Economic and Social Effects of Pandemics on Globalization and Xenophobia in Eurasia

Pandemilerin Avrasya'da Küreselleşme ve Yabancı Düşmanlığı Üzerindeki Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etkileri

Teoman Ertuğrul TULUN[1]*

[1]* Dr., Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi (AVİM), Ankara, Türkiye.

*Sorumlu yazar/ Corresponding author:
tulun@avim.org.tr,
tetulun@gmail.com

Abstract

Aim: This article aims to analyze the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on globalization processes, the emergence of new forms of discrimination triggered by the pandemic, and the implications for current social and economic realities, with a particular focus on Central Asian countries. Considering the historical role of pandemics in transforming societies and economies, the study provides a comprehensive assessment of the global economic downturn, unemployment, poverty, and social discrimination induced by COVID-19.

Method: A comparative historical analysis was conducted, juxtaposing the societal impacts of major past pandemics (Black Death, Spanish flu) with those of COVID-19. Secondary data from international organizations and reputable survey institutions were utilized to evaluate unemployment, economic growth, and incidents of racist-xenophobic violence in Western European and Central Asian countries.

Results: The COVID-19 pandemic caused severe disruptions in global supply chains-the arteries of economic globalization-leading to a marked contraction in world trade and economic growth. Government measures such as border closures, quarantines, and mobility restrictions exacerbated job losses and disproportionately affected vulnerable groups, especially youth and women. The climate of fear and uncertainty fuelled by the pandemic increased racist and xenophobic attitudes toward "others" (foreigners, migrants, ethnic minorities), conceptualized as "xeno-racism." While such discriminatory behaviors were widely reported in Western countries, no significant evidence was found in Central Asia, though the region suffered deep economic impacts.

Conclusion: The research concludes that while COVID-19 will not end globalization, neglecting the human factor may inflict greater harm on globalization and the economy than the pandemic itself. Ongoing and future studies are needed to fully understand the long-term consequences of the pandemic on economies and societies.

Originality: This study highlights that pandemics generate lasting effects not only on health but also on social cohesion and economic structures, emphasizing the emergence of xeno-racism as a distinctive phenomenon during the current pandemic.

Key Words: COVID-19, economic globalization, global value chains, stigmatization, xenophobia.

Öz

Amaç: *Bu çalışma, COVID-19 pandemisinin küreselleşme süreçleri üzerindeki etkilerini, pandeminin yeni ayrımcılık biçimlerini nasıl tetiklediğini ve özellikle Orta Asya ülkelerinde mevcut toplumsal ve ekonomik sorunlara olan yansımalarını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Pandemilerin tarihsel olarak toplumların ve ekonomilerin dönüşümünde oynadığı rol göz önüne alınarak, COVID-19'un küresel düzeyde yarattığı ekonomik daralma, işsizlik, yoksulluk ve ayrımcılık gibi sosyal sonuçların kapsamlı bir değerlendirmesi hedeflenmiştir.*

Yöntem: *Araştırmada karşılaştırmalı tarihsel analiz yöntemi kullanılmış; Kara Veba ve İspanyol Gribi gibi önceki büyük pandemilerin toplumsal ve ekonomik etkileri ile COVID-19'un sonuçları karşılaştırılmıştır. Ayrıca, uluslararası kuruluşlar ve güvenilir veri sağlayıcılarının ikincil verileri ile Batı Avrupa ve Orta Asya ülkelerine ilişkin işsizlik, ekonomik büyüme ve ırkçı-ayrımcı şiddet olayları istatistikleri değerlendirilmiştir. Orta Asya ülkeleri için bölgesel raporlar ve uluslararası kuruluşların güncel verileri temel alınmıştır.*

Bulgular: *COVID-19 pandemisi, küresel tedarik zincirlerinde ciddi kesintilere yol açarak dünya ticaretinde ve ekonomik büyümede belirgin bir daralma yaratmıştır. Hükümetlerin sınır kapatma, karantina ve hareket kısıtlamaları gibi önlemleri, istihdam kayıplarını artırmış ve özellikle gençler ile kadınlar başta olmak üzere kırılgan grupları orantısız şekilde etkilemiştir. Pandeminin yarattığı korku ve belirsizlik ortamı, "öteki" olarak görülen gruplara (yabancılar, göçmenler, etnik azınlıklar) yönelik ırkçı ve yabancı düşmanı tutumların artmasına neden olmuş, bu durum "xeno-ırkçılık" kavramı ile açıklanmıştır. Batı Avrupa'da ayrımcı şiddet olaylarında artış gözlenirken, Orta Asya'da bu tür davranışlara dair belirgin bir veri bulunmamıştır. Orta Asya'da ise ekonomik etkiler, özellikle gelir kaybı, işsizlik, göçmen dövizlerinde azalma ve kadınların işgücü piyasasındaki kırılganlığı şeklinde ortaya çıkmıştır.*

Sonuç: *COVID-19 pandemisi, küreselleşmeyi sona erdirmemiş; ancak ekonomik ve sosyal eşitsizlikleri derinleştirmiştir. Pandemi, küreselleşmenin kazananları ile kaybedenleri arasındaki uçurumu artırmış, toplumsal dayanışma ve adaletin önemini bir kez daha ortaya koymuştur. Pandemi sonrası dönemde, sosyal sigorta sistemlerinin güçlendirilmesi ve kırılgan grupların desteklenmesi gerekliliği vurgulanmaktadır.*

Özgünlük: *Bu çalışma, pandemilerin sadece sağlık değil, aynı zamanda toplumsal ayrışma ve ekonomik yapı üzerinde de kalıcı etkiler yarattığını, özellikle xeno-ırkçılık kavramının güncel pandemiyle birlikte öne çıktığını vurgulamaktadır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *COVID-19, ekonomik küreselleşme, küresel değer zincirleri, damgalama, yabancı düşmanlığı.*

Introduction

Throughout human history, catastrophic events, such as wars, famines, and natural disasters, have affected societies, causing cities and civilizations to decline. Similarly, it has been suggested by some historians and economists that infectious diseases were also crucial to the rise and fall of societies and empires (Price-Smith, 2001, p.118). Moreover, as per some scholars, pandemics, the most dangerous type for the spread of infectious diseases have shaped 'the course of human history by overthrowing swaying empires, changing colonization patterns, and giving populations a competitive advantage.' (Gingerich and Vogler, 2020, p. 393). It should be noted that the spread of infectious diseases in the form of pandemics can disrupt the social and economic development of countries and may create new forms of social discrimination in societies. There are examples of such developments in the past. 'Pandemic' refers to a worldwide epidemic affecting large numbers, often crossing international borders, sometimes used interchangeably with 'epidemic' and 'outbreak' though on a larger scale (Last, 2001, p. 131; Dietz and Black, 2012, p. xxvii). As this description suggests, a pandemic is a worldwide or global occurrence that affects the health of individuals and may result in a high incidence of death.

Pandemic infections are global problems that cannot be managed exclusively by individual states. The World Health Organization (WHO) formally declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020, in response to its rapid global spread (WHO 2020c). A broad consensus is that the most serious pandemic occurring at the global level in the 21st century is that of COVID-19 (Green, 2020, p. 1034-1035). The COVID-19 pandemic has been ongoing for one and a half years and has negatively affected the world population, and it has had serious economic and social consequences worldwide.

In the context of these global consequences, this article intends to answer three questions: First, to what extent has the course of globalization been affected by socioeconomic factors in the COVID-19 pandemic era? Second, why and how has the COVID-19 pandemic triggered new forms of discrimination? Third, how has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the current realities and problems in Central Asian countries?

Materials for Discussion, and Methodology

Comparative Historical Analysis of Selected Major Pandemics

During pandemics, strict measures, such as quarantining to isolate individuals, have been implemented to eradicate disease. For example, due to bubonic plague 'as early as the fourteenth century … city states established crude lazarettos, quarantine facilities for isolating sick passengers and sanitizing ships and goods' (Carvalho and Zacher, 2001, p. 235). The bubonic plague, later named the 'Black Death, ultimately resulted in unprecedented loss of life, with tens of millions of victims, and acted as a catalyst for far-reaching social and economic transformations across both Europe and Asia. Its impact included labor shortages, shifts in social hierarchies, changes in land use, and profound effects on trade and urban development, fundamentally altering the fabric of societies affected by the pandemic (Epstein, 2001).

After the Black Death, Influenza Pandemic of 1917-19, commonly referred to as Spanish flu, killed more people than did all the armies in First World War (Kohn, 2008, p. 370). This pandemic was considered the worst following the Black Death (McMillen 2016, p. 89) and killed an estimated fifty million individuals (Taubenberger and Morens, 2006, p. 15-22). Although once attributed to Asia, the 1918 influenza pandemic's origins remain uncertain, with early outbreaks also reported in the United States (McMillen, 2016, p. 89-90). In the pandemics, mortality indicates the total number of deaths, and morbidity the total number of cases and these numbers are one of the measures of the impact of a pandemic (Snowden, 2019, p. 84). It should be noted that the Black Death and the 1917=1919 influenza were considered by most scholars to be two great scale major pandemics humanity faced since the middle of the fourteenth century in terms of the total morbidity and mortality figures. In this regard, the portrayal of Asia and particularly the Asian steppes as the source of the virus in both of those major pandemics is a subject that can be researched in the context of Central Asian studies.

Recent scholarship has foregrounded the unique role of Central Asia's historical experiences in shaping contemporary societal responses to crises. For instance, the legacy of the region's nomadic empires and multi-ethnic makeup continues to influence modern Central Asian nation-state formation and responses to transnational threats (Akiner, 1997; Khalid, 2007). Scholars emphasize that historical traumas, such as forced collectivizations and border demarcations during the Soviet period, created complex social dynamics whose effects persist in pandemic resilience, migration, and trust in institutions (Kandiyoti, 2002; Sokolov, 2017). Detailed sociological studies also highlight variations between Central Asian states, notably in how social cohesion, clan structures, and local governance impact public health responses and the spread of misinformation (Heathershaw and Schatz, 2017). Engaging with this literature enhances the conceptual foundation of pandemic analysis in Eurasia by situating COVID-19's effects within the historical and sociopolitical context of the region.

No major-scale pandemic was recorded for nearly a century after the 1917=1919 influenza until 'the first human cases of COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus, subsequently named SARS-CoV-2, were first reported by officials in Wuhan City, China, in December 2019' (WHO, 2020a). Coronaviruses, a group of viruses observed in various animals, cause a multitude of diseases with varying severities. Some of these coronaviruses cause colds or other mild respiratory (i.e., nose, throat, and lung) illnesses, and other coronaviruses cause more serious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (commonly known as SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (commonly known as MERS). Coronaviruses are named for their appearance: under a microscope, the viruses appear to have pointed structures that surround them and look like a corona (a crown) (Johns Hopkins Medicine 2021). A scholar, in the context of the long historical background of the novel coronavirus, defines the novel coronavirus as 'an unfamiliar member of a familiar virus family' (Hotamışlıgil, 2020, p. 15). In a brief time, that is, throughout 2020, COVID-19 spread worldwide and was detected in more than 190 countries. The WHO first declared COVID-19 as 'Public Health Emergency of International Concern' (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020, and afterward as aforementioned, on March 11, 2020, made the pandemic announcement.

In response to the announcement of the WHO of COVID-19 first as PHEIC and then as pandemic, most countries have step by step enacted wide-ranging mandates, such as closing borders to arrivals from countries with infections; halting international and domestic flights; imposing domestic transportation restrictions and sometimes banning mass mobility; instructing populations to self-quarantine; announcing partial or full lockdowns; and in some cases, imposing curfews, school closings, and bans on mass gatherings. Furthermore, responding to the calls of their expats, many countries, at the initial phase of the pandemic, evacuated their citizens living abroad. These measures, although not the aim, have led to the complete cessation of daily social life and economic activities. Therefore, a steep worldwide economic decline and its traumatic social consequences have been observed.

Economic and Social Consequences on Globalization of Measures Implemented to Curb and Eradicate COVID-19

Globalization is a contested concept for which political scientists, sociologists, and economists offer differing explanations by emphasizing the various aspects of this phenomenon. Despite the differences of opinion on the real nature of globalization, distinct features of the globalization processes can be classified under the three broad rubrics: political, economic, and cultural. A widely cited sociologist, Anthony Giddens, defines globalization in a broad perspective 'as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.' He characterizes this phenomenon as 'dialectical process' because such local happenings 'may move in an obverse direction from the very distanced relations that shape them' (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). According to the views that focus on the economic definition of globalization, as Dani Rodrik states, 'enhanced trade and financial integration' first comes to mind (Rodrik, 2007, p. 195). In Rodrik's judgment, 'Economists' standard approach to globalization is to emphasize the benefits of the free flow of goods, capitals, and ideas and to overlook the tensions that may result' (Rodrik, 1997, p. 3). Rodrik stresses that when he refers to economists, he is referring to mainstream economics, represented by neoclassic economists, a group in which he considers himself to belong (Rodrik, 2007, p. 3). Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson also mention the 'increased international trade,' 'increased financial integration,' and 'increased political integration' as dimensions of globalization. In this context, Acemoğlu and Yared describe the age of globalization as 'where technology, ideas, factors of production, and goods are increasingly mobile across national boundaries' (Acemoğlu and Yared, 2010, p. 83-88; Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2005, p. 321).

All the explanations regarding globalization, in general terms or in the economic sense, suggest an *interconnectedness* among the countries, nations, and individuals at the global level (Five Books 2020). This *interconnectedness*, as mentioned in connection with the economic description of globalization, involves 'international movements of goods, people, and capital, but is also associated with transfers of ideas and shifts of technology' (James 2009, p. 7).

Similarly, Lawrence Summers describes economic globalization as 'the phenomenon of increasing interconnection between the world's economies as reflected in the flow of goods, capital, people, and ideas' (Five Books, 2021). Regarding the 'flow of goods, capitals, people and ideas' mentioned by Summers, prima facie, the most important flow at the surface that affects the daily lives of individuals worldwide is the flow of goods. This flow, undoubtedly, in large degree, is also affiliated with the flow of individuals. The flow of capital and ideas, by contrast, might be considered the oceanic deep-water currents that travel the globe like a global conveyor belt. Elaborating on the scope of the *flow* in the context of globalization, Richard Baldwin considers 21st century international commerce as 'a richer, more complex, more interconnected set of cross-border flows of goods, investment, technology, services, technicians, managers and capital' (Baldwin, 2013, p. 39). The flow of goods is strongly associated with the 'global value chain' concept which encompass(es) the full range of activities that are required to bring a good or service from conception through the different phases of production-provision of raw materials; the input of various components, subassemblies, and producer services; the assembly of finished goods- to delivery to final consumers, as well as disposal after use (Pselis and Gereffi, 2011, p. 3-4).

In this sense, the degree of integration for each country to the global economy is measured by the number and content of the chains to which it is attached. The content of the chain determines how beneficial the integration for the country is, which is formed by the structure and the complexity of its economy.

Conventional wisdom,[i] in the academic sense and relating to business practices, deems that the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted globalization. In the opinion of some, globalization is waning or teetering on the verge of total collapse; others argue that globalization is heading for the 'intensive care unit' (Walt 2020), whereas some others question whether COVID-19 has 'killed' globalization (The Economist 2020).

There is a generally accepted assumption that the COVID-19 pandemic is having profound negative effects on the economies of individual countries and the global economy. Economic reports prepared by the leading international economic and financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), report on the devastating effects of COVID-19 on economies. Major institutions described COVID-19 as the most severe economic shock in decades, sharply reducing trade and growth worldwide (World Bank 2021; IMF 2020). According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the world economy was projected to contract by 3.2% in 2020.

COVID-19 triggered historic declines in cross-border flows and disrupted global supply chains (Altman 2020). Forecasts by World Trade Organization in the middle of 2020 state that 'world trade fell sharply in the first half of the year, as the COVID-19 pandemic upended the global economy' (World Trade Organization, 2020a). This evaluation indicates a decline of approximately 13% in merchandize trade. Notably, the World Bank's report similarly states in this respect that 'the sharp fall in activity in the first half of this year is expected to contribute to a contraction in global trade of about 13.4 percent in 2020' (World Bank, 2021, p. 11). Based on the aforementioned explanations, a possible

claim is that the most important effect of the negative economic consequences of COVID-19 on globalization is to block its *arteries* and *veins*, namely, the global supply chain.

As mentioned previously, countermeasures implemented by the governments against the outbreak, in most cases, have led to a complete cessation of daily social life and economic activities, and a steep economic decline has been observed. Therefore, a considerable number of working hours has been lost worldwide, and a return to pre-pandemic employment levels is unlikely in the short term, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) (ILO 2020c). In the context of the negative social consequences of unemployment because of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to ILO data, special attention must be paid to the most vulnerable segments of the labour force: *young* and *female workers*. Regarding young workers' unemployment, the ILO underscores that they are experiencing multiple shocks from the COVID-19 crisis, which could lead to the emergence of a *lockdown generation*. Young individuals are disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 crisis with multiple shocks, for example, disruption to their education and training, employment and income losses, and greater difficulties in finding a job than their older counterparts. The ILO stresses that for the post-COVID-19 period, support should be channelled to sectors that can create decent and productive employment (ILO 2020a, 2).

Regarding female employment during the COVID-19 pandemic, this crisis is disproportionately affecting women workers in many aspects. Per the ILO's assessment, 'there is a risk of losing some of the gains made in recent decades and exacerbating gender inequalities in the labour market' (ILO 2020b). Due to the impact of this decline on the service sector, female employment has been more at risk than male during the COVID-19 period (Akbaş Tuna and Türkmendağ, 2020).

The ILO's assessment of unemployment during the pandemic thus far, particularly for young and female workers, deserves careful attention. The data announced by the ILO suggests that the dissatisfaction occurring among employees because of the measures to combat COVID-19 will be higher in the most adversely affected groups, such as young workers and female workers, than in less adversely affected groups.

According to the UNDESA, the COVID-19 outbreak affects all population segments and creates particularly detrimental effects for social groups living in poverty, elderly individuals, individuals with disabilities, youths, and indigenous peoples (UN DESA 2021). The UN further expresses that the health and economic impacts of the virus are being borne disproportionately by poor people, including those who are unhoused, refugees, migrants, and displaced. The UNDESA further underscores those refugees, migrants and displaced person will probably suffer disproportionately from the pandemic and the increased *xenophobia.* In this context, the UN Secretary General António Guterres, during the launch of a COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan, stated, 'We must come to the aid of the ultra-vulnerable - millions upon millions of people who are least able to protect themselves. This is a matter of basic human solidarity. It is also crucial for combating the virus. This is the moment to step up for the vulnerable' (United Nations Secretary-General 2020).

As the aforementioned information reveals, negative social consequences of COVID-19 measures bring to the fore phenomena, such as unemployment, poverty, desperation, and expanded discrimination. These factors can be considered *fertilizers* of social unrest. The economic difficulties observed at the global level because of COVID-19, as referred to previously, are being compared with the economic collapse of the Great Depression. Acemoğlu and Robinson state that 'economic globalization has increased the volume of trade/outsourcing and offshoring have enabled the production process to be distributed around the world to take advantage of lower cost of production for certain tasks and goods' (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2019, p. 367). They underscore that developing and developed nations have benefited from this globalization process. However, they assert that not everybody benefited from economic globalization at the same level and that 'where corporations and the already well-off have seen their incomes rise, while workers have experienced much more limited gains and, in some cases, lower wages and job losses.' They claim in this context that 'globalization creates winners and losers' (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2019, p. 367). In such a winner–loser framework, low-skill, low-wage labour, workers-and particularly less-skilled workers-are, in most cases, on the losers' side. In this context, we can claim that COVID-19 measures have deepened the divide between the winners and losers of economic globalization because of the increase in unemployment, particularly among young as well as female workers (Sayılı and Uyanık, 2012).

Acemoğlu and Robinson introduce 'the Red Queen effect,' a notion that 'refers to a situation where you have to keep on running just to maintain your position, like the state and society running fast to maintain the balance between them' (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2019, p. 46). If we apply 'the Red Queen effect' to economic globalization in the COVID-19 pandemic environment, in order that the hard running of the losers of economic globalization against the winners will not be wasteful and useless, and hence might not turn into running amok, the primary beneficiaries of economic globalization, particularly multinational companies, should pay utmost attention to fairness, social solidarity, and assistance. In that respect, to maintain the momentum of economic globalization, a reasonable balance is necessary between the beneficiaries of economic globalization and vulnerable groups of societies, such as workers (especially female workers) and youngsters.

COVID-19 and Xenoracism: Why Racism and Xenophobia often Accompany Outbreaks of Disease?

Pandemics trigger widespread uncertainty and fear, which foster new social behaviors alongside severe economic and societal impacts. During such crises, trust declines and avoidance of perceived outsiders rises. The priority of protection from deadly contagious diseases, blending with possibly irrational fears of individuals perceived as strangers and foreigners spreading the disease can increase the intensity of xenophobic attitudes and behaviours during pandemic periods. Quarantine and social isolation have long been key public health responses, dating back to the Black Death. Social isolation intensifies anxiety, panic, and depression (Pietrabissa and Simpson, 2020). In the COVID-19 era, these patterns reemerged as racism and xenophobia targeting 'others' in society. Notably, East Asians abroad, Africans in China, and Western tourists in Africa all experienced pandemic-related stigmatization (COVID-19 Working Group, 2020). Scholars term this 'xeno-racism,' though its relevance to Central Asia warrants critical assessment. In this context, while Western scholars have theorized such reactions as 'xeno-racism'-a blend of racism and xenophobia-its relevance to Central Asian societies should be critically assessed and contextualized.

As theorized chiefly in Western Europe, xeno-racism's application to Central Asia is complicated and context-dependent (Sivanandan, 2008). In Western Europe, "xeno-racism" typically captures the stigmatization and exclusion of foreign-born or non-native populations, including those sharing physical or cultural similarities with the host society. In Central Asia, social boundaries arise more from clan, tribe, and region than race, though migrant discrimination does occur (Kandiyoti, 2002; Khalid, 2007; Heathershaw and Schatz, 2017). Although large-scale, ethnically targeted violence or systemic xenophobia during COVID-19 was not widely reported in Central Asia, latent biases and exclusionary rhetoric surfaced in localized contexts, often directed at labor migrants, Chinese nationals, or marginalized minorities. Thus, while the Western-derived term "xeno-racism" does not fully capture the intersectional and situated realities of Central Asian societies, it offers a useful lens for examining emergent forms of pandemic-era discrimination, especially as transnational flows intensify. To provide a more accurate analysis, this study draws upon "xeno-racism" as a heuristic-while also attending to the distinctive, historically-specific modes of social boundary-making prevalent in Central Asia (Akiner, 1997; Sokolov, 2017).

Though post-World War II Europe condemned racism, late 20th century violence against migrants persisted sometimes reframed as xenophobia. Scholarly debate distinguishes racism (based on physical traits) from xenophobia (based on foreignness); 'xeno-racism' captures prejudice against marginalized outsiders regardless of appearance (ILO et al.; Sivanandan, 2008; Fekete, p. 23-40).

Throughout history, the spread of diseases has often been a reason for othering and discrimination. As recent articles on the COVID-19 pandemic penned by historians and medical sociologists suggest, outbreaks are typically accompanied by, as aforementioned, a sense of fear, which has the potential to fuel racism and xenophobia. This phenomenon holds also in the context of the spread of coronavirus. The COVID-19 pandemic has uncovered social and political fractures within communities realized as racialized and discriminatory responses to fear and induced a social environment prone to isolated societies (Devakumar et al). However, commerce requires the opposite condition, which is, increasing cosmopolitanism and exchanges among societies. Therefore, pandemics and global commerce are inextricably related (White, 2020, p.1-2).

In the context of measures implemented to prevent the spread of disease, according to the generally accepted view, quarantine, cordon sanitaire, and other social distancing practices date back to 14th century Europe. In the 19th century, the spread of epidemic diseases emerged as a problem that required an international, coordinated response. European colonial expansion brought smallpox and other diseases to the Americas and Africa from the time of Christopher Columbus to the 1800s. These epidemics caused widespread death and its consequences for the living among the indigenous peoples. Simultaneously, Europeans encountered new diseases in the newly colonized lands. A new system was necessary to improve the management of the spread of infectious disease. From 1851 to 1938, p.14 conferences were held to standardize international regulations for quarantines in response to and sanitary management of plague, cholera, and yellow fever; notably, the Ottoman Empire was a part of this process. In this respect, 'Eleven European States and Turkey were represented at the first International Sanitary Conference in Paris, and the third conference was held in İstanbul in 1866' (Howard-Jones 1975, p. 23-35). Additionally, to colonial health officials and the drafters of the First International Sanitary Conventions, the spread of cholera and plague was an economic, epidemic, and political risk to the long-term stability of the global economy. Historical and medicine sociologist Alexander White highlights that the framing of disease threats, from a historical perspective, has largely been shaped by European priorities. Per this approach, epidemic threats that arose from colonial (or now post-colonial) sites affecting trade had priority when evaluating precautionary measures. The target social groups of these precautionary measures were developed correspondingly. According to White, in a pandemic, the optimal response is that which protects and considers all members of the population and not some of them. He cautions that exclusions and stereotyping, in combination with economic difficulties, may generate racist or xenophobic responses in societies (White, 2020, p. 2).

Similar cautionary advice was pronounced by the Director General of the WHO Tedros Adhanom. He said, 'It's so painful to see the level of stigma we're observing … stigma, to be honest, is more dangerous than the virus itself.

And let us really underline that the stigma is the most dangerous enemy. For me, it's more than the virus itself' (Bauomy, 2020).

Based on our literature review in this section, COVID-19 did not resurrect existing 'everyday racism' and xenophobia (Essed, 1991, p. 10). By contrast, it added a newly manufactured *stigmatization* type in accord with the current conditions to the racist and xenophobic discrimination, which substantially fits the description of *xeno-racism*.

Method

Before explaining the method used in our research, we consider it useful to explain what we understand by the terms methodology and method, which are often used synonymously or interchangeably, as well as with the terms research strategy and research design. In our judgment, methodology as a contextual framework defines the overall research strategy that outlines the way research is conducted, showing how research questions are developed and articulated, whereas method is a research tool, a tool or mode of data collection in research. Research design is a plan for answering research questions that form the framework for data collection and analysis.

To ensure robust and comparable analysis, countries were selected based on three key criteria: (1) availability of internationally recognized, multi-year data on core economic and social indicators, including GDP growth, unemployment, and acts of racist/xenophobic violence; (2) regional significance, with Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom representing major Western European economies often at the forefront of pandemic trends and data transparency, and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan exemplifying Central Asia's diverse pandemic experiences; and (3) relevance of national policy responses, as these countries illustrate distinct pandemic management approaches, border and migration regimes, and demographic vulnerabilities. Countries with consistent and transparent reporting (e.g., Germany, UK) were prioritized for empirical rigor, while Central Asian states were included for comparative regional insight despite well-known data limitations (KazStat, 2024; CEIC Data, 2025). This selection aligns with established cross-national pandemic research practice, where both data quality and regional representativeness are central criteria (Bollyky et al., 2022). Within the scope of the research strategy, quantitative research was used in our study. In this context, the secondary data provided by the international organizations as well as the secondary data produced as statistics or survey results by reliable survey institutions were utilized in our analysis.

Despite utilizing reputable national and international sources, the present study remains subject to several important limitations inherent to secondary data analysis. First, the collection and reporting of economic and social indicators-especially during the COVID-19 period-were disrupted or delayed in many countries, producing gaps and inconsistencies in the data sets (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020). Second, there are important comparability challenges: countries use differing definitions and thresholds for unemployment, GDP, and, crucially, for racist or xenophobic violence, making direct cross-national comparison methodologically problematic (UNSTATS, 2020). Moreover, systematic underreporting-particularly for hate crime and xenophobic acts-is widely acknowledged in both official statistics and the academic literature, especially for sensitive phenomena or in countries where government record-keeping is limited or subject to political constraints (Naudé and Vinuesa, 2020). For Central Asian states, data on hate crime and racist violence are generally absent, fragmented, or derived from non-official or ad hoc sources, affecting both validity and reliability. Access to disaggregated, timely, and comparable social statistics also varied substantially by country and year. Consequently, the analyses and comparisons conducted in this study should be interpreted with caution, in full recognition of the uncertainties, partial coverage, and methodological biases embedded within the available secondary data. Future research should seek to address these limitations, ideally by incorporating primary research, triangulating diverse data sources, and leveraging international data harmonization efforts.

What Do the Data reveal Regarding Western Europe?

Worldwide health problems and restrictions caused by COVID-19 have created difficulties in compiling and reporting statistical trade data (World Trade Organization, 2021). Furthermore, economic data for some countries may not have been compiled salubriously during the pandemic period. These challenges are particularly valid for 2020 and the first three months of 2021. The end of the pandemic remains unknown. As of the current situation, it is not possible to reach a definite judgment on this issue beyond the estimations. These ambiguities render making the precise assessments of the future of economies and global trade difficult.

Although examining the effects of the pandemic period on the economy, we discussed also the social problems caused by unemployment. We further highlighted that pandemic period may lead to the emergence of discriminatory behaviour in general. We stated that discriminatory approaches can take the form of racism and xenophobia, and stigmatization is also common.

To assess the negative effects of COVID-19 on supply chains at the global level, we refer to the annual percentage change in the worldwide commodity trade. Table 1 below shows the annual percentage change in this regard during 2012–2020.

Table 1: Worlds merchandize trade volume annual percentage change.

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
2.5 %	2.7 %	2.5 %	2.3 %	1.4 %	14.7 %	2.9 %	−0.1 %	−9.2 %

Source: World Trade Organization (2020b).

To gain a preliminary insight into the economic and social impacts of COVID-19 through the data, we first identified three countries with 2020 data on racial and xenophobic hate crimes in Western Europe. These countries are Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. We also paid attention that these countries should have data on GDP growth and unemployment for the period of 2017-2020. Then, we compiled unemployment, GDP growth and racist and xenophobic violence and crime data for 2017-2020 period of these countries in the composite single table. This compiled data is presented in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Key Economic and Social Indicators for Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom (2017–2024): Unemployment, Economic Growth, and Politically or Racially Motivated Violence

		Unemployment (%)	GDP growth (%)	Acts of violence & other offences involving racist & xenophobic intention[1]
ITALY	2017	11.2	1.7	423
	2018	10.5	0.8	405
	2019	10	0.3	378
	2020	9.3	- 10.6	109
	2021	9.52	6.7	230
	2022	8.12	3.9	1105
	2023	7.68	0.7	Trend suggests continued increase; no published figure
	2024	5.8	0.7	No data available yet
GERMANY	2017	5.7	2.6	39.505
	2018	5.2	1.3	36.062
	2019	5	0.6	41.177
	2020	5.9	- 6	55.300
	2021	5.7	2.9	56.000
	2022	5.0	2.7	58.916
	2023	2.9	3.1	60.028
	2024	2.8	1.3	84.172
UK	2017	4.2	1.7	No data available
	2018	4	1.3	71.264
	2019	3.8	1.3	78.991
	2020	4	- 9.9	76.070
	2021	6.5	5.7	92.052
	2022	4.4	4.5	76.070
	2023	4.0	4	76.070
	2024	4.0	4	76.070

(*) Estimated

Source: Statista (2021c); Statista (2021d); Statista (2021a); Statista (2021e); Statista (2021b); Statista (2019); Bunderministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (2020); Deutscher Bundestag (2020); Statista (2020a); Statista (2020b).

---

[1] In this study, the data reported for Germany correspond to the total number of politically motivated crimes (Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität; PMK), a categorization encompassing right-wing, left-wing, foreign-ideological, and religious extremist offences, including those motivated by xenophobia and racism. This comprehensive approach reflects the German context where such political criminality is closely intertwined with hate and bias-motivated acts. Using the total PMK figures, rather than a narrower "hate crime" subset, provides a fuller picture of socially destabilizing and ideologically driven violence. This approach also aligns with international academic practice in comparative research, particularly given the varying definitions and reporting standards of hate crimes across European countries. It captures a broader spectrum of offences that often overlap with hatred and xenophobic hostility but may not be formally recorded as hate crimes under stricter definitions (Tulun 2018).

Table 3: Key Economic and Social Indicators for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (2017–2024): Unemployment, Economic Growth, and Reported Acts of Racial or Xenophobic Violence

		Unemployment (%)	GDP growth (%)	Acts of violence & other offences involving racist & xenophobic intention
KAZAKHSTAN	2017	6	3	No official or systematic reporting[2]
	2018	5.89	3.33	No official or systematic reporting
	2019	5.78	3.65	No official or systematic reporting
	2020	5.66	3.97	No official or systematic reporting
	2021	5.55	4.30	No official or systematic reporting
	2022	4.86	3.20	No official or systematic reporting
	2023	4.82	5.10	No official or systematic reporting
	2024	4.60	4.80	85[3]
TURKMENISTAN	2017	4.50	6	No official or systematic reporting[4]
	2018	4.50	6.10	No official or systematic reporting
	2019	4.50	6.10	No official or systematic reporting
	2020	4.46	6.20	No official or systematic reporting
	2021	4.46	6.20	No official or systematic reporting
	2022	4.11	6.20	No official or systematic reporting
	2023	4.10	6.30	No official or systematic reporting
	2024	4.30	1.3	No official or systematic reporting
UZBEKISTAN	2017	6.00	5.00	No official or systematic reporting[5]
	2018	5.84	5.30	No official or systematic reporting
	2019	5.68	5.50	No official or systematic reporting
	2020	5.52	5.70	No official or systematic reporting
	2021	5.36	-	No official or systematic reporting
	2022	4.49	5.70	No official or systematic reporting
	2023	4.46	-	No official or systematic reporting
	2024	4.49	-	No official or systematic reporting

Source: KazStat, 2024; CEIC Data, 2025; OSCE Hate Crime Reporting 2024; Tengrinews.kz 2024

In the three countries, the figures in Table 2 do not indicate a meaningful association between GDP growth, unemployment rates, and the number of racist-xenophobic violent incidents during the COVID-19 period. The data on GDP growth and unemployment for the three countries have robust content. However, it is difficult to argue the same in relation to acts of violence originating from racist–xenophobic intentions. In this respect, the insufficiency of the data does not allow tested evaluations beyond conjectural arguments. To determine whether an academically meaningful association exists among these three phenomena beyond the conjectural claims, we must wait for the end of the pandemic. We plan to investigate the data on violent acts originating from racist and xenophobic intentions during the pandemic period.

How Has COVID-19 Affected Central Asia in Terms of Health Concerns and Globalization?

We have described the global effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This pandemic, like prior major pandemics (i.e., bubonic plague and Spanish flu) has produced effects worldwide and, in this context, significantly negatively affected the economies of Central Asian countries. The reports prepared by international economic organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, on the Central Asian region show that these countries have lower morbidity and mortality rates caused by the COVID-19 pandemic than some OECD member countries (OECD, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus). According to the report, the impact of the pandemic on the economies of the region has been profound in contrary to the relatively successful containment of the virus. The closure of borders and the collapse in international demand had a significant impact on the economies of the regional countries, some of which rely heavily on remittances and exports of oil, gas, and minerals. In this context, the reports estimated that the

---

[2] For Kazakhstan, national statistics on hate crimes and xenophobic violence remain unpublished for all years except a limited investigation report (85 cases, 2024); data compiled from government releases and notable criminal investigations. No systematic or annual recording is undertaken in public reports or international databases such as OSCE/ODIHR

[3] Kazakhstan's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 85 cases related to "ethnic or religious hatred" in 2024. This figure is included as the most comprehensive available, but categories may differ from European hate crime reporting.

[4] Turkmenistan does not systematically publish or report hate crime or related violence data to OSCE/ODIHR or in public law enforcement bulletins; figures for all years are methodologically unofficial and should not be considered as indicative of either presence or absence of such incidents.

[5] Uzbekistan lacks systematic annual hate crime reporting. Regional NGO and international monitoring reports confirm the absence of publicly released official data for the entire period. News and NGO reports occasionally cite discrimination or isolated incidents, but no aggregate statistics exist.

region's economies would contract on average 1.7% in 2020. Regarding employment, governments in Central Asia, like those in the other OECD countries, provided immediate support to firms and workers for limiting unemployment. However, according to the OECD report, these support measures did not prevent surges in unemployment in some Central Asia countries.

These summarized developments indicate that the COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly affected Central Asian countries like other world regions. In this regard, COVID-19 has affected the economies of these countries, for example, caused unemployment; made exporting extractive-sector exports, an important source of their income, difficult; reduced their connection with other countries; and harmed their contribution to supply chains. Border closures have heavily affected labour migrants' remittance-dependent countries of the region. Notably, the World Bank predicted that remittance inflows to Central Asian countries would decrease by approximately 28% in 2020 (The World Bank, World Bank Predicts). The UN Development Programme (UNDP) report states that in this context, the countries of Central Asia experienced negative impacts on drivers of growth, such as trade disruptions and declines in consumption and investment, migrant remittances, and oil and mineral export revenues in the COVID-19 pandemic period. According to UNDP assessments, the COVID-19 pandemic has had significant negative impacts on household income in Central Asian countries due to loss of wage income and income from informal work, loss of remittances. It also caused price inflation, especially food prices. The loss of income has hit households significantly and conduced to spill over effects such as rising household debt, the inability to meet out-of-pocket payments for health care, and reduced access to education. Like other parts of the world, the crisis affected females more than males in Central Asian countries. Women's opportunities to find a job or compete in the labour market are further reduced due to societal norms related to family distribution of household chores, child and elderly care responsibilities (UNDP, 'COVID-19 and Central Asia').

On the other hand, it is a fact that COVID-19 has not disappeared even though it has been almost two years elapsed since its onset. In this context, it is necessary to take a brief look at the recent effects of COVID-19 on Central Asian countries. The latest World Bank report notes that new COVID-19 cases and deaths in Central Asia soar to all-time highs in 2021 as low vaccination rates leave large segments of the population vulnerable to the highly contagious Delta variant. According to the report, vaccination requirements and renewed restrictions implemented at the beginning of the third quarter of 2021 have led to limited working hours and capacity utilization in some countries in Central Asia. According to the report, the gradual reopening of the economies despite these adverse events increased retail sales, helping the relative recovery of domestic demand and the revival of economic activity. Foreign demand also increased the export performance of many goods in some Central Asian countries. However, the recovery is not complete and oil exports remain below pre-pandemic volumes. Additionally, there is a weakening in foreign direct investments. The World Bank report points out that growth in Central Asia is expected to rise to 4.3 percent in both 2021 and 2022. The report underlines that this rate is below historical averages due to ongoing pandemic challenges (World Bank 2021, 26). The report reveals that Central Asian countries continue to suffer greatly from the health problems and economic difficulties caused by COVID-19.

Concerning discriminatory behaviours against individuals considered 'others,' during the COVID-19 pandemic period, the international community did not receive specific information on incidences of xenoracist discriminatory behaviours toward foreigners and strangers in Central Asian countries. It is possible to say that the Central Asian countries' record of discrimination during the COVID-19 period is much cleaner than that of the USA and Western European countries.

Discussion of Findings and Results

Based on current indicators, our assessment is that economic growth and global trade recovery can only occur when the pandemic is contained. Furthermore, supply chain policies will be atop the agenda in the upcoming period, and domestic self-sufficiency policies will probably strongly challenge international diversity. An expectation should be that nationally and locally sensitive industries related to health and national security and the industries employing large domestic workforces will be the focus in promoting domestic self-sufficiency policies. However, such policies should not be expected to end economic globalization. Although the support for economic globalization will decline, an unrealistic expectation would be a total collapse in sophisticated global supply chains. Ultimately, an equilibrium between these two rival thoughts will be obtained.

From the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, to guide the business community in the pandemic environment, blueprints were developed by various business and management consultancy groups. The most notable point in these blueprints is that nearly all these parties approach the problems caused by COVID-19 based on metric means. Since the aim of these plans is to respond to the needs of the business world, it can be said that this approach is an appropriate one. However, it is not always possible to determine the depth and suffering of the social problems caused by COVID-19 with metric methods (COVID-19 Working Group). For example, providing unemployment figures of working groups as metrics is insufficient to explain the desperation that employees experience when unemployed. In this context, seriously considering the warnings of the ILO is useful. Larry Summers states that global integration will not work if it

means local fragmentation. Unfortunately, this foresight proved that he was farsighted. Summers states that the essence of the solution should be to strengthen social insurance systems and prepare people for a world that will change more rapidly (Five Books 2021).

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can state that globalization cannot end with COVID-19. However, it should be taken into consideration that neglecting the human factor may cause more damage to globalization and economy than the measures implemented to curb and eradicate the spread of COVID-19.

Despite the passage of time, COVID-19 has not been fully eradicated, and its economic and social impacts continue to evolve. The emergence of successive variants-initially Delta and Omicron, followed by others-has demonstrated the persistence of vulnerabilities in both public health systems and global economies. Although many countries have shifted toward normalization, the reintroduction of certain restrictions underscores the ongoing uncertainty. In light of these conditions, current evaluations should be considered interim and context-dependent. Continuous research will be essential to understanding the long-term implications of the pandemic on economic globalization, social cohesion, and public policy. In this regard, longitudinal studies that track developments across multiple years and regions are crucial to producing sound, evidence-based assessments of the variables examined in this article.

To meaningfully address the widening social and economic disparities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic-and prevent further erosions of global solidarity-governments, international organizations, and regional actors must adopt coordinated and inclusive strategies. The resilience of global systems depends not only on containing the virus but also on correcting structural vulnerabilities in labor markets, health systems, and governance mechanisms. First and foremost, governments must prioritize the expansion and modernization of social protection systems. COVID-19 underscored the limitations of existing welfare frameworks, especially in reaching informal workers, migrants, youth, and women. National social insurance programs-such as unemployment benefits, universal health coverage, and direct cash transfers-should be recalibrated to function effectively in times of crisis. Moreover, flexible, responsive social protection schemes that can be rapidly deployed during pandemics and other shocks are now essential to safeguard against widespread precarity (ILO, 2020a; UNDP, 2021). In the realm of global health governance, states should strengthen coordination through bodies such as the World Health Organization. Equitable vaccine access, timely disease surveillance, and transparent data sharing must be standardized as part of future global responses. High-income countries and multilateral institutions have a role in financing pandemic preparedness in developing economies, which remains a major weak point in achieving shared global safety (Bollyky et al., 2022). In parallel, inclusive labor market policies are critical. Policymakers should invest in large-scale re-skilling and up-skilling initiatives anticipating structural employment shifts-especially those affecting younger and female workers. Safe and legal labor migration channels must remain open and supported by bilateral agreements, ensuring protection of both migrant rights and vital remittance flows. These remittances are a lifeline in many Central Asian economies and have been severely disrupted (World Bank 2021). At the societal level, tackling xenophobia and discrimination requires proactive state intervention. Anti-discrimination laws must be paired with rigorous enforcement mechanisms, including the collection of disaggregated hate crime statistics and improved access to justice for victims. Public education and awareness campaigns should accompany legal instruments to challenge pandemic-fuelled stigma and prevent 'xeno-racism' from institutionalizing in public discourse and behavior (Devakumar et al., 2020; Sivanandan, 2008). The resilience of globalization itself depends on reinforcing supply chains without abandoning international cooperation. While domestic self-sufficiency will remain a priority post-pandemic-particularly in sectors like health, food security, and national security-these policies must be balanced with continued engagement in international trade networks. Strategic reserves of essential supplies should be coordinated at the regional level, ensuring collective preparedness without resorting to protectionism (Altman 2020; Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2019). Finally, international institutions need to scale up support mechanisms for pandemic recovery. Financial support frameworks coordinated by the IMF, World Bank, and UN agencies should prioritize low- and middle-income countries facing compounded crises. These mechanisms should be complemented by research investments into real-time and longitudinal monitoring of the pandemic's effects across different societal groups and regions, with particular emphasis on vulnerable and underrepresented populations in Central Asia and the Global South. In this new global reality, effective recovery requires moving beyond technocratic metrics to include principles of economic justice, social solidarity, and equitable governance. As COVID-19 has demonstrated, neglecting the social contract weakens the very foundation of globalization. Embedding inclusivity, transparency, and international cooperation at the center of crisis recovery strategies is not only ethically imperative-it is politically and economically necessary.

Referances

Acemoğlu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Acemoğlu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2019). The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. New York: Penguin Books.

Acemoğlu, D. & Yared, P. (2010). *Political limits to globalization. American Economic Review 100*(2), 83-88. doi:10.1257/aer.100.2.83.

Altman, S. A. (2020). Will Covid-19 have a lasting impact on globalization? *Harvard Business Review*, May 20. https://hbr.org/2020/05/will-covid-19-have-a-lasting-impact-on-globalization

Akiner, S. (1997). Between tradition and modernity: The dilemma facing contemporary Central Asian society. *Religion, State & Society*, *25*(2), 162-177.

Baldwin, R. (2013). Global supply chains: Why they emerged, why they matter, and where they are going. *In Global Value Chains in a Changing World*, edited by Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low, 13-59. Geneva: World Trade Organization.

Bauomy, J. (2020). COVID-19 and xenophobia: Why outbreaks are often accompanied by racism. *Euronews*, March 6. https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/05/covid-19-and-xenophobia-why-outbreaks-are-often-accompanied-by-racism

Bunderministerium des Innern, für Bau & Heimat. (2020). Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2019. *Bunderministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat*, May 12. https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2020/pmk-2019.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11#:~:text=Von%20den%20insgesamt%20erfassten%20politisch,die%20f%C3%BCr%20unsere%20freiheitliche%20demokratische

Carvalho, S. & Mark Z. (2001). The International Health Regulations in Historical Perspective. In *Plagues and Politics: Infectious Disease and International Policy*, edited by Andrew T. Price-Smith, 235-261. New York: Palgrave.

CEIC Data. Kazakhstan Unemployment Rate.

COVID-19 Working Group. (2020). COVID-19, globalization and the aftermath. *Center For Eurasian Studies (AVİM)*, June 18. https://avim.org.tr/en/Analiz/COVID-19-GLOBALIZATION-AND-THE-AFTERMATH

Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazStat). Annual Report, 2024.

Deutscher Bundestag. (2020). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Petra Pau, Dr. André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. *Deutscher Bundestag*, August 6. https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/215/1921507.pdf

Dietz, J. E. & David R. Black, eds. (2012). *Pandemic Planning.* New York: CRC Press.

The Economist. (2020). Globalisation Unwound: Has Covid-19 Killed Globalisation? *The Economist*, May 14. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/05/14/has-covid-19-killed-globalisation

Epstein, P. R. (2001). Climate, Ecology and Human Health. In *Plagues and Politics: Infectious Disease and International Policy*, edited by Andrew T. Price-Smith, 27-58. New York: Palgrave.

Essed, P. (1991). Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory. London: Sage.

Five Books. (2021). The Best Books on Globalization recommended by Larry Summers. *Five Books.* Accessed October 10, 2021. https://fivebooks.com/best-books/larry-summers-globalization/

Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Gingerich, D. & Vogler J. P. (2020). Pandemics and Political Development: The Electoral Legacy of the Black Death in Germany. *SSRN*, November 23. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3578732

Green, M. S. (2020) Did the hesitancy in declaring COVID-19 a pandemic reflect a need to redefine the term? *The Lancet, 395*(10229), 1034-1035. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30630-9.

Heathershaw, J. & Schatz, E. (2017). The logic of clan politics: evidence from the central ASIAN survey. Central Asian Survey, *36*(1), 1-18.

Horrox, R. (1994). The Black Death. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hotamışlıgil, G. (2020). Coronavirus and its effects on the global economy. DTİK, April 1. http://dtik.org.tr/UserFiles/Document/Coronavirus-and-Its-Effects-on-the-Global-Economy.pdf

Howard-Jones, N. (1975). The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences 1851-1938. Geneva: World Health Organization.

ILO (International Labour Organization). (2020a). ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work. Fourth Edition: Updated Estimates and Analysis. *International Labour Organization*, May 27. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_745963.pdf

ILO (International Labour Organization). (2020b). ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work. Fifth Edition: Updated Estimates and Analysis. *International Labour Organization*, June 30. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_749399.pdf

ILO (International Labour Organization). (2020c). As Jobs Crisis Deepens, ILO Warns of Uncertain and Incomplete Labour Market Recovery. *International Labour Organization*, June 30. https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_749398/lang--en/index.htm.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). (2020). World Economic Outlook, April 2020: The Great Lockdown. *International Monetary Fund*, April. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020

James, H. (2009). The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Johns Hopkins Medicine. (2021). What Is Coronavirus? *Johns Hopkins Medicine*, May 19. https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus

Kandiyoti, D. (2002). Post-Soviet institutional design: clan, tribe and patrimonialism in Central Asia. *Central Asian Survey*, *21*(1), 43-64.

Khalid, A. (2007). Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kohn, G. C. (2008). *Encyclopaedia of Plague and Pestilence: From Ancient Times to the Present.* 3rd ed. New York: Facts on File.

Last, J. (2001). A Dictionary of Epidemiology. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

McMillen, C. W. (2016). Pandemics: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

OSCE Hate Crime Reporting. https://hatecrime.osce.org/reporting/kazakhstan

Pietrabissa, G. & Simpson, S. G. (2020). Psychological consequences of social during COVID-19 Outbreak. *Frontiers in Psychology* 11(2201). doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02201.

Price-Smith, A. T. (2001). Disease and International Development. In *Plagues and Politics Infectious Disease and International Policy*, edited by Andrew T. Price-Smith, 117-150. New York: Palgrave.

Psilos, P. & Gary G. (2011). Workforce Development in the Global Economy: Linking Skills and Capabilities to Upgrading. In *Workforce Development and Global Value Chains in Developing Countries*, edited by Gereffi, G., Fernandez-Stark, K., and Psilos, P., 1-13. Center for Globalization, Governance, and Competitiveness, Duke University.

Rodrik, D. (1997). *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Rodrik, D. (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sayılı, M. & Uyanık, M. (2012). Küresel ekonomik kriz ve etkileri: Tokat ili merkez ilçe gıda sanayi örneği. *Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, *3*(2), 239-250.

Sivanandan, A. (2008). Catching History on the Wing: Race, Culture and Globalisation. London: Pluto Press. https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745328348/catching-history-on-the-wing/.

Snowden, F. M. (2019). Epidemics and Society: From the Black Death to the Present. New Have: Yale University Press.

Statista. (2019). Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Projections for the U.S., U.K., Germany and Western Europe from 2010 to 2023. *Statista*, April. https://www.statista.com/statistics/369222/gdp-growth-forecast-western-europe-vs-major-economies/

Statista. (2020a). Annual Number of Police-Reported Racially Motivated Hate Crimes in England and Wales from 2009/10 to 2019/2020." *Statista*, October. https://www.statista.com/statistics/674846/race-crimes-in-england-and-wales/

Statista. (2020b). Cases of Racial Verbal Violence in Italy from 2017 to 2020. Statista, August. https://www.statista.com/statistics/627248/cases-of-racial-verbal-violence-italy/

Statista. (2021a). Annual Average Unemployment Rate in Germany from 2005 to 2021. *Statista*, September. https://www.statista.com/statistics/227005/unemployment-rate-in-germany/#:~:text=Annual%20average%20uneployment%20rate%20in%20Germany%202004%2D2020&text=This%20statistic%20shows%20the%20annual,rate%20amounted%20to%205.9%20percent

Statista. (2021b). Germany: Growth Rate of the Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 2016 to 2026 (Compared to the Previous Year)." *Statista*, October. https://www.statista.com/statistics/375203/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-germany/

Statista. (2021c). Unemployment Rate in Italy from 2008 to 2020. *Statista*, January. https://www.statista.com/statistics/531010/unemployment-rate-italy/

Statista. (2021d). Unemployment Rate in Italy in 2020, with a Forecast for 2021 and 2022. *Statista*, May. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109090/forecasted-unemployment-rate-in-italy/

Statista. (2021e). Unemployment Rate in the United Kingdom from March 1971 to August 2021. *Statista*, October. https://www.statista.com/statistics/279898/unemployment-rate-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/

Sokolov, V. (2017). Social trauma and memory in Central Asian societies. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *69*(2), 230-248.

Taubenberger, J. K. & David M. M. (2006). 1918 Influenza: The mother of all pandemics. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* *12*(1), 15-22. doi:10.3201/eid1201.050979.

Tengrinews.kz. Interior Ministry on Hate Crimes in Kazakhstan, April 2025.

Tulun, T. E. (2018). Küreselleşme Süreçlerinin Kutuplaşma ve Yabancı Düşmanlığındaki Rolü: Almanya Örneği [The Role of Globalization Processes in Polarization and Xenophobia: The Case of Germany], Doctoral Thesis, Ankara University, Institute of Social Sciences, 2018. (YÖKSİS: Tez No 552473)

Tuna, A. & Türkmendağ, Z. (2023). Covid-19 sürecinde uzaktan çalışmada iş stresi, iş tatmini ve işten ayrılma niyeti. *Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, *14*(1), 163-184. https://doi.org/10.54558/jiss.1241552

UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) (2021). "Everyone Included: Social Impact of COVID-19." *United Nations*. Accessed October 10, 2021. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/everyone-included-covid-19.html

United Nations Secretary-General. (2020). "Launch of Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19." *United Nations*, March 25. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2020-03-25/launch-of-global-humanitarian-response-plan-for-covid-19

Walt, S. M. (2020). The Realist's Guide to the Coronavirus Outbreak. *Foreign Policy*, March 9. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/09/coronavirus-economy-globalization-virus-icu-realism/

White, A. I. R. (2020). Historical Linkages: Epidemic Threat, Economic Risk, and Xenophobia. *The Lancet* 395 (10232), 1250-1251. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30737-6.

WHO (World Health Organization)? (2020a). Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Situation Report - 94. *World Health Organization*, April 23. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200423-sitrep-94-covid-19.pdf

WHO (World Health Organization)? (2020b). Listings of WHO's Response to COVID-19. *World Health Organization*, June 29., https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline

WHO (World Health Organization). (2020c). Timeline of WHO's Response to COVID-19. *World Health Organization*, July 30. https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline

World Bank. (2021). Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Fall 2021: Competition and Firm Recovery Post-COVID-19. *World Bank Group*, October 11. https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-1802-8

World Bank. (2021Y). Global Economic Prospects. *World Bank*. Accessed October 10, 2021. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects

World Trade Organization. (2020a). Trade Falls Steeply in First Half of 2020. *World Trade Organization*, June 22. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr858_e.htm

World Trade Organization. (2020b). Trade Shows Signs of Rebound from COVID-19, Recovery Still Uncertain." *World Trade Organization*, October 6. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr862_e.htm

World Trade Organization. (2021). World Trade Statistical Review 2020. *World Trade Organization*. Accessed October 10, 2021. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2020_e/wts20_toc_e.htm

---

[i] This term in the meaning of ideas or explanations generally accepted as true by the public, experts, and scholars. The term was introduced by John Kenneth Galbraith in his book *Affluent Society*. Galbraith explains the concept in Chapter 2 as follows: 'Because familiarity is such an important test of acceptability, the acceptable ideas have great stability. They are highly predictable. It will be convenient to have a name for the ideas which are esteemed at any time for their acceptability, and it should be a term that emphasizes this predictability. These ideas henceforth as the 'Conventional Wisdom.'