

EVALUATION OF NATO'S USE OF FORCE IN KOSOVO STATE BUILDING

KOSOVA DEVLET İNŞASINDA NATO'NUN GÜÇ KULLANIMININ DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the power policies implemented in state-building from the perspective of neoliberal theory. As a case study, NATO's policies and activities in the state-building process in Kosovo will be examined. Based on the case study, the questions "How did the power policies implemented by NATO in Kosovo and the state-building processes work? Is there a relationship between them?" were sought. The aim of the research is to reveal how successful the concept of smart power is as an analytical tool in explaining practices in the context of the theory-practice relationship regarding state-building.

Key Words: State, State Building, Smart Power, NATO, Kosovo.

ÖZ

Bu çalışmada, neoliberal teori perspektifinde, devlet inşasında uygulanan güç politikaları konu edilmektedir. Örnek olay olarak NATO'nun Kosova'da Devlet inşa sürecindeki politikaları ve faaliyetleri incelenecektir. Örnek olaydan yola çıkarak, "NATO'nun Kosova'da uygulamış olduğu güç politikaları ile devlet inşası süreçleri nasıl işlemiştir; aralarında bir ilişki var mıdır?" sorularına cevap aranmıştır. Araştırmanın amacı devlet inşasına ilişkin teori-pratik ilişkisi bağlamında akıllı güç kavramının analitik bir araç olarak uygulamaları açıklamada ne kadar başarılı olduğunu ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Devlet, Devlet İnşası, Akıllı Güç, NATO, Kosova.

1. INTRODUCTION

The use of hard and soft power together is called smart power. This study is about smart power policies implemented in state building from the perspective of neoliberal theory. The aim of the research is to reveal how successful the concept of smart power is in explaining practices as an analytical tool in the context of the theory-practice relationship regarding state building. How smart power functions operationally in state building compared to hard or soft power will also be analyzed in detail. The research question is "Is there a relationship between smart power policies and state-building success?" As a case study, NATO's policies and activities in the state-building process in Kosovo will be examined. Using the definition that the coordinated use of hard and soft power is smart power; smart power policies will be determined from the data found. The relationship between NATO's smart power policies implemented in Kosovo and the state-building process will be tried to be found. The documentary screening model, one of the qualitative research methods, was used in the article. General screening was preferred as the screening model type. Observations were made on NATO's policies and role in the construction of the Kosovo State.

2. STATE BUILDING

With the end of the Cold War, in the geography extending from the Balkans to the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Africa, failed and weak states that could not effectively fulfill their state functions emerged. It is stated in the public opinion and in various studies that the source of many serious problems that threaten our security, such as poverty, AIDS, drug trafficking and terrorism, are weak or failed states.[1] One of the biggest problems of the international system is seen as failed and weak states.

In the liberal perspective, the idea that the solution to the problem of failed states is through the construction of effective democratic states and that the international community should act together on this issue is shared.[2] In this context, the importance of state building increases with each passing period. Liberal state building is seen as the construction of administrative institutions that can provide physical and economic security to its citizens. The main assumption is that the existence of strong state institutions will ensure economic growth and the economic and social security of its citizens. When combined with strong state institutions and functioning infrastructure, the legitimacy of the state will be strengthened through democratic elections, and the integration of the fragmented society will be ensured. With the establishment of democracy, the environment of violence will disappear, and instead it will become a struggle between political structures.

In this context, state-building includes measures to create a certain type of government based on liberal norms of democracy, market economy and the concept of democracy.[3] State building is the activities carried out by national or international actors to establish, develop and strengthen state institutions.[4] State-building is an interdisciplinary subject that falls within the scope of international relations, political science, anthropology, economics, security and many other disciplines.[5] Today, state-building is generally used in the sense of creating a secure and democratic state.[6]

2.1. State Building Theories

There are three main approaches in the literature on how the state should be built. The first of these is the traditional liberal perspective. It is an approach based on the modernization theory of political scientist Martin Lipset. In his article written in 1959, Lipset compared the economic and political data of various countries. He determined that countries with good economies were democratic, while those with bad economies were undemocratic and underdeveloped. In this way, the proposition emerged that if economic development occurs, democratization and a welfare state will occur. According to Deutsch, with modernization; urbanization, industrialization, education, communication and transportation will increase. This will lead to increased social and community mobility. It will lead to the merging of ethnic communities in one melting pot and local assimilation. Nation building and state building will be more successful.[7] The state that is being built must receive foreign aid from the builder. Foreign aid triggers the economic development of the state that is being built. He argued that economic development and growth provide democratization.[8]

The second perspective is Acemoğlu and Johnson's path dependency approach to state building. They argue that random developments at a certain point can affect state building. In their book "Why Nations Fail", where they examine various failed states, they criticize approaches that attribute state failures to culture, geography or race. They argue that implementing strategies in a certain way in processes results in economic growth and democratic development. For example, they stated that in North and South Korea, there is a path dependency in terms of the policies and preferences implemented by the leaders. Strategies make the difference between being a successful or unsuccessful state. In unsuccessful states, a management in which the elite leaders generally prioritize their own interests is implemented. It is concluded that political and economic rights are shared by a narrow elite. They emphasized the importance of distributing political rights

to citizens in a way that covers them and distributing economic opportunities fairly so that the masses, not a narrow elite, can benefit from them in order for state-building to be successful.[9]

The third approach is the one that prioritizes institutionalization, as put forward by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington in their books. The policies adopted with the Washington Treaty after the end of the Cold War aimed to shrink states. The aim was for states to reach a flexible structure with the privatizations. However, the policies in question weakened states over time. They led to the formation of failed and weak states that could not perform basic state functions. Francis Fukuyama defines state building as the creation of concrete institutions such as the army, police, bureaucracy, ministries, etc. According to Fukuyama; the state building process includes various institutional issues such as the provision of personnel for institutions, their training, budget allocation, and the making of laws and regulations, and is a difficult chain of activities.[10]

3. SMART USE OF POWER IN STATE BUILDING

3.1. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power

The currently accepted definition of power was put forward by Neoliberal theorist Joseph S. Nye Jr. According to Nye, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others in order to obtain a desired outcome. Power is divided into three categories: soft, hard, and smart power.

The components of hard power are military and economic power. Military power is used for the purpose of coercion, protection and deterrence. The primary method of use is the use of force or threat. Hard power policies are embodied through war, alliances and coercive diplomacy policies. What is desired with economic power is coercion and guidance. The primary method of use is payment and sanctions.[11] Hard power policies are likened to the carrot and stick method. Good behavior is rewarded and bad behavior is punished. Soft power is used for the purpose of influencing and setting the agenda. It provides its validity with values, culture and policies. Soft power policies come into being with public diplomacy, mutual and multi-faceted diplomacy policies. [12]

According to Nye, soft power and hard power are different paths to the same end. Just as a goal can be achieved by using economic measures or military force, the same goal can be achieved by using shared values or good mutual relations. The difference between soft power and hard power is that cooperation is preferred over coercion.[13] According to Nye, there is no hierarchy between hard and soft power. Just as soft power can be used for good or bad purposes, hard power can be used for good or bad purposes. The combination of hard and soft power provides the desired result.

The coordinated use of hard and soft power is called smart power. In this context, the ability to transform hard and soft power into an effective strategy is smart power.[14] It is necessary to implement smart power policy according to the situation, not a regular combination of hard and soft power policies.[15] Nye describes smart power as a third way, somewhere between hard and soft power. He also emphasizes that smart power is something beyond hard and soft power, and is a new approach that is especially suitable for the field of international relations and foreign policy.[16]

3.2. Use of Smart Power in State Building

State building is a difficult process. External actors need to get support from internal actors of the state being built. External actors need to cooperate with internal actors. The minds and hearts of the people of the state being built need to be won. It needs to be explained that state building is done for a good reason.[17] The main aim should be not to be seen as a state or organization that comes to exploit.[18]

The solution to this problem is to win the minds and hearts of the people in the state that is being built. The solution can be realized with soft power policies. Especially in the post-conflict state-building process, hard power policies are necessary within the scope of military power to maintain peace. Protecting the ceasefire, collecting weapons, controlling refugees, ensuring public safety, clearing mines, and ensuring border security can be achieved with hard power policies. The combined use of soft power and hard power will reduce the negative impact of hard power policies on the people. The target that cannot be reached with soft power can be reached by using hard power. In this context, the use of smart power policies, which are the combination of hard and soft power, will increase the success of the process.

4. CASE: NATO'S POLICIES IN KOSOVO STATE BUILDING

Kosovo began to enter the world's agenda with the violent incidents that broke out in February 1998. The incidents escalated rapidly and became a threat to regional peace. Thereupon, the United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with resolution 1160 adopted on March 31, 1998, and requested all parties, groups and individuals to cease hostilities immediately with resolution 1199 adopted on September 23, 1998. As attempts to resolve the crisis failed, NATO began air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the evening of March 24, 1999. Along with the NATO operation, the Serbs accelerated their ethnic cleansing policies in Kosovo. As a result, a large migration movement began in the direction of Albania and Macedonia, and 850,000 people became refugees.

At an extraordinary meeting of the NATO Balkans Council held in Brussels on 12 April 1999, it was decided that NATO air raids would continue until President Milosevic accepted the demands of the international community (five conditions). This was confirmed at the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit Meeting held in Washington on 23 April 1999.

The G-8 platform, in which the Russian Federation had taken a position supporting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since the beginning of the operation, was brought to the forefront in order to include it in the peace process, and as a result, the G-8 principles were accepted at the meeting of foreign ministers of the G-8 countries held in Bonn on 6 May 1999.

The G-8 principles envisaged the immediate and controlled end to repression and violence in Kosovo, the withdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from Kosovo, the establishment of an effective international civilian and security presence in Kosovo that would be accepted by the UN and would guarantee common goals, the unconditional and safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and the unhindered entry of international humanitarian organizations into Kosovo to assist these people.

Regarding the political solution, it was envisaged to initiate a political process to establish a political framework agreement that would include the establishment of comprehensive autonomy in Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet Agreement, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the countries in the region, and the need to disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It was also stated that a comprehensive approach should be developed for the economic development and stability of the crisis region.

As a result of the determined continuation of NATO air operations, on June 3, 1999, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Milosevic accepted the G-8 principles. On June 9, the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia signed a military technical agreement foreseeing the withdrawal of their troops from Kosovo.[19] The army and paramilitary forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were withdrawn from Kosovo and replaced by NATO troops.

Thus, the Kosovo Force Peace Support Operation, which continues to this day, began on 17 June 1999. When NATO began the KFOR Peace Support Operation, its first priority was to “re-establish security and stability and ensure freedom of movement”; this mission changed to “continuation of the established environment of security and stability and freedom of movement” as of 2007. Today, the total number of troops in the mission is 4,352.[20]

4.1. NATO’s Use of Force in Kosovo State Building

During the state-building process, the Yugoslav State carried out the withdrawal of its army, police and paramilitary forces, the establishment of a ceasefire between the parties, the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the clearance of mines, border security, the provision of public safety, and the training and support of the Kosovo Security Forces. NATO also implemented soft power policies such as distributing humanitarian aid, carrying out education, health and development projects in every region of Kosovo, etc. [21]

The State of Kosovo is recognized by 119 states. 9 general elections have been held since 1999. As a result of the last two general elections, it is governed by a coalition. A tradition of democracy is being established. According to the 2016 Freedom House Democracy Report, while other Balkan states are experiencing a decline in the democracy index, the State of Kosovo is experiencing a noticeable increase.[22] It has a constitution that accepts multi-identity and multiculturalism. Different ethnic elements such as Albanian, Serbian, Bosnian, Turkish, Roma and Gorani live together. Each star on the Kosovo flag represents an ethnic element. According to the constitution, it is accepted that minorities have special days related to their ethnic identities and that celebrations are held on these days.[23]

It is a member of international organizations such as IOM, UNHCR, UEFA, FIFA. Kosovo participated in the 2016, 2021 and 2024 Olympics and won a gold medal at the 2021 Tokyo Olympics. It implements a free market economy. It is a member of the IMF [24] and the World Bank. Since the economic crisis in 2008, it is one of the four states in the European Region that has experienced economic growth every year, including 2017.[25] It is in a dialogue process with Serbia, the state it seceded from.[26] It has applied to join the European Union in 2022. According to neoliberal theory, the state-building process in Kosovo is relatively successful compared to other state-building processes after the Cold War.

5. CONCLUSION

NATO used its military power, that is, its hard power, in the Kosovo State-building process. Unlike other state-building processes, it effectively used soft power policies such as distributing humanitarian aid, carrying out education, health and development projects, etc. in coordination with hard power policies in Kosovo for the first time. NATO carried out and institutionalized its soft power policies through Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units.

As a result; NATO implemented a smart power strategy by using its hard and soft power in coordination in the construction of the Kosovo State. In addition, NATO's Kosovo experience has set an example for its subsequent operations.

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