Is It Possible to Create a MediterraneanCommunity? North African Perspectives*

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ABSTRACT

Mediterranean is the birthplace of different ancient cultures and civilizations, however, the countries in the opposite shores of this sea share historically distinct political, cultural and socio-economic characteristics. Despite these differences, increasingly rising scholars as well as politicians emphasize the need to promote cooperation and socio-cultural dialogue in the region which is expected to eventually lead to the emergence of a Mediterranean community. Within the context of this article, the possibility of the establishment of such a formation will be analyzed by elaborating the major obstacles on the emergence of this community and on a fruitful mutual dialogue. The main question of the study, therefore, will be to what extent the internal as well as external dynamics have an influence on the development of this regional partnership process. The role of international organizations in coordinating regional co-operation and facilitating the appearance of the Mediterranean community along with the different views as the northern African perspectives on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) process –through Barcelona Process which was evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)- is also a great concern of this article. It will be concluded that it is not possible to create a Mediterranean community in the very near future even though international institutions can play a significant role in yielding security, stability and a firm regional cooperation in the Mediterranean littoral.

Keywords: *Barcelona Process, Union for the Mediterranean, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Mediterranean Community, Regional Integration.*

Introduction

The concept of "community" has several definitions and the literature does not show consensus in using it. The use of "community" was consciously chosen by the author to describe a possible formation between the two shores of Mediterranean which will expectedly lead a further regional integration. *Cambridge Dictionary*[1] defines community as "thepeople

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[1] Cambridge Dictionary Online, Accessed on 20 March 2010, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/.

living in one particular area or people who are considered as a unit because of their common interests, social group or nationality" while *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*[2] describes the concept as simply "the people with common interests living in a particular area." As is seen, in both of these definitions, the emphasis is on the presence of common interests. While trying to evaluate the role of security communities in region-building and pacification processes, Adler and Crawford note that a community should not be taken only as "a group of people who interact on the basis of common values and understandings" but the term community also refers to "a social structure that constitutes the identities and interests of community members."[3] Similar to Adler and Crawford, by Mediterranean community, I refer to an institutional and contractual framework starting first by pragmatic concerns but due to determined efforts, continuing with the emergence of shared values, norms and institutions. Current initiatives such as EMP are expected to lead a common culture and identity between the two sides of the Mediterranean. Obviously, here, the concept of community is not understood only in security concerns. It is acknowledged that each of the two coasts shares a common history and culture; however, there is not a shared value system or a total unity of interests which makes these two separate shores one single entity. That is why inter-regional efforts should focus on establishing a common understanding to construct a Mediterranean community.[4]

Although not being prevalent in the literature, the use of "community" in referring to the regional integration process between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries has gained popularity in recent years.[5] In

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[2]   Merriam-Webster Online, Accessed on 20 March 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/.

[3]   Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, "Normative Power: The European Practice of Region-Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", in Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford and Federica Bicchi (eds.), *The Convergence of Civilisations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 12

[4]   Here, it should be noted that even though the paper discusses the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process by using the term "community", it is not the only concept employed in the literature when referring to this process. In order to define the regional co-operation in the Mediterranean, the notions of "union" or "society" are also used by some scholars; however, the use of "community" is much more common in the related literature when compared to these concepts.

[5]   See, for example, Charles T. Barber, "Creating a Mediterranean Community: Euro-Maghrebi Cooperation", *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall 1998), pp. 159-172, Muriel Asseburg and Paul Salem, "No Mediterranean Community without Peace", 10 Papers for Barcelona 2010, September 2009, *European Union Institute for Security Studies and European Institute of the Mediterranean,* Accessed on 26 January 2011, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/10papers2010_1.pdf. As the name of Vasconcelos and Joffé's book on the integration process in the Mediterranean; "The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community" also indicates, the authors see the Barcelona Process as an initiative which will construct a regional community between the two coasts, different from earlier initiatives based almost exclusively upon economic

fact, the concepts of "culture" and "community" were embedded in the third basket of the EMP[6]; the social, cultural and human partnership. The use of the "Mediterranean Community" to refer the Barcelona Process was also proposed by Eduard Soler, Coordinator of the CIDOB (Barcelona Center for International Affairs) Foundation's Mediterranean Programme, in a seminar held in 2008 on French President Nicolas Sarkozy's initiative on the EMP Process. Soler was of the opinion that a modest title to refer the ongoing Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process like "the Euro-Mediterranean Community" rather than the term "union" which was proposed by Sarkozy would be more suited for the EMP's aspirations. As Soler also noted[7], the term Euro-Mediterranean Community was also proposed in the 2005 EuroMeSCo report entitled as "Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States" which noted that "the EMP can only be reinvigorated and maintain its relevance into the future if it turns its *potential acquis* into specific actions designed to create a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States" which must be built around five pillars, namely; democracy, inclusion in diversity, migration, citizen security and social solidarity and cohesion.[8] However; the expression of "Mediterranean Community" is more commonly used as "Mediterranean Security Community" in accord with the first basket of the EMP; political and security dialogue, which is assumed to create a common area of peace and

relations. See: Alvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé (eds.), *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community* (Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000). Biscop also regards the presence of EMP as implying the existence of a Euro-Mediterranean community and legitimizing an approach looking at the Mediterranean as a whole (Sven Biscop, *Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership* (Great Britain: Ashgate, 2003), p. ix) whereas Adler and Crawford evaluates the beginning of Barcelona Declaration as "one of community and region building and the creation of a security partnership, eventually leading to a security community." To them, the EMP depends both on shared norms and on institutions regularizing those norms (p. 4). Nevertheless, Volpi opposes these arguments and evaluates the possibility of the emergence of a Mediterranean community in a different way. While examining if the EMP is "a new kind of regional community that increases security and reduces politico-cultural conflict in the Middle East and North Africa", Volpi offers three scenarios for the political future of the Mediterranean region, however, to him, the scenario which considers the EMP process as being largely irrelevant to the issue of regional community building and as a piecemeal process lacking a momentum of its own, reflects the present situation in the region. Frédéric Volpi, "Regional Community Building and the Transformation of International Relations: The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Politics* (Vol. 9, No. 2, 2004), pp. 145-164.

6   Michelle Pace and Tobias Schumacher, "Culture and Community in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: a Roundtable on the Third Basket, Alexandria 5–7 October 2003", *Mediterranean Politics* (Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004), pp. 122-126.

7   "Union for the Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean Community, *CIDOB News*, 03/11/2008, Accessed on:
08/01/2012,http://www.cidob.org/en/news/mediterranean_and_middle_east/union_for_the_mediterranean_or_euro_mediterranean_community

8   "Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States", *A EuroMeSCo Report,* April 2005, Accessed on: 07/01/2011,
http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/media/barcelonaplus_en_fin.pdf

stability in the region. The increasing usage of this concept coincides with the surge on studies focusing on a possible security community formation between the two sides of the Mediterranean.[9]

The role played by international organizations in accelerating the regional integration process in the Mediterranean is also important. It is beyond any doubt that the regional developments in one side of the Mediterranean basin will affect the security concerns as well as socio-cultural and demographical nature of the opposite side. In this respect, the Euro-Mediterranean and NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) dialogue or the efforts of OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe)[10] may seem to have the potential to provide stability in the region, however; one can also argue that these initiatives will only bring more chaos. When these different ideas combine with the examination of Mediterranean politics by a Eurocentric view, the urgent need to provide an alternative to the conventional approaches regarding the region may be better understood. In this article, therefore, the current situation of the partnership process will be analyzed by also elaborating the concerns of northern African countries. The study will be concluded that unless sound steps are taken by both sides in order to facilitate regional stabilization and integration, it will not be possible to create a Mediterranean community in the very near future despite the efforts of international institutions.

During the Cold War, the Mediterranean was a marginalized region and the main concern of the two great security organizations of the time, namely, NATO and the Warsaw Pact was to hold influence areas in Europe.[11] However, as pointed out by Ormanci, with the dissolution of the Communist bloc, the emphasis has shifted from the center of Europe to the *periphery* (emphasis added) and Mediterranean started to hold a strategic importance. Today, the southern part of the Mediterranean basin is characterized by inter-state and intra-state conflicts;[12] however, it does not mean that this

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9   See for example, Annette Jünemann, "Security-Building in the Mediterranean After September 11", *Mediterranean Politics* (Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003), pp. 1-20, Helle Malmvig, "Cooperation or Democratization? The EU's Conflicting Mediterranean Security Discourses", *DIIS Working Paper no 2004/8,* 2004, pp. 1-29, Accessed on 2 May 2010, http://dcism.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2004/ hma cooperation democratisations.pdf, Fulvio Attina, "Partnership and Security: Some theoretical and empirical reasons for positive developments in the Euro-Mediterranean area", *Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics*, 2000, http://aei.pitt.edu/400/1/jmwp27.htm, Accessed on: 10/01/2012 and Hall Gardner, "Toward a New Euro-Atlantic Euro-Mediterranean Security Community", 2002, Accessed on: 05/01/2012, http://www.cicerofoundation.org/ pdf/LectureHallGardner.pdf

10   Formerly CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe).

11   Biscop, Ibid., pp. 2-3.

12   Emriye Bagdagul Ormanci, "Mediterranean Security Concerns and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue", Paper Submitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1998/2000, p. 4, Accessed on 4 April 2010, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/ormanci.pdf

situation will not change in the foreseeable future. While on the one hand, the south is perceived by some analysts to be a great threat to European security, on the other hand, there are also some specialists who assert that a cultural dialogue has the potential to eliminate the current security threats. In examining the prospect of the emergence of a Mediterranean community, the following sections will focus on these existing threats and obstacles on the emergence of a Mediterranean community, as similar to that of Ormanci, while mostly and firstly focusing on the "myth of 9/11."

Main Challenges on the Emergence of a Mediterranean Community

In International Relations discipline, classifying the history of the twentieth century as "before and after the Cold War" is prevalent, however, this division has lately altered related to 9/11 terrorist attacks. After these tragic events, in the disturbing incidents of migrant uprisings, violence, racism and xenophobia, we witness an upsurge in ultra-nationalism in which the centuries old phenomenon of identification through othering is at work. After these attacks, "the West and the Rest" started to identify their own-selves through the concept of "other."[13] The trend to consider the Arab people as terrorists by the Western world particularly via media has accelerated after September 11 events[14] and this negative stereotyping of Muslim citizens residing in European, Northern African or Middle Eastern countries increased the resentment of these people. Perceptions of Islam also have radically changed after these attacks and Islamic fundamentalism has been the new "enemy at the gates."

The flows of the migrants coupled with the fears of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly after 9/11, arouse suspicions about their presence. Today, in most European countries, public concerns have led restrictions on immigration since recent terrorist activities in US and in some major European capitals have intensified the security concerns of the public.[15] It is also argued that the partners of EMP process had diverse

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[13] Elem Eyrice, "The Concept of Other after 9/11", paper presented at the 5th EuPRA General Conference, "Challenges of Peace and Democracy in Europe", 21–24 August 2007, Sakarya University/TURKEY

[14] Beate Winkler, director of the FRA (Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union. The former name was EUMC; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia), was of the opinion that the attacks created a climate of suspicion in which anyone who looked "foreign" or Muslim had to prove they were not a terrorist. Beate Winkler, "A Multicultural Society - A Challenge for us all", European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) report: *Brandon Lecture, Salzburg-Seminar*, 29 March 2003, pp. 2-9. Accessed on 4 April 2010, http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/general/dir_speech_29032007.pdf

[15] Robert Holzmann and Rainer Münz, "Challenges and Opportunities of International Migration for Europe and its Neighborhood", in K. Tamas & J. Palme (Eds.), *Globalizing Migration Regimes: New Challenges to Transnational Cooperation* (Ashgate, 2006), p. 243.

interests on the issue: Gillespie contends that whenever the European countries endeavored to discuss the migration issue within the Partnership, southern Mediterranean countries emphasized the phenomena of xenophobia and racism encountered by migrants within the borders of the Union.[16] However, in this new era, it was not peculiar to any group to re-establish their own identity through "the other." Some Muslims, for instance, evaluated the 9/11 events as a great tragedy while in some Muslim countries, the anti-American views transformed into hostility to the Western world as a whole.

Since the opinions of ordinary citizens both in southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean are so important in the sense that they have the capacity to influence the domestic as well as foreign policy decisions of the policy-makers, several public surveys analyzing the public opinion of these two parts were conducted especially in the post-9/11 period. In one of these surveys performed by the Pew Research Center, the respondents were asked which religion they think of as more violent; in some EU countries and also in Canada, US, India and Russia, the answer was Islam by large majorities while according to the respondents in Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Indonesia and Pakistan, Judaism was regarded as the most violent religion. The majority of respondents living in Western Europe, the U.S., Canada, India and Russia also expressed their worries on the rise of Islamic extremism in their own countries.[17] As Monod emphasizes, Islam is the

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16 Cited in Georgia Papagianni, "Institutional Framework and Policy Developments with Regard to Migration in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" in M.C. Henriques and M. Khachani (eds.), *Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean*: *Playing with Fire* (Amsterdam, Berlin, Oxford, Tokyo Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2006), p. 45.

17 For more detail, see the Pew Research Center Project: "Support for Terror Wanes among Muslim Publics, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics", *17-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey,* 14 July 2005, Accessed on 21 June 2007, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248.pdf. In order to analyze whether the opinions of ordinary people from Western and Eastern countries against each other altered after 9/11, research centers conducted several public surveys all of which reflected the increasing intolerance of these people against one another. The findings of some of these surveys on how Westerners and Muslims view each other are available in the website of the Pew Research Center: The Pew Research Center Project; "Europe's Muslims More Moderate, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other", *13-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey*, 22 June 2006, Accessed on 21 June 2007, Accessed on 9 April 2010, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/253.pdf and The Pew Research Center Project; "Support for Terror Wanes among Muslim Publics, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics", *17-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey,* 14 July 2005, Accessed on 9 April 2010, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248.pdf. Moreover, for the illuminating articles of Moore, Haddad and Khashan on post 9/11 attitudes toward Muslims and the views of Lebanese Muslims on 11 September, see, Kathleen Moore, "A Part of US or Apart from US?: Post-September 11 Attitudes toward Muslims and Civil Liberties", *Middle East Report* (No. 224, Autumn 2002), Simon Haddad, Hilal Khashan, "Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim Views on September 11", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Vol. 46, No. 6, December 2002), "Poll: Muslims call U.S. 'ruthless, arrogant", CNN.com/US, 26 February 2002,

second religion in many European countries and besides, it is not only a religion of immigrants, but also the religion of European-born citizens.[18] To identify this religion with violence is dangerous in the sense that it may further increase the existing negative perceptions on Muslim citizens living in Europe. However, religious extremism is not the sole concern of the European public countries, especially after September 11.

A number of tragic events unfolded in European countries following 9/11, such as the caricature crisis in Denmark, the bombings of Madrid and London and violent racist incidents against Muslims residing in Europe. Further, the rise of radical right as well as extreme nationalist parties following the above-mentioned events widened the gap between the peoples of Western and Muslim nations of Mediterranean in viewing each other and thus, complicated the emergence of a Mediterranean community. Current challenges that both parts face including the existing prejudices, increasing migratory flows from the south to the north and economic and cultural differences, decrease the expectations on the establishment of such a community. Ormanci focuses on the security threats in the region and lists them roughly as economic and demographic imbalance, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, the increasing military expenditures of the southern states and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Attina is of the opinion that due to the intense fears for diffusion of radical Islam, the unstable situation of the élite group who comply with the human rights and democracy standards of the Barcelona Declaration, non-economic liberalization of southern countries, the migration question and imbalanced economic relations between the two parts, a positive direction in the regional dynamics is not likely.[19] Within the context of this paper, economic and cultural matters between the opposite shores of Mediterranean are regarded as having more importance than the security issues and the economic problems of southern Mediterranean countries as constituting the second most important challenge on the emergence of a Mediterranean community after the radically changing perceptions of the European and Muslim people against each other following the tragic attacks of the 11th of September.

The great economic inequality between the two shores of Mediterranean countries is also one of the main underlying reasons of large migratory flows from the south of the sea to the north. Biscop, for instance, holds that the European Union has to fear economic problems and the lack

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Accessed on 9 April 2010, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/02/26/gallup.muslims/index.html

[18] Jean-Claude Monod, "Immigration, Secularization and Euro-Islam" in *Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean*, p. 57.

[19] Fulvio Attina, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views", *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003), pp. 198-199.

of democratic institutions in the southern shore rather than a direct military threat.[20] Although there are strong trade relations between the southern and northern Mediterranean countries, this trade relation does not necessarily mean that both shores have equal economic advantages. Oil and gas represent the majority of Mediterranean exports to the EU.[21] Further, agricultural trade issues, -which are vital for the Southern economies- have not been included in the association agreements signed between the European Union and Southern countries and the latter also don't have the ability to affect the related economic decision-making processes.[22] This economic imbalance distinguishes the two shores and it is beyond any doubt that the existing economic as well as commercial relations are not in favor of the southern Mediterranean countries since the majority of their exports go to the European countries. Moreover, without diversity in exports and in production, these economies stay dependent on the export of a natural resource. The countries on the south also experience rapid population growths along with high unemployment rates and these interrelated factors constitute the main reasons of increasing migratory flows to the north. Under these circumstances, the measures taken by the European countries, like the reduction of visas and rigorous control of borders have had perverse effects such as illegal emigration.[23] These migration-related issues are perceived to increase the cultural divide across the Mediterranean and as discussed by Hogwood, immigration issues now became a relevant element in "high" politics.[24]

It has been mentioned that migratory flux often increases the negative feelings of the majority population in the countries of immigration.

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[20] Biscop, op. cit., pp. 11-17.

[21] Ibid., p. 17.

[22] Alvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé, "Introduction: Towards Euro-Mediterranean Regional Integration" in Alvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé (eds.), *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community* (Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 4 and Ormanci, Ibid, p. 12.

[23] Mohamed Khachani, "Migratory Movements in the Mediterranean Basin" in M.C. Henriques and M. Khachani (eds.), *Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean: Playing with Fire* (Amsterdam, Berlin, Oxford, Tokyo Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2006), pp. 12-15. Moreover, it is well-known that after 9/11, many European countries attempted to change their immigration policies. In 2005, the Minister of the Interior of France, Dominique de Villepin, even declared that he was in favor of a new law which would support the policy of "chosen immigration", that is, allowing foreigners to work in France for a limited period of time, and with the goal that "those foreigners would not necessarily be there to integrate", but would go back to their native country after the end of their working contract. Jean-Yves Camus, "Racism and Anti-racist Measures Conditioning Migrations in the Mediterranean", in *Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean,* pp. 97-98.

[24] Patricia Hogwood, "German immigration policy after September 11: militant democracy in the twenty-first century", *Workshop: 'Who makes immigration policy? Comparative perspectives in a post 9/11 world'*, Directors: Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops Uppsala, 2004, p. 15, Accessed on 10 December 2010, http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/ uppsala/ws16/hogwood.pdf

Many individuals feel that these people can harm their national integrity and culture which will eventually lead to the erosion of their very national identity. The fact that the migrants can work at lower prices is another reason of this increasing hatred against these people and the result is a further restriction in anti-immigration measures since the citizens of destination countries compel their governments to regulate the migratory flows. Under the given conditions, some extremist right-wing and nationalist parties can politicize the issue in order to gain more public support.[25] When this negative feelings against migrants couple with the fears of Islamic fundamentalism, the divide between the people of the two shores increases. As Ayoob notes, the popularity of political Islam in such a strategic region increases the concerns of Northern countries.[26] Moreover, due to the geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean for the Europeans, the countries in the region cannot let to be governed not only by extreme Islamist groups but also by the governments using strict Islamic ideology unless they are strongly pro-Western. As obvious, this part of the article had mostly focused on European concerns on the idea of a Mediterranean community, the flowing section, therefore, will analyze the issue from a northern African perspective.

North African Perspectives

The perceptions of European countries on the cultural, economic and political differences of Southern countries and their emphasis on the deficiencies of the political, economic and cultural models that these countries use increases the sense of insecurity that the people of the southern Mediterranean countries feel. Similar to their European counterparts who were worried about their national integrity due to increased migratory flows, the Southern countries argue that the growing relations with their northern counters will only lead to the endangerment of their national identity and independence. In addition to this perception, the peoples of Southern countries also do not conceive that the Western countries had "good intentions" when imposing their own models of democracy and economic liberalization. The strict immigration measures are also regarded by these countries as the main factor which destroys the possibility of a Mediterranean partnership.[27] This obvious difference of opinion on cultural matters between the two shores of the Mediterranean evidently does not contribute to the emergence of a strong regional dialogue, nor does it signify the possibility of a Mediterranean community.

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[25] Kristof Tamas and Joakim Palme, "Transnational Approaches to Reforming Migration Regimes" in *Globalizing Migration Regimes,* p. 3.

[26] Mohammed Ayoob, "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide", *International Studies Review* (Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 2007), pp. 631-632.

[27] Ormanci, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

However, a Mediterranean dialogue requires the disappearance of misperceptions and mutual fears.[28] As Panebianco notes, although the necessary measures to be taken in order to eliminate such prejudices makes "a unified culture respectful of differences" essential, a relatively new cultural challenge, "Islam-West confrontation" increased the North-South cleavage.[29] To Vasconcelos, the states of the southern Mediterranean also perceive the West as confrontation with the Islamic world. The reason is multi-fold: These southern Mediterranean countries conceive that Western countries uphold double standards in humanitarian issues. They are of the opinion that Europeans as well as the US were late and unsuccessful in preventing ethnic cleansing in Bosnia because the victims had Islamic origin. They also blame the Western powers for not implementing UN Security Council resolutions concerning Israel and the Bush administration that does nothing to prevent Sharon government in destructing the Palestine Authority, but, on the other hand, for applying sanctions to an Arab country such as Iraq. Criticizing the position of Western governments during the Gulf War, these countries saw the war against Iraq as an attack against a powerful Arab country.[30] Although such negative perceptions does not necessarily mean that a regional co-operation particularly on common security concerns is not likely to emerge, their existence indicates that decision-makers should consider these attitudes when attempting to establish a strong regional dialogue.

Southern Mediterranean countries are ex-colonies of European powers. It is asserted that as a result, the memories of the colonial era are still fresh in the minds of these states. Further, due to this colonial past, these countries remain suspicious of some values, norms and institutions peculiar to the Western world. Muslim states of the region also opposed the establishment of Israel in the territory which once belonged to Palestine with the support of Western countries at the very beginning and now, the inclusion of this state in all initiatives related to security concerns between the two shores while excluding some Arab states from such initiatives. Such a double standard strengthens the suspicions of Arab states in their relations with the countries on the northern shore of Mediterranean.[31] It is therefore, a great requirement for European statesmen to consider these regional dynamics when trying to improve their relations with the countries on the southern shore, bridge the gap between these two coasts and create a Mediterranean area of peace and prosperity.

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[28] Mendo Castro Henriques, "Natural Right in Islam: a Bridge to Modernization" in *Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean*, p. 18.

[29] Stefania Panebianco, "Preface", in Stefania Panebianco (ed.), *A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity*, (London and Portland Or: Frank Cass, 2003), p. xiii.

[30] Álvaro de Vasconcelos, "Europe's Mediterranean Strategy: An Asymmetric Equation", June 2002, pp. 1-3, Accessed on 6 April 2010, http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/Vasconcelos.pdf.

[31] Ormanci, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

Similar to many scholars studying the Mediterranean world, Selim also holds that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should focus on its cultural component since a co-operation in the cultural area reinforces political as well as economic co-operation and facilitates to reduce misperceptions. He also holds that a politico-economic partnership can only be durable if the diversity of the cultures on both shores is acknowledged and the Arab countries contributes actively to the program of this cultural co-operation. Otherwise, if the European countries try to spread their own values to these countries, a cultural warfare would be inevitable. To Selim, this cultural component was thus, included in the EMP baskets from the very beginning. However, the process on a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership had an unforeseen outcome for the Southern people. Unfortunately, the governments of the southern countries used this Partnership to oppress opposition and such an attitude led this cultural dialogue to turn into an élitist exchange which could not reach out to the people.[32]

While drawing attention to the studies stressing the reluctance of European countries to implement human rights and democracy clauses of the Barcelona Declaration and the bilateral association agreements, Malmvig maintains that these studies pointed out the regime-friendly approach of the Europeans. To Malmvig, the impositions of structural reforms and trade liberalization mostly have been to the advantage of the European countries that were generally occupied with economic liberalization.[33] The term "Mediterranean security" is also argued to be usually analyzed from a European point of view and to be associated with internal problems in the Muslim states of the Mediterranean. These countries suspect peace-making and military operations of the northern security organizations during the post-Cold War era and the idea of establishing military pacts between the two coasts, while perceiving these kinds of interventions as a means to form Western hegemony and domination in the region.[34]

This policy of European countries is also subject to harsh criticism from Southern countries holding that these countries only act in accord with their own strategic interests rather than considering the dynamics of Southern countries. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which was put into practice by the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 is regarded by many scholars and politicians as the major framework which has the capacity to prevent such mutual misperceptions and fears. Under the following title, the potential of this Partnership on actualizing a Mediterranean dialogue will be

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[32] Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, "Towards a Viable Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Partnership", in *A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity*, p. 175.

[33] Helle Malmvig, Accessed on 2 May 2010, http://dcism.dk/graphics/ Publications/WP2004/hma_cooperation_democratisations.pdf

[34] Ormanci, op. cit., pp. 7-10.

discussed together with its deficiencies and the role of other international institutions operating in the region. Further, the question what role these organizations can play in promoting stability and co-operation in the Mediterranean basin will also tried to be answered by displaying different points of view on the issue. However, first, the role of such multilateral initiatives in providing and/or promoting regional integration will be examined in a theoretical level without going into too much detail.

International Institutions, Regional Integration And International Relations Theory

The role played by international institutions and regimes in coordinating regional or international co-operation is a contentious issue among the International Relations (IR) scholars. The main debate on this issue is between the (neo) realists who believe that international co-operation is not easy to achieve in this anarchic system since the relative gains of the states are more important and the neo-liberal institutionalists who assume that international institutions can facilitate peace and co-operation. The neo-liberal institutionalists, the primary International Relations theoreticians focusing on the role of international institutions and regimes, therefore, focus on the absolute gains. Realists argue that the inherent anarchic and competitive nature of the international system inhibits collaboration rather than facilitating it. According to these students, the pressure to compete under anarchy and the crucial role that power play in determining the relations as well as any kind of co-operation between the states was largely ignored by liberal institutionalists.[35]

In their *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977), Keohane and Nye offered an alternative to the dominant realist thought and held that the assumptions of political realists overstating the role of security and force were proved wrong in a world where countries are connected by multiple social and political relationships. The writers used the term "complex interdependence" to understand the politics of interdependence.[36] The ideas of Keohane and Nye were groundbreaking since they attempted to criticize the dominant IR theory of the time while at the same time offering an alternative. However, being one of the leading neo-realists, Mearsheimer criticizes the approach which rests on the belief that institutions are a key means of promoting world peace. Mearsheimer, in his prominent *The False Promise of International Institutions* (1994-1995), addresses the claim that institutions push states away from war while

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[35] Steve Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory", in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 169-171.

[36] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).

promoting peace. While criticizing the theories that employ institutions as a core concept -as a response to realism- he maintains that "institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior."[37]

The recent wave of academic interest in institutions and their role on regional integration processes was sparked particularly due to the success of European Union.[38] Here, two approaches dominated the analysis on European integration: neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. The concept of "spillover" which was developed by Ernst Haas and which simply meant that cooperation in one sphere may create pressure for further integration in the other neighboring spheres had an important place in the former approach. Neo-functionalist theory of European integration suggests that nation-states are transferring their sovereignty to supranational institutions and the European Union is perceived as the greatest example in these studies focusing on the process of regional integration. This theory was built mostly on the research of Haas who, in his prominent *The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (1958), argued that "integration" is a two-way process in which the central institutions affect and are affected by the subject groups.[39] Andrew Moravcsik developed the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism in order to explain European integration. This theory perceives co-operation between states as a result of the demand for integration which is developed through interstate bargaining. In his leading article; *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovermentalist Approach* (1993), Moravcsik explains the liberal intergovermentalist approach in detail and perceives the European Community (EC) as the most successful example of "institutionalized international policy co-ordination in the modern world." In

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[37] John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security* (Vol. 19. No. 3, 1994-1995), p. 7. However, Behr evaluates the view of these two rival approaches on regionalism under one single category and holds that there are two major different ways of explaining the formation of regions in IR literature. To him, the above-discussed neo-realist and neo-liberal theories emphasize the material basis of regionalism whereas constructivist scholars assert that although material factors matter, regions are socially constructed entities, created by common narratives about identity and belonging. Timo Behr, "Regional Integration in the Mediterranean Moving out of the Deadlock", *Notre Europe*, 3 May 2010, p. 6, Accessed on 25 February 2011, http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etud77-MediterraneanIntegration-TBehr-en.pdf

[38] As Roy and Domíngue points out, although being an unfinished project, the European integration process is still at the forefront of regional integration experiences. Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domíngue, "Introduction", in Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domíngue (eds.), *The European Union and Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective and Lessons for the Americas* (Miami: Jean Monnet Chair University of Miami, 2005), p. 7.

[39] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 1958).

contrast with Ernst Haas and other prominent neo-functionalists who were of the view that European integration can only be explained through *general* theories of IR, Moravcsik argued that this process can be analyzed as "a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination."[40]

Regional integration theories on the Mediterranean focus generally on the increasing Euro-Mediterranean relations and the alliances as the Barcelona Process and Union for the Mediterranean. Süel, for instance, holds that in the 1990s, the global and regional dynamics urged the formulation of a common European policy and the EU-Mediterranean process was a part of this development.[41] In elaborating European Union's security policies towards the Mediterranean region, Bilgin presents four main arguments in the literature regarding the success/failure of the Union's policymaking toward the Mediterranean region: The first argument asserts that "it was European policy-makers" indecision that rendered the EMP still-born" while the second assumption maintained that "the Mediterranean neighbors have had different priorities from the start." The third approach holds that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) addresses many of the problems of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, lastly and contrary to the third assumption; it is asserted by some scholars that "the ENP has inherited the EMP's problems."[42] As will be examined in the next section, such different views on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process result in the numerous distinct analysis of this process.

The studies elaborating a likely regional integration process in the Mediterranean mostly focus on the economic factors, in other words, the internal instability and the economic incompetence of southern Mediterranean countries which also affect their political stability. By examining the importance of domestic obstacles including persistent fiscal

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[40] Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovermentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 31, No. 4, December 1993), pp. 473-474.

[41] Aslı Süel, "From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean", *Perceptions* (Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter 2008), pp. 87-88. It is also asserted by Lazarou that the value promotion and norm diffusion also affects the Union's external relations policy and an important part of this policy is the promotion of regional integration and cooperation in other parts of the world. Lazarou also contends that even though Europe has been active in the Mediterranean since the 1970s, it was in the mid-1990s that the European Union elaborated a more holistic approach towards the region. Elena Lazarou, "The EU and Regional Integration in the Mediterranean: The Challenge of Promoting a 'model' for regionalism", 6 October 2010, EuroMedO, EKEM, Accessed on 1 April 2010, http://www.ekemprogram.org/euromedo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=220:the-eu-and-regional-integration-in-the-mediterranean-the-challenge-of-promoting-amodel-for-regionalism&catid=37:2010-05-05-10-07-53&Itemid=59

[42] Pınar Bilgin, "EU Security Policies towards the Mediterranean: The Ethical Dimension – what do we know and what else should we know?", *INEX Policy Brief* (No. 2, 2009) pp. 2-5.

deficits, Dessus and Suwa focus on two Northern African countries, Tunisia and Egypt and argue that "successful regional integration requires maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium in the short-term and economic restructuring and investment promotion over the longer term."[43] Escribano, on the other hand, maintains that regional integration in the Mediterranean could increase the production function of both the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) and the EU itself. However, he does not analyze the Mediterranean integration only through an economic analysis but further holds that regional integration is also promoted as a tool for achieving political stability.[44]

The initiatives attempted to institutionalize inter-Mediterranean relations have both regional and interregional character, as emphasized by Aliboni.[45] In this paper, three of these initiatives will be evaluated: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and OSCE's Mediterranean Dimension. The first of these initiatives is regarded as the most determined one in providing regional integration between the northern and southern coasts while the other two attempts are still in progress. The contextual or essential differences of these attempts do matter little when considering the necessity that they all have to include the equal representation of southern Mediterranean countries in the decision-making processes of these initiatives and to respect their cultural differences.

The Role of International Institutions in Providing Regional Integration of the Mediterranean Area

There are several regional organizations helping to maintain co-operation within the Mediterranean region. The first most important attempt to establish strong relations between the two shores was launched by the Barcelona Process of 1995 who held 15 EU members and 14 Mediterranean partners. As is stated in the website of the *European Union External Action*, this process also formed the basis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which has evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean, aimed "to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity" and was organized into three main dimensions: political and security dialogue, economic and financial partnership and social, cultural and human partnership. It is also stated that the Barcelona Process, also known as the

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[43] Sébastien Dessus and Akiko Suwa, *Regional Integration and Internal Reforms in the Mediterranean Area* (OECD, 2000), p. 7.

[44] Gonzalo Escribano, "Means and Sectors for Euro-Mediterranean Integration", *European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed),* 2010, Accessed on 25 January 2010, http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/ aarticles/Escribano_Integration_ en.pdf

[45] Roberto Aliboni, "The Role of International Organizations in the Mediterranean", Paper prepared for the **Halki International Seminar** on "**The Mediterranean and the Middle east: Looking Ahead**"*, Halki*, September 13-18, 2000, p. 1.

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, "essentially became the multilateral forum of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners."[46]

However, the Process is not free of criticism. As Borrell Fontelles notes, the Barcelona Process is largely considered by the critics a failure, or a disappointment. Fontelles notes that "the time and energy invested by the EU on Poland in a single year was greater than the total amount invested in all the North African countries since the beginnings of the Barcelona Process." He further notes that both shores of the Mediterranean lack a common identity, a "regional will" as well as shared goals, a situation which make any sort of "union" between the EU and the Mediterranean countries even more complicated. Although Borrell Fontelles assert that this situation does not necessarily mean that the Arab countries of the Process have no common interests, these shared interests is just not strong enough to create unity. As he notes, the real interest of these countries is their bi-lateral relationship with the EU.[47] Yet, it may be argued that at least the bi-lateral relations between the European and southern Mediterranean countries have been deepened by the Barcelona Process.

Another EU initiative is the Union for the Mediterranean, the successor of the Barcelona Process. The UfM was initiated by French President of Nicolas Sarkozy as an important part of his presidential campaign in early 2007. Formerly known as the Barcelona Process, the Union also promotes regional integration, particularly in the economic sector. In the Final Statement of the Marseille Meeting of the Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs (2008), it is stated that the Union was "a renewed political momentum into Euro-Mediterranean relations" and an initiative formulated "to reinforce the successful elements of the Barcelona Process by upgrading their relations."[48] However, it is argued by some scholars that there is not much evidence to be optimistic on the future of this Union. Nazemroaya, for example, maintains that the underlying reason of the establishment of UfM is the Anglo-American and Franco-German desire to share the Mediterranean.[49] Colin also argues that the split between Mediterranean

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[46] European Union External Action, "Barcelona Process", Accessed on 9 March 2011, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm

[47] Josep Borrell Fontelles, "Yes the Barcelona Process was "mission impossible", but the EU can learn from that", *Europe's World*, Autumn 2010, Accessed on 21 January 2011, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PublicProfile/tabid/690/UserID/630/language/enUS/Default.aspx

[48] Final Statement, Marseille, 3-4 November 2008, Accessed on 7 April 2010, http://www.parlamento.it/documenti/repository/affari%20europei/APEM/dicFinaleMarsigliaUfM.pdf

[49] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, "The Mediterranean Union: Dividing the Middle East and North Africa", *Global Research*, 10 February 2008, Accessed on 21 January 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6879

African countries and Sub-Saharan Africa has fuelled the reluctance of some Mediterranean partnership countries to engage with the UfM[50] while Hollis regards EMP as the reflection of the desire of Europeans to hold the southern states "at arm's length."[51] As is seen, divergent points of view exist in evaluating the EMP. Moreover, while the southern governments use this Partnership as a means to oppress the opposition groups in their countries, the peoples of the Southern Mediterranean mostly suspect the "real" motives of European states in implementing the requirements of such a Partnership. These people further argue that European politicians can use the issues like human rights and democracy for an intervention to their countries while feeling the same for NATO's Mediterranean initiative of 1994 and questioning *raison d'etre* of this organization even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

As is noted by Tayfur, during the Cold War years, the main concern of NATO in the Mediterranean region was to contain the Soviet Union, nevertheless, with the end of this era and the approval of the new security concepts of 1991 and 1999,[52] the organization declared the stability and peace in Mediterranean area as a priority[53] and concerns about instability and the future of relations across the region have become a part of security discussions.[54] Although "the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) of NATO was launched to contribute to regional security and stability, to achieve a better mutual understanding, and to correct any misperceptions about NATO among MD countries,"[55] it is not clear what role the organization can play in

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[50] Stéphanie Colin, "The Union for the Mediterranean: Progress, Difficulties and Way Forward", International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), *Trade Negotiations Insights* (Vol. 8 , No. 5, June 2009), Accessed on 5 April 2010 http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/47668/**.**

[51] Rosemary Hollis, Barcelona's First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security Relations?' in S. Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt (Eds.), *Security in the Middle East*, (Munich, Guetersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, unpublished working papers, Center for Applied Policy Research, 1999), p. 107–32, cited in Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 215.

[52] For the Security Concepts of NATO of 1991 and 1999 see: "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" (1991), **http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm? selectedLocale=en** and "The Alliances Strategic Concept" (1999), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

[53] Fatih Tayfur, "Security and Co-Operation in the Mediterranean", *Perception*s (Vol. 5, No. 3, September-November 2000), Accessed on 10 February 2011, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume5/September-November2000/VolumeVN3FatihTayfur.pdf

[54] Ian O. Lesser, Jerrold D. Green, F. Stephen Larrabee and Michele Zanini, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps* (Rand, 2000), pp. 1-2.

[55] See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Mediterranean Dialogue", NATO Basic Fact Sheet, 08 December 2004, Accessed on 10 April 2010, http://www.nato.int/med-dial/2004/041208e.pdf.

the region given that NATO was perceived by the majority of the people of Mediterranean states as a purely military organization. Furthermore, as Winrow highlights, some Atlantic Alliance officials still focus on "what they perceived to be potential if not actual threats rather than risks and challenges from the south."[56] It is therefore frequently emphasized that if NATO desires to play an important role in shaping the security environment of the region, it should seriously take into consideration the public concerns against its presence, prevalent in southern Mediterranean states.

The OSCE also has a Mediterranean Initiative which "maintains special relations with six Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation", namely, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. As stated in the official web site of the organization, "this relationship goes back to the Helsinki Process and the Helsinki Final Act, which included a Mediterranean chapter stating that security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole."[57] In the Budapest Conference, it was also declared that "strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean is important for stability in the CSCE region."[58] In 2008 Mediterranean Conference, the Secretary General of the organization stated that "the conference's agenda was one of continuity with the past… which was reflected in two major themes; the continuing relevance of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security; and the ever growing interdependence between the OSCE's security and that of the Mediterranean region."[59] It is also asserted that the Mediterranean basin has a potential for social and political instability, with repercussions for the whole OSCE region[60] and the aims of the OSCE Mediterranean Initiative remain weak and uncertain while the non-Member Mediterranean States lack the right to influence the organization's decision-making process.[61] This institutional design certainly contributes to the

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[56] Gareth Winrow, *Dialogue with the Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000), pp. 159-160.

[57] See "Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation", The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Accessed on 12 January 2010, http://www.osce.org/ec/43245

[58] See the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1994 Summit: Budapest Document 1994 – Towards A Genuine Partnership in a New Era, 5-6 December 1994, Accessed on 12 January 2010, http://www.osce.org/mc/39554

[59] For details see; The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "2008 Mediterranean Conference: The OSCE Approach to Regional Security - a Model for the Mediterranean", Amman, Jordan 27 and 28 October 2008, p. 11, SEC.GAL/233/08, Accessed on 10 January 2010, http://www.osce.org/ec/35571

[60] Raul Daussa, "Background Paper" in José L. Rubio et all (eds.), *Water Scarcity, Land Degradation and Desertification in the Mediterranean Region: Environmental and Security Aspects* (Springer, 2007), p. 5.

[61] Roberto Aliboni, "The OSCE Mediterranean Dimension: Conflict Prevention and Management" in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas (eds.), *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes* (Hauge: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 495.

weakness of the organization which aims to secure a peaceful environment in the region.

In order to indicate the challenges which impede the creation of a Mediterranean community, students emphasize different factors. Some of them focus on security issues including Asseburg and Salem who cites the collaborative report of European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) which frequently emphasized that the long-term objective of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Community will not be fulfilled without peace being established in the Middle East.[62] By examining regional dynamics, Behr, who consider the Mediterranean region a *sui generis* case of regional integration, points out multiple factors in the Mediterranean integration process and argues that political and structural impediments continue to hamper such integration.[63] In order to analyze the possibility of the emergence of a Mediterranean community, Barber analyzes the increasing relations between the European and Northern African countries. He holds that such a community should focus on economic and political ties which could provide more security in the area and even provide inspiration for comparable efforts in other potentially conflictual regions.[64] Although it is true that the success of an organization in one certain region paves the way for similar developments –as in the example of European Union- the idea that the emergence of a Mediterranean community would be an example to the other regions of the world does seem an exaggerated "dream" due to above-discussed obstacles and the difficulty of establishing an area of peace and security in the Mediterranean region in the short-run. Finding a solution to the ongoing intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the region, especially to the long-lasting Arab-Israeli dispute is not simple and it is an acknowledged fact that the instability within one region impedes the creation of a firm regional integration with other regions. However, the solution of the problems and disputes especially among the Southern Mediterranean countries is a prerequisite in maintaining a unified culture at least in the southern shore of the sea. It is, therefore, essentially important to develop a culture of dialogue and cooperation in one of the world's most strategically and historically important regions.

Unless an understanding and esteem among the "equal partners" of the two shores is established by eliminating all kinds of psychological barriers, it will not be possible to create a Mediterranean community.[65] Some students contend that providing financial as well as technical assistance to

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[62] Asseburg and Salem, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/10papers2010_1.pdf
[63] Timo Behr, pp. 1-3.
[64] Charles Barber, pp. 159-172.
[65] Ormanci, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

the Southern-shore countries may decrease the development gap. However, there is a growing literature which focus that foreign aid actually harms developing countries despite the good intentions of the donors. It is also claimed that the emphasis should be to provide development and to improve the infrastructure services in those underdeveloped countries. In the Mediterranean case, the amount of foreign aid is not important if it does not increase the living standards of ordinary citizens rather than the rulers. Further, as is emphasized when analyzing the North African perspectives on the EMP, the rulers use their increasing bilateral relations with European countries to oppress the oppositional groups in their society.

Within the context of this article, it was argued that the international institutions can play a significant role in providing security and stability of the Mediterranean basin, however, all of these institutional frameworks should first increase confidence-building measures and consider the negative perceptions of the southern public against their presence in the region. An assurance of "equal representation" of these southern nations in the regional and international organizations focusing on the Mediterranean is also a great requirement. This paper argues that the activities of multi-national organizations may strongly contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Euro-Mediterranean world only when they assure that their intentions are not to intervene but to secure the stability of the region. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is a long way for these organizations to help creating a regional community in this strategically and historically important area.

Conclusion

The ideal of creating a Mediterranean area of peace and stability which will eventually lead the emergence of the Mediterranean community is hindered by the socio-economic, political and cultural differences of the countries in the opposite shores of the Mediterranean. International institutions promise to reduce the great divide between these two different coasts and to provide the increased integration of Mediterranean peoples by building a common space of peace and shared prosperity. These institutions are also believed by many scholars to offer an opportunity to accelerate the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process. However, the Barcelona Process could not be successful to meet the expectations of the member-states and failed in yielding the expected outcomes. There was also an obvious lack of common identity and shared goals as well as interests among the member-states with different political cultures. In the light of the previous data, my argument is that it is not possible to create a Mediterranean community in the very near future.

This paper also assumes that international institutions can play a significant role in yielding security, stability and a firm regional cooperation

in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, although it may sound pessimistic, institutional frameworks are also not likely to bring a solution to the regional problems of Mediterranean *in the short-run.* This is partly because the distinct points of view between the governments and peoples of southern states and partly because of the listed socio-economic, political and cultural differences hindering a sound region-wide co-operation. The lack of mutual respect and tolerance is originated from the prevalent misperceptions and prejudices in the countries of both shores. In order to eliminate these negative perceptions, a collaboration of statesmen and academic community is also required. Moreover, the countries in the region cannot formulate a common foreign policy and the Southern Mediterranean countries, which mostly focus on improving their bilateral relations with European countries, lack a desire to unify on a common ground. Therefore, UfM, similar to its predecessor, Barcelona Process, does lack the capacity to overcome all the challenges in order to advance Euro-Mediterranean relations. Moreover, while the rulers of Southern Mediterranean countries generally support the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process for practical and pragmatic reasons, the peoples of these countries do not share the profit gained from increased relations. Whether organizational frameworks will bridge the gap between the two coasts of the Mediterranean and pave the way for the establishment of a community in the Mediterranean heritage and environment is yet to be seen.

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