

THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF THE CONFLICT THEORY

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Introduction

Much has been written about the United Nations peace-keeping activities, in general, and about the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), in particular, and the story of how the system of peace-keeping operations was gradually built up has been expounded by many writers.¹ We do not propose to go over all the ground, previously covered. Our purpose is to look at the actions of UNFICYP in the light of the recent conceptualizations of conflict theory.²

The United Nations Force in Cyprus is the most recent and the most developed experiment of the Organization. Like its predecessors, UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East) and ONUC (United Nations Force in the Congo), UNFICYP is a pragmatic achievement. It was set up on an *ad hoc* basis. It serves under the authority of the United Nations Sec-

1 See, for instance, Albert Legault, *Peace-Keeping Operations Bibliography*, Paris: International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations, 1967; D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces*, London: Stevens, 1964; Finn Seyersted, *United Nations Forces*, Leyden: Sijthof, 1966; James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, Ohio State University Press, 1968; A. L. Karaosmanoğlu, *Les actions militaires coercitives et non coercitives des Nations Unies*, Genève: Droz, 1970.

2 Traditionally, the discipline of international relations has tended to place its emphasis on historical and normative approaches. In recent years, however, an increasing number of American and European scholars, based on empirical social science research, have formulated general propositions about the phenomenon of international conflict, and developed measures of control. The key studies on this issue have been recently published in Clagett G. Smith, *Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Further discussions of these issues will be encountered in the following sections of this paper.

retary-General. Its purpose is to restore order and normality. Its guiding principle is to remain neutral and not to fire unless fired upon. In very general terms, it is a means of persuasion rather than an instrument of enforcement. It, however, differs from its predecessors in that it is functionally and organizationally much more developed and it utilizes a much wider range of more refined methods for dealing with the conflict. UNFICYP constitutes an important new element introduced into the social context of the Cyprus conflict.³ The presence of such a disinterested or neutral actor affects undoubtedly the interactions of the opposing parties. In this paper, we are particularly concerned with the effect of this third party on the course of the conflict. We will study the actions of UNFICYP from the point of view of the United Nations, and on the basis of the documents of the Organization. It should be mentioned that it is also possible to approach the matter from the point of view of the communities, taking into consideration the intracommunal conflicts as well. But, due to the difficulties of obtaining reliable detailed information on the intracommunal problems, we are induced to place our emphasis on the first approach.

On the other hand, the approach of this study will be mainly social-psychological. It will consider both the social interactions and the psychological variables involved in the Cyprus conflict. Thus we are interested both in the psychological factors introduced into the decision-making processes of the two disputing communities and in the social settings in which the actions take place. Such an approach differs from the classical point of view of political science and history which is mostly concerned with the global description of conflict situations. The application of behavioral science to problems of war and peace unavoidably raises the question of relevance. Nevertheless, we assume that it would be more helpful to pose this question in relative terms.⁴ Then the real problem concerns the kind of relevance that the conflict theory has for international relations in general and for

3 On March 4, 1964, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution (S/5575) providing for the creation of a United Nations Force in Cyprus. The stationing of the Force in Cyprus was recently extended for another period of six months (S/PV. 1683, 12 December 1972).

4 For the question of relevance, see Herbert C. Kelman, *International Behavior*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 565-605.

the Cyprus case in particular. While we are concerned here largely with international and intercommunal relations, most of the principles to be discussed also apply to intrapersonal, interpersonal and other intergroup conflict. We admit that this generalizing character of the conflict theory is highly debatable.⁵ Moreover the reliance on generalizations for predictive purposes is probably nowhere more misleading than in the field of international relations where problems, decisions, behaviors and interactions tend to be interestingly unique and random. Nevertheless, in spite of this warning, the schematic presentation of the theory is valuable because it provides the scholar with concepts which facilitate the analysis and evaluation of situations. In other words, we regard these generalizations as suggestive guidance rather than as established laws, and we will make use of them for heuristic rather than predictive purposes. We believe that this approach will contribute to the comprehension of the conflict-control measures taken by peace-keeping forces, and probably propose some new ground for further discussion.

In the following section of the present study, we attempt to show some characteristics of the case, which are significant from the point of view of our approach. These aspects of the Cyprus conflict are basic to the arguments of this paper and will be presented as the assumptions from which the more specific assertions follow. The second section clarifies the political objectives of the United Nations, and the strategy of the Force as determined by the Security Council and interpreted by the Secretary-General. In the last two and the most important sections, we concentrate on the conflict-control measures taken by UN-FICYP and their effect. We classify, examine and evaluate them on the basis of three different, but interrelated strategies developed in terms of the conflict theory: prevention of escalation, promotion of cooperative process and manipulation of images.

Aspects of the Conflict

I— The structural configuration of the conflict has three important aspects. In the first view, there is a significant intercommunal dispute involved in the Cyprus case. It appears to be

⁵ For an interesting criticism of this aspect of the conflict theory, see Raymond Aron, *Etudes politiques*, Paris: Gallimard, 1972, pp. 382–410.

primarily an internal affair between the two fractions of the same population living under the authority of the same state. But, the intercommunal conflict takes place in the larger framework of the Greco-Turkish relations. The present dispute between the two communities can be regarded as the latest episode in a long struggle between the Greek and the Turkish nations.⁶ For the Turkish Cypriots, their motherland and their protector against Greek domination is Turkey; and for the Greek Cypriots, Greece is their motherland. In the words of Mr. Rauf Denktaş, "the national communal arteries pulsate in the two national centers, Ankara and Athens".⁷ Turkey and Greece, on the other hand, consider the two communities as being the "prolongation" of their respective peoples. For this reason, if the bloody intercommunal struggle were prolonged it might mean a war between Greece and Turkey. Thirdly, Cyprus lies in a sensitive strategic area of world politics. From this point of view, it concerns the relations between the superpowers. Nevertheless, neither of them is fully committed to Athens or Ankara.

So we may conclude that the Cyprus dispute is not only internal, but also international. It is polarized at the sub-system level between Greece and Turkey, having implications in the global international system.⁸

II- The case of Cyprus presents other contradictory aspects. In the first view, it is a realistic conflict which can be characterized by incompatibility of interests and of political ends. The claims of the disputing parties seem to be formulated in precise legal terms (partition against union with Greece; revision of the 1960 Constitution against inadmissibility of such revision; autonomy against majority rule, etc.) But the issues are often dominated by national images and historical attitudes. The traditional hostility between Greek and Turk plays a significant part especially at the intercommunal level. This gives a "non-realistic" character to the conflict.

III- One of the central assumptions of the theory is that conflict is an inevitable aspect of life, and that its pervasiveness

⁶ See Robert Stephens, *Cyprus - A Place of Arms*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, pp. 11-17.

⁷ "Cyprus: on the Threshold of New Talks," *Dış Politika*, 1972 (2), p. 65.

⁸ See Albert Legault, *The Authorization of Peace-Keeping Operations in Terms of the Nature of the Conflict*, Paris: International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations (IPKO), 1968, pp. 10-11.

ceful settlement of dispute. It tries to maintain cease-fires and to provide order while negotiations are being conducted.¹³

In pursuit of these major political purposes, the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964, determined the strategy of UNFICYP. The Force was charged with three tasks. Firstly, the Force was "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting." Secondly, it was asked to "contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order." Thirdly, the Security Council recommended that UNFICYP contribute to "a return to normal conditions." Each of the two communities interpreted these generally phrased tasks according to its own interests.¹⁴ But the Secretary-General rejected the conflicting biased interpretations of the Turkish and Greek communities. The Force has not been used to impose the conceptions of peace, order and normality of one party upon the other. UNFICYP has been employed to "prevent a recurrence of fighting" by interposing the United Nations troops between the two conflicting communities and patiently negotiating to reduce tensions. Secondly, the Secretary-General has preferred to define "law and order" not as the law and order as provided for in the London and Zurich Agreements of 1959 or as understood by the Makarios Government; he has rather described these terms in the quite "general sense of stability", to mean that "the peace-keeping Force should assist in protecting life and property against violence from any source".¹⁵ UNFICYP's third task of contributing to a "return to normal conditions" has been interpreted by the Secretariat of the Organization not in the political or constitutional terms of either of the two communities, but as being the normality in social and economic fields.¹⁶

Conflict - Control Measures

In performance of these tasks, UNFICYP has taken a series of measures. We propose to examine and evaluate them under

13 Dr. Albert Legault, *op. cit.*, p. 5, notes that peace-keeping "has added a new dimension to the traditional diplomatic instruments of negotiation, conciliation and mediation. In a period of tension, the dispatching of an international force to an area of danger can help to stabilize, if not to freeze, an exploding military situation. The whole logic behind this process is to provide the parties to a dispute with an international buffer zone providing a separation which it is hoped they will use to negotiate and work towards a peaceful settlement of their conflict."

14 See James A. Stegenga, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-118.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 119.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 119-120.

suggests that it is not necessarily destructive. In most situations there is the possibility of an outcome of mutual satisfaction for the parties. The question is how to make the conflict productive or how to prevent it from being destructive.⁹ We assume that the Cyprus problem is constituted by such an "impure" conflict—a non-zero sum game, to use a more fashionable term—where there is a mixture of cooperative and competitive interests. Positive outcomes for all parties are possible especially at the level of local intercommunal problems.

The United Nations Policy and the Strategy of the force

The political purpose of the United Nations presence in Cyprus is twofold. Firstly, the Organization aims to localize the conflict. This objective has been inherent in all the peace-keeping operations. In his major exposition of the concept of "preventive diplomacy",¹⁰ the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had highlighted this important aspect of the United Nations peace-keeping. He had described this activity as "the filling of vacuums by the United Nations" designed to obviate the competitive intrusion of the interested powers.¹¹ Thus the United Nations first political objective in Cyprus is to insulate the intercommunal conflict area from the intervention of Greece and Turkey, and so, to avert a possible war between these two nations.

The second major purpose of the Organization is to contribute to the resolution of the conflict by creating on the island an atmosphere of calm and non-violence, —to repeat the words of the Secretary-General U Thant by "creating an atmosphere more favorable to the efforts to achieve a long-term settlement".¹² The objective is to prevent a settlement by force and to encourage one by negotiation. The Force has no capacity for arbitrating or imposing settlement, but it is only an auxiliary means of pea-

⁹ See Morton Deutsch, "Conflict and its Resolution," in Clagett G. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁰ Introduction to the *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 1959-1960*, A / 4390 / Add. 1.

¹¹ See Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares*, New York: Random House, 1964 (3rd ed.), pp. 286-289; and John W. Holmes, "Political and Philosophical Aspects of United Nations Security Forces," in Per Frydenberg, *Peace-Keeping-the Oslo Papers* Norwegian Institute of international affairs, 1964, p. 81-87.

¹² S / 6228, par. 274.

three different headings. Each heading will correspond to a conflict-control strategy elaborated on the basis of the concepts of conflict theory. These strategies are: prevention of escalation, promotion of cooperative process and manipulation of images. It should be noted that they are interdependent and complementary. A measure taken by UNFICYP in coping with the situation may serve two or three of them at the same time. The achievement of one of the strategic goals (for instance the promotion of the cooperative process) may facilitate the realization of the others.

I- *Prevention of Escalation*

The outbreak of hostilities between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in December 1963 created a situation of civil strife which had important implications for international peace and security. Until the intervention of UNFICYP, the peace was maintained by British troops. Although the British succeeded to prevent the escalation of the conflict, the operation was not able to achieve to restore peace completely. When UNFICYP became operational on March 27, 1964, the sporadic skirmishes were continuing to show a strong tendency to intensify and to spread to wider geographic areas. The Cyprus conflict was then (and is still) generally in a *post-hostilities* stage, and the issues were (and are today) being perceived in potentially military terms by both communities.¹⁷

Thus the major objective of UNFICYP is to prevent the resumption of hostilities, and, if hostilities break out, to contain them or terminate them. For this reason, measures taken by the Force are aimed at offsetting factors promoting escalation. There are a number of factors promoting escalation either by favoring resumption of hostilities or by tending to inhibit the termination of resumed hostilities.

1- Measures to prevent resumption of hostilities

a) The Secretary-General's report of the 10th of June 1966 noted that the most important factor contributing to tensions

¹⁷ On the structure of conflict, some useful schemes were recently elaborated by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. See also Quincy Wright, "The Escalation of International Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1965, pp. 434-449.

and the danger of a recurrence of fighting in Cyprus was the armed confrontation that existed around the periphery of a number of "islands" of Turkish Cypriot population.¹⁸

The main Turkish Cypriot enclave was comprising the northern quarters of Nicosia, some of the capital's north-western suburbs and the countryside stretching about twenty kilometers northwards on either side of the Kyrenia road to the outskirts of the town. There were also Turkish strongholds in Famagusta, Larnaca, Louroujina, and on the north-west coast, and in a series of other smaller areas. All these enclaves were circled by fortified positions held by Turkish Cypriot fighters; and they were faced by the similar positions held by Greek fighters.¹⁹

So UNFICYP's major effort has been concentrated on the promotion of the "process of deconfrontation".²⁰ In performance of this function, UNFICYP applies the following tactics:

- Its units are interposed between the antagonistic Greek and Turkish Cypriots who face each other over "no man's lands" sometimes only less than fifty meters wide. This interposition depends on the consent of the both parties, and the Force is not entitled to resort to arms in order to prevent fighting. It is hoped that the mere presence of the United Nations troops will deter each side from initiating hostilities.²¹
- They locate their posts at the strategic points and patrol in sensitive areas in order to observe the cease-fire. The main purpose of the patrols is the collection of information and the preparation of accurate reports.²²
- The Force tries to clarify the arranged cease-fire lines by marking them on the land, and on the maps distributed to Greek, Turkish and UNFICYP commanders.²³
- UNFICYP investigates all shooting incidents. Moreover, both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leadership

18 S / 7350, par. 29.

19 S / 5950 and S / 6102.

20 S / 7350, par. 29.

21 S / 5950 and S / 6228, par. 109.

22 International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations, Document No. 33 (Ireland), pp. 14-16.

23 S / 6102, pars. 155-158.

bring to the attention of the Force any actions which they consider to be a violation of the *status quo*. UNFICYP investigates these complaints in order to prevent either side to gain a unilateral advantage over the other. On this basis, it gives advice or makes requests to one side or the other with a view to restoring the *status quo ante* and easing the tension.²⁴

b) In addition to interposition, UNFICYP also attempts to persuade and negotiate the withdrawal and the disengagement of the opposing armed units. It tries to arrange agreements to increase the width of the "no man's lands" and to eliminate the road barriers, fortifications, and other evidences of the confrontation.²⁵ For instance, a "defortification committee" was set up in the Limassol District.²⁶ This Committee was composed of three members, a UNFICYP officer, a Turkish Cypriot and a Greek Cypriot and was charged with the task of arranging the dismantling of new fortifications.

c) The increasing capacity of the antagonistic armed forces in Cyprus is another important factor tending to promote resumption of hostilities. Each party regards the increasing military capacity of the other as a threat to its security and intensifies its armements. For this reason UNFICYP tries to encourage both sides to decrease the number of their military personnel and to reduce their armements. On the basis of the arrangements agreed upon between the special representative of the Secretary-General and the Makarios government, it inspects periodically the arms and ammunition imported by the Greek Cypriots with a view to ensuring that they are not used.²⁷

d) The freedom of movement on the island was considerably restricted. Turkish Cypriots were denied this freedom in the areas under Greek control; and Greek Cypriots were not allowed to enter the Turkish enclaves. The restoration of the freedom of movement was, according to the Secretary-General, "the first prerequisite for a return to normal conditions".²⁸ Attempts

24 S / 10401, pars. 27-28.

25 S / 5950, pars. 30-36; S / 6102, par. 211; S / 7001 and S / 7191.

26 S / 6228, par. 247.

27 S / 5950, pars. 43-44; S / 8248; S / 8248 / Add. 6; and S / 10564 / Add. 1.

28 S / 7001, par. 106.

have been made to persuade the Makarios government to eliminate the road barriers and to relax the searches. UNFICYP also provides escort services to school children, judges, lawyers, civil servants and farmers to enable them to go about their business. Furthermore it tries to control the irregular Greek Cypriot elements threatening the security of road traffic.²⁹

e) One of the most dangerous and deplorable methods pursued by the opposing communities was the tactic of taking hostages. The Force have always tried hard to discourage this activity and to convince both sides to release the hostages. It has also searched for the missing Cypriots.³⁰

f) Following the events of December 1963, ninety-four villages were partially or completely evacuated by 25.000 Turkish Cypriots who moved to other places of residence. Approximately 21.000 of them were given houses in larger Turkish Cypriot communities, while another 4.000 persons found temporary shelter in refugee camps. These people who fled from their homes (many of them were burned or demolished) because of the fear for their safety, and who were obliged to live in miserable conditions were also a source of tension.³¹ UNFICYP has tried to solve this problem in two ways. Firstly it has tried to achieve arrangements to secure their resettlement. Secondly it has undertaken relief operations; and it has assisted and coordinated the relief operations conducted by the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society of Turkey.³²

g) Another factor of friction was the severe economic restrictions imposed by the Makarios government on the Turkish Community. UNFICYP has tried to remove or ease these restrictions.³³

2) Measures to terminate resumed hostilities

If, despite all these measures, the parties resume hostilities, UNFICYP immediately intervenes to try to obtain a cease-fire

29 S / 5950, par. 105; S / 6102, pars. 43-44 and S / 7191, p. 26. At the end of successful negotiations, on October 26, 1964, the road from Nicosia to Kyrenia was reopened under the control of UNFICYP which secures a safe traffic with the use of convoys and checkpoints (S / 6102 / Add. 1).

30 S / 7350, par. 76 and S / 8286, pars. 85-86.

31 S / 6102, par. 45.

32 S / 6102, par. 58; S / 5950, pars. 197-198 and S / 7969, pars. 146-147.

33 S / 6102 / Add. 2 and 3.

through the diplomatic ways (persuasion and negotiation). In an aide-mémoire presented by the Secretary-General in April 1964³⁴, it is emphasized that the Force should avoid any action designed to influence the military - political balance in Cyprus. UNFICYP has to cooperate with all the parties to the conflict and its soldiers should take no action which is likely to bring them into direct conflict with either community in Cyprus. Consequently the Force can deploy its soldiers in new positions and can interpose them between the clashing elements of the two communities only with the consent of the parties. When hostilities break out, the UNFICYP officers first try to find a solution by negotiating with the local community leaders. If these local efforts prove to be unsuccessful, negotiations are then held in Nicosia at a higher level between the representative of the Secretary-General (or the commander-in-chief of the Force), the Turkish community leader and the Makarios government. Nevertheless, in certain cases, UNFICYP can act without the consent of the parties: It is entitled to act in self-defence and to take measures when specific cease-fire arrangements previously accepted by both communities were violated or about to be violated.³⁵

II- *Promotion of Cooperative Process*

We have noted that there are in the Cyprus conflict, two major types of processes: competitive and cooperative.³⁶ But the orientations of the parties were of course predominantly competitive. The concern of UNFICYP has been to prepare the necessary conditions leading to mutual agreement and mutual satisfaction of the parties rather than the conditions leading to one-sided victory. This implies that the action of the Force should have been designed to elicit the cooperative process, while obviating the competitive one. The measures taken to prevent escalation have also helped to moderate the competitive process. But has UNFICYP tried to promote the cooperative process?

34 S / 5653.

35 S / 6228, pp. 32-34; S / 7418. See also Kjell Goldmann, *Peace-Keeping and Self-Defence*, Publication of the International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations, Paris, 1968, pp. 45-46.

36 The social-psychological differences between a competitive and cooperative process are described in detail by Morton Deutsch, "A Theory of Cooperation and Competition", *Human Relations*, 1949 (2), pp. 129-151.

Before answering that question we wish to explain briefly the essential elements of the two processes. Firstly it should be noted that this matter is closely related to the problem of perception, trust and suspicion.³⁷ The initiation of cooperation requires a climate of mutual trust.³⁸ On the other hand, a cooperative process leads to trusting and trustworthy behavior, tending to increase sensitivity to similarities and common interests. It stimulates a convergence of beliefs and values.³⁹ Contrarily a competitive process leads to a suspicious attitude tending to increase sensitivity to differences and threats. Due to their significance, the problems raised by perception will be discussed in a separate section.

So we pass to the second important element which is communication. A cooperative process is characterized by honest communication between the parties, while a competitive process is dominated by either lack of communication or misleading communication. It should be mentioned that there is also a close interrelationship between communication and perception. Trust and cooperation increases as a function of communication. One way of eliciting a cooperative process is then to attempt to induce the required communication patterns.⁴⁰

Thirdly, in a cooperative process, the participants are led to feel that the welfare of each other is of their common concern. They consider their conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved by common effort, whereas in a competitive process each party seeks to impose its own solution.⁴¹

We turn now to the actions of UNFICYP which are taken to elicit cooperative process.

1) One of the primary activities of the Force is to provide the opposing communities with useful communication patterns.

37 See Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1958, pp. 265-279; and "Conflict and its Resolution," in Clagett G. Smith (ed.), *Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Science*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971, p. 39.

38 Morton Deutsch, "The Effect of Motivational Orientation upon Trust and Suspicion," *Human Relations*, 1960, p. 124.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 138, and Morton Deutsch, "Conflict and its Resolution," p. 39.

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40, and Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," pp. 274-275.

41 Morton Deutsch, "Conflict and its Resoluion," pp. 39-40.

a) UNFICYP contributes to the solution of some political, social and economic problems of the island by serving as "the link and channel of communication between two communities which arbitrarily and irrationally have cut themselves off from normal communication with one another."⁴² For instance, the first communication between Vice-President Küçük and President Makarios since the outbreak of hostilities in December 1963, was established through UNFICYP officers.⁴³

b) UNFICYP is not only a simple channel of communication. It also acts as a mediator. It determines the important intercommunal problems in social, economic and judicial areas which require mutual effort for solution. These problems with possible alternative solutions elaborated by UNFICYP technicians are then brought to the attention of both communities. The views of the Greek community (or the Turkish community) are ascertained and communicated to the Turkish community (or the Greek community) whose reactions are transmitted back to the other community.⁴⁴

c) The Force has set up a "Political Liaison Committee" which continues to meet every two weeks. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, and three other functionaries of the Force (the Senior Political Adviser, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer) meet separately with liaison officers representing the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with a view to determining and classifying specific current intercommunal problems.⁴⁵

d) UNFICYP arranges meetings between the local leaders of the opposing communities. They come together in the presence of a representative of the Force to discuss and solve their local problems. For instance, in the Summer of 1967, UNFICYP persuaded the *Muhtars* (official village leaders) of the District of Paphos to meet periodically. During August and September, the *Muhtars* held eighteen meetings in which they discussed the problem of free passage through their villages and the security of agricultural workers.⁴⁶

42 S / 6102, par. 238.

43 James A. Stegenga, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 139 and S / 6228, pars. 174-181.

45 S / 10664, par. 16.

46 S / 8286.

Another illustration of such meetings is the "Defortification Committee" in the Limassol District, consisting of a UNFICYP officer, a local Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot official.⁴⁷

e) The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) maintains close liaison with the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot police elements. This link of communication facilitates considerably the investigation of criminal matters of an intercommunal nature.⁴⁸

2) UNFICYP tries to convince the both communities that the problems in political, social and economic fields are mutual, and can only be solved by collaborative effort.

Apart from the unsuccessful attempts to reintegrate the Turkish Cypriot civil servants into the central administration, the Force has tried to get the public services functioning regularly. For example, it has made useful efforts to secure the restoration of normal telephone, electric and postal services. It has attempted to re-establish the normal judicial system, and made arrangements to reopen closed schools.⁴⁹

Moreover, attempts are made to get Cypriot economic activity back to normal conditions. The Force makes considerable and partially successful efforts to persuade the parties to restore normal traffic patterns, agriculture, industry and trade. It arranges meetings of Cypriot businessmen and farmers.⁵⁰

III. *Manipulation of Images*

The gap between perception and reality has always preoccupied philosophers, and some social scientists have developed the concept of "image". The discipline of international relations has borrowed it to discuss the psychological variables involved in the foreign policy decision-making. Distorted images and misperceptions are not only a feature of interpersonal and other domestic social conflicts, but also an element of international conflict. A nation (or a community) responds not only to the "objective" reality, but also to its image of the situation. The nation's subsequent action is then determined by the meaning

47 S / 6228, par. 247.

48 S / 10401, pars. 40-41; S / 10664, pars. 37-40. See also International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations, Document No. 27 (Denmark).

49 S / 6102, pp. 35-36; S / 5764, par. 33; S / 7611, par. 145; S / 6228, par. 183.

50 S / 5950, pars. 147-164; S / 6102, pars. 83-89.

ascribed to the situation. For example, its image of the hostility of another, not the "objective" hostility, which determines the reaction.⁵¹ So the perception of the situation by the decision-making authority is a very important variable in determining willingness to escalate or cooperate. Images in one nation produce behaviors that affect images in another nation, which in turn produce actions that alter images in the first. The perception of threat by one of the opposing nations may produce a progressively deepening sense of threat in all the parties to the conflict. This "circular process" is also valid for benevolent images and cooperation.⁵²

Since the misperception is a basic element of conflict, it follows that manipulation of images is a very important conflict-control strategy. The clarification of the signals of an opponent may produce favorable responses, reduce the chances of further negative cues, induce conflict reduction, and perhaps promote cooperation. Consequently, effective communication plays a major role in the alteration of images. It is also important to note that the communication process is considerably influenced by some important factors. The impact of the new information depends, for instance, upon the degree to which the belief system is "open" or "closed", and the images are flexible or inflexible.⁵³ This factor is especially significant in international relations where belief systems are mostly "closed", and images inflexible. So the basic problem of persuasive communication emerges as the manipulation of the factors helping to reduce resistance and increasing the chances of modifying images.⁵⁴

Two kinds of image are particularly important as far as international behavior is concerned. Firstly, decision-makers and

51 See Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1959, pp. 120-131; Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, pp. 244-246; and "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in Farrell and Smith, *Image and Reality in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, pp. 16-39; K. E. Boulding, *The Image*, University of Michigan Press, 1956.

52 See Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," in Herbert C. Kelman, *op. cit.*, pp. 396 and 420.

53 See Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," p. 19; and William D. Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics*, Chicago: Markham, 1971, p. 38.

54 See I. L. Janis and M. B. Smith, "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-235.

citizens try to predict the future action of the other nations. The perception that another nation is threatening the attainment of a goal leads to the adoption of defensive measures, which, in turn, are seen as an evidence of threat by the other nation. Secondly, Distrust is also a basic perception of another nation, and may underlie threat perception. So, distrust and threat perception are often related. Distrust reinforces the image of threat. Conversely, perception of threat from another nation produces distrust.⁵⁵

The Cypriot communities have most rigid images about the character and intentions of their opponents. History, their past experience and judgements confirm and reinforce their attitudes. They tend to increase the intensity and frequency of their negative signals by making more visible their areas of incompatibility. Their real differences are exacerbated by their nationalistic ideologies. What is the role of UNFICYP in such a climate where issues are dominated by negative perceptions? What measures does it take to manipulate the images of the opposing communities?

1) As a link of communication and a source of information, UNFICYP tries to contribute to the reduction of the intensity and frequency of misperceptions and of negative images. The neutral position of the Force and the relative prestige of its soldiers are factors augmenting the changes of modifying images of both communities.

UNFICYP refrains from being directly involved in major political issues. Instead of dealing with highly polemical problems, it prefers subsidiary issues, such as public services, reopening of schools, safety of agricultural workers, etc., on which relatively low resistance can be expected. Even when it copes with the military situation (fortification, armements, confrontation, etc.), its messages carefully avoid any reference to the basic political differences. This moderates the resistance of the parties to the communication.⁵⁶

Furthermore, the Force tries to influence the impact of events (of negative signals) by means of *preparatory communica-*

55 See Dean G. Pruitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 393-399.

56 See Irving L. Janis and M. B. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 213, who call this tactic of minimizing resistance to persuasive communication "the use of side attacks".

tion. This action is designed to diminish the psychological effects of subsequent events on the community in question. "The level of fear evoked by a threatening news event will tend to be reduced if the audience has been previously exposed to preparatory communication that discuss and predict it in advance".⁵⁷ For example, UNFICYP informs the communities in advance of the field exercises of each other's armed elements. It also informs the Turkish Cypriots about the police patrols to be carried out in sensitive areas by the Greek authorities.⁵⁸

2) The threat perception can be defined as the anticipation of frustration from another nation. Two kinds of evidence contribute to the perception of threat: evidence of capability to do harm and evidence of intent to do it. Both must be present before another nation is regarded as a threat.⁵⁹ In Cyprus, the mutual perceptions of the parties to the conflict are continuously dominated by these two kinds of evidence.

The evidence of capability of the parties is constituted by the following facts: armements of the opposing communities, importation of arms (including armoured cars) by the Greek Cypriots, continuous increase in the number of the armed elements of the both communities, training activity and parades organized by these elements, their fortified positions and road barriers, police patrols carried out by the Greek Cypriots, military aid coming from Greece and Turkey, the possibility of the military intervention of Turkey, etc.

All these factors also contribute to the formation of the evidence of intent.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the actions and statements of both communities are a major source of information about their intentions. The occasional Greek Cypriot armed attacks, the frustration of the agricultural workers, the actions and statements of the extremist Greek Cypriots, the claims for *Enosis*, the severe economic restrictions imposed upon the Turkish community, the Greek Cypriots' claim that the Turks must submit to the authority of the Makarios government, and the Turkish

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

⁵⁸ S / 10664, pars. 21 and 41; and S / 10401, par. 33.

⁵⁹ Dean G. Pruitt, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 402: "In addition to the direct part it plays in threat perception, capability is often regarded as a clue to intent."

Cypriots' insistence on maintaining the *de facto* partition of the Island are some of the factors which constitute the bases for inferring threatening intent.

It has been shown in the preceding paragraphs that UNFICYP takes measures to counteract some of these important factors increasing tension. We remind, among others, the effort of the Force to ease the economic blockade, to control the importation and use of armements, to clarify the intentions of the parties by establishing an effective link of communication and by playing the role of intermediary between the conflicting communities.

Appraisal and conclusions

UNFICYP has undoubtedly made a successful work in preventing the escalation of the communal war. It has controlled and stopped the shooting incidents, arranged and maintained cease-fires. It is certain that its simple presence and timely action has reduced the level of violence and saved a considerable number of lives. But it has not been possible to make progress in the matter of deconfrontation; the Greek Cypriot armed elements and the Turkish Cypriot fighters have continued to stand face to face in sensitive areas.⁶¹ UNFICYP is neither authorized to disarm the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and to demolish fortifications, nor able to persuade them to do so. Thus the opposing parties continue to perceive the issues of the conflict in military terms. In other word, the escalation has been prevented; but the "de-escalation" has not been realized.

UNFICYP's success in the promotion of cooperative process has been even more limited. Although it deserves some credit for the relative improvement of daily life and freedom of movement through effective communication and persuasion, there has been little to indicate a reversal in the trend towards separate development of the economies of the two communities. Each side continues to maintain its own planning office and there is still a complete lack of contact between them.⁶² There has also been very little progress in the normalization of public services and in the solution of the problem of Turkish Cypriot refugees.⁶³

61 S/10664, par. 73.

62 S/10401, par. 47.

63 S/10401, pars. 54 and 60; S/10664, par. 43.

The Cypriot society is far from being reintegrated. Each community lives its own life under its own administration.

It has been emphasized that cooperation and "de-escalation" are closely related to and even dominated by the problem of images. The achievements of UNFICYP in these fields are constrained by the degree of reasonableness and responsiveness of the two communities and their leaderships. Moreover, reasonableness and responsiveness are psychological elements that depend on the threat perception of both communities. We have seen that some of the measures taken by the force were designed to alter the threatening image of the parties. But these measures have not been successful at all. The perception of threat is based partly on evidence and partly on predispositions that affect the interpretation of evidence. Predispositions to perceive threat, in turn, originate in emotional states, attitudes of distrust and past experience.⁶⁴ UNFICYP has not been able to manipulate these deeply rooted psychological factors, because it was neither prepared nor equipped to do that, and there is no evidence that this problem has been identified and treated scientifically by UNFICYP. In his report of the 26th of May 1972, the Secretary General remarks pessimistically that "the distrust and suspicion which have divided the two communities remain strong, and any action by one side which may be considered as provocative by the other may all too easily lead to a crisis with unforeseeable consequences".⁶⁵

Then what can a United Nations Force do to deal effectively with images held by the parties to a conflict? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless it may be noted that the communication patterns established by UNFICYP have proved to be relatively useful in promoting the cooperative process. The United Nations Secretariat may probably focus its attention on this problem, and try to develop some new communication techniques in the light of the Cyprus experience. For instance, it seems that it is also important to provide "the parties with insights into their own behavior" by introducing into discussion new information "about conflict, its origins

⁶⁴ Dean G. Pruitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-401.

⁶⁵ S/10664, par. 76.

and processes drawn from theoretical analyses and empirical studies".⁶⁶

A specialist on the peace-keeping operations defines humorously the ideal peace force soldier as "a Scandinavian farm boy who had gone to the city, quit medical school, and spent a few years as a construction worker before becoming a labor union negotiator".⁶⁷ It, however, seems that the poor boy is also supposed to be a learned psychologist.

66 John W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication*, New York: The Free Press, 1969, p. 157.

67 James A. Stegenga, *op. cit.*, p. 147.