

Araştırma Makalesi/ Research Article

An “Unimportant” Siege: The Siege of Kabul by Mirza Suleiman (1556)

Yakup Aslan*

(ORCID: 0000-0002-2926-470X)

Makale Gönderim Tarihi
18.04.2025

Makale Kabul Tarihi
05.08.2025

Atıf Bilgisi/Reference Information

Chicago: Aslan, Y., “An “Unimportant” Siege: The Siege of Kabul by Mirza Suleiman (1556)”, *Vakanüvis-Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 10/ Özel Sayı: Vakanüvis 10. Yıl Özel Sayısı (Special Issue for the Decennial of Vakanüvis), (2025): 152-173.

APA: Aslan, Y. (2025). An “Unimportant” Siege: The Siege of Kabul by Mirza Suleiman (1556). *Vakanüvis-Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 10 (Özel Sayı: Vakanüvis 10. Yıl Özel Sayısı (Special Issue for the Decennial of Vakanüvis)), 152-173.

Abstract

This article examines the siege of Kabul in the early days of Akbar Shah's reign in terms of military, strategic and political aspects. The article is divided into two chapters. The first chapter focuses on the narration of Kabul siege, particularly by Bayazid Bayat. The second chapter contains an analysis of the siege from the perspective of military history. Factors such as military technology, siege methods, supply and geographical conditions, cunning and deception are identified and their impact on the outcome of the siege is discussed. The siege of Kabul provides a transitional example between traditional sieges and early modern methodical siege wars.

* Res. Assist., Hacettepe University, Faculty of Letters, Department of History, Türkiye, yakupaslan92@gmail.com.

Arş. Gör., Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Edebiyat Fakültesi, Tarih Bölümü, Türkiye.

Keywords: Akbar Shah, Early Modern, Kabul, Mughal Empire, Mu'nim Khan, Siege Wars.

"Önemsiz" bir Muhasara: Mirza Süleyman'ın Kabil Kuşatması (1556)

Öz

Bu makale Ekber Şah döneminin ilk günlerinde meydana gelen Kabil kuşatmasını askeri, stratejik ve siyasi dinamikler bakımından ele almaktadır. Makale 2 kısma ayrılmıştır. İlk kısımda özellikle Beyazid Beyat'ın hatıralarına dayanarak Kabil kuşatmasının anlatısı sunulmaktadır. İkinci kısım ise kuşatmanın askeri tarih bakımından bir değerlendirmesini ele alır. Kuşatma boyunca öne çıkan askeri teknoloji, kuşatma yöntemleri, iase ve coğrafi şartlar, hile ve aldatma gibi etkenler belirlenmiş ve kuşatmanın neticesine tesirleri tartışılmıştır. Kabil kuşatması, geleneksel kuşatmalar ile erken modern dönem metodik kuşatma savaşları arasında bir geçiş örneği sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Babürlü İmparatorluğu, Ekber Şah, Erken Modern, Kabil, Kuşatma Savaşları, Mu'nim Han.

Introduction

The aim of this study is to investigate the siege of Kabul, focusing on its military, strategic and political dynamics, during the mid-16th century Mughal empire building. By examining the siege activities, both defensive and offensive tactics including the constructing murchals, trench warfare, and outflow charges, and the roles of Mun'im Khan and Mirza Suleiman, this article aims to interpret the chief elements of the mid-16th century Mughal sieges. The main question guiding this study is what was factors shaped its outcome? Based on a detailed reading of contemporary sources, the paper intends to contribute to the Mughal military historiography.

In the year 1556, Humayun Shah was on the eve of regaining control of Hindustan after his exile in Iran. The defeat of Afghan Salim Sur Shah by the Mughal army was only a step towards the complete control. It alone was not sufficient for the re-establishment of the Empire. An unexpected incident that cause to the death of the Padishah, opened a new phase in re-conquering of the North India. Following the death of Humayun, various political and military figures in Hindustan emerged to defeat Akbar Shah, the new Mughal Emperor. One of the most famous

enemies of the new emperor was the Hindu chief Hemu.¹ Apart from him, Akbar had to struggle with many other internal and external opponents during the reign of approximately fifty years. Among these rivals, Mirzas who were important political figures of the Timurid dynasty, continued to cause problems for Akbar from the first days of his reign until almost the end. When Akbar ascended the throne nearly in 14 years old in Delhi, Mirza Suleiman governing the Badakhshan region expected to take advantage of the recent events. As soon as received the news of the Humayun's death, he considered himself as the oldest member of the dynasty and moved to Kabul to have the khutba delivered in his name. He laid siege to Kabul for about 4 and half months. The siege did not lead to an important changes in the Mughal politic history. But it has many military features that might attract attention of historians.

The Mughal historical documents have several siege records from Akbar Shah period. Some plausible explanations can be offered for this prevalence of siege narratives. Douglas E. Streusand claims in his book *"The Formation of the Mughal Empire"* that the regional powers on the Indian subcontinent who realized the limitations of their military capabilities in pitched battles against the Mughals, sought refuge within the relative safety of fortified positions.² This motivation caused sieges to be prevalent form of warfare between the Mughals and their rivals. The sieges of Chitor, Ranthambor and Surat, for example, are frequently mentioned in Akbar-era sources. And some scholars also have conducted detailed studies of these sieges in recent years.³ Yet, the siege of Kabul has not attracted such attention from researchers, and it differs from the mentioned ones due to its specific factors.

¹ His confrontation with Akbar in the plain of Panipat has been a popular subject among historians. For example, Andrew de la Garza, *The Mughal Empire At War: Babur, Akbar and the Indian Military Revolution, 1500-1605*, Routledge, New York 2016; Jadunath Sarkar, *Military History of India*, Sarkar & Sons, Calcutta 1960.

² Douglas E. Streusand, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1989, p. 51 et seq.

³ See, for example, Pratyay Nath, "Through the Lens of War: Akbar's Sieges (1567-1568) and Mughal Empire-Building in Early Modern North India", *Sout Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 2018, vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 245-258.

The first important point of Kabul siege is that it occurred during the early days of Akbar's reign, a period organizational and technological reforms of him had not yet manifested themselves. Secondly, the forces of Akbar were besieged in Kabul. This siege diverges from the general course in Akbar reign, as it was the encirclement of imperial forces rather than those of its adversaries. Lastly, an account by an eyewitness within the fort provides a first-hand account of the siege. The availability of such an eyewitness source enables scholars to delineate the nuances of the siege. This eyewitness, Bayazid Bayat of Tabriz, had joined Humayun service after his arrival in the Safavid court. Following Humayun's death, he rose to significant positions under Akbar, including *bekavulbegi*⁴, master of ceremonies, and treasurer. On Akbar's order, Bayazid recorded his memoirs to serve as a source for Abu'l Fazl Allami's Akbarnama.⁵ His memoirs provide valuable insights into the siege as a besieged one. In addition to Bayazid's memoirs, Akbarnama, The Tezkereh al Vakiat by Jauhar Aftabchi, Muntakhabu't-Tawarikh, Tarikh-I-Alfi, Humayunnama and Baburnama would assist us to comprehend and analyze the activities that transpired during the siege.

The paper is divided into two chapters. The first part focuses on the narration of Kabul siege, particularly by Bayazid Bayat. This part provides a detailed account of the siege, paying attention to the various activities. The second part of the paper contains an analysis of the siege from the perspective of military history. It examines the meaning of the military activities of the siege within the context of early modern siege warfare.

Narrative of the Siege of Kabul

It appears that Mirza Suleiman's desire to capture Kabul dated back to the reign of Emperor Humayun, as detailed in the Akbarnama, which provides an overall account of this process. According to the text, Mirza Suleiman's wife, Haram Begum's complete control over financial and administrative affairs, coupled with her undisputed power of promote or demote nobles at will, had led to the enmity of certain Badakhshan

⁴ It was a title given to those in charge of the imperial kitchen.

⁵ See, for more details on Bayazid Bayat and his memoirs, Abu'l-Hasan Mobin, "Tadhkirat-i Humayun wa Akbar"; *Âyene-i-Mîrâs (Mirror of Heritage)*, No.40, Spring 1387 (2008), pp. 319-329; Wheeler M. Thackston, "Translator's Preface" in *Three Memoirs of Humayun*, Mazda Publishers, California 2009, p. XII-XIII.

umara.⁶ The umara in question began to malign Haram Begum to her son Mirza Ibrahim, such an extent that Begum's brother Haidar Beg was finally imprisoned and murdered. This hearth-breaking incident likely caused profound grief for Begum, who decided to leave Badakhshan and to perform a pilgrimage. Just then, the death of Humayun's brother, Mirza Hindal enabled her an opportunity to visit Kabul and offer her condolences to the Begums of Gulchahra⁷ and Gulbadan⁸. In this way, Haram Begum travelled to Kabul and stayed there for some time. While she was in Kabul, Mirza Suleiman and Mirza Ibrahim convinced her to return Badakhshan. On returning to Badakhshan and observing the current situation in Kabul, she began informing Mirza Suleiman about the potential for capturing the fort.⁹

In order to determine what Haram Begum might have said to her husband, it is necessary to make inferences about the physical condition of the Kabul fortress from the available data sources. In his memoirs,

⁶ Haram Begum was known as "*vali n'iamat (ولی نعمت)*" according to Abu-l-Fazl. Abu-l-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, trans. H. Beveridge, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta 1907, p. 40; Abul-Fazl-ı Mubarak-ı Allami, *The Akbarnamah*, Persian Text edited by Maulawi Abd-ur-Rahim, vol. 2, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta 1879, p. 23; She had an important status within the Timurid women. Beveridge provides a detailed account of her. Annette S. Beveridge, "Appendix" in *The History of Humayun (Humayun Nama)*, The Royal Asiatic Society, London 1902, p. 242; Annette Beveridge, "Babur, Gülbeden, ve Haydar Tarafından Zikredilen Kadınların Tercümei Halleri", in *Hümayunname*, Turkish Translation by Abdürreb Yelgar and Eymen Manyas, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1987, p. 264-269.

⁷ Gulchahra Begum was the child of Babur Shah and Dildar Begum, and the younger sister of Hindal, Gulrang and Gulbadan. After Hindal's death, she was amongst those whom Haram Begum paid a visit to. See, for a detailed information about Gulchahra Begum, Beveridge, "Appendix", p. 231; Beveridge, "Babur, Gülbeden...", p. 251-252.

⁸ Gulbadan was a prominent figure of the dynasty. Her work "Ahwal-i-Humayun Padshah or Humayunnama" that written at the behest of Akbar Shah contains of the events during the reign of Babur and Humayun. She passed away in Agra in the year 1603. For a detailed information about her life, see A.S. Bazmee Ansari, "Gulbadan Begam", *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 2, Brill, Leiden 1991, pp. 1134-1135; Ruby Lal, *Vagabond Princess The Great Adventures of Gulbadan*, Juggernaut Books, New Delhi 2024.

⁹ Abu-l-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, (trans. Beveridge), p.40-41; Abul-Fazl, *The Akbarnamah*, vol. 2, (ed. Abd-ur-Rahim), p. 23-24; Qazi Ahmad Tatawi et al., *Tarikh-i Alfı*, ed. Ghulam Reza Tabatabai, vol. 8, Sherkat-e Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, Tehran 1382, p. 5733.

Babur Shah described Kabul as being completely encircled by mountains, with a lake to the south and a strong fort. Babur also mentioned that Kabul was a well-protected area, making it hard for an enemy to invade because of its mountainous nature.¹⁰ After Babur's capture of the region in 1504, Kabul became a major trading center and a key strategic location for the Mughal Empire, by experiencing significant improvements.¹¹ However, the prolonged struggle between Humayun and Kamran, which included many sieges, caused considerable damage to the Kabul's defensive structures.¹² Moreover, Humayun's campaign to conquer Hindustan and subsequent death there left Kabul deficient in troops. On the eve of the siege, the Emperor's sisters, children, concubines and the wives of the *Amirs* also had not yet left for Hindustan and were still engaged in the procession of mourning for Hindal Mirza. And, it is documented that the fort had very little *zakhira* (supply) and *sipahi* (soldier), indicating a significant military deficit. When Mirza Suleiman advanced towards the Kabul, there were approximately 150 soldiers inside the fort, but no cannons or provisions according to Bayat.¹³ It is therefore plausible that Harem

¹⁰ Gazi Zahîreddin Muhammed Babur, *Baburnâme (Vekayi)*, Turkish Translation by Reşit Rahmeti Arat, Kabalcı Yayınevi, İstanbul 2006, p. 284-288; Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, *Bâburnâme, Part Two: Kabul, Chaghatay Turkish Text with Abdul-Rahim Khankhanan's Persian Translation*, ed. and trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilisations, Harvard University, 1993, p. 263-269; Zahiru'd-dîn Muhammad Bâbur Pâdshâh Ghâzî, *The Bâbur-nâme in English (Memoirs of Bâbur)*, vol. 1, trans. Annette Susannah Beveridge, Luzac and Co., London 1922, p. 200-204.

¹¹ More details about the Kabul, see C.W. Woodburn, *The Bala Hissar of Kabul, Revealing a Fortress-Palace in Afghanistan*, The Institution of Royal Engineers, 2009, p. 3-4; Alison L. Gascoigne et al., "In the Trenches: Rescue Archaeology at the Bala Hissar, Kabul", *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, vol. 51, Issue. 1, p. 151.

¹² During the ongoing conflict between Humayun and Kamran Mirza for dominance over Kabul, Humayun's siege of the Kabul resulted in significant damage to the fortifications. After the siege, which lasted for several months, Humayun permitted his soldiers to loot Kabul overnight. See Jouher, *The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun*, trans. M. Charles Stewart, The Oriental Translation Fund, London 1832, p. 87; Jauhar Aftabchi, *Waqi'ât-i Humâyûn*, Maulana Azad Library, Farsia-Ahkbâr Collection, Ms.109, fol. 85b-86a.

¹³ Bâyezîd Biyât, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, ed. M. Hidayat Hosain, The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1941, p. 196-197; Bâyezîd Biyât, *Târikh-i Humâyun*, (Persian texts Edited and Translated by W. M. Thackston), Bibliotheca Iranica, Mazda

Begum, having spent some time in Kabul fort for a period, informed Mirza Suleiman of the fortress's state and its military capabilities. Once hearing of Humayun's death, Suleiman moved to Kabul with his son Mirza İbrahim and an army of 10,000 men. His objective was to have the *khutba* delivered and coins issued in his own name there, as the eldest member of the royal family.¹⁴

The Amirs in Kabul assumed that Mirza Suleiman's intention was solely a condolence visit, which led to their failure to muster sufficient troops from the surrounding areas. However, Mun'im Khan,¹⁵ the governor of Kabul region and qal'a-dar of the Kabul fort, anticipated a potential siege and began to make the necessary arrangements without delay. He ordered the bastions and walls of the fort to be repaired and modified, and allocated soldiers and *ra'aya* to the murchals. Concurrently, shops and other buildings outside the fort wall were demolished and their materials, i.e. timber and other resources, were transported to the fort. The population, both men and women, were also herded inside.¹⁶ Prior to the siege, Mun'im Khan had already sent intelligence to Akbar Shah regarding the matter and requested his assistance.¹⁷ All these measures implemented by the governor in a quick manner would yield favorable outcomes in the later stages of the siege.

Publishers, California 2009, p. 95; For an analysis about the existence of cannons and firearms in the fort, find the relevant sections below.

¹⁴ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-l-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 196; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 95.

¹⁵ Mun'im Khan was a noble of Humayun's court. Following the ascension of Akbar Shah to the throne and dismissal of Bairam Khan, he was promoted to the *Vākil* and granted the title Khan-l-Khanan. A prominent figure among Akbar's nobles, Mun'im Khan demonstrated his military prowess in numerous battles, contributing to the expansion and security of the empire. Further information regarding his life, see Nawwab Shah Nawas Khan and Abdul Hayy, *The Maathir-ul-Umara*, trans. H. Beveridge, vol.2, part.1, Janaki Prakashan, New Delhi 1979, p. 283-291; İqtidar Alam Khan, *A Political Biography of A Mughal Noble: Mun'im Khan Khan-l Khanan, 1497-1575*, Orient Longman, New Delhi 1973.

¹⁶ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-l-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 197; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 95.

¹⁷ Abu-l-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, (trans. Beveridge), p. 41; Abul-Fazl, *The Akbarnamah*, vol. 2, (ed. Abd-ur-Rahim), p. 24 ; Mullā Abd ul-Bāqī Nāhāvandī, *The Ma'āsir-l-Rahimī*, vol.1, ed. Mawlawi M. Hidayet Husain, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1910, p. 648; Tatawi et al., *Tarikh-i Alfi*, vol. 8, p. 5733.

Mun'im Khan was aware that if he had confronted the Badakhshan army in a direct clash, a decisive and crushing defeat would have been inevitable due to the superior numbers of the opposing forces. So he did what early modern siege warfare required.

While Mun'im Khan was busy in fortification, a small group of soldiers from the fort launched an attack on Suleiman's *harawal* (vanguard) troops approaching the city. There were also movements of infantry and cavalry from the fortress against the enemy. These actions indicated that the first fights of the siege began. In the earlier phases of the conflict, despite the limited number of combatants on either side, “*there were no one who did not receive five or six wounds*”¹⁸ Then the enemy retreated to the vicinity of Gulkana, and Kabul soldiers returned to the fort and were deployed on a defensive position in Nakhas side with the onset of nightfall. Meanwhile, one of the enemy soldiers, named Mir Kamal, had remained among the Kabul troops retreating towards to the fort due to the darkness. The Mughal troops apprehended him and handed over to Mun'im Khan. Such confusions were likely to occur during conflicts, especially under cover of darkness. In order to prevent such incidents, Mun'im Khan forbade his soldiers to depart from the fort without permission, although he rewarded those who assaulted the enemy. He delivered the keys of the gates to Bayazid Bayat, thereby authorizing him to prevent any individual, regardless of gender or military unit, from leaving the fort without his clear permission.¹⁹ It is apparent that Mun'im Khan's strict orders were intended to preserve his strength and to commence the siege in the most advantageous conditions possible against the Mirzas, who were nearing Kabul.

Shortly after, Mirza Suleiman and his son Ibrahim also arrived in Kabul and began establishing their forces in strategically advantageous locations. One of the most important activities of Ibrahim after the settlement was the construction of a defensive ditch (*murchal*) to

¹⁸ “*Hič kas nabūd ke az panj u shish zakhm-i ... nadāshte bāshand.*” Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 199; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 96.

¹⁹ For the all information in this paragraph, see Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 199-200; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 95-96.

prevent Kabul soldiers supplying fodder from the surrounding areas.²⁰ This strategy yielded some degree of success. However, despite their numerical superiority, the Mirzas still required further success in order to capture the fort. The defensive ditches (*murchals*) that had been constructed around the fort were subject to frequent and unexpected attacks by Kabul soldiers. The Badakhshan troops suffered significant losses, particularly during night-time assaults from the fort. Kabul forces, on the other hand, were vulnerable to attacks by the enemy when they left the fortress to make sudden raids and/or to supply of fodder. On one occasion, a group of soldiers who had ventured out to collect fodder for their animals were encountered by the enemy and compelled to retreat to the gates. At this precise moment, Bayazid, on his own volition, moved to provide assistance to these hard-pressed soldiers. Despite being hit by an arrow during the attack, he saved his life thanks to a golden plate on his chest. As Bayazid's account illustrates, while Mirza Ibrahim engaged in fierce and intense combat, the defenders responded it with sudden and effective counterattacks.²¹

The primary objective of the Kabul soldiers was to remain behind the ramparts, with the aim of preventing the enemy from reaching the walls. Simultaneously, they sought to inflict casualties through sudden assaults to the enemy trenches when opportunities arose. For instance, following the reporting by spies that Muqaddam Beg from the Badakhshan army was occupied in Shahrara Garden, a small number of Kabul soldiers initiated a surprise attack on the trench where his men were positioned. This attack resulted in the destruction of the trench and the capture of the ladder and other items that besiegers had brought with themselves to scale the wall. Muqaddam Beg, realizing the severity of the attack, immediately rushed to the aid of his soldiers. Upon arriving there, he found that the trench had been completely annihilated. Just at very moment, he came under gunfire from approximately 30 artillerymen within the fort by since he was not fully covered. The trench was restored the same night. A few days later, the fort soldiers launched an attack on the same trench once again.

²⁰ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 200; Bāyazīd Bayāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 96-97.

²¹ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 202-204; Bāyazīd Bayāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 97-98.

However, this time Muqaddem Beg's men were on alert. The fort soldiers failed to achieve any significant outcomes from this attack and consequently returned behind the walls.²²

In the midst of ongoing clashes between the two sides, Mirza Suleiman dispatched Qazi Nizam²³ as an envoy to the fort. Mun'im Khan rejected Kadi Nizam's demands and detained him within the fort for approximately 40 days. The purpose of detaining the envoy within the fort was to demonstrate that the forces and resources available were sufficient to withstand a prolonged siege. For instance, in the assemblies Qazi Nizam attended, a variety of food, fruit, syrup and sherbet were brought. He was also informed that the morale of Kabul soldiers was so high that they would be able to defend the fort for a long time, and reminded that reinforcements would soon arrive from Hindustan. The defenders posed a crucial question to Qazi Nizam for the Mirzas to consider: "*Once the auxiliary forces arrived from Hindustan, what course of action would they pursue? How would they return to Badakhshan by passing Hindukuh?*" Following an assessment, Qazi Nizam determined that the fort could not be captured easily. He was consequently given a khilat (a robe of honour) and a horse, and permitted to return to the Badakhshan camp. A few days later, Mun'im Khan received a letter from Mirza Suleiman, who declared his intention to return to Badkhshan provided that his name be recited in the khutba within the fort.²⁴

During the negotiation process, Mun'im Khan, who was likely hoping to strengthen his bargaining position, saw an opportunity to capture Mirza Ibrahim. Baba Dost Bahshî, who had a murchal between the gate of Barak and the citadel, sent one of his men to Mirza Ibrahim and informed him that he could take him into the fort through his murchal. Upon believing in the message, Mirza arrived at the murchal of Baba

²² Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-l-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 201-202; Bāyazīd Bayāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 97.

²³ The envoy's name is referred as "Qazi Khan Badakhshi" in *Tarikh-i Alfi*, see Tatawi et al., *Tarikh-i Alfi*, vol.8, p. 5733; and in *Akbarnama* as "Qazi Khan Badakhshi", see Abu-l-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, (trans. Beveridge), p. 42; and in *Muntakhab at-Tawarikh* as "Qazi Nizam of Badakhshan", see Abdul-Qadir Badaoni, *Muntakhabu-t-Tawarikh*, vol. 2, trans. George S.A. Ranking, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi 1990, p. 5.

²⁴ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-l-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 205-206; Bāyazīd Bayāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 99.

Dost Bahshī one night with nine soldiers and a ladder. When Mirza began to scale the wall by employing the ladder, Mun'im Khan gave the order for his immediate arrest. Despite these efforts, the attempt to capture Mirza Ibrahim was unsuccessful, and he managed to escape from the trap by cursing Baba Dost Bakhshī.²⁵ Two days later, Mirza Suleiman requested Babūs, one of Mun'im Khan's trusted men, to deliver his message. The content of his message was explicit: the siege would not be lifted until a khutbah was delivered on his name in Kabul.²⁶

Despite having better conditions in terms of troops and provisions, as the days passed, problems began to affect Mirza Suleiman's troops as well. Food supplies and the approach of winter season now had to be taken into account for the Badakhshan side which had more men. In the meantime, a further issue became apparent that required immediate attention from Mirza Suleiman. The arrival of a small party from Hindustan, led by Mīr Muhammad Khan Ataka and Mirza Khizr Khan Hazara,²⁷ at a location known as Khurd Kabul had the potential to pose a significant threat. This party had embarked on a mission to escort the harem women of Kabul to Akbar's court prior to the news of the siege reaching Hindustan. In the course of the siege in Kabul, no other military units were deployed to provide assistance, with the exception of the aforementioned unit.²⁸ The military strength of this unit was

²⁵ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 206-207; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 99-100.

²⁶ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 207-208; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 100.

²⁷ In *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, their names were recorded as "Muhammad Quli Khan Barlas, Atka Khan, and Khizr Khan Hazarah". See Badaoni, *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, vol. 2, (trans. Ranking), p. 5; and in *Tarikh-I-Alfi* as "Muhammad Quli Khan Barlas, Shamsuddin Muhammad Khan Ataka Khan, Khizr Khan Hazarah and Khwaja Jalaluddin Mahmud". See Tatawi et al., *Tarikh-i Alfi*, vol. 8, p. 5733.

²⁸ According to some chronicles, which were written many years after the siege, reinforcements were dispatched to assist Mun'im Khan. For example, Measir-I-Rahimi says that "*Khan-i-Khanan jam'i az bahaduran-I dargah ra be-komak namzad kard*". See Nāhāvandī, *The Ma'āsir-I-Rahimī*, vol.1, (ed. Husain), p. 648; On the other hand, Abu-I-Fazl says that "*Many represented that the force which had left to bring away the chaste ladies was sufficient for the purpose, and before Akbar, on account of sundry necessary matters in India, had arranged about sending help, Kabul and the Kabulis were by God's help delivered from the Mirza's troubling.*" See Abu-I-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, (trans. Beveridge), p. 41-42; Therefore, it seems reasonable that no reinforcement other

inadequate to overcome the army of Badakhshan and bring an end to the siege. Given these circumstances, it was determined that the most suitable course of action would be to proceed to the Hazara region, where the necessary troops would be recruited, and subsequently execute a *shabhûn* (night raid) against the Mirzas. Nevertheless, having receiving intelligence report from the spies on that the unit in Khurd Kabul were in possession of large quantities of goods and other materials, Mirza Suleiman resolved to launch an attack on them. Consequently, Suleiman seized all the money and goods in their possession. These resources enabled Suleiman to extend the siege for a further month.²⁹

The attack of Suleiman on the unit coming to the aid of Kabul probably demoralized Mun'im Khan and the defenders and made negotiations imperative for the conclusion of the siege. Mun'im Khan was aware that he would no longer receive any support. Furthermore, the food supply in Kabul, which had been a long-standing concern, had reached a critical level. On the other hand, the imminent winter season, the closure of the passes due to snowfall, and the fortress's impregnability, made negotiations plausible for the Mirza as well. Consequently, reciting the name of Mirza during the khutba became a mutually acceptable solution for both parties. After the khutba, the Mirzas departed from Kabul with the intention of proceeding towards Badakhshan, thus bringing an end to the siege. Mun'im Khan proceeded to deliver the khutba in the name of Akbar Shah upon the cessation of the siege, a feat he accomplished with limited resources.³⁰

The Analyses of the Siege

The siege of Kabul by Mirza Suleiman, which lasted for four and a half months, provides valuable information about the siege wars of the same period and the region. In this section, I will make an assessment by

than the group for escorting Begums in Kabul were deployed. In addition, the ongoing struggle for sovereignty of Hindustan against numerous local forces, particularly Hemu, required more troops for the Akbar Shah.

²⁹ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 206-207; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 99-100.

³⁰ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 208-211; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 100-102.

comparing the activities of both sides with other sieges of the period. This part will identify the military characteristics of the siege of Kabul, and the findings will be examined to draw conclusions about the similarities and differences between it and other sieges. Therefore we aim to discuss the role and significance of the siege of Kabul within the context of the siege wars of the period.

Firstly, as previously stated, there was a significant numerical superiority of the Badakhshan troops over those of Kabul. Armies facing the possibility of an absolute defeat in the open field retreated to fortified positions, a common tactic in early modern India.³¹ Upon receiving news of the Mirzas' arrival, Mun'im Khan immediately began to gather his forces within the fort and mobilize the soldiers and the Kabulis to confront the enemy. Throughout the siege, he did not allow his forces to move beyond the fortress walls and to engage the enemy directly. This would have exposed his already diminutive number of soldiers to the potentially disastrous consequences of open-field conflicts. Moreover, the demolition of all houses and shops outside the walls that could be of use to the enemy, and transportation of these materials to the fort, were among the pre-siege measures implemented. The purpose of these measures was to make it hard for the besieging armies to find suitable encampment (*ibatah*) and to access necessities (*i'asha*), while coping with the harsh climatic conditions of the region. A relevant example is the siege of Chitor by Akbar Shah. Prior to this siege, the ruler of the fort, Rana Uday Singh, destroyed the surrounding meadows, leaving no pasture in the vicinity.³² The same tactics put the Badakhshan soldiers in a challenging siege. The topography of the region was mountainous and the climate conditions were inhospitable.

³¹ A comparison of battles and sieges in Akbar period reveals that the sieges occurred with greater frequency. Douglas E. Streusand points out that although the Mughal military history was not entirely devoid of field battles, the frequency and presence of these battles decreased, particularly after the defeats of the Afghans in Bengal circa 1575-76. The absolute military superiority of the Mughal forces over their rivals in the pitched battles during the reign of Akbar led to the predominance of siege warfare. See Douglas E. Streusand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*, Westview Press, Boulder 2011, p. 254-255.

³² Abu-l-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, (trans. Beveridge), p. 464; Abul-Fazl, *The Akbarnamah*, vol. 2, (ed. Abd-ur-Rahim), p. 314.

Mun'im Khan implemented defensive measures within the walls of the fort, alongside the external arrangements. The gates, towers and murchals were apportioned among the amirs. During the siege, the Âhenîn (Iron) Gate was under the direct control of Mun'im Khan, while the amirs were responsible for the command of the murchals in the different parts of the fort. Bayazid describes in detail which amir was assigned to which area.³³ This division was implemented with a tactical focus on areas regarded as vulnerable to the attacks and being needed strong defense. In early modern sieges, a strategic deployment of cannons along the fortifications was another common defensive tactic employed to prevent enemy advances and ensure the security of the surrounding.³⁴ The question of whether Mun'im Khan possessed the cannons in Kabul is a subject that requires careful interpretation of the available sources. Bayazid Bayat explicitly states in the first part of his account of the siege that they did not have cannons. In the later parts of the text, the presence of artillerymen inside the fortress is mentioned, but their activities are represented as firing.³⁵ A type of light cannon, the *zamburak*,³⁶ is the only mention of artillery in the text,

³³ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 209-210; Bāyazīd Bayāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyūn*, p. 101.

³⁴ See the examples: During the siege of Chunar by Humayun in 1538, a *ghulam* (slave) named Kalafat infiltrated the fort as if a traitor to determine the locations of the cannons. Jouher, *The Tezkereh*, (trans. Steward), p. 9-10; Jauhar Aftabchi, *Waqi'āt-i Humāyūn*, Ms. 109, fol.11b-12a; Richard M. Eaton and Philip B. Wagoner's research reveals that Bahmani rulers built the platforms into the walls of Bidar, Kalyana and Raichur forts to accommodate cannons. These archaeological evidences have enabled the dating of the presence and prevalence of cannons in the subcontinent to a period before the arrival of Portuguese. See, Richard M. Eaton and Philip B. Wagoner, Warfare on the Deccan Plateau, 1450-1600: A Military Revolution in Early Modern India?, *Journal of World History*, March 2014, vol. 25, No.1, p. 9-10; In the year 1510, when a Portuguese army was engaged in the siege of Goa (Pangij fort), they encountered artillery fire from the fort. See, Alfonso Albuquerque, *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, Second Viceroy of India*, vol. 2, trans. Walter de Gray Birch, Hakluyt Society, London 1877, p. 89.

³⁵ Bayazid mentions to the Kabulis' musket firings in various sections of the text. See Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 201, 204, 207; Bāyazīd Bayāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyūn*, p. 97, 98, 100.

³⁶ Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 204; Bāyazīd Bayāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyūn*, p. 98; About *zamburak*, see William Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moguls: Its Organization and Administration*, Luzac and Co., London 1903, p. 135-136.

which is full of references to musket fires. Here, it is vital to reiterate that large quantities of arms and munitions possibly had taken to Hindustan by Humayun before the siege. Yet it seems that there were cannons in the type of *zamburak* in the fort. The Akbarnama, as recorded approximately fifty years following the siege and lacking direct first-hand accounts of it, states that assaults by Mirza Suleiman were met with cannon and musket fire.³⁷ While there exists a degree of uncertainty among sources regarding the presence of cannon in the fort, there is no such doubt with regard to muskets. As is well documented, the artillerymen within the fort employed muskets and arrows in order to repel the enemy soldiers in a variety of instances. Lastly, there remains no verifiable evidence confirming the presence of firearms among Mirza Suleiman's troops. After examining all these dispersed data, it can be derived that despite of the presence of firearms during the siege, they did not play a decisive role in determining the outcome.

The Badakhshan army initiated the siege activities by encircling the Kabul fort. This tactic was a common practice in early modern siege warfare. The objective was threefold. Firstly, it sought to isolate the fort from the surrounding area. Secondly, it aimed to obstruct the fort's supply routes and communication networks. Finally, the objective was to impede the arrival of reinforcements, a key factor in achieving a conquest. Following the encirclement of the fort, Mirzas demonstrated no mercy towards the Kabulis attempting to acquire provisions. At the same time, the besiegers initiated the construction of murchals.³⁸ Murchals were one of the methodical siege activities that clearly visible

³⁷ "Az bala-yi hisar ba-zarb-i tup va tufang" Abul-Fazl, The Akbarnamah, vol. 2, (ed. Abdur-Rahim), p. 24; Abu-l-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, (trans. Beveridge), p. 41.

³⁸ Murchal is a word that appears in the texts with different spelling variations. For example, it is possible to find the word as *mürchal* (مورچال) or *mürchāl* (مورچال). An analysis of the word reveals that the first part, *mür* (مور), has the meaning of "ant". When combined with the Turkish diminutive suffix, the word could be translated as "way of ant". The dictionaries provide three possible meanings of the word: trench, bastion, tower and sap. See Francis Joseph Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian- English Dictionary*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London 1963, p. 1343; Mehmet Kanar, *Farsça-Türkçe Sözlük*, Say Yayınları, İstanbul 2015, p. 1602.

in many geographies during the early modern period.³⁹ The Mughal sources frequently mentioned murchals during sieges, indicating their functional importance.⁴⁰ The primary purpose of a murchal construction was to provide the attackers with a sheltered position and to isolate forts from their surroundings. Murchals, serving both defensive and offensive purposes, were utilised to bring besiegers in as close proximity as possible to fort walls during a siege. However, it is noteworthy that the term murchal could be used by the sources to refer to different construction types. In addition to the examples cited in the sources as trenches, there were documented cases where the batteries constructed by defenders in front of or behind the walls, such as piling of soil, were also designated as murchals.⁴¹ The purpose of these earthworks, erected by accumulating earth in front of the walls, was to create an obstruction between the walls and the enemy. The construction of such structures at vulnerable areas or behind the walls was primarily intended to impede or decelerate the advance of the besiegers. Consequently, both the defenders and the attackers employed murchals as a fundamental component of sieges. Lastly the safety of murchals was another matter to be taken concern. As previously referenced, there were multiple outflows from the fort to the Badakhshan murchals.⁴² In the event of such outflows, the murchal had to be rebuilt if it had been destroyed.

The most significant factor determining the outcome of the siege was the limit of the supply availability. Even when militarily outnumbered,

³⁹ For example, The Safavid chronicles mention murchal. See, Sertaç Sarıççek, "Safevi Kuşatma Savaşlarında Kullanılan Sahra Tahkimatları", *Ankara Anadolu ve Rumeli Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol. 2, No. 3, 2021, p. 135.

⁴⁰ During the Humayun's siege of the Sehwan fort, the besiegers were unable to approach the wall due to the cannon fire, and therefore had to build a murchal. See Gülbeden, *Hümâyunnâme*, Translated into Turkish by Abdürreb Yelgar, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1987, p. 173. Gul-Badan Begam, *The History of Humâyûn (Humâyûn-Nâma)*, trans. Annette S. Beveridge, Royal Asiatic Society, London 1902, p. 152; In Akbar's siege of Ranthambor (1568), murchals were constructed. See Khwâjah Nizâmuddîn Ahmad, *The Tabaqât-i Akbarî*, vol. 2, ed. B. De, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1931, p. 224.

⁴¹ To compare the murchals established by Mirza Ibrahim, Muqaddem Beg, and the amirs from the Kabul side, refer to Bâyezîd Biyât, *Tadhkira-i-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 209-210; Bâyezîd Biyât, *Târikh-i Humâyun*, p. 101.

⁴² See particularly the section on Muqaddem Beg above.

defenders who retreated behind the walls could sustain their struggle for an extended period, provided they had sufficient supplies of water, grain, and food. However, in the absence of these essential resources; military skills, formations, tactics, and strategies became secondary concerns. There are numerous instances in history where the outcome of a siege was shaped by the availability or lack of provisions. One such notable example is the case of the siege of Kangra. Emperor Jahangir's order for Padshahzadah Hurrem to capture the fort was carried out due to a lack of provisions for the defenders. The closure of the Kangra fort's entrances and egresses resulted in a critical shortage of food, consequently compelling the defenders to submit pleadings for mercy.⁴³ Another example of the vital connection between siege warfare and provisioning can be found in nine-month siege of Samarkand by Uzbek Shaybanī Khan. The severe conditions endured by the defenders were a decisive factor in the eventual conquest of the city. The inhabitants were forced to eat dogs and donkeys, while the animals survived by eating tree bark.⁴⁴ Following the fall of Samarkand, Babur indicated the vital connection between siege warfare and the availability of provisions: *"To hold a fort there must be a head, two hands and two legs, that is to say the Commandant is the head; help and reinforcement coming from two quarters are the two arms and the food and water in the fort are the two legs"*⁴⁵. Babur's analysis clearly presents the general character of the siege warfare in early modern period. This analysis can be applied to the siege of Kabul, where Mun'im Khan displayed a successful command as the head. But, lack of reinforcements and food supplies ultimately compelled the defenders to agree the delivery of the khutba in the name of Mirza Suleiman after a siege of four and a half months. As was the

⁴³ Motamad Khan, *iqbalnama-I Jahangiri*, ed. Mawlawis Abd Al-Haii ve Ahmed Ali, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1865, p. 174-176.

⁴⁴ Babur, *Baburnâme (Vekayi)*, (Turkish trans. Arat), p. 238-ff; Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, *Bâburnâma, Part One: Fergana and Transaxonia, Chaghatay Turkish Text with Abdul-Rahim Khankhanan's Persian Translation*, ed. and trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilisations, Harvard University, 1993, p.183-ff; Bâbur, *The Bâbur-nâma in English*, (trans. Beveridge), p. 142-ff.

⁴⁵ Bâbur, *The Bâbur-nâma in English*, (trans. Beveridge), p.145; Babur Mirza, *Bâburnâma, Part One, ed. and trans. Thackston*, p. 189; Babur, *Baburnâme (Vekayi)*, (Turkish trans. Arat), p. 239.

case in Samarqand, the absence of “arms and legs” determined the fate of the siege. With the imperial army’s expedition to Hindustan, the necessary precautions had not been taken against Mirza Suleiman’s unexpected campaign. This lack of preparation, coupled with the scarcity of food in Kabul, played a pivotal role in the siege’s outcome. Though Bayazid Bayat does not mention detailed accounts of the severity of the shortage inside the fort, the frequency of outflow maneuvers to procure food and fodder suggest that the scarcity had reached a critic level.⁴⁶ The rapid movements of the fort’s mounted troops were intended to procure supplies. In response to these manoeuvres, Mirzas employed a tactic of complete encirclement of the fort, thereby preventing the outflow of the defenders, and compelling them to acquiesce the terms of surrender. In conclusion, the negotiations between Qazi Nizam and Mun’im Khan, as previously written, clearly indicate that the inhabitants of the fort were in a desperate situation.

During the negotiation days, Mun’im Khan’s actions in the art of cunning made a real effect on the ongoing siege. It goes without saying that cunning and deceptive behaviors were so common in siege warfare like a battlefield. In case of the Kabul siege, the efforts of the Mun’im Khan to mislead Badakhshan messenger, Qazi Nizam, about the actual situation of the inhabitants of the fort constitutes a good example to deceptive behaviors in sieges. After the arrival of the envoy, he was entrusted to Bayazid, whose primary responsibility was provide him with the utmost hospitality. Qazi Nizam was thus included in the banquets, which consisted of food, fruit, syrup and sherbet. Following a period of approximately 40 days, and satisfied that the fort could withstand a prolonged siege, the envoy was allowed to return to the Badakhshan army camp. The primary motivation behind this act of hospitality was to create an impression among the enemy that there

⁴⁶ Bayat gives the impression that the defenders suffered from food shortage during the siege. For example, the efforts to convince Qazi Nizam that there was no shortage (تنگی) in the fort, see Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 205; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 99; In the assembly organized by Mun’im Khan, the amirs believed that the fort would be relieved from the shortage (عسرت) provided that the khutba be read in the name of Mirza Suleiman. See Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tadhkira-I-Humayun wa Akbar*, p. 206; Bāyazīd Biyāt, *Tārikh-i Humāyun*, p. 99.

was sufficient food in the fort and that the defenders could withstand the siege until the arrival of relief forces from Hindustan. Mun'im Khan's cunning tactics and the valiant defense of the inhabitants caused a delay to the outcome of the siege; however ultimately these admirable efforts of the defenders were failed due to lack of both food and reinforcement.

Conclusion

The siege of Kabul was an “unexpected” event that occurred during the new emperor’s military campaign in India. The outcome of the siege not only a strategic victory but also reinforced the stability of the empire’s northern frontier. This military success allowed the newly enthroned emperor to focus toward the rising threat posed by Hemu. Beyond its strategic consequences, the siege also marked an important landmark in the military career of Mun'im Khan. His leadership during the siege contributed to his elevation within the Mughal imperial hierarchy. In the subsequent years, Mun'im Khan would rise to become one of the most prominent military figures of the Mughal court, holding the title of Khan-I Khanan. When considered as a whole, these results indicate that, despite its limited prominence in Mughal historiography, aforementioned siege was, in fact, a significant military and political affair that occurred at a critical juncture in the empire’s early history.

This siege exemplifies the prevalent form of siege warfare of the period. It shows that fortified positions could not be captured easily, despite the significant numerical superiority of the besiegers. The defenders under the command of Mun'im Khan provided a remarkable example of effective fort defense. From the beginning of the siege, Khan was aware of the prevailing conditions and acted accordingly. Rather than engaging the Badakhshan forces in direct fights, he adopted defense strategy and implemented sortie operations against to the enemy’s trenchments. Conversely, the besiegers employed conventional siege tactics, along with mining and trenching, as firearms had not yet become a decisive factor in siege warfare. The siege of Kabul, therefore, serves as an example of the transitional phase in siege warfare between traditional form and the early modern era characterized by use of firearms.

References

- Abdul-Qadir Badaoni, *Muntakhabu-t-Tawarikh*, vol. 2, trans. George S.A. Ranking, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi 1990.
- Abu-l-Fazl, *The Akbar Nama*, vol. 2, trans. H. Beveridge, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta 1907.
- Abul-Fazl-ı Mubarak-ı Allami, *The Akbarnamah*, Persian Text edited by Maulawi Abd-ur-Rahim, vol. 2, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta 1879.
- Albuquerque, Alfonso, *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, Second Viceroy of India*, vol. 2, trans. Walter de Gray Birch, Hakluyt Society, London 1877.
- Ansari, A.S. Bazmee, "Gulbadan Begam", *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 2, Brill, Leiden 1991, pp.1134-1135.
- Babur Mirza, Zahiruddin Muhammad, *Bâburnâma, Part One: Fergana and Transaxonia, Chaghatay Turkish Text with Abdul-Rahim Khankhanan's Persian Translation*, ed. and trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilisations, Harvard University, 1993.
- Babur Mirza, Zahiruddin Muhammad, *Bâburnâma, Part Two: Kabul, Chaghatay Turkish Text with Abdul-Rahim Khankhanan's Persian Translation*, ed. and trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilisations, Harvard University, 1993.
- Bâbur Pâdshâh Ghâzî, Zahiru'd-dîn Muhammad, *The Bâbur-nâma in English (Memoirs of Bâbur)*, vol. 1, trans. Annette Susannah Beveridge, Luzac and Co., London 1922.
- Babur, Gazi Zahîreddin Muhammed, *Baburnâme (Vekayi)*, Turkish Translation by Reşit Rahmeti Arat, Kabcacı Yayınevi, İstanbul 2006.
- Bâyazid Bayât, *Târikh-i Humâyun*, (Persian texts Edited and Translated by W. M. Thackston), Bibliotheca Iranica, Mazda Publishers, California 2009.
- Bâyazîd Biyât, *Tadhkira-l-Humayun wa Akbar*, ed. M. Hidayat Hosain, The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1941.
- Beveridge, Annette S., "Appendix" in *The History of Humayun (Humayun Nama)*, The Royal Asiatic Society, London 1902, pp. 203-301.
- Beveridge, Annette, "Babur, Gülbeden, ve Haydar Tarafından Zikredilen Kadınların Tercümei Halleri", in *Hümayunname*, Turkish Translation by Abdürreb Yelgar and Eymen Manyas, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1987, pp. 217-337.
- De La Garza, Andrew, *The Mughal Empire At War: Babur, Akbar and the Indian Military Revolution, 1500-1605*, Routledge, New York 2016.
- Eaton, Richard M. and Wagoner, Philip B., Warfare on the Deccan Plateau, 1450-1600: A Military Revolution in Early Modern India?, *Journal of World History*, March 2014, vol. 25, No.1, pp. 5-50.

Gascoigne, Alison L. et al., "In the Trenches: Rescue Archaeology at the Bala Hissar, Kabul", *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, vol. 51, Issue. 1, pp. 151-196.

Gul-Badan Begam, *The History of Humâyûn (Humâyûn-Nâme)*, trans. Annette S. Beveridge, Royal Asiatic Society, London 1902.

Gulbeden, *Hümayunnâme*, Translated into Turkish by Abdürreb Yelgar, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1987.

Irvine, William, *The Army of the Indian Moguls: Its Organization and Administration*, Luzac and Co., London 1903.

Jauhar Aftabchi, *Waqi'ât-i Humâyûn*, Maulana Azad Library, Farsia-Ahkbar Collection, Ms.109.

Jouher, *The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun*, trans. M. Charles Stewart, The Oriental Translation Fund, London 1832.

Kanar, Mehmet, *Farsça-Türkçe Sözlük*, Say Yayınları, İstanbul 2015.

Khan, İqtidar Alam, *A Political Biography of A Mughal Noble: Mun'im Khan Khan-i Khanan, 1497-1575*, Orient Longman, New Delhi 1973.

Khwâjah Nizâmuddîn Ahmad, *The Tabaqât-i Akbarî*, vol. 2, ed. B. De, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1931.

Lal, Ruby, *Vagabond Princess The Great Adventures of Gulbadan*, Juggernaut Books, New Delhi 2024.

Mobîn, Abu'l-Hasan, "Tadhkirat-i Humayun wa Akbar"; *Âyene-i-Mîrâs (Mirror of Heritage)*, No. 40, Spring 1387 (2008), pp. 319-329.

Motamad Khan, *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, ed. Mawlawis Abd Al-Haii ve Ahmed Ali, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1865.

Mullâ Abd Ul-Bâqî Nâhâvandî, *The Ma'âsir-l-Rahîmî*, vol.1, ed. Mawlawi M. Hidayet Husain, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1910.

Nath, Pratyay, "Through the Lens of War: Akbar's Sieges (1567-1568) and Mughal Empire-Building in Early Modern North India", *Sout Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 2018, vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 245-258.

Nawwab Shah Nawas Khan and Abdul Hayy, *The Maathir-ul-Umara*, trans. H. Beveridge, vol. 2, part.1, Janaki Prakashan, New Delhi 1979.

Qazı Ahmad Tatawı et al., *Tarikh-i Alfi*, ed. Ghulam Reza Tabatabai, vol. 8, Sherkat-e Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, Tehran 1382.

Sarıççek, Sertaç, "Safevi Kuşatma Savaşlarında Kullanılan Sahra Tahkimatları", *Ankara Anadolu ve Rumeli Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol. 2, No. 3, 2021, pp. 129-149.

Sarkar, Jadunath, *Military History of India*, Sarkar & Sons, Calcutta 1960.

Steingass, Francis Joseph, *A Comprehensive Persian- English Dictionary*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London 1963.

Streusand, Douglas E., *Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*, Westview Press, Boulder 2011.

Streusand, Douglas E., *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1989.

Thackston, Wheeler M., "Translator's Preface" in *Three Memoirs of Humayun*, Mazda Publishers, California 2009, pp. VIII-XIII.

Woodburn, C. W., *The Bala Hissar of Kabul, Revealing a Fortress-Palace in Afghanistan*, The Institution of Royal Engineers, 2009.