EU CITIZENSHIP AS A COMMON IDENTITY: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND MAIN DIMENSIONS

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ABSTRACT
This study deals with the emergence of the European Union citizenship as a kind of common political identity and attempts to make a theoretical analysis of this citizenship as well as a dimensional one. Regarding the theoretical analysis of the issue, there are two aspects to be explained. First, from a wider perspective, a theoretical background is given to clarify the role and impact of identity in international realm. Then, from a more specified perspective, theoretical underpinnings and rationale of the choice of citizenship as a common identity in the EU is unfolded. Following these theoretical explanations, the EU citizenship is scrutinised referring to its three main dimensions, namely political dimension, economic dimension and popular-symbolic dimension.

Keywords: EU citizenship, common political identity, social constructivism

ÖZET

Anahtar sözcükler: AB vatandaşlığı, ortak siyasi kimlik, sosyal yapışıcılık
Introduction
The concept identity in recent decades has gained great importance in international politics. In parallel to this, the popularity and importance of the concept has reached a great level within the specific context of the European integration process launched after the Second World War. This is because this integration process has an aim of being a political community to the full extent (a supranational society with civil, political and economic facets) and, therefore, to realise this ultimate aim, it has to construct a common identity among its constituent citizens. Specifically, since the early 1970s, the changing geo-political and economic conditions have increased the need to construct such a common identity day after day. According to many scholars who are going to be referred in the second section, the major (and apparently the only alternative) way to reach this goal was to forge a political identity. This was denoted also as the answer of the official EU discourse. Indeed, since the 1970s, the EU has practised various methods to create a collective political identity and these efforts culminated in the legal introduction of EU citizenship in 1992. We presuppose that almost all political identity approaches to EU identity, including the official discourse, contain within them to a lesser or greater degree some major and similar constituents that elaborate their views. Accordingly, EU citizenship as a political identity rests on mainly political (civic society, democracy, human rights, rule of law) and economic (market orientation) dimensions. In addition, a certain level of popular-symbolic dimension is accommodated especially in the official discourse to raise the awareness and consciousness of the EU.

This article endeavours to present theoretical grounds and idealistic discourse succinctly behind putting forward such a political identity as the common identity choice for the EU. In this regard, after explaining the theoretical framework of the concept of identity in international realm as well as in the EU realm in the first section, we aim to elucidate the general views and justifications for backing a common identity for the EU in the second section. The first two sections of the article explain these theoretical aspects respectively. The last section continues to scrutinise the context of EU citizenship at a more concrete base through delineating its three dimensions: political dimension, economic dimension and popular-symbolic dimension.

1. Identity: A Key Concept in International Context
This section presents a theoretical framework for identity formation in an international (supranational) realm. While explaining this issue, it is useful to refer to the social constructivism that emerged towards the end of the twentieth century as a valuable instrument for students of international relations who are interested in the role of culture, identity, and other social dimensions of political life in the determination of international politics (Wendt, 1997; Lapid, 1997; Hopf, 1998). Identities, according to the social constructivist approach, are phenomena that are necessary for stability and order in the realm of international relations, because definitions of identities provide the actors in this realm with an understanding of other actors’ aims, actions and interests (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 18; Hopf, 1998). Actors in an international system should be understood as man-made institutions, including not only states but also domestic and transnational organisations that are established in terms of normatively constituted
practices as well as legal-formal entities (Koslowski, 1999, p. 565). Besides, while utilising the politics of identity in the analysis of international politics, the social constructivist approach affords the possibility of examining identities empirically in different contexts e.g. historical, cultural, political, and social (Hopf, 1998).

Therefore, the social constructivism provides a basis on which to elucidate some obscure features of international politics, namely the transformation of international actors, the reconstruction of political identities and interests, and systems of governance (Adler, 1997; Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 538). Constructivism in this social form accepts that international reality is not merely the product of physical forces and material power whether military or economic, but is, at the same time, a phenomenon socially constructed through discursive power (the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language) (Adler, 1997; Hopf, 1998, p. 1760). The social construction of identities and interests emerges from ‘collective understandings of the physical and the social world’ through a ‘cognitive evolution’ that underlines ‘the process of innovation, domestic and international diffusion, political selection and intersubjectivity’ (Adler, 1997, p. 339). These intersubjective understandings, as the basis of identities, interests and practices of governments, exist as collective knowledge and persist beyond the lives of individual social actors.

Following on from the above explanations, it can easily be concluded that in parallel to this process of the social construction of state identities in the domestic realm, any international community or institution attains its essential identity through the same logic. That is to say, common objectives and interests in an international community will hinge upon intersubjectively shared knowledge and normative understanding, constructed and diffused through a process of cognitive evolution across the community’s constitutive agents. Each of the agents, already a part or willing to be a part of the whole, should reconstruct, if necessary, its domestic structure according to the norms and characteristics, in brief the identity, of that international community or institution. This means that an agent’s external identity as a member of that community should be consistent with the domestic characteristics and practices of this agent (Adler, 1997, p. 345).

This social constructivist framework is especially appropriate in the case of the EU because the EU aspires to be more than an international society: a supranational one. This means that the EU needs to create its own norms and practices to a greater extent than any international society. As with the nationalism that brought in new patterns of identification and a sense of belonging at state level, through which domestic and international relations were poised to change, the EU has emerged as a different and sui generis form of organisation committed to establishing a new community with, of course, its own norms and practices. In the case of nation states, domestic social structures, shared ideas and other dynamics have been involved in establishing the state not only as a legal entity or formal organisation but also as ‘normatively constituted practices’ (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994, p. 323; Koslowski, 1999, p. 565; Wendt, 1999). With the same logic, this time the relevant actors and dynamics aspired to construct a special type of political association. In this sense, social constructivism has also become a necessary component of identity formation debates in the EU, and has appeared as a continuous project of constructing sui generis and collective governance that harbours norms, values, and symbolic properties as well as material structures.
Instead of accepting the use of this constructivist approach as a grand theory of European integration, it may be incorporated into different frameworks of analysis to enable us to understand different aspects of European integration (Christiansen et al, 1999, p. 538).

According to all these explanations, the main task for the EU on the road to identity formation is twofold. First is the determining of apposite norms, understandings and, finally, practices as a collective identity for the Union. Common identity, as can be seen, is not given and multifarious causes play a role in forming it. Driven by these causes, the formed identity reflects the outcome of a compromise among the constituents of the Union. The second part of the identity formation task is the diffusing of the collective identity to the constituents of the Union. Again, there are various processes (political, diplomatic) and policies for this purpose, depending upon the nature of the identity. It is a process of the diffusion of new European norms through societal mobilisation including non-state actors and policy networks, and through social learning, where agents, particularly elite decision-makers, adopt prescriptions to constitute ‘a set of shared intersubjective understandings’ that make behavioural claims (Checkel, 1999a, p. 552).

Leaving aside our explanations through constructivist views, we can approach the identity issue in the EU from another angle to reach similar theoretical conclusions. Though debate persists about using the term, Europeanisation seems a succinct concept to describe the already mentioned two-fold task for the EU on the way towards identity formation. Europeanisation is a controversial concept and scholars have put lots of definitions forward from different perspectives. Among these, Radaelli’s definition seems to be comprehensive enough and also consistent with the EU’s already mentioned task. According to Radaelli (2001, p. 2), the concept of Europeanisation refers to:

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

The definition accommodates changes in normative elements, identity, norms and beliefs as well as institutional and material ones. Furthermore, by emphasising the EU, instead of Europe, as a systematised concept, it provides an ‘analytic focus’ that leads to definition, operationalisation and explanation (Radaelli, 2001, p. 3). So far, the two main phases of the identity formation issue in the EU have been revealed using two channels: a constructivist approach to the issue and a certain definition of Europeanisation. First phase is determining the type and substance of the common identity and, second one is the attainment of this common identity by the actors of the EU project i.e. member states, various level institutions, and individuals on the most micro basis. The exploration of this second phase is not possible within the limits of this article. Therefore, the rest of the article focuses on the first phase. Since the 1970s, a common political identity, which, then, was embodied by the introduction of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, has been pronounced by the official discourse of
the Union as well as by increasing number of scholars. The following section elucidates this issue and explores the theoretical underpinnings and rationale behind choosing such sort of common identity for the EU. The last section investigates the substance of this citizenship-centred political identity through analysing its important dimensions.

2. The Emergence of Citizenship as a Common Base for the European Union

After the devastating impact of two big world wars during the twentieth century, a serious attempt towards European integration has been launched after the Second World War through the founding treaties of the European Community. In fact this was not the first initiative to unify Europe. At times only as an economic union, at times further projects of cultural, religious and political union in the continent have been proposed throughout centuries. Supposedly, during the last two centuries alone, there have been more than 160 plans to unify Europe in one way or another (Papcke, 1992, p. 72). However, the ongoing European unification process of the post-Second World War has been peculiar and different from all those previous ones. Most of the previous experiments throughout history, from the Romans and Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire to Napoleon and Hitler’s Third Reich, hinged on war, invasion and oppression (Black and Shore, 1996, p. 277). Although the rest of the previous plans dreamed a peaceful integration in a theoretical context, they could not find any basis in reality. This last endeavour pursued both a peaceful path and, for the first time, made it possible to practise a European integration process (Smith, 1992, p. 55).

The ultimate aim of this final attempt has been clear from the beginning that is the development of co-operation and interaction among European states to establish a powerful and fully-fledged political community (the ideal of ever closer union). Until the 1970s, however, the leading actors of the European integration process followed the neo-functionalist pathway that proposed to reach unity through gradual, incremental steps in certain areas, which would cause a ‘spill over’ effect to give rise to harmonisation and further integration in other areas (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999, p. 14; Shore, 2000, p. 42). Therefore, the Community’s initial activities were canalised and confined to economic integration. Political and social integration, as a ‘by-product’ or ‘side-effect’, would be created inevitably as a result of deepening economic integration (Shore, 2000, p. 18; Rosamond, 2000, p. 52). By the 1970s, the situation began to change in consequence of the need ‘for a Europe close to its well-informed citizens’, and because of the debates about the legitimacy of the Union (Black and Shore, 1996, p. 275). Thereafter, the interests and activities of the EU have intensified in other areas as well. The issue of common EU identity seems to be one of the most critical of these areas because, as the name implies, it colours and promotes all the other policy areas and provides a normative basis for the continuity of closer co-operation. That is why since the 1970s, the search for a common identity to underpin political integration has always been a live topic among the EU officials, member states and academic milieus. Alongside its gradually rising importance, an extensive discussion around the definition of an already existing or a possible European identity has emerged.

Among the various views to find out a common identity for the Union, the idea of constructing a common political (legal) identity based on some political (civic understanding, democracy, rule of law, human rights, multiculturalism, etc.) and
economic (market orientation) values has gained much more importance and, in the past two decades especially, this line has increasingly found supporters (Habermas, 1992, 1994; Heater, 1990, 1992; Keane, 1992; Laffan, 1996; Tassin, 1992; Meehan, 1993; Delanty, 1995; Waever, 1995, 1996; Rose, 1996; Weiler, 1997a, b; Emerson, 1998; Karlsson, 2000; Shore, 2000; Kostakapoulou, 2001). All these scholars like many others have advocated the construction of a European political identity within a post-national context hinging upon those political and economic values. They vary according to the point of origin in their arguments (i.e. security, rights and responsibilities), giving more emphasis to one feature (i.e. civil society in Garcia and Keane or democracy in Weiler and Rose) and reconciling efforts between national, regional and European identities. Common citizenship as a type of collective identity is still a matter of construction. EU citizenship might evolve according to the distinctive and pre-eminent aspects of any of those views. But the evident point here is that all the above-mentioned scholars have some common inputs or dimensions to verify their separate routes. That is to say democracy, civic affinities, rule of law, respect for human rights and for diversity have become reference points in the political discourses of all their views. These common principles have been combined with different accents, scopes and forms in the formulation of the above-mentioned projects.

In fact, this citizenship-centred mode of common identity based on those political and economic dimensions is also the official answer of the Union, with the addition of a further dimension, namely a popular-symbolic one to increase awareness of the Union and to build up a sense of togetherness. The requirement of such a supportive popular-symbolic dimension has also been underscored in the works of some of the previously mentioned scholars (i.e. Heater, 1992; Shore, 2000; Kostakapoulou, 2001). Despite continuing debate about their context and practice, as general landmarks in the process of forming a common identity, these political, economic and popular-symbolic dimensions have frequently been enunciated in the documents and works of EU institutions and embodied by the introduction of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty.

Citizenship can usually be described in a legal-formal sense that denotes an individual’s membership of a polity (status-based) and in an active-practical sense that ensures ‘active involvement of individuals as deliberators, participants in common affairs and responsible for the identity and continuity of the community’ (identity based) (Kostakopoulou, 2001, p. 87; Oliver and Heater, 1994). Citizenship here is considered more than a legal label that denotes an individual’s tie to a state. It is assumed, from a wider sociological perspective, as a set of practices which determines a person’s membership of a community and, in this way, constitutes rather than defines citizenship (Turner, 1994, p. 159). In other words, EU citizenship is loaded with its ‘psycho-sociological implications’ that constitute an important part of the political culture of the supposed European Community, and with its ‘mental and cultural grounds’ for participation of her members in public life, rather than just a legal-judicial entitlement of individuals with rights and duties (Dziubka, 1997).

According to the general views of this citizenship-centred approach, despite the prominence of cross-national differences between any sources of differentiation, a common European citizenship might be constructed on a shared political future and
aims, hinging upon the political and economic values of democracy, a civic way of thinking, the rule of law, respect for human rights and diversity, and the market economy. It is a new circle of identity in a European’s life, a different level of belonging, a feeling of being a European that is different from national identity but not in conflict with it. Parenthetically, despite its prominence, nationality is not the only identity in an individual’s life and s/he might sometimes have difficulties in expressing and organising his/her other identities (gender, class, religion, sexual preference, race) and interests within the framework of the nation state. This new identity denotes a new continental order aiming at co-operation, solidarity and full integrity among the countries that are diverse in culture, economic power and geography and, therefore, will also provide a transnational base for the protection of other individual identities. It does not favour any particular religious, cultural or regional form but aims to establish a common political culture that impedes the antagonisms emerging from all those differences and makes possible the peaceful co-existence of people as equal subjects under the common title of European citizenship.

Higher level integration can be the only way to prevent lower level disputes and clashes. Accordingly, this common base will be a remedy not only for such enemies as fascism or totalitarianism that come out of Europe but also for any other cultural-historical ones mostly arising from prejudices and hatreds i.e. anti-Semitism, anti-Islamism. Instead, it preserves and improves individuals’ economic, social, and political rights at European level and deals with the common problems of all Europeans i.e. terrorism, pollution, uncontrolled immigration, drugs use.

In sum, the general route of this citizenship-centred common political identity is simple: in the absence of a European ethnos, constructing a forward-looking European demos and its identity based on civic virtues and democratic-liberal values, which already have strong roots in the member state societies is the best choice. By constructing a common identity through EU citizenship which hinges upon those political and economic values, the EU could attain a supranational society. Harbouring a supportive third dimension, the popular-symbolic one to raise the awareness and consciousness of the EU is also needed to embrace such a society. In the last section of our study, we explain these dimensions respectively to explicit the theoretical context of common EU citizenship.

3. Dimensions of EU Citizenship

3.1. Political Dimension
There are two basic concepts shaping this dimension, namely civic virtues and democracy. These two concepts are closely tied to each other in the case of EU citizenship. As Beetham and Lord (1998, p. 58) pointed out, any formation of EU identity around civic values, at the same time necessitates the democratisation of the Union or vice versa. This civic-democratic goal necessitates both the construction of institutional-legal channels for the participation of citizens, and normative preparation of these citizens for such participation at EU level. The establishment of such a dimension, which Dahrendorf (1997, p. 154) suggests to call ‘European Legal Union’ to conceptualise it in parallel to European Monetary Union, is very important to attaining political community.
In addition, some other useful concepts, namely rule of law, human rights, pluralism can also be mentioned to elaborate the characteristics of the political dimension, but the former two, to a great extent, include and imply these latter concepts. Therefore, democracy here should be perceived in a Kantian way that is characterised by the rule of law, the respect for human rights, the non-violent and compromise-oriented resolution of domestic conflicts, and participatory opportunities for the citizens; subsequently, liberal democratic states form pluralistic security communities of these shared values (Risse-Kappen, 1996, p. 315). Dahrendorf (1997, p. 153) confirms this Kantian view and adds that in the progressive history of civilisation, the nation state could only be a step. The horizon of the rule of law and civic sense, according to him, was wider than this exclusive frame of the nation state and Europe could be a further step to attain the ultimate end of world civil society.

From the very beginning, democracy was a principal requisite for EU membership. Rose (1996) shows democracy as a distinctive feature of contemporary European states, and argues that the political map of the continent includes countries that are democratic or aspiring to become democratic and abide by the rule of law. In similar vein, the following statement from the preamble of the Treaty on European Union accentuates the aim of a democratic Union: ‘This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.’ The Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty, draft Constitution of the EU and all the other main documents likewise, emphasise the significance of democracy as well as other aforementioned political values for the Union.

However, the conditions of democracy have developed gradually. This is because the founding states and the states included in the first enlargement in 1973 already had long-standing democratic experience. Then, the EU stipulated and emphasised some structural aspects of democracy (free elections, separation of powers, a liberal democratic constitution etc.) for the inclusion of Southern European countries that had been exposed to authoritarian regimes until recent dates. Henceforth, depending upon the efforts in deepening and further integration, the understanding of democracy has surpassed the procedural features and queried some normative conditions (citizenship, civil society, cultural concerns, the practice of human rights etc.) (Pridham, 1999).

In the same vein, from the very beginning, the unique development of the EU as an institutional/legal entity has made it ‘the promoter of an image of civic statehood’ as well as a ‘community of law’, and this has, at the same time, become one of the most important determiners of its geo-political boundary (Smith, 1996, p. 15). The civic characteristic of European citizenship can be delineated as in Weiler’s arguments (1997a, p. 119): The substance of membership (and thus of the demos) is in a commitment to the shared values of the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment, inter alia, to the duties and rights of a civic society covering discrete areas of public life, a commitment to membership in a polity which privileges exactly the opposites of

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nationalism - these human features which transcend the differences of organic ethno-culturalism.

Without carrying such a ‘sense of civic bond’ with others in the same community or ‘of some responsibility for civic welfare’, one cannot be deemed a true citizen (Heater, 1990, p. 182). Uncoupling Union citizenship from state sovereignty and shared nationality, and endowing some political rights, Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty\(^1\) offers certain kinds of civic entitlements rather than ethno-cultural loyalty for individuals by recognising every person holding the nationality of a Member State as a citizen of the Union (Weiler, 1997a; Linklater, 1998).

The task here is the construction of such political values within a wider supranational context and the creation of civic-democratic-minded citizens. More explicitly, it involves constructing a European-wide democratic-civic system with its civil society (interest groups and intermediary organisations) and political society (political parties) as well as legal, governmental and juridical institutions. This being so, not only the introduction of citizenship, but also European civil society (and also political society) and its intermediary role for a civic-democratic Union have been given more emphasis in EU texts in recent years.\(^2\) This civic-democratic construction of European society aims to provide a basis for symbiosis, consensus and empathy. Transnational interaction and co-operation among similar political, social and cultural institutions or groups are supposed to strengthen ‘we-feeling’ emotions as well as undermine any prejudices and national aspirations.

Theoretically, after choosing such a democratic-civic path, substantive standards of EU citizenship that basically give way to participatory polity through ‘giving entitlements and opening paths to participation in (European) civil society’ (Garcia, 1996, p. 272) can be enhanced over time. However, this is not an easy task because of the differences between the member states in terms of political cultures, the evolutionary paths and current circumstances of citizenship, civil society and state-civil society relations. Two general examples can be given to shed light on these differences.

Firstly, as again Garcia (1996) pointed out through the Spanish case, Spain and other southern European countries in their domestic structures were short of these assets compared to their northern counterparts. Leaving aside such substantive values, in the 1970s, while the six founding members were trying to ensure a convergence, some southern countries were still lacking a democratic polity. Two authors (Torcal and Montero, 1999), who analyse the development of societal organisations within a period of over twenty years after passing to democracy, arrive at the same conclusion that, despite a relative boom in the initial years, mainly due to the legacy of older political culture, the level of social capital and organisations remained low in Spain, especially compared to other Western democracies. Secondly, the interpretations of the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty, Nice Treaty and EU Constitution in individual

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\(^1\) Article 17 to 22 on renumbering.

\(^2\) For an explanation of this increase of civil society issue in the EU context and for links to official reports about this, see the article (Smismans, 2002).
member states also tend to articulate these kinds of discrepancies among their political cultures.

The list of difficulties and risks in the process of constructing a European-wide democratic-civic society can be broadened. All these are not the matter of this study. As already underscored from the beginning, we aim to present the theoretical and idealistic framework of the EU citizenship.

3. 2. Economic Dimension (Market Citizenship)

The emergence of burghers and craftsmen (the embryo of the European middle class) who were settled in the medieval European towns and cities is frequently acknowledged as the source of the economic and then political and social changes of the following centuries. The bourgeois class of industrialisation followed these groups and the driving role of economic incentives and actors has always retained its place in shaping the societies.

Before the Treaty on European Union, as Everson (1995, p. 79) noted, a direct relationship was established between Europeans and the Union by creating market citizenship and its rights through the Rome Treaties. Consequently, the identity-building process was tightly embedded in a market paradigm (Wiener, 1998, p. 152). This very centrality of market orientation in Union policies has not changed since then and the creation of the Single Market accelerated the convergence of economic activities amongst member states and the importance of market citizenship. Adoption of the Single European Act and the Commission’s White Paper on Completing the Internal Market in 1985 coincided with the release of the Adonnino reports that also deal with freedom of movement for Community citizens and goods. Apart from the broader economic aims of such efforts, they also contributed implicitly or explicitly to the establishment of an economic dimension for a people’s Europe. The creation of the Single Market and free movement rights as a core element of EU citizenship also aimed to promote interaction and interdependence throughout the EU.

Furthermore, an important research programme, the Research on the Cost of Non-Europe (known as Cecchini Report), was launched in 1986 and completed in 1988, to analyse the costs of European market fragmentation and thus the potential benefits from their removal (Cecchini, 1988; CEC, 1988). First, the title of the research implied the need for a more unified Europe. Then the findings of the research showed that the removal of economic barriers would provide a base for political and social convergence.

Creating a single currency in itself can be seen as the most salient example of economic policies, defining the frontiers between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ and carrying political purposes beyond economic ones. That is to say, at least some of the individual member states could maintain their prosperous and well-functioning economies without the need for a single European currency, but a European political union could not be completed without its own currency (Mills, 2001). Replacing the national currencies of member states by the Euro banknotes and coins on 1 January 2002 has mainly served to pursue this political aim and has taken an important role in the identity formation process.
In spite of introducing new political rights, the basic characteristic of Union citizenship has still remained market-oriented and has represented the functional requirements of a community based upon a liberal market economy (Everson, 1995; Baubock, 1999). So much so that the Directorate in the European Commission that is responsible for citizenship was located for a long time in the one that is responsible for the Internal Market, rather than the Social Affairs Directorate or anywhere else (Shore, 2000, p. 84) and has been placed in DG Justice and Home Affairs since the creation of the latter in 1999. This was because, as mentioned before, Union citizenship aimed to complete previous measures to assist the free movement of people and goods between member states by extending the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member states, even to people not pursuing economic goals.

Such provisions shape part of the essential economic freedoms of the European Market by putting the ‘mobility’ element at the core of European citizenship (D’Oliveira, 1994, p. 132). To complete this picture, it should be stressed that, although there is consensus on some common objectives and on nurturing the convergence of social policies, for now, EU citizenship has no social dimension underpinning market integration and each member state pursues its diverse path to social protection (O’Leary 1996b, p. 128).

2.3. Popular-Symbolic Dimension
The popular-symbolic dimension comprises so many different policies and innovations. This dimension represents the subjective and experiential (practical) aspect of citizenship (Shore, 2000, p. 72). It is depicted as subjective because it attempts to increase both people’s awareness of the EU (citizenship) and the sense of belonging to the EU. It can also be identified as the experiential dimension because of the inclusion of everyday practices and symbolic innovations.

The logic behind this dimension is clear. Unlike in nation-states, the lack of a common language, traditions, history and/or religion implies that a Community of European citizens has to depend on derived loyalties from civic values and democratic principles instead of some emotional and affective bonds among its peoples. But even this limited and shallow form of common political identity (thin identity), which is bestowed upon peoples from different nations and cultures, necessitates the development of interactive and communicative skills to participate in social and political exchange, to overcome any prejudice and, finally to establish a suitable environment for the construction and maintenance of other dimensions at European level (Melchior, 1999, p. 58). Therefore, this is a make-up dimension for all other dimensions to remind Europe’s constituent citizens of the democratic-liberal European ideals and their Europeanness.

The first serious attempt to forge a people’s Europe (in contrast to the original Treaty of Rome, which refers to a peoples’–not people’s– Europe) was the Report on European Union prepared by Tindemans in 1975. To achieve this, the report proposed ‘the protection of rights of Europeans, where this can no longer be guaranteed solely by individual states’ and ‘concrete manifestation of European solidarity by means of
external signs discernible in everyday life.’ (CEC, 1976, p. 26). According to the report, the EU had to make itself felt in education and culture, news and communications, and in leisure-time activity (CEC, 1976, p. 2). In 1983, the Solemn Declaration on European Union was signed by the Heads of State and Government in Stuttgart. In this declaration (CEC, 1983), they confirmed their commitment ‘to progress towards an ever closer union among the peoples and Member States of the EC on the basis of an awareness of a common destiny and the wish to affirm the European identity’.

After that, the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau in 1984 agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to produce a report on a People’s Europe. Under the leadership of Pietro Adonnino, the Committee produced two reports in 1985. The aim of the Committee was ‘to propose arrangements, which will be of direct relevance to Community citizens and which will visibly offer them tangible benefits in their everyday lives’ (CEC, 1985, p. 10). The Committee recommended many nation-building and symbolic measures to enhance common consciousness about the Community and the strength of the Community’s image and identity, namely: a uniform electoral procedure for all Community citizens for the European Parliament; the citizen’s right of petition; declaring 1988 as European Film and Television Year; a European television channel broadcasting multilingually; a European Academy of Science, Technology and Art; a Euro-lottery; exchanges between schools; voluntary work camps for young people; giving new impetus to a European dimension in education, including the preparation of appropriate school books and teaching materials; university co-operation; vocational training; the formation of a European sports team; an anthem and a flag for the EC; stamps for drawing attention to ideas and events in the Community; a Europe day (9 May); and so on.

These selective and practical instruments aimed to increase interaction and the sense of we-feeling on the way towards collective identity formation. The awareness of the EU and the sense of EUness should be perceived as the two connotations that people have been targeted to cultivate through specific popular-symbolic innovations and policies. If the levels of these orientations are high, the popular-symbolic dimension is likely to be strong or successful enough to carry out its mission as a part of a common EU identity.

Despite the fact that the popular-symbolic policies are very significant but only one dimension of the EU political identity, these policies are usually deemed to occupy the whole of the politics of identity in the EU, perhaps because of their direct, visible and colourful place in daily life.

Conclusion
The aim of this article has not been to acknowledge common political identity choice for the EU or to discard it on account of its very short history. Aron (1974) had given no chance to a common European parliament in 1974 and again he (1976, p. 4) had described declarations about monetary union as ‘a dead letter’ two years after this. Considering the achievements since these ill-fated predictions that include Parliamentary elections, the Single Market and the Single Currency, EU citizenship, convergence of policies and attempts to strengthen the Community’s image, it can be
argued that the construction of common political identity in the EU has advanced within a very short time.

On the other hand, regarding the failures or deficiencies on this track that include the problem of the democratic accountability of EU institutions and the near-destructive results of the Maastricht Treaty, Nice Treaty and Constitutional referenda, there is still a long way to go. For the time being, as O’Leary (1996b, p. 313) said, the current form of EU citizenship just pays ‘lip service’ to the ideal of furthering integration. It has become critical in determining ‘European subjects’ but fostering a ‘European subjectivity’ beyond this point is another issue (Shore, 2000, p. 83). A compromise can be made between successes and failures for the sake of optimism. In spite of its current weakness and deficiencies, Linklater (1998, p. 183) shows the efforts to formulate a European citizenship as an initial attempt from which more extensive developments may grow; and Kostakopoulou (2001, p. 8), who in many aspects criticises it, finds a ‘radical potential’ in EU citizenship to develop. The contents of EU citizenship are likely to change or develop day by day; new rights and maybe duties are likely to be included and, in the same vein, new popular-symbolic innovations and policies are likely to be introduced.

At the same time, it has not been the purpose of this chapter to make projections about whether, after constructing such an identity, it would be effective enough for the maintenance of a common community ideal. A common political identity through citizenship is a thin identity. While endorsing such an identity for the EU, many authors presumably were aware of the risk that such an identity might not function to create enough solidarity and Europeanness to carry an ever-closer Union ideal.

This study has simply denoted the increasing importance of the political identity as the most possible type of common identity for the EU and has articulated its seminal dimensions. The introduction of citizenship was really a turning point in the process of European integration. This is not because of the provisions it includes. Although some amendments have been made since then, EU citizenship from very early in its introduction has been the focus of criticisms. But the declaration of EU citizenship itself pronounces what makes it a turning point. That is to say, through citizenship hinging upon certain basic dimensions, the EU certainly concretised and declared its vision of common EU identity that was trying to breed until that day. Although it is the product of a previous process, EU citizenship is still in its childhood, even infancy. Hereafter, any development concerning EU identity is likely to follow the path of these dimensions, in our opinion.

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3 These criticisms are not within the scope of this study. For a reading about this issue, see (Welsh, 1993; O’Leary, 1996a, b).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


