

TURKEY'S QUEST FOR SECURITY THROUGH DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES

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INTRODUCTION

The European system of balance of power had helped to preserve the existence of the Ottoman Empire following its siege of the West that had ended under the walls of Vienna in 1683. However, when the balance of power system broke down as a result of the rigid alignments of European powers, introduced by the Franco - Prussian war of 1871,¹ the security and the existence of the Ottoman Empire was jeopardized. Having been situated in the cross road of European struggle for power the Ottoman Empire finally collapsed under the impact of the First World War.

The establishment, the growth, and the decline of the Ottoman Empire clearly illustrates the nature of the struggle for power between sovereign nation - states.

In international relations mutual suspicion and fear of being subjected to attack provides nation - states with the incentive for power; and in the face of competition for power in turn creates insecurity and greater desire for power. Each nation - state seeks, at least, the preservation of its vital interest against interference by others. In the absence of a higher authority to restrain the drive for power and prevent

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¹ See William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments: 1871-1890* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 67.

self-help each nation-state must live under the fear of attack. Under such an international anarchy «the security of one state is potentially jeopardized by the very existence of others.»² The term «security», as used in international relations, is a relative term. A nation-state may consider itself secure against an attack by its small neighbor but may feel insecure against another power in another part of the world which possesses a formidable striking capability. Again, the concept of security changes as time passes. Security is a circular proposition which requires the prior satisfaction of conditions that can only be achieved when security is possible. Thus, absolute security is unobtainable and it defeats the intelligence of policy makers and military experts. Within this vicious circle they can only speculate. In an uncertain, changing world where mutual suspicion and fear rules supreme the quest for security becomes the pivot of foreign policy. The policy makers must choose the proper means, namely, self-help, normative systems, alliances, collective security through a world organization, establishment of a world government, or conquest of the world.

Up until the last quarter of the nineteenth century alliances and the system of balance of power and at times normative systems have succeeded in preserving the existence of most of the nation-states and in preventing any one of them gaining universal dominion. Consequently, the existing anarchy in the international field was prevented from being a «war of every state against every state.» The Western state system was built upon the concept of the plurality of territorial nation-states.³ Under the then existing weapons of destruction they were somewhat invulnerable against annihilation by the enemy. With the advent of the twentieth century, the whole system and structure of international relations seems to have changed. The techno-scientific-economic developments—long range artillery, air power, and means of economic

² Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1962) 2nd. ed., p. 272.

³ John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 39-108.

blockade; the concept of total war had finally broken the hard shell of defensibility of nation-states.

The twenty year period between 1919 and 1939 may be considered as the beginning of a third status between war and peace which is described as a «status of intermediacy»⁴ a status of neither war nor peace, in which the struggle of ideologies divided the world into two and which in both Mussolini's⁵ and Lenin's words «permitted no compromise.»⁶ Basically, the distinction between the two ideologies, democracy and totalitarianism, including in the latter, communism, lay in their differing conceptions of the position of the individual and the purpose of the state.

Totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and Russia aiming at overthrowing the status quo by overt or covert means and acquiring world domination benefitted from the divergent aims and policies of Western democracies and ridiculed the concept of collective security of the League of Nations.

In his conversation with General Douglas MacArthur in 1932 President of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had analyzed the international situation in these words :

The Treaty of Versailles was not only unable to eliminate the causes of the First World War but on the contrary it has widened the gap between yesterday's principal rivals. For, while imposing the peace terms upon the defeated the victorious powers did never take into consideration the ethnic,

⁴ The expression «status of intermediacy» seems to have originated in the House of Lords at the start of the Crimean War. Fritz Grob writes the following: «... the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Clarendon, declared in the House of Lords on February 14, 1854... 'We are not at war, because war is not declared - we are not strictly at peace with Russia... I consider that we are in the intermediate state; that our desire for peace is just as sincere as ever, but then I must say our hopes of maintaining it are gradually dwindling away and that we are drifting toward war'» *The Relativity of War and Peace: A Study in Law, History and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 17; see also Philip C. Jessup, «Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between Peace and War?» *A. J. I. L.* 48 (1954), p. 101. For the rejection of the existence of this third status, see Grigory I. Tunkin, «Peaceful Cooperation or 'Intermediate Status'» *New Times*, No. 25 (June 1956), pp. 8-10.

⁵ Walter Consuelo Langsam, *The World Since 1914* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 731.

⁶ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 10.

geo-political, and economic peculiarities of these nations and were moved only by their feelings of enmity. Consequently, the so-called peace period of today has remained only as a period of armistice. If you Americans had not decided to withdraw from European affairs, and had insisted on the program introduced by Wilson, this period of armistice would last longer and eventually would bring genuine and continuous peace.⁷

The League of Nations that was established, under the influence of Wilsonian Utopianism and his Fourteen Points plus his idea of projecting the democratic principles into the international arena, was to be based on the concept of collective security. This new system was to replace the rigid alliances which had contributed to the insecurity of nations. Despite the high hopes of an eternal peace and security under the League system, the world organization was to become an instrument of protection of the status quo imposed upon the defeated nations by the victorious powers, rather than initiating, according to the Covenant, a real effort towards the establishment of conditions necessary for collective security.

The final result of the pious intentions of the fathers of the League of Nations was that when Western powers called the bluff of Germany the outcome was the Second World War. Thus the armistice period had led to the opening of the hostilities again on a world wide scale.

As it was predicted by Kemal Atatürk in 1932 «the principal winner of a war in Europe would neither be Britain and France nor Germany but would only be Bolshevism.»⁸ The Soviet Union, almost immediately following the end of hostilities in the Second World War, rose to the status of a world power.⁹ This fact and secondly the advent of the atomic age has reintroduced the status of intermediacy. Under the impact of the bipolarization of power, awakening of the dark continent of Africa, ideological warfare, advancement in science and

⁷ Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, III (1918-1937) (Atatürk's Speeches and Statements) (Ankara: Türk Kurumu, 1954), p. 92 (Hereafter cited as Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri).

⁸ Ibid., p. 93.

⁹ See John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), Chapter Twelve: «The Five-Year Score», pp. 140-164.

technology the world has entered into a period of pre-war armistice—with an undeterminable duration—in which conventional and new concepts, weapons and policies coexist.

The second and more auspicious attempt at creating a world organization for the preservation of international peace and security within the framework of the revitalized concept of collective security was based on the postulate of the Five Power solidarity. However, it did not take long for the fathers of the United Nations to realize that they had built their Glass House on sand.

A study of Turkey's quest for security, in this uncertain world of ours, therefore cannot escape from the realities of the international system and structure in which it has operated and continues to operate.

In the light of these observations the writer has attempted, in retrospect, to tackle this subject by dividing the question of Turkey's security problems into two phases. The first one will deal with the armistice period of 1919 to 1939 and the Second World War years. This phase is characterized as the period of «Survival and Belligerent Neutrality.»

The second phase of Turkey's quest for security shows an unprecedented close alliance with the Western bloc, which may be attributed to the policy of «stand and fall with the West.»

Following a general and somewhat brief discussion of the first phase of Turkey's quest for security greater emphasis will be placed on the second phase and finally an attempt will be made to analyze the developments since the end of the hostilities in the Second World War.

TURKEY'S POLICY OF SURVIVAL AND BELLIGERENT NEUTRALITY

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and after the Armistice of Mudros of October 30,

1918,¹⁰ the Turkish people had come face to face with the possibility of division of their homeland and submission to the will of the victorious powers. In order to survive as an independent and sovereign nation the Turks were forced to fight on two fronts at the same time: a- against the personal sovereignty of the Sultan who had become the puppet of the Allied Occupation forces in Istanbul, and b- the foreign invaders.

Along with the fighting went a diplomatic campaign, no less successful. The fruits of military victory in the years 1919 - 1923 could never have been gathered without an astute foreign policy of the leaders of the Nationalist Movement in Anatolia which paralleled the military campaigns.¹¹ Mustafa Kemal's tactful and foresighted diplomacy utilized every possible advantage presented by the postwar situation to register the right of existence of the Turkish people in international treaties. The divergent policies of the principal Allied powers,¹² the lack of will on the part of these powers to implement by force of their own arms, instead of resorting to the use of the Greek armies, the Treaty of Sèvres which they had dictated to the Sultan's Government in Istanbul by force of arms and the turmoil and civil war that was going on in Russia as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Wilsonian principal of national self-determination, had strengthened the hands of the Nationalist Government in Ankara.

The emphasis on territorial integrity and political independence was the prime objective of Mustafa Kemal's diplomacy at the Lausanne Conference where Turkey, as an equal with the victorious Allies of the First World War, successfully reversed the dictated Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920.¹³

¹⁰ See Ali Türkgeçdi, *Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi* (The History of the Armistices of Mudros and Mudania), (Ankara: Güney Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik T. A. O., 1948).

¹¹ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti* (Foreign Policy of the Turkish State), (İstanbul: Milli Mecmua Basımevi, 1938).

¹² Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question In Greece and Turkey* (London: Constable and Co., 1923), pp. 39-42.

¹³ See the speech of Foreign Minister İsmet İnönü before the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 23 August 1923, *Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (İnönü's Speeches and Statements), İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1946), pp. 33-61. See also a detailed analysis of the Lausanne Conference: Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Paşa* (Lausanne Conference and İsmet Pasha), (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1943).

From 1919 to 1923 for Mustafa Kemal's diplomacy survival carried a paramount importance which may be expressed in the phrase «**primo vivere deinde philosophari,**» i.e., «let us think first of all about how to survive thereafter everything else.»¹⁴ In his first statement as Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on October 29, 1923, had elaborated on this point by saying that, «the fundamental principal of the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic is to keep strengthened its existence and territorial integrity and at the same time, while guarding its vital interest, as far as possible to promote and to reiterate the peace, tranquility and friendly relations.»¹⁵

Mustafa Kemal had considered it a fault of the Ottoman Empire that it had fought too many battles for the benefit of others. He had said: «New Turkey, the people of new Turkey, have no reason to think of anything else but their own existence and their own welfare. She has nothing more to give away to others.»¹⁶

During this first phase of Turkey's quest for security joint enmity towards the Western European powers had brought the two traditional enemies, Turkey and Soviet Russia, into a so-called friendly cooperation. The Treaty of Friendship of March 16, 1921, between the two countries spoke of the sharing of «the principles of the liberty of nations, and the right of each nation to determine its own fate, and taking into consideration, moreover, the common struggle undertaken against imperialism.»¹⁷ The decision of the League of Nations awarding the Mosul province to Iraq and Soviet suspicion of the Locarno treaties had brought once again the two countries into signing the Treaty of Friendship, Non-aggression and Neutrality on December 17, 1925.¹⁸ Despite these formal agreements and correct relations between the leaders of the two countries Turkey knew very well that as soon as the Soviet Union consolidated

¹⁴ Herz, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁵ İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 62.

¹⁶ Gazi Mustafa Kemal, Speech (Leipzig: 1949), p. 510.

¹⁷ Taken from the preamble of the Treaty of Friendship. See J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, (Princeton, N. J. D. Von Nostrand, 1956) Vol. II, p. 95.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 142-143.

its grip on vast territories and strengthened its position in international affairs it would reintroduce the age-old Tsarist policy toward Turkey and the warm waters of the Mediterranean. In 1932, during the so-called honeymoon period of Turco-Soviet relations, Mustafa Kemal had declared that «We Turks, being a close neighbor to Russia and as a nation who had fought numerous wars against her, are following the events that are taking place there and watching the real danger as a bare truth. Bolsheviks have become a principal power threatening not only Europe but also the continent of Asia.»¹⁹

Meanwhile, in the face of Italian and German threat to European security Turkey felt the need of the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention which lacked adequate provisions guaranteeing Turkish security in case of war.²⁰ The Montreux Conference for the revision of the Straits Convention again brought Turkey and the Soviet Union into closer cooperation. Italian aggression against Ethiopia and her threatening attitude towards Britain in the Mediterranean, following the settlement of the Mosul question between Britain and Turkey brought closer understanding between these two countries. Again under the impact of the Axis threat to European security the Hatay dispute between Turkey and France was settled by peaceful means. As these three unsettled questions of the Lausanne Treaty—namely Mosul, the Straits, and Hatay—were disposed of to the satisfaction of the countries concerned, Turkey moved into closer and friendlier relations with the Western democratic countries.

During the general armistice period of 1919-1939 the prime international aspect of Turkish ideology was definitely defensive. She was ready and willing to defend at all costs her hard-won independence and territorial integrity against any power, great or small.²¹ The principle formulated by Mus-

¹⁹ Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 93.

²⁰ Mehmet Gönübol and Türkkaya Ataöv, Turkey in the United Nations: A Legal and Political Appraisal (Ankara: Publications of the Institute of International Relations of the University of Ankara, No. 14, 1960), p. 10.

²¹ See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's State of the Nation Speech before the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on Nov. 1, 1928. Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 343.

tafa Kemal, «peace at home and peace abroad,» was the corner stone of Turkey's foreign policy. However, Turkey had to weigh cautiously the steps taken by the revisionist powers and thereupon in order to consolidate her security enter into bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with big and small neighbors and close and distant powers.²²

In response to the Italian threat to her security, Turkey entered into the Balkan Pact, February 9, 1934, with Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania²³ and in 1937 she concluded the Saadabad Pact with Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq²⁴ which «provided for nonaggression, consultation, and mutual cooperation in stamping out subversive activities among the signatory states»²⁵ and which was «implicitly directed against Soviet infiltration of the area.»²⁶

The Italian threats to her security and Turkey's ardent desire for a peaceful world through the League of Nations were among the reasons for Turkey's entry into the world organization. For Turkish leaders had realized that they could not change the stream of events which were directed by the big powers and had reached the conclusion that through collective action under the Covenant of the League international peace and security could be maintained. In 1935 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in line with this thinking, declared that «one of our primary desires is to see the League of Nations to be able to strengthen international security, to remedy the remnants of the old wounds and to achieve humanitarian results.»²⁷

Thus, Turkey looked upon the League of Nations as a means of security whereby she could appeal to the world public opinion even in this anarchic world and especially during the period of neither peace nor war. In line with this

²² Ibid.

²³ Basın Yayın ve Turizm Genel Müdürlüğü (General Directorate of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism) *Ayın Tarihi*, 1934, No. 9, pp. 110-111 (Hereafter cited as *Ayın Tarihi*).

²⁴ *Ayın Tarihi*, 1937, No. 44, pp. 64-66.

²⁵ George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, N. Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 171.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 534.

²⁷ Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 368.

policy Turkey took an active part in the application of sanctions against the revisionist powers.²⁸ For in the opinion of the Turkish leaders international security constituted a whole and regardless of which part of the world was threatened such an event would in the long run effect the security of Turkey.²⁹ During all this period Turkey always sought to settle her disputes with the other powers through pacific means.

However, when the collective security system of the League of Nations proved itself unworkable and when Germany and the Soviet Union joined hands in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, Turkey's security was in real danger. Under these circumstances, Turkey moved closer to Britain and France which culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance on October 19, 1939, which was tempered by reservation of no action against the Soviet Union.³⁰ On the other hand, Turkey's efforts in late September 1939 to have the Soviet Union confirm its respect for Turkish independence and territorial integrity were in vain.³¹

The opening of actual hostilities between Germany and Great Britain and France, the invasion of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union in September 1939 and the Dunkirk disaster placed Turkey in a state of preparedness for the defense of the homeland. The course of action adopted by Atatürk's successor İsmet İnönü in the autumn of 1939 was an extremely cautious and correct policy towards the belligerents. According to Franz von Papen, «The Turks were determined to fight if they were attacked, but did not consider their army sufficiently equipped for offensive enterprises.»³² When Yugoslavia and Greece were attacked by Germany in April 1941, Turkey had to declare that she was following a policy of «belligerent neutrality.» Thus isolated, inadequately armed, she was exposed to the direct

²⁸ Gönübol and Ataöv, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

²⁹ Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri (İnönü's Speeches and Statements), (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1946), p. 327 (Hereafter cited as İnönü's Speeches and Statements).

³⁰ Ayın Tarihi, No. 71 (October 1939), pp. 88-91; see also Cevat Açıkalın, «Turkey's International Relations,» *International Affairs*, 23 (October 1947), pp. 477-491; N. Erim, «The Development of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance,» *Asiatic Review*, 42 (October 1946), pp. 347-351.

³¹ On Turco-Soviet negotiations see Harry N. Howard, «Germany, The Soviet Union and Turkey during World War II» *Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, 1948, pp. 66 ff.

³² *Memoirs* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1953), p. 472.

pressure of Germany. However, Turkish diplomacy was successful in extracting a favorable treaty from victorious Germany, in that the Turco - German Treaty of Friendship and Non - Aggression of June 18, 1941,³³ like the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France, contained a clause which stated that «already existing engagements of each party» would not be affected by the Treaty. Undoubtedly, Turkey under this clause was going to remain loyal to her commitments towards the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United Kingdom and France on the other. Her Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France, therefore, cannot be considered an all out commitment towards these powers, mainly for three reasons: 1 — In the event Britain and France found themselves in war with the Soviet Union, Turkey would be under no obligation to go to the assistance of Britain and France; 2 — Unless she was directly attacked by the Soviet Union Turkey was determined to avoid an armed clash with her northern neighbor at a time when the odds were against the Western democracies; 3 — Her military capabilities would not permit Turkey to take an effective offensive action against Germany, and furthermore, the general feeling of the Turkish people was considerably friendly towards the Germans. Speaking on Turkish foreign policy in general and her commitments towards Britain and France in particular, President İsmet İnönü in his State of the Nation speech on November 1, 1939, had this to say:

The Government of the Republic until now had considered it as its major task to promote international peace and to protect the integrity of the country. The joint declarations that were issued on May 12th together with France and on June 23rd together with Britain are the results of this endeavor. The treaty which was signed on October 19th... being directed against no one, has in view the protection of our security while, as far as we possibly can, contributing to international peace and security.³⁴

³³ Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 231; see the State of the Nation Speech of President İnönü, November 1, 1945, defending Turkey's position in entering into this Treaty with Germany, İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 393.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 341; see also Mümtaz Faik Fenik, 1939 Harbî: Türkiye İngiltere İttifakı (War of 1939: Alliance between Turkey and Great Britain) (Ankara: Zerbomat Basımevi, 1941), pp. 1-11.

Turkey's constant concern at Soviet's designs on her territories, as it was witnessed during the Molotov - Ribbentrop negotiations on November 12 - 13, 1940, and a possibility of a joint Russo - German operation against her had vanished as a result of the signature of the Turco - German treaty and the following German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Hearing the news of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Foreign Minister is reported to have expressed his views on the matter in these words: «Ce n'est pas une guerre, c'est une croisade.»³⁵ This sentence clearly indicates the cause of Turkey's fears for her security. Turkish sympathies had lain with the Western democracies; however, the turn of the events had now brought the Soviets into the Western camp! Turkey's participation in the war on the Western side had thus become a very difficult and delicate question.

Each new Allied success during the war had made it more troublesome for Turkey to withstand the Allied pressure on her to enter the war. Despite her treaty obligations Turkey maintained her «belligerent neutrality» until the last days of the Second World War for the following reasons: 1 — Turkey's military strength had only a defensive worth;³⁶ 2 — The Allied promises to equip the Turkish army with modern weapons were never fulfilled; 3 — Turkey's entry into the war, under such circumstances, would be a liability rather than an asset for the Allies and a national suicide for Turkey; 4 — Up until 1942, when the Axis Powers had reached the zenith of their military conquest, Turkey was virtually encircled by these powers; 5 — At the time, Turkey's «belligerent neutrality» was playing a positive role by blocking the Axis drive towards the Middle East;³⁷ 6 — The Turks were

³⁵ von Papen, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

³⁶ Following the Teheran Conference of November 29 - December 1, 1943, of the three Allied leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, another conference was arranged at Cairo between Roosevelt, Churchill, and İsmet İnönü to discuss Turkey's entry into war. According to Robert E. Sherwood, «... during the talks Roosevelt frequently portrayed a considerable amount of sympathy for the Turkish point of view and even stated, on one occasion that it was quite understandable that these distinguished and amiable gentlemen should 'not want to be caught with their pants down'», Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Bantam Books, 1950), II, p. 429.

³⁷ In State of the Nation Speech on November 1, 1945, President İnönü refers to the Note of the Soviet Union on 19 January 1942, expressing its

never strongly anti - German; on the contrary, Germany enjoyed great popularity among the Turks; 7 — And most important of all, the Turkish leaders were more concerned about their future relations with the Soviet Union than about participating in the war. A status quo country, like Turkey, could not expect any benefit from a possible victory. Furthermore, if she had entered the war and was subjected to aerial bombardment and an enemy occupation, who could guarantee that at the end of the war she was not going to be another victim of the liberating forces of the Soviet Union?

Despite the genuine efforts on the part of some of the leading statesmen of the West for the establishment of conditions prerequisite for the concept of collective security grave mistakes had been committed during the peace settlement of 1919. Secondly, the concept of collective security was the brainchild of a few internationalists and the peoples of the world were not as yet ready to accept the idea of the indivisibility of world peace and order. Thirdly, with the coming into power in Tsarist Russia of a Communist regime a different kind of an ideological warfare had already been introduced into the international scene. Last but not least, means of destruction, thanks to the development in science and technology, had changed the concepts of defense and offense, breaking the hard shell of territorial nation - states.

Query: in view of these developments could the League of Nations and its infant system of collective security prevent the Axis Powers from overthrowing the then imposed status quo and ridicule the world organization? Was there not a deep conflict between the self-interest of nations and the interests of the world community?³⁸ Specifically, could Turkey, then, be blamed for not honoring the terms of her treaties with Great Britain, France and the Balkan Powers? The realistic approach to world problems would demand a cautious foreign policy. The Republic of Turkey during its formative years, in its

appreciation of Turkey's neutrality in the war, İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 392.

³⁸ See on the subject of subjective and objective requirements of collective security, Inis L. Claud, *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 257-269.

quest for security and peace, relied mainly on its own strength in order to consolidate the homeland and once this was achieved aimed at preserving and defending its territorial integrity and political independence against possible encroachments by the great powers seeking to overthrow the status quo in the Middle East. Motivated by continuous doubt and fear of the expansionist policies of first Italy and later of the Soviet Union Turkey 1 —avoided being too dependent — except to a certain extent on a formal treaty basis with Great Britain and France — on a single major power, 2 — thus profitted from the divergencies of policy among the European powers, 3 — aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Middle East, and 4 — as far as circumstances permitted supported the Covenant of the League of Nations and its system of collective security.

Only upon the insistent request of the Allied Powers Turkey declared war on Germany in the last days of the war in the European theatre, on February 23, 1945, so that she would be able to obtain a seat at the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco.³⁹

TURKEY'S POLICY OF «STAND AND FALL WITH THE WEST»

The Soviet Pressures Upon Turkey

At a time when the Western Powers were still confident that any international dispute could be settled effectively by peaceful means, e.g., around the conference tables of the United Nations, the Soviet Union was showing a tendency to settle its differences with other states, especially with its weak neighbors, through the use of force or threat of force. As far as Turkey was concerned, for the victorious Soviet Russia, an ally of the West, temptation to expand towards the warm waters of the Mediterranean, so far an unrealized dream of the Tsarist Russia, was now being considered irresistible, and within easy reach of the Soviet power. To this end Turkey was to be made one of the first victims of Soviet expansionism. No

³⁹ İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 394.

one in Turkey was caught in surprise when Turkey was confronted with Soviet's territorial demands. What was novel in the situation was that Turkey was to resist against these demands alone, until the Western Powers, namely Britain and the United States, realized the consequences of this drive.

The period between May 1945 to March 1947 was one of the most critical periods of recent Turkish history. A period in which the survival of Turkey as a free country was in danger second only to the eventful years of 1919 to 1923.

Ever since communism became synonymous with Russia, Turkey's anti-Russianism had automatically become anti-communism. The successful resistance of the Turks against the Soviet aggressive designs, in the absence of Western aid, may have been the result of their natural hatred towards the Russians and their «last and most powerful weapon: necessity». For Machiavelli had said that «War is just for those who are forced to it by necessity, and Heaven favors those who have no hope but in their arms.»⁴⁰

The Soviet Union during the Russo - German negotiations in November 1940 had demanded the modification of the 1936 Montreux Convention. During the Teheran Conference in November 1943, and again at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 between the Soviet, American and British heads of governments the revision of the Montreux Convention had been discussed without reaching any decision on the subject. Taking the matter into its hand the Soviet Government on March 19, 1945, had brought pressure upon Turkey by denouncing the 1925 Treaty of Friendship, Non - Aggression and Neutrality⁴¹, and later June of the same year had demanded the cession to the Soviet Union the Turkish provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Artvin. Having achieved no result on this matter the Soviets reintroduced the question of the Turkish Straits at the Potsdam Conference and proposed joint control of the Straits by Turkey and Russia. The Potsdam Conference of the three Allied leaders agreed that the Convention should be

⁴⁰ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Modern Library, 1950), p. 453.

⁴¹ *Ayin Tarihi*, No. 136 (March 1945), p. 52.

revised and that this should follow the direct conversations between the Turkish and the Allied Governments.

To these Soviet demands the Turkish answer was a flat no! President İnönü on November 1, 1945, declared that «We wish to state with absolute certainty that we do not owe an inch of Turkish territory to anyone. We shall live and die as an honorable people.»⁴² In its Note of August 7, 1946, the Soviet Government once again proposed to Turkey that «a new regime for the Straits be prepared by the Black Sea powers only and Turkey and the U.S.S.R. organize the joint means of defense of the Straits as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and the security in the Straits.»⁴³

What is interesting at this juncture is that the United States in keeping with the agreement reached by the Big Three at the Potsdam Conference proposed to Turkey, on November 2, 1945, that the revision of the Montreux Convention proceed on the basis of the following principles: the Straits be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times; the Straits be open to the transit of warships of Black Sea Powers at all times; save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea Powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations.⁴⁴ Such a proposal was, in the long run, against the security interests of Turkey and the intention behind it was to enhance Russian - American collaboration in the post-war years. However, later events have proved that such a collaboration was not within the realm of possibility. The United States Government came to realize that the entry of the Russian troops into Turkey with the ostensible purpose of enforcing joint control of the Straits would in a short time lead to the control of Turkey.⁴⁵

⁴² İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p. 396.

⁴³ U. S. Department of State, *The Problem of Turkish Straits*, Publication No. 2752 (1947), p. 39.

⁴⁴ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1956), II, p. 96.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97. See also Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks: February 21 - June 5, 1947*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), Part II, «Soviet Pressure

The security of each country, according to the Charter, was placed under the guarantee of the United Nations.⁴⁶ However, in the absence of cooperation between the great powers in the preservation of world peace, due to ideological and political differences, the security mechanism of the United Nations had become inoperative. At the time when two gravitational poles for the world organization were being formed, Turkey could not help but try to find her safety under the protective shield of the Western bloc, particularly the United States. This was, in the opinion of this writer, an inevitable and at the same time a bold departure from the policy of not entering into too close alliance with a great power.⁴⁷

Turkey, at the end of 1946, was not in a position to maintain indefinitely a defensive posture against the Communist bloc. The burden was too heavy for the economy to carry on much longer.⁴⁸

The United States, under the impact of Soviet expansionism, was left with no choice but to assume the leadership of the West and embark upon an unprecedented project of assisting the remaining free peoples of the world. Such a decision was made in the context of global relations with the Soviet Union. On this point Truman writes the following :

I had a very good picture of what a revival of American isolationism would mean for the world. After World War II it was clear that without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal... Inaction, withdrawal, «Fortress America» notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them.

This was the time to align the United States of America clearly on the side, on the head, of the free world.⁴⁹

on Turkey,» pp. 59 - 66; Necmeddin Sadak, «Turkey Faces the Soviets,» *Foreign Affairs*, 27 (April, 1949), pp. 449 - 61; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, «The Straits, Crux of World Politics,» *Foreign Affairs*, 25 (January 1947), pp. 290 - 302.

⁴⁶ For a detailed treatment of Turkey's participation in the United Nations Organization, Gönülöbol and Ataöv, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ *Supra.*, p. 14.

⁴⁸ U. S. Department of State, *Seventh Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey*, publication 3494 (1949), p. 18.

⁴⁹ Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 102; see also John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East : Problems of American Policy* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1960), revised edition, p. 33.

The Truman Doctrine, which was the outcome of this decision, declared that the territorial integrity and the survival of Turkey and Greece were of major importance to the security of the United States and of the free world.⁵⁰ Thus the first step in the direction of close relationship between Turkey and the United States was taken.

Turkey's Policy of Seeking an Alliance With the West

The Turkish leaders, in the face of continued Soviet threats, did not feel that economic and military aid alone, extended by the United States under the Truman Doctrine, was sufficient for Turkey's security. They openly expressed their desire to see established closer cooperation between Turkey, the United States and the other European allies. In September 1948, during the initial phases of the North Atlantic Treaty the Turkish Ambassador approached the United States Government that his country be included among the initiators of the Treaty. Further official approaches by the Turkish Government were also not heeded. However, the United States expressing sympathy with the Turkish desire for inclusion in the Treaty requested that Turkey withdraw her demand, promising at the same time, to accord friendly and careful consideration to the security problem of Turkey after the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty by its signatories and upon its approval by the United States Senate.⁵¹ At the conclusion of this exchange, the Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak on March 16, 1949, stated: «It is out of the question for Turkey, on the basis of not being situated on the shores of the Atlantic, to adhere to the Atlantic Pact as a result of clear declaration by the initiators that it will cover a strictly geographical region.⁵²

It was a foregone conclusion of the Turkish Government and the Turkish press that in the event of an attack on Turkey,

⁵⁰U. S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, XVI, No. 403 (March 23, 1947), p. 534. Later, on July 4, 1948, Turkey by becoming a member of the organization of European Economic Cooperation received aid under the Marshall Plan.

⁵¹ U. S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 2760.

⁵² *Ayin Tarihi*, May 1949, p. 31.

it would be impossible to expect the small members of NATO to come to the help of Turkey. She was, therefore, seeking an alliance, a guarantee of her security from the United States. Nihat Erim, a leading member of the opposition party, during the Democratic Party Administration, representing the general consensus of opinion, wrote that «the only nation that will stop future aggression will be the United States... Turkey wants to join the Atlantic Pact because she—like the other members of NATO—also wants to obtain a written commitment from the United States.»⁵³

Despite the Democratic Party Government's insistence on Turkey's adherence to NATO such efforts met with continuous opposition for two years. The principle argument against Turkey's adherence to NATO came from the small countries of the alliance. They did not want to extend NATO geographically to include Turkey and Greece. They expressed the view, which was also supported by some British commentators, that «... if there ever is to be a real European Community it must possess natural homogeneity. The inclusion of a Moslem state like Turkey, would weaken the ideal of a 'Christian, democratic community of free states'». ⁵⁴ They also raised the following objections: 1 — The inclusion of Turkey and Greece would add to the rearmament burden and further split United States aid for armament; 2 — The inclusion of Turkey and Greece would increase the danger of war, and there was no compelling reason to extend the obligations of NATO; 3 — Even if Turkey would be a military asset, her membership might create embarrassment in the relations of NATO countries with nations which would like to join but which might be military liabilities, such as Iran or Egypt.

At the time when the build - up of Western European defense was progressing so slowly, contrary to their vital interests in the Middle East, France and Britain also opposed the idea of Turkey's inclusion in NATO. They were afraid of spreading NATO too thin. Specifically, British official circles felt that if

⁵³ Ulus, September 18, 1950, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Hamilton F. Armstrong, «Eisenhower's Right Flank,» Foreign Affairs, 29 (July 1951), p. 661

Turkey and Greece were included in NATO, this would mean the separation of the Middle East Command proposal, in which Turkey would be a pillar, but not the right arm of NATO.⁵⁵

On the other hand, the United States Government, although favoring the extension of the Pact as early as its creation,⁵⁶ felt that it should not undertake further responsibilities until NATO structure had been firmly established and until greater progress had been made in developing the collective strength of its members. Moreover, it was feared in the Department of State that a unilateral guarantee to Turkey might imply American indifference to the security of Greece and Iran.⁵⁷

In order to create a favorable atmosphere the Turkish leaders have concentrated their efforts on three main points: ⁵⁸
1 — there was an apparent weakness of NATO on the southeastern flank: Western Powers were indulging in a false sense of security, a kind of «Maginot Line» complex which evidenced weakness and would prevent dealing with the long-range Soviet objectives. For this reason, the defense strength of NATO needed to be reinforced along the southern flank. Peculiarly, the danger of Soviet expansion through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean would naturally have created a situation which would not only endanger the security of that area, the Arab countries, but also threaten the security of Western Europe and the United States. Furthermore, the policy of «containment» of the Soviet Union was weakened by the gap in the southeastern flank; 2 — the defense of the free world would require a common defense line; this could only be achieved if the free nations of the world organize their military potentialities into a common front. Could the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an unprecedented organization in the modern world inasmuch as it seeks to establish a supranational com-

⁵⁵ H. L. Roberts and P. A. Wilson, *Britain and the United States* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 176.

⁵⁶ U. S. Department of State, *The Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty*, Publication No. 3497 (1949), p. 35.

⁵⁷ *New York Herald Tribune*, August 4, 1950, editorial.

⁵⁸ See the Statement of Premier Menderes to the press which elaborates on the fundamental principals of Turkish foreign policy and gives the reasons for Turkey's desire to become a member of NATO, *News From Turkey* (N. Y.: Turkish Information Office, 1950), Vol. III. No. 32 (August 10, 1950).

mand and joint military facilities during the time of peace, be considered as a sort of «club of the twelve nations» under the worldwide threat of communism? 3 — Turkey would be an asset to the West rather than a liability: Turkey was moving swiftly on the road of democracy, evidence in the peaceful change from one party dictatorship to a multi-party democracy in 1950; which could be «achieved only in politically mature countries.»⁵⁹ Anti-communism of Turkey was probably her greatest asset. She was in a state of semi-mobilization, almost half of her budget was devoted to military expenditures, her army of 650,000 men was second to Russia's in Europe.

The invasion of South Korea provided an opportunity for Turkey to demonstrate her solidarity with the West and her dedication to the principles of the United Nations Charter. By taking a bold and unprecedented step in offering to send 4,500 men to Korea the Democratic Party Government strengthened its position in demanding membership in NATO.⁶⁰ Opposition to Turkey's membership in the Atlantic Pact, however, continued ever after the Korean affair. «During the last two years,» wrote the **New York Times**, «the Turks repeatedly have been told that through their Treaty of Alliance with Britain and France [October 19, 1939] they have all the advantages of Atlantic membership without the risks.»⁶¹

Because of the grave situation in the Middle Eastern countries, in Iran and Egypt, the reluctance of France and Great Britain to stretch their defense lines as far as Turkey and Greece had been partly overcome at the end of the North Atlantic Council meeting at New York on September 19, 1950. However, the Council decided only to permit the association of Turkey and Greece with such phases of the military planning work of NATO as were concerned with the defense of

⁵⁹ See Kasım Gülek, «Democracy Takes Root in Turkey,» *Foreign Affairs*, 30 (October 1951), pp. 135-144.

⁶⁰ See Özel Şahingiray (ed.) *Celâl Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1933-1955, Dış Politika* (Speeches and Statements of Celâl Bayar, 1933-1955, Foreign Policy) (Ankara: Doğuş Ltd. Ortaklığı, 1956), pp. 46-48.

⁶¹ August 11, 1950.

the Mediterranean.⁶² Upon being informed of this decision, the Turkish Government expressed its deep regret and disillusionment. The decision was considered by the Turkish Government as an inadequate solution to Turkey's security requirement.⁶³ The Turkish Government, therefore, appealed to the United States Government, inviting it to establish direct contractual ties with Turkey, but found the latter unwilling to take such a step which would, according to the Department of State, «necessitate the reevaluation of American relations with practically every country».⁶⁴ The Turkish Government, then, suggested another formula which envisaged merely the adherence of the United States to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939 between Turkey, Britain and France.⁶⁵ Due to the fact that the scope of this new alliance would limit the area of mutual assistance to an act of aggression perpetrated against Turkey, or to a state of war in the Mediterranean, it was, according to Turkey, in complete harmony with the United States foreign policy.⁶⁶ The American reaction to this proposal was a negative one.

In view of the continuing grave crises in the Middle East, in the spring of 1951, the British Government agreed to the admission of Turkey and Greece into NATO. However, the British Government was still interested in the establishment of an alliance for Middle Eastern security build around Turkey.⁶⁷ Sharing the British view, Turkey as an alternative approached the United States for the formation of an Eastern Mediterranean Pact, based on the Atlantic Pact pattern, and including France, Great Britain and the United States. This proposal was also turned down by Washington.

Finally at the Ottawa Conference of the North Atlantic Council in September 1951, it was agreed to recommend to the Governments the accession of Turkey and Greece to the North

⁶² U. S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 23 No. 589 (October 16, 1950), p. 632.

⁶³ *Ulus*, October 7, 1950.

⁶⁴ Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey in the World* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 153.

⁶⁵ *New York Times*, March 2, 1951, p. 1.

⁶⁶ U. S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 2760.

⁶⁷ *New York Times*, May 16, 1951, p. 1.

Atlantic Treaty as full members.⁶⁸ On this occasion President Truman in his message to the Turkish President said :

I am particularly pleased with this decision because I know that it represents the fulfillment of a deep desire on the part of the Turkish Government and Turkish people, and a recognition of the valiant efforts Turkey has made in the postwar period to maintain her independence and integrity in the face of present threats and pressure.⁶⁹

President Bayar in his reply reassured President Truman that «Turkey will never fail to carry out the obligations that will devolve upon her within the Atlantic Community which she is about to join.»⁷⁰

On February 15, 1952, the Protocol of the North Atlantic Council on the accession of Turkey and Greece came into force and on February 18, upon the approval of the Protocol by the Grand National Assembly, Turkey succeeded in entering the «exclusive club» of the Atlantic Community. The defense shell of the Western Powers was extended as far as the Iranian borders and the gap in the eastern Mediterranean was filled.

The admission of Turkey into NATO was described by the spokesman of the Turkish Government, **Zafer**, as a «great victory,» who went on to add that «the Turkish blood shed in Korea has not been wasted. There has been an honorable share of the blood of our Korean heroes in the signatories' ink, used at Ottawa for the acceptance of Turkey into the Atlantic Pact.»⁷¹

In the opinion of the opposition leader İsmet İnönü Turkey's accession to NATO was to strengthen her security.⁷² A student of Turkish affairs describes this achievement also as «a great victory for the Turkish Government» and says, «Its dynamic diplomacy had achieved for Turkey the prestige and

⁶⁸ U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, 25, No. 640 (October 1, 1951), p. 523.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 25, No. 641 (October 8, 1951), p. 571.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 25, No 643 (October 22, 1951), p. 650.

⁷¹ Zafer, September 22, 1951, p. 1.

⁷² Sabahat Erdemir (ed.) Muhalefette İsmet İnönü (İsmet İnönü in Opposition) (İstanbul : M. Sıralar Matbaası, 1956), p. 66.

security of membership in a Western Alliance».⁷³ Turkey's success was twofold: Turkey not only obtained a formal commitment from the Western Powers, particularly from the United States, to defend her against the Soviet Union but also secured formally acceptance in the Christian family of nations which hitherto had kept the door shut to the Moslem Turks.

The Soviet reaction to Turkey's prospective entry into NATO was violent as expected. The Soviet Government in its Note, November 30, 1951, declared that the policy of the Turkish Government «will undoubtedly do serious harm to relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union».⁷⁴ A Soviet paper, *Trud*, had this to say on Turkey's accession to the Atlantic Pact:

The Turkish people are having to pay dearly for the Turkish ruling circle's policy of including the country in Wall Street's aggressive plans... Thousands of Turkish soldiers have already found themselves graves on Korean soil... It is impossible to convince the Turkish people that the Turkish soldiers in Korea are supposedly defending Turkish frontiers and that militarization of the country is supposedly benefiting the Turkish people.⁷⁵

Turkey As a Bridge between the East and the West and the Northern - Tier Alliance

In order to maintain her position in the Middle East through a network of bases, Great Britain had conceived, early in 1950, the idea of establishing a Middle East Defense Organization within which Turkey would keep the Arab countries in line and would establish a link between them and the West. The only advantage to be gained by Turkey through such a scheme would be the presence of Western troops in the region. On the other hand, the scheme would entail certain objectionable consequences for Turkey, such as compromising her status as a pro-Western state by adhering to a bloc of nations dominated by largely anti-Western Egypt, and substituting her membership in the Atlantic Pact for a Middle

⁷³ Kilig, op. cit., p. 158.

⁷⁴ Current Digest of the Soviet Press, III, No. 48 (January 12, 1952), p. 8.

⁷⁵ Ibid., III, No. 40 (November 17, 1951), p. 22.

Eastern Alliance. However, on the eve of adherence to NATO Turkey reluctantly agreed to her co-sponsorship of this plan. On October 13, 1951, the Governments of France, Great Britain, Turkey and the United States presented the proposal to the Governments of the Arab countries and Israel,⁷⁶ which was rejected simultaneously by these countries. The proposal only served to increase Arab hostility toward Turkey. The Arab countries have, since 1948, suspected that Turkey was serving as a pawn of the imperialism of the West.⁷⁷

The non-cooperative and hostile attitude of the Arab world towards the West resulted in the reappraisal of the West's Middle East policy. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State of the new Eisenhower Administration in Washington, after visiting various capitals of the Middle East in the spring of 1953 had come with a firm conviction that it was futile to seek to align the Arab countries with the West against international communism. He declared that:

A Middle East Defence Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab countries are so engrossed with their own quarrels that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet Communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations show awareness of this danger. There is a vague desire to have a collective security system, but no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within, out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. While awaiting the formal creation, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat of all peoples.⁷⁸

When Mr. Dulles outlined his «Northern - Tier Alliance» concept to the Turkish leaders he found the latter quite prepared and willing to take the initiative. For their greatest concern was

⁷⁶ U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, 25, No. 640 (October 22, 1951), p. 647.

⁷⁷ See James W. Spain, «Middle East Defence: A New Approach», *Middle East Journal*, 8, No. 3 (Summer 1954), p. 251 ff.

⁷⁸ U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, 28, (June 15, 1953), p. 836.

how to increase the United States' commitments in the Middle East against the Soviets.

The entry of Turkey and Greece into NATO had opened a new phase in their friendly relations. And when Tito's Yugoslavia defected from the Soviet bloc and showed signs of veering toward the West the common interest of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia favored the revival of the Balkan Pact. Negotiations aiming at this objective resulted in the signing on February 28, 1953, a five-year Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration⁷⁹ which was strengthened by a twenty-year military pact, on August 9, 1954.⁸⁰ This achievement was hailed in the West as the most substantial single gain for the military position of the West in Europe since the creation of NATO.⁸¹ However, the hopes of closing the last gap in NATO area by the recreation of the Balkan Pact were shattered when the danger, in Tito's eyes, of Soviet assault subsided. With Yugoslavia turning back toward neutralism and the Cyprus issue dividing Greece and Turkey, the usefulness of the Balkan Pact became highly questionable.⁸²

Anxious to implement the «northern-tier» concept the Democratic Party Government in Turkey lost no time in sounding out the Middle Eastern capitals. In the opinion of the Turkish leaders the establishment of a northern-tier alliance system would not only bring the United States to the defense of the Middle East but also, if an Arab country were to join this alliance, break the anti-western Arab unity, and help Turkey in resuming her role as a leading power in the region. As a first step a Turco-Pakistani Pact of Mutual Assistance was concluded on April 2, 1954.⁸³ Subsequently, in spite of bitter opposition by Egypt, Iraq joined with Turkey in a Pact of Mutual Cooperation on February 24, 1955, which became the basis of the Baghdad Pact.⁸⁴ In the course of the year

⁷⁹ New York Times, February 29, 1953, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Ibid., August 10, 1954; *Ayin Tarihi*, No. 249 (August 9, 1954), p. 85-88.

⁸¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, November 4, 1953.

⁸² Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁸³ *Middle East Journal*, 8, No. 3 (Summer 1954), pp. 137-138.

⁸⁴ Central Treaty Organization, *CENTO Makes Progress* (Ankara; February 1961), p. 42.

Britain, Pakistan and Iran formally adhered to the alliance between Turkey and Iraq, thereby establishing the Middle East Treaty Organization. It was believed that the United States would join the Pact as a full member. Despite her participation in Economic, Counter - Subversive Activities, and Military Committees and to footing the greater portion of the bill the United States preferred to remain outside the Pact in order to avoid antagonizing Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Israel.

The Pact was left open to «any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in the region.» However, the violent opposition of the Egyptian - led Arab states, and the Israeli - Anglo - French aggression against Egypt in October 1956, had raised serious doubts as to the would - be effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact. To prevent a possible Soviet penetration into the region the United States was forced to declare on November 29, 1956, that «a threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran, Pakistan, or Turkey would be viewed by the United States with utmost gravity.»⁸⁵ On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower, in a special message to Congress asked authorization to employ the United States «armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of» the nations of the Middle East, «requiring such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.»⁸⁶ This unilateral warning of the United States, which later came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, had sought to placate the apprehensions of the Baghdad Pact nations.

The Turco - Syrian crisis of 1957, the rebellion in Lebanon in May 1958, and continuous Soviet - Egyptian agitation against Iraq, which culminated in the revolution of July 1958, and eventual withdrawal of this country from the Pact weakened the Northern - Tier Alliance.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ U. S. Congress, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., *Report of Committee of Foreign Affairs, H. J. Res., 117* (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 21.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ During these crises opposition leader İsmet İnönü criticizing the Government's Middle Eastern policy declared that «We sincerely believe that

For the purpose of revitalizing the Northern - Tier Alliance the Council of Ministers had a meeting in London and on July 28, 1958, issued a declaration in which it reiterated the determination of the members of the Pact to protect themselves against direct and indirect aggression and to that end to maintain and augment their collective defense arrangements.⁸⁸ At the meeting the United States made an explicit pledge to cooperate with the remaining members of the Alliance and agreed to negotiate separate bilateral security agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

As it was envisaged in the London Declaration, «Bilateral Agreements of Cooperation», between the United States and Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were signed in Ankara on March 15, 1959.⁸⁹ According to one observer these agreements were «a restatement of existing policies and obligations rather than an assumption of new ones. The United States agreed in case of aggression to 'take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and is envisaged in the Joint Resolution' [Eisenhower Doctrine].»⁹⁰ According to Premier Menderes these agreements did not only constitute «positive steps toward the fulfillment of the objectives of our defensive Alliances, but also indicate the importance attached by the United States Government to the defense of CENTO area and its determination to render it more solid in every possible way.»⁹¹ Through these agreements the United States became no less linked to the Northern - Tier Alliance than if she had signed the original Pact.

there are all sorts of dangers involved in an adventurous foreign policy.» C. H. P. Araştırma Bürosu, 1958'de İnönü (İnönü in 1958) (Ankara : Rüzgârlı) Matbaası, 1959), p. 8.

⁸⁸ London Declaration is in Paul E. Zinner (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 376-377. Following Iraq's withdrawal from the Pact the name of the Alliance was changed to Central Treaty Organization.

⁸⁹ A critical analysis of this agreement may be found in Hamza Eroğlu, «Türkiye - Amerika Birleşik Devletleri İkili İşbirliği Anlaşması» (Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation between the United States of America and Turkey) Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, I, 1960, pp. 23-64.

⁹⁰ Campbell, op. cit., p. 148. The same view is expressed also by Coşkun Kırca, «Birleşik Amerika ve İç İşlerimiz» (The United States and Our Internal Affairs) Ulus, February 13, 1960.

⁹¹ The CENTO Council Meets in Washington, CENTO Publication (1957), p. 25.

The Northern - Tier Alliance provides for political, economic and cultural association, if not integration, as well as defensive cooperation. It establishes a link between NATO and SEATO. As far as Iran and Pakistan are concerned CENTO represents a traditional inter - governmental arrangement, formalized by a treaty stating general purposes, pledging assistance and cooperation but reserving the prerogatives of the contracting parties. Therefore, CENTO does not possess supranational characteristics to the same extent as does NATO. As far as Turkey is concerned CENTO represents another channel for American military and economic aid, this seems to be Turkey's only advantage gained in building the Northern - Tier Alliance.

No basic changes in the foreign policy of Turkey has taken place following the Revolution of May 27, 1960, which overthrew the Government of Premier Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party rule. The lack of understanding of the social, cultural and political conditions in Turkey on the part of some Western observers had, at the time, led them to think that the revolution in Turkey was one of those **coup d'états** that had taken place in the past in Latin America and in the Middle East. For example, **Time** magazine argued that «But abroad fears grew that Turkey's military rulers might be planning a permanent Nasser - or - Kassem type dictatorship rather than turning the country back to civilian rule.»⁹² In this connection Henry W. Wriston quite accurately states that in an age of revolution one must realize that «revolution is normal, sanctified by experience and by theory,» that «instability is inherent in post - revolutionary states», and that «power which is obtained under the imminent risk of life to be enjoyed for at least a short period of time», and that «depending upon the national point of view from which it is observed, the same historical event carries wholly different significance; what seems trivial to one appears vital to the other.»⁹³

⁹² **Time**, July 4, 1960, p. 22.

⁹³ Henry W. Wriston, «The Age of Revolution,» **Foreign Affairs**, 39 (July 1961), pp. 540 - 543.

The Turkish people, no doubt, twice in a decade surprised the world by peacefully overthrowing the oppressors. First they had voted the Democratic Party into power in 1950, and ten years later with the help of the Armed Forces they have moved it out of power. The leaders of the Revolution instead of remaining in power transferred the reins of Government to the duly elected representatives of the people in the shortest time possible.

As far as Turkey's foreign relations are concerned immediately upon taking over the Administration of the country the leaders of the Committee of National Unity, addressing the allies of Turkey, her neighbors, and the whole world, proclaimed that their aim was to comply fully with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and reiterated the principle of «peace at home and peace abroad» set by Atatürk. They have also reaffirmed the loyalty of Turkey to all alliances and obligations including NATO and CENTO.⁹⁴

AN ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S QUEST FOR SECURITY THROUGH DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES

Following the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in 1945 two revolutionary factors have changed, almost **in toto**, the structure and the system of international relations; namely a - the unexpected bipolar concentration of power in the hands of the Soviet Union, communist world domination as its objective and the United States as its chief opponent; b - the advent of the atomic and later space ages with their limitless power of destruction.

It seems, therefore, appropriate to dwell, briefly on the main characteristics of the bipolarity and the atomic age before analyzing Turkey's quest for security.

The conflict between democracy and communism as represented by the Western and the Soviet blocs threatens the

⁹⁴ Türkkiye Atatürk, «The 27th of May Revolution and Its Aftermath.» The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, I, 1960, pp. 13-22; Enver Ziya Karal, 27 Mayıs İnkılabının Sebepleri ve Oluşu (The 27th of May Revolution and its Causes) (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1960).

survival of mankind.⁹⁵ However, the real conflict between the two contending forces is between their value systems. Soviet rulers are animated by an atheistic - materialistic creed which denounces the existence of a moral law or natural law which is the premise of the institutions of Western society. The rulers of Soviet Communism openly declare their intention to impose their system upon the rest of the world. The rapid material development and advancement in science and technology are projected tenfold or more on the international scene by these rulers as an evidence of the superiority of their system.

The policy of the West, on the other hand, «seems rather confused, ineffective and frequently incomprehensible.»⁹⁶ It is confused because «the West... is struggling to adjust its principles to essentially changed conditions and has in this process become lost in the existential fear and anxiety.»⁹⁷ It is ineffective because the West in contradiction to the principles of its value system pursues an idealized version of materialism. It is incomprehensible because it is forced to act in a status of intermediacy and thus forced to devise conventional and new concepts, plans and means, simultaneously. The consequence of this is that the idealized version of materialism takes the spirit out of man, and makes him the counterpart of the bee working for the realization of the goal of his political organization, i.e. survival.

The fear of being encircled by aggressive imperialists and the counter fear of communist world conspiracy seems to have accelerated the shift from territorial state to the bloc, communist and democratic blocs as the case may be, as the unit of defense and protection, ultimately for survival, and the establishment of a defense wall around the bloc, i.e., NATO, iron, bamboo, or in the case of Cuba sugar cane curtains.

⁹⁵ The conflict between democracies and communism was elaborated upon by this writer in a speech delivered at «The Twentieth Century Cultural Revolution Conference» at Amman on May 18, 1962, under the title of «Understanding and Educational Cooperation Between the west and the Middle East.»

⁹⁶ William H. Roberts, «The Nature of Modern International Conflict.» *World Polity: A Yearbook of Studies in International Law and Organization*, Vol. II (Utrecht / Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers, 1960), p. 15.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Within these defense walls each bloc seems to remain in an inflexible position because of the impossibility of retreat without giving up what one considers vital and because of the impossibility of advance without risking a thermonuclear holocaust. The blocs, politically, militarily, and economically integrated by the superpowers seem to reproduce the Leviathan pictured by Thomas Hobbes. Within each bloc conflicts among the component parts seem to have been minimized, and **sovereign inequality** established between the superpower and the rest of the powers. Outside these blocs there remains a large number of uncommitted territorial states whose status are as precarious as the units of the Leviathans. On the hands of these Leviathans there remains a «world organization,» a brain child of the idealists, whose aim is preventing the pre-atomic age type wars.

There seems to be three basic characteristics of the present atomic and space age: namely, a - similar to the chain reaction in the explosion of an atomic weapon the fast and swift sequence of discoveries, b - an apparent absence of an effective defense against atomic attack, c - vulnerability of all states to an atomic attack.⁹⁸ Briefly, this is how bipolar concentration of power came about.

Soon after the meeting of the armies of the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers in the heart of Germany the inter-Allied war time cooperation came to an abrupt end. Soviet suspicion and distrust of the peaceful intentions of the Western Powers, who had then the monopoly of the atomic bomb, and the communist doctrinal assumption of the inevitable clash between the capitalist and communist worlds must have led the Kremlin leaders to prepare themselves for the worst. Viewed from Moscow the war had wrought fundamental changes in international relations, according to which:

A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in postwar international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces in operation in the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist

⁹⁸ Herz, op. cit., p. 20.

and the anti - democratic camp, on the one hand, and anti - imperialist and democratic camp, on the other.⁹⁹

In order to meet the so-called challenge of the West on its own soil, the Soviet Union began to consolidate its position in large areas of the Soviet occupied territories of Eastern Europe and Central Europe, and integrated the states in these regions in its orbit. Through the successful conclusion of the civil war in China, the Soviet Union made its greatest conquest which «meant that domination of the Eurasian land mass has passed to the Communist world.»¹⁰⁰

While harvesting the fruits of the Second World War and pursuing a policy of territorial expansion, the Soviet Union spared no effort in infiltrating the so-called Western sphere of influence, i.e., the colonial territories in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and spreading seeds of discontent in the war-devastated areas of Western Europe.

As early as March 1946 an iron curtain was dropped around the Soviet Union. Such fast developing events had caught the Western Powers unprepared to meet the Soviet expansionism. «After a year and a half of following a policy of 'patience with firmness'» says one observer, «the United States prepared to assume Western leadership and embark upon a positive program of checking Soviet expansion.»¹⁰¹ The consequent developments were, therefore, one of successive responses and counter-responses of the Communist and Western Leviathans. However, in Turkey's case, other and more important factors, i.e., the emergence of Soviet communism to world eminence with its threat to world peace and the advent of the atomic age, with its limitless capacity of destruction, had decisive influence on Turkish foreign policy. Such new developments have increased Turkey's insecurity and her fear of being dominated by international Russian communism.

⁹⁹ Andrei Zhdanov's speech at the founding conference of the Cominform in Wlilza Gora (Upper Silesia), September 22-23, 1947. Quoted in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 215.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

At the end of the Second World War Turkey was no longer in a position to resist the threats of international communism alone, and in a bipolar world she had no other alternative—neutralism being impossible—but to join the West in defensive alliances. Under the impact of bipolarity and atomic developments, Turkey was forced to readjust her foreign policy the characteristics of which were: 1 - a shift from an extremely cautious to a dynamic foreign policy; 2 - open hostility towards the Soviet Union and complete break with the communist world and integration with the West. Despite occasional utterances like, «No nation should be allowed to have her entire security at the mercy of any one country, no matter how great a friend and ally that country may be at the time.»¹⁰² an insistent policy of standing unequivocally with the United States, i.e., being too dependent on a single big power; 3 - assuming, under Western pressure, a leading role in the Middle East; 4 - taking a definite stand against the policy of neutralism; 5 - in compliance with the decision of the United Nations sending troops to Korea, taking part in a collective police action outside the territorial limits of the country.

These fundamental changes of policy were considered by the Democratic Party Government as compatible with Atatürk's legacy: to pursue a status quo policy, including peaceful changes that are necessary for the maintenance of the equilibrium in the Middle East, e.g. revision of the Straits Convention of 1923, the Mosul settlement, and the annexation of Hatay; to show vigilance and determination against communist threats and aggression and to that end stand with the West.

Although every Members' independence and territorial integrity was under the guarantee of the Charter of the United Nations, except the decision of the Security Council with respect to assisting the Republic of Korea in her struggle against Communist aggression, the events in the post-hostilities period in the Second World War made it clear to every policy maker that it was essential to take necessary measures,

¹⁰² This statement is attributed to the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Party Government, Fatin R. Zorlu by Kılıç, op. cit., p. 169.

under Article 51 of the Charter, for individual and collective defense against the threat to peace and act of aggression. When the Western European Countries and the United States began to establish a network of defensive alliances, e.g., the Rio Pact of 1947, the Brussels Pact of 1948, and the North Atlantic Pact of 1949, Turkey spared no effort in joining in an alliance with the West, particularly with the United States. Western Powers, on the other hand, preoccupied with their own security were certain that the Turks would resist Soviet aggression regardless of whether they were included in a defensive alliance with the democratic countries of the West. An editorial in the **New York Herald Tribune** put it in these words: «They [Turks] will never go so far as to say: 'Either comply with our demands, give us more aid and take us into the North Atlantic alliances or sign some other treaty with us, or else we will make a deal with the other side.»¹⁰³

The truth of the matter was that Turkey had no other alternative but to resort to entering into defensive alliances with the West. Persuading the West that an alliance with Turkey would serve the interest of the free peoples was a difficult task which required patience, tact and dynamic steps on the part of the Turkish leaders.

Was such a dynamic policy and complete dependency on the United States and the West the right course of action for Turkey? A student of Turkish affairs, Altemur Kılıç, expresses the opinion that:

Turkey considers herself an integral part of the West not because of a temporary expediency, but as a matter of basic philosophy. She will stand and fall with the West. Her geographic and strategic position make neutrality impossible for Turkey. Her neutrality in the Second World War was anachronistic and accidental; it cannot happen again. A general war will almost certainly extend to the Middle East. Even if we imagined for a moment that Turkey was not in the path of Russian objectives, no Turkish leader or no Turkish party, however cautious, could take the course of waiting it out, knowing well that Kremlin would not hesitate to turn against a «neutral» Turkey once it had beaten the West.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ April 11, 1951, p. 26.

¹⁰⁴ Kılıç, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

It is true that the only way to deal with the Soviets is to show strength and determination and pursue a policy of «stand and fall with the West.» Can the West feel safe and secure under the fear of annihilation in a thermonuclear war? Can it, therefore, afford to wage a «preventive war»? The fear of mutual annihilation precludes such a possibility, even though it may be the only way out of the present dilemma. Can the West create conditions which may provoke an all-out war? It must calculate the risk of war while strengthening its defensive posture. In a world where everything is in a constant flux and where time and space lose their traditional meanings the mind must be ever more cautious. In such a world a split second would make the difference between life and death. Recklessness, on the other hand, would result with the loss of what one considers dear. The atomic age requires an ever more enlightened leadership for the West as well as for its component parts. It is the considered opinion of this writer that Turkey should have followed a more flexible policy, in keeping with the requirements of the present age, for her own interest, because «defensive alliances» are only means towards an end, i.e., the protection of national interests. Sir Anthony Eden puts it in these words:

No single member of NATO likes to feel that for his protection he is dependent on the decision of one, two or may be three powers to come to his aid at the critical hour, or it could be the critical minute. Mr. Henry A. Kissinger writes of the problems of peacemaking after the Napoleonic Wars, and gives a warning which is applicable today, 'To be dependent on the continued good will of another sovereign state is demoralizing because it is a confession of impotence, an invitation to irresponsibility induced by the conviction that events cannot be affected by one's will'.¹⁰⁵

When considering the national interest of Turkey, even in a bipolar world such as ours, one is inevitably led to this question: has the too close alliance with the United States created greater insecurity for Turkey in proportion with her

¹⁰⁵ Sir Anthony Eden. «The Slender Margin of Safety», *Foreign Affairs*, 39 (January 1961), p. 172; see also Henry A. Kissinger, «The Unsolved Problems of European Defence», *Foreign Affairs*, 40 (July 1962), pp. 541 ff.

commitments to the West? It may be said that Turkey's quest for security through defensive alliances with the West has strengthened her defensive posture, but, it cannot be denied that today she is less secure than she ever was, for the following reasons: 1 - Security is a vicious circle, the more nation - states and blocs, for that matter, acquire power the less they must feel secure, because of the ensuing armament race; 2 - Complete security is unobtainable; 3 - Complete full - proof collective security is not possible and promises of help «in accordance with the constitutional provisions» of an ally, in the words of a military expert, General Maxwell Taylor, «is not very encouraging to a country living on the Communist periphery, thousands of miles from the United States.»¹⁰⁶ 4 - It is no less true today than it was during the balance of power system that alignments by virtue of alliance treaties are not always identical with the alliances that oppose each other in the actual contest of armed hostilities. The Suez crisis of 1956 is an example. 5 - Moreover, a country like Turkey, which lacks the industrial capacity to produce the necessary weapons in the atomic age and the financial means of sustaining huge, conventional, armed forces may feel less secure, and exposed to communist penetration, if her requests in military and economic aid are not met by the leading power of the bloc, which may lead to misunderstandings and mutual irritation.

This brings up the question of the relationship between Turkey and the United States. Has the quest for security resulted with Turkey's **de facto** dependence and the loss of some of the attributes of sovereignty? According to George Schwarzenberger, within the Western bloc the United States has «complete freedom of action regarding peace and war.» The United States is, says Schwarzenberger, «still sovereign in the political sense,» while «from the point of view of the world powers the other sovereign states have become security zones, atom absorbers, stationary aircraft carriers and jumping off grounds for the conquest of continents.»¹⁰⁷ Taking into

¹⁰⁶ Maxwell D. Taylor, «Security Will Not Wait,» *Foreign Affairs*, 39 (January 1961), p. 180.

¹⁰⁷ George Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1951), p. 98.

consideration the period of Democratic Party Administration one would incline to agree with Schwarzenbergen's view. Pre-occupied with the desire to be included in the Atlantic Alliance and with the idea of receiving more military and economic aid the Democratic Party Government, in international issues, seemed to be over-zealous in following the course of action formulated by the West (e.g. Middle East Defense Organization, Baghdad Pact, Palestine, Anglo-Iranian, Suez, and Algerian questions). In all these issues Turkey's freedom of action was limited by the West.¹⁰⁸ Again preoccupied with the security problem the Democratic Party Government agreed to open Turkey to American armed forces and agreed to the establishment of conventional and nuclear bases, while other NATO partners were being reluctant in this respect. Such agreements and integration of Turkish forces into NATO can hardly fail to have some influence in Turkish sovereignty. Guidance in foreign affairs led to guidance in domestic policies. Turkey was to remain or become a reliable and stable force of resistance against communist penetration. To that end, it may be argued, the United States suggested certain domestic measures in economic development and in establishing democratic procedures and institutions. «The transformation of Turkey from one-party dictatorship into something resembling a two-party democracy» says one Western observer, «was not unrelated to that country's reception into Western system at the time of President Truman's Greek and Turkish aid policy.»¹⁰⁹

It must be admitted, however, that such a dependency was not the result of a deliberate act, a free choice, but was one of the consequences of the bipolarization of the world and the atomic age. Furthermore, one of the subjective requirements of collective security involves a relinquishment of sovereignty in the most crucial area of policy, i.e., dealing with situations which may be created by the action and policy of other states, which implies a transfer of power to make vital decisions. Thirdly, in a bipolar world, in order to survive

¹⁰⁸ On Turkey's voting practice in the United Nations, see Gönlübol and Ataöv, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁹ Herz, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

as a bloc, apparent national interests must be subordinated to the bloc interests. Fourthly, states do enter into agreements with others which one way or another limit their freedom of action. Finally, is it not a fact of international life that some states are more equal than others?

This dependency could be turned into a really equal partnership if the Democratic Administration could establish an effective public administration, financial stability, a sensible plan of economic development and a reasonable degree of consistent law and order in the country and formulate a farsighted and somewhat more cautious foreign policy, taking into consideration the long term national interests. These would achieve greater respect for Turkey and at the same time increase her prestige in international affairs, and at times would place Turkey in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States in matters of military and economic aid.

In conclusion: Turkey until now has succeeded in preserving her territorial integrity and political independence and has so far succeeded in the preservation of the peace in the Middle East, where the Western and Eastern philosophies, cultures, ways of life, institutions overlap and where the past, present, and under certain conditions the future co-exist and where conventional and nuclear establishments, arrangements, policies juxtapose. Turkey must play an important role in this space vehicle, whose future depends on the will and determination of the free peoples to preserve their value systems and to lead a «good life» in the Aristotelian sense.