

NATO AND TURKEY AN OVERALL APPRAISAL

Mehmet GÖNLÜBOL

I

From the end of the Second World War until the 1970's, Turkey was confronted with two major foreign policy issues of direct relevance to her vital interests. First, immediately following the Second World War in 1945, the Soviet Union exerted pressure on Turkey for territory. The Soviet claims on Turkey disclosed during a series of meetings held among the Allies to reorganize the post-war world, or, in better terms, to divide war spoils, became eventually subject to an exchange of notes between Turkey on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain on the other. As is well known, Soviet claims comprised a suggestion to revise the Montreux Convention of 1936, governing the right of passage through the Turkish Straits, in order to obtain bases on the Straits, as well as demands to annex some of the eastern provinces of Turkey, and ultimately to induce a change in the existing political regime of the country. This episode led Turkey to abandon overnight her policy of *de facto* neutrality maintained since the beginning of the Second World War, and to seek stronger and closer ties with the West, and particularly with the United States. The relations between Turkey and the U.S.A., which originally took the form of foreign aid extended under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan eventually resulted in Turkey's membership in NATO in 1952.

The second most important foreign policy issue facing Turkey in the period mentioned was Cyprus. The problem of Cyprus was first posed as an international issue by Greece in 1954-55, in the United Nations. The three countries directly involved in the issue - Turkey, Greece and Great Britain - finally found

a solution to the problem by granting conditional independence to Cyprus through the London and Zurich Agreements of 1959 and the Nicosia Treaties of 1960. Relative tranquillity dominated the Cyprus scene until December 1963. At that date President Makarios violated unilaterally and openly the provisions of the above-mentioned agreements and treaties with the intention of changing the status of the Republic of Cyprus totally to the advantage of the Greek community. The action of Archbishop Makarios was reflected in turn in the relations between Turkey and Greece. These relations rapidly deteriorated, while new and serious conflicts unresolved to this day arose. The Cyprus issue which caused repeatedly armed conflicts in the interior of the island produced also some very important side-effects in Turkey proper. One of these, and probably the most important effect was the sudden expansion and intensification of a recent anti-Western feeling, which was followed soon by explicit demand on the part of certain circles that Turkey pursue a "neutral" foreign policy, to be proven by the withdrawal from NATO.

In short, while the Soviet demands in 1945-46 brought Turkey into NATO, the Cyprus issue created antagonism to Turkey's membership in NATO, and even resuscitated hostile attitudes in some circles toward the same organization.

The impact of the Soviet demands on Turkish public opinion in 1945-46 was so violent and continuous that even the reluctant admission of Turkey into NATO, in 1952, after prolonged, and at times seemingly hopeless endeavours and diplomatic manouvers, was acclaimed by the Government and the opposition as a great foreign policy victory. From the time marking Turkey's admission into NATO until the beginning of the 1960's, there was practically no reaction in the country against this organization. On the contrary, NATO was praised and exalted in Turkish political circles to such an extent that it was not deemed necessary or even possible to think of a Turkish defence policy outside of this alliance. Some circles in Turkey found the activities of the American information and propaganda agencies in Turkey aimed at "acquainting the Turkish public with NATO" as completely unnecessary on the ground that "these could cause harm rather than sympathy since there existed no anti-NATO feelings in Turkey."

This positive attitude towards NATO continued even after the National Unity Committee came to power through the military revolution of 1960. It remained in power one year and a half. Indeed, the revolutionary government, in one of its first public declarations, reaffirmed Turkey's allegiance to NATO and CENTO. The reasons that prompted these declarations of fidelity cannot be explained solely in terms of Turkey's real and enthusiastic attachment to NATO. Among the underlying considerations that led the military to this declaration were the following: the persistence of a feeling of insecurity towards the Soviet Union as a result of the negative attitude of the Russians towards various foreign policy issues concerning Turkey, despite the time lapsed since the Soviet territorial demands in 1946 and the public renunciation by the new Soviet leaders of the same demands; a strong yearning towards Westernization, a yearning turned into tradition since the time of Atatürk. This yearning, especially prevalent among the military, was regarded often almost as synonymous with cooperation of any kind with the West. Furthermore, there was the conviction that a strong and disciplined army could be maintained best only through American aid. There was anxiety over the possibility of withdrawal of Western assistance in reaction to a negative Turkish stand on NATO. Such an action could have deteriorated further the economy which was expected to enter a period of stagnation as a consequence of the Revolution of 1960, and thus accerbate internal tensions. Finally the military government feared losing the confidence and support of the West as a result of an all-out attack on NATO and did not want to jeopardize its own survival from the very start. Nevertheless criticism and objections concerning the foreign policy in general, and NATO in particular were first heard after 1961. The military government, remaining faithful to its original promise, produced a liberal constitution, and ultimately yielded its powers to a popularly elected civilian government in 1961. The liberal constitution of 1961 allowed leftist ideas which until then had never been expressed in complete freedom to circulate freely. Works by many socialist leaders and writers including those by Marx and Lenin, were translated, and the Turkish domestic and foreign policies were reinterpreted in light of these "new" doctrines. The radical leftists, inspired by Lenin's ideas, used the terms "capitalism" and "imperialism"

interchangeably and asserted that the capitalists would inevitably turn into imperialists. Eventually their foreign policy criticism zeroed in on American attitudes toward Turkey, and against NATO. In the opinion of these circles, NATO was the major instrument of American imperialism in the world. Consequently Turkey had no choice but to free herself from NATO, if she wanted to achieve real national independence, and join the nonaligned bloc made up of underdeveloped countries like herself.

— However, until 1964, most people considered such criticism a leftist prejudice, since NATO had not until then, given rise to any “concrete” incident harmful to Turkish foreign policy. So these ideas were tolerated since very few paid attention to them.

Most astonishing was the fact that for the first time in the long history of Turkey the government could be criticised openly on its foreign policy, a subject which had been treated as taboo so far. It is true that the First Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Republic that convened during the War of National Independence, under Mustafa Kemal in 1920-22, discussed fully foreign policy issues and leveled criticism to the same.

But from then until the establishment of the multi-party system in 1945, the task of formulating and directing foreign policy lay exclusively within the competence of the Executive. Even after 1945, the discussions on foreign policy did not go beyond the ideological framework of the existing political parties. Indeed the ideology and the social bases of the political parties was so limited as to leave little room for assessing or criticising the Turkish foreign policy with a new outlook. The appearance of ideological views on foreign policy, and the doctrinaire evaluation of world affairs in general and of Turkish stand and behavior in world politics in particular took place only after 1961 as a result of a wide range of freedoms, granted by the Constitution.

Therefore, by the time clashes between Turks and Greeks broke out in Cyprus in December 1963, unorthodox views falling counter to those promoted by the government as well as an ideological reassessment of Turkish foreign policy had lost much of their taboo character. Several developments coincided to make the Cyprus issue a catalyst of Turkish foreign policy.

First, the Turkish public already very alert, became interested in world politics. The United States involvement in the war in Vietnam increased, while the principle of "peaceful coexistence" propagated by Khrushchev as a pillar of foreign policy back in 1956, at the 20 th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, began to be extensively discussed in Turkey as if it were a brand new political idea. All this led to some public tendency towards a re-evaluation of the Turco-Soviet relations and possibly closer economic ties with "East" European countries. Such economic ties were deemed essential in order to stimulate the economy which had entered a period of stabilization and stagnation as a result of the haphazard economic policies of the Democratic Party. It was under the influence of such internal and external circumstances that the foreign policy views put forth by the radical left found the opportunity to pass an important "test". The Cyprus crisis prepared the ground, in fact necessitated a Turkish intervention on the Island in 1964 in order to defend the Turkish community. The Cyprus problem presented a paradox in itself. Although outside the specific area of interest of the alliance, it involved directly two members of NATO—Greece and Turkey. The Turkish Government, acting on the assumption that the United States was NATO's leading and most powerful member and one of the two super powers which would be affected by any major incident anywhere in the world, informed the U.S. Government of its intention to intervene on the island. The letter sent by President Johnson as answer to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in June 1964 marked the beginning of a change in the Turkish foreign policy. This letter, drafted in the style of a peace agreement dictated to an occupied enemy country, created first utter astonishment and then violent reactions not only among leftist circles, but among the public in general. The letter was an indication of the fact that the image of "Turkey" among the government circles in the United States, contrary to the assumptions generally held until then by Turks and propagated by various media was not a positive one in the least. However, more important and interesting was the section reflecting the American interpretation of NATO. This section of the letter reads:

"I must call your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, to the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention

pg 429

in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in the Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as "literally unthinkable". Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies, nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey would lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies."

The provisions of the 1960 Treaty of Niocosia gave Turkey the right to intervene for the sole purpose of upholding her rights in the Island. But upon the receipt of this letter which arrived shortly before her intended intervention, Turkey abstained from this act. Government officials clearly confirm this fact today.

The section of President Johnson's letter quoted above is important in many respects. First, it indicated that the United States envisaged no enemy for Turkey other than the Soviet Union and believed that Turkey's rights could be violated only by the Soviet Union. Thus if another country, even a member of the NATO violated Turkey's rights and interests, the country should have not resisted such an act, let alone invoke the relevant provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. The NATO interests prevailed over everything else. In other words, to put it more concretely, the American thinking on the Cyprus question was the following: the important problem in the whole Cyprus issue was the protection of peace, or rather, prevention of war between the two allies of NATO. The violation of Turkey's interests in favor of or by another NATO ally, could not be construed to be a cause for war so far as these did not affect the "NATO community" unfavorably vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It appeared in fact clear that the United States would apply utmost "influence" to prevent a war of this type. As a matter of fact President Johnson's intimidating sentence "war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as 'literally unthinkable'", quoted from the speech by Secretary Rusk, was a clear confirmation of this intention.

There is an even more important implication in President Johnson's letter; the United States did not intend to invoke the

NATO mechanism in favor of Turkey, as long as no direct Soviet aggression occurred even though the vital Turkish interests were at stake. As the last sentence of the letter quoted above shows it clearly, the Americans tried to justify their stand by referring to Turkey's obligation to consult her NATO allies in this case. This, then brings several questions to mind. Two of these are of special importance to our discussion. First, under what conditions is an aggression to be regarded as a "direct" one? Second, does the United States seek the approval of its NATO allies when engaging in acts likely to drag them into war? Prime Minister İnönü, in his answer to President Johnson, had the following to say on "direct" aggression:

The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any suggestion against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means this defect in NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance... In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council as early as the stage of the United Nations debate on the problem, i. e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December 1963.

As for Turkey's responsibility to consult the United States on the question of intervention, the Turkish Prime Minister said:

"In the first place, it is being emphasized in your message that we have failed to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days of 1963. From the outset we have taken special care to consult the United States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis on December 25, 1963 we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the other guaranteeing powers only to be answered that the United States was not a party to this issue... (When) Mr. George Ball (visited) Ankara (in February 1964), we informed again the United States of the gravity of the situation... that we might have to intervene at any time."

However, it is clear that contrary to the allegations expressed in President Johnson's letter, the Turkish Government had

informed the United States of the gravity of the situation—a type of behavior not usually exercised by the United States in NATO-only to be told that the latter preferred to stay out of the dispute. What is more important for our specific subject is this: how could one relate the policy of non-involvement pursued by the United States, the strongest power in NATO, to the explicit provision of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty? If the Soviet Union attacked Turkey, without any provocation, can the United States stay out of the conflict although the conflict may not be of direct interest to her.

The reaction to this letter, the text of which had been kept secret for some time and later obtained by a daily newspaper in an unknown way, was so enormous that it pushed the question of Cyprus to the background. At the time the letter was revealed, the leftist circles had made foreign policy issues more popular than ever before. Subsequently these circles which had limited themselves to advocating cooperation between Turkey and other developing, non-aligned countries changed their views and became vehemently anti-American and anti-NATO. Posters with slogans such as “No to NATO”, “American Imperialism”, and “Fully Independent and Truly Democratic Turkey”, became visible in the street demonstrations organized by university students. Walls in major cities and in universities were covered with posters carrying these slogans. Beginning early in 1970, demonstrations were accompanied by bombing of American bases in Turkey and the kidnapping of American personnel. Naturally we do not intend to explain the animosity against America and NATO solely in terms of their particular stand in the Cyprus question. This may be posed differently. Assuming that Turkey had not faced such a problem as Cyprus and the United States had never been involved in it, or assuming that the turn of events there had favored Turkey, one may ask whether animosity against NATO and the United States would have developed at all? Undoubtedly it would have. Paradoxically, the animosity of the radical leftist circles is not, in reality an animosity directed solely against NATO and the United States as an organization and as a state. It is a basic animosity towards “Western capitalism” and the “Western way of living”. Since the most powerful and effective representatives of these concepts in Turkey are the United States and

NATO, these have become the chief targets for attack. In other words, the forces underlying the reasoning of the radical left are ideological and have some public appeal for a variety of complex cultural and social reasons beyond the scope of this paper. Consequently, people with similar ideological aspirations would have seized every opportunity to incite animosity against NATO and the United States and have succeeded, at least partially in their efforts regardless of the Cyprus issue. Yet, we are of the opinion that the Cyprus question and the attitude of the United States on the issue accelerated the development of this animosity and helped its dissemination among the intellectuals and even among the neutral masses at large.

Thus, the American view of NATO that surfaced as a result of the Cyprus problem, affected indirectly the internal development in Turkey, and reactivated and accelerated negative factors of foreign policy. This mutual interaction between domestic and foreign politics, a most natural process certainly, intensified with the help of the communication media and by a rapidly organizing left, brought Turkish political life into a vicious circle from which she has not emerged yet. If one considers the situation objectively, one must admit that some of the criticism related to Turkey's relations with NATO and the United States is justified. But the critics raise also several erroneous objections alongside the justified ones purely on theoretical and ideological grounds, with little respect for the rules of international politics. The switch in policy proposed by the radical left on the issue of Cyprus and related problems provides ample proof to verify the previous statement. These circles displayed a most violent reaction against the United States because she prevented the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1964. But then, they made a complete turnabout, rejecting intervention and the partition of the island that would have followed it by labelling such an act "a trick of Western Imperialists". The Turkish Workers' Party (closed formally in 1971) and the other radical leftist organizations adhere to this view. This switch is a consequence of looking at these developments from an ideological point of view suggested by someone else. We believe that the strength acquired recently by the leftists in Cyprus, and the Soviet Union's anti-partition stand, are among the foremost reasons behind this new ideologically oriented line.

We have tried to summarize briefly the reasons underlying Turkey's desire to enter NATO and the part played by the radical left (and some other segments of public opinion) against NATO. There is one point that needs clarification before proceeding further with more specific and concrete criticism of NATO. In spite of the reaction caused by the Cyprus problem in certain circles against NATO and the United States, and in spite of the anxiety and suspicion displayed by the public, the official circles of Turkey did not revise their original views and attitudes towards NATO. The original attempt to enter NATO was initiated by the People's Republican Party which was in power when the organization was first established in 1949. These efforts were kept alive after the Democratic Party came to power in 1950, and culminated in Turkey's entry into NATO in 1952. During the Democratic Party's tenure in office in 1950-60 there was almost no reaction against NATO, while relations between Turkey and the United States developed at a very rapid pace. Turkey found herself following the policies of the United States almost step by step both within and outside NATO, thus reducing herself to the position of a satellite. The military government which took power in 1960, as mentioned before, brought no important changes in Turkey's relations with NATO except for a change of tone.

Coalition governments headed by the People's Republican Party were in power between 1961 and 1964, that is, during one of the most acute phases of the Cyprus problem. The American attitude on Cyprus and the reaction it created among the youth compelled Prime Minister İnönü, a prudent statesman and a master of foreign policy, to issue the following statement: "A new world order could be set up under created conditions and Turkey would take her place in that world." But all this did not produce any immediate change since the relations between Turkey and the United States were so complex as to necessitate considerable time before any kind of change be effected.

Meanwhile the Justice Party which won the elections in 1965 and 1969 with unchallenged majorities formed the government and stayed in power until the Memorandum of March 12, 1971, delivered by the Armed Forces. The Justice Party's domestic and foreign policies were in essence similar to that of the defunct Democratic Party. However, the national and the international situation during the Justice Party rule entered a process of devel-

opment and change quite different from the one that had prevailed during the Democratic Party. Following the détente between the East and the West, agreement was reached on the partial limitation of nuclear testing, economic relations were improved, and talks on disarmament (SALT) were started. France quit NATO's military organization and Rumania began to follow a more independent foreign policy. These developments were followed by events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the internal conflicts in Poland in 1970.

The Turkish developments in the same period followed in a different direction; that is, into social and political restlessness.

The student movements which started at the end of 1968 brought to the foreground once again alongside domestic issues the foreign policy problems, especially Turkey's relations with NATO. A series of books, dailies and periodicals discussed at length the new strategy of NATO known as "flexible response" its impact on the security of states located on the flanks of NATO, such as Turkey and the "bilateral agreements" concluded between the United States and Turkey within the framework of NATO. These publications although often tainted by sentimental or ideological biases nevertheless shed light on many important points in the relations between Turkey, NATO and the United States, and had considerable impact on the official stand of Turkey on these issues. The Turkish Government, for example, engaged in "normalizing" her relations with the countries in the Eastern Bloc and the Third World, a process initiated in the early 1960's. It also initiated negotiations with the United States in order to reassess the situation pertaining to the "bilateral agreements", a subject of extreme irritation to the Turkish public opinion. Yet, the Turkish Government made no changes in its basic NATO policy and expressed repeatedly the view that there was no need to do so. This situation continued until the resignation of the Demirel Government on March 12, 1971. The new Government was formed by Prime Minister Nihat Erim. A section in the program dedicated to foreign affairs reads as follows:

"We find the strongest external guarantee to our security in our membership in NATO, a defensive organization since the time of its establishment and today. We believe that NATO conforms to our foreign policy objectives (and it is) also a kind of forum where the real conditions of a reliable peace are discussed."

II.

Having reviewed the reasons leading to Turkey's admission into NATO and the ensuing reaction against Turkey's participation in NATO in several circles, we shall now turn to the study of two topics of specific interest for a better understanding of the subject under discussion: Why and how was NATO established? Why and how did the Western states admit Turkey into NATO?

The United States, after toying with the idea of returning to her traditional policy of isolationism, ended up by renouncing it. Eventually she assumed new commitments in several parts of the world in line with the "containment policy". It is clear that the new American policy was adopted to protect freedom in the world, as much as to protect her own national interests which were challenged at the time. Much of this development was the consequence of the Soviet expansionist policy after the war. The weakness of Europe at the time coupled with a certain ephemeral U. S. view on world politics, as though these had changed overnight their age-old nature, brought the Soviets close to achieving the centuries-old policies of Imperial Russia. The Soviet Union imported communism into the Eastern European countries under its occupation and then turned them into satellites.

Indeed, the American hopes to continue the war-time cooperation with the Soviet Union came to a halt in 1947. At this time the Soviet demands began to take on a turn totally contradictory to the political and economic interests of the United States. Neither the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, nor the Mutual Aid Treaty between Britain, France and the Benelux countries, were powerful enough to stop the Soviet expansion. Finally the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Crisis brought developments to a climax.

Meanwhile it became quite clear by the end of the 1940's that the American nuclear monopoly could not hinder Soviet expansion. Moreover, it was not too difficult to foresee that American nuclear monopoly would not last long, that sooner or later the Soviets would produce the atomic bomb and would, thus, create a nuclear balance.

NATO was founded amidst these conditions on April 4, 1949, with the participation of twelve North Atlantic countries, but without Turkey. At this date the Soviet threats on Turkey, though they had quieted down, had neither been completely lifted nor officially renounced. The uncompromising attitude of Britain and that of the United States regarding the Turkish Straits, undoubtedly contributed to this state of affairs. Still, what was most effective in preventing the Soviets from escalating their claims into an armed attack was the stand taken by the Turkish Government not to yield but fight if necessary to the end. The Turkish Army kept mobilized since the end of the Second World War was ready for war.

The Turkish application for membership in NATO in 1949 was rejected despite the fact that she was one of the first countries to receive American aid after the war. The rejection created anxiety throughout the country chiefly because in spite of American aid to Turkey, the Soviet policies continued to remain aggressive as evidenced by a series of incidents. Furthermore, the rejection created considerable anxiety as to the wisdom of carrying on with the policy of Westernization as amended after Atatürk's death. Westernization as a means of modernization was initiated by Atatürk. But the Republican Party in power until 1950, and especially the Democratic Party reinterpreted Westernization to mean intimate cooperation with the "Western" countries at all costs and under all conditions. Thus "Westernization" in this sense became a general philosophy of domestic politics and foreign policy. (This interpretation has survived to this day. As a matter of fact, the program submitted by the government of Prime Minister Nihat Erim to the Parliament on April 2, 1971 reads: "We maintain our close ties of friendship and cooperation with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and understanding. The fact that we differ on certain matters must be regarded as the natural expression of mutual understanding and sincerity between our countries, and as an open indication of their strength, and of the political philosophy of the Western world of which Turkey and the United States are members".) Finally, another reason for the disillusion caused by rejection of Turkey's application for NATO membership was fear of reduction in American aid to Turkey. It was assumed that the establishment of NATO would put an end to Soviet expan-

sionist aims. This proved to be wrong since the Soviets did not officially renounce their claims for territories and bases on the Straits until after Stalin's death.

The reasons precipitating the admission of Turkey into NATO together with Greece in 1952 must be sought first in the Turkish decision to assign a contingent of 5,000 men for the war in Korea in 1950, soon after the United Nations resolution to this effect was passed. This decision and the prowess displayed by the Turkish soldiers on the battlefield gave rise to a belief among American leaders and the public that Turkey would be a rather useful ally in the future. The second reason, connected with the admission was the existence of twenty-two Turkish divisions. The meaning of such a force for NATO was suddenly dramatized by the establishment of a nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the priority regained by conventional armies. It became obvious that the rearmament efforts of Europe, and especially those pertaining to the building up of a conventional force, would not proceed as fast as had been supposed. Finally, the admission of Turkey was achieved after Britain and the Nordic powers withdrew their objections. Initially Britain preferred to keep Turkey out of NATO on the grounds that she would rather have the Middle Eastern countries organized in a common alliance or pact. The commander of the military forces of the alliance in which Britain would be a natural member because of her interest in the region, would be a British general. This, in turn, would give Britain a chance to retain her hold of the Middle East, a region she was supposed to leave shortly. However, once Britain received word that Turkey would play a leading role in the establishment of such a pact if admitted into NATO, England withdrew her objections. After admission into NATO, Turkey fulfilled her promise to Britain by taking a leading part in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. Some of the smaller members of the alliance had objected to Turkish membership because they feared a decrease in the amount of American aid, while others did not wish to risk an armed conflict with the Soviet Union on account of Turkey. Still others did not want Turkey as a member because they did not consider her as "part of the Western civilized world". But all these objections were withdrawn when the United States put her weight on the side of Turkey. Turkey became a member of the organization

when the American proposal was voted for at the meeting of the NATO Council in September 1951, in Ottawa. The Protocol of Entry was signed in February 1952, in Washington.

III

Having summarized under what conditions and how Turkey was admitted into NATO, we shall attempt to determine whether NATO membership was beneficial or harmful to the country, whether any of the criticisms directed against NATO by certain circles in Turkey are justified at all.

As indicated before, the Soviet threat to Turkey was still present when Turkey became a member of NATO. For that matter, one may say that considering Turkey's geographical location she might have suffered the fate of Korea as long as the Soviets remained convinced that their policy of acquiring land or expanding their sphere of influence, initiated after the war, produced dividends. Therefore, it may be appropriate to conclude that the NATO membership has provided Turkey with a much more basic security than the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

Stalin died on March 5, 1953, a year after Turkey's entrance into NATO. His successors, in a note submitted to Turkey on May 30, 1953, declared that they renounced their former claims on the Turkish territories and emphasized their sincere wish to establish ties of friendship within a very short time. Some anti-NATO circles in Turkey claimed that if Turkey had stayed outside NATO, she could have grasped this opportunity to pursue a more flexible policy towards her great neighbor which in turn would have led to an easing of tensions between the two countries. This reasoning, however, goes beyond our imagination. First of all, it was not possible to foresee that Stalin would have died one year after Turkey's admission into NATO, and that the new Soviet leaders would have adopted a different course of foreign policy. Anyway, antagonisms on the international level do not last forever but neither do they dissolve with the first peaceful initiative, but persist for some time to come. One may ask in fact whether the Soviet attempt at rapprochement would have occurred at all if Turkey were not a member of NATO. Therefore,

Turkey's entrance in NATO must be assessed basically as a necessary and a positive foreign policy move.

As for Turkey's comportment, we believe that she made a series of mistakes after her admission. For instance Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 14, 1956, in Moscow in which peaceful coexistence was advocated - was not interpreted by Turks as a symptom and evidence of a real thaw in international relations. This was appreciated only recently. This speech attacked various Soviet domestic and foreign policy decisions of the Stalinist period and seemed to open a new phase in international relations. The Soviets were apprehensive at the time that their attack on Stalinist policies may be reinterpreted as a change of tactics forced by the international atmosphere and the gradual change in the internal Soviet structure. In order to counteract such a charge Khrushchev declared:

"It has been alleged that the Soviet Union advances this principle of peaceful coexistence merely out of tactical considerations, considerations of expediency. Yet it is common knowledge that we always, from the very first years of Soviet Power, stood with equal firmness for peaceful coexistence. Hence it is not a tactical move, but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy... To this day, the enemies of peace allege that the Soviet Union is out to overthrow capitalism in other countries by "exporting" revolution. It goes without saying that among us Communists there are no supporters of capitalism. But this does not at all mean that we have interfered or plan to interfere in the internal affairs of countries where the capitalist order exists... It is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order... (Engaged in) building communism in one country, we are resolutely against war. We have always held and continue to hold that the establishment of a new social system in one or another country is the internal affair of the peoples of the countries concerned..."

Even if only tactical motives lay behind the new moves in Soviet foreign policy, it must be recalled that it is extremely difficult to separate tactics from substance. Tactical changes will, in time, inevitably lead to changes of substance. Anyway, the 20th Party Congress helped thaw somewhat the rigid bi-polarization of the two blocs and gradually gave way to a rapprochement which, paradoxically enough, benefitted by the "balance of terror" resulting from the Soviet launching of the first satellite in 1957, which implied that they had developed intercontinental missiles. However, no matter what the real reasoning was, it was obvious that the Soviet attitude towards the Wes-

tern countries underwent considerable change. The moves for rapprochement were interrupted temporarily by the refusal of Khrushchev to attend the Paris Summit Conference with President Eisenhower in May 1960, as a consequence of the incident caused by a U-2 spy aircraft which had taken off from an American base in Turkey and had been shot down over Soviet territory. The efforts however were resumed after the Sino-Soviet conflict erupted before some 81 Communist parties meeting in Moscow in November-December 1964. Subsequently events that led to a relative easing of tensions between the "East" and the "West" followed in succession. In December 1961, President Kennedy and the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party met in Vienna; on June 25, 1967, President Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin met in Glassborough. A direct telephone line was established between the White House and the Kremlin in order to prevent at the last moment the outbreak of an accidental nuclear conflict between the two blocs. Among the very first concrete examples of these contacts are the partial nuclear test-ban treaty signed in August 1963 and the SALT negotiations presently taking place.

These developments provided Turkey with an opportunity to pursue a more flexible policy towards the Soviet Union. However, Turkey failed to take advantage of the opportunity and followed a policy of blindfolded dependence on the West. Turkey turned herself into an outpost of the West on the Soviet border and remained as such until the middle of the 1960's. Behind the Turkish attitude lie not only ideological motives or security considerations but a variety of internal factors. The economic policy pursued by the government made Turkey increasingly dependent on foreign aid, injecting the reasoning that the more obedient Turkey was in her relations with the United States, the more aid she would receive from the latter. However, this reasoning proved misleading and fallacious, as evidenced by other international examples. For instance, Yugoslavia or Spain have, from time to time, received more direct aid from the United States than Turkey despite firm adherence to their respective ideologies. Indeed, the blindfolded attachment to a rigid policy left Turkey far behind the developments and changes in the world. At a time when classical colonialism was rapidly eliminated, Turkey felt obliged to support the colonial powers

because of the membership in NATO, as fully attested by the UN record of speeches and votes. Furthermore, a considerable number of NATO powers which interpreted the concept of strategic embargo according to their own interests did not hesitate to enter into commercial relations with the Eastern bloc. Turkey was a late-comer and probably lost markets for her goods in this region. A vivid example of her belated response to international developments is her policy with regard to mainland China. Many NATO members chose to recognize this country because of economic and commercial considerations. Turkey, however, hesitated to recognize this country until August 1971, most likely because of the influence of her powerful ally, the United States.

The image of Turkey as an American satellite within NATO in the eyes of the developing countries in general and the neighboring countries on her southern border in particular are among the disadvantages brought about by NATO membership. For instance, after joining NATO, Turkey was used by the Western powers as an instrument to protect their interests in some of the developing countries. She was one of the few states that posed as the spokesman of the West at the Bandung Conference of 1955, and attracted the scorn of all the developing countries. In return for the British support for membership in NATO, Turkey played the major role in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact as part of the "containment" policy of the West. Furthermore, the stand taken by Turkey during the Suez Crisis of 1956 merely because she was a NATO member, despite some apparent support for Egypt, led to a further deterioration in the already poor relations between Turkey and the Arab countries. Finally the part played by Turkey in the Syrian and the Lebanese crises of 1957 and 1958, neither of which fell within the responsibilities of NATO, can again be said to be an indirect consequence of her membership in NATO.

One had to wait for the emergence of the Cyprus crisis in order to understand better the international image of Turkey created by the foreign policy of the Turkish governments. The United Nations General Assembly, proceeding from a series of resolutions detrimental to the interests of Turkey since March 1964, adopted on December 18, 1965, a resolution greatly limiting Turkish rights on the island. The vote was 47 for, 6 against,

including the vote by Turkey - and 54 abstentions. We believe that this vote reflected best Turkey's standing on the international stage. The six negative votes, apart from Turkey, belonged to two CENTO allies, Iran and Pakistan, to Libya, with which Turkey maintained strong ties of traditional friendship, to the United States and Albania. Albania, completely isolated in the Balkans and Europe and hoping to be recognized by Turkey, cast a negative vote. The United States vote which was in total contradiction to her previous record on the Cyprus question, was an attempt to calm to some extent the reaction aroused by President Johnson's famous letter. [The abstention votes belonged to all of the Eastern bloc countries, and the rest of the NATO members. These votes reflected the new tendency which appeared in the Turkish foreign policy prior to the voting. This new tendency consisted of efforts to better, or at least normalize the unfriendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union and other members of the Eastern bloc which prevailed since the middle of the 1940's. The first of these initiatives was the visit to Moscow after so many years, on October 30, 1964, of a Turkish Foreign Minister. This visit which paved the way for other visits at different levels was accompanied by declarations which created world-wide repercussions. Indeed, Turkey declared all of a sudden that she would not participate in the "Multi-Lateral Force" (MLF). This proposal defended by the United States for some time in order to associate West Germany in the use of nuclear weapons had created vehement Soviet reaction. In a declaration on January 14, 1965, Washington officially announced that Turkey had refrained from participating in MLF and had simultaneously withdrawn her eleven man crew from the destroyer "Claude-Ricketts" manned by seven NATO members. At the time of these Turkish declarations, Moscow revised its pro-Makarios attitude and came out with an official announcement stating that the Soviet Union now accepted "the right of existence of two separate communities" in Cyprus, and considered suitable a "federative" administration for the island. This stand was more in line with the Turkish position on Cyprus. In May 1966, the Turkish parliament subjected NATO to criticisms for the first time in its history, while several youth organizations issued a declaration openly demanding the withdrawal of "our troops from NATO".

Thus, the Cyprus question brought to light the fact that Turkey had been isolated in the international scene and, indirectly, resuscitated the awareness of Turkish public opinion of foreign policy. Perhaps for the first time in history the Turkish people became involved in a thorough discussion of foreign policy problems alongside domestic issues with a view to searching the best course to secure Turkey's national interests. The discussions and debates did not go unheeded by the government of the Justice Party which, in line with its political philosophy, had accepted without any reservations whatsoever the Western model of development. Consequently the government, while preserving the existing ties with NATO and the United States, made several attempts to normalize the tense relations between Turkey and the countries of the Eastern bloc. This was the real intention behind the official visits mentioned previously.

Naturally, as may be the case elsewhere, the extreme left in Turkey benefitted most by these developments. Those who advocated a Marxist-Leninist line for the development of Turkey believed that NATO was the major obstacle to the establishment of socialism in the country. The radical left believed that if Turkey stayed outside NATO, the possibility of American intervention against leftist activities would be largely reduced. It was based on this reasoning that the radical left initiated a violent campaign against NATO. The campaign which portrayed NATO as an instrument of American imperialism affected, after a while, even the sections of the public which had remained neutral so far, and contributed to the gradual loss of prestige of the Justice Party government. Some of the reasons advanced to justify the withdrawal of Turkey from NATO, although ideological and emotional in substance, nevertheless revealed many issues which had been concealed from the public. Two of these will be carefully reviewed here since they point to the other side of the coin in the relations of Turkey with NATO and the United States, that is, to the advantages and disadvantages stemming from these relations as far as Turkey is concerned.

The first of these issues concerns the bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the United States within the framework of NATO, and the second concerns the position of Turkey vis-a-vis the recently altered strategy of NATO.

IV

The agreements concluded between Turkey and the United States after the Second World War within and without the framework of NATO on military, economic and financial matters are generally referred to by Turks as "bilateral agreements". Some of these agreements are open agreements, signed, ratified and promulgated according to the constitutional provisions of both parties. A good many, however, are executive agreements, concluded in accordance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As mentioned before, the latter agreements became the subject of public discussion in Turkey only after 1965. Turkish public opinion which was not interested even in the open agreements was completely unaware of the existence of the secret agreements. The commitments undertaken by Turkey vis-a-vis the United States through these international agreements was brought to the attention of Turkish public opinion for the first time with President Johnson's letter. A section of the letter reads as follows:

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States' consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

The agreement, referred to in the letter, is the one concluded between the two countries setting up the conditions under which Turkey would receive aid under the Truman Doctrine. It will be necessary to examine briefly the provisions of this treaty in order to understand fully why President Johnson's letter caused such an uproar in Turkey. The preface to the agreement specified that aid would be extended to Turkey "On terms consonant with the sovereign independence and security of the two countries". Article 2 of the agreement again stated "The Turkish Government will make use of the assistance furnished for the purposes for which it has been accorded". Article 3 contained the following statement: "...in so far as may be consistent with the security of the

two countries: representatives of the Press and Radio of the United States will be permitted to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance, and the Government of Turkey will give full and continuous publicity within Turkey as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts and progress of such assistance". According to Article 4, "... The Government of Turkey will not..., without the consent of the Government of the United States... permit... the use of any such article... for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished."

Once the circumstances under which the agreement was reached, and the text of the agreement are carefully examined, it will be much simpler to understand the causes of the Turkish reaction to the Johnson letter. First, the treaty was concluded at a time of an acute Soviet threat in 1947, when no ties of alliance existed between Turkey and the United States. The two countries became allied with Turkey's admission into NATO. Once Turkey was admitted into NATO, American aid was extended not according to the Agreement of 1947 but within the framework of the alliance. Consequently, the American view that the weapons Turkey intended to use in Cyprus in 1964 had been provided within the framework of the Agreement of 1947 seems to be deprived of a legal basis. Even if one agrees that all aid given to Turkey were to be used according to the Agreement of 1947, then one finds difficulty in reconciling the contradiction in the same agreement. Aid should be extended "on terms consonant with the sovereign independence and security of the two countries", says the agreement, but on the condition that the Turkish Government "obtain United States' consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished".

It is public knowledge that the member states of NATO have divided military responsibilities among themselves in order to defend best the region covered by the alliance. According to this master scheme, Turkey, though the least developed of all NATO countries, was to maintain one of the largest land-forces. And again according to this division of responsibilities, the United States was to provide the Turkish army a large part of its weaponry. Can one then consider Turkey rightly a sovereign state if she cannot have access to these weapons at a time when her

rights and interests are violated, or if she has to seek beforehand the permission of the United States? Therefore, one of the major causes of the reaction against NATO and the United States in Turkey lies in this peculiar American interpretation of the idea of "alliance" and "ally" as reflected in President Johnson's letter. If this line of reasoning were extended to its logical limits, one would arrive at the following conclusion: the enemies of the United States were automatically the enemies of Turkey whereas the United States was free to decide whether the enemies of Turkey were also its own enemies.

After becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty, Turkey concluded a series of bilateral agreements with the United States either directly with reference to Article 3 of the Treaty or with reference to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement signed between the member countries on June 19, 1951. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist and attack". The Status of Forces Agreement contains provisions regarding the status of the forces of a member country during their being stationed on the territory of another country. Following her admission into NATO, Turkey became a party to this agreement on March 10, 1954.

The Status of Forces Agreement consisted of general provisions applicable to all NATO members, while the bilateral agreements, concluded either according to the Status of Forces Agreement or to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty consisted of special provisions applicable only to the states directly parties to them. Turkey and the United States concluded nearly a hundred of these agreements, a majority of which remained secret. Among these, the secret Military Facilities Agreement concluded on June 23, 1954, was in the nature of a general agreement, while the rest were agreements of implementation. In the course of the heated debate on foreign policy in Turkey after 1965 a great majority of these bilateral agreements were revealed either by the press or Parliament. Several points came out into the open. It was learned, for example, that the agreements had been conc-

luded by different departments in the government, and that some were written while others were oral agreements reached either by face-to-face or telephone conversations. Actually the texts of some of these agreements could not be located when later the United States and Turkey began negotiations for a basic treaty to replace some of the bilateral agreements. It is likely that American officials, when rejected by one Turkish department for one reason or another, preferred to turn to another department to secure the concessions they sought, thus entering into a series of agreements with a multitude of government offices, each with no information on what the others were doing.

Possibly the most important point in the revelations on bilateral agreements concerned the American bases and sites in Turkey. The presence of some American bases, facilities and military personnel in Turkey was common knowledge. However, the status, the real nature of the bases, together with the amount, responsibilities, rights and privileges of the American personnel on the bases was not known since many of these were regulated by the Secret Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, and by the agreements of implementation deriving from it. The Agreement of 1954 was concluded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs upon the authorization of the Council of Ministers while a majority of the agreements of implementation were concluded either by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, or directly by military officials themselves.

The American bases and sites established in Turkey under these agreements can be classified into four categories: (1) Air bases, (2) Strategic missile bases, (3) electronical communication facilities, and (4) establishments necessary to meet the needs of the American military personnel and their dependents working at bases and related sites, such as housing, hotel, schooling, hospitals, clubs, various recreation facilities, shopping centers (PX) and supply storage centers. The Turkish government made available 32 million square meters of land to the United States for the bases and sites. The expropriation costs of this land and the responsibility for the protection of the bases and sites, the storage and care of weapons and the maintenance of environmental security were assigned to Turkey. The financial burden placed on the Turkish defence budget by these obligati-

ons was approximately 30 million Turkish lira annually. The agreements made possible the following: (1) The establishments of a joint Turkish-American air base at Çiğli (İzmir), and (2) the İncirlik Air Base at Adana, connected to the Strategic Air Forces Command of NATO, to be turned over to American control in case of a crisis; (3) access for American planes to the airports at Pirinçlik Diyarbakır, Esenboğa (Ankara), and Eskişehir; (4) the establishment of electronic communication bases at Karamürsel, Samsun, Trabzon, Ankara and Diyarbakır; permission for American ships to have shelter and repair service at the Turkish ports. In addition, the same agreements granted other rights ranging from juridical privileges to the establishment of a private postal service and tax-free shopping centers. These privileges and rights granted to the United States personnel in Turkey exceeded by far the rights stemming from the Status of Forces Agreement concluded among the rest of the NATO members. These were, in sum, a form of modern "capitulations". Many of these privileges and rights were misused to an embarrassing degree by some American officials and responsible officers. All this had its share in generating a wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey. For instance, the legal privileges granted to the American military personnel in Turkey by the same agreements prevented their trial in the Turkish courts for any offense committed. All American military offenders ranging from a colonel who ran over a child with his jeep, to drunken sergeants who tore up the Turkish flag and insulted Turkey publicly were exempt from trial in Turkish court by a simple statement by the highest ranking American officer in charge: "he was on duty". One of the bilateral agreements on legal matters ruled that offenses committed by military personnel while "on duty" were to be tried before American courts. The exemption of custom duties accorded to American personnel deprived the Turkish treasury of an important source of income and encouraged the flow into the domestic market, illegally through the PX stores of a whole set of luxury goods whose entry had been officially forbidden. The historical and cultural treasures of Anatolia accumulated over a period of nine thousand years were smuggled out of Turkey in unprecedented proportions. The postal service owned and operated by the United States in Turkey, without Turkish control over it, provided convenient channels to smuggle anything out of the

country including thousands of ancient works of art,

This abuse of the bilateral agreements, when extensive publicity by the press and other media of mass communication bred rapidly anti-American feelings among the public. The sympathy and affection shown by Turks, well known for their hospitality, contrasted sharply with their dislike and scorn displayed towards Americans at the end of the 1960's. Anyone who lived through both of these periods could discern easily the vast difference. Neither the Turkish nor the American official circles were too willing to notice or acknowledge for long the change in the Turks' attitude towards the United States and the Americans in Turkey. Finally, following a proposal put forth by the Turkish Government on April 7, 1966, and accepted by the United States on April 18, 1966, the two governments entered into preparatory talks in order to revise the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, to clarify the thirteen secret bilateral agreements stemming from it and to combine them all into a single Basic Agreement. The press release issued on July 3, 1969, at the end of the preparation talks stated:

Following careful studies carried out by the national authorities, the representatives of the two Governments officially started negotiations to this effect on January 20, 1967. After two years and four months of extensive and detailed negotiations which took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cordial relationship that has always characterized the bonds of friendship between Turkey and the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America have today (July 13, 1969) concluded an agreement relating to the basic principles of the collective measures to be taken by the two Governments pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The details of this agreement, too, are secret like the majority of the rest of the bilateral agreements; only its basic principles were made public. One has the impression that some of the principles in the Basic Agreement were taken as the basis in correcting some of the provisions of the bilateral agreements. For example, the following provision of the basic agreement was made public: "The nature, purpose and duration of each common defense installation must be approved by the Government of the Republic of Turkey". It is generally assumed that this provision was inserted in the text of the Basic Agreement in order to bring an end to the *fait accompli* with respect to defense matters and to oral agreements. Another provision in the text

said: "Within the terms of this agreement it is clear that the Government of the United States of America holds no secrets from the Government of the Republic of Turkey". The reason for such a provision may be attributed to the desire to avoid the recurrence of such incidents as that of the U-2 plane shot by the Soviets after it took off from Turkey without the prior knowledge of the Turkish authorities, or the American aircraft which was downed over the Black Sea in the same fashion. The majority of the provisions in the Basic Agreement give the impression that they were inserted in order to rehabilitate the Turkish Government in the public eye. The self-defensive attitude of the government is evident in some of the provisions of the agreement: "The mutual cooperation between the two parties envisaged in the Agreement is based on reciprocal respect for each other's equal rights and sovereignty... Turkey retains the right to assign Turkish military and civilian personnel to all facilities as it deems suitable... Turkey has the right of inspection of all facilities to verify that the nature and purpose of the common defense effort under this agreement conforms to mutual goals of both nations as specified in implementing agreements". This provision may be the result of the debate revolving around the fact the Turkish officials were not permitted to enter the military bases and its facilities which were thus placed under *de facto* American sovereignty.

The signing of the Basic Agreement was accompanied with a reduction in the number of American military personnel in Turkey and a change in Turkish-American relations. A Turkish journalist related the opinion of an American official on the subject as such: "We first made the adjustments with respect to the bilateral agreements proposed by the Turkish Government. We now turn to the reduction of the American military personnel in Turkey to a minimum number adequate for the defense purposes of NATO and Turkey, this is a matter which reached a peak of sensitivity".

In fact, in order to "lessen the presence" of American personnel especially in the bigger cities, their number was reduced from 27,000 to 6,400. A parallel undertaking was the transfer of Cigli airport (Izmir) and the radar bases at Trabzon and Samsun to the Turkish armed forces, while the status of the radar

bases at Karamursel, Sinop and Pirinçlik (Diyarbakır) and of the Incirlik airport (Adana) were adjusted to the principles of the new agreement.

However, in spite of all these adjustments, the question of bilateral agreements continued to remain subject to criticisms in Turkey even by people who have a moderate or even pro-Western view on foreign policy. For example, İsmet İnönü, the leader of the People's Republican Party, the main opposition party, who had already indicated his dissatisfaction with these agreements earlier, came out openly against them later. The apprehension expressed by İnönü and other critics was based mainly on the special case of the Incirlik base.

The nuclear weapons placed in Turkey as a result of the NATO defense scheme are subject to the "double key" system. That is, a nuclear weapon cannot be fired without the consent of both parties which have access to the weapon. The "double key" principle is to be applied in the following manner: the weapon is in the hands of the American troops in Turkey; the means of delivery, however, are in the hands of the Turkish armed forces. Consequently, it is impossible to use the nuclear weapons without the consent of the Turkish Government. The only place where this system is not applicable is Incirlik base. Short range American planes equipped with nuclear war heads are located at this base. According to the NATO defense plans, the airplanes located at the Incirlik base come neither under the command nor the control of the Turkish armed forces. These are directly related to the European Allied Command of NATO whose Commander is always an American. He wears both the cap of the NATO military command and the American armed forces. This means that the United States can, through this commander, move her air fleet equipped with nuclear war heads at Incirlik toward any destination it chooses, simultaneously dragging Turkey into a nuclear war without her consent.

Here, however, one has to remember a very important safety valve. The NATO commander in Europe has to consult the NATO Council before making a move that could trigger off a war. Since decisions in the Council are to be taken unanimously, in other words, since Turkey like every other member state has the veto in principle, in the Council, these planes should not under-

take any action without Turkish consent. Yet, could this required consent impede the United States from a *fait accompli*? Incidents such as the transfer of American troops from their base at Incirlik to Lebanon during the crisis of 1958, the take-off of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960, and the removal of the strategic missiles from the same base without prior consultation with the Turkish government (possibly as part of a deal between the United States and the Soviet Union following the Cuban crisis of 1962) create deep apprehension in Turkey. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that in case of a nuclear attack on the Soviets by planes taking off from Incirlik, the Soviet Union would retaliate by bombing not only the bases in Turkey but also the NATO bases in Europe. The chances of a *fait a compli* which would sacrifice Turkey exclusively thus appear rather remote. However, the recently adopted NATO strategy known as the "flexible response" and the idea of the so-called "limited war" enhance further the possibility of converting Turkey into a first degree target. In order to understand this question it is necessary to study the nature of this NATO strategy and the special place of Turkey in it.

The defense strategy of NATO has undergone several changes. Between 1950-57, NATO strategy rested on the understanding that the United States would activate immediately her total nuclear power in case of an attack on any member of the alliance. At the time, the conventional power balance between the European members of the Alliance and the Soviet Union was in favor of the latter almost beyond comparison. The balance of power could be established only with the aid of the American nuclear power. Yet, this balance changed suddenly in 1957 when the Soviets launched into space their first earth satellite, proving their mastery of long range missiles. In order to fill the missile gap created by this development, since the United States possessed only medium range missiles, it was proposed at the meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers in December 1957, that American missiles be installed and nuclear war heads be stored in Europe. Turkey was one of a few NATO members which supported this proposal wholeheartedly. Prime Minister Menderes seemed at the time more than willing to allow use Turkish territory for American missiles and nuclear war heads. This attitude was due probably to his feeling that the Soviet missile

superiority posed a serious threat to Turkish security, and possibly to his hope that such a stand would be rewarded by a generous amount of American aid sufficient to pull out the Turkish economy from its miserable stand at the time. Thus, a new bilateral treaty was concluded between Turkey and the United States in November 1958, providing for the construction of a base for fifteen Jupiter missiles at the Cigli (Izmir) Air Base (It was the missiles at this base which became part of the U.S. - Soviet deal.). The Soviets proposed that in return for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, a neighbor of the United States, American missiles be removed from Turkey, a neighbor of the Soviet Union. The missiles were in fact removed from Turkey in 1963, according to some, without consultation with the Turkish government. This incident took place at a time when the American military circles were engaged in efforts to replace the NATO strategy of "massive retaliation" with that of "flexible response", which placed the European countries in a new position vis-a-vis the U. S. A. Therefore, on top of the anxiety caused by the removal of the missiles from Turkey came the uncertainties and the suspicions concerning the proposed new NATO strategy.

The questions arising from this development became the subject of discussion among the other NATO countries. This was, in fact the main reason of De Gaulle's controversy with the United States, and the eventual withdrawal of France from the integrated forces of NATO. This was also the reason why West Germany desired to have closer ties with the actual nuclear weapons. In order to determine the position of Turkey towards this new development one must first analyze the very concept of "strategy".

The meaning of the term strategy obviously changes according to the technological characteristics of the period. Strategy, in its classical meaning can be defined as "re-course to force with skill". Clausewitz's dictum of, "war is the continuation of policy by other means",¹ which was accepted generally as a basic premise until recently seems to have lost its validity today. Diplomacy and defense have become complementary factors. Today the basic function of strategy is to avoid war and to maintain defense by using force as an instrument of threat but without recourse to it. The reason for this is the

range and the terrifying power of weapons capable of covering the whole world.

The overriding concept in the nuclear strategy of our times is "deterrence", which means to cause the enemy to adopt a predetermined behavior. The most important condition for an effective deterrence is that it must be convincing. The threat will be effective if the would-be aggressor is convinced that its preplanned action is considered most vital by the other party. But if, on the other hand, the would-be aggressor is frightened by a powerful threat or deterred from the execution of the planned action, or the interests to be protected are not vital, then the threat would not be as convincing as in the case of the first. The establishment of a complete nuclear balance through the development of inter-continental missiles caused considerable change in the degree of deterrence of a nuclear threat. Obviously, it will be unconvincing to assume that one would enter a limited nuclear war which would simultaneously mark one's own destruction. In a nuclear war of this type there would be no chances of survival for either side. This development brought forth by the establishment of the "balance of terror" made it indispensable for NATO to dismiss the strategy of "massive retaliation" in favor of the strategy of "flexible response".

The strategy of "massive retaliation", to be resorted to in case of lesser incidents, as an alternative of an "either all or none" type, has become completely unthinkable in the circumstances prevailing in the world today. If the forces in the hands of the Alliance were to be used according to the strategy of "massive retaliation", they would be paralyzed and unable to intervene in case of an attack, for example, on Turkey.

The adoption of the strategy of "flexible response" appears to be a necessary and even a helpful development, not only with regard to the security of NATO as a whole, but also with regard to Turkey, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Now, we can briefly take a look at the meaning of "flexible response" and then deal with Turkey's special position in it.

The strategy of "flexible response" was accepted unanimously in December 1967, by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in a meeting at ministerial level. The strategy, proposed by the United States originally in the early 1960's, had been opposed

to by some European members of NATO and by Turkey for a long time. In fact, Turkey was one of the last countries to accept this strategy. According to the declarations of the NATO Council and public documents, the strategy consists of three stages: the first, foresees a direct conventional response. This means that a conventional attack on one NATO member will receive a response of the same type. In the second stage, if aggression cannot be defeated by conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, following consultations among member states, will be used but with utmost caution. This stage will prevent the expansion of war by escalation. The third stage involves a strategical total nuclear war which is practically unthinkable under the present circumstances. The presence of this stage, however, reveals the terror inherent in the danger of escalation, which forms the essence of the second stage, thus forcing deterrence to be both violent and convincing.

Various criticisms were advanced against the strategy of flexible response. Here we shall dwell on some of the more important ones. According to a view this strategy, while placing some of the territory covered by NATO, namely the North American region, outside the zone of war, turns the territories of the European members into zones of war. It seems as though the two super-powers wish to have the European countries pay the bill of a possible conflict among themselves. However, if the disaster is world-wide, then the sacrifice might be proportionate with it. According to another view, the interests of both super-powers call upon them in case of war to limit the scope of that war. Consequently, certain ideas may become the subject of a secret deal between them. The Soviet Union may, by occupying some areas within the NATO countries present the West with a *fait accompli*, which may very well be accepted by the United States on grounds of preserving the world peace.

The above criticisms may be answered in various ways. The would-be aggressor cannot be sure whether its conventional attack would remain limited either in weaponry or in area. The thought that following a conventional response, tactical nuclear weapons may be used might be sufficient in itself to deter the aggressor. Secondly, it is impossible to imagine that American forces will not be involved in such an attack simply because

these forces are found practically in, or the vicinity of every region vulnerable to attack. Therefore, the aggressor will inevitably face the United States. Finally, the would-be aggressor will not make an attempt at a *fait accompli* however limited in size, since underneath deterrence lie essentially the danger of escalation.

One agrees that the technological developments in the world forced NATO, as a whole, to adopt the strategy of limited war. Still, one is induced to believe that this strategy does not provide for the total security of countries such as Turkey situated at the flanks of NATO. For the critical questions above bring to mind further questions. For example, there is the question where to use the tactical nuclear weapons if a conventional attack cannot be repulsed by conventional means. The European zone of the Alliance where the attack is likely to occur will be used as nuclear war zone. Under these circumstances, the areas most vulnerable to attack - to a sort of trial attack, one may say - are the countries located at the flanks of NATO, which, for political, military and economic reasons, will cause minimum reaction if attacked. It is obvious that Turkey is among the very first countries which fit into this category. Thus, the strategy of the limited war, which is the inevitable outcome of the strategy of flexible response, protects the two super-states almost completely from being a target of nuclear weapons. It fails, however, to provide a similar security for the European members in general and for the members at the flanks in particular. On the other hand, since the use of nuclear weapons in Turkey are either dependent on the double key system or are solely in the hands of the United States, the degree of deterrence inherent in these weapons will be determined mainly by U. S. intention and determination to use them to protect the whole or just part of Turkey. The presence of American bases, sites and even personnel in Turkey does not change the situation much because it is not too difficult to suppose that some bases, facilities and even personnel can be sacrificed in order to save oneself from total annihilation. Thus, one reaches the conclusion that the question of NATO strategy as far as Turkey is concerned rests, in the final analysis, on the decision of the United States, the most powerful partner of the Alliance, to side or not with Turkey and to use or not use all her nuclear and non-nuclear weapons to defend her.

Some neutral observers in Turkey suggest that Turkey withdraw from NATO, because the above question has never been answered definitely by the United States. Others propose that Turkey stay in NATO but direct at the same time all her energies to lessening the disadvantages and maximizing to her benefit the advantages deriving from the Alliance. These ideas will be elaborated upon in the summary.

V

In drawing a conclusion concerning the relations between Turkey and NATO, one must pay attention to two considerations: first, whether Turkey has secured for herself politically, economically and socially a permanent place in the Western world through her membership in NATO, and secondly, whether or not Turkey fulfilled the military objective of achieving security within NATO.

It is not just coincidence that the majority of Turks unfavorably disposed towards NATO are members of the radical left. These circles believe that membership in NATO made Turkey lose her independence and made her dependent on the West, especially the United States. Besides, the leftists feel that the American bases, sites and personnel in Turkey, together with the U.S. aid undermine directly or indirectly their power. They believe that Turkey's withdrawal from NATO would be followed by United States withdrawal from Turkey, and subsequently the Turkish people will have the chance to establish the government most suitable to the realities of their own country.

The above claims contain truth as much as prejudices and dogmas. It is true that following Turkey's acceptance in NATO, the Turkish statesmen pursued blindly a pro-Western and pro-American foreign policy with little regard for the national interests of their own country. Several examples cited above support this observation.

One may be justified to take a strong position against the intervention of any foreign state or organization in the domestic affairs of Turkey. However, one cannot blame another state or organization for the mistakes committed or likely to be committed by Turkey in her relations with the outside world. Turkey

did not sign the NATO Treaty or the bilateral agreements with the United States by force or the threat of force. They were signed with the full and free consent of the Turkish Government. If these were detrimental to the interests of Turkey, then only Turkey and her leaders should be held responsible. And, by the same token the correction of these mistakes rests only in the hands of Turkey and her leaders.

Furthermore, one cannot suppose, as some do, that the unhappy state of the internal development and the foreign policy of Turkey can be attributed to NATO membership and other foreign commitments. It has been a well-known fact as put forth by Machiavelli that the smaller and less powerful states enter into an alliance only in case of vital necessity, since alliances generally favor the bigger and more powerful members. Obviously this observation should not be turned into an absolute principle, ruling out all alliances. Alliances should be formed and maintained only in case of vital necessity. The question at hand, therefore, is to determine whether Turkey deems it vitally necessary to continue her membership in NATO.

NATO is an alliance formed primarily against Soviet aggression and expansion. It would be sheer illusion to think that the Soviet policy of expanding her territory and sphere of influence adopted after the Second World War underwent a substantial change. One can easily prove this proposition by citing such examples as the Soviet occupation of several countries in Europe after the war, the Czech incident being the last in a series of moves of this sort. The Brezhnev Doctrine and the recent Soviet involvement in the Middle East are other examples. As long as Turkey is geographically located within the expansion zone of the Soviet Union and is incapable of meeting the Soviet expansion solely with her own powers, she has a vital interest, in fact a dire necessity to participate in a system of alliance to assure her security. Since there exists no other power outside of NATO to balance the Soviet power, Turkey's membership in NATO is a foregone conclusion. Consequently, the question facing Turkey today is not whether or not to stay in NATO, but to make every attempt to reduce the disadvantages of this membership and to increase its advantages. For example, it will be in Turkey's interest to try to establish normal relations

with her big neighbor, the Soviet Union, and with other socialist countries of Europe, while staying in NATO. Experience has demonstrated that NATO membership does not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of such relations. Several members of NATO have tried this course before Turkey. Turkey, due to her geographical location, should and could have been one of the very first to do so. Turkey's bad relations which lasted until recently with her Arab neighbors were the result of the role she played in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, her stand at the Bandung Conference, her position adopted during the Suez Crisis, and her role as a relay station to the American troops during the Lebanese crisis. Turkey's own interest demanded abstention in all these endeavors. Although Turkey made slight alterations in her foreign policy after 1960, she could have easily taken additional steps and initiative in the international arena. She should not have abstained for so long from recognizing mainland China out of unconditional loyalty to the United States, thus depriving herself of certain economic and commercial advantages. A more active part by Turkey on such proposals as the convening of an "European Security Conference" and the signing of a "Non-aggression Pact" between the "Eastern" and "Western" blocs should be given high priority simply because Turkey is one of the countries likely to derive utmost benefit by their enactment.

As for the military aspects of NATO membership, in other words, as to the question of whether this alliance guarantees the security of Turkey, various factors must be kept in mind. First, there is the evident fact that no member country was ever subjected to an attack after the establishment of NATO. This obviously is not a mere coincidence but a consequence of the alliance itself. On the other hand, just because aggression in its customary form of armed attack upon another country has not occurred in NATO, should not make one say that the bigger and the more powerful states have renounced to resort to other means with the purpose of influencing the smaller and less powerful countries, including NATO members, that is, of taking them into their spheres of influence. The geopolitical position of Turkey makes it necessary for this country to be especially sensitive towards any moves undertaken by the Soviet Union. Some writers and intellectuals assume that the rivalry

and struggle for influence among the super powers, force these giants to aid the smaller and weaker states, whether they are allies or not, when their own national interests are involved. The Turkish defense cannot be entrusted to a probability of this sort, although staying outside of an alliance is not an "immoral" act, as John Foster Dulles once labeled it. But events change form and content drastically. Not long ago one could have not imagined that the Western powers would allow the Soviets to penetrate the Middle East to the extent she appears to have today. If Turkey were not a member of NATO, or had she left NATO, while Greece remained a member of the alliance, this would tip the power balance in favor of Greece and weaken the Turkish stand on Cyprus. In such a case, the chances are that the bigger western powers would favor the unification of Cyprus with Greece, at least as far as their own security is concerned, and would make every effort to achieve this objective. On the other hand, Turkey has received until today approximately 3 billion dollars of military aid as grants and 2,5 million dollars of economic aid from the United States especially because she was a member of NATO. The amount of military aid received in 1969 was 99 million dollars and in 1970, 92 million dollars. Were this aid not extended to Turkey, she could not have the well-disciplined army of about 500,000 people maintained today. Turkey has no interest to give up a source of power of this magnitude when nearly all the countries of the Middle East possess large and regular armies maintained largely by foreign aid. In the light of the circumstances prevailing in the world today, it is folly to assume that military power serves no ends and that vital foreign policy objectives can be obtained merely through diplomatic, economic and moral means.

Turkey's position within the strategy of NATO needs some elaboration. NATO is an alliance system stretching over a large part of the world, which makes it difficult to formulate a strategy equally valid and acceptable for all the member countries. Therefore, it is expected that the member countries will come out with special demands stemming from the specifics and the geographical location of their respective countries. Turkey's special demands stem from her position as a weaker member of the alliance and her location on the flank of the NATO region. Since Turkey cannot deter a possible aggressor with her own nuc-

lear capability and cannot improve her conventional power beyond a certain limit in a foreseeable future, she is bound to seek aid from the more powerful members of the alliance. There is one thing, however, that must be kept in mind: Turkey herself must see to it that, while she receives aid, she is not dragged into a war she does not wilfully intend to take part in. We have outlined above the measures Turkey has already taken to this end. Only the status of the Incirlik base remains unaffected. It is imperative for the security of Turkey to revise the status of this base and adopt the double key system in case of nuclear operations. This will place the base under the direct control of NATO European Command, and hence under the indirect control of the United States. The single key system presently effective at the Incirlik base, however, carries with it the threat of dragging Turkey into a war, to a *fait accompli* against her will.

On the other hand, whatever the strategy agreed upon, it is simply impossible for a country threatened by this or that great power to provide for her defense effectively only from outside sources. The further a country of this type is located from the center of gravity of the alliance, the more hazardous her defenses are. In the light of these circumstances, Turkey is bound to develop a well-equipped national conventional force with superior mobility and fire-power through her own resources with a view to creating local deterrence. A force of this type might prove to be a most important weapon against the aggressor, even if the other NATO members choose to refrain from helping Turkey. The state of the world calls for Turkey to secure the utmost protection through a regular army maintained through outside assistance within the framework of NATO, and with a force established and maintained through her very own resources.