

**FROM OTTOMAN TO REPUBLIC
CENTER-PERIPHERY ANALYSIS IN TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE AND
BUREAUCRACY**

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Abstract

Purpose of this study is to prove the effect of center and periphery is the most known reason of the political structure and political struggles in Turkish political culture and state tradition, from Ottoman to Republic. According to some authors like Şerif Mardin and Frank Tachau who interested in the effect of center-periphery in Turkish political structure and state tradition, there is a center which has been captured by some elitist in Turkey. And these elitist persons prevent to the others in periphery. As most of the academician or observer mentioned, the problem in Turkish political life starts at that point. Each side (center-periphery) try to surpass the other. Appointed officers and elected representatives, bureaucrats and bourgeoisie, sultan and his national subject. And the other purpose of this study is to explain the issue with the examples from history.

Key Words: Effect of the center – periphery, Turkish political culture, State tradition in Turkey.

**OSMANLI'DAN GÜNÜMÜZE
TÜRK SİYASAL KÜLTÜRÜ VE BÜROKRASİNDE
ÇEVRE-MERKEZ ANALİZİ**

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Özet

“Türk siyasal kültüründe Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Çevre - Merkez Analizi” isimli bu çalışmanın amacı Osmanlı Devleti ve onun bir anlamda evrimleşmiş hali olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ndeki siyasal durum ve mücadelelerin en önemli etkenlerinden biri olarak çevre - merkez ilişkisinin bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Çevre ve merkez ilişkilerinin Türk siyasal yaşamı üzerindeki etkilerine dair yazıları bulunan Şerif Mardin, Frank Tachau gibi isimlere göre, elitlerin hâkim olduğu bir merkez vardır ve bu merkez çevredeki unsurların, yani sıradan vatandaşın, kendisine doğru olan hareketini engellemeye çalışır (<http://www.anlayis.net/makaleGoster.aspx?dergiid=60&makaleid=1218>, 25 Aralık 2012 tarihinde erişildi). Çoğu akademisyen ya da gözlemciye göre işte tam olarak da sorunlar bu noktada başlamaktadır. Çünkü, devlet düzeneğinde çevre ve merkez arasında bir denge olması gerekirken Türk siyasal kültürü ve devlet geleneğinde tam aksine herbirinin birbirine karşı üstünlük kurma çabası gözlemlenmektedir. Her ne kadar genelde kazanan tarafın merkez olduğu gözle görülen bir gerçeklik teşkil etse de bu karşılıklı üstünlük kurma çabası zaman zaman cumhuriyet döneminde atanmışlar ile seçilmişler; bürokratlar ile burjuvazi arasında ortaya çıkarken, zaman zaman ise osmanlı döneminde sultan ile ayan; seçkin bürokratlar ile teba arasında meydana geldiği gözlemlenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın bir diğer amacı da, konuyla ilgili örneklerin irdelenerek konunun açıklığa kavuşturulmasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çevre-Merkez İlişkisi, Türk Siyasal Kültürü, Türkiye’de Devlet Geleneği.

A -) General Situation In Terms Of Center - Periphery in Ottoman Bureaucracy

When we look at the history, generally there is always a powerful government system in the big states, empires...etc. There are different systems to govern the state. Some of these systems democracy, monarch, aristocracy, tyranny...etc. Some great states or empires were governed by monarchy, some of them were governed by aristocracy, some of them were governed by tyranny...etc. No matter which is it but that is certain every state have a government, administrative system.


Ottoman Empire is also one of the biggest states in the political history. It can clearly be seen that the Sultan was the top of the state organization of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman had control over the religious groups with the reference to the Turkish – Iran state tradition (Heper, 2006). According to Ottoman understanding the state is not effective in every issue except a few issues like security and justice within its borders (Kapucu, Palabiyık, 2008).

The Ottoman State (*Devlet-i al-i Osman*) is very important for Islamic world because of size and duration of the Ottoman dynasty (Black, 2001). The Ottoman was founded by Turkish tribes under the leadership of Osman Bey in 1299 (<http://www.theottomans.org/turkce/tarihce/index.asp>, reviewed on 2 January, 2013). Military has a key factor in the establishing of Ottoman Empire (Tachau and Heper, 1983). These tribes were very effective in Ottoman State until Sultan 1. Bayazid ("*the Thunderbolt*"; 1354 – March 8, 1403). He had transformed the Ottoman to a real state which was managed from center (İnalçık, 1976, s. 26-27.). Ottomans preferred a state organization which occurs from the person who was transformed to Muslim from non - Muslim peoples (*devshirmeh*). Turkish Aristocracy that was acquired from *Great Seljuks Empire (Selçuklu İmparatorluğu)* removed from the administrator in center and jerkwater town with the appointment of the *devshirmeh* group to the critical positions in administration. At this point, statue of the the former aristocrats was determined from the center (Heper, 2006). That is to say, periphery is linked to center. With the centralization, all the agriculture squares belonged to the state. In 1475, the land of the religious foundations were taken from them and were given to timar (Özoğlu, 2004) holder as timar (İnalçık, 1976, p.15).

As it was mentioned above, the centralization of Ottoman started with the *Sultan 1. Bayazid* but it did not finish with him. *Mehmed II (30 March 1432 – 3 May 1481) (Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror)*, *Suleiman I* who is known in the history as *Suleiman the Magnificent* and "*The Lawgiver*" (*Kanuni*) are also effective on centralization. The sultan is the head of the government in Ottoman until the late Ottoman era. So, the leaders were very effective in the

administrative decision process, local administration organizations...etc. This situation comes from the weakness of the periphery.

According to Ottoman – Turkish State Philosophy, Sultan (Padişah) was appointed by the god, to hold together all the various groups of people (Heper, 2006). Grand vizier is under the Sultan and represents him. The duty of the center was to give what the groups deserve, not more, not less (Heper, 2006). “*Circle of justice*” was a given name to this system. According to circle of justice; sultan, military, national subject (tebaa) are linked to each other in a circle.



Circle of Justice

There cannot be a sovereignty of a sultan without a military, there cannot be a military without money, and there cannot be also money without the prosperity of national subject (*tebaa*). At the end, there cannot be any prosperity (welfare) of national subject without “justice”. Consequently, the first principle of the sultan was to treasure to the justice (Gündoğdu, 2009, pp. 1-18.) as the source and leader of the state.

According to Şerif Mardin, Ottoman State was structured on the identity of Sultan (Mardin, 1973, s. 173). Because of this situation, obeying the orders was very important in Ottoman. One of the other meanings of merit was to do what the sultan says (Heper, 2006). So the sultan represents the center. However Mardin mentioned also every “society has a center” (Mardin, 1973) . It can be seen like a dilemma. But it is understandable when we look at the situation of communication tools, transportation system etc. in the boundaries (As it was written in the most of history books, the ottoman state was very rich in terms of land squares, <http://www.theottomans.org/turkce/tarihce/index2.asp>, reviewed on 2 January, 2013).

The ruling class was thought as a mechanism to do what the sultan wants. This classical period institutionalization of Ottoman State was changed from 16.th century to 19.th century. The transformation in shape and volume of the trade, production, valuable mine and because of these transformations increase in price in Europe caused substantial damages in the socio-economic structure of Ottoman State. In addition, the wars in 16.th century did not bring income on the contrary they brought great losses for Ottoman state. Ottoman could not reach to the army level of the developed states. Because of this, it lost so many wars. Then ottomans could not win war booties. Hence, ottomans overtaxed for the peasants. These heavily taxes damaged the timar system. Consequently, timar system was failed. Taxes could not gathered well. Then Ottoman developed a new system. Iltizam was the name of this new system. The right to collect taxes was given to the special persons. It was a kind of privatization and this privatization was usually for annual fee (Retrieved December 31, 2012 from web site: <http://sosyalbilimler.org/iltizam-sistemi/>).

The difference between timar and iltizam systems is that for the first soldiers and officers have the right of collecting taxes; for the latter special persons – this specialty results from richness mostly - have the right of collecting taxes. The iltizam system occurred from the wrong or unsuccessful implementation of timar. The purpose of the iltizam was to create a new budget for the state urgently. On the other hand as a result of the iltizam system, peasants (köylüler) were damaged because of this new system (Heper, 2006). As it is understood above, neither timar system nor iltizam system could be successful for a long time. This ineffectualness created bribe, corruption, injustice...etc. the circle of justice was also damaged. If we do not miss the links among center (state) and periphery (tebaa) in terms of taxes we can realize the changings in the system. As a result of these changings, the position of Sultan was damaged. At the end of this process, Sultan had to give money to his state officers to provide their loyalty for him under the name of enthronement (cülus) (Shaw, 1977). The enthronement (cülus) is not enough to remain on the throne. Sultans had to create their own partisan group (Shaw, 1977). Actually this is a current debate in Turkish politics as well. Every government in Turkey is blaming to create their own partisan group.

Self - interest is also an effective factor on the tension between the center and periphery. As Mardin mentioned, “With the decline of the empire... the officers in Ottoman transformed to a mass of robbing their own communities. Consequently, the relationship among officers and periphery (peasants) was getting worse day by day (Mardin, 1973). By the way “officers had been crueler” (Shaw, 1971). Hence state government became a noncompliant more than ever before (Gibb and Bowen, 1950). In addition to this, “*adab*

tradition” (<http://www.osmanli.org.tr/yazi-7-202.html>, reviewed on 2 January, 2013) has damaged then clientelism has been clearly seen in the civil bureaucracy and also education in-company training has damaged (Gibb and Bowen, 1950).

In Ottoman state tradition, local gentry could not find any chance to create horizontal links with the other local gentries. Periphery could not get strong in terms of economy, politics and society because of this situation. Thus, the local gentries had to get stronger the links with the bureaucrats of the state. The bureaucrats were composed of three groups. These groups are *ilmiye* (scientist), *kalemiye* (officers), *seyfiye* (military). So, according to Mardin, it can be say that the Ottomans created their own embourgeoisement process (Heper, 2006). As a result of this process, an *Ayan class* – landed proprietor in Ottoman Empire – was created in the periphery by the center (İnalçık, 1980).

In eighteen century, the tension among the center and periphery was getting stronger with the changings in the position of Sultan. During that time the sultan was losing his power day by day. Sultans tried to use a religious meaning for their legitimacy. The efforts of the sultans to use religious approaches were unsuccessful efforts. Why did the sultans prefer to use religious approaches to legitimate themselves and their positions? Because there is an understanding that is (*Zilullah-I fil ard*) “Sultan is the shadow of the god on the earth” (Çaha, 2008). In contrast to the sultan, bureaucrats were getting stronger in the state government. Council of ministers (*Divan - ı Hümayun*) (<http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/katalog/osmanli/fonbilgisi.asp?kurumkod=A.}&ilgilikurumkod=A.}DVN.>, Retrieved 01 January, 2013) was not gathering in the Sultan’s Palace. It was gathering in the place of residence of the Grand Vizier (Sadrazam) (Itzkovitz, 1962).

In nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire was playing the role of constitutional state. There were some cases. For instance; *1808 Senned- I İttifak* (charter of alliance - deed of agreement), *1839 Gülhane Hatt – ı Hümayunu* (The Hatt-i Sharif of the Gülhane - Imperial Edict of the Rose House), *1856 Islahat Fermanı* (royal edict of reform), 1839 and 1876 *Tanzimât reforms...* etc (Heper, 2006. p. 75). These reform efforts were brought some new institutes like central and regional representative assemblies, the first constitution, and the first Ottoman parliament in 1877...etc. The periphery has gained legal status with the reference of the constitutional event. And also it was gaining an advantage over the center. The center which has lost the power made some new laws. These laws were *1858 Arazi Kanunu* (Law of the Land) and *1864 İller Kanunu* (Province Law). These two laws were attempts to increase the control of the center on the periphery (Heper, 2006, p. 83.).

The ottomans realized that the land reforms, land system, taxes system will be the end of the Ottoman State if they cannot be fixed. The land retention efforts illegally, some new laws for registration of land title could not be successful to stop the destroying of Ottoman Empire. In addition, the support that was given by local gentries to the rebels was accelerating the process of collapsing. Secularization efforts, efforts to transform the bureaucracy to a machine, institutionalization efforts were also could not be able to save the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, ideological separation in the Ottoman geography was getting stronger with the help of nationalism. At the end the Ottoman Empire demolished.

B -) Transitional Stage

According to Andrew Mango “The history of modern Turkey falls naturally into two periods: those of Ottoman Turkey and Kemalist Turkey” (Kasaba, 2008. pp. 147). The new state of Turks has founded in a process that occurs independence war (1919 - 1922) (Heper, 2006, p. 93). The new state was created when there were Armenian and Kurdish rebellions in the Anatolia (Heper, 2006). The founding fathers of the ‘republic’ were thought that Anatolia can be divided in the direction of nationalism. And this thought is background of the kemalist approach (Mardin, 1973, p. 177). There was a very big changing in the society in Anatolia during the transitional stage because of land losses, exchange of population. Minority groups were marginalized with the effect of these events (Mango, 1976). According to Andrew Mango, “The population of Turkey, within the boundaries recognized in Lausanne, is estimated to have fallen by nearly 3 million to 13 million between 1914 and 1923” (Behar, 1996). The Lausanne Treaty was also the proof of the new State.

There were some efficient characters in the process of national struggle. Mustafa Kemal – he has known as *ATATÜRK* as well – was one the most efficient of them. Actually most of them were soldier. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), İsmet İnönü, Kazım Karabekir...etc. This situation can be a good point to explain where the militarist effect comes from in Turkish political culture.

Mustafa Kemal is most known leader of Turkish national struggle. He organized the people to the struggle. Then started the national struggle. This is the well know part of him. But the most important points of Mustafa Kemal are his views, ideas, thinking... they are important for an important reason. And that reason to show us the differences among the intangible and tangible versions of their reflections. In terms of legitimacy, when we concentrate to situation of Sultan, he was the just absolute monarch (*Saltanat – ı Şahsiye*) according to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II, 1959). And at the

same time he has thought that this situation was the main reason of the ineffectiveness of the periphery (Heper, 2006). Mustafa Kemal was created a solution to this old problem. And that is to say: “people’s state” (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II, 1959). Insomuch that, this new state would be founded by the people (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II, 1959).

According to Mustafa Kemal, during the long war periods, economic problems have damaged the peoples. So much that they led the enemies to occupy their country. Consequently “they must be lightened and also concentrated in order to do something in the name of national struggle” says Mustafa Kemal (Nutuk, 1934). Mustafa Kemal was a big chance to periphery. But this is just in theory. The practice is quite different. He realized that people are ignorant and that’s why they could be deceived and used for any purpose (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II, 1959). Because of the ignorance of the people, “we must give shape to people” said Mustafa Kemal (Heper, 2006). This idea is the background of structure of the the republic in terms of indoctrination. And this ‘giving a shape to the people’ has understood as ‘social engineering’ in Turkish political culture.

The new order was created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his close friends. This new order was a kind of tranny. Mustafa Kemal was the leader and everything that he said has accepted as a rule. So that he was a kind of mortal god for most of supporter of Mustafa Kemal. Despite Mustafa Kemal’s efforts “Credo of Turk” (*Türk’ün Amentüs*) was written in 1928 (<http://www.haberajanda.com.tr/contents/files/dergiler/ekim2012/estep/assets/basic-html/page80.html> Rewieved on 5 january, 2013). This shows the structure of the kemalist idea.

Mustafa Kemal and his close friends removed Ottoman’s traces from the civil bureaucracy. As it is mentioned by Şerif Mardin, “Turkish Revolution is not a result of the bourgeoisie that is not satisfied from its position. And also it is not created with the support of the peasants. And also it did not annihilate the old feudal privileges. This revolution was made against Ottoman ancient regime” (Heper, 2006). They send away too many old bureaucrats, they were very dominant in new system. They even barged in the elections of village headman (muhtar). According to Mustafa Kemal, reforms should be in terms of necessity, not the demands of people. Hence they used that slogan “Despite the people for the people” (Halka ragmen halk için) (Heper, 2006). This is the key factor to explain why the periphery could not be get strong in the past. Because reforms were made against the periphery by the center.

C -) Bureaucratic Government in Republic

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk thought that the revolutions and their effects would be rational, practical, and effective. But some results of the revolutions were very bloody. For instance, the hat acts. The periphery was not really voluntary to all the revolutions. But center was powerful. So, bloody or not, everything which Ankara wants has done.

The appointments to the higher order of the civil bureaucracy were based on the political criteria (Bent, 1969). The bureaucratic elites started to be the advocates of the Atatürkist thought. But when the revolutionary impact is weakened, bureaucracy has returned to its old routine (Bent, 1969). When Mustafa Kemal receded on politics and went to the Çankaya Köşkü to interest in “Turkish History Thesis” and “Turkish language thesis” the rebellions has started. İnönü was getting stronger with the rebellions. He was quashing the rebellions. Hence he was getting stronger in the political area. Civil bureaucracy was very active in İnönü era. The deputies was resigning to be a ruler, public prosecutor, governor, district governor...etc. the Atatürkist thought was captured by the bureaucratic intelligentsia then it was transformed to a new style. Firstly it was a world view that defines how should make decision, but right now; it is an ideology that tells what should be done (Heper, 2006). According to this new ideology, Republican Peoples Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) was thought as an instrument to actualize the project of culture revolution. Government was bureaucratized as a result of convergence of the party and the bureaucracy (Heper, 2006). Atatürkist Thought was not a purpose for bureaucratic elites anymore, it was a tool (Heper, 2006). When Mustafa Kemal died there was no obstacle for bureaucratic elites to use Atatürkist thought. And that is certain that using Atatürkist Thought means to push the periphery to do something.

When we reached the years of 1950s, there is a revolution in Turkey in terms of the political life. White Revolution (*Beyaz Devrim*) is a reaction of periphery to the center. Because the peoples had very damaged during one party regime (CHP- RPP). Then they did not vote for RPP (CHP). This was a reaction. These people voted for Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) because of periphery effect. Actually, Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) and its leader Adnan Menderes were a good agent of the periphery. Because Adnan Menderes is a prominent landowner from the Aegean region (Kasaba, 2008). Land and ownership of land are good source to be a part of periphery. The Justice Party was supporting the periphery against the center. Democrat Party has won the trust of the people. Democrat party supported the periphery organizations without making discrimination. Most of them are known as religious groups. The reason of this is the center. Because after Mustafa Kemal and early

İnönü era bureaucratic structure of Turkey has been the center. Mustafa Kemal and İnönü were not optimistic to religious groups in the periphery. These religious organizations and their places were closed. However Adnan Menderes was the voice of the periphery. Consequently, he had well relationship with the religious groups. So this good relation among Democrat Party and periphery organizations disturbed the ‘bureaucratic elites’ (Heper, 2006). In addition, these bureaucratic elites found insufficient politicians and people in terms of democracy (Heper, 2006). Moreover, they considered democrats as a threat to their system, ideology, order...etc. The result of this threat perception has been seen in 1960.

1960 Military Coup is the reflection of this threat perception. Adnan Menderes and some of his closest agents were executed by hanging. This was a kind of ‘*the killing of the periphery by the center*’. The center needed some tools to check the political parties and life. Then these tools were created by junta as ‘The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey’ and ‘The National Security Council’. These tools started to be very active in the name of center.

When we reached the years of 1970s, “political parties in Turkey have tried to transform the members of the bureaucracy to the bureaucrats of the political party” (Heper, 2006). As a result of this, bureaucratic review of Atatürk’s Thought weakened in the political life (Madin, 1978). Bureaucracy and politics conflicted. Hence Political instability and the failures of coalition governments allowed to a new military coup. 1971 Memorandum...

Most active political parties were closed after military coup. That is to say periphery has lost one more time. Because the political parties except RPP (CHP) were representing the periphery. There is no doubt about that RPP (CHP) is always center. Because the Constitution of Republic of Turkey contains the ideology and the arrows of RPP (CHP). Even though RPP (CHP) has stayed out of the parliament. That is to say RPP (CHP) is a kind of ‘hidden political power’.

When we reached the years of 1980s, we have a new military coup. The parliament was abolished by the Junta. Political parties were closed again. In addition to this, the leaders of the political parties were banned from politics for a while. This new military coup brought a new institution for Turkey. Its name is ‘Institution of Higher Education’ (YÖK) (<http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.2547&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=> reviewed on 03, January 2013). With this military coup, it became clear once more that the Turkish Military is the most powerful part of the center in the Turkey. The result of the 1980 Military Coup was awfully for the periphery. Too many people were killed; too many clubs and institutions were banned...etc.

Turkey needed a development after these events. Then there is a new political figure in the Turkish political life. The name of this person was Turgut Özal. Özal has caught the spirit of the times. Turkey was developing with his efforts. There is no doubt that he comes from the periphery. Because he is a Kurdish originally. He was also the first and the only Kurdish president of the Turkish Republic. But he was unlucky. His death is a “suspicious” death still.

When we reached 1990s, the periphery was waking again with Necmeddin Erbakan. He is a good example to the periphery. He represented and supported to the little entrepreneurs in Anatolia. Most of his votes came from the religious peoples. Hence he was directly in the periphery. Because religious groups were in always periphery. In this case we have an exception. The Alevi community has supported to the center (CHP) most of the time. Such that the leader of the most centralist party is an alevi currently. Because the alevi people were captured by the kemalist elites.

When we reached 28th of February in 1997, there is a new and the “last” military operation to the politics. This military coup is known as post-modern coup. The military coup was against to the coalition of True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) and Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). That is to say the military – as an element of the center - involved in politics one more time...

When we reached these days, most of the figure in politics was affected from the center. For instance, the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has also lived in prison for a while because of a poem. There were some laws which are not certain in the constitution. If the center wants to damage someone, it usually uses these ambiguous laws. In short Turkish political structure formed from the conflict among the center and periphery.

Conclusion

As it is mentioned above, there could not be a powerful periphery in the Turkish Political Culture. Actually when we concentrate to the Ottoman State there is a good system to integrate the periphery to the center. Devshirmeh system . . . This system provides to take the persons who live in the periphery then put them in the center. Thus, you can have information about what happens or what can be happen in the periphery. It means it is a kind of controlling mechanism. Hence the center – the sultan during that time – saves its situation against to periphery.

Another proof of this situation is the constitutional or legal infrastructure events in Ottoman Empire. Because 1808 *Senned- I İttifak* (charter of alliance - deed of agreement), 1839 *Gülhane Hatt – ı Hümayunu* (The Hatt-i Sharif of the Gülhane - Imperial Edict of the

Rose House), 1856 *Islahat Fermanı* (royal edict of reform), 1839 and 1876 Tanzimât reforms were not developed by the periphery. They were a kind of grant of the Sultan. This is a result of the periphery comes from a culture which there is not a right to say a word.

When we focus to the minorities in Ottoman. Mostly the trade persons come from the minorities. That is also the most important reason why economic entrepreneurs did not develop from periphery in Anatolia during the early republic era. Because when Ottoman Empire collapsed, most of these riches and trade persons have gone to the other countries.

When we reached to the early republic era, it can clearly be seen that the republic revolutions did not make by the peasants or the other elements of the periphery. Maybe with this reason, the center scared from the periphery and dichotomy. As another result of this fear, the center wanted to control the periphery. For instance; the governors was appointed from RPP (CHP) in early republic era. So much that, provincial chairman of RPP (CHP) was governor at the same time.

When we look at the bureaucratic situation, the bureaucrats are real agents of the center. There is also historical word about this situation. Once upon a time, Süleyman Demirel who is the leader of Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) said that “there are three intitions which block my party! Council of State (Danıştay), Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) and High Court (Yargıtay)” (<http://www.mehtap.tv/makale.aspx?yazar=21&id=3482> rewieved on 2 january, 2013). The current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has olsa a conflict with some bureaucrats. The Prime Minister claimed them about the transformation to the monsieur (monşer) from the officers. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/SonDakika.aspx?aType=SonDakika&ArticleID=1059445&Date=13.02.2009&Kategori=siyaset&b=Erdoğan:%20Monşer%20geldiler,%20monşer%20gidiyorlar>, reviewed on 2 january, 2013.).

When we focus on the society it is too hard to create a powerful periphery in Turkey. Because Turkish society is a totalitarian and militarist society still. Hence state can speak about everything. For instance, YÖK – one of the gifts of the 1980 military coup – has a wearing rule and no one can object to this rule. Not only the students but also the academicians. As another example, incomes of the army cannot accountable still. 20,359,914,000 Turkish Liras was granted to the Ministry of National Defense in the last budget discussions (<http://www.dunya.com/butceden-aslan-payini-maliye-bakanligi-aldi-168977h.htm>, reviewed on 2 january, 2013). And no one did not ask what will be this money...!

When we look at the situation among center and periphery. The loser of this relationship is always periphery. Because most known agent of the periphery has lost their government like Necmeddin Erbakan, their life like Turgut Özal, their government and life like Adnan Menderes. But during all this time the military has a dominant role. That is to say the military is the most known agent of the center with the reference of military coups. In addition to military, RPP (CHP) is also well known agent of the center. Because RPP has the same principles with the constitution. It is a kind of hidden political power even though it is not in the parliament. Maybe this situation is the reason that current Prime Minister Erdoğan said that “We have the power but we could not be able to do what we want” (http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/Cumhuriyet_ve_demokrasi_III/Blog/?BlogNo=252791, reviewed on 2 January, 2013). – “İktidar olduk ama muktedir olmadık” – Who knows maybe this word of Prime Minister can be the best word to explain the situation of the periphery in the Turkish political culture.

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