

OPERA OMNIA JAMES M. BUCHANAN **JAMES M. BUCHANAN KÜLLİYATI**

Siyaset ve Hukuk Felsefesi'nden Anayasal Politik İktisat'a;
Kamu Maliyesi'nden Kamu Tercihi'ne "Buchanan Külliyyatı"'na Genel Bir Bakış*

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I. GİRİŞ

*"Katkılarının genişliği, derinliği, hacmi ve çok disiplinli önemi göz önüne alındığında, belki de 'Buchanan Külliyyatı' diyebileceğimiz bir alanın geliştirebileceğini söyleyebiliriz."*²

Art Carden

Samford Üniversitesi profesörlerinden Art Carden'in gayet isabetle ifade ettiği üzere akademik kariyerlerini Adam Smith Külliyyatı, Friedrich Hayek Külliyyatı, Karl Marx Külliyyatı, John Maynard Keynes külliyyatı gibi tek bir düşünürün çıkar açan içgörülerini keşfetmeye ve anlamaya adanmış çok sayıda bilim insanı vardır. Carden 20. yüzyılda ana akım geleneğin önde gelen temsilcilerinden biri olan Buchanan'ın tarih, felsefe, siyaset bilimi, hukuk, anayasal iktisat gibi alanlardaki görüşleri dolayısıyla bu sayılan fikir adamları ve filozoflar gibi geniş külliyyata sahip bir düşünür olduğunu belirtmektedir.³

* Bu çalışmada bilimsel araştırma ve yayın etiği ilkelerine uyulmuştur.

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Atf (APA): Aktan, C. C., (2025), Opera Omnia James M. Buchanan -James M. Buchanan Külliyyatı-Siyaset ve Hukuk Felsefesi'nden Anayasal Politik İktisat'a; Kamu Maliyesi'nden Kamu Tercihi'ne "Buchanan Külliyyatı"'na Genel Bir Bakış, Ekonomi Bilimleri Dergisi, 17 (3): 1-93.

² *Given the breadth, depth, volume, and multidisciplinary importance of his contributions, it stands to reason, perhaps, that there would develop a field we might call "Buchanan Studies."* Bkz. Carden, A. "Buchanan's Big Idea", Regulation, Winter 2017/2018. S.61.

<https://www.cato.org/regulation/winter-2017-2018/james-m-buchanan-liberal-political-economy>

³ Carden, A. "Buchanan's Big Idea", Regulation, Winter 2017/2018. S.62

Bu çalışmanın yazarı olarak ben de 1985 yılında başlayan ve bugüne değin 40 yılı bulan akademik kariyerim boyunca Buchanan'ın bilgeliğinde ilerlediğimi, onun içgörülerini keşfetmeye ve anlamaya çalıştığımı not etmek isterim.

Buchanan Külliyyatı adını verdiğim bu çalışmayı onun sosyal bilimlerin birçok alanına yaptığı katkılar ve bıraktığı mirasa bir saygı olarak kaleme almak istedim.

Külliyat kelimesi felsefeye, eskiye, geleneklere ve geçmişin birikimlerine olan hayranlığım ve saygım dolayısıyla kulağıma hoş geliyor. Latince *Opera Omnia* terimi ise Buchanan'ın bilgeliğine ve felsefi derinliğine sanırım çok daha uygun düşüyor. Bu çalışmamda hem *Külliyat* hem de *Opera Omnia* kavramlarını kullanmanın doğru olacağını düşündüm.

II. JAMES M. BUCHANAN: KISA BİYOGRAFİSİ⁴

James McGill Buchanan, 1919 yılında ABD'nin Tennessee eyaletindeki küçük bir kasaba olan Rutherford'da doğdu. Üniversite eğitimini aynı eyalette Middle Tennessee Teachers College'de tamamladı (1940). Daha sonra, Tennessee Üniversitesi'nden master (1941) ve Chicago Üniversitesi'nden Doktora (1948) derecelerini aldı. Doktoranın hemen ardından Tennessee Üniversitesi'nde akademisyen olarak göreve başladı. 1951-1954 yılları arasında Florida Devlet Üniversitesi'nde, 1954-1955 akademik yılında ise Fulbright bursuyla İtalya'da araştırmalarda bulundu. ABD'ye döndükten sonra G. Warren Nutter ile birlikte Virginia Üniversitesi'nde Thomas Jefferson Politik İktisat Araştırmaları Merkezini kurdu. Buchanan, merkezde 1957-68 yılları arasında Direktör olarak görev yaptı. 1968-1969 eğitim yılında ise Los Angeles'ta California Üniversitesi'nde Misafir Profesör olarak bulundu. Daha sonra 1969 yılında Virginia Politeknik Üniversitesi'ne geçti ve aynı üniversitede Gordon Tullock ile birlikte Kamu Tercih Araştırma Merkezi'ni (Center for Study of Public Choice) kurdu. Buchanan uzun yıllar bu merkezin Genel Direktörlüğü ve daha sonra da Müşavir Genel Direktörlüğü görevini yürüttü. 1983 yılında merkezde çalışan diğer profesörler ile birlikte George Mason Üniversitesi'nin Fairfax'taki kampüsüne taşınma kararını aldı.

<https://www.cato.org/regulation/winter-2017-2018/james-m-buchanan-liberal-political-economy>
⁴ Geniş ölçüde şu çalışmamızdan nakledilmiştir: Aktan, C.C. 1994. "James M. Buchanan'ın Politik İktisada Katkıları", Maliye Yazıları Dergisi, Ocak-Mart 1994, s.32-65.

Profesör Buchanan 1986 yılında Kamu Tercihi alanındaki öncü çalışmaları dolayısıyla Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü'ne layık görüldü. Buchanan bu ödülün yanısıra pek çok bilim ve araştırma ödülü, şeref ödülü ve fahri doktora derecelerinin sahibi oldu.

Buchanan, kırk yılı aşkın bir süre Kamu Maliyesi, Kamu Tercihi, Anayasal İktisat ve Ekonomik Felsefe gibi konular üzerinde pek çok kitap, makale, monograf yayınladı. Kendisinin bir çok kitabı ve makalesi çeşitli dillere tercüme edildi. Buchanan'ın ekonomi ve felsefe üzerindeki düşünceleri ulusal ve uluslar arası düzeyde pek çok iktisatçı, sosyolog, siyaset bilimcisi vb. bilim adamlarının ilgisini çekti. Her yıl dünyanın çeşitli ülkelerinden bilim adamları ve araştırmacılar Kamu Tercihi Araştırma Merkezi'ni ziyaret ederek Buchanan'ın gelişmesine önemli katkılarda bulunduğu Kamu Tercihi ve Anayasal İktisat üzerinde çalışmalar yaptılar. Virginia Politik İktisat Okulu olarak da bilinen bu merkez halen ABD'de ve diğer ülkelerde saygın bir araştırma kurumu hüviyetine sahiptir.

III. NOBELİTE: NOBEL EKONOMİ ÖDÜLÜ (1986)

İsveç Kraliyet Akademisi, Alfred Nobel Ekonomi Bilimleri ödülüne layık görülen James M. Buchanan için 1986 yılında dünya basınına ve kamuoyuna şu açıklamayı yapmıştır:

“James B. Buchanan, ekonomi ve politik karar alma sürecine ilişkin sözleşmecî ve anayasal bir temel oluşturmak yolunda yaklaşık 40 yıl kendini bilimsel çalışmalara adanmış. Bu çalışmaları ile Kamu Tercihi Teorisi'nin en başta gelen temsilcisi ve lideri oldu.”⁵

İsveç Kraliyet Akademisi'nin Nobel Ödülü başlığını taşıyan resmi sitesinde ödül gerekçesi “*ekonomik ve politik karar alma teorisi için sözleşmesel ve anayasal temellerin geliştirilmesi*” (“*for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making*”) şeklinde ifade edilmiş ve ilave olarak Buchanan hakkında şunlar yazılmıştır:

⁵ Press release from the Royal Swedish Academy, No. 1986.
<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/facts/>

“James Buchanan, siyasi karar alma teorisi ve kamu ekonomisine yaptığı katkılardan dolayı Ekonomi Bilimleri Ödülü'ne layık görüldü. Geleneksel ekonomi teorisi, tüketicilerin mal satın alma, ürünler ve çalışma vb. konularda nasıl karar aldıklarını ayrıntılı bir şekilde açıklar. Bir dizi çalışmada, Buchanan kamu sektöründe buna karşılık gelen bir karar alma teorisi geliştirdi. En bilinen eseri, Gordon Tullock ile iş birliği içinde yazdığı Calculus of Consent (1962)'dir.”

Basit cümlelerle ifade edilmiş olsa da yukarıdaki sözler iktisatçılar ve hatta sosyal bilimciler tarafından her yönüyle anlaşılacak cümleler değildir. Buchanan'ın ödül almasının gerekçesinde onun sözleşmecilik (contractarianism) ve anayasacılık (constitutionalism) felsefesine bağlılığına vurgu yapılarak hem piyasa ekonomisi hem de kamu ekonomisinde tercihleri (seçimleri) inceleyerek kamu ekonomisinde piyasa ekonomisine benzer bir karar alma sürecinin analizine katkılar yaptığı ifade edilmiştir.

IV. BUCHANAN ARŞİVİ: AİLESİ, ÖZEL YAŞAMI, YAZIŞMALARI VS.

ABD'nde James M. Buchanan'ın çalıştığı George Mason Üniversitesi'nde bulunan Özel Koleksiyonlar Araştırma Merkezi Buchanan'ın 93 yıllık yaşamına dair belgelerin düzenlenmesi, tanımlanması ve yeniden işlenmesi konusunda bir mali destek alarak Buchanan Arşivi oluşturmuştur. National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) bağışı ile mümkün olan bu projenin yürütücülüğünü Rebecca Thayer yapmıştır.

James M. Buchanan belgeleri 1930-2014 yılları arasında oluşturulan yazışmalar, yazılar ve idari dosyalardan oluşmaktadır. Koleksiyon 9 seri içermektedir.⁶

Seri 1: Biyografik materyaller (yaklaşık 1944-2012). James M. Buchanan'ın hayatı ve kariyeri hakkında bilgi içerir.

Seri 2: Yazışmalar (1951-2014). Çoğunlukla Buchanan'ın profesyonel kariyeriyle ilgili mektuplar, e-postalar ve diğer yazılı iletişim biçimlerini içerir.

⁶ Bu konuda bilgi ve belgelere ulaşmak için aşağıdaki adrese ulaşılabilir: James M. Buchanan Papers, George Mason Libraries, Special Collection Research Center. URL: <https://aspace.gmu.edu/resources/c0246>

Seri 3: Yazılar (1946-2012). Buchanan'ın kitaplarının, makalelerinin, konuşma metinlerinin, derslerinin ve yayınlanmamış materyallerinin taslaklarını, daktilo edilmiş metinlerini, fotokopilerini, notlarını ve yeniden basımlarını içerir.

Seri 4: Akademi (1946-2013). Buchanan'ın çeşitli üniversitelerdeki (özellikle görev yaptığı Virginia Üniversitesi, Virginia Politeknik Enstitüsü ve George Mason Üniversitesi) çalışmalarına ilişkin yazışmaları, raporları vs. içerir.

Seri 5: Profesyonel Hizmet (1958-2013). Bu seri, Buchanan'ın üniversite sorumlulukları dışındaki profesyonel faaliyetleriyle ilgili materyalleri içerir. Buchanan'ın kariyeri boyunca katıldığı konferanslardan, konuşmalardan ve diğer etkinliklerden yazışmalar, programlar, planlama belgeleri, makaleler ve ders notları ve seyahat belgeleri içerir.

Seri 6: Betty Tillman belgeleri (1968-2008). Buchanan'ın idari asistanı ve Kamu Tercih Araştırmaları Merkezi'nin idari müdürü olan Betty Tillman tarafından oluşturulan dosyaları içerir.

Seri 7: Jo Ann Burgess belgeleri (1972-2014). Buchanan'ın idari asistanı ve editörü ve Kamu Tercih Araştırmaları Merkezi sekreteri olan Jo Ann Burgess tarafından oluşturulan dosyaları içerir.

Seri 8: Başkalarının yazıları (1930-2014). Buchanan dışındaki yazarların makalelerini, kitap taslaklarını ve diğer yazılarını içerir. Bazı materyallerde notlar ve açıklamalar bulunur. Bazı yazılar Buchanan ve fikirleri hakkındadır.

Seri 9: Görsel-işitsel ve dijital olarak üretilmiş materyaller (yaklaşık 1970'ler-2013). Ses kasetleri, video kasetleri, CD'ler, DVD'ler, disketler ve ilgili kağıt materyalleri içerir.

V. BUCHANAN ÜZERİNE BİBLİYOGRAFYA ÇALIŞMALARI

Buchanan'ın akademik kariyeri boyunca kaleme aldığı kitap, makale, monografi ve saire çalışmaların listesi farklı dergiler ve internet arşivlerinde yer almaktadır. Bunların en kapsamlısı Liberty Fund tarafından yayınlanan Online Library of Liberty içerisinde yayınlanmıştır.

James M. Buchanan: A Bibliography. (1987). Southern Economic Journal, 54(1), 1–18. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1058799>

Bibliography of James M. Buchanan's Publications, 1949-1986. (1987). The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89(1), 17–37. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3440482>

The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison, 20 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999-2002).

VI. LIBERTY FUND TARAFINDAN YAYINLANAN BUCHANAN'IN TOPLU ESERLERİ

Merkezi ABD'nde Indiana'da bulunan kar amacı gütmeyen bir vakıf olan Liberty Fund, Inc., James M. Buchanan'ın kitap ve makalelerinin önemli bir kısmını "*James M. Buchanan'ın Toplu Çalışmaları*" (The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan) adıyla 10 cilt halinde yayınlamıştır. Bu çalışmaların bir kısmı ücretsiz erişime açıktır.⁷

- The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan in 20 vols.
- The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Vol. 2 Public Principles of Public Debt
- The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
- The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 4. Public Finance in Democratic Process
- The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 5. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods
- Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory, Vol. 6 of the Collected Works
- The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, vol. 7 (The Limits of Liberty)
- Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes
- The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 9 (The Power to Tax)
- The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 10 (The Reason of Rules)

⁷ bkz. <https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/james-m-buchanan>

VII. BUCHANAN KÜLLİYATINA DAİR GENEL DEĞERLENDİRME

Buchanan 93 yıllık uzun yaşamının neredeyse üçte ikisini sadece ve sadece yazı hayatına hasrederek geçirmiş bir fikir adamı ve bilim insanıdır. 1941 yılında yüksek lisans tezini⁸, 1948 yılında da doktora tezini⁹ tamamladıktan sonra ölümüne kadar geçen yıllarda durmaksızın sosyal bilimlerin muhtelif alanlarında kitaplar ve makaleler kaleme almıştır.

Bugün dünyanın birçok ülkesinde onlarca araştırmacı Buchanan'ın miras bıraktığı bu külliyat üzerine çalışmalarını sürdürmektedirler. Buchanan'ın bilime yaptığı katkıları inceleyen çok sayıda kitap ve sayısız makale kaleme alınmıştır.

James M. Buchanan 1940'lı yılların sonlarından 1970'li yılların başlarına değin ağırlıklı olarak *Kamu Maliyesi* ve *Kamu Ekonomisi* üzerine çalışmalar yayınlamıştır. Buchanan Kamu Maliyesi ve daha ileriki zaman diliminde Kamu Ekonomisi adıyla gelişen araştırma programını Kamu Tercihi adıyla daha da ileriye taşımıştır. 1963 yılında Gordon Tullock ile birlikte kaleme aldığı *Oybirliğini'nin Hesabı*¹⁰ kitabı ile *Kamu Tercihi* (Public Choice) adı verilen bir disiplinin doğuşu gerçekleşmiştir. Buchanan 1980'li yılların başlarından itibaren de *Anayasal İktisat* (Constitutional Economics) veya *Anayasal Politik İktisat* (Constitutional Political Economy) adı verilen bir başka çok disiplinli araştırma programının kurucusu ve öncüsü olmuştur. Buchanan kamu ekonomisi ve kamu maliyesinde ve daha genel anlamda ekonomide ortaya çıkan sorunların çözümünde anayasal düzeyde hukuk kuralları üzerinde çalışarak *Anayasal Politik İktisat* adıyla bir multi-disipliner araştırma programı geliştirmiştir. Buchanan'ın akademik kariyerindeki bu gelişme aşamalarını şu şekilde göstermemiz mümkündür.


⁸ Buchanan, J. M. 1941. Gasoline Tax Sharing Among Local Units Of Government İn Tennessee. Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee.

http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/2683.

⁹ Buchanan, J.M. 1948. Fiscal Equity in a Federal State. PhD thesis. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago.

¹⁰ James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Paperback edition (1965).

Şekil-1: Buchanan’ın Akademik Kariyerinin Temelini Oluşturan Araştırma Programları



Buchanan’ın akademik kariyerinde disiplinlerarası çalışma geleneği oldukça dikkat çekicidir. Buchanan Maliye/İktisat alanındaki çalışmalarını Siyaset Bilimi (Politika), Hukuk ve Felsefe disiplinleri ile buluşturarak yeni disiplinlerin doğuşuna öncülük etmiştir.

James M. Buchanan esasen bir iktisatçı olmakla birlikte Siyaset Bilimi, Hukuk (özellikle Anayasa Hukuku), Sosyoloji, Felsefe, Etik gibi alanlarda çok sayıda eserler vermiş engin ve derin bilgiye sahip bir “*polimat*” düşünürdür. Buchanan’ın uzun ve verimli akademik kariyerinde ilgi duyduğu araştırma konularının genel bir resmini Şekil-2 üzerinde görmemiz mümkündür. Geliştirmeye, iyileştirmeye ve eleştiriye açık bu taslak şema bize onun sosyal bilimlerin neredeyse tüm alanları ile çok yakından ilgilendiğini göstermektedir. Buchanan Bibliyografyası titizlikle incelendiğinde Buchanan’ın inter-disipliner ve daha da ilerisinde multi-disipliner araştırmalar yapan gerçek bir polimat sosyal bilimci olduğu söylenebilir.

James M. Buchanan yukarıda da belirttiğimiz üzere 93 yıllık yaşamının 60 yıllık kesitini oluşturan aktif araştırmacı akademisyenlik dönemi boyunca hep ideal bir toplumsal yaşamın ilkelerini aramakla geçirmiştir. 8 Kasım 1986 tarihinde İsveç’te yapılan Nobel seramonisinde bu dileklerini şu sözlerle yinelemiştir:

“...kendi değerlerimizi yaratabilen ve yaratmak zorunda olan bizler özgürlüklerimizi koruyarak, barış, refah ve uyum içinde bir arada nasıl yaşayabiliriz?”¹¹

Buchanan toplumsal yaşamda özgürlük, adalet, refah, barış ve uyum gibi değerleri tesis edebilmek için daima toplumsal düzenin ana kuralları üzerine anlaşmanın ve

¹¹ James M. Buchanan Jr. – Prize Lecture. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach 2025. Fri. 18 Apr 2025.

<<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/lecture/>>

uzlaşmanın önemine vurgu yapmıştır. En azından bu kuralların istismar ve suistimale yol açmayacak şekilde güvence altına alınması için fikirler üretmiş, onlarca yazı kaleme almıştır.

Şekil-2: Buchanan’ın Akademik Kariyerinde İlgilendiği Başlıca Disiplinler

İKTİSAT TEORİSİ İktisat Metodolojisi Pozitif ve Normatif İktisat İktisadi Analiz İktisat Teorileri	POLİTİK İKTİSAT Klasik Politik İktisat Yeni Politik İktisat Kamu Tercih İktisadi Kurumsal İktisat	İKTİSADİ DÜŞÜNCE İktisat Felsefesi Klasik İktisadi Düşünce Keynezyen İktisat Yeni İktisat Okulları Mülkiyet Hakları İktisadi	MALİYET İKTİSADI Tercih ve Maliyetler Fırsat Maliyeti Oylama ve Maliyet Görünmez Maliyetler
VERGİLEME Vergi Teorisi Vergi Politikası Normatif vergi Hukuku Anayasal Vergileme Vergi Anayasası	KAMUSAL MALLAR Özel Mallar-Kamusal Mallar Küçük Mallar Mal ve Hizmet Sunumu Etkinlik & Verimlilik Özelleştirme & Düzenleme	DIŞSALLIK Piyasa Başsırsızlığı Dışsal Ekonomiler Çevre Kirliliği Pareto Optimalitesi	MALİ FEDERALİZM İdareler-arası Hizmet Paylaşımı İdareler-arası Mali İlişkiler Mali Tevzin Mali Rekabet
REFAH İKTİSADI Teorik Refah İktisadi Sosyal Refah Devleti Pareto Optimalitesi Sosyal Güvenlik Sosyal Hizmetler	DAĞITICI ADALET Gelirin Yeniden Dağılımı Sosyal Adalet Vergileme ve Adalet Demokrat	KENT İKTİSADI Kentsel Hizmetler Kent Hizmetlerinin Finansmanı Kent Hizmetlerinin Fiyatlandırılması	MALİ DİSİPLİN Mali Denge / Ekonomik Denge Mali Sorumluluk Ahlakı Açık Bütçe / Denk Bütçe Mali Kurallar
DEVLETİN BÜYÜMESİ Merkezi Leviathan Yerel Leviathan Devlet Niçin Büyüyor? Devletin Büyümesinin Sonuçları	DEVLETİN BAŞARISIZLIĞI Piyasa Başsırsızlığı Devlet Başsırsızlığı Siyasal Talep ve Siyasal Arz Cephesinden Devlet Başsırsızlığının Anatomisi	KAMU TERCİHİ Politikarın İktisadi Analizi Metodoloji ve İlkeler Doğuşu, Gelişimi ve Etkileri Pozitif/Normatif Kamu Tercih Sosyal Seçim Teorisi	SÖZLEŞMECİ FELSEFE Sözleşmecilik Toplumsal Sözleşme Teorisi Kurucu Rasyonalizm Evrimsel Rasyonalizm
ANAYASACILIK Anayasacılık Felsefesi Anayasacılık Hareketleri Anayasal Reform Anayasa Dizaynı	ANAYASAL İKTİSAT Mali Anayasa Parasal Anayasa Vergi Anayasası Borçlanma Anayasası	KURALLAR & KURUMLAR Kuralların Önemi Hukuk ve İktisat Hukukun İktisadi Analizi Anayasal/ Post-Anayasal Kurallar Kurallara k. Kurumlar	ETİK Ahlak Felsefesi Çalışma Ahlakı Etik ve İktisadi Gelişme Mali Etik ve Mali Kurallar

James Buchanan kanaatimce insanlık tarihi boyunca kuralların ve kurumların (rules and institutions) önemine en fazla vurgu yapan fikir adamıdır. Bu ifademiz kesinlikle yanlış, taraflı ve abartılı bir ifade olarak değerlendirilmemelidir. Buchanan “sözleşmecilik” (contractarianism) ve “anayasacılık” (constitutionalism) felsefelerine sıkı sıkıya bağlı kurallara dayalı bir düzen arayışında olan bir düşündürdür. Politik iktisatçı olarak iktisadi hayatın ana kurallarının tanzim edilmesinde kuralların önemine, spesifik olarak da “anayasal kuralların” önemine ağırlık verdi. Ona göre vatandaşlar ile devlet arasındaki anlaşma ve sözleşmenin (sosyal kontrat) ilkeleri yani oyunun kuralları önceden belirlenir ve ilan edilirse o

takdirde yukarıda ifade edilen toplumsal amaçlara (özgürlük, adalet, refah, barış ve uyum vs.) ulaşmak mümkün olur. Buchanan iktisat biliminde “*kararlara karşı kurallar*” (rules vs. discretion) tartışmasında her zaman kuralların yanında oldu; hükümetlerin keyfî kararlar almalarını engelleyecek anayasal kuralların ne olması gerektiği üzerine fikirler ve öneriler geliştirdi.

VIII. SON SÖZ

Profesör Buchanan ile 24 yaşında iken tanıştım ve o günden bugüne, yani yaklaşık 40 yıldan bu yana onun engin ufkundan ilham alarak sosyal bilimlerin hemen her alanında yazılar kaleme alıyorum. Ne Buchanan’ın ne de bir başka fikir adamının “*müridi*” falan değilim; olsa olsa onun izinden giden bir “*izdeş*” olabilirim o kadar!¹² Bu 40 yıl boyunca Buchanan’ın muhtelif kitaplarından bazı bölümlerin ve makalelerin Türkçe’ye tercüme edilmesinde öncülük yaptım, Buchanan’ın fikirlerinden esinlenerek sosyal bilimlerin çok farklı disiplinleri üzerinde yazılar kaleme aldım. Buchanan’ın büyük külliyyatının tanıtılmasında çabalar sarf ettim. Onun Kamu Maliyesi, Kamu Tercihi, Politik İktisat, Anayasal İktisat ve daha birçok alanındaki katkılarının anlaşılması için çalışmalar yaptım.¹³

¹² Ayrıca not etmek isterim: Hiçbir sosyal, siyasi ya da iktisadi düşünceye kesinlikle koşulsuz “mensubiyet” içerisinde olan bir yazar değilim ve olmadım. Bugüne değin hiçbir siyasi partiye üye olmadığım gibi “particilik” ve “partizanlığı” akademik kimlik ve entelektüel hüviyet ile asla yan yana görmedim, bu yönde ilerleyen insanları daima ayıpladım ve kınadım. Bir kitabım içerisinde kaleme aldığım görüşlerimi burada tekrarlamak isterim: “*Ben iktisat teorileri ve iktisadi düşünce içerisinde “iyi iktisat okulu”nu değil daima “iyi iktisat”ı aramakla meşgul oldum ve hala bu uğraş içerisindeyim. Bir iktisat düşünce ya da doktrini ya da bir iktisat okulunu “dogma” ya da “ideoloji”ye dönüştürmek ve buna saplantı düzeyinde biat etmek yanlıştır. Doğduğu topraklarda ailesinden ve çevresinden öğrendiği dinin tek kutsal ve doğru din olduğunu savunmak ve onun dışındaki dinleri “yalan”, “uydurulmuş”, “değiştirilmiş”, “bozulmuş” olarak nitelemek mi doğrudur; yoksa alışkanlıkları ya da bilinçli iradesi ile kendi inandığı ve bağlı olduğu din dışındaki inançlara da saygı göstererek onların da özünde doğruluk ve güzellik mesajlarına sahip olabileceğini görmek ve kabul etmek mi daha doğrudur? Tekrar edelim: İktisat biliminde kutsal bir din yaratmak ne kadar yanlış ise bir iktisat okulunun bağnaz ve yobaz bir takipçisi olmak da o kadar yanlıştır.*” Aktan, C.C. 2018. Yeni İktisat Okulları ve İktisadi Düşünce, 3. b. Ankara: Seçkin.s.405.

¹³ Görev yaptığım Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi’nde birlikte çalıştığım hocalarım ve meslektaşlarıma Buchanan’ın başında bulunduğu Araştırma Merkezi’nde çalışma fırsatı sağlama konusunda kapı araladım ve yardımcı oldum. Meslektaşlarımla Amerika’da geçirdikleri 1-2 yıllık zamanlarını verimli kullanmalarını ve Buchanan’ın *Opera Omnia*’sından bizim daha fazla şey öğrenmemiz için çaba içerisinde olmalarını çok arzu ederdim. Bu üzüntümü burada ifade etmenin yeri olduğunu düşünüyorum. Benim ABD’nde görev yaptığım süre içerisinde merkeze 3 aylığına misafir araştırmacı statüsü ile gelen Profesör Vural F. Savaş (O dönemde Anayasa Mahkemesi üyesi idi) Buchanan ve felsefesi üzerine Anayasal İktisat adını taşıyan bir monografi kaleme aldıktan sonra bu

Önümüzdeki yıllarda sağlığım, gücüm ve motivasyonum el verdiği ölçüde *Opera Omnia James M. Buchanan* (*James M. Buchanan Külliyyatı*) adını verdiğim bu çalışmayı çok daha genişleterek gelecek kuşakların Buchanan'ı keşfederek yapacağı araştırmalara yol gösterici olacak ve ışık tutacak bir noktaya taşımak istiyorum. Buchanan'ın biyografisi, bibliyografyası ve hepsinden önemlisi bilgeliğini yazmaktan zevk, onur ve gurur duyduğumu ifade etmek isterim.

EKLER

EK-1. JAMES M. BUCHANAN'IN SOSYAL BİLİMLER ALANINDAKİ BAŞLICA ESERLERİ

(KATEGORİK SINIFLAMA)¹⁴

KAMU MALİYESİ (GENEL)

- *Fiscal Theory & Political Economy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960).
- *The Public Finances* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1960). Second edition (1965); third edition (1970); fourth edition, with Marilyn Flowers (1975); fifth edition, with Marilyn Flowers (1980); sixth edition, with Marilyn Flowers (1986).
- *Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).
- Introduction to *Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): xi–xiv. National Bureau of Economic Research, Special Conference Series, 12.

macerasını sonlandırdı. Geçen bu 40 yıllık zaman zarfında Buchanan *Opera Omnia*'sı üzerine kapsamlı bir tez ya da araştırma kaleme alınmadığını da ayrıca not etmek isterim. Zorlama ile değil gönüllülük ve adanmışlıkla Buchanan *Opera Omnia*'sı üzerine çalışma yapabilecek bir asistanım olmasını çok isterdim. Bir son not daha yazmak isterim: Türkiye'de maliye profesörlerinin neredeyse tamamı Buchanan'ın maliye biliminin gerçek kurucusu ve öncüsü olduğu gerçeğini görmezden gelerek maalesef onun görüş ve önerilerine kitaplarında yer vermediler. Daha da kötüsü bazı maliye profesörleri Buchanan'ın “neo-liberalizmi”in ideoloğu olduğunu ifade ederek karalama yapmışlardır.

¹⁴ Liberty Fund tarafından yayınlanan liste tarafımızca konu esas alınarak kategorik olarak sınıflandırılmıştır.

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