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"LEFT-OF-CENTRE" IN TURKEY: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE IMPASSES OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

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Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Gönenç UYSAL[1]

Abstract

Between 1965 and 1980, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party) formulated its position as 'left-of-centre' in order to claim to represent the subordinate classes. Despite contributing to the radicalisation of organised fractions of workers and peasants to a great extent, its social democratic discourse could not respond to the prolonged hegemonic crisis in the late-1960s and the late-1970s. The left-Kemalist and liberal-conservative approaches, the dominant but opposing perspectives, explained the CHP's failure with references to the power of foreign capital and the tutelage regime of the Republican state respectively. This paper argues that both perspectives could not adequately understand social democratic welfare state as a particular sociohistorical form of capitalist state whose hegemonic crisis is embedded in class relations. Therefore, it aims to offer a consistent and coherent perspective that is critical of both approaches, and that examines the internal and dynamic relationship among the capitalist state, political parties, hegemony, and social democracy in accordance with class relations. With this aim, it borrows its theoretical and conceptual framework from historical materialism. This paper fundamentally argues that the CHP's failure stemmed from and concretized the impasses of social democracy regarding its relation to the struggle of subordinate classes.

Keywords: Turkey, CHP, Social Democracy, Class, State.

Jel Codes: F50, P16, B51, N45, O53.

TÜRKİYE'DE "ORTANIN SOLU": SOSYAL DEMOKRASİNİN AÇMAZLARINA ELEŞTİREL BİR YAKLAŞIM

Özet

1965-1980 yılları arasında CHP konumunu 'ortanın solu' olarak belirleyerek bağımlı sınıfları temsil ettiğini iddia etmiştir. İşçi ve köylü sınıfının hareketliliğine önemli ölçüde bu şekilde katkıda bulunmuş olsa da, CHP'nin sosyal demokratik refah devletinin geç-1960'lar ve geç-1970'lerdeki hegemonya krizine bir yanıt olamamıştır. İki baskın ancak karşıt görüş olan sol-Kemalist ve liberal-muhafazakar yaklaşımlar CHP'nin bu başarısızlığını sırasıyla yabancı sermayenin gücü veya Cumhuriyet devletinin vesayet rejimi ile açıklamaktadır. Bu makale, sözkonusu yaklaşımların sosyal demokratik refah devletini, sınıf ilişkilerinden kaynaklanan hegemonya krizlerinin içkin olduğu kapitalist devletin toplumsal-tarihsel bir biçimi olarak anlayamadığını savunur. Bu nedenle, sözkonusu yaklaşımlara eleştirel ve kendi içinde tutarlı bir yaklaşım sunmayı amaçlar. Kapitalist devlet, siyasi partiler, hegemonya, ve sosyal demokrasi arasındaki içsel ve devingen ilişkiyi sınıf ilişkileri bağlamında incelemeyi amaçlar. Bu amaçla, kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçevesini tarihsel materyalizmden ödünç alarak çizer. Bu makale, temel olarak CHP'nin başarısızlığının sosyal demokrasinin açmazlarından kaynaklandığını ve bu açmazları somutlaştırdığını bağımlı sınıfların mücadelesi üzerinden tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Chp, Sosyal Demokrasi, Sınıf, Devlet.

Jel Kodları: F50, P16, B51, N45, O53.

[1] İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Osmaniye Korkut Ata Üniversitesi, Email: gonencuysal@osmaniye.edu.tr.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey underwent a massive and rapid socioeconomic and sociopolitical change. In the international sphere, Turkey deepened its organic and dependent relations with Western capital, represented significantly by the IMF. Nevertheless, *détente* between the USA and the USSR, and limited but important economic relations with the USSR contributed to the flourishing of left-wing interpretations and movements. In the domestic sphere, the aim of Western capital to maintain Turkey as a bulwark against the USSR, and the struggle of various fractions of bourgeoisie and landlords encouraged the rise of nationalist and Islamist interpretations and movements. Nevertheless, the rise of left-wing further encouraged the rise of organised university youth and industrial workers in urban areas, and of mobilised peasants and smallholders in certain rural areas.[2] In the meantime, the Constitution of 1961 arguably aimed to consolidate social democratic framework by broadening labour rights, social provisions, and social security. In this socioeconomic and sociopolitical context, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party – CHP) formulated its position as 'left-of-centre' ('*ortanın solu*') (CHP, 1965, s. 45-46). It claimed to represent the petty-bourgeoisie, including artisans and shopkeepers, and subordinate classes, including workers, civil servants, peasants, smallholders, university youth, and the left-wing intelligentsia, while reconciling their demands with the state's policies on economic development.

Both in the late-1960s and the late-1970s, Turkey was shaken with widespread demonstrations of intelligentsia and university youth, organised practices of workers and peasants, and political violence between left- and right-wing fractions that accelerated with acts of paramilitary forces, ranging from unsolved murders and assassinations to unsolved bomb attacks. It was further shaken with the determined pressure of various fractions of bourgeoisie and landlords to curtail liberal rights and freedoms, and economic crises that ended up with deference to prescriptions of the IMF. Both in the late-1960s and late-1970s, socio-political crises, whose tipping points were reached with the failure of central-left and central-right political parties that held the biggest majorities in the parliament to represent various fractions of social classes, resulted in military interventions. The Constitution of 1961 was followed with the Constitution of 1982, which aimed to discipline democracy by curtailing the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms.

The left-Kemalist approach, which dominated the academic literature until the 1970s, claimed to offer a Third Way project that reconciled Kemalism – ideology named after Kemal Atatürk (CHP, 1935) – with socialism. Proponents of left-Kemalism arguably functioned as the organic intelligentsia of the CHP to contribute to the formulation and safeguarding of the discourse on left-of-centre. In a nutshell, to the extent the left-Kemalist approach considered the revolution of 1923 as an absolute progress, it aimed to complete the revolution to maintain political and economic independence against foreign capital and imperialism, and to achieve democracy through economic development and a purge of semi-feudal relations (Akşin, 2001; Kongar, 2012). It regarded the 1960s and 1970s as the triumph of social democracy when the CHP allied with the subordinate classes to broaden the welfare state. It considered the 1980s as the triumph of oppression and repression when the instrumentalisation of state by various capital fractions aimed not at development and welfare policies but economic growth at the expense of workers and peasants, health, education, nature, and so on. This paper argues that despite its emphasis on the subordinate classes, the left-Kemalist approach foresaw economic development without problematizing capitalism as a particular historical economic and social

[2] This paper regards landlords as a semi-feudal form in agriculture as a result of articulation of feudal relations under the domination of capitalist relations of production and reproduction. See Boratav (1980).

formation. Therefore, its position *vis-à-vis* the dominant classes remained ambiguous, and it could not adequately examine the internal and dynamic relationship between democracy and capitalism. In other words, it could not adequately understand class relations underlying social democracy in a particular historical context. Consequently, it could not adequately analyse the role and conditions of democracy *vis-à-vis* various fractions of social classes where the CHP's failure to respond to the hegemonic crisis of the late-1960s and 1970s was significant.

In opposition, the liberal-conservative approach, which dominated the academic literature beginning in the late-1970s, was based on Mardin (1973)'s conceptualisation of centre-periphery dichotomy and state tradition. To the extent the state was conceptualised as an entity external to society that could aspire after certain goals above class-interests, the CHP was portrayed as the representative of the Republican state which aimed to maintain a tutelage regime over civil society consisting of propertied and unpropertied classes (Heper, 2006; Karpat, 2013).[3] Therefore, the liberal-conservative approach considered conservative political parties as true representatives of civil society/masses. It further portrayed deficiencies of democracy as a result of the dependency of bourgeoisie on this patrimonial state. In this sense, it did not recognise any difference regarding the state of democracy between the 1960s and the 1980s. This paper argues that the liberal-conservative approach did not problematize capitalist relations of exploitation, domination, and competition, which constituted the basis of contradictions internal to social democracy. Since it conceptualised the state torn away from its location in the class structure, it could not adequately examine social democracy as a particular sociohistorical form and a particular ideological element. Despite being 'dissident' of left-Kemalism (Yalman, 2002, s. 7-8), the liberal-conservative approach similarly could not adequately understand the role of subordinate classes *vis-à-vis* the broadening of democracy. Therefore, it could not adequately address the CHP's failure to respond to the hegemonic crisis of the late-1960s and 1970s that indicated particular (re)structure of class relations.

This paper aims to offer a consistent and coherent perspective that is critical of the left-Kemalist and liberal-conservative approaches, and that examines the internal and dynamic (dialectical) relationship among the state, secular democracy, and class relations in its historical context. In this sense, it accepts a dialectical relationship between capitalism and social democracy. Therefore, it borrows its theoretical and conceptual framework from the historical materialist approach. It particularly focuses on the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre articulated in the 1960s and 1970s in order to explore the impasses of social democracy. In the first section, it discusses the dialectical relationship between capitalism and social democracy, and social democracy in Turkey in the 1960s and the 1970s as a particular sociohistorical form. In the second section, it discusses the role of CHP *vis-à-vis* social democracy in accordance with class relations. In the third section, it discusses the crisis of social democracy in relation to crisis of welfare state where the CHP's failure stemmed from and concretised the impasses of social democracy.

2. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, CLASS, AND STATE IN TURKEY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

Historical materialism accepts a divorce between essence (constitutive content) and appearance (contingent form), which distorts the understanding of essence of a social phenomenon. In order to reveal essence, it conceptualizes every social phenomenon with respect to its internal and dynamic function in social relations and processes in its historical

[3] This paper utilizes liberal-conservativism as an umbrella term where proponents of liberalism and conservatism converged at the formulation of a duality between state and civil society. See Yalman (2002).

context. It further accepts a dialectical unity between social relations of production (and reproduction) and political, juridical, and ideological forms (Ollman, 1993). Finally, it accepts a dialectical unity between 'what is said' and 'what is done' (Hall, 1997, s. 31). In this sense, meaning(s) and practice(s) contribute to 'the creation and constant recreation of the [social] relations' (Fairclough, 1995, s. 73). Therefore, it utilizes the term discourse in order to unpack meaning(s) and practice(s) of social democracy in Turkey in its sociohistorical context.

Democracy, in its simple definition, refers to the rule by the *demos* (people). However, the meaning and practice of *people* and *democracy* differs in various societies in the course of history. In the capitalist era, democracy is contracted to liberalism on the basis of private property. Democracy is dissociated from 'the active exercise of popular power' and 'the collective power of subordinate classes' but associated with 'the passive enjoyment of constitutional […] [freedoms] and rights' and 'the privacy […] of the individual citizen' (Wood, 1995, s. 227-231). It regulates relations between citizens and the capitalist state, which is separated from civil society in appearance and whose power is limited against the dominant classes through checks and balances, in accordance with bourgeois class domination. Nevertheless, it encompasses political and legal means and channels, including the rule of law, the assembly and universal suffrage, human rights and freedoms, labour rights and so on, which are achieved through the struggle of subordinate classes (Therborn, 1977).

Social democracy emerged as a reformist and gradualist idea within the socialist debate that aimed to respond to destructiveness of capitalist social relations while confirming the fundamental principles of bourgeois democracy (Saraçoğlu, 2012, s. 366). With the beginning of Cold War, social democratic movements withdrew their claim to transcend capitalism and aspired after benefiting from capitalism in a more equalitarian and efficient way. It claimed to offer a prosperous capitalist society through public goods, social security and provisions, and broadened labour rights. Social democracy, in this sense, can be regarded as a hegemonic ideological form corresponding to welfare state of the 1960s and 1970s. Welfare state claimed to increase public welfare through market economy and progressive social reform (Saraçoğlu, 2012, s. 375). In this sense, welfare state can be regarded as a particular form of capitalist state which simultaneously and contradictorily aims to enhance the social reproduction of capital and wage labour, and weakens the reproduction of capital with the strengthening of subordinate classes (Ankarloo, 2012).

Hegemony refers to the structuring of different social classes under political, intellectual, and moral leadership of a particular class in order to maintain a particular pattern of capital accumulation and its corresponding political and juridical forms. In this sense, different fractions of capital – financial, productive, and commercial capital – form power bloc under the hegemony of one fraction of capital (Jessop, 1983, s. 91). Hegemonic crisis emerges when a crisis emerges in the pattern of capital accumulation that poses an organic threat to the reproduction of capitalism. While such crisis is internal to every pattern of capital accumulation, and thus, characterizes the capitalist system with its internal contradictions, it makes hegemonies unstable and appears in the form of political crises to compel the government to restructure the pattern of capital accumulation and class relations (Gülalp, 1987, s. 310-311). In this sense, the welfare state encompasses economic redistributive mechanisms, and political, juridical, and ideological practices based on social democracy in order to obtain consent of the subordinate classes to be supervised and regulated by the dominant classes. Nevertheless, social democracy is prone to hegemonic crisis in accordance with class relations in its historical context.

Countries are hierarchically integrated with the world capitalist system in accordance with the confrontation and harmonisation of international and domestic class relations. Countries that arrived late at capitalism demonstrate varying degrees of dependency on foreign productive capital, whose power is significant to determine the domestic capital accumulation (Ercan, 2002, s. 55), and thus, class relations. The capitalist system can be characterised with the principle of uneven and combined development, which refers to various sociohistorical formations as a result of the interaction of unequal spatiotemporal diffusion of capital (Van der Linden, 2007). Therefore, the development of capitalist relations in late-arriving countries is in accordance with the opportunities and 'contradictions of capitalism in general and of late capitalist development in particular', and 'the historical specificities of […] social formation' (Oğuz, 2008, s. 1). This paper considers Turkey as a late-arriving country (Yerasimos, 1989), and thus, its social and economic formation took a particular sociohistorical form.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the national economy stood on import-substitution that addressed interests of both domestic and international dominant classes. Indeed, by the mid-1950s, the industrial bourgeoisie was strong enough to undertake accumulation of productive capital alongside the state economic enterprises (Savran, 2004, s. 23), while the industrialization represented assembly industry where investment goods, intermediate goods, and technology were imported (Ataay, 2001, s. 59). By the late-1960s and the early-1970s, the domestic industrial bourgeoisie was strengthened enough through planned economy in order to enhance industrialisation. It conglomerated into finance-capital, which refers to the monopolist integration of the social relations of production and reproduction where all sectors are controlled by few monopolist bourgeoisie under the hegemony of productive capital (Öztürk, 2011a, s. 21-22). The formation of finance-capital was represented with the establishment of *Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği* (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association – TÜSİAD) in 1971 (Atılgan, 2012, s. 344-345). The productive capital accumulation enhanced the social reproduction of capital and wage labour through an increase in wages, and public services and social security. Therefore, it favoured the subordinate classes. The development of industrialization further resulted in the growth of number of workers and an increase in their education levels in urban areas whose significant majority was organized in trade unions. Indeed, in 1967, *Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey – DİSK) was established. It played a significant role regarding the radicalization of workers with the help of socialist intelligentsia in the late-1960s and the 1970s (Akkaya, 2002b, s. 75-82). The strengthening of organised workers in the urban areas broadened labour rights, including right to strike, unionise, and collective bargaining alongside other various fundamental rights and freedoms (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, 1961).

This paper argues that the form of state in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s corresponded to the welfare state since the state maintained economic redistributive mechanisms owing to the accumulation of productive capital, and political, juridical, and ideological forms based on social democracy to enhance social reproduction and obtain consent of subordinate classes to a great extent. The form of state in Turkey, however, was questioned in the academic literature when it was compared with the Western European welfare states. Certain academics addressed the form of Turkish state in the 1960s and 1970s as 'social state' (Boratav, 1990; Buğra and Candaş, 2011). This paper argues that in Turkey, social state still corresponded to a particular sociohistorical form of welfare state and it differed from the Western European welfare states in appearance. Nevertheless, its sociohistorical form referred to the strengthening of planning, regulative, and redistributive roles of state to the detriment of subordinate classes due to the paternalist relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie (Boratav, 1990, s. 291-295), and

the monopolisation and internationalisation of domestic capital through its dependence on foreign capital (Öztürk, 2011b, s. 130). Consequently, the state employed redistributive mechanisms in an eclectic and often clientelist manner. For instance, the social security, which provided health benefits to civil servants and workers, covered only a small percentage of the working class – mostly those who worked in state economic enterprises – and of peasants and smallholders – who could afford to pay premiums – (Buğra and Candaş, 2011, s. 518). The state further curtailed democratic rights and freedoms in the face of rise of subordinate classes. For instance, following the memorandum of 1971, strikes and collective bargaining for the proletariat were suspended in practice, and right to unionise was denied for civil servants (Tanör, 1994, pp.54-60). Nevertheless, this paper argues that the welfare state, whose political and ideological form rested on social democracy, was consolidated to a great extent in the 1960s and 1970s.

3. THE CHP, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, AND CLASS RELATIONS

The CHP claimed to change socioeconomic and sociopolitical order with its discourse on left-of-centre (CHP, 1969). This paper argues that the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre was concretised in meaning and practice under Bülent Ecevit's chairmanship in the 1970s when it managed to mobilise trade unions, significantly DİSK. It should be noted that left-of-centre was already effectively constructed by Ecevit himself (Ecevit, 1966). Left-of-centre was rooted in a social democratic interpretation and it aimed to contribute to the consolidation of the welfare state in favour of the subordinate classes. The CHP aimed to preserve private property by safeguarding freedom of entrepreneurship. It aimed to turn workers and peasants into the petty-bourgeoisie and enable the petty-bourgeoisie to enjoy freedom of entrepreneurship against the monopolisation of big-scale capital. In this sense, it proposed three sectors; public sector under the control of state, people's sector under the control of workers and peasants, and private sector under the control of capital. Since the CHP did not problematize property relations, it was diverted from and positioned against the socialist movements. Indeed, Ecevit portrayed left-of-centre as a 'bulwark against […] the destructive deluge [of socialism] […] [stemming from] rioting feelings of poor and exploited masses' (Ecevit, 1966, s. 21). Therefore, the CHP aimed to tame the struggle of subordinate classes so that it would not challenge the capitalist system. The CHP further sought legitimacy by confirming Turkey's dependency on foreign capital, particularly Western capital and the USA, by giving references to Franklin D. Roosevelt's protectionist New Deal (Ağtaş, 2009, s. 197). In this sense, in the 1960s and 1970s, the discourse on left-of-centre reproduced Turkey's hierarchical integration with the world capitalist system under the hegemony of foreign capital, which already corresponded to the interests of domestic industrial bourgeoisie. Moreover, the CHP aimed to turn into a mass party by establishing organic relations with workers and peasants, particularly through trade and peasant unions. This aim was concretised with the CHP's motto 'going to the people' ('*halka gitmek*') (Ağtaş, 2009, s. 205).

The discourse on left-of-centre was constituted with two main pillars: statism (étatism) and populism (CHP, 1965). Statism portrayed the state as the main actor to mobilise public and private resources to contribute to public welfare, economic development, and social justice and common good. It corresponded to import-substitution since the state's intervention was required to encourage the industrial capital accumulation and regulate labour. The state's intervention was further required to enhance the living standards by broadening public service and increasing wage in order to ameliorate the social reproduction and revive the market through the stimulation of demand. Statism also complemented populism with its aim to prevent class struggle and foster sociocultural development alongside economic development. Populism foresaw the constitution of diverse but unified groups comprising the totality of the

people. It foresaw a socioeconomic transformation to enable different social fractions to enjoy equal rights and freedoms, and equality before the law in a classless society. Nevertheless, populism constituted the most contradictory element since it accepted the existence of social classes but opposed to class struggles and advocated social justice but recognised right to (private) property and freedom of entrepreneurship as fundamental rights and freedoms, and aimed to enhance social democratic reforms but gave tacit consent to bourgeois class domination. This paper argues that the discourse on left-of-centre aimed to unify the subordinate and dominant classes with a petty-bourgeois agenda (Timur, 2004, s. 201). Indeed, the CHP aimed at economic development and social justice within an emancipatory democratic framework (CHP, 1973). Therefore, this paper will unpack the discourse on left-of-centre in accordance with class relations by examining the CHP's party programmes of 1965, 1969, and 1973 if not otherwise specified.

In urban areas, the CHP claimed to represent the petty-bourgeoisie, workers, civil servants, university youth, and intelligentsia. One of the most significant means proposed to change the socioeconomic order on a petty-bourgeois basis was to abolish difference between the rural and urban areas by enabling workers and peasants to gain capitalist interests. With this aim, the CHP proposed people's sector consisting of peasants' cooperatives, workers' assistance funds and trade unions, and various popular cooperatives that constituted people's sector to undertake industrialisation. It portrayed the public sector as the pioneer of industrialisation to be followed by people's sector. While public sector was to be utilised to transfer funds to private sector in order to enhance industrialisation, the CHP paradoxically aimed to limit the role of private sector in order to foster the state's role in relations of distribution. It offered workers' assistance funds and popular cooperatives to be constituted with savings of workers and civil servants. It further offered to invest savings of Turkish migrants in industrialisation of underdeveloped regions, particularly in cooperation with agricultural cooperatives in rural areas. Moreover, it favoured an increase in wages to enhance the social reproduction. It also favoured social justice regarding taxing.

Regarding the relationship between the CHP and the urban subordinate classes, the CHP's petty-bourgeois position remained hesitant to challenge the social order in favour of the subordinate classes. On the contrary, the struggle of subordinate classes often compelled the CHP to undertake a more challenging position against the dominant classes. Most significantly, although the Constitution of 1961 recognised rights to unionise, collective bargaining, and strike, the constitutional rights could only be practiced through amendments in relevant laws and regulations. Executive and legislative powers did not foster a preparatory process to legislate such amendments. In January 1963, workers of the Kavel cable factory, which belonged to the Koç holding, began their strike in the face of the factory management's attempt to curtail workers' social and economic rights. In the meantime, workers in various cities and factories, part of which belonged to the Koç holding, demonstrated their solidarity with the Kavel workers by sending money. The CHP government under İsmet İnönü's Premiership used police force to suppress the strike. However, the resistance of workers came to the fore and grew with the participation of women, children, local people, and workers of various other factories. It lasted for three months and ended with a negotiation with the Koç holding. Nevertheless, the strike compelled the CHP government and the Assembly to amend relevant laws and regulations to recognise the right to unionise, collective bargaining, and strike in July 1963 (Atılgan, 2015, s.530-531).

The beginning of the rise of organised workers, including civil servants, and students marked the beginning of the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre to gain its very characteristic to ally with and mobilise the subordinate classes. Beginning in 1968, simultaneously following

the anti-capitalist boycotts and protests of university youth and their search for broadened rights and freedoms, workers and civil servants engaged in strikes, protests, and boycotts. Most significantly, in June 1970, the bill that deteriorated labour rights was widely protested under the flagship of the DİSK and with contribution of members of *Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions – Türk-İş). The demonstrations compelled the CHP, as the opposition party, to apply to the Constitutional Court to annul the bill (Savran, 2004, s. 25). Therefore, the CHP was radicalised by practices of organised workers, and radicalisation of urban subordinate classes was partly imprinted in the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre. In return, the CHP managed to mobilise workers. Indeed, in May 1978, DİSK declared its support for the CHP's minority government at the Labour Day demonstration in Taksim square, Istanbul (Ozan, 2015, s. 675).

Regarding the relationship between the CHP and the urban dominant classes, the CHP's petty-bourgeois position still remained hesitant. It is already briefly discussed that Turkey's dependence on foreign capital corresponded to the interests of domestic capital. Beginning in the 1960s, the welfare state adopted a planned economy in order to support the domestic industrialisation. The domestic industrialisation favoured domestic fractions of commercial and financial capital to conglomerate in the form of industrial capital and strengthened the industrial bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the domestic industrial bourgeoisie withheld its dependent and organic relations with foreign capital while benefiting from partnerships and the import of investment goods. For instance, the domestic automotive industry actually functioned as local branches of foreign capital (Avcıoğlu, 1996: 885-886). In the meantime, the domestic industrialisation was further confined to the consumer goods sector that could respond to the increasing domestic demand as a result of an increase in wages. Indeed, the collaboration between foreign and domestic capital was concentrated in the fields of plastic and rubber, chemistry, electric machines, food and beverages, and tobacco. Most significantly, the domestic households enjoyed automobiles, and white and brown goods, ranging from radios and televisions to refrigerators and vacuum cleaners, all of which were encouraged with consumer norms and behaviour of countries that arrived early at capitalism (Atılgan, 205, s.520-521).

In the face of the monopolisation of big-scale capital under the hegemony o foreign capital, the CHP targeted foreign capital and domestic monopolist commercial bourgeoisie as regressive fractions. Indeed, it foresaw limits on collaboration between private sector and foreign capital, and nationalisation of perceived geostrategic goods, including railways, communication, natural resources, and energy. Nevertheless, it tended to consider domestic small- and middle-scale industrial bourgeoisie and fractions of financial bourgeoisie that were subordinated under the big-scale capital as progressive fractions to maintain economic development. Indeed, the CHP favoured the industrial and financial bourgeoisie by offering credits, mobilising public resources for research and development, and supporting their association. It further proposed economic incentives for small- and middle-scale enterprises in Anatolia. With its aim to favour the petty-bourgeoisie, it proposed economic incentives for shopkeepers and artisans against big-capital. Regarding public sector, it focused on promoting state economic enterprises without collaboration of domestic and foreign capital. However, the CHP denied concentration – the absorption of individual capital units through increase of capital – and centralisation – the increase in individual capital units that accelerate the process of concentration – of capital (Kiely, 2012, s. 232), the two contradictory tendencies inherent in accumulation of process which constituted the basis of unequal spatiotemporal diffusion of capital and the growth of domestic capital as a subordinate under foreign capital. Indeed, the majority of foreign credits received from International Development Association, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and European Investment Bank were transferred to

the private sector and benefited the big-scale capital (Atılgan, 2015, s.524). Therefore, the CHP's position against foreign capital and big-scale domestic capital could not adequately address concrete socioeconomic and socio-political problems. Rather, it continued to favour relations of competition among various fractions of capital, and partly reproduce Turkey's hierarchical integration with the world capitalist system under the hegemony of foreign capital, particularly Western capital.

Regarding the relationship between the CHP and the rural classes, the CHP claimed to represent peasants and smallholders against landlords. It particularly considered the rural areas as a social base required to be strengthened in order to redistribute accumulated wealth. The CHP's most significant aim to form class consciousness and radicalise peasants – often landless peasants – and smallholders was related to land reforms that targeted semi-feudal relations in agriculture, particularly in the Eastern region. The CHP further targeted underdevelopment regarding forest villages, animal husbandry, and fishing. On the one hand, the CHP favoured industrial and financial capital by promoting agricultural credit in order to respond to underdevelopment. On the other hand, it focused on agricultural cooperatives to favour peasants and smallholders by preventing accumulation of property of lands in the hands of few. It favoured agricultural subsidies and bulk purchases in favour of peasants and smallholders again by preventing accumulation of wealth in the hands of landlords. It further favoured the promotion of public education, infrastructure works, and restructuring of already-established agricultural cooperatives under the state supervision.

Nevertheless, the CHP's petty-bourgeois position remained provisional and fragile *vis-à-vis* rural social classes. Most significantly, the CHP did not target private land property but accumulation of lands in the hands of few landlords. Nevertheless, similar to the radicalisation of urban subordinate classes, the radicalisation of rural subordinate classes compelled the CHP to challenge the social order and enabled the discourse on left-of-centre to gain its very core characteristic. Beginning in the 1960s, peasants and smallholders were organised and undertook radical practices to challenge the capitalist system. Most significantly, in 1969, *Türkiye Tütün Üreticileri Sendikası* (Turkey Tobacco Growers Association) was established (Atılgan, 2012, s. 351). Peasants and smallholders further engaged in land occupations, demonstrations, and marches with an aim to realise land redistribution against landlords and fair exchange against usurers and merchants in the fields of tobacco, hazelnut, garlic, potato, beetroot, and chickpea in Central Anatolian, Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Eastern regions. The radical fractions of university students in urban areas demonstrated their solidarity with peasants and smallholders. Protests of rural subordinate classes could significantly be heard in urban media owing to the efforts of *Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* (Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey – Dev-Genç) (Atılgan, 2015, s.615). The rise of organised peasants and smallholders was inevitably imprinted in the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre. Most significantly, the CHP undertook its motto 'land belongs to whom cultivates' and promoted *Köykent* (village-township) project, which foresaw various neighbouring villages to collectively invest in expenditure, infrastructure, and industries, and benefit from public education, health, art, and sports (CHP, 1973, s. 38).

Overall, regarding the state of social democracy, the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre claimed to broaden and deepen it particularly beginning with Ecevit's chairmanship. With this aim, the CHP particularly targeted the memorandum of 1971 and repressive state apparatuses. Indeed, the memorandum of 1971 constituted the breaking point for the CHP when Ecevit won the chairmanship election against İnönü in May 1972 by interpreting the memorandum as a military intervention against the CHP, and positioning the CHP against the role of military in politics (Akşin, 2007, s. 274). The CHP further targeted the curtailing of social democracy to

the detriment of subordinate classes following the memorandum. Most significantly, the CHP targeted the use of martial law courts and the State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri*), which consisted of civilian and military judges, and dealt with crimes against the state's security, in other words, which targeted radical practices undertaken by trade unions, intelligentsia, workers, and peasants. The CHP further targeted the possible use of martial law to suspend right to strike.

Nevertheless, the CHP's position *vis-à-vis* repressive state apparatuses remained hesitant. Despite recognizing the rise of violence as a response to socioeconomic and sociopolitical crises, the CHP underlined the importance of state authority and security in accordance with social democratic framework. In this sense, it accepted the presence of repressive state apparatus, whose main role was to maintain the capital accumulation, while aiming to reform them in order to prevent the abuse of fundamental human rights and freedoms and the rule of law. Most significantly, the CHP aimed to abolish thought crime in order to safeguard freedom of thought and speech. Regarding the constabulary forces, the CHP offered to decrease political pressure on police to enhance its functioning, increase personal responsibility for actions, and limits on the use of arms. Regarding the intelligence, it offered means to prevent the abuse of competence against the Constitution. Regarding the military, it affirmed dependence on Western capital by committing to NATO, although it sought to enhance domestic war industry which would enhance domestic capital accumulation. The CHP's position regarding Western capital was further ambiguous since it remained hesitant to target paramilitary forces, also referred as contraguerilla that was established as a *gladio*-type counterinsurgency force under the CIA supervision and often undertook violence against left-wing intelligentsia and movements (Ganser, 2005, s. 226). The CHP further contributed to militarization by offering to introduce the possibility of conscription in police alongside the military.

In addition, the CHP gave tacit consent to the military's attempt to develop objective capitalist interests and an organic relationship with various fractions of foreign and domestic capital. Indeed, in March 1961, the Military Personnel Assistance Fund (*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu* – OYAK) was established as an autonomous organisation. Despite its submission under the Ministry of Defence, OYAK was subject to the Commercial Code. Although its mission was to provide mutual assistance such as aid in case of retirement, death and/or disability and/or other social services for its members, it accumulated contributions of its members and channelled funds to accumulate commercial, financial and industrial capital, significantly in the fields of automotive, cement, transport, and food, and the sectors of insurance and banking (Uzgel, 2003, s.183). Therefore, the CHP gave tacit consent to the military's integration with the capitalist system through OYAK, which functioned as a fraction of bourgeoisie, and the military's inevitable loss of relative autonomy *vis-à-vis* the dominant classes.

On the other hand, with its aim to enhance social democracy, the CHP targeted the curtailment of freedoms of thought, speech, broadcast, communication, and assembly and of rights to strike and protest, and any attempt to curtail severance pay, collective bargaining, and right to unionise. It further offered to broaden labour law, social security, and public services to cover all fractions of wage-labour in the urban and rural areas. It understood public services as a wide range from education to art and sports. Significantly, it offered to introduce agricultural labour law, right to unionise for civil servants, and labour rights and social security for workers in forests, severance pay for retirement, regulations regarding the use of lockout, and unemployment benefits. Furthermore, it offered to ameliorate town and urban planning in accordance with right to housing, environmental and public health, and cultural, sportive, and

entertainment activities. It should be noted that the CHP's attempt to defend right to housing was to further safeguard public housing and *gecekondu* (squatter towns around big cities where mostly immigrant villagers and workers lived), whose inhabitants consisted of urban subordinate classes. In addition, the CHP offered to lower voting age to eighteen, right to vote to Turkish migrant workers, abolish political ban for associations, broaden means for trade unions to involve in politics, enable voters to participate in local government, enable civil servants to participate in intra-institutional administration, and enable students to participate in university administration. Besides, the CHP offered judicial reforms to encourage citizens to claim their rights easily.

In a nutshell, it can be argued that the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre was rooted in social democracy and remained provisional and fragile *vis-à-vis* both dominant and subordinate classes. The CHP aimed to broaden social democracy by broadening rights and freedoms. It further aimed contribute to the struggle of urban and rural subordinate classes since the CHP was radicalised owing to the struggle of organised workers, university youth, intelligentsia, and peasants and smallholders. Nevertheless, the CHP aimed to tame and domesticate such struggle so that it would not challenge the capitalist system. This aim limited the CHP's radical position *vis-à-vis* the dominant classes. Indeed, the CHP already aimed to form power bloc under the hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie and fractions of left-wing intelligentsia. Nevertheless, it failed to obtain consent of subordinate classes and fractions of dominant classes. The CHP's failure to form power bloc eventually became significant during the moments of hegemonic crisis of the late-1960s and late-1970s, which will be discussed in the next section.

4. PROLONGED HEGEMONIC CRISIS OF THE LATE-1960s AND THE LATE-1970s, AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

In the 1960s and 1970s, the CHP was in rivalry with the socialist *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (Turkey Workers' Party – TİP) on the left-wing, and *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party – AP), Islamist *Milli Görüş Hareketi* (National Outlook Movement organized as *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order Party) in 1970 and *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party) following the memorandum of 1971), and nationalist *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party – MHP) on the right-wing. The AP represented the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, and landlords as well as local religious constituents and religious brotherhoods. *Milli Görüş* and the MHP represented nationalist and Islamist fractions of landlords, small- and middle-scale Anatolian bourgeoisie, and workers (Zurcher, 2007, s. 253-258).

The crisis internal to import-substitution constituted the core of hegemonic crisis of social democracy in the 1960s and 1970s. The crisis of import-substitution reflected the competition between growing industrial bourgeoisie, and commercial bourgeoisie and landlords. It also reflected harmony and competition between domestic industrial capital and foreign capital since import-substitution corresponded to the early-stage of internationalisation of foreign productive capital. Since landlords and commercial bourgeoisie specialised on the export of agricultural products and raw material, their power hampered the transfer of resources from agriculture to industry. Thus, the growth of industry further depended on the import of intermediate goods and raw material. However, since domestic industrial capital accumulation was not strong enough to have enough currency to compensate import, the crisis of import-substitution appeared in the form of debt crisis in the late-1960s and late-1970s. By the late-1970s, the world capitalist system entered to the process of neoliberal transition based on free market economy within the IMF framework. The neoliberal transition constituted an answer for domestic finance-capital, which absorbed most of the potential of inward-oriented capital accumulation and aimed to internationalise to increase profits (Ercan, 2002, s. 66-70).

In the late-1960s, the AP favoured the small- and middle-scale Anatolian bourgeoisie and landlords that were specialized in the export of raw material and agricultural products. It attempted to manipulate the industrial bourgeoisie toward export in order to solve the crisis. Consequently, the AP failed to unify the dominant classes under the hegemony of industrial capital (Akça, 2013, s. 58). It further failed to obtain consent of the subordinate classes since it could not address their social democratic demands. It also remained silent in the face of political violence stirred up by paramilitary forces. Nevertheless, the CHP significantly failed to obtain consent of both dominant and subordinate classes, since İnönü's chairmanship still represented the civil-military bureaucracy and it suffered from internal cleavages represented by Ecevit and Kemal Satır. Indeed, İnönü remained the National Chief (*Milli Şef*) in the memory of masses. Furthermore, following the coup of 1960, İnönü allied with the military and managed to establish a CHP government in 1961 owing to the military's influence behind-the-scenes (Özdemir, 1990, s. 208). Therefore, in the late-1960s, Ecevit represented the discourse on left-of-centre while Satır was loyal to İnönü's image.

In August 1970, Turkey accepted an IMF package, which foresaw devaluation of Turkish lira (Ataay, 2001, s. 63). In the meantime, the subordinate classes were radicalised in rural and urban areas. Indeed, while students engaged in boycotts and occupations in universities, workers engaged in public demonstrations, strikes, and factory occupations (Atılgan, 2012, s. 347), and peasants and smallholders engaged in widespread land occupations in almost every region (Gürel, 2015, s. 331). Nevertheless, the CHP failed to canalise the struggle of subordinate classes to target the attempt of IMF package to compel the working-classes in rural and urban areas to pay the price for the economic deterioration. Even worse, already back in May 1969, İnönü met with Celal Bayar, one of the most significant representatives of landlords and the commercial bourgeoisie owing to his position in *Demokrat Parti* (Democracy Party) in the late-1940s and 1950s (Atılgan, 2015, s. 627).[4] Since İnönü held the chairmanship of the CHP, such meeting contributed to the CHP's failure to obtain consent of the subordinate classes. Nevertheless, the CHP failed to obtain consent of the dominant classes since Ecevit already aimed to represent the subordinate classes and further underlined CIA's efforts to support the AP (Atılgan, 2015, s. 643). In the face of rise of violence stirred up by paramilitary forces, the memorandum of 1971 enabled a technocrat government, which outlawed the organic relationship between political parties and class relations, to apply the IMF package in the early-1970s. Ecevit was elected as the Chair in May 1972, since he interpreted the memorandum as an action against the CHP and İnönü allied with the military following the memorandum of 1971 (Akşin, 2007, s.274). Therefore, this paper dates the concretisation of the discourse on left-of-centre to the 1970s.

Similarly, in the late-1970s, the postponed impact of oil crisis of 1973 was combined with disruption of foreign trade and resulted in an economic crisis. The Nationalist Front government, consisting of the AP, *Milli Görüş*, and the MHP suspended the populist redistributive mechanisms in the face of overwhelming inflation and unemployment (Boratav, 1990, s. 340-343). In the face of the rise of violence stirred up by paramilitary forces and the political crisis in the Assembly, the IMF package again was applied by the junta of 1980 whose Deputy Prime Minister was Turgut Özal, the main architect of economic policies consolidated transition to neoliberalism in the 1980s. The transition to neoliberalism was corresponded with the purge of welfare state and disciplining of democracy through the curtailment of rule of law,

[4] *Demokrat Parti* (DP) was established in opposition to the CHP's attempt to pursue land reforms in 1946. The DP safeguarded its position against land reforms and labour rights in the 1950s (Timur, 2003, s. 44-48).

fundamental human rights and freedoms, labour rights, and social security, and privatisation of public goods (Akçay and Türkay, 2006, s. 51-55).

It is already argued that this paper dates the concretisation of left-of-centre to the 1970s. The CHP managed to come to power either as a coalition partner of *Milli Görüş* in 1974 or as short-dated minority governments between 1977 and 1979. The CHP and *Milli Görüş* coalition represented the subordinate classes and the small- and middle-scale bourgeois fractions to a great extent. Since it failed to obtain consent of foreign capital, landlords, and finance-capital, the coalition government was soon dissolved. Similarly, the CHP minority government was fragile all along since it represented the subordinate classes, and small- and middle-scale bourgeois fractions against foreign capital and finance-capital. Nevertheless, the CHP could only manage to mobilise fractions of subordinate classes under its flagship already. The MHP and *Milli Görüş* supported nationalist Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (MİSK) and Islamist *Türkiye Hak İşçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* (Hak-İş) respectively. Türk-İş, which was established with the USA funds according to the Marshall Plan, already kept its distance from the CHP (Akkaya, 2002a, s. 147-164). The political partition of subordinate classes was a result of articulation of conservative and nationalist discourse to curb the rise of left-wing movements beginning in the late-1940s. Therefore, such political partition curbed the power of CHP to represent and mobilise the subordinate classes.

Moreover, the CHP contradicted with itself in the late-1970s. Such contradictions deteriorated its relationship with the subordinate classes. It is already briefly discussed that the CHP remained hesitant to put spotlight on the paramilitary forces, which significantly targeted the left-wing and labour movements beginning in the late-1960s. The paramilitary forces committed provocations, including assassinations of significant political figures and mass murders, stirred up political violence to its limits, and consequently, paved the way to the coup of 1980. Previously following the Taksim massacre in May 1977, Ecevit underlined the role of state behind the paramilitary forces *vis-à-vis* the unidentified murders and massacres, and bombing attacks. However, in the face of the massacre of Alevis in Kahramanmaraş in December 1978, the CHP government did not attempt to target the repressive state apparatus but responded to the massacre by declaring martial law in the region (Özdemir, 1990, s. 247). Martial law declared in Istanbul further forbid the Labour Day demonstration in Taksim square in May 1978. Executives of DİSK were detained upon the Chairman of DİSK's call for workers' demonstrations, and members of TİP were also detained upon their public protest (Ozan, 2015, s. 675). Therefore, the CHP contributed to the rise of political violence to the detriment of subordinate classes while compelling DİSK to distance itself from the CHP. The subordinate classes were further distanced from the CHP since the CHP government could not respond to the economic deterioration concretised with poverty, electric-cut outs, and long queues for basic needs (Ozan, 2015, s. 697).

In addition, the CHP's contradictions also became visible regarding its relationship with the dominant classes. At first, the CHP government resisted against the IMF policy, which involved liberalisation of prices and freezing wages and agricultural subsidies, since such agreement would compel the urban and rural subordinate classes to pay the cost of the economic crisis, and would mean a political suicide for the CHP. Nevertheless, the CHP government implemented inconsistent measures, such as concessions to foreign capital in accordance with the IMF's policy, and price-controls to solve export-congestion, all of which did not bring any amelioration to the economic situation and remained a delayed attempt to respond to the interests of foreign and domestic capital (Boratav, 1990, s. 341-342). Consequently, the CHP's minority government was overthrown in ten months following the classified ads funded by TÜSİAD (Ozan, 2015, s. 697).

In a nutshell, the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre represented the petty-bourgeoisie, and thus, remained provisional and fragile *vis-à-vis* dominant and subordinate classes. Indeed, the location of petty-bourgeoisie in class structure is provisional and fragile since it unites working class and bourgeoisie in its own being by owning the means of production and using its own labour. The capitalist relations produce and reproduce the petty-bourgeoisie. The same capitalist relations of competition weaken the petty-bourgeoisie against the bourgeoisie, and compel it to ally with workers. Nevertheless, the petty-bourgeoisie could still ally with the bourgeoisie since it owes its existence to capitalism (Savran, 2015, s. 37-41). Furthermore, the CHP sought to ameliorate capitalist relations by searching for an answer within the capitalist system. In this sense, it could not adequately understand contradictions inherent in the capitalist system. It further could not address that the interest of domestic capital itself to integrate with the world market through subordination under foreign capital, and that public sector in the welfare state was to facilitate this integration. It also could not address that the welfare state was based on compromises of the short-term interests of dominant classes in order to obtain consent of subordinate classes and enhance the social reproduction, since the dominant classes already benefited from the increasing mass of surplus product through inward-oriented productive capital accumulation. It, finally, could not address the neoliberal transition imposed by the IMF and desired by domestic capital that foresaw the purge of social democratic welfare state with an authoritarian form of state in order to deteriorate subordinate classes and curb their organised power, and maintain internationalisation of domestic capital.[5] Consequently, the CHP's failure in the late-1960s and the late-1970s demonstrated the impasses of social democracy.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the CHP's discourse on left-of-centre in order to explore welfare state and social democracy in the 1960s and 1970s. It has argued that left-of-centre aimed to foster welfare state in favour of the petty-bourgeoisie, workers, peasants, smallholders, university-youth, and intelligentsia by enhancing redistributive mechanisms, and consolidating social democratic political, juridical, and ideological forms. Most significantly, the discourse on left-of-centre remained a petty-bourgeois ideology that did not problematize private property but sought to ameliorate it by searching an answer within the capitalist system. Therefore, it failed to obtain consent of and mobilise subordinate classes against the dominant classes enough to actually realize a change in the social order. Nevertheless, it still contributed to the achievement of broadening of the rule of law, social security, public services, fundamental human rights and freedoms, and labour rights. It further contributed to the organization and radicalisation of subordinate classes in urban and rural areas. However, to the extent social democracy remained an ideological form corresponding to the welfare state, the organic crisis of welfare state resulted in hegemonic crisis of social democracy. In this sense, the discourse on left-of-centre stemmed from and concretised the impasses of social democracy whose contradictions were internal to capitalist relations. Indeed, beginning in the 1980s, the neoliberal transition aimed to purge the welfare state and its social democratic framework, while externalising and deforming social classes and class-identification,[6] in order to consolidate free movement of capital without any social opposition. Therefore, in order to set a bulwark against such destructiveness of neoliberalism, which has been suffering an organic crisis since 2008,

[5] For a comprehensive discussion on the authoritarian neoliberal state, see Akçay (2013).
[6] See Yalman and Bedirhanoğlu (2010).

the impasses of social democracy should be recognised in order to challenge relations of exploitation and domination and contribute to the struggle of subordinate classes.

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