

TURKEY: THE STAUNCHEST ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES?

Forces of Continuity and Change in the Strategic Relationship

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I

In the explanation of America's relations with his country, the primary concern of a scholar of any small power-which is not vitally important for the U. S. economically-should be the careful evaluation of two points: (i) To find out where the long and short term interests of the U. S. lie in its dealings with the particular country; and (ii) how the ever-changing strategic balance and developments in weapons technology are likely to effect the relative position of the small power within the framework of the U. S. foreign policy in the foreseeable future. In doing so, with respect to the relations between the U. S. and Turkey, it becomes imperative to formulate some *models* especially for putting forward a valid assumption on what sort of a relationship the future is likely harbour for Turkish-American relations. Since, without the evaluation of singular factual evidence within the limit of models it is impossible to understand the nature of relations today and to trace their probable trend into the future, it is my intention to bring about some viable models and use them as tools for an orderly perception of the relationship.

Up to the end of World War II, the role played by Turkey in the U. S. foreign policy was relatively small. But, especially following the Truman Doctrine of 1947, such close, unbroken, functional and organic relationships were formed that Turkey, in a relatively short duration of time, became America's "stauncest ally." This is a clever euphemism for all other words in the field of international relations relating to dependence of one country on another and used enthusiastically by the socialist "bloc" and somewhat timidly by the West.

The relations between the U. S. and Turkey have continuously developed after 1947. From the viewpoint of the U.S., the most significant factor effective in this continuity is Turkey's geographic location in the Middle East, a region of strategic importance in the global power struggle launched by the U. S. against the Soviet Union. In Turkish- American relations the forces of continuity were so strong that the global and regional changes which were to cause a breach in the intimacy of the relationship, had no substantial and sudden effect on the continuity. But, it was clearly understood recently that this continuity in Turkish-American relations will not be immune from the grinding effects of the forces of change, brought about by the developments of weapons technology in particular and the international system in general. The subject-matter of this article, then, is to explain the true nature of Turkish - American relations taking into account the basic strategic and international factors which have a bearing on the forces of continuity and change.

II

The Truman Doctrine and its 100 million dollars worth of military aid was the landmark in the close Turkish-American relationship. But it must be admitted that the reason for its declaration was not so much to defend Turkey against the Soviet threat, but to help put an end to the civil war in Greece and maintain the security of Europe. With the unique advantage of the atom bomb, the U. S. was in a position to influence in its favour the behaviour of other states. This was the direct consequence of the revolutionary change brought about by the technological developments after World War II. The air and nuclear supremacy had rendered to the U. S., in the words of James Forrestal, Secretary of Defence, "great opportunities" abroad.¹ As a consequence of this understanding, the U. S. had tried to perform three basic tasks: (i) to help Europe in securing its military, economic and political stability; (ii) to place Europe under the protective nuclear umbrella of the U.S.; and (iii) to reorganize Europe's potentialities in a defence sys-

1 M. S. Venkataramani, *Undercurrents in American Foreign Relations, Four Studies*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1965, p. 166.

tem against the Soviet Union under the leadership and close cooperation of the U. S. These goals were materialized successively by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty and the organizational mechanism of NATO.

There were, of course, also some specific reasons for the U. S. to enlarge the Truman Doctrine to include Turkey. In general, Turkey had rendered to the U. S. the control of the land, sea and air communications of the Balkans and the Middle East, hindered the Soviet Union in its thrust into the Mediterranean, and apart from forming a barrier against a possible Soviet attack, also provided a valuable staging area in attacking the heart of the Soviet Union in time of war.²

A detailed analysis of the reasons why Turkey was forced to receive U. S. military and later economic aid within the framework of the Truman Doctrine, is of no concern to us here. It can be summarized as the Soviet threats to Turkey immediately following World War II, the foreign aid that she deemed absolutely necessary for financing her economic development and the maintenance and strengthening of the westernization movement initiated by Atatürk in the 1920's.³ The effects of the Turkish-American cooperation on Turkish foreign policy—one of our primary concerns — can be seen specifically in two highly indicative foreign policy decisions. In the Palestinian question, while Turkey was following a pro-Arab policy until the Truman Doctrine, she reversed this policy soon after the aid and recognized the new Jewish state 10 months after its establishment. She later permitted the Turkish Jews to immigrate freely to Israel. Even more indicative was Turkey's changing attitude towards the Afro-Asian countries. In January 1949, Turkey refused to participate in the first Asian Conference on the Indonesian question by turning down an invitation on the grounds that she was *not* an Asian country.⁴ Six years later, in 1955, one of the few countries that assumed the role of defending the Western alliances *vis-a-vis* the newly independent Afro-Asian count-

2 Thomas V. Lewis and Richard, N. Frye, *The United States, and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, p. 146.

3 For a detailed analysis of these points, see: M. Gönlübol and H. Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı," (Twenty Years of Turkish Foreign Policy), *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. XXI, No 1 (1966), pp. 143-182.

4 *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, 1945-1950, pp. 9792-9793.

ries, was again Turkey. In this Bandung Conference she was the "powerful" spokesman of the West, facing the risk of cutting all her ties with the Afro-Asian movement.

While Turkey, today, still carries the burden of these miscalculated decisions by way of receiving virtually no support from the Third World countries, the U. S., on the other hand, by re-evaluating the situation in the Near East, came to the conclusion that the forces of continuity that were responsible in the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, have changed to a considerable extent. The first task of the U. S. in the Truman Doctrine, namely Europe's military, economic and political stability was secured. Despite the fact that numerous nuclear strategies were developed for NATO since 1949, Western European countries felt themselves secure as far as the nuclear umbrella was concerned. The "cold war" of the 1950's, initiated by the Soviet attitude in Eastern Europe, and the Truman Doctrine and its consequences for Europe has been transformed into the so-called *detente* after the 1960's. If we consider this somewhat ambiguous term as the pacification both of bilateral relations between the U. S. and the Soviet Union and international relations in Europe on the basis of multilateral recognition of the post-war frontiers; then, the third task-the reorganization of Europe in a defence system against the Soviet Union-can be considered as fulfilled. The cold war politics has ended in Europe.

Turkey's vigorous endeavour in 1947 was to secure the close cooperation of the U. S. against the threats of the Soviet Union by way of receiving foreign aid and support. But the Turkish governments had enlarged this limited and easily defined foreign policy objective soon after the application of the Truman Doctrine and became ardent proponents of a more comprehensive and ambiguous policy of "global struggle against communism." The forces responsible for the maintenance of such a policy have changed. Thus, the Western powers, and especially the U. S., have modified their foreign policies accordingly. This is one of many reasons why Turkey must adapt her foreign policy in general, and her relations with the U. S. in particular, to the requirements of the forces of change which are clearly visible in the international system of the 1970's. It seems that

one alternative policy within the framework of such a transformation is Turkey's normalization of her relations with the Soviet bloc. Although some indications of this policy can be found after the Cyprus dispute of 1964, it is far from meeting the needs of a foreign policy consistent with the international and regional changes. What is needed is the careful preparation of a political agreement with the Soviet Union, which, in turn, would give Turkey both a valuable trump card in her relations with the Western bloc, and a means for contributing to the *detente* politics in Europe.

III

The Truman Doctrine, being unilateral in nature and essentially an aid agreement, was far from meeting Turkey's anxiety over her immediate security. For this reason, Turkey's subsequent endeavours would be directed towards the purpose of forming a treaty alliance with the U. S., and would accomplish it by entering NATO as a full member in 1952. In this respect, it would be appropriate to find out the factors affecting the U. S. decision to take Turkey into NATO, in face of wide opposition of the other NATO member countries. These forces of continuity in American attitude towards Turkey, which can be classified under three headings, will also succumb to the forces of change some twenty years later.

1. *U. S. Desire to Foster Security Measures*: From 1949 onwards and with an accelerated pace, the U. S. was forced to foster security measures against the Soviet bloc. Turkey's entry into NATO was one of these measures. There were a number of reasons for the U. S. to follow such a policy: *First*, the successful explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949, constituted an important landmark in U. S. foreign policy by forming a potential threat to the security of the Western powers and opened the area of "nuclear balance of power."⁵ This achievement of the Soviet Union forced the U. S. to take more effective measures. *Secondly*, in February 1950, a treaty of alliance was signed between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China which clearly gave the impression that these two com-

5 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Russian Technology and American Policy," *Current History*, March 1958, p. 129.

munist powers had formed a common front against the capitalist world. In face of such a combined threat, the U. S. deemed it necessary to foster and extend the "policy of containment" initiated by the Truman Doctrine. *Thirdly*, the subsequent war in Korea was interpreted by the U. S. as the first indication of the military campaign launched by the Soviet Union for world domination⁶ and falsified the widely acknowledged American belief that, due to American nuclear superiority, the Soviet Union would not dare to precipitate regional wars. Now, as the Soviet Union had instigated such a war in the Far East, she would well try to do the same in Europe, specifically in "renegade" Yugoslavia. General Eisenhower, the NATO Supreme Commander, proposed the strengthening of the Southeastern flank of NATO if Yugoslavia was to be properly defended against a Soviet attack.⁷ This measure included the utilization of Turkish territory which in turn necessitated Turkey's inclusion into NATO.

2. *The U. S. Strategy and Need for the Turkish Bases:* According to the American strategy of the 1950's, NATO would meet a Soviet attack directed against Western Europe on two fronts: Conventional NATO forces in Europe would try to hold the front line as long as possible, and in due course, American strategic bombers equipped with atomic bombs would destroy the centres of armament industry, and communication routes within the Soviet Union with the aim of preventing logistic support for the European front. But, due to the fact that the bulk of American strategic air force comprised medium-range bombers, they were unable to use airbases in continental Europe, in their task of attacking the heart of the Soviet Union. Thus, American strategy was badly in need of bases close to the Soviet border, like those in Northern Africa, Middle East, and especially Turkey. According to Washington, the defence of Europe would be based on a "forward strategy."⁸

6 Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Policy for the United States*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, p. 131.

7 A. Halûk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler, 1923-1968," (Factors Shaping Turkish Foreign Policy, 1923-1968), *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (1968), p. 261.

8 Stephan Kertesz, *American Diplomacy in a New Era*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1961, p. 288; Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *Last Chance in Europe: Basis for a New American Policy*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1967, p. 68; *Daily Telegraph*, May 16, 1951.

In *The New York Times*, C. L. Sulzberger commented on the dangers of Turkey being left outside the framework of NATO:

"A neutral Turkey could even represent a positive danger to the treaty powers. Such a political situation might encourage the Soviet Union, in case of a new war, to attack only across northern and central Europe, initially ignoring the Balkans and possibly Italy, with the intention of gobbling them up later. At the same time, were Turkey to remain neutral because of the present impasse, she would ban Allied aircraft from flying over the country en route to the Soviet Union and above all toward the vulnerable Caucasus oil installations... Right now the USAF has been unable to negotiate rights for bases in that country pending the outcome of the present pact discussions."

One of the fundamental reasons why she was admitted to NATO was this geographic proximity of Turkey to the Soviet Union. Turkey, cleverly, refused to give bases to the U. S. unless she joined NATO as a full member, and thus the U.S. found no other alternative than acquiescing to the Turkish demand. George C. McGhee, the American Ambassador in Ankara, wrote the following lines after Turkey joined NATO:

"Despite the vulnerability of Iran, an easy Soviet victory in the Middle East is blocked. Russia is confronted with the necessity of allocating a substantial portion of her forces available for a drive against Western Europe to the neutralization of Turkish forces and bases. Adherence to NATO placed Turkey's 19 well-equipped and well-trained divisions and also her moral and physical strength... squarely behind the Western Alliance. The West has found a reliable friend."¹⁰

The Ambassador aptly indicated the American strategic thinking: to alleviate the military and political pressure on Europe where the Soviet Bloc forces clearly outweighed that of the West, by extending the areas of aggression around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

9 *The New York Times*, June 2, 1951.

10 George McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1954, p. 618.

3. *Turkey's Importance in the Middle East*: The U. S., in her global struggle with the Soviet Union, was compelled to extend her involvement to include the Middle East due to the collapse of Britain's power in the area in early 1950's. It was not immune from Soviet influence and was vitally important for the Western economy, because Europe was dependent on Middle East oil and European trade needed the communication routes of the region. Turkey, consequently, was considered by the U. S. as the key power to the Middle East oil, and an invaluable channel in U. S. relations with the countries of the Middle East, a region which gained great strategic and economic importance since the end of the Second World War.

As a consequence of her membership in NATO, the successive Turkish governments have equated the U. S. with NATO and NATO with Turkish national policy. From 1952 onwards, this organization, more than a treaty of alliance that enhances Turkey's security, has really become a framework within which Turkey's military, economic, and political relations with the U.S., or to put it shortly, American presence in Turkey, is shaped and legalized. The undisputable leadership of the U. S. in NATO, the stationing of American forces on Turkish territory, and subsequent close relations have all added to the equation of NATO with the U. S. As a direct consequence, those who formulated and executed Turkish foreign policy considered the North Atlantic Treaty as a national policy and even a world outlook, and evaluated the international system totally from the viewpoint of this organization. This understanding has become the general basis for relations between the two countries.

If this is one of the impacts of NATO membership on the Turkish foreign policy, another one is the fact that in a conflict between the two blocs, Turkey's chances for remaining non-belligerent have become extremely low if not nil. Turkey had conducted her foreign policy with considerable success up to 1939 without seeking the alliance of any great power, and despite her alliances with England and France, had splendidly maintained her non-belligerence throughout World War II. But, her NATO membership and bases constructed on her territory had rendered the policy of non-belligerence, in the event of a global conflict, impossible in practice if not in theory. This

fact alone can be considered as a landmark in the Turkish foreign policy.

In the evaluation of the kaleidoscopic international system of the 1970's, it is clearly witnessed that the forces of continuity effective on Turkey's NATO membership have considerably changed, as have the principles on which the Truman Doctrine was based. The "nuclear balance of power" of the early 1950's has been transformed into a "nuclear balance of terror" which stabilized the relations between the two super powers. With the advent of the People's Republic of China, it proved to be a fantasy to talk about a united communist drive against the capitalist world. In a Europe under *detente* – a concept feasible in so far as it signifies the recognition of the *status-quo*, i. e. the post-war frontiers in Europe – it would be a naivety of utmost degree to formulate the foreign policy of a European country on the premise of a possible aggression in Europe. Factors leading to *detente* could partly be attributed to the strength and determination of NATO, as the proponents of this organization tend to indicate very often. But, whatever the case may be, it is still true to state that international relations in the 1950's are not the same as in the 1970's and cold war politics is not the same as *detente* politics. This transformation can be attributed to the technological developments in the armaments industry, which, in turn, necessitated radical changes in the U. S. strategic thinking. This change, together with the changes discussed above, help clarify the U. S. attitude toward Turkey, especially after the Cyprus operation of 1974, an attitude which today is considered by the Turkish authorities as "incomprehensible" and "not worthy of an ally."

The forces responsible for the maintenance of the essence of the Truman Doctrine and factors effective on Turkey's admission to NATO have succumbed to the grinding effects of change and this change points toward one direction: a new "rocking and revolving chair" for Turkey in the international system beside a window with a broader perspective.

IV

From the viewpoint of the U. S. strategy, NATO was established on four basic and important factors in the early 1950's:

nuclear monopoly of the U. S., the need of the U. S. for bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union; economic weakness of the Western European countries; and the stiffness of the Stalinist tactics.¹¹ Now, let us elaborate on the first two factors, which are closely related to the topic under discussion.

At the time of its establishment, the Atlantic Alliance was not a matter of choice for the countries of Western Europe, but the political, military and economic precondition for their survival as independent national states. One of the preconditions was the "protective umbrella" which the nuclear monopoly of the U. S. provided for Western Europe.¹² This nuclear umbrella would secure their defence like a "magic stick" without the need for maintaining large armies and would thus help them overcome their pressing economic difficulties. Although the explosion of the first Soviet atom bomb in 1949 had far-reaching consequences, it did not create a sudden change in the U. S. strategic thinking due to the fact that the Soviet Union lacked, at that time, necessary long-range delivery means for using it against the West. Consequently, "massive retaliation" became the official strategy of NATO.¹³ In short, "massive retaliation" called for total nuclear response directed toward the important population and industrial centres inside the Soviet Union in case of a communist attack to the North Atlantic Region. This strategy has suited perfectly to the Turkish defence and economic requirements. The Soviet launching of the *Sputnik* in 1957, however, brought increased priority for "massive retaliation" and transformed the delivery system from aircraft to missiles.¹⁴ Pending the time when the U. S. produced her own ICBM's, the American retaliatory capacity had to rely on the IRBM's. But, IRBM's were of no value unless they could be brought close to the Soviet territory, namely to the territories of America's allies in the Near East. The direct result of this consideration was the mounting of Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory in 1959.

11 Morgenthau, "Russian Technology...", *op. cit.*, p. 134.

12 Morgenthau, *A New Policy...*, p. 4.

13 See, Albert Lagault, *Deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance*, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966, pp. 32-71.

14 For the effects of *Sputnik* on Western strategy, see Denis Healey, "The *Sputnik* and the Western Defence," *International Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (April 1958), pp. 145-156.

Thus, the forces of continuity in Turkish-American relations were greatly augmented.

This interdependence among the allies, brought about by the advancements in weapons technology, also signaled the completion of the "honeymoon" period between the U. S. and the other NATO member countries in general and Turkey in particular. In the early 1960's the conditions changed. The offensive strategic forces cancelled each other out, and a "logical conclusion was reached in the paralysis of thermo-nuclear weapons."¹⁵ This logical conclusion was the new official strategy for NATO devised by the U. S., which clearly reflected the changes inherent in the international system. The "balance of terror" resting at the peak of the missile race necessitated a new formula that would minimize the risk of total annihilation on the part of the U. S. and the Soviet Union. The new formula, the so-called "flexible response" called first for a "gradual" or "controlled" response. The stabilization of a conventional or nuclear war at its inception by such a response would insure the U. S. and the Soviet Union a "pause" (a frequently used concept in the jargon of flexible response) which, in turn, would give time to calm down and even to bargain over the heads of the other "interested" parties. The U. S. and the Soviet Union had no interest whatsoever now in launching against each other a war which inevitably would be fatal for both of them.¹⁶ But the "pause" could be fatal for the NATO flank countries, like Turkey, which would experience the damaging effects of the first strike.

One of the preconditions for a harmonious relationship inside NATO was the protective umbrella which the nuclear monopoly of the U. S. ensured. Now, the transformation of that monopoly into a "bipolar relationship of mutual deterrence"¹⁷ was bound to change the whole character of relations between the U. S. and Turkey. Among other factors, this change in the U. S. attitude explains why President Johnson felt free to write the following lines in the event of a Turkish intervention in Cyprus (letter addressed to the Turkish Prime Minister on June 5, 1964):

15 Legault, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

17 Morgenthau, *loc. cit.*, p. 4.

"... A military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies..."

President Johnson was acting in conformity with the spirit of the new strategy. A regional conflict could escalate to a nuclear clash which would jeopardize the security and vital interests of the U. S. But, for Turkey, the sum total of the American threat was that Turkey was required to consult to the U. S. in advance of any action in international politics, and that her NATO allies might not come to her aid if Turkey was attacked by the Soviet Union. What sort of a security Turkey was supposed to have in an alliance which would remain passive in case of an attack by one of its primary enemies on the "staunchest ally?" One of the most important forces of continuity in the relations between the U. S. and Turkey had changed. The nuclear monopoly of the U. S. was not and is not there.

V

Turkey, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty and bilateral agreements with the U. S., gave permission for the construction of the most developed air bases and radar installations on her territory. These bases and installations were very close to the Soviet Union and were used by a variety of aircrafts, including strategic heavy bombers. Especially in the pre-missile period, these bases gave to the U. S. Strategic Air Force the capability of delivering nuclear weapons to the important targets within the Soviet Union with long-range bombers, and this enabled the U. S. to have a second-strike capacity in case of a surprise attack. Thus, the central and southern regions of the Soviet Union, which harbour vital industrial centres and military installations, were brought into the striking distance of the USAF. In the missile age, the American Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory, also gave the U. S. the possibility of counter-balancing the Soviet ICBM's. In short, these

bases and missile sites proved to be advantageous to the U.S. in the maintenance of her strategic superiority over the Soviet Union and became one of the most important factors effective in the continuity of Turkish-American relations.

We have already noted how, following the 1960's, the developments in strategic weapons technology had changed the whole basis of relations between the two super powers, and how this change affected the American and consequently NATO's strategy *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union. It is an accepted idea today that the U. S. would use nuclear weapons only if her vital interests were at stake, but in other cases, like the defence of south-eastern Europe, conventional weapons would be employed. These developments were bound to change the nature of relations not only between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, but also between the U. S. and Turkey so far as the importance of the air bases are concerned. Moreover, recent and rapid developments witnessed in the Soviet Union and especially in the U. S. of weapons locating and destroying nuclear submarines simultaneously, will necessarily raise the nuclear balance to a different level. Consequently, the completion of such a sonar system, of long-range, submarine launched missiles with atomic war-heads, and of cruise missiles will further reduce the importance of air bases in the Near East. Especially the cruise missile's relatively small size would enable it to be launched from numerous platforms, including aircraft, naval vessels, and mobile ground launchers. It could undertake long-range missions from the mainland, air space or sea surrounding Western Europe, and thus minimize the importance of platforms in the vicinity of the Soviet Union.¹⁸

The American air bases in Turkey have lost their importance as striking sites in the defence of vital American interests *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union. Thus, their closing down as a counter-measure against the arms embargo would not much affect the American defence policy. This is exactly the reason why the U. S. placed an arms embargo on Turkey with impunity immediately following the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, without elaborating on the risk of their closing down by the Turkish government.

18 For the details of the cruise missile, see: Richard Burt, "Arms Control and the Cruise Missile," *Washington Post*, 9 November 1975.

This action of placing arms embargo on a "staunch" ally, unique in the history of international relations, altered another factor which had a bearing on the continuity in Turkish- American relations. The effects of the forces of change was again dominant.

The radar installations, however, are maintaining their importance at least for the time being, if not for a long time to come. These installations have a trifold task: the spying on the Soviet missile installations, the examination of whether the Soviets stick to the agreement on the limitation of nuclear weapons, and the determination of the quality and quantity of the arms which the Soviet Union sends to some of the Middle East countries such as Syria and Iraq. Pending the time when the spy satellites circling in outer space replace the ground installations (according to American specialists this will not be before 1990) the radar installations in Turkey were supposed to continue their activity. Now, after the Turkish government has taken over these installations, the U. S. is deprived of her "ears" in the vicinity of Soviet territory. In order to regain the control of radar installations, it becomes a necessity to keep Turkish-American relations at a certain level. This, together with Turkey's location in the Middle East, explains the recent endeavours of the American government to ease the embargo for the purpose of calming down the anxieties of the Turkish government.

In view of these considerations, it will not be a mistake to assert that, from the American point of view, the forces of continuity in Turkish-American relations are reduced to the maintenance of the radar installations, and Turkey's role in the Middle East. To follow a policy which would lead to a total break with Turkey is not in the interests of the U. S., because it will be a reverse development to draw the enmity of a country, desirous of closing ranks with the countries of the Middle East, where the U. S. has deep-rooted economic and political interests. It must also be remembered that Turkey, with a population of 40 million, has the most powerful and disciplined army in the Middle East. She has shown this power and determination in the Cyprus intervention. Big powers, having deep-rooted interests in the region, and following policies based on broad

perspectives and long-term considerations, would evaluate the steady strengthening of Turkey in the region with awesome anxiety. From their viewpoint, while necessary measures are being taken to hinder such a process, big-power policy should be pursued in such a manner that would keep some of the control mechanisms intact. Such an approach to Turkish-American relations removes the clouding veil from the superficially maintained contradiction between the legislative and executive branches of the American government: the Congress trying to maintain, and the executive trying to ease the embargo.

The forces of continuity in Turkish-American relations have changed, are changing and will continue to change. What is important for the U. S., in the last analysis, is the relative value of Turkey within the framework of the U. S. strategic thinking. The ever-changing strategic balance and developments in weapons technology lowered Turkey's strategic importance to such a level that the nature of the relations between the two countries has changed in due course. On this basis, the U. S. has brought the relationship to a point of stalemate. It is, of course, true that the super powers always try to force the international system to a point where their national interests can best be preserved and furthered, and that they have been successful in this attempt so far, as the study of Turkish-American relations indicates. But, it is equally true that the lesser powers have attained an unprecedented freedom of action in a world where there is a "balance of terror", in which the super powers are anxious not to escalate regional conflicts and discords to a nuclear level. Turkey's likely efforts toward re-establishing intimate and close relations of the 1950's, irrespective of the forces of change, is bound to fail. The embargo of 1975, must be a starting-point in the act of freeing Turkish foreign policy from the dominant influence of the U. S. Turkey must also be freed from a position of serving the strategic interest of any super power. The re-evaluation of the whole basis of Turkish foreign policy is long overdue. A "rocking and revolving chair" facing all directions is a better place than a fixed one facing only West.