

ANGLO-TURKISH RELATIONS, 1919-1922

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This paper is mainly concerned with events occurring after the end of the First World War and up to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. These four years represent the birth of Modern Turkey after the disintegration of Ottoman Empire. They also represent a transitional phase from the nineteenth century Anglo-Turkish relations in which the wide employment of political and economic means by Britain produced imprints of major importance, to those of the twentieth century built on new lines.

The emphasis will be mainly on the following points:

- (a) The attitude of the British towards the Turkish National Movement,
- (b) The lines on which the British wanted to develop these relationships, and
- (c) The Turkish viewpoint.

It may be said that the period was the most active in Anglo-Turkish relationships in the twentieth century. The parliaments, leaders, and public opinion of both countries were not in agreement for most of the time. Also the attitude of the other victorious Powers of the First World War, and of Bolshevik Russia, to a degree affected Anglo-Turkish relations.

The chronological order of events has been given a subordinate role in order to emphasize the political, military, and national aspects of the period. It is also intended to show the factors that contributed to the rise of Turkish nationalism which can be traced in the Anglo-Turkish relations of 1919-1922.

After the First World War, large portions of the Ottoman Empire and its capital, Istanbul, were under the military occupa-

tion of the victorious Powers. The minority groups (local Greek, Armenian, etc.) of the Empire, had become almost independent of the Porte and had put themselves under the protection of the British and her Allies. A very small fraction of the Turkish Army was dispersed in various places in Anatolia.

Post-war Turkey, with its many and complicated problems, was to be dealt with by the victorious Powers of the First World War. The situation at the Peace Conference was well illustrated by the Italian High Commissioner in Istanbul, Count Sforza, in recounting later that:

"At the Peace Conference, everything conspired to increase mental confusion. The French, engrossed as they were by their situation on the Rhine, were not inclined to oppose too plainly the English on a part of the chess-board less vital to themselves. It was the same with the Italians, preoccupied in their turn with the Adriatic question. The English - the English were Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon."¹

Thus Britain had the most important role at the Peace Conference in matters regarding Turkey. This was again, in part, due to the fact that, unlike the other Allies, Britain had actually fought the major actions with Turkey (Gallipoli and Mesopotamia) and, therefore, naturally assumed to a louder voice in the settlement of the Turkish problem. The British Prime Minister confirmed this determination of Britain in the Commons when he said:

"Practically the whole of the conquest of Turkey was the achievement of British arms.. and we have got to hold it now... After civilisation has failed for hundreds of years to accomplish it, Britain has done it. Were we, having done it, to go home and leave it derelict? That is not the policy of British Statesmen."²

As early as the first sittings of the Peace Conference, there was no strong unity between the Powers, and the clashes of interest showed themselves even in matters of relatively small importance. For instance, the Italians and the Greeks could not come to an agreement as to which territories were to be occupied by themselves in Turkey, whilst the British were opposed to the further extension of Italian occupation. France, on the other hand, was opposed to the line being followed by the British Commander-in-Chief, claiming that he received direct orders from

1 Carlo C. Sforza, "How We Lost the War with Turkey" *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. CXXXII (November, 1927), pp. 583-9.

2 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXX (October 30, 1919), pp. 977.

the British Government instead of from the Allies. M. Clemenceau also complained that the French were not allowed by the British to play any part in Asia Minor. The Italians, it was true, had gone to Asia Minor in spite of the British, but they declined to replace the British in the Caucasus'. The Conference tried to discover the attitude of the United States, whilst the latter sought the opinion of the Conference regarding Turkey. Meanwhile, to add to the confusion, the United States presented a very severe ultimatum to the Istanbul Government, a display of unilateralism which annoyed both the Allies as well as the Istanbul Government.³

As the Conference progressed, the diversity of interests of the Allies intensified and, undoubtedly, was one of the factors which aided the rise of Turkish nationalism.

British Government policy during 1919-1923 was one of determined opposition to, and intervention against, the rise of nationalism. In this policy, the role of Lloyd George was outstandingly important for he sincerely believed that the Turks were the chief enemy of civilisation, and he expressed this view strongly throughout the period.

During the Great War, the Allied policy had been to eject the Turk from Europe. Istanbul had been promised to Tsarist Russia by Secret Treaty, whilst the remainder of Turkish territory was to be partitioned among the Allies into spheres of influence or mandated areas. Bolshevik revelations of these arrangements created tension in Britain, eliciting Lloyd George's declaration of war aims of 5 January 1918:

...Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race.. while we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople.."⁴

The need for the support of India (with its Moslem contingent) was also a consideration, for, without the participation of the Indian army, Lloyd George considered the conquest of Turkey to be impossible.

³ *Documents on British Foreign Policy* (1919-1939), ed. E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, 1 st ser., Vol. I, pp. 86-7, 105-9, 131-6, 524-5, 868-72.

⁴ *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXV (February 20, 1920), p. 1961.

However, in pursuing government policy in relation to the Turkish situation, it soon became clear that this pledge held little importance. As a matter of fact, the Turkish national leaders had never believed in the pledge from the beginning, a fact which may be deduced from Atatürk's statement three years later that the United States, Britain, France, and Japan, by the Washington Conference, were obviously trying to establish a free trade market in China. This showed that the European Powers had abandoned their previous policy of separating the Far East into areas of influence and that he wished they would do the same for the Middle East.⁵

In defence of his policy, Lloyd George frequently attacked Turkey for its 'treachery' in closing the Straits to Britain in the First World War. Therefore, he maintained that the Straits should not be entrusted to their 'old door keeper'.⁶ This view was later challenged by *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the nationalist press:

"If going into war with another country is a treacherous act, then Britain which had fought with almost all of the countries in the world, should be considered the greatest traitor of all nations and countries."⁷

The point to be stressed is that Lloyd George's speeches and views were provocative to the Turks and the Indian Moslems, and in later years, even to the British public.

Another characteristic feature of this period was that the Allies' policy for Turkey was not backed by their peoples. As Atatürk observed in the National Parliament:

"During the War of Independence, Western nations began to think differently from their governments, and they were inclined to recognise the existence of the Turkish nation. Later their governments began to think like their nations. This was the case of France and Italy. Only Lloyd George acted more stubbornly."⁸

As early as 1919, Lord Robert Cecil complained about the Turcophile campaign of the French press,⁹ and, from 1921, one

⁵ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, March 3, 1922.

⁶ *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXIII, (December 18, 1919), pp. 767.

⁷ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, August 11, 1922.

⁸ *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. VII, (January 29 1921), pp. 410-415.

⁹ *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXIII, (December 18, 1919), pp. 730.

can observe that most of the British press began to criticise government policy severely and to support the Turkish case.¹⁰ In Parliament, the secrecy of the government's Middle Eastern policy was also severely criticised, for example by Mr. A. Herbert, who said:

...if any of us had made as many mistakes in the Near East as the government has made, we should also do our best to keep it dark... This policy is really the policy of the ostrich."¹¹

These were obviously very favourable factors, at least in the moral sense, for the leaders of the Turkish Movement. The nations of Europe were divided among themselves and there was hardly any common front between individual nations and their governments.

The delay in the formulation of the Treaty of Sévres, 1920, was mainly due to the indecision of the United States, for, as Lloyd George said in August 1919, she failed to provide a clear indication as to her willingness to 'guarantee the protection of people, who, if they are not protected, will be subjected to torture, misgovernment, and massacre.' No peace could be signed with Turkey until the United States position was clear.¹²

Meanwhile, Anglo-American relations showed signs of strain during the 1920's. There was the possibility of Anglo-American conflict at the Washington Conference and the American insistence on the immediate repayment of her debts met with disfavour in Britain. The post war balance, with America emerging as a superior material Power caused Britain to be more sensitive to American attitudes and policy.¹³

The significance of this period of delay lies in the fact that Istanbul was occupied by Allied forces in March 1920, because

10 Cf. "The Claims of the Turks," *The New Statesman*, June 18, 1921. H. C. Wood, "The Anatolian War," *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CX, (September 1921), pp. 492-500. "From the Turkish Point of View," *The Nation and the Athenaeum*, Vol. XXXI (1922), pp. 788-9. V. Chirol, "Our Policy Since the Armistice," *The Times*, September 18, 1922. A. J. Toynbee, "The Denouement in the Near East," *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. CXII (October 1922), pp. 409-418.

11 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXI (November 17, 1919), p. 742.

12 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXIX, (August 18, 1919), pp. 2016-17.

13 Public Record Office, London, *Foreign Office Papers*. FO, 800, 151.

of unrest in Anatolia and to stabilise the situation until the execution of the Peace Treaty. This occupation advanced the cause of Turkish nationalism because the British occupied all the important positions, arrested many Senators and Deputies, and proclaimed a state of seige. British specialists took over all political and police control and their ineptitude did much to reduce occidental prestige.¹⁴

The Sévres Treaty,¹⁵ which was later imposed on the Istanbul Government, was designed to punish Turkey for her entry into the war on the side of Germany and because of her historical misgovernment. By this treaty, Turkish sovereignty was completely diminished. Even the Istanbul Government's Prime Minister, who was known as a very loyal friend of Britain, found the treaty too onerous for voluntary acceptance. But the Allies found no reason to modify the treaty. As they firmly informed the Prime Minister:

"Neither among the Christians of Europe nor among the Moslems of Syria, Arabia, and Africa has the Turk done other than destroy wherever he has conquered. Never has he shown himself able to develop in peace what he has won by war. Not in this direction do his talents lie..."¹⁶

The attitude of most Ottoman intellectuals who were 'concentrated in the capital to a degree unknown in any European State' was that they were willing to pay any price to the Allies for the privilege of remaining in Istanbul.¹⁷

Another incitement to Turkish nationalism was the landing of Greek troops at Izmir on 15 May 1919, by order of the Allied Supreme Council, to enforce Article Seven of the conditions of the armistice with Turkey.¹⁸ To choose Greeks to enforce the Peace terms was a tactless blunder. Firstly the area had a large Greek population¹⁹ and Greece had wellknown Hellenistic Empire aims. Under these conditions, it was obvious that, rather

14 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXVI, March 17, 1920), pp. 2214-15. Cf. also *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. I (April 24, 1924), pp. 90-3.

15 *Tripartite Agreement Between British Empire, France, and Italy Respecting Anatolia*, Parliamentary Papers 1920. Vol. LI (Cmd 963), No. 12.

16 *The Times*, June 27, 1919.

17 *Ibid.*, June 26, 1919.

18 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXVI May 26, 1919), p. 813.

19 *The Times*, June 27, 1919.

than enforcing order, Greek troops acted as invaders to the extent that anxiety arose in the Supreme Council.²⁰

The basis of the British Government's Greek policy at the time was well analysed by A. Prince who wrote that:

"...the present Greek policy is compounded of a curious amalgam of historic sentiment, economic cupidity, political ambition and religious pride."²¹

The first Turkish resistance began on this Western Front and was independent of the national resistance which developed later.²² On 23 July and 4 September 1919, at the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, Mustafa Kemal declared his aim of Turkish national independence and began organisation of the necessary military and administrative machinery. Lloyd George's view in August 1919, was that:

"There are vital British interests involved (in the case of Turkey) ...the future of the Empire depends upon the settlement of Turkey..."²³

The Peace-Conference decision of 15 February 1920 to leave Istanbul to the Turks was cabled to Admiral Robeck and circulated in India on 23 February. The Commons, severe reaction reflected public feeling, forcing Lloyd George to declare in the ensuing debate that his peace aims with respect to Turkey were 'the freedom of the Straits, freeing non-Turkish communities from Turkish rule, and preserving the selfgovernment of Turks where they were a majority with safeguards taken'.

Public reaction to the news was also agitated and a vigorous correspondence ensued in *The Times*, led by the Archbishop of Canterbury. A counter-agitation came from India in favour of the Conference arrangements, led by the Aga Khan and Ghandi and widely supported by the Indian press, India being strongly of the opinion that the disintegration of Turkey should be prevented.²⁴

20 *Documents on British Foreign Policy, op. cit., passim.*

21 A. E. Prince, "Pride and Prejudice in the Near Eastern Problem," *Queen's Quarterly*, Vol. XXX (October 1922), pp. 164-81, 171.

22 Ş. S. Aydemir, *Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal, 1919-1922* (İstanbul, 1966) Vol. II, pp. 149-61.

23 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXIX (August 18, 1919), pp. 2016-7.

24 *The Times*, May 18, 1920.

At the initial stages of Turkish resistance, the British Government and public were far from realising the potential of the movement. Although, at this stage, the resistance was not organised on a national scale, nevertheless, it could have given the Western Powers some idea of how the Turkish people felt, independently of the Istanbul Government.²⁵

The rising of Nationalists in Anatolia was, however, still considered by Lloyd George in June 1920 as a case of brigandage, when, in the face of the opening of the Turkish Parliament in Ankara on 23 April 1920, the date upon which Ottoman rule can be said to have, in practice, ended, he said:

"If we allow Mustafa Kemal, or any man of his type to organise forces in order to break down that policy (the policy on which Sévres was based), Europe would have dismally failed in its duty, I believe - I say so after full consultation with the ablest soldier in Europe - that we shall be able to establish authority over these areas."²⁶

The new importance of this Nationalist Parliament was, however, recognised by the French, who attempted to negotiate on 30 May 1920 with the Ankara Government.

In pursuit of Lloyd George's policy, the Greek landing in Thrace which began on 20 July 1920, was sanctioned at Boulogne where British and French military advisors were present. On 21 June, Bonar Law had already declared Greece to be 'one of the Allies' and her troops to be used as such, and Greek troops were under the direct command of a British Admiral.²⁷

From the beginning of the War of Independence, though Britain did not fight directly against Turkey, she was considered more hostile than Greece, as clearly indicated in the declaration of the Turkish Parliament to the nation.²⁸

After the opening of the Turkish Parliament in Ankara, the resistance movement began to be organised more effectively and the isolated bands were absorbed to form the National Army.²⁹

25 Cf. Atatürk, *Söylev* (Ankara, 3rd ed., 1966) Vol. I, pp. 1-4.

26 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXX (June 23, 1920), pp. 2260

27 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXXI (July 1, 1920), pp. 636.

28 *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. I (April 25, 1920), p. 60.

29 Ş. S. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* (İstanbul, 1966), pp. 146-51.

British policy against Turkey was sterner than that of the other Allies during the Turkish War of Independence. One of the many reasons for this was that, as one-fourth of the population of the British Empire was Moslem, Britain was interested in keeping the Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul under the control of the Allies.³⁰ Meanwhile, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Nationalist Parliament was saying that 'Turkey being a centuries-old Islam State was, as always, deeply interested in the welfare of other Moslem people'.³¹

The British interest in the Caliph was recognised by Atatürk when he said in the Parliament, "For the English, the Sultan is a very precious pearl in their palm."³² According to *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, Britain wanted to kill Turkish resistance in order to turn Turkey into a colony like Egypt or South Africa and use the Sultan-Caliph like the President of South Africa.³³ However, during this time, the majority of the Istanbul press and the Istanbul Government had parallel views to that of the British Government. The Istanbul press considered the National Movement as treachery³⁴ and blamed the Nationalists for annoying the Allies and causing the Sévres Treaty to be drafted with heavy terms for the Turks.³⁵

On 21 June 1920 the Coalition Foreign Affairs Committee at Boulogne, under the chairmanship of Lord Cecil, passed the following resolutions: that it was unwise to cut Bulgaria off from the Aegean Sea and similarly to cut the Turks of Asia Minor from their natural outlet to the sea at Izmir; and that giving Edirne to Greece was objectionable. The Committee advised that the Turkish Treaty should be considered with these points in view.³⁶

30 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXV (February, 1920), pp. 1949-2062.

31 *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. VII (January 14, 1921), pp. 314-5. (However, in later years, the development of events illustrated that this view was far from representing true Turkish aims.)

32 *Ibid.*, Vol. VII (January 24, 1921), pp. 410-5.

33 *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, July 16, 1922.

34 *Peyam-ı Sabah*, June 26, 1922.

35 *Ibid.*, July 14, 1922.

36 PRO, FO, 800, 151.

The first Turkish victory of 10 January 1921 against the Greeks was the background to the initiative of the London Conference of 23 February, at which a modification of the Sévres Treaty was considered and at which, for the first time, Turkish-Nationalist as well as Ottoman delegates were present. In reality the Nationalist delegates negotiated for Turkey and a cease-fire agreement was reached pending investigation into the racial composition of the territories in dispute.³⁷ Two of the very important demands of the Ankara Government were for the evacuation of Turkish territory by all foreign troops and recognition of the Ankara Government as the sole party to negotiations. These demands were held by the British press to have been advised by Tchitcherin, the Russian Premier, to the Nationalist Government, and they were considered unreasonable.³⁸ However, the decisions of the London Conference were not upheld by Greece, who resumed the offensive on 23 March 1921.

On 16 March 1921, Russia had recognised the Nationalist Parliament as the legal government of Turkey. According to the British Prime Minister, the Turco-Russian alliance was not 'quite an alliance, but rather the opposite'.³⁹ With Turkish victories during the year, France agreed, by the Ankara Treaty of 20 October to withdraw her troops from Southern Anatolia, allowing concentration of the Turkish forces on the Western Front.

Thus, Britain was left alone by her Allies in the settlement of the Turkish question. However, it seemed, ignoring the political changes which had occurred since 1919, that Britain was determined to make a peace treaty with the 'sovereign of the State, the Sultan'.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the House of Commons was pressing hard for the publication of the Franco-Turkish and Italian-Turkish treaties and demanding to be informed whether Britain had been consulted before they were signed. The Government indicated that it was aware of these treaties and was seeking communication with the respective governments.⁴¹

37 *The Times*, February 26, 1921.

38 *Ibid.*, February 4, 1921.

39 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CXXXV (December 6, 1920), p. 1720.

40 *Ibid.*, Vol. CLI (March 7, 1922), p. 1044.

41 *Ibid.*, Vol. CXI (April 18, 1921), p. 1514.

Meanwhile, Greek aggression intensified and Greek war-ships passed through the Bosphorous, which was controlled by an inter-Allied Commission, and bombarded Samsun and the Black Sea coast.⁴²

British policy, by this time, had met with complete failure, because the assumptions on which the success of the Sévres Treaty depended, were not realised. Firstly, Bolshevik forces were not defeated by Denikin. Secondly, America did not participate in the enforcement of the Allied decisions. Thirdly, there was no unity among the Allies, and fourthly, internal Greek politics proved to be very unstable.⁴³ Finally, the extent of the Turkish awakening had not been foreseen. Disillusioned, Britain resorted to rather desperate political measures to stop the tide of events by approaching the Balkan countries. A confidential memorandum of Professor Gerothwohl⁴⁴ to Mr. Vansittart, Private Secretary of the Prime Minister, is very illuminating in this respect. In his conversations with the Serbian Minister on 13 November 1921, Professor Gerothwohl advised a Serbo-Greek rapprochement, in view of Italy's recrudescent nationalism. The Serbian Minister said that his country was interested in the Straits because of the prevailing uncertainty in respect to an outlet to the Adriatic and her Danubian Black Sea interests. Professor Gerothwohl continued:

"I said: 'if France (and Italy) were to leave us alone at the Straits would you, like Roumania be prepared to help us militarily there, by the dispatch of a division?'"

The answer was positive and, in return, Serbia requested that Britain should guarantee their defensive convention with Roumania against Bulgaria, just as Italy had underwritten the corresponding conventions against the Habsburgs.⁴⁵

Apart from her secret rapprochement with the Balkans, Britain tried to find means to appeal to world opinion via the employment of the ethnic minorities, to secure aid against the

42 *Ibid.*, Vol. CLV (June 21, 1922), 1279-80.

43 Cf. Ormsby-Gore, "Great Britain and the Middle East," *New World*, (July 1921) pp. 85-90.

44 Gerothwohl appears to have acted as an agent of the British Intelligence Service.

45 PRO, FO, 800, 151, 14 November 1921.

Turkish War of Independence. Professor Gerothwohl's suggestion to Mr. Vansittart in this respect was:

"Concerning the protection of Cilician Christians why not create an *international* instead of an *Allied* situation at Mersina. The dispatch of British (or British and Italian) warships if and when French evacuation is completed, at the same time issuing an appeal to all civilised powers to help in police measures. I am sure there would be a humanitarian response from some Powers, possibly America, some of the European neutrals and the little Entente..."⁴⁶

The British rapprochement with the Balkans, which was hinted at by the French press, caused yet another agitation in India, the outcome of which was a renewal of appeals by the Indian Moslems to Lord Curzon.⁴⁷

In February 1922, Sir Samuel Hoare, gave the British Government a report on Turkey in which he strongly insisted that the Greek Army was much superior to that of the Turks and that victory was most likely. Therefore, the British Government should support the Greek Army particularly in view of the fact that no peace was likely to be achieved with the Turks, due to their extremely unreasonable conditions.⁴⁸

By the 16th September 1922 Izmir had been taken by the Turks and Anatolia cleared of foreign troops. On this day, Lloyd George appealed to the Dominions and Balkan States to join an offensive against Turkey for the 'freedom of the Straits', despite the fact that such freedom had already been offered by the Ankara Government and secretly refused by the British Government before 26 August 1922 when the final Turkish offensive began.⁴⁹

Allied reactions were hostile to Lloyd George; Italy refrained from offensive action against Turkey, and France pursued her belief in diplomatic rather than military action and display. Canada refused any form of support and in this connection Colonel W. Bovey of Montreal said that:

46 *Ibid.*, November 15, 1921.

47 *Ibid.*, May 20, 1921 and June 3, 1921.

48 *Ibid.*, "Political Impressions of Turkey and Greece," February 9, 1922.

49 Cf. *The Times*, September 18, 1922; *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. XXIII (October 4, 1922), p. 264.

"Mr. Lloyd George and his Colleagues have replaced secret diplomacy by fireworks diplomacy... while Canadians are ready to join in the wars of the Empire, they are not ready to let the Government of Great Britain have the sole voice as to what are the Empire's wars."⁵⁰

South Africa merely gave moral support. New Zealand alone responded by sending troops.

In Britain also, the Prime Minister's enthusiasm for a new war against the Anatolian Turks, was received with a marked disfavour expressed by some writers:

"English public opinion has definitely decided that her soldiers' lives and her taxpayer's money must not be squandered in a new war without clear proof that our honour and our interests cannot be maintained by peace."⁵¹

Lloyd George's provocative speech was disclaimed by the Foreign Office as one of its repercussions might well have been hostilities between the meagre British garrisons and Turkish Nationalists' Forces. Further, the speech had provoked yet another agitation in the Indian press in the interests of Turkish independence. Britain appeared as the active enemy of Turkey whilst Italians and French troops were withdrawn, neither of them desiring to be drawn into a new war.⁵² Thus, both politically and psychologically, Anglo-Turkish relations were once more strained.

According to the Anatolian press, this call of Lloyd George was similar to that of the Crusaders and Lloyd George was called the 'New Pierre l'Hermite.' That fact that Lloyd George acted alone in making the call was strongly stressed and the British peoples attitude against him was highly praised.⁵³

The British situation in Turkey was saved by Sir Charles Harrington, Commander-in-Chief who, by dint of great patience and skill, obtained the consent of Mustafa Kemal to a conference of generals at Mudanya, 3 October 1922. This effort was placed in jeopardy by a blundering public order to Harrington from London to present the Turks with an ultimatum to withdraw from the Çanakkale area. The failure of this order to provoke

⁵⁰ *The Times*, October 10, 1922.

⁵¹ Marquess of Crewe, K. G., "The Near East and the Late Government," *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. CXXII (November 1922), p. 549.

⁵² *The Times*, September 19, 1922.

⁵³ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, September 21, 1922.

the Turks to extreme action, enabled Harrington to complete, on 11 October 1922, the Armistice of Mudanya.⁵⁴ This success led directly to a major step in the direction of recognising a new era in Turkey when her delegates were invited to attend the Lausanne Conference on 27 October 1922 for negotiations.

The results of the events of 1919-1922 can be summarised as follows: There seemed to be two groups vitally interested in the settlement of the Turkish problem. Firstly, there was the defeated but legal government of the Caliph in Istanbul as well as the Nationalists in Anatolia. Secondly, there were the victorious Powers of the First World War whose interests and views were most often not in accord. In effect, the real struggle was between the British and the Nationalists in Anatolia.

The leaders of the National Movement frequently stressed the point that Britain was, in fact, their greatest enemy and that she was also an extremely sly one.⁵⁵ Britain was accused of provoking risings in Anatolia against the National Movement as well as sending troops to back such risings. Military and naval demonstrations of strength were another factor that made her the most-resented enemy.⁵⁶ At the same time, the Allies of Britain were not regarded as equally hostile and, in fact, the resentment against them was almost nil.

Some of the reasons for the development of the hostility between Turkey and Britain were firstly, the landing of Greek troops in Anatolia. The Turks believed that Britain was solely responsible for the Greek atrocities there. Secondly, while Nationalists fought against the Greek forces, Britain helped the formation of associations for intrigue using agents like monk Frew and Sait Molla to provoke risings against the Nationalists.⁵⁷ All of this was done in spite of her declared neutrality in the Greco-Turkish war.⁵⁸

Thirdly, Lloyd George's personality undoubtedly intensified Anglo-Turkish hostilities. His severe policy, rooted in his personal

54 F. Maurice, "The Crisis as Seen in Constantinople," *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. CXXII (December 1922), pp. 556-61.

55 *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. VII (January 3, 1921), pp. 146-60.

56 *Ibid.*, Vol. I (April 25, 1920), pp. 60, 220.

57 Atatürk, *Söylev*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 212-9.

58 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CLX (April 13, 1921), pp. 1137.

dislike of the Turk, was resented by his own Parliament and the British public, and was occasionally disowned by the Foreign Office. The role played by Venizelos in influencing Lloyd George's attitude towards Turkey was of major importance. The latter's great admiration for Hellenistic culture may have been another factor in influencing his anti-Turkish policy. His personal enmity for the Turks was so great that even after falling from power, he said, in reference to the Lausanne Treaty, that it was 'a disaster to civilisation.'⁵⁹ It may be safe to say that the majority of his misjudgements with relation to Turkey, were due mainly to his extreme and emotional hatred. For instance, on the eve of the Mudanya Armistice with Mustafa Kemal, he said:

"...Mustafa Kemal may be a great general and a great patriot; but the head of Islam is in Constantinople... He is the Caliph."⁶⁰

He believed, or wanted to believe, until the last minute, that the key to the solution of the Turkish problem lay in the Sultan-Caliph. Undoubtedly, it was most unfortunate for Anglo-Turkish relations, that Lloyd George was the British Prime Minister at this period.

Britain, the confident protagonist of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms clothed in chimerical hues of universal prosperity, became hostile, pessimistic, at best indifferent to the Turkish National Movement and reforms when they were autonomously pursued in a twentieth century generation to which the Great War had been the ultimate lesson in the fallacies of 'brotherhood through free trade.'

59 "The Turkish Victory at Lausanne," *Current Opinion*, Vol. LXXV (September 1923), pp. 277-278.

60 *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. CLVII (August 4, 1922), p. 2000.