

THE RECEPTION OF WESTERN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW NATIONS

Kemal H. KARPAT

I. Political change. Causes and Patterns

Profound political developments are underway in three major areas of the world. Large portions of Africa and Asia have achieved national statehood. Since the end of the Second World War not less than thirty-five countries, former colonies and mandates, have become independent and the remaining few are expected to become so in the next years. The traditional social and political organizations in the the new countries, as well as in Latin America, are moving towards larger socio-political units. This process of transition and evolution is generally referred to as Westernization or modernization, for the forms adopted, and the processes of building new organizations resemble the socio-political order of the West. Nominally many of the countries in the transitional stage reject the term "Westernization" in reaction to Western colonial domination, but objectively considered, the transition, whatever the name, is stimulated by western influences and aims at reproducing its way of life.

The present political controversy between the Eastern socialist bloc and the West should not obscure the basic fact that the first is an off-shot of Western civilization - Karl Marx represents one aspect of the Western social and political thought. The Soviet Union adopted Marxism at the end of a long process of modernization, started by Peter the Great under the influence of Europe. Possibly

Dr. Karpat, is associate professor of political science at the New York University, N. Y. This paper was presented to the Western Political Science Association meeting held at the University of California-Berkeley in April 15-16, 1960. It has been revised and brought up to date according to the latest developments. The references in the text are listed in the bibliography.

one of the major challenges faced by the political sociologist is to determine the extent to which Marxism in USSR was affected by the political traditions of imperial Russia. This seemingly elementary problem of traditional background influences is of capital importance in the comparative study of political systems. The scholar using the empirical approach is constantly faced with a backlog of cultural influences which often determine the speed, and sometimes even the special forms of modernization. It is in the latter case that the much discussed socialist versus capitalist orientation of the newly developing countries becomes relevant. But the question of orientation, however, is primarily a matter of foreign policy and should not be confused with the more basic question of institutional modernization.

The transition process taking place in developing countries, seems to present some major characteristics:

It appears as a new way of thinking, in which decision making and enforcement are rationalized and legitimized with a new socio-political philosophy, and economic goals. This in turn leads to the adoption of a corresponding modern political mechanism, that is to say the national state, which is both the agent and product of modernization.¹ Within the framework of national state there occurs an intensive interaction between the traditional culture and the Western values. So far no definite pattern seems to have emerged yet, although various trends are discernible².

The original stimulus for change in Asia and Africa came directly from the West which penetrated first these areas. It spread its influence through colonial policies, private individuals, commercial and religious organizations, or through a native elite who, for one reason or another, accepted the Western ways as superior. For about two centuries the West was the undisputed master of most of the developing areas. It therefore had the time and the means to indoctrinate the society with its own patterns of thought and compelled it to accept new socio-cultural goals resembling its own. The indoctrination occurred often unwittingly since dominated societies tend generally to emulate the superior political order.³

1 See Rupert Emerson *From Empire to Nation*, Boston 1963.

2 For a comparative study of two countries see Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow (eds), *The Political Modernization of Turkey and Japan*, Princeton 1964.

3 An incisive analysis of nationalism in the context of modernization in the Middle East can be found in Gustave von Grunebaum "*Problems of Muslim Nati-*

The West was able to break the social inertia of Asian and African societies and set them in motion. This began first by the creation of a native modernist intelligentsia, educated in Western-type schools. These were individuals who took up Western ideas, habits, and even dress, and looked upon their society with Western eyes. But often their national origin, religion or race set the dividing line whereby the ruling power that made them Western failed to accept them as equal. Nationalism, which in the ultimate analysis is the transposition of a Western political doctrine to the traditional society, made the native intellectual realize that they had been given only the fringe benefits of Western civilization as a price for becoming the obedient servants of the powers that controlled their native lands. The difference in rank existed everywhere; in the metropolitan country they were classified as inhabitants from the dependent areas; in their own mother land, when employed as civil servants or teachers, they were always under the supervision of a Westerner and received less pay than the Westerner regardless of their education and ability.⁴ The accumulating resentment to this treatment materialized when the native elites became large enough, and outside conditions enabled them to organize and defy their masters and to press for independence. Thus, anti-colonialism and anti-Westernism became the common attitude of Asian and African intellectuals. In those areas in which the natives humiliation and discrimination by colonial powers were more widespread, the intellectuals reacted by rejecting all that

onalism" in *Islam and the West* (ed. R. N. Frye) The Hague 1957, pp. 7-29. See also Albert Hourani, *Near Eastern Nationalism Yesterday and Today in Foreign Affairs*, October 1963, pp. 123-136.

4 The treatment accorded to various native groups also varied according to cultural affinity or economic interests. For instance, the French gave to Catholics in Indochina (Vietnam) and Maronites in Syria and Lebanon a preferential treatment. The English in Egypt supported the Turkish families, originally brought to power by Mehmet Ali. In the Ottoman Empire the Christian minorities were used as agents for Western economic enterprises and many of them became identified with the supporting country, and took up its citizenship. Of course these are ruling methods used by all conquering powers including the Muslim Empires. In Persia the *Digans* (tax collectors) preserved their positions for over a millenium under native kings, and later Muslim rulers. Later the Arabs used the Turks and Persians in the army and administration. Throughout history it seems that the *client* groups have played major part in instigating changes either in taking the power of their rulers, through the force of arms, as did the Mamelukes in Egypt, or, in modern times, by allying themselves with the masses against the dominant ruler. In the modern times the situation is further complicated with the rise of middle classes, whose economic and social interests often defy cultural affinities. For instance the Christian Arabs fathered Arab nationalism and continued to defend it even under the French rule (1920-45).

came from the West. They would return to their native culture and past to seek cultural and political arguments to counterbalance the Western claims of superiority. Kenyatta's book, *Facing Mount Kenya*, is probably one of the best documents describing how the West imbued a native with its own values and then refused to accept and judge him accordingly. This treatment forced him to return to his own people and seek redressment there. Yet, whatever the intensity and scope of this anti-Western reaction, one cannot escape the fact, as mentioned before, that it was caused by the transfer of Western nationalist attitudes and values to native culture.⁵ It must be pointed out that the nationalism in emerging countries, referred to as charismatic although contributing to independence, has caused also a fragmentation of the larger colonial domains under which they had been ruled in the past. In the emerging countries the prevailing tendency is still one of political fragmentation, even in the independent entities. It is too early to predict whether the second phase of nationalism would develop into a drive for unification. The movement for Arab unity, considered to have best chances of success has not produced lasting results yet.

Yet, the Western influence in the emerging countries continues to make itself felt, not only in the leaders way of thinking but also in their attempts to establish political organizations. The Western political influence in the emerging countries stems basically from two sources: French and English, even though their colonial empires are mostly liquidated now. The French emphasis on centralization has helped break down the narrow parochialism of native society. The importance attached to rationalization and intellect has encouraged the emergence of a group of alert and progressive-minded intellectuals. These have often embraced socialism merely to turn into an elite group aloof from their people. On the other hand, the French addiction to definitions, to perfect legal systems, and their attempts to assimilate the natives into the mystique of French culture, have resulted in dogmatism and the loss of practical touch with the socio-economic problems of the community. Until very recently French statesmen took pains to describe their colonial system as different from the English; since they aimed at a close union of their colonies with the mother country, they, therefore, opposed

⁵ Nationalism which seemed discredited as philosophy after the second world war, has been reappraised as still a viable force in the developing areas.

all separatist movements. With the Fifth Republic the situation was changed and local government was more widely applied.

The English influence was evident in the concept of the supremacy of law, respect for individual rights, and representative government, as well as in the idea of cultivating a direct interest in the social and economic problems of the community. In administration, local government, *indirect* rule - not always with good results - was widely applied by the English. These features of the English policy had lasting effects. (The Indians, who originally encouraged *satyagrah* -civil disobedience- in violation of the English ideal of law and order, during their struggle for independence, have changed later their attitudes and rejected *satyagrah*.) In India "even at the height of the freedom struggle" according to a native, "there never was hesitation at expressing appreciation for British parliamentary institutions. It was British liberal thought which encouraged the Indian desire to be free..."⁶

It is true that this British policy was dictated by self-interest, but it projected onto dependent areas, to paraphrase James S. Coleman, the traditional British political theory and practice regarding local government and representative institutions of England. It must also be added that the London School of Economics which served as the ideological cradle for many leaders in Asia and Africa has left a deep impact upon their thinking. H. Laski, G.D.H. Cole, and other British economists and social thinkers might have given these leaders a taste for Marxism but they indoctrinated them also with the ideas of representative government and respect for human freedom and dignity.

In Asia and Africa, French or English languages became the means of communication for the native elites, for they belonged to a maze of cultural and linguistic groups. Even today these languages are still used as official language in some of the newly independent states. Finally, the major element that accounts for the depth of Western influence is the duration of Western domination. In areas in which the Western rule was long, habits of representative government and Western ways of thinking struck deep roots. On the other hand, one gathers the impression that the Dutch left little influence in Indonesia, despite their long occupation of this country.

⁶ Sharokh Sabarala, "What Chances for India's Middle Way?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 24, 1960.

In some areas, such as in India, the inherent capacity of the native culture to assimilate outside influences into its own system, played considerable part in accepting and assimilating Western concepts. But whenever the native culture was rigid and did not permit assimilation, the outside concepts and institutions, even when introduced by a native elite, as in the Ottoman Empire, had to be superimposed by force upon the traditional structure, but for the most part these remained syncretic. In the case of countries of Islamic culture, the study of political modernization faces a special theoretical difficulty deriving from the fact that politics and government organizations were incorporated into the religious-moral system whose goals they served. Although secularism solved formally the problem in two or three countries by separating religion from politics, in reality the habits and attitudes inherited from the traditional monolithic organization survived. It is in this context that the modern political systems in Islamic countries tend to transcend functional boundaries and embrace the totality of moral, ethical and cultural problems with the same normative goals as the religion based systems of the past. The emergence of new social groups and philosophies create the conditions for a dualistic political system, but so far totalitarian monolithic tendencies have prevailed, except for Turkey, where this trend seems to have been reversed and dualist foundations developed⁷.

The Soviet Union furnishes another source of inspiration for political modernization, more as a practical alternative for quickening the society's transition to a modern stage rather than as an ultimate goal. The Soviets are still encountering social problems resembling those of the emerging countries, and this gives them a clearer understanding of the motivation for modernization in the new nations. Yet, the Soviet Union has failed to satisfy the democratic liberal tendencies of some elites in the developing areas. The totalitarian structures established in most of these areas have not developed yet absolute controls, and for the most part representative political institutions still remain as professed ultimate goal. And probably in the ultimate analysis what really matters is the spirit that dominates an institution, rather than its form.

⁷ A new conceptual approach on the political modernization of the Middle East may be found in Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton, 1963.

2. Background influences affecting the reception of new institutions.

Political institutions play a vital role in the process of social and political modernization, not only as centers generating ideas and actions but also as symbols of emancipation and national pride. They also become the foci around which the reintegration of society takes place. The political institutions of the emerging states present, at this stage, certain common characteristics.⁸ But before dealing with these, it is necessary to point out that each of the developing areas -and their respective subdivisions- require individual analysis to determine the nature of local forces likely to speed up, delay or determine the course of transition. Latin America deserves special attention in this context, not only because of its special cultural relations to the West, but also because the national state has long been in existence in this part of the world. Many of the social and political institutions, long in existence in Latin America, are barely striking roots in Asia and Africa. While the latter countries are in the initial stage of political modernization, the Latin American countries are on the threshold of a major internal evolution. This may be described as a movement to democratize their political systems. Economic development is relatively advanced in a number of Latin American countries as to necessitate the enlargement of the social and economic bases of political institutions. It seems, therefore, that the fundamental problem in Latin America consists of transferring the political power held by small landed groups, the army and the clergy, to institutions representing larger popular groups, and enable them to participate more effectively in political life.

The effect of broadening political bases in Latin America is clearly demonstrated by the fact that political parties with socio-economic orientation attract popular participation, and with proper balance, achieve some stability. For instance, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, with multiparty, one-party and two-party systems respectively, owe their relative stability to a fairly balanced socio-economic representation. On the other hand, the Peronista and Aprista parties of the past, found a large popular following (larger than

⁸ These should not be confused with the four characteristics, common to all political systems, as cited by Gabriel Almond in the introduction to *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1960.

we like to admit) because they justified their monopoly of power by the imperatives of economic and social development supposedly aiming at general welfare. These parties, which departed drastically from the ideal of representative government, paradoxical enough, appear to have rendered some service to democracy by emphasizing economic objectives and by achieving social mobilization. Among such parties one may cite the Trabalhistas of Brazil, the Partido Revolucionario Cubano, born after Machado's fall in 1934 in Cuba, the Partido Febrerista of Paraguay, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario of Bolivia and the Accion Democratica of Venezuela.

The new nations of Africa and Asia, despite many common characteristic and similar developmental problems, appear divided by political differences of historical and institutional nature. The Asian society, be it in the Middle East or South East, has long known traditional political organizations in the form of autocratic empires or local dynasties. Social groups in Asia have been subject to authoritarian political indoctrination, which supplemented by religious currents, produced a wide range of deeply ingrained values and beliefs that cannot easily be replaced by Western ones. Moreover, various types of civilization of the traditionalist type have saturated the Asian society with myriad rigid rules and social organizations, which leave little room for the new ones. The importance of these institutions and rules, strongly imbedded in the social mores, lies in the fact that they retain the loyalties of the native population and prevent, or at least delay, the development of loyalties to the new Western institutions. For instance, the Panchayat system of village administration of India, despite its many excellent features, is actually a victory for traditionalism. For the Panchayat preserves some of the traditional beliefs of the order which counter the modernist aims professed by large segments of intelligentsia.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey was compelled to adopt a thorough program of Westernization and to reject officially the old order, based on experience gained from the Ottoman Empire. The latter attempted to modernize itself by imposing new institutions on the top of the old, and thus jeopardized the functions of both. This may be an oversimplification of the Ottoman attempt at modernization, but it does point out the nearly impossible task of fusing institutions and beliefs belonging to two different systems. The leader

in Asia, therefore, transplanting Western institutions, must possess unusual qualities to harmonize them with the native ones, by stressing their practical value rather than relying on arbitrary value judgments. Experience has shown that some of the institutions in the old order could be restored to life, if their functional aspects are emphasized.

African society south of Sahara, offers a much better chance for the successful reception of Western political institutions. The religious, social and political integration of Africa in the past remained behind that of Asia. The historical studies by Africologists, praising the native cultural past, do not detract from the fact that social stratification and the system of beliefs in Africa is not supported by a traditional political structure as old as in Asia, to provide lasting resistance to Western political ideas. Like all the newly integrating societies, Africa has fewer cultural obstacles to overcome, and consequently better chances to adapt rapidly rational modern systems to local conditions, once the proper political organization has been firmly established. (The United States of America is a typical example of a country which developed without the cumbersome burden of imbedded political traditions. In this respect the American political system is indeed new.)⁹

In Africa today, the old social organizations are being assimilated into new organizations, especially into those connected with labor and welfare, far more rapidly and firmly than in Asia. The successful modernization of Africa was facilitated by economic development, which has affected the social structure and has created an organic need for new modern institutions. The rapid urbanization, taking place in some African countries, has altered fundamentally the structure of tribal society and opened promising avenues for the future. The urban population of formerly Belgian Congo, for instance, was over 21 per cent in 1954, which compares favorably with Indonesia's 15, or Vietnam's 11 per cent, and even with the Philippine's 24 per cent. James S. Coleman makes a penetrating observation about the future impact of modernization by stating that "Africans coming from small autonomous local communities or from widely dispersed tribal communities have tended to adapt themselves more readily to the symbols of and membership in modern-

⁹ See Seymour M. Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, New York, 1963.

scale political units. Conversely the loyalties and sentiments of Africans coming from archaic state systems have tended to be less malleable, particularly where those systems were preserved under indirect rule."¹⁰ One of the reasons for which the English granted independence to African countries was their belief that economic development and social integration had proceeded far enough there to provide a basis for self government. By the same token, enough dependence on and security for British capital was assured. In any event the economic development on one hand, and lesser ingrained resistance to Western ideas on the other, place Africa in an excellent position and gives it better chances than Asia to effect a successful transition to a modern stage.

The success of the African experiment depends upon a foresighted leadership capable of avoiding the innumerable pitfalls that new nations encounter. Excessive nationalism, and expansionist dreams, are some of the immediate dangers, while lack of well-trained professionals is a long-range handicap. Some of the present leaders have given proof of moderation, while others have shown disquieting symptoms of vindictiveness and a desire for personal aggrandizement. The All-African People's Conference, held in Tunis in January 1960, and led by leaders of Ghana and Guinea, had neo-colonialism as its main theme. The imperialists, according to this theory, were trying to resume control of Africa by economic aid, balkanization (division of Africa into small states), and affiliation of African organizations with international bodies.

3. Institutional adaptations; The national state.

The second and main part of this article aims at dealing with the actual reception of some Western institutions, such as the political state, parliaments, political parties, trade unions, and the civil service. We shall not attempt to emphasize the technique of adoption but rather the reasons for and the mode of reception, as well as the changes in the role of these institutions when transferred to Asia and Africa. We visualize all political institutions as born or borrowed with the purpose of meeting or of creating a need. Consequently, the survival of these institutions depends largely on their functional ability to serve an end, either actual or symbolic. In this context all

¹⁰ See reference in the bibliography.

the institutions dealt with in this study are considered chiefly in their functional role, although at times reference will be made to their normative value aspects.

Rational administration, political freedom and progress as understood in the West, are possible only within a political framework, the state, which recognizes them, prescribes the rules for their use, and opposes any internal or external infringement upon them. This is a rationalized process. The political state is geared to serve the needs of complex societies. It secures allegiance from groups and individuals, voluntarily or involuntarily, and generates images and philosophies of the universe and mankind according to the mentality of groups ruling it. In the final analysis it is the arena in which two processes vital to social evolution, and eventually to representative democracy, can take place. First, individuals here are brought together around political symbols, which create a new kind of allegiance transcending family or groups loyalty. Second, the modern political state produces a diversity of interests and personalities, which in turn generate tension and a new process of evolution. The progress of Western society itself came about with the establishment of the modern state. Society and state complemented and stimulated each other's development.

The modern political state ¹¹ in the emerging countries of Africa and Asia is in its infancy. Governments in these countries are engaged in building a state as part of modernization, but also as the prime condition for it. Great obstacles face their endeavor, for few of these countries have achieved yet full political integration. The individual in Asia, and Africa is still fiercely attached to his family, clan, tribe, or religious organization. He cannot see himself, as part of a larger political-social unit such as the state or nation. When the British decided on a policy of independence for Malaya after 1946, there was no organized nation to whom power could be handed over. Anti-colonialism may stir groups to present a united front to the outside world, leaving the impression that these groups are motivated by consensus on a wide range of issues. Yet, the political front collapses

¹¹ Even though aware of the dangers involved, we use the term "state" and "government" separately merely for the sake of convenience. The first is intended to describe the framework and the totality of groups charged with specific functions within it, whereas the term "government" is being used in the continental sense as being the agent of state. In practice, needless to say, these differences remain theoretical.

as soon as the emotion is spent and the individual returns to his customary life. Often he refuses to relate the happenings in his village to those in the country, or vice-versa, although the sporadic political meetings may leave him with the impression that he belongs to social bodies larger than his primary groups. The role of political parties in developing national identity, deserves special emphasis in this respect.

The national state appears at the beginning as the ideal of only the small minority of modern-minded leaders. They discover that the establishment of a modern state is possible only by combining the tribal groups into larger political units and by liquidating influences leading to fragmentation. This is accomplished often by forcing the old structure into new organizations. These new institutions, as pointed out by David Apter, become vehicles for conducting government business and orientational foci around which the society reintegrates itself. In the initial stage of institutional transplantation and transformation, the old chieftains or local lords who held power under the traditionalist order may find it advantageous to support the new structure. In the traditional society kinship ties dominate. So the chieftains may feel close to the leaders of the new emerging state for they all may come from the same environment and may speak the same dialect or have the same religion. The chieftain or local lord may believe initially that a new organization might assure him better protection, and may even permit him to enlarge his own authority. After independence these chieftains may receive additional power by acquiring new positions. Yet, the situation does change rapidly. The modern state cannot tolerate within its own structure any kind of organization that has the potential to destroy its own supremacy. So the tribal leader, and the landlord have either to bow out and see their group or domain incorporated into the new structure, or stand up and try to prevent it. The landlords and *seyhs* (religious leaders) who wholeheartedly supported Mustafa Kemal's liberation movement in 1919-22, turned against him and revolted in 1925, as soon as the modern secular state which Kemal was trying to establish, threatened to destroy their own religious and social supremacy. In Turkey they were subdued; elsewhere in the Near East, in Iran and Iraq (prior to Kassim), for instance, these traditional chiefs secured control of government and used it for their own advantage, thus preventing in large measure the establishment of

a truly modern state. And of course one has to consider the social origin, philosophy and structure of the groups acquiring power.

The modern state relies on moral, spiritual, philosophical or interest bonds to unite together the members of a community. Thus, common culture, language, or economic interest, and even religion (Pakistan) may furnish the ideological bases for a modern state. But these must acquire the form of a political philosophy, if the state is to survive at all. In reality most of the developing states often lack common language, religion or culture, and even if they possess them the fusion into a philosophy of nationalism is effected rather slowly. Yet, the reaction against the colonial power and the desire for recognition produces a new kind of nationalism, which backed by political power keeps the new group together. Despite this spontaneous-charismatic nationalism¹², the developing countries lack the benefit of more deeply rooted political philosophies. An Arab may answer this statement by pointing to Ibn Khaldun's philosophy, and an Indian may indicate Ghandi, others may point out the thinkers who may antedate the Western political philosophers. The truth is that few of these philosophies are truly political and very few indeed can be applied to the modern state.

Political philosophy is predominantly of Western origin. Ibn Khaldun had a philosophy of history, while Ghandi's teachings, instrumental in achieving independence, had certain aspects opposed to the modern concept of power. Ghandi's rejection of authority and his insistence on detachment from power, even on the part of the leader, prevented open competition for position and created disinterest in government. This led to a hypocritical attitude on the part of office seekers, who vied for position and used every available trick to secure it. Yet, they claimed all the same, that they had no personal interest in power, that they strived for public good and wanted to prevent the "bad" fellow from getting onto saddle. The moralistic and not the functional view thus prevailed.

Asian society is governed by an inertia, which extends to all aspects of human life. It is supported by asceticism which in turn

¹² The developing countries may find the roots of their nationalism in history. Yet, there is not any convincing evidence to prove that this nationalism is older than a few decades. The arguments used to prove that the roots of Arab nationalism are to be found in a period antedating Islam are not convincing. One of the most representative studies in this field, is by Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, Los Angeles, 1962. For broader reference see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, 1952.

condemns worldly pleasure and hence is a cultural impediment to economic development. The problem, therefore, is to find a philosophy which can overcome inertia and asceticism, and galvanize the society into action. Communism appears suitable to this goal, but it violates the basic Asian traditions which oppose discipline, regimentation, mental and physical effort, all of which make up the arsenal of Communist ideology.

There is no ready-made political philosophy to be recommended for use in the emerging states. Eventually, conditions may improve and lead to the formulation of some basic guiding philosophy. Some leaders attempted to formulate a political philosophy for their respective countries, for example Nasser's and Nkrumah's essays on revolution. But these certainly do not offer plans for long-range activity. Even Mustafa Kemal's well-planned and comprehensive attempt to create a political philosophy for the Turkish Republic was only partially successful. This resulted partly because nationalism, the basis of the Republican regime lost its touch with positive cultural elements and reoriented itself to the past, and because the traditional understanding of government and authority, as well as the social organization were kept largely intact.

4. Economic and social development and their political role.

Most Asian and African leaders agree that the establishment of a modern state is vitally dependent on economic development to provide welfare and sustain the new institutions, including the army. Economic development is well under way in Asia and Africa. It was initiated by the colonial powers and has been resumed with zeal by the leaders in all emerging countries to the point where it has become their basic goal. Economic development has already disrupted the old social organization, as mentioned before, and has led to the establishment of a series of new institutions, such as labor and welfare organizations. Many of these are working at the community level, and tend to become an inherent part of the modern state. They also serve as models of democracy and representative government, for the people learn through them, by trial and error, how to govern themselves and how, by governing themselves properly, they can live more humanly and securely. Governments themselves initiate and support social organizations rooted in rational economic acti-

vities as likely to consolidate the establishment of a new order. In Ghana, for instance, the power of the government is based on the farmers and trade unions; the former organized under the name of United Ghana Farmers Council, the latter in a federation. The government has also established the Builders Brigade to take and train school-leavers in various skills. A Pioneer Youth Movement and a Vanguard Activists Organization are planned to provide for political leadership in the community. Presently, however, these organizations are being used by President Nkrumah to establish his own power. Yet, this development cannot obscure the fact that the new social organizations continue to mobilize and educate the society, which in turn may develop resistance to the leader.

A considerable number of people fear that the urgent need for economic development in the emerging countries may facilitate the emergence of strong governments and lead to the eventual annihilation of individual freedom. It is not definitely proven that economic development supported by the state leads necessarily to the denial of individual freedom if the philosophy underlying such development is not totalitarian. The case of England, which preserved its political freedoms under the Labor Party, is a striking example. In fact, it is difficult to expect any kind of economic development in the emerging states without some government participation.

Governments support the accumulation of capital and investment simply because private capital in the country is lacking, foreign capital cannot easily enter the country for lack of favorable conditions. If economic development in an emerging country does not follow a one hundred per cent capitalist line, the alternative is not necessarily Communism, as some implied to be the case. Between the two extremes there is a wide range of economic systems that may well suit the conditions in emerging countries. As for control and coercion, one must admit that some sort of indirect or direct compulsory planning existed in all countries at the initial stage of their economic development.

Studies connected with the history of industrialization in Western Europe prove that a certain amount of state power was used to bring about economic development which, once achieved, led to the establishment of a firmer democratic rule. One scholar (K. de Schweintz) even found that the initial industrial development in England and the use of coercion there, bore some resemblance to the methods

used in the economic development of Soviet Union. One should be prepared, therefore, to accept some government participation in the economic life of the emerging countries, if economic development and a modern structure are to be achieved at all. Unfortunately, economic development is being often used as a pretext to develop totalitarian systems. Admittedly it is extremely difficult to draw the line between economic development and political freedom and the ultimate outcome in this field is often determined by the political philosophy underlying economic development. Cultural and political background often play a crucial part in determining the government's attitude towards economic development, and thus pave the way for an etatist or an individualistic economic philosophy. The state philosophy could be altered substantially later when new social groups with diverse interests acquire power and alter the government's policy. This is in fact a latter phase of modernization, which is outside the scope of this article.

Modernization obviously imposes on the emerging states of Asia and Africa, a wide range of acute social, economic and political problems which can be solved only by quick action. Often decisions must be arbitrary, not only because the mechanism for broader participation in decision - making is lacking, but also because the odds are that certain groups may effectively oppose modern reforms if they had a real voice in decision-making. The leading intelligentsias have justified their authoritarian actions by claiming that a modern state cannot be established without infringing upon some cherished traditions, especially in matters of authority and organization.

A powerful charismatic leader may carry out some change until reaction threatens to out-balance his powers. At this stage he has to rely upon some organized authority both to maintain the existing modern structure and carry on further changes. Nkrumah of Ghana defended "benevolent dictatorship until the country has achieved a level of development facilitating real independence." He, and Sekou Touré of Guinea have declared themselves in favor of a *centralized* democracy implying that all citizens should be involved in making major decisions and forced to obey them through a single party. Sukarno of Indonesia has long been on record for a *guided democracy*, which calls for a strong executive, to last until the necessary social and economic bases for democracy, such as economic development, a fair-sized middle class, and a large group of professionals, have

been properly established. All these indicate that Asia and Africa would go through a period of strong government¹³.

The Executive assumes the dominating position in the emerging states, whereas the other branches of the government are subordinated to it, even though the Constitution may grant equal powers to all branches. The modernizing countries before the Second World War borrowed Western Constitutions and strove to establish some checks and balances among all three branches of government, although in practice such provisions remained meaningless, for the Executive soon acquired control. For instance, the liberal constitutions of the Young Turks of 1908, and Iran of 1906, were soon amended in 1911, and 1921-25 respectively, and the Executive emerged supreme.

Many of the leaders in the emerging states openly accept Executive supremacy as a basic principle. Ngo Dinh Diem, the former Premier of South Vietnam, was quoted by J.A.C. Grant, to have declared that the "vital issue is to establish an effective state apparatus.... a weak and powerless Executive will bring about discontent and indignation... a strong and efficient executive organization capable of rapidly solving the complex and urgent problems is a guarantee for democratic regime." These leaders seem to think that liberal regimes are inadequate to meet all the problems of an emerging state, at the initial stage at least, and to provide at the same time effective resistance to the lure of dynamic leadership offered by Communism. Thus, a strong Executive in the hands of a modern intelligentsia appears as most suitable instrument for the establishment of a modern state. In Burma, Malaya, Vietnam and Pakistan, where civilians have proven incapable of meeting the challenge, the Army has taken over and provided strong and dynamic leadership. In Turkey, on the other hand, the military's intervention in politics in 1960, was caused by the malfunctioning of democracy, as well as by structural changes¹⁴ and ended by consolidating the representative system.

13 Sad enough such authoritarian tendencies appear well after the initial work has been accomplished. It results primarily from the power ambitions of various groups, which is often rationalized with the slogans of democracy and modernization.

14 Since we intend to deal with this problem in greater detail elsewhere, we shall not analyze it any further.

It is rather depressing to view as inevitable a period of Executive domination in the emerging states of Africa and Asia. There is no safeguard to prevent domination from turning permanent or from leading to an exclusive technological modernization, with little room for representative government, as in pre-war Japan. The comforting thought that democracy will be triumphant in the end is based on the utterances of Asian and African leaders, who regard authoritarianism not as an end in itself, but only as a short and unavoidable expediency to overcome the handicaps of underdevelopment. These leaders appear basically dedicated to freedom and democracy as an ultimate end. Their actions often contradicted their vows, but many leaders took the pains to justify their authoritarian conduct as having been caused by lack of adequate bases on which to erect a stable democracy. For them, in theory at least, representative institutions still seem to represent the symbol of political maturity. The future generations may use these ideas as premises to advance claims for democracy and freedom. The Turkish example, as a country in the second phase of modernization is an excellent precedent to predict future developments in Africa and Asia. For instance, the oppositon in Turkey in 1946-50, supported its claim for liberalization with the argument that the one-party rule in 1923-45, was accepted only in order to establish modern foundations for Turkey. Since this goal had been reached, there was no reason to preserve the strong government.

The turning point in the political evolution of the emerging states may come about when the place of present leaders is taken by their successors. The latter, lacking the charismatic power of today's leaders may find it really difficult to fulfill their tasks without further expanding the power of the Executive and entrenching themselves firmly in command. The prospect of weak leaders and the lack of operative forces in Asian society to produce integration has led some scholars, to advocate the strengthening of a social group, namely the Army, as a possible source of leadership and opposition to Communism. Guy Pauker claimed that the Army in Southeast Asia was in a situation different from Latin America and Europe, and would not perpetuate itself in power. It had the position of a reformer and looked upon itself as a moderate force charged with the mission of modernization. This opinion stems from foreign policy motives and ignores largely internal developments, particularly the reactions among lower social groups to Army .

The Legislatures or Parliaments in Asia and Africa seem to have lost their Western meaning and role. Each of these countries possesses a Legislature (usually a single chamber assembly designed to speed up the legislative process), which in practice is subject to the control of the Executive. The Legislature often serves as a rostrum to publicize the policies of the Executive, and secure their formal approval. The legislative checks are rather insignificant, and the Opposition's attempts to exercise them are considered ill-intentioned, obstructive tactics. The Opposition, in Africa in particular, as it was in Latin America a decade ago, is treated often as a subversive and treasonable group. The Preventive Detention Act passed by the majority Convention People's Party has enabled the government of Ghana to jail opposition members at will. (In India, which remains the most advanced democracy among the emerging countries, the Parliament can balance the Executive. The Parliament here has established some original committees - Delegated Legislation and Assurance - that follow up the fate of bills enacted by the Legislature.) In other countries, however, when Parliaments oppose the Executive they are either dissolved or brought, with speedy constitutional amendments, under the domination of the former. On the other hand, few leaders appear willing to rule by decree or executive order for long. The belief in the magic power of formal statutes, still persists. For the common citizen, a law formally enacted is still being associated with his traditional beliefs, that authority has miraculous origin and that law-making bodies have taken their authority from a divine source.

5. Political parties in the emerging nations

The dynamic force behind the emerging modern states and their Executives is the political party. As a matter of fact much of the transformation and activity centers around political parties.

A political party in the West is a means through which individuals and groups acquire access to and effect changes in government. In the emerging states of Asia and Africa, political parties are born directly from the movement for independence, and appear often as an aggregation of interests and tendencies without a central political philosophy. A party may represent marxist, nationalist, traditionalist and liberal tendencies all at the same time, depending on the orientation of the component groups. The party systems in the emer-

ging states can be classified as authoritarian, dominant non-authoritarian, two-party and multi-party, but all groups once in power tend to act empirically, by advocating policies likely to meet short range problems.

We said that the government parties appear in the initial phase of their existence as national movements for self-government. In this "missionary" capacity, they become intolerant of the opposition, although theoretically they may not rule out the existence of other parties. At one time Kassim of Iraq, allowed the establishment of political organizations by declaring that "political parties are vital to Iraqi freedom as rivers to agriculture." In reality, however, Iraq's political life was directed by one single party. After Kassim's overthrow in 1963, the Baath party acquired the power, but without permitting other parties to activate freely.

The government party in an emerging state may claim all the credit for achieving independence, even though substantial effort in this direction, might have been spent by another organization. Dr. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party was built on the wreckage of Dr. Danguah's United Gold Coast Convention in 1948, when the latter failed to react to the discontent caused by the fall in cocoa price and by rising unemployment. Nkrumah organized strikes and riots and once his organization was strengthened he put forth the demands for self-determination. In Indonesia, Sukarno established the Partai Nasional Indonesia in 1927, because of the indecision and hesitation of the large Islamic organization, *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Association) to participate actively in politics. In Turkey the People's Republican Party, was rooted in the Associations for Defence of Rights organized to resist foreign occupation in 1918-19, which in turn were mainly local branches of the Union and Progress Party dissolved in 1918.

The political party, which is instrumental in winning the struggle for self-government tends to perpetuate itself in power as the symbol of independence and nationhood. The Congress Party of India, born originally as a group striving for independence, is still preserving its original, all embracing features instead of representing a given segment of population or special interest group as the Indian minority parties. In Turkey, the People's Republican Party attempted to introduce a multi-party in 1946-50, but did not quite succeed to learn how to live with it. Even today, after a period of ten years in

opposition, and three in coalition with other parties, it still regards itself as though exclusively entrusted with the mission of establishing a modern Turkey. Often these "missionary" parties tend to become expansionist, not only by attempts to incorporate territories which they deem their own, but also by instigating independence movements in neighboring territories. Sukarno's party in Indonesia, and his opposition to Malaysia and the expansionist attitude of some parties in Africa, are the best examples of this. In Congo, the Abako party of Kasavubu, which led the movement for independence, plans eventually to unite the French and Portuguese Congo in a Union of the Republic of Central Africa. The same situation prevails in Ghana.

The opposition parties of Asia and Africa usually represent a variety of local social and cultural groups, rather than ideologies. Thus, the United Party of Ghana, now only a shadow opposition, represents the Ashantis as a distinct social or linguistic group, which fears the domination of other groups. The majority of India's some fifty opposition political parties represent religious communities, castes or language groups. The fourth largest party in that country, Jan Sangh, is a Hindu communal party. In Nigeria, the Action Group of the Western Region, the Northern People's Congress of the Northern Region and the National Council of Nigeria all represent linguistic groups, among whom the Yorubas deserve special mention. In other instances, labor or religious groups may unite around one specific party. In South Vietnam, the National Revolutionary Movement, the party formerly in power was opposed by the Citizens Assembly which was a Catholic group, by the Labor Party, and by the Movement to Win and Preserve Freedom, the latter being the party of the Liberals.

In some instances the opposition parties may harbor dissatisfied intellectuals who failed to acquire a position in the new state. In other instances they may represent the residuum of ruling groups, which attempt to preserve their social positions. Finally, opposition may develop within the ruling party itself, and if not confined within party ranks by some compromises, it may burst into the open in the form of a new party.

It must be added that inherited traditional concepts of power affect even the relations between the government party and the opposition. In the Muslim countries both, the Sunni and especially the Shiite teachings concede no place to an opposition, since such oppo-

sition is utterly incompatible with the theocratic conception of state. The elite in government had an absolute monopoly of power and claimed to possess the wisdom to decide on the fate of the entire society.¹⁵ The opposition represented in Islam by religious sects was never incorporated into the state and this led it to seek power through every possible means including assassination. These attitudes rooted in traditional Islam were transferred to the modern state and preserved within the framework of would-be parliamentarianism.

The government and opposition parties are usually built around one strong individual, who commands loyalty. Prince Siha-nouk of Cambodia organized the Sangkum-Socialist Party and won all the seats in the elections of 1955, and all 68 seats contested in 1958. He then apologized for his "too complete success" resulting from his popularity.

Africa and Asia offer an extremely suitable ground for political activity. The constant mobilization of the social strata results in mass participation in politics. The leaders calculatedly enlist the masses to support their ambitious plans for independence and modernization. In Africa, the movement for independence met some local opposition at the beginning. Certain groups mistrusted the native leaders, either because they belonged to different cultural groups or because they believed that the leaders merely wanted lucrative jobs in the new state. Many commoners thought that the colonial officials were impartial and honest, and worked for social welfare and, therefore, they saw little reason to change the situation. But the intelligentsia involved the chieftains into party work, by giving them important party jobs and succeeded in overcoming the apathy. They soon became identified with the party and following the directives from the top, visualized their problems and aspirations from the viewpoint of their respective political group. Once the chieftains participation was secured, the kins followed the example of the leader and supported his party, although in some cases the question of party allegiance gave rise to intra-group dissension.

6. Political parties, labor and the civil service.

The political parties established in some emerging states in Asia (especially the Middle East) and Africa prior to the Second World

¹⁵ Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) said: "Every Arab regards himself as worthy to rule, and it is rare to find one of them submitting willingly to another, be it his father, or his brother or the head of his clan, but only grudgingly and for fear of public opinion."

War, drew strength from small groups of landed lords and intellectuals, and as a whole had little contact with the masses at large. They represented the upper social crust, and found it practical and advisable not to involve the workers or peasants in political action. The contemporary political parties, e. g., those established during and after the war to fight colonialism relied rather heavily on the industrial workers and often the trade unions become the backbone of the political parties. In India, the Trade Union Congress still works closely with the ruling party, the Hind Masdoor Sabha Trade Union Federation supports the Praja Socialist Party and the All-India Trade Union Congress supports the Communists. In Indonesia, the Central Trade Union Federation (SOBSI) supported the Communist party. The African leaders Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, Tom Mboya, are supported primarily by modern trade unions. Thus, the development of strong labor facilitated first the other kinds of modern organizations. Originally, many of the trade unions achieved internal strength through the policy of colonial powers which, while suppressing political groups, left the trade unions free. Soon, the leadership on trade unions was assumed by politically minded intellectuals and the unions became centers of political activity. The intellectuals supplied ideas and leadership in exchange for organized support.

The liberal attitude of the colonial powers towards labor, stemmed first from the desire to organize and train the native labor for better productivity; second, to divert opposition from the government to private employees; third, to establish some control against outside social currents; and fourth, to please the trade unions in the mother country which demanded freedom for their colleagues in the colonies. Only the French prevented the establishment of trade unions in most of their colonies until after the Second World War.

In some instances, the trade unions in the emerging nations reflect the organizational pattern of the old social system. Some of the local trade unions are run by foremen of the old, traditional guilds (*cays* in Indonesia, *sardars* in India) who rule their own village-mates. In Bangkok the Samlor, Pedicab Drivers Union, was organized by former army generals from among ex-soldiers. But the top trade unions leaders in Asia and Africa belong to the group of modern-minded intellectuals and are closely associated with the government. These leaders fought against colonialism and cannot be blamed by Communists for being the "servants of capitalism", and so their prestige remains unimpaired.

In the Near East (except in Israel) the trade unions played a rather insignificant part in politics. Only in Turkey, where the number of industrial workers has soared to over a million, stringent laws have been amended since 1960, and labor is emerging as a strong political force. The insignificance of the labor movement in the Near East can be explained by the fact that economic development was limited in scope, and in large measure benefitted the traditional power groups. Thus, in the Middle East the social and cultural aspects of economic development were overlooked, and the real progress to be gained from a progressive democratic labor force was forfeited. In contrast to the limited political role of labor in this area, the Army appears as the main force of change, a function dictated by the military's special position in society and in its culture. This may change soon. In conclusion it may be stated that the modern trade unions appear as vital structures in the emerging state, not only for supporting the modernist governments, but also for becoming the means through which the individual learns to reintegrate himself in new organizations larger than his tribe or family.

The Civil Service appears in a rather awkward situation, somehow out of step with the post-colonial developments. Many of the native civil services were organized during the colonial period and served the interest of the Western powers. The native civil servants, although not enjoying the same benefits as the civil servant from the metropolitan country, had usually a better income and higher status than many of his fellow natives.

Some of these civil servants became associated with nationalist movements, but the majority remained passive to the struggle for independence. Afterwards they were looked upon with resentment for having served the colonial administration. The truth remains, nevertheless, that in those places in which the colonial administration left a well-trained group of officials, these proved to be of invaluable assistance to the emerging state. The Indian Civil Service, created through the constitutional acts of 1911 and 1913, stands today among the best civil service in the world and is a great asset to modernization and industrialization. The role of the well-trained group of civil servants in modernizing countries is clearly demonstrated by the example of Japan, where technological advancement was greatly enhanced by a qualified civil service.

Presently, the civil service jobs in some of the emerging countries are bestowed as special favors to political followers without much

regard to ability or performance. In other instances, government jobs, particularly in foreign service, are given to members of leading families. In some places, however, government jobs have lost their attraction. In Turkey, for instance, government positions, highly coveted in the past, have diminished in prestige in the last ten years, since economic development has opened better opportunities in private enterprises.

The administrative system enforced by colonial powers had a deep impact upon structural transformation. Whenever the colonial powers directly administered the population, (such being the case of British and French *direct* rule in some African areas) the tribal authority was disrupted and the latterday integration into larger political units facilitated. But, in cases of *indirect* rule which preserved the tribal councils and ruled the country through them, the old social structure was preserved and even strengthened. This in turn prevented the establishment of uniform rules and standards so essential to a modern state. Thus, in matters of administration, the central unitary form of government seems to have priority, even though a federal form of government may be formally accepted, chiefly to placate various cultural and linguistic groups.

7. Conclusion

The emerging countries of Asia and Africa are rapidly adopting Western institutions with the purpose of establishing a modern society. The adoption appears as a change of native values and beliefs, and organizations which resemble the Western patterns.

The modernization of the Asian and African societies is accompanied by economic development, the breaking down of the traditional social order, and by a new social reintegration in the form of a national state. Thus, the Western institutions appear as the cause of and means for structural changes rather than their results. In the West, such institutions resulted from structural changes and were organically incorporated into the society as the pillars supporting the regime, rather than creating it. The importance of Western institutions in the emerging national states of Asia and Africa is determined by their ability to effect the transition to, and to consolidate the national state. Consequently, the Executive, in view of its functions and the magnitude of the practical tasks involved in building a national state, acquires supremacy and acts as the agent of all moder-

nization. The position of the Executive is further strengthened, first by the traditional bent towards authority which favors strong leadership, and second, by the lack of precedent which allows political checks upon the Executive. The political parties in the emerging national states of Asia and Africa support the Executive, and if in power, become synonymous with the government. The trade unions in turn form a strong basis for modernist political parties and play significant part as vehicles of power and as centers of reintegration at the community level.

Any prediction as to what definite forms the Western institutions may take in Asia and Africa cannot be more than a guess at this time. It may be said, however, that once the national state has been established on solid foundations and modernization has sufficiently progressed, these institutions may resume their usual functions. It may be possible then for the Parliament to become stronger than the Executive, and for political parties and trade unions to have balanced influence in the government. In any event, the developing social and political institutions cannot be expected to be an identical reproduction of the Western model, but may emerge as a third pattern combining the elements of Asian and African traditionalism with Western modernism.

The main permanent force guaranteeing the successful adoption of Western institutions is the West itself. It may support democratic endeavors by understanding the fundamental change occurring in Asia and Africa. The greatest support it can render is by way of example -to uphold and venerate, in each Western country, the basic human rights and freedoms that form their greatest assets.

* * *

The information, if not identified in the footnote, is derived from the following works, consulted in the preparation of this paper.

BOOKS

Allen, G. C., *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya*, London, 1957.

Almond, Gabriel, and Coleman, James S., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1960.

- Apter, David E., *The Goald Coast in Transition*, Princeton, 1955.
- Apter, David and Harry Eckstein, *Comparative Politics: A Reader*, Glencoe, 1963
- Balandier, Georges, *Sociologie Actuelle de l'Afrique noire, dynamique des changements sociaux en Afrique Centrale*, Paris, 1955.
- Borton, Hugh, *Japan's Modern Century*, New York, 1955.
- Brown, Delmer M., *Nationalism in Japan*, Berkeley, 1955.
- Brown, William O. and Carter, Gwendolen M., *Transition in Africa, Studies in Political Adaptation*, Boston, 1958.
- Emerson, Rupert, *Representative Government in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge, 1955.
- Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. E., (eds) *African Political Systems* London, 1940
- Johnson, John J. (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, 1963.
- Karpat, Kemal H., *Turkey's Politics, The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, Princeton, 1959
- Lerner, Daniel, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, 1958.
- Mansur, Fatma, *Process of Independence*, London, 1962.
- Mardin, Şerif, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton, 1962.
- Maung, Maung, *Burma in the Family of Nations*, New York, 1956.
- Mills, Lennox A., *Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal*, Minneapolis, 1958.
- Morris-Jones, W. H., *Parliament in India*, Philadelphia, 1957.
- Mukhereja, A. R., *Parliamentary Procedure in India*, London, 1958.
- Panikkar, K. M., *The Afro-Asian States and Their Problems*, London, 1959.
- Park, Richard L. and Tinker, Irene (eds), *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Princeton, 1959.
- Rustow, Dankwart A., *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Princeton, 1956.
- Scalapino, Robert A., *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-war Japan*, Berkeley, 1953.
- Thompson, Virginia, *Labor Problems in Southeast Asia*, New Haven, 1947.
- Hard, Robert and Roy Macridis, *Modern Political Systems: Asia*, Engelwood, 1963.

Weiner, Myron, *Party Politics in India, The Development of a Multi-Party System*, Princeton, 1957.

Woodman, Dorothy, *Republic of Indonesia*, New York, 1956.

ARTICLES

Almond, Gabriel A., "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, August, 1956, pp. 391-409.

Arden-Clarke, Sir Charles, "Gold Coast into Ghana," *International Affairs*, January, 1958, pp. 49-56.

Berliner, Joseph S., "Soviet Economic Aid," *World Politics*, October, 1959, pp. 62-70.

Blanksten, George L., "Political Groups in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1959, pp. 106-127.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew., "The Politics of Underdevelopment," *World Politics*, October, 1956, pp. 55-75.

Bretton, Henry L., "Current Political Thought and Practice in Ghana," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1958, pp. 46-63.

Busey, James L., "Foundations of Political Contrast, Costa Rica and Nicaragua," *Western Political Quarterly*, September, 1958, pp. 626-659.

Coleman, James S., "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1954, pp. 404-425.

Coleman, James S., "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa," *Western Political Quarterly*, March, 1955, pp. 44-57.

De Schweinitz, Karl Jr., "Economic Growth, Coercion and Freedom," *World Politics*, January, 1957, pp. 166-192.

Fitzgibbon, Russell H., "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly*, March, 1957, pp. 3-22.

Friedman, F. G., "The Impact of Technically Advanced Civilization on Underdeveloped Areas," *Confluence*, IV, 4, January, 1956, pp. 391-406.

Gil, Frederico G. "Responsible Parties in Latin America," *Journal of Politics*, August, 1953, pp. 333-348.

Grant, J. A. C., "The Viet Nam Constitution of 1956," *American Political Science Review*, June 1958, pp. 437-469.

Gutteridge, W. F., "The Nature of Nationalism in British West Africa," *Western Political Quarterly*, September 1958, pp. 574-582.

- Issawi, Charles**, "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East," *International Affairs*, January, 1956, pp. 27-42.
- Khadduri, Majid**, "The Role of the Military in Middle Eastern Politics," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1953, pp. 511-524.
- Kilson, Martin L. Jr.**, "The Analysis of African Nationalism," *World Politics*, April, 1958, pp. 484-497.
- Lambton, Ann K. S.**, "The Impact of the West on Persia," *International Affairs*, January, 1957, pp. 12-25.
- Levy, Marion J.**, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, October, 1953, pp. 161-197.
- Lichtblau, George E.**, "The Politics of Trade Union Leadership in Southern Asia," *World Politics*, October, 1954, pp. 84-101.
- Lloyd, Peter C.**, "The Development of Political Parties in Western Nigeria," *American Political Science Review*, September, 1955, pp. 693-707.
- Lockwood, William W.**, "Japan's Response to the West," *World Politics*, October, 1956, pp. 37-54.
- Malenbaum, Wildred**, "Some Political Aspects of Economic Development in India," *World Politics*, April, 1958, pp. 378-386.
- Mc T. Kahin, George, and Parker, Guy J., and Pye, Lucian W.**, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review*, December, 1955, pp. 1022-41.
- Mboya, Tom J.**, "The Party System and Democracy in Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1963, pp. 650-58.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal**, "Changing India," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1963, pp. 453-65.
- Palmer, Norman D.**, "Indian and Western Political Thought: Coalescence or Clash?" *American Political Science Review*, September, 1955, pp. 747-761.
- Passin, Herbert**, "The Sources of Protest in Japan," *American Political Science Review*, June 1962, pp. 391-403.
- Pauker, Guy J.**, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, April, 1959, pp. 325-345.
- Peterson, A. D. C.**, "The Birth of the Malayan Nation," *International Affairs*, July, 1955, pp. 311-316.

- Padget, L. Vincent**, "Mexico's One-Party System: A Reevaluation," *American Political Science Review*, December, 1957, pp. 995-1008.
- Rustow, Dankwart A.**, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic", *World Politics*, July 1959, pp. 513-552.
- Rustow, Dankwart A.**, "New Horizons for Comparative Politics," *World Politics*, July, 1957, pp. 530-549.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin**, "Collapse of Parliamantary Democracy in Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn, 1959, pp. 389-406.
- Shils, Edward**, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma," *World Politics*, October, 1958, pp. 1-19.
- Tucker, Robert C.**, "Russia, The West and World Order," *World Politics*, October, 1959, pp. 1-23.
- Van Der Kroef, Justus M.**, "The Role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, March, 1958, pp. 33-54.
- Weiner, Myron**, "Struggle Against Power," *World Politics*, April, 1956, pp. 392-403.