9	306.78 7	---	---	766.60 6	320.65 4	---	3.553.3 58	
8	---	176 pieces	---		---	---	---	---	---	277 pieces	300 pieces	133 pieces	---	---	264 pieces	106 pieces	---	1256 pieces	
194	---	422.42 2	---		---	---	---	---	---	384.53 0	411.82 3	255.06 9	---	---	287.89 2	168.82 3	---	1.930.5 59	
9	---	94 pieces	---		---	---	---	---	---	163 pieces	300 pieces	103 pieces	---	---	114 pieces	60 pieces	---	834 pieces	
195	---	705.50 8	---		---	---	---	10.500	---	463.08 4	705.50 8	286.54 2	---	---	596.63 3	457.94 7	---	3.225.7 22	
0	---	309 pieces	---		---	---	---	2 pieces	---	167 pieces	445 pieces	120 pieces	---	---	267 pieces	177 pieces	---	1.487 pieces	
195	---	590.09 9	---		---	---	---	21.977	---	413.23 4	732.77 4	374.93 0	---	---	577.88 8	383.15 4	---	3.094.0 56	
1	---	123 pieces	---		---	---	---	9 pieces	---	144 pieces	510 pieces	121 pieces	---	---	257 pieces	231 pieces	---	1.395 pieces	
195	---	487.70 9	---		---	---	---	69.671	---	450.21 2	1.092. 441	316.87 9	---	---	533.81 4	493.88 2	---	3.444.6 08	
2	---	101 pieces	---		---	---	---	32 pieces	---	141 pieces	698 pieces	127 pieces	---	---	269 pieces	249 pieces	---	1.617 pieces	
195	---	645.04 8	---		---	---	---	57.097	---	416.39 7	995.33 4	673.20 7	---	---	649.99 0	270.13 3	---	3.707.2 06	
3	---	122 pieces	---		---	---	---	17 pieces	---	144 pieces	650 pieces	195 pieces	---	---	282 pieces	190 pieces	---	1.600 pieces	
195	---	642.40 9	---		---	---	---	272.94 8	---	587.92 3	1.624. 003	1.442. 369	---	---	827.54 9	441.01 9	---	5.838.2 20	
4	---	130 pieces	---		---	---	---	65 pieces	---	193 pieces	929 pieces	359 pieces	---	---	330 pieces	295 pieces	---	2.301 pieces	
195	---	466.62 4	---		---	---	---	289.53 5	---	557.62 9	1.541. 685	1.186. 488	---	---	1.207. 741	573.74 5	---	5.823.4 47	
5	---	126 pieces	---		---	---	---	65 pieces	---	182 pieces	890 pieces	287 pieces	---	---	477 pieces	413 pieces	---	2.440 pieces	
195	---	589.35 1	---		---	---	---	322.06 1	---	490.11 3	1.490. 850	1.099. 027	---	---	2.390. 625	770.96 1	---	7.152.9 88	
6	---	114 pieces	---		---	---	---	69 pieces	---	159 pieces	960 pieces	284 pieces	---	---	868 pieces	609 pieces	---	3.063 pieces	
TO	25.416 .247	13.243 .131	10.138 .073	1.615. 293	1.866. 208	1.326. 287	900. 700	17.571 .321	7.090. 982	63.407 .781	63.877 .281	23.749 .236	661. 445	16.486 .190	23.424 .751	42.312 .103	---	316.39 5.825	
PL.	---	2.021 pieces	---	---	---	---	---	869 pieces	---	5.800 ad.	9.454 ad.	2.689	---	---	4.621 pieces	7.059 ad.	---	17.446 pieces	