



## The United States Reaction to the Iraqi Kurdish Issue 1990-1996 \*

### 1990-1996 Yılları Arasında ABD'nin Irak Kürt Sorununa Tepkisi \*

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#### Öz

Körfez Savaşı'nda Irak Baas rejimine karşı zafer kazanan Amerikan koalisyonu, 1991'de savaşın sona ermesiyle birlikte Irak Kürdistanı halkı sorunuyla derinden iç içe geçmiş bir şekilde kuruldu. ABD'nin 1991'de Irak'taki Kürt sorununa ve sonrasındaki olaylara verdiği ikilemli tepkiyi anlamak için, Kürt örgütsel ve siyasi gelişiminin arka planını, 1991 öncesi ve sonrasındaki Kürt siyasi olaylarını incelemek önemlidir. Bu makalede araştırmacı, mücadelenin ana hatlarını ve tarihsel anlatımını, barışçıl girişimleri, Kürt zorluklarındaki yerel ve küresel rolü ve CIA destekli operasyonun başarısızlığına yol açan olayları ve bunların ardından gelen olayları geliştirmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma, bu taraflarla ilgili olarak açıkça ortaya konmamış ayrıntıların değerli bir açıklamasını sunmaktadır. 1980'lerdeki Kürt siyasi durumu ile ABD'nin Kürt sorununa yönelik politikası, Irak hükümetinin Kuveyt'i işgali ve Kürt ayaklanması, Kürt sorununa birleşik yanıt, Rahatlık Sağlama Harekâtı ve Irak tepkisi, Kürdistan bölgesel hükümetinin kurulması, 1993 yılı istikrarlı durum, Kürt iç çatışması, 1996 yılı kargaşası ve Kürt iç çatışmasına ilişkin bölgesel ve iç endişe arasındaki ilişkiye kesin olarak odaklanılmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makale şu gibi bazı sorulara cevap vermeye çalışmaktadır: Kürt sorunu Irak'taki gelişmeler bağlamında nasıl ortaya çıktı? Kürt siyasi partileri Irak'ın gelişme koşullarından fırsat yakalama çabaları nasıl oldu? ABD o dönemde Kürt sorununa nasıl baktı? ABD'yi Irak'taki Kürtlere yönelik politikasını bozmaya teşvik eden koşullar ne tür koşullardı? Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, ABD'nin Irak'taki politikasını ve Kürt sorununun bu politika içinde nasıl şekillendiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kürt sorunu, Irak ABD, Türkiye, , Fransa ve İngiliz.

#### Abstract

The American coalition which became victorious in the Gulf War against the Iraqi Baathist regime, instituted itself profoundly mixed up with the question of the people of Kurdistan of Iraq once the war ended in 1991. To perceive the United States' dilemmatic reaction to the Kurdish issue in Iraq in 1991 and afterward events, it is significant to explore the background of Kurdish organizational and political development previous and the Kurdish political events followed the 1991. In this paper, the researcher attempts to develop the outline and historical account of the struggle, the peaceful initiatives, the local and global role in the Kurdish challenges and the events that resulted in the failure of the CIA supported operation besides the events that ensued. This study showcases a valuable explanation of confidently unexposed specifics related to these parties. Precise focus was placed on relation between the Kurdish political situation in 1980s and the US policy toward the Kurdish issue, the Iraqi government invasion of Kuwait and the Kurdish uprising, the unified response to the Kurdish question, the Operation Provide Comfort and the Iraqi reaction, the founding of Kurdistan regional government, the 1993 year of stable situation, the Kurdish internal conflict, the 1996 year of turmoil and the regional and internal worry for the Kurdish internal conflict. For that reason, this article attempts to answer some questions such as how did the Kurdish issue appear within the context of political developments in Iraq? How did the Kurdish political parties' efforts to take opportunities from the development circumstance of Iraq? How did the US view the Kurdish issue at that

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time? What kind of conditions did encourage the US to shift its policy towards the Kurds in Iraq? Hence this study aims to show the US policy in Iraq and how the Kurdish issue has been shaped within it.

**Keywords:** The Kurdish problem, Iraq, US, Turkey, France and Britain.

## Introduction

In the period of the Iraq and Iran war in 1980 decade, the U.S. delivered indications to Saddam Hussein's government representing that the US wanted to see a heavy-duty Iraq to counterbalance Khomeini's regime, for alarm of the possible special repercussions of the Iranian triumph in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the US delivered substantial support to the Baathist regime in the war against Khomeini's regime. To standstill US shore up to the Baathist regime in the period of the conflict would have endangered huge trade arrangements with Iraq, basically in the field of agriculture (Gibson 2010). The Kurds could have only been seen in the background of the U.S. relations with the regional states in which they were living.

In a verification presented to committee consisted of Senators, an amount of more than \$1 billion carried across to Iraq in 1989, with an additional \$500 million in loans protracted to the country in 1990, was revealed. The Bush government safeguarded the mentioned arrangements by declaring "Based on previous experience, we do not consider that legislating unilateral trade and economic sanctions would help us to achieve US objectives with Iraq" ( Merrick, 1996; Lambert, 1997). Through forbidding US exporters to trade with Iraq, it would refute "U.S. exporters the capacity to compete with foreign exporters who continue to benefit..." The consequences of this backing to the Baathist administration permitted Saddam's regime to make its stance stronger against the Kurds in north of Iraq, regardless of any concern for international reprisal.

Due to this political consent, the Baathist administration committed a number of chemical assaults against the Kurds and enforced relocation activities. The incongruent political groups in Kurdish areas inside Iraq incapacitated their usual aggressions toward these programs, cleaved, as well as founded the (Kurdistan National Front-KNF) in May 1987 (Mcdowall 2003).

The US-Senate Foreign Relations Committee (USSFRC) transported the substance of Iraqi gas assaults targeting the Kurdish people during the closing years of 1980. Also in June 1990, the USSFRC clearly represented that "Iraq is engaged in numerous human rights violations including the depopulation of the Iraqi Kurdistan, the summary execution of tens of thousands of its citizens, use of chemical weapons on its own people". That Committee moreover indicated that "The Reagan administration opposed my [Senator Clair borne Pell] efforts to sanction Iraq for its use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish minority" (Lambert 1997).

In connected verification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, a political figure fortified the Bush government's rule. That official was Assistant Secretary of State James Kelley. Also, he stressed on an extremity to recompense former Iraqi Baathist activities just before the Iraqi Baathist regime incursion into Kuwait. James indicated that Iraq was in talks considering a new constitution that could possibly offer more recognition of human rights (Gök, 2018).

It Needs to be mentioned that from 1961 to 1991 the US adopted different views on the Kurdish issue in Iraq, the US viewed the Kurdish issue as an Iraqi internal affair and did not want to intervene it. The US administrations frequently showed Iraqi governments that they should resolve the Kurdish issue through peaceful means. In this regard the US government would attempt to help Iraq to make an agreement with Kurds and respect their sovereignty. Furthermore, the US diplomats and its

representatives in the region greatly endeavored to collect information on the political developments regarding the Kurdish issue and its effects on the political stability in Iraq. With the political transformations of Iraq, the US has dealt with the Kurdish issue. When the US intervened in the Kurdish issue it intervened through a third party in the region. So, within its historical framework this study endeavors to analyze the international factors that have critically transformed the US policies of Kurds in Iraq between 1990 and 1996.

This paper is a historical study grounded on qualitative analysis of certain secondary sources. This paper used some of the most suitable secondary references related to this paper.

### **The Influence of Iraq Invasion of Kuwait on Kurds and the U.S.**

Once the Baathist regime of Iraq invaded Kuwait, it changed the military circumstances in Iraq. The incursion into the small country permitted Kurdish peshmerga forces to re-organize in Kurdistan of Iraq as a result of Iraqi Baathist regime redistribution of armed forces to the Kuwaiti border (Gök, 2018).

The regime of Saddam was distrustful of abandoning the Kurdish question, endeavored to calm down the Kurdish Front with reconciliation proposals in October 1990. For panic of cooperatively supporting an internationally convicted administration, The Kurds refused this reconciliatory project (Wanche 2002).

Previous to the beginning of US guided military confrontation with the Iraqi regime, the Kurdish Front was cautious of not doing the previous mistakes. These mistakes comprised not challenging full autonomous state, as Mullah Mustafa Barzani had been struggling for in manners if not in expression. Self-government within an Iraqi entity converted the favorite aim. To follow anything away from self-government in a unified Iraq may aggravate similar political projects among Kurds in Iran, Turkey and Syria, thereby encouraging those powers to interfere to contradict the Kurds of Iraq their autonomous administration (Shareef 2010).

Preceding to the origination of aggressions between the US led alliance forces as well as Iraq, Kurdish political officials were watchful of entirely align with the West. In November 1990, Jalal Talabani secretary-general of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) explained that the main point is that they are not exploited by anyone in the Gulf crisis and that they do not end up supporting one side against the other (Lambert 1997). Notwithstanding sensors sent out by Talabani whereas once he visited Washington, the Coalition forces were uncertain to provide explicit backing to the Kurds prior or in the period of the skirmish discouraged by the possibility of the disintegration of Iraq, which was opposing to what the Coalition expected. A united country was observed as a defensive procedure in guaranteeing that inner Iraqi disagreements, for example the issue of the Kurds, would not tumble throughout the country's boundary. A united Iraq was furthermore watched as stopping the opportunity of adjacent states superseding in Iraqi land, thus varying the power equilibrium in the region.

The caution by the Kurds to avoid angering Iraq's adjacent states was vindicated in observations by Turkish President at the time, Halil Turgut Ozal. He indicated that Syria, Iran, and Turkey would not have consented on the occurrence of a Kurdish autonomy in Iraq after the end of the conflict. Conversely, Ozal concurrently directed discussions with Talabani, if an autonomy came into being, anticipating to ensure some kind of authority over such autonomous area by founding discourse timely (Mcdowall 2003).

### **The Uprising of Kurds in Iraq - 1991**

Upon the defeat of the Iraqi Baathist government's military, Shi'ite revolutionaries in the southern Iraq emerges against the Iraqi Baathist government, stimulating Saddam to distract a considerable manage

of his enduring army to attack the uprising (Gök, 2018). With the departure of the major part of the militaries from the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Kurdish Peshmarga forces began growing assaults upon the residual Iraqi armed force trustworthy to the central government in Baghdad. Those irregular assaults developed all the way through Kurdistan, which concluded by the Kurdish Front forces entering Kirkuk and maintain control on 19 March 1991 (Mcdowall 2003).

Contemporary with the intensification of Kurdish Peshmarga forces operation in March 1991 inside Kurdish areas in Iraq was the romanticism whispered by prominent Kurdish Front fellows. These concepts established that the confrontation of the allied forces with the Baathist government of Saddam would end with in his defeat. Talabani had estimated several times in the beginning of March envisaging Saddam's regime overthrow (Gunter 2009). On 13 March 1991, Talabani positively specified "I expect his [Saddam Hussein's regime] downfall soon, in a matter of weeks." Hence, the Kurds considered the U.S. should have taken the Kurdish question into consideration and support the Iraqi opposition to overthrow the Baathist regime in Baghdad.

On the other hand, the uprising of the Kurds in the northern Iraq would verify to be temporary. Following the overpowering the Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq, Saddam Hussein redeployed the armed forces at maintaining dominance in the Kurdish areas anew. Besides the United States veto on the use of airplanes by Iraqi military, helicopters were not enclosed within the expressions of the armistice. Consequently, Saddam still owned the presidential guards' forces not beaten in the conflict also helicopter units to assault the Kurdish people in the northern areas (Gök, 2018).

Overall, the US over and done with its indecision, was over again delivering the hint that it wanted to view Iraq as an integrated, rather than a fragmented entity in three chunks: A Kurdistan in the northern part of Iraq; a Shi'ite territory in the southern area; as well as a central part of Iraq as the Sunni Arabs' monopoly (Disney, 1980). James Baker, the US Secretary of State reproduced this distress once he indicated "We believed it was essential that Iraq stay integral" (Baker, 1995, 439). A British article further added a pragmatic turn on the change in the proceedings: "Both the Americans and, much more painfully, the Kurds have run up against the same truth: it is that in the late 20th century the rules of the international game set great store on sovereignty" (Baker, 1995, 439).

Not merely did the US alarm of the disintegration of Iraq the way formerly stated, however it furthermore afraid of that the Kurds at their own accord would be incapable to defy the Baathist regime's armed forces, thus demanding a noteworthy United States advance arms guaranteed. This promise would most probably be included a great involvement of military units, with the supplementary probability of an extended US occupation that may not have enough money to closure in a speedy manner. Furthermore, if the US openly shored up the Kurdish rising at this stage, it may have provoking the Kurds in adjacent countries (Gunter 1992).

The US was not able to accept to miss the shore up of Turkey and Syria, if it inclined to segregate Iraq economically and politically (McCool III, 2021). The US Secretary of state Baker resonated this concern, saying "From a practical standpoint, nothing short of direct United States military operations would have guaranteed success by the insurgents" (Lambert 1997). The Bush government was criticized of discounting the war attempts to crush the Iraqi forces capabilities to mount those operations. Some considered Bush government basically not to finish the task. The fiasco to demolish the Iraqi conflict engine was compounded the fiasco to protect the Kurds from the offensive, a circumstance which damaged the U.S. standing as a western state supporting liberal principles (Gomes, 2016, 43).

Thinking that the US was distant from footstep into termination of Saddam's armed forces encouraged a combined statement by both Talabani and Barzani, which blamed President Bush of rejection by indicating that "in the name of the principles of freedom, justice, and democracy, we appeal to the United States to come to the aid of the people of Iraq. You personally called upon the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship, the Iraqi oppositions have responded to your call to uprising to overthrow the dictator Saddam Hussein. We have learned that your picture is currently hanging over many buildings and places in Iraqi Kurdistan and they are considering you their liberator", the Kurds said. "They have now risen and are confronting the might of Saddam's tyranny. They are being subjected to ruthless indiscriminate attacks against which they have no effective defense. The only hope for the Iraqi people to avoid an imminent catastrophe is for the world community to act resolutely, and immediately, to restrain Saddam Hussein from persisting with this barbaric onslaught". The Kurdish leaders moreover pleaded for the Bush administration to "prevent the Iraqi Baathist government's war of genocide against the Kurdish people" (Mcdowall 2003; Kurdish National Congress of North America, 29 March, 1991). The Kurdish leaders formally call the United States government to intervene to prevent Saddam Hussein from using heavy weapons of mass destruction against civilians, including fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter gunships, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, heavy artillery, napalm, phosphorus and sulphuric acid. Also ensure the distribution of humanitarian supplies to the whole of Iraq by delivering aid directly into the liberated areas by road convoy from Turkey, Syria and Iran and through captured airfields. Saddam Hussein cannot again be allowed to benefit from the international community's indifference to the deliberate abuse of human rights and of international law. The international community has already paid a heavy price for this short-sightedness' (Kurdish National Congress of North America, 29 March, 1991)

On the other hand, the head of Kurdish National Congress of North America (Asad Khailany) appealed to the US government to intervene in the Kurdish issue and sent a document to the US president as follows: "Mr. President, our U.S. government has the moral obligation to intervene immediately to end the regime of dictator Saddam Hussein and to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqi people. As you pointed out always, we the Americans are against Saddam Hussein and we do have great respect for all Iraqi people. It is inconceivable to let the Iraqi people suffer and the dictator to stay in power". On behalf of the Kurdish American community, "we appeal to you to open immediately a dialogue with the Kurdish and Iraqi oppositions to plan for establishing a democratic Iraqi government in place of the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein, so that the Iraqi people can live in peace and tranquility (Kurdish National Congress of North America, 29 March, 1991).

In response of the Kurdish leaders the deputy white house press secretary (Roman Popadiuk) said: "our mandate was to get Iraq out of Kuwait; we fulfilled that mandate. The issue of internal unrest in Iraq is an issue that has to be settled between the government and the people of Iraq". when asked if Bush was concerned about the comparisons, Popadiuk said: "absolutely not, I think the parallels are unfair". Then he said: "Bush's comments about the Iraqi people overthrowing Hussein were intended only to emphasize to all segments of Iraqi society that the United States will never maintain normal relations with Baghdad as long as Hussein is in power" (Kempster, 30 March, 1991). Therefore, it certainly appeared the US rejected Kurdish appeal for support in uprising. Hence the Kurdish issue pretenses a political and moral predicament for Bush's administration, as he pressed the overthrow of Saddam

On the other hand, although the Kurds were accurate in their declaration that Bush had asked for the citizens of Iraq to rise against Saddam's regime, while the Bush's administration never promised to support this endeavor from a military perspective. A recurrent number of misinterpreted indications by

the Kurds from an unclear procedure were forwarded by the US. Baker would note the disorganized indications later:

Our detractors accused us of inciting the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions against Saddam...then dooming them by refusing to come to their aid, either through United States military action or covert assistance...We never embraced as a war aim or a political aim the replacement of the Iraqi regime (Baker, 1995, 439, 435; Lambert 1997, 74).

The Secretary of States Baker further discovered that the rhythm of measures in Iraq following the conflict did not progress the way the White House had predicted:

We did, however, hope and believe that Saddam Hussein would not survive in power after such a crushing defeat. Ironically, the uprisings in the north and south, instead of lessening his grip on power as we felt they would, contributed to it. .When he managed to consolidate his power, Saddam scrambled our strategic calculations (Baker, 1995, 439, 435; Lambert 1997, 74).

The operation of the Baathist regime in Kurdistan stretched the highest level on March 28<sup>th</sup>, 1991, forcing the Kurdish forces to give up the Kirkuk province as well as other truncated lying towns. Evaluations a variety between two hundred thousand upwards to (1.5 ) million civilian Kurdish individuals had escaped the regime's attack thus generating a refugee crisis that both Iran and Turkey were incapable (or keen) to manage (Mcdowall 2003).

Simultaneously, Kurdish-inclined commentaries in the United States broadcasting channels were accumulating a continuous torrent of serious articles accusing the Bush administration's falling short of defending the Kurdish people, encouraging Bush's Chief of Staff to remark that "the only pressure for the United States to intervene is coming from the columnists". Similarly, worldwide denunciation of US indecision was predominant. A prominent member of the Israeli administration did not hesitate to recommend that "the Bush administration made shameless and cynical use of the pretext of not intervening policy in sovereign countries internal affairs, a category within which the Kurdish revolution accessibly falls"(Lambert 1997; McCool III, 2021).

### **The US and the Kurdish Dilemma**

"If Saddam was successful in suppressing the uprising, Bush administration could face humiliating political retaliations. The Kurds even now enjoy the support of key members of congress such as the chairman of the senate foreign relations committee (Claiborne Pell-D-R.I.), if the uprisings were crushed the Kurdish cause might become a striking target of chance for Bush's political challengers who had been unsatisfied by the Bush's victory in the Gulf war" (Kempster, 30 March, 1991).

Concerning the international reaction to the Iraqi Baathist regime retaliations targeting the Kurds and Shi'ites, diplomacy sustained in the period of the Baathist regime entering the parts that were controlled by the Kurds. The conclusion of the dialogues ensued in the 5<sup>th</sup> of April 1991 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 688, that stated "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas", also asking that "Iraq as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression"(Goff 1992; Gunter 2004).

Resolution 688, of considerable significance, was noticeable initially at the UNSC that the Kurdish people were named explicitly in a document by UNSC. This resolution furthermore manifests initially the UNSC instructed UN interfering in the dominion of a member country (Holt, 1999). In spite of the language by which the resolution was written, other requirements in the UN charter prohibited the

fulfillment of the resolution. Nevertheless, the notion of overstepping on Iraq's land dominion to safeguard the Kurdish people would rapidly obtain supporters among allied states members of the period (Mcdowall 2003).

On 8 April 1991, in reaction to the developing media disparagement directed at the Bush administration, Secretary Baker travelled to the Turkish borders to have a direct interpretation of the circumstances of the refugees. Baker remembered his "horror and shock" concerning the weighbridge of the refugee issue, confirming "What we've [U.S.A] done so far is a pittance. We have to mobilize the world. We've got to think big. Otherwise this could be the systematic destruction of a people" (Lambert 1997).

At the beginning of April 1991, the European Community (EC) espoused a British notion in which sponsored by international community, the Kurdish people would be capable to go back to their native land from the immigrant base camps in neighboring Iran and Turkey. The EC recommendation would effectively generate a self-governing Kurdistan region in the Iraq north shielded by international community armed forces. This indication represented instantaneous incredulity from UNSC members, predominantly China and ex-Soviet Union which were managing with separatist small groups. The US similarly was cynical of the EC proposal worrying that "Europe intends to fight to the last American for the sake of Kurdish rights". The US President Bush resonated the distress once he identified that, "I do not want one single soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in Iraq that has been going on for ages. And I am not going to have that". Atypically, it is accurately what would happen just several days following this speech(Lambert 1997).

Increasing Turkish density to manage with Kurdish people accumulated along its rocky boundary with Iraq, strapped the US and its alliance partners to speak out a short-term refuge in Kurdish areas in Iraq on April 16<sup>th</sup> 1991. The provisions of this refuge excluded Iraq from deploying all sorts of airplanes and aircraft, from navigating Latitudes above 36°N (Goff 1992). Even though not officially executable from the viewpoint of Resolution 688, the US announcement of a refuge together with its security of assistance agencies functioning in this region, in a straight line saw the coming back of 250,000 Kurds. The armed forces led by US in Iraqi Kurdistan, reaching 8,000 forces on the ground, with units in Turkey, if necessary, delivered a recognizable guarantee to the Kurds for their security upon their coming back. The primary land force, apparently led by the United Nations (UN), was directed by US Lieutenant General Shalikashvili (later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The operation led by his guidance would become Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). It would develop the US armed forces biggest assistance operation assumed perpetually up to this point(Gunter 1999).

The Baathist regime speedily predestined the US' interfering in Iraqi land, encouraging the Foreign Affair Minister of Iraq to announce that the United States act "constitutes a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, an independent country and member of the United Nations". A furthermore disapproval directed at the Bush government was that if the television did not attract attention for Kurds' living circumstances in the uplands, the government may not have act on behalf of so rapidly in moving United States armed forces into Kurdistan of Iraq. Nevertheless, the US attendance in the refuge encouraged an evaluation of US purposes towards the Kurdish people. Queries to be responded including what should be done concerning safeguarding the Kurdish people following the US drawing the troops; the period of the activities; and most significantly, did the US existence in the refuge show a change in US foreign rule concerning the question of Kurdish autonomy? (Lambert 1997; Merrick, 1996)

The development of the refuge on the ground permitted for a bigger deportation endeavor from the Turkish administration. This development disturbed confidences once more among the Kurds that this

state-of-the-art change of proceedings might have lastly formed what the Kurdish people had desired for a lengthy time: a region excluded from Iraqi intervention specifically for the Kurdish people (Malanczuk, 1991). A Kurdish figure observed "I think the creation of Kurdistan is now closer than ever before". Additional explanations by other figures among Kurds termed for the additional development of the refuge to take account of entire Kurdish areas in Iraq: "We want the zone to make up all of Kurdistan in Iraq only. We want the United States army to take over all of Kurdistan in Iraq". These recommendations on the part of Kurds elevated the degree of apprehension as viewed by the Department of State that was concerned about the extension of effort and scope of the US forces attendance. The department of state authority expressed "This is the most complicated refugee problem in the world...We're talking megabucks, Megabucks and mega problems" (Lambert 1997).

Notwithstanding the formation of the refuge, discussions were held by the Kurdish Front with the Baathist regime in Baghdad. Both Baathist regime and the Kurds were engaged with their own purposes for motivating such discussions. The Kurds anticipated alleviating the depressed circumstances that the Kurds confronted in the camps of refugees as well as mountainous areas where numerous Kurds were not found yet. The Kurdish people were likewise cautious of depending entirely on the respectable resolve of the global community in sustaining the refuge over the long haul. Masoud Barzani the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader indicated that, "we also need a political solution for Kurdistan. Only when this is found will the refugee problem be solved" (Lambert 1997). Contrariwise, the Baathist government confronted substantial international diplomacy concerning the resolution of Iraq's inner crisis, which subsequently might witness the restart of country's oil exportation to the international marketplace.

Both Barzani and Talabani were among the Kurdish influential figures that formed the Kurdish Front and were involved in the discussions. Talabani would dumbfound the Kurdish people as well as the world whilst he visibly contained Saddam on TV during the discussions, following pledges were expressed by Saddam to eradicate the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and facilitate for open votes, that would far ahead verify to be a ploy (Mcdowall 2003). The root of the discussions arranged on the 1966 Bazaaz statement; a proposal that had been recurrently suspended before the Kurds for years regardless of noteworthy hard work representing the government to pursue over and done with application (Stansfield 2003). Nonetheless, guided by history, the Kurdish Front desired international assurances by the UN, US, or the EC, to make the Baathist regime committed to the promise it made.

The Kurdish people originated beneath resilient disapproval by other opposition parties in Iraq, who realized the Kurdish Front's approaches towards Saddam established a political surrendering to the central administration. Barzani rebounded this censure once he said "Our Kurdish people made sacrifices alone also have struggled and without a support or helper, that is to say, since the Iraqi state was established, for the sake of realizing these sacred aims [self-government]". A rift came into being between Talabani and Barzani in May 1991 about the possibility of ongoing discussions with the Baathist regime in Baghdad. Talabani had developed progressively unsatisfied through the lack of development, whereas Barzani was confidence that he would be capable to form an agreement to ensure self-governing rights for the Kurds (Resool 2012; Yildiz 2007).

### **Operation Provide Comfort II**

The US in the meantime sought a UN armed unit to exchange the US guided forces in Kurdistan of Iraq (Gök, 2018). Nonetheless, this determination was knotted to the discussions about self-government between the Kurdish people and Baathist government. The Bush government was fervent to perceive an agreement held between both parties, that could make haste the US retreat (Goff 1992). Notwithstanding Bush's keenness to disentangle US forces, he expressed alarm about forthcoming Iraqi implications, "I

don't think that we can hand over the fate the Kurdish fate to the word of Saddam Hussein's regime "(Lambert 1997).

Upon the end of June 1991, the Kurdish Front originated an introductory agreement with the Baathist authorities, put in a nutshell in the Autonomy Draft Law (Gunter 2009). Nonetheless the Baathist government positioned an addition to the law that encompassed six requests that the Kurdish Front discovered undesirable. The requests comprised: thorough demilitarization; dissolution of Kurdish Front dominance over radio stations; end of communications with external authorities; committing to collaboration with the Baathist government; arrangement with the government seeking the country's armed forces as well as political objectives; and additional responsibility to apply the above-mentioned Baathist objectives across Kurdistan (Gunter 2004).

This supplementary to the law of Autonomy imposed the Kurdish people to refuse the whole decree. The Baathist government in Baghdad had wished that the forthcoming leaving of allied armed forces from the refuge might motivate the Kurdish Front to hold an agreement with the central administration. Nonetheless, newscast of a novel US guided speedy response unit grounded in Turkey seemed to have supported the Kurdish situation in defying the developments of the Baathist regime in politics (Lambert 1997). Like As revealed before, the formation of a US led quick response armed force grounded in Turkey, had developed realism by July 1991, nicknamed Combined Task Force (CTF) Operation Provide Comfort II. This action exchanged the partnership land units that had been removed from Iraqi Kurdistan in July 15<sup>th</sup>, 1991(Cowan 1995). The CTF's headquarters was outside Incirlik Airbase in Turkey, commanded by the US command (Gözen 1995). The undertaking was detailed as:

To ensure continued success of the humanitarian aid to the Kurdish and other Iraqi refugees. In pursuit of that, the Combined Task Force will also make sure that steps are taken so that Iraq complies with the appropriate United Nation Security Council resolutions that address this issue of humanitarian aid to the Kurds (Ripley, 1991,1056; Lambert, 1997,83).

Upon the formation of the new quick placement armed force, the Kurds were satisfactorily robust to poker chip the Iraqi stresses their own demands, disproving each of the Iraqi's undesirable state of affairs. Notwithstanding the positive commentaries prepared by Talabani and Barzani in the press, the consultations from here onward had arrived to a stalemate. As this impasse became prolonged, both the Kurds and the Iraqi military instigated to assess one another, in addition to a possible coalition rejoinder, when inclined battles erupted between both parties out of the main cities inside Kurdistan. This aggressive activity simply meant to highpoint the circumstances of talks between the Kurdish Front and the Baathist regime. A US authority had previously reproduced on how this weak situation might match American rule:

There is a lot of thinking about how to keep the pressure on, and we understand that it would partially strengthen Saddam if the Kurds sign an agreement with him....But I don't think there is anyone in the U.S. government who is telling the Kurds to hang in there with no agreement to keep the pressure on Saddam Hussein, even if in fact that is what is happening (Tyler, 4 August, 1991, 14; Lambert, 1997, 83).

The deadlock in the consultations additional decorated variances in the Kurdish Front's direction. Yet, Barzani strapped for holding an agreement with the central government as well as resolving the provocative concerns like dominance over Kirkuk ~~also~~ and its oil, in the future. Talabani, who had previous toured across Europe as well as the US to gain shore up for the Kurdish people, advised his people to be patient until the Baathist government further complied with Kurdish demands.

In September 1991, Talabani travelled to the US, endorsed the administration to reaffirm its stance to the KNF. In a media message issued by the department of state the stance was pure: "We [the U.S.] do not back any particular opposition faction, nor is it our aim to shape a government to succeed Saddam Hussein.... Similarly, the United States supports peaceful political reform within Iraq, not Iraq's breakup". Additionally, the meeting moreover emphasized the developing relations between Turkey and the Kurdish people in Iraq. The department of state announcement remarked "We welcome the development in relations between the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and the government of Turkey. We appreciate the clear Iraqi Kurdistan Front statements supporting Turkish sovereignty and denouncing the extremist tactics of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)" (Lambert 1997).

### **Formation of the local Government**

Barzani was persuaded that the US would not offer backing for additional Kurdish armed force operations, so far meanwhile was positive that the US in addition to its allied associates would warranty the Kurdistan autonomous state within Iraq from the Baathist regime's military. Nonetheless, the principal government in Baghdad would persuade the tangible proofs concerning Talabani's stance. In the closing days of October 1991, the Baathist regime recognized a measured obstruction of Kurdistan, progressively decreasing the course of food, gasoline and electricity (Mirza 2007).

The Baathist regime's purpose served to encourage the Kurds to ignore the Kurdish leaders, who would demonstrate to be powerless once there was the obstruction. This encouraged a Kurdish leader in the US to indicate "I think this is Saddam Hussein saying that if you don't deal with me, you will all starve to death"(Mcdowall 2003).

When winter approached, the Baathist regime of Saddam wished that its obstruction would enforce the Kurds into approving the Baathist government proposal for autonomous administration. Nonetheless, the Baathist government retreat from Kurdistan with the purpose of securing the obstruction had the conflicting consequence. The Kurdish Front acknowledged the influence void in Kurdish areas as a predicament. If the Kurdish Front elected to self- inaugurate as an administration, they would face the jeopardy of disaffecting Iran, Turkey, and Syria, who did not prefer their particular Kurdish people to acquire alike concepts. Nevertheless, to not fill the emptiness would merely aggravate the economic difficulties generated by the obstruction. Thus, the Kurdish Front comforted the international community that separatism was not on the Kurdish program as well as that the Kurds desired to remain inside the Iraqi boundaries (Mcdowall 2003).

In April 1992, the Kurdish Front concluded discussions with the Baathist regime likewise conducted to write basic suggestions for the establishment of a Kurdish house of representatives to be nominated by the Kurds. The ballot vote, which had been postponed several times, would verify to be an examination of acceptance between Talabani and Barzani. Both figures exemplified the biggest political parties up for election, as well as the election of either would form which approach might be preferred as to how to manage with the Baathist regime of Iraq. In May 1992, votes determined, with Barzani in advance a little advantage ahead of Talabani in securing dominance of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). In the face of this, both leaders promised to honor its outcomes. Both figures honored this initiate with a succession of power allocation agreements in the emerging administration between both political parties PUK and KDP (Resool 2012; Stansfield 2003).

Provincially, awkwardness inclined regarding what rejoinder should be engaged towards the KRG. Turkey was particularly concerned as to safe houses United States guarantees that "in the long run, the consequence should not be the appearance of a Kurdish state in the region"(Lambert 1997). Turkey was

correspondingly disturbed that an extended CTF Provide Comfort II might simply buoy up the Iraqi Kurdish people to ensconce themselves to the disadvantage of the Iraqi regime, in addition to the possible pushed Turkey's Kurds. Nevertheless, the Kurdish people evidently supported their inclination for an autonomous administration as opposed to an independent entity, in addition had clarified for Secretary Baker on a Kurdish representatives official meeting with him on July 1992. The US similarly identified its stance regarding the Kurdish state of affairs, when it expressed that the United States policy had not altered as well as that it dragged on to "respect the territorial integrity of Iraq" (Lambert 1997).

The US, despite most other states, could not have engaged the government of the Kurdistan region in straight discourse due to the unsolicited repercussion of acknowledgment of that government. This illustrated the Kurdistan Region Government with a predicament. With the Iraqi obstruction screening no mark of conceding, the Government's merely having the materials at its disposal in addition assistance from the outdoor world would need to be via Turkey. Turkish state acknowledged this quandary likewise parlayed support from Turkey in arguments for the Iraqi Kurdish people's support with Turkey's hard work to fight the PKK. The PKK is a Marxist leaning Kurdish political party that had been conducting a military conflict targeting Turkey beginning from 1984. The US had covertly prearranged its funding to Turkey's hard work in regard with its endeavors to fight the PKK fighters. The US directed its shore up following the time when it exchanged an \$855 million manage to trade Black Hawk helicopters made by the US to Turkey in the prime of the PKK- Turkish encounter (Besifki, 1998).

During the course of the 1980 decade, with the aim of securing Western backing in its determination, Turkish governments had urged that the he *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (USSR) had supported PKK shored up. Nevertheless, as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey had faced its concerns in isolation to its in-house Kurdish issue, in addition currently assumed a new mission to clash with the PKK supported by the KDP. Consequently, on October 4<sup>th</sup>, 1992, the Kurdistan Region Government chose to dismiss any PKK officialdoms from KRG areas, which caused obvious fighting between the PUK and the PKK as well as KDP. On the other hand, the mish mash of the Baathist government obstruction, lengthways with belligerence between Kurdish forces, delivered for a distracted economic atmosphere for the people of Kurdistan in north of Iraq. The US Agency for International Development alone allocated more than \$43 million (out of \$200 million in total worldwide assistance) to understand the Kurds via the forthcoming cold season (Gunter 1996; McCool III, 2021).

Paradoxically, in spite of the terrible economic passages that had happened to the Kurds, the US via its preservation of the Kurdish refuge, and through its capability to let the central government military out of Kurdistan, had effective Kurdish state inside the Iraqi borders (Holt, 1999). The Kurds, upon the conclusion of 1992 would urged to have a voted parliament with a functioning administrative contraption, however until now was still secured to the UN, US and Turkey through an economic umbilical rope (Lambert 1997).

### **The Stable Year of 1993**

There was a comparative period of stability that would triumph in Kurdistan of Iraq in 1993. The US guided CTF in Turkey still attended to be as a protector of the people of Kurdistan in the Iraqi north, and most significantly, the Kurds in Iraq avoided their historical hostilities with one another in addition to sustain a peace within their land. Verbal critics of former United States policy towards the Kurdish people admired the Kurdish attempt in Iraq as a creditable instance of United States foreign policy praiseworthy of appreciation. Furthermore, the US welcomed a representative of Kurds supervised by Barzani at the pinnacle of what so far bestowed on the Kurds: a meeting with Vice-President Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake (Stansfield 2003). In

the face of this high level gathering likewise wishes through the Kurds that it may encourage the United States backing, Barzani would indicate in relation to the consequence of this gathering "I have no answers for my people".

In January 1994, Barzani declared that:

Here you have the foundation of a democratic experiment right in the center of the Middle East. We are an example for the people all around not just in Iraq but Iran and other neighbors. The United States and the European countries have a political and moral commitment to protect the Kurds until there is a secure situation (Lambert 1997).

### **Kurdish Internal Conflict**

On the other hand, this period above showed of comparative composed was rapidly to be devastated by the Kurdish people themselves. At the beginning of 1994, a Kurdish group with an Islamic ideology, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) came in the disagreement in the fight with the PUK. Furthermore, Kurdish fighting between the PUK and the KDP had exploded. KDP/IMK related reports conspiracy against the PUK emerged as the battle intensified. The Iraqi opposition central body, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), back then extensively supposed to be basically financed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), endeavored to intermediate the skirmish without triumph. Conversely, fighting would drag on to intensify between the challenging Kurdish political parties, ongoing fundamentally what was a clutch for control by Talabani and Barzani as well.

Correspondingly, in July 1<sup>st</sup>, 994, France with US and the United Kingdom (UK) as monitors endeavored to intermediate between the PUK and KDP in Paris. The talks generated an arrangement signed by the two contending parties on July 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1994. The gathering established having few demands of the global community: initially to discover a loophole in the economic embargo against Iraq hence Kurdistan could obtain goods; also then, to sustain Operation Provide Comfort II till the time that Kurdistan would be able to become self-sufficient. Notwithstanding France's endeavors, the battle sustained, with episodic accelerations of weighty belligerent, in September 1994, encouraging the US to formally ask for an armistice. The US confirmed that if both parties could not originate to terms, then the US may go back over its backing for the refuge. Conversely, neither US endeavors, nor appeals from the European Community could stop the fight, as it sustained even in 1995 (Gunter 1996).

The US originated its own diplomacy at the beginning of 1995 to inaugurate a harmony. The original exchange between the Iraqi Kurds and the United States befallen in January 1995. Conversely, Turkey was disturbed that once the US could efficiently develop a harmony, it could conceivably cause a possible Kurdish separatist project. Consequently, when the US dogged an armistice, Turkey advised the Kurds to re-build discussions with Iraq, opposing to the US attitude to the Kurdish internal issue (Gunter 1996). In March 1995, the Kurdish National Congress of North America (KNC) sponsored became intermediary between the KDP, PUK, and IMK at US, Washington DC. These discussions called for the fighting groups to obey the settlements developed in Paris in 1994. Nevertheless, notwithstanding arrangements by all factions, certainty in Kurdistan witnessed dragged on conflicts between the two major Kurdish political parties. This recurrent disappointment encouraged the Department of State to send envoys to Iraqi Kurdish leaders in June 1994; in addition it was again unsuccessful to form a peace satisfactory to all parties (Lambert 1997).

In the meantime, Turkish administration was not upset for the incapability of the Kurds to standardize relationships. This contributed Turkish administration a sturdier intervention in managing with the PKK in Kurdistan of Iraq, despite the fact at the same time releasing itself of the alarm over a possibly self-governing Kurdistan. Once more, in August 1995, the US declared furthermore session of

talks to be managed in Ireland, at Drogheda, directed by the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs in the State Department, Director Robert Deutsch. Deutsch was capable to safe an arrangement to uphold an armistice, nonetheless once more the peace consultations were outshined through pressures in Kurdistan. Another session of discussions happened in September 1995, however as earlier, attained an arrangement simply to be astounded by proceedings in Kurdistan (Gunter 1996).

In this period, Iranian as well as Syrian intervention in the skirmish converted eagerly obvious. Both neighboring states were doubtful of the US impact in the region. Hence, they pressed the PKK to conduct assaults upon the KDP with the purpose of derailing any continuing peace talks. Iran delivered the PUK with support for assisting the PKK endeavor targeting the KDP, anticipating to get-up-and-go a long-lasting wedge between the PUK and KDP. Similarly, both Iran and Syria were alarmed, as was Turkey, of the opportunity of a self-governing Kurdistan state. Therefore, their attempts at sustaining tightness in Kurdistan might be understood as having reduced this opportunity. Turkey, in the meantime, was blamed by the PUK for mobilizing the KDP with arms in its conflict with the PUK. Talabani stated "Turkey has and is supplying arms to the KDP. This cannot be accepted because Turkey promised us it would not do anything to harm the balance of arms in northern Iraq". Iran shadowed getup while pursuing discussions with the Kurds, wishing to outperform the US as spearhead of any consultations. Iran "expressed concern over the meddling of outsiders [United States] in the region which has led to tension and instability" (Lambert 1997).

In November 1995, The United States once more endeavored to launch channel of communication sponsored by Deutsch in Salah-al Din, Kurdistan Region (headquarter of the KDP). The Turkish government and the INC were accommodated at the discussions as monitors, and then the US was unsuccessful to ensure peaceful circumstances. The year 1995, would conclude as it instigated: with the two challenging sides confronting one another. An assistance operative in Kurdistan of Iraq appropriately outlined the state of affairs: "Barzani thinks he's the true leader of the Kurds. So does Talabani and they'll fight each other down to their last peshmerga to prove themselves right" (Gunter 1996).

### **The Period of Turmoil 1996**

Both Kurdish political parties in challenging war entered 1996 having separated up Kurdistan region into zones, organized by either the PUK or KDP. The PUK held the midpoint and southeast. The KDP administered considerable part of northwest Kurdistan near the Turkish frontier. From the outset of aggressions in 1994, a huge number of Kurds had died because of the Kurdish skirmish. The US dragged on in its determinations at intervention, notwithstanding at a superficial degree in the State Department. Conversely, the equilibrium was rapidly to be disturbed (Stansfield 2003).

Opponents of the United States policy for becoming unsuccessful to accomplish a wide-ranging harmony between the two parties, refer to the US insignificance during the initial six months of 1996 wartime. The same criticizers supposed that this indifference permitted the Iranian regime to advance its impact in Kurdistan region, predominantly with the PUK, at the expenditure of the US effect. The Kurdish people, the disparagers claimed, questioned the US obligation to resolving the Kurdish internal issue. A critic said, "At a time when we are harassing Iran on so many other fronts, why suddenly not pay attention to Kurdistan of Iraq?" (Lambert 1997).

In July 1996, the PUK allowed the Iranian armed forces to enter Kurdistan region to pursue Iranian Kurdish party at the PUK zone, in return to assist the PUK targeting the KDP. Thus, KDP showed that after the Iranian retreat on July 29<sup>th</sup>, 1996, the Iranian armies left provisions to support the PUK's endeavor. Succeeding the Iranian retreat, on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 1996, the PUK declared an aggression targeting the KDP.

On 17<sup>th</sup> August 1996, after the initial PUK assaults, the US set up the level of discourse with the Kurds. Robert H. Pelletreau Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, personally called on Talabani and Barzani for talks in London. The speedy progress of the Iranian provided PUK pushed Barzani to use his final resort as he said: Saddam's help. On August 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1996, Barzani pleased to Saddam standstill the PUK development (Hooks 1996).

Upon 23 and 28 August 1996, the State Department officials were capable to attain two armistice agreements correspondingly, however like in the past, the fight kept on as the discussions went on. As early as 28 August 1996, CIA authorities remarked that they sent the Clinton government with notice of the forthcoming Iraqi assaults. Conversely, concerning the unsuccessful of the consultations, a US official indicated that, "A part of them [Kurds] were working with us for a cease-fire and part of them were looking for advantages, for a way to put it to the other" (Othman 2000; Stansfield 2003). On August 31<sup>st</sup>, 1996, the Baathist government rejoined through sending 30-40,000 soldiers, with weaponry and armor backing into Kurdistan land north of the 36 parallel.

The Baathist administration authorities, observing on the Iraqi development into Kurdish seized areas, declared that "The leadership has decided to provide support and military aid to Massoud Barzani and his comrades to enable them to confront the vicious aggressors". The United States authorities, while endeavoring to establish the degree of the offensive would remark "This is perhaps in some ways a more nuanced situation". Eventually, the US' replied originated in the formula of sequences of cruise rubber bullet assaults against military objects in Kurdistan region of Iraq, as chastisement for the Baathist government infiltration into the Kurdish areas. Barzani, observing upon his association with Saddam Hussein, showed "We don't have any alliance with the Iraqi regime. It is just a temporary arrangement". The central government of Saddam's armed forces withdrew after the PUK had been pushed out from its significant locations within north of Iraq, thus permitting the KDP to seizure entire crucial urban areas in Kurdistan region. The consequence of the KDP triumph was one more immigrant circumstance close to the Iranian border. Once carrying out the disarray of the PUK, Barzani observed "The problem is finished" (Hooks 1996; Lambert 1997).

### **The Collapse of CIA Assisted Resistance**

CIA participation in the Kurdish territory through this period could be attributed to the months after the conflict following the Baathist regime's defeat also the causing Kurdish refugee disaster in the north. In May 1991, the US President Bush signed up a presidential verdict which permitted secret action to topple Saddam's regime. An administration authority indicated on this agenda that, "It was a minimal program". In 1992, the CIA backed the establishment of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as an endeavor to unify both foremost Kurdish political parties PUK and KDP sponsored by a greater political protector than the KNF. The INC was observed by the CIA as a possible emergency for the Baathist government. Nevertheless, Turkish enforce kept the US from backing the INC adequately to extremely creep up the Baathist government (Stansfield 2003).

The Clinton administration at its inception sustained to supply the INC as the Bush government had, notwithstanding inner pressing for reducing its backing. Upon 1994, the CIA recognized an office in Salah-al Din in Kurdistan region, to deliver a quicker aspect at the INC operation (Hooks 1996). The amount of fifty agents had been grounded at this ability ever since 1994. In November 1994, a significant Iraqi turncoat, Wafiq Hamad Samarra, the ex-chief of Iraqi military intelligence, separated from the regime and joined the INC. Samarra suggested his service area to the CIA and INC to support in toppling the Baathist regime through the deployment of his associates and groups.

In March 1995, an effective scheme developed by Samarra, hitherto accepted by the INC and CIA. The INC declared an assault on Iraqi military that was considered to have shaped quantity of escapes from the Baathist armed forces. The assault was unproductive for several of causes. Primary, the prearranged rebellion of Iraqi armed forces did not show up. Second, thought CIA promises of US air shore up never came to fulfilment. Third, unreliable indication recommends that reports of Iranian participation with the strategy reduced Clinton government's eagerness for the attempt. Eventually, the scheme was unsuccessful and subsequently Samarra escaped to Syria, Damascus (Lambert 1997).

The unsuccessful of the strategy to attain any triumph, as well as the increasing crack between the PUK and the KDP, encouraged the CIA to change backing from the INC, to another opposition faction connected with the CIA, the Iraqi National Accord (INA). Based in Amman, Jordan, the INA favored an armed coup to knock down Saddam's regime, instead of an extended civil war proposed by the INC. Days ahead of the Iraqi offensive upon Kurdistan Region, the CIA occurrence in Kurdistan region moved to Turkey (Othman 2000). Generally, cost assessments of CIA maneuvers in backing of the INC and INA in Kurdish areas equals about \$100 million from the start of campaigns in 1991. The subsequent Iraqi invasion devastated the INC/INA activities in Kurdish area. Constitutionally, a Defense Intelligence Agency account recommended "Saddam's departure from the Iraqi political scene does not appear imminent".

After the overthrow of the resistance supported by CIA, military command authorities recommended that the buckled activities from the actual start was "ludicrous" also was "naive to trust that a force like this could overthrow the regime". The unplanned magnitudes of the Iraqi offensive as well as the fall of the CIA supported resistance were the huge number of Kurdish people who were now threatened by their association with either United States backed NGOs or with the INC as well as INA. Concerning the question of these Kurdish civilians, President Clinton stated that "Now, we're doing everything we can to get out of Iraq American citizens and those who have worked with us". The US replied approached in the shape of a cavalcade of cars to interchange the threatened Kurds to the borders of Turkey. The US governed out any armed forces activities to support the harassed Kurds, saying "These plans depend on them [the Kurds] reaching the border between Turkey and Iraq on their own. Our assistance will begin at that point". The removal of the Kurdish civilians connected with the INC caused in the ultimate air transport of the groups of Kurdish people to Guam and next to the US (Lambert 1997).

## **Conclusion**

As in 1975, plenty of points to the US involvement in the catastrophe of the Kurdish people to attain either harmony or self-governing in Iraqi Kurdistan succeeding the 1991 Gulf war. Conversely, a convergence of conditions caused in the Kurds' incapacity to obtain any appearance of self-government status, for example in 1975. Mainly, the fight between the PUK and KDP in view of their selected council of representatives, the government, was incapable to exploit on the armed cover delivered through the CTF in Turkey. Antagonisms between both contending parties scamped any wish of the Kurdistan Region Government acquiring any political victory.

Once more, like in 1975, world powers had a part in safeguarding that the Kurdish people might be incapable to capitalize on their victory in forming the Kurdistan Regional Government into any significant self-governing state. Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq governments all favored letting the Kurds stay in conflict against each other. This attempt of letting any reconciliation talks off stability efficiently disallowed the KRG from pursuing self-government autonomous state, with its possible consequences for Kurds in the above-mentioned neighboring states.

Saddam Hussein's threats to the US interests in the region, the former's military advancement in Kuwait and authoritarian political targeting in particular Kurds made the US shift its policy towards the Kurds. In addition, Turkey and the US media played a key role of encouraging the US to consider making relations with Kurds in Iraq. As the transformations of the Kurdish issue in Iraq threatened the Turkish borders security. Hence the US decided to collect details on the Kurdish issue political developments with the aim of intervening in the Kurdish issue and protecting the Kurds from the Iraqi government. This road encouraged the US to protect Kurds from mass killing, as the Kurdish political circumstances proved for the US governments they were in dangerous conditions and the Iraqi government has attempted to destroy Kurds seriously.

It is noteworthy to say that since 1991 the US administrations have always dealt with the Kurdish issue within the transformations context of political developments in Iraq. As during that period the Iraqi government attempted to seriously threaten the US interests in the region. As a result, the US attempted to meet with some leaders of Iraqi oppositions to make a plan for overthrowing the Iraqi government, and it viewed the Iraqi Kurds as a loyal ally to protect its interests in Iraq. When the civil conflict happened between the Kurdish political parties, the US governments through its representatives and allies in the region had critically attempted to end their conflicts, as the US considered that conflict would deteriorate the political circumstance and its enemies would take opportunities to take advantage from the Kurdish civil war. The US governments struggled to meet with the Kurdish leaders to put aside their political interests and work in favor of their people in this region. Hence the Kurdish leaders in Iraq have efforts to make special relations with the US government through its representatives in Iraq.

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## Appendix

Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani appeal to President George Bush regarding the Kurdish issue in Iraq, March 1991.

### IRAQI KURDISTAN FRONT

#### PRESS RELEASE

The Kurdish Leaders, Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, have issued the following joint appeal to President George Bush regarding the present situation inside Iraq.

Mr. President:

RE: URGENT APPEAL FROM THE IRAQI KURDISTAN FRONT

Today, Saddam Hussein's forces began a full scale offensive to recapture Kirkuk. As part of this offensive the center of the city has been subjected to heavy bombardment by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter gunships, heavy artillery and surface-to-surface missiles causing widespread civilian casualties.

You personally called upon the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship. They have now risen and are confronting the might of Saddam's tyranny. They are being subjected to ruthless indiscriminate attacks against which they have no effective defense. The only hope for the Iraqi people to avoid an imminent catastrophe is for the world community to act resolutely, and immediately, to restrain Saddam Hussein from persisting with this barbaric onslaught.

The opposition forces are united in their commitment to achieve a pluralistic democracy which respects the human and collective rights of all the people of Iraq. Fears about the possible disintegration of Iraq are totally unfounded and serve only to provide Saddam Hussein with a pretext for clinging to power. The Iraqi Kurdistan Front, the coalition of all Iraqi Kurdish groups, has made it absolutely clear that it will respect the integrity and unity of Iraq.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Front formally calls on the government of the United States of America to intervene to--

1. Prevent Saddam Hussein from using heavy weapons of mass destruction against civilians, including fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter gunships, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, heavy artillery, napalm, phosphorus and sulphuric acid.
2. Ensure the distribution of humanitarian supplies to the whole of Iraq by delivering aid directly into the liberated areas by

road convoy from Turkey, Syria and Iran and through captured airfields.

Saddam Hussein cannot again be allowed to benefit from the

international community's indifference to the deliberate abuse of human rights and of international law. The international community has already paid a heavy price for this short-sightedness.

In the name of the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, we appeal to the United States to come to the aid of the people of Iraq.

Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani  
(Please telephone or fax reply urgently to London (081)667-0681