

**THE ANALYSIS OF DAHIYA DOCTRINE
IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAEL'S FURTHER SECURITY CLAIM**

***İSRAİL'İN DAHA FAZLA GÜVENLİK EDİNİMİ AÇISINDAN
DAHIYA DOKTRİNİNİN ANALİZİ***

Zafer BALPINAR

Öğr. Üyesi Dr., Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, zbalpinar@mehmetakif.edu.tr
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0336-7233>

Başvuru Tarihi/Application Date: 01.03.2018

DOI: 10.30798/makuiibf.399992

Kabul Tarihi/Acceptance Date: 09.05.2018

Abstract

This study aims to understand, determine and explain the Dahiya Doctrine that was adopted during the Lebanon War (2006), and that was applied as a deterrence model. In this frame, it deals with Israel's dissuasive expectation through the doctrine which was based on harming military infrastructure of the organizations and their civil elements and forcing them to change their behaviors. This deterrence model which was created in Lebanon against Hezbollah is questioned whether it can be applicable to Israel's security policy or not in the future. The study examines and explicates Israel's Dahiya Doctrine experience in the context of its further security claim and the threat imposed by Hezbollah and Hamas. The analysis frame intends to reveal the Dahiya doctrine, which is a result of Israeli purposes and applications in the field, as a military behavior rather than a doctrine which stands on a concrete theoretical/conceptual structure.

Anahtar kelimeler: Israel, Security, Dahiya Doctrine, Lebanon, Gaza.

Öz

Bu çalışma 2006 yılındaki Lübnan Savaşı sırasında şekillenen, caydırıcı model olarak uygulanan ve daha sonra geniş ölçüde benimsenen Dahiya Doktrinini anlamayı, sınırlarını belirlemeyi ve açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, örgütlerin altyapısına ve onların sivil unsurlarına zarar vermek ve onların davranışlarını değiştirmeye zorlamak üzerine kurulu doktrin bağlamında İsrail'in caydırıcılık adına beklentisini ele almaktadır. Lübnan'da Hizbullah'a karşı oluşturulan bu caydırıcılık modelinin gelecekte İsrail'in güvenlik politikasına uygulanıp uygulanamayacağını sorgulamaktadır. Çalışma, İsrail'in Dahiya Doktrinini deneyimini kendi güvenlik beklentisi ve Hizbullah ile Hamas tarafından ortaya konan tehdit bağlamında incelemekte ve açıklamaktadır. Analiz çerçevesi, İsrail'in sahadaki amaçlarının ve uygulamalarının bir sonucu olan Dahiya doktrinini teorik/kavramsal bir yapı üzerine oturan bir doktrinden ziyade bir askeri davranış olarak açıklamayı hedeflemektedir.

Keywords: İsrail, Güvenlik, Dahiya Doktrini, Lübnan, Gazze.

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

İsrail Devleti kuruluşundan beri askeri güç kullanımı var oluşunun öncelikli garantisi olarak görmüştür. Bu bağlamda aşırı güç kullanımı, önce stratejik ve taktik askeri süreçlerin, sonra da askeri gelenek ve doktrinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olmuştur.

Uzun bir tırmanma dönemi sonrasında İsrail'in 2006 yılında Lübnan'da Hizbullah'a karşı başlattığı askeri operasyon, anılan bu aşırı güç kullanımı geleneğinde bir sonraki halkayı oluşturmuştur. Tırmanma iki İsrail askerinin Hizbullah tarafından kaçırılmasıyla geri döndürülemez biçimde savaş benzeri bir duruma dönüşmüştür. İsrail'in askeri müdahalesinin merkezi Hizbullah'ın karargahı konumunda olan Beyrut'un banliyösü olan Dahiya olmuştur. Yıkıcı nitelikteki operasyonel tercihler muharip olanlar ile olmayanlar arasındaki çizgiyi bulanıklaştırmıştır.

İsrail'in Lübnan'da benimsediği askeri yöntem ve onun Gazze'deki yakın uygulaması bu çalışmanın konusunu teşkil etmektedir. Bu çalışma uluslararası hukuk ve etik çerçevesini dışarıda bırakarak, İsrail'in aşırı güç kullanımını, yani Dahiya Doktrini'ni, İsrail'in güvenlik edinimine olan katkısı, potansiyel faydası veya zararları ile İsrail'in güvenlik anlayışı üzerine olan etkisi bağlamında ön plana çıkarmaktadır. Bu kapsamda İsrail'in Hizbullah ve Hamas'a karşı olan mücadelesi bütünüyle ele alınmamakta sadece Dahiya banliyösü ve Gazze'deki uygulaması çalışmaya dahil edilmektedir.

Bu çalışma İsrail'in aşırı güç kullanımını Lübnan ve Gazze'de sanki bir askeri doktrinmiş gibi kullandığını kabul etmektedir. Bu çalışma İsrail'in askeri davranışını doktrin konseptiyle ele almaktadır. Ancak bahsedilen yaklaşımın amacı İsrail'in askeri davranışını doktrinleştirmek değildir. Dahiya Doktrini ismi İsrail'in sahadaki uygulanmasından gelmektedir. Konseptin doktrin olarak nitelenmesi, İsrail'in bunu resmi bir doktrin olarak kabul etmesinden değil, sahada bunu yöntem olarak uygulama kararlılığıdır. Dahiya Doktrini, İsrail'in güvenliğine ilişkin akademik çalışmalarda anıldığı şekilde, sanki bir doktrinmiş gibi kararlı bir askeri davranış ve sanki resmi olarak kabul edilmişçesine doktrinel bir davranış olarak ele alınmaktadır. İsrail'in askeri davranışı fiili bir doktrin olarak işlev sergilememektedir. Bunun hukuki-resmi bir doktrin olarak kabul edilmesi sivillere verdiği açık zarar yüzünden ne İsrail ne de demokratik bir ülke tarafından mümkün değildir. Bu nedenle çalışmada “doktrin” ifadesi İsrail'in “doktrin benzeri kararlı askeri davranış” manasında kullanılmaktadır.

Bu kabul doğrultusunda çalışmada, önce askeri zemin ve doktrinel davranışa neden tırmanma betimlenmekte, sonra Lübnan'daki çatışma sahasındaki İsrail askeri davranışının niteliği ortaya konmakta, daha sonrada bu kapsam Gazze'deki Dökme Kurşun Operasyonu ile örtüştürülmektedir. Lübnan ve Gazze'deki operasyonlar iki vakanın karşılaştırılması ve tekrarlayan güvenlik beklentisi ve askeri davranışa dikkat çekmek için ayrı ayrı işlenmektedir. Böylece gelecekte bu askeri davranışın tekrarlama olasılığı belirlenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Analiz bölümünde ise bu doktrinel davranışın İsrail'in güvenlik anlayışı ve politikasındaki konumu, İsrail'in güvenliğine olan olumlu ve olumsuz katkıları belirlenmeye çalışılmakta, caydırıcılık bağlamında stratejik ve taktik verimliliği açığa çıkarılmaya gayret edilmekte ve gelecekte tekrar kullanılıp kullanılmayacağı değerlendirilmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın temel argümanı İsrail'in var oluşunu askeri güç kullanımı üzerinden tanımladığı; siyasi ve askeri ihtiyaçlarını şiddet araçları ve metotları üzerinden temin ettiği; orantısız güç kullanımının tercih edilen bir yöntem olduğu; İsrail'in daha fazla güvenlik edinimi arayışının düşmanın daha fazla maddi ve manevi kaybıyla doğru orantılı olduğu; çatışmalarda kimin sivil olduğu konusunun İsrail için tartışmalı bir konu olduğu; İsrail'in ilk ve şiddeti vuran taraf olmadığı sürece inisiyatifi kaybeden olacağı kabulü; askeri hedeflerin yanı sıra sivillerin vurulması veya vurulmakla tehdit edilmesinin hükümetler ve örgütler üzerinden daha fazla etkiye sahip olduğu unsurları üzerine kuruludur.

Çalışmanın bulguları: İsrail askeri davranışının, yani bahse konu doktrinin, temel motivasyonu aşırı güç kullanarak İsrail'in düşmanlarının en azından zarar vermeyecekleri düzeye kadar, ideal olarak da tamamen yok edilmesi; İsrail'in güvenliği söz konusu olduğunda etik, uluslararası hukuk, evrensel kabul edilmiş askeri kuralların sınırlarının görmezden gelinebileceği; askeri güç kullanımının düşmanın siyasi tutum ve davranışının değiştirilmesi için gerekli olduğu; doktrinin bir çeşit meşru müdafa yöntemi olarak kullanıldığı; İsrail'in gerek duyması ve konjonktürel şartların uygun olması durumlarında doktrinin yeniden kullanılma potansiyeli bulunduğu unsurları ile tanımlı bir çerçeveye denk gelmektedir.

INTRODUCTION

Israel has seen military force as prior and preferred guarantee of its existence since the foundation of the state. The use of excessive force has become indispensable application of strategic and tactic military phases. And then, it has been an inseparable part of its military tradition and doctrine.

After a long military escalation period, Israel's air and land operation (2006) against Hezbollah in Lebanon became the next ring in the excessive force use tradition. The escalation turned into an irreversible war-like condition in the wake of abduction of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah and Israel's militarily orientation towards Hezbollah.

The epicentre of the operation was Beirut's southern suburb "Dahiya", the headquarter of Hezbollah. The devastating operational choices blurred the distinction between combatant and non-combatant elements during Dahiya-oriented operation. The military method adopted in Lebanon and its very close application in Gaza are the subject of this study. The study, excluding international laws and codes of ethics, intends to bring Israel's excessive force use, namely, the Dahiya doctrine, to the fore in terms of its contributions, potential benefits and harms to security acquisition and its impact on Israel's security understanding. In this frame, Israel's armed struggle against Hezbollah and Hamas is not entirely reviewed, but the specific portions in Beirut's southern suburb "Dahiya" and Gaza.

This study accepts that Israel adopted excessive military force against any threat and used this understanding as if a military doctrine in Lebanon and Gaza. The study deals Israeli military behaviour with the concept of doctrine. However, the purpose of the mentioned approach is not to make Israeli military behaviour a doctrine that is constructed on a theoretical ground. The concept named "Dahiya Doctrine" comes from the military practice which Israel applied on the ground. And the concept that names it as a doctrine points out to Israeli persistent determination in practicing, not an official indoctrination (for instance, Truman doctrine). "Dahiya Doctrine" is accepted, just like it is dealt with in the studies regarding Israel's security, as a concrete military behaviour as if it is officially accepted. Israeli military behaviour functions as a *de facto* doctrine, not a *de jure* doctrine because no country in the democratic world, even Israel, can officially recognize and put something in written state documents as a doctrine that seeks better security environment by coercing great suffering indiscriminately on civilians. So, the word "doctrine" in the study means "Israeli doctrine-like decisive/stable military behaviour".

In line with this acceptance, the headings in the study respectively constitute a causality connection. Firstly, the military ground and the escalation heading to the doctrinal behaviour are defined; then, the military behaviour's identification, qualification and projection on the battle field in Lebanon are determined; and then, this scope and content are correlated with the Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The military operations in Lebanon and Gaza are taken separately in order to superpose two cases and to draw attention to the repeating security expectation and military behaviour. Thus, it paves a way for future re-application possibility. In the end, the analysis section tries to determine the doctrinal behaviour's position in Israel's security understanding and policy, to fix its positive or negative contributions to Israel's security, to reveal its strategic and tactic reproductivity/efficacy in context of deterrence and to assess its applicability to the future.

The study's major arguments focus on that Israel has defined her existence through use of military force, that her critical political and military necessities conclude with violence tools and methods, that disproportion in use of force is highly required tactic, that her further security needs enemy's further morale and material losses, that that the civilians are arguable for Israel, that if Israel do not strike first and fiercely, she will lose initiative, and that hitting civilians or threatening to hit them, besides military targets, cause more impact on governments or organizations.

The study's findings regarding the doctrine fall in this frame are that the basic motivation of Israeli military behaviour, namely the doctrine, is to wipe off Israel's enemies via an overwhelming military force; if Israel's security is in question, the limits regarding ethic, international law, universally accepted military tradition and civil losses can be ignored; the military force is necessary for changing enemy's political attitudes and choices; the doctrine is used as a kind of self-defence action; the doctrine has a strong potential of re-execution if Israel believes its essentiality and if the regional/international security conditions are suitable.

1. THE GROUND OF THE DOCTRINE

After Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah filled the gap in the south of the Litani River (Lambeth, 2011: 37) and strengthened its political and military existence in the country (Kennedy, 2009: 37-45). Meanwhile, Hezbollah built its military infrastructure in the form of tunnels and shelters to use against Israel in a future war (Muller, 2012: 69-70). Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hasan Nasrallah, remarked that combatants would continue their normal life among civilians thanks to the tunnels and it was not possible to fight against them as a regular army (Editorial, 2006).

Nasrallah's explanation in September 2006 about reinforced arms stockpile (Blandford, 2011: 433) and Zella-2 missiles provided by Iran was a negative development in Israel's security perception (Hirst, 2010: 347; Samaan, 2013: 151). Besides, Hezbollah adopted the method of kidnapping soldiers for bargaining (Kennedy, 2009: 37-45). Due to mentioned threats and Hezbollah-Hamas co-operation, Israel increased the alert level between 2 and 4 (max 5) on Lebanon border (Hirst, 2010: 347). The statement of Brigadier General Herzi Levi, Commander of 91th Division, "if Hezbollah attacks, Israel's response will be sharper, harder and in some way very violent" was pointing out Israeli stance for current state and upcoming armed conflict (Cohen, 2012).

In the end, the breaking point in the military escalation occurred on 12 July 2006. Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers and inflicted losses on the rescuing contingent (Kennedy, 2009: 37-45). Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described the assault not only as a terrorist action but also as an "act of war" because Hezbollah was a part of Lebanese government. And he said that Lebanon had to endure the consequences, and then promised that Hezbollah would get a painful and long-term response. In line with the statement, Israeli government designated the military aims so as to bring back soldiers, to create a new situation in Lebanon, to improve deterrence and to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. But political goals were aiming at charging a disproportionate price for the kidnapped soldiers, chancing the situation radically in southern Lebanon and reinforcing the security perception in northern Israel (Lambeth, 2011: 333). The strategy in Israeli Chief of General Staff, Major General Dan Halutz's mind was covering two options for achieving the objectives: to relegate Lebanese government or to put strong pressure on it (Kober, 2008: 4).

Halutz's statement "if the hostages are not released, Israel will wind 20 years back Lebanon's clock and it will do that by targeting civilians and infrastructure" (Hirst, 2010: 333-334) was giving hints about the method. From the first moment to the end, Halutz's perpetual approach was to adopt an overly aggressive method along the borders (Lambeth, 2011: 43, 163). Israeli Army's first assumption was to force Prime Minister Fuad Siniora to put pressure on Hezbollah by hitting Beirut and depriving the country from tourism incomes. But, this idea was abandoned because USA and West countries would not support Siniora's attenuation (Bayman, 2011: 927). Besides, Arab states' support (due to Iranian support behind Hezbollah) for Israel was crucial (Hirst, 2010: 341).

So, Israel revised the military plan and the attack was re-planned on Hezbollah. Israel's attack strategy consisted of two parts; the first was dealing with directly military goals and the second was adopting military methods for political ends. The second part was aiming at disarming Hezbollah by inflicting suffer on Lebanese government (Hirst, 2010: 333). In line with this strategy, two military plans

were prepared. The first plan, “ice breaker”, was targeting a limited land operation in wake of a precision air strike of 48-72 hours. And the second plan, “celestial water”, was aiming at driving Hezbollah to the north of the Litani River by a war-scale air bombardment of several days or by a simultaneous combination of air and land attacks (Lambeth, 2011: 47).

A mixture of these two was finally decided. Accordingly, in order to destroy Hezbollah positions, Israel would penetrate deep in Lebanese territory with an operation combining air and land forces (Kober, 2008: 6). The projection of the operation on the field was defined by Colonel Gur Laish, then-Commander of Department of War Planning in Israeli Air Forces, as a heavy assault on Hezbollah’s military existence, commanding centre, organizational structure in Beirut and social formation in the southern Lebanon. The commander of 91st Galilee Brigade, Brigadier General Gal Hirsh expressed the goals of the operation as not solely eliminating rocket launchers; however, charging a high price to Hezbollah (Inbar and Shamir, 2014: 80).

The operation commenced on 12 July 2006 with a consensus among Israeli administrative on that the operation would be destructive and scary. The targets chosen on the first day were included Hezbollah’s military, strategic and accomplishment installations such as Lebanon’s newly constructed airport, roads and bridges (Hirst, 2010: 336-337). But, on the second day, the operation’s both military and political objectives were removed to the forefront after the destruction of most of Hezbollah’s rocket launchers (Kober, 2008: 4-5).

2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE: LEBANON WAR-2006

The operation’s military and political target was Dahiya (the name of the Israeli doctrine). Having taken from Amal militia group in 1989 by Hezbollah, it became new face of Shi’ism in Lebanon (Saramifar, 2015: 29). Besides, Lebanon’s southern part (including Dahiya) was shaping Hezbollah’s combatant power, organization and political party with its family-based dependency and loyalty network (Khayyat, 2013: 185; Norton, 2007: 52-53, 105, 107). Dahiya also was the place of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah’s home and office as well as the headquarter that was sheltering long-range missile guiding systems and UAV’s control centre. The southern part of Lebanon (including Dahiya) was the nearest position of Hezbollah to Israel. And this part included short-range rockets and military elements which might block Israel’s ground advance (Lambeth, 2011: 39).

Upon heavy rocket barrage by Hezbollah in northern Israel on 13 July, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided to push against Dahiya. Olmert’s push was intending to draw attention of the media to heavily destructed scenes and to break the resistance of the people related to Hezbollah through the shock and the fear created by the media reports and images (as USA did in Iraq in 2003) (Lambeth, 2011: 51-52). And, the suburbs were grossly bombarded and almost razed to the ground (Hirst, 2010: 336-367).

Along with Dahiya, Israel also targeted Hezbollah’s defence formation integrated into densely populated areas. The defence formation was involving arms cache and military supply network as well as rocket launchers. And it was connecting the tunnels that were dug along Israeli border to the ones in Dahiya (Popovich and Schumacher, 2008: 121). As the system was targeted, Dahiya-centred devastating attack expanded to the Shiite population centres in the south of Beirut and in southern Lebanon (Abbout and Muller, 2012: 81).

Lebanon demanded cease-fire in the face of large-scale destruction. Vice Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Kaplinsky recommended the suspension of the operation in order not to deteriorate the situation. Although a cease-fire at this stage was substantially compensating military expectations, Israeli military-political decision makers did not accept an agreement that would not fully meet expectations. And, the operation evolved into the next step, namely, a small-scale war. A battle front was inevitably formed between whole Lebanon and the northern Israel (Kober, 2008: 4-5; Gabrielsen, 2013: 436). On 22nd of July, Israel begun to fight against Hezbollah on the ground just beyond its border. At the

beginning of August when the threat posed by Katyusha rockets in the tunnels become ineluctable by means of air bombardment, the ground operation was expanded into Lebanon territory up to the Litani River (Kober, 2008: 4-5).

The operation finally ended with a cease-fire on August 14 as a result of international pressure. Throughout the conflict, even though Israel explained that Lebanese civilians had not been targeted and that the locations known as terror-related had been hit by precision weapons, the picture left behind was describing the opposite (Lambeth, 2011: 151). According to that picture, it was difficult to say that Israel solely harmed Hezbollah-connected targets (Montgomery and Pettjohn, 2010: 548).

Israeli Air Force hit 7.000 targets in 15.000 sorties during the conflict. The figures were equal to the military movement experienced during Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel fired 53.000 artillery shells during Yom Kippur War that lasted 24 days, but the number was 180.000 during Lebanon operation that lasted 33 days. In the course of the operation, more than 130 towns and villages that included Hezbollah elements were targeted in Lebanon; 1100 persons (one third of them were children) including Hezbollah combatants were killed, some 3626 other were wounded; 10.000 houses completely, 22.500 seriously, 73.000 other partially were demolished; 100 bridges, 24 fuel stations, airport and harbours were rendered unusable. 1.250.000 persons had to leave their homes, 900 commercial enterprises became dysfunctional, Lebanon economy suffered from 3-5 billion-dollar losses (Hirst, 2010: 349, 373; Lambeth, 2011: 73, 150; Samaan, 2013: 148). On Israeli side, 119 soldiers and 44 civilians were killed (Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2017).

In addition to the effort that aimed at inflicting combatant losses and material destruction, Israel somewhat mined (dud bomblets pose permanent danger) Hezbollah's influence areas by using cluster bombs in order to protect the destruction, to prevent resettlement, to keep the threat away as much as possible and to gain time for next military-political steps (Cook, 2009). Uncultivated agricultural lands, due to dud bomblets, extended the term of the harm given to Lebanon, in some way, Hezbollah which was a part of Lebanese government (Khayat, 2013: 246-248).

Israel's method in Lebanon and its results were defined by USA as "brutal, increasingly inexcusable", by EU as "disproportionate force", by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as "excessive use of force", by Lebanon's UN representative Nuhah Mahmoud as "bringing Lebanon to its knees" (Lambeth, 2011: 162). The Human Rights Watch clearly accused Israel of war crime (Howell, 2006).

After the Lebanon operation, Israeli military attitude was clarified by Israeli Northern Commander, Major General Gadi Eizenkot in an interview that he gave to Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper on 10 June 2008. According to his remarks, the disproportionate force used on purpose by Israel was not related to military needs, but its military-political goals. The method was essentially a doctrine (Samaan, 2013: 146; London, 2008). In this interview, "Dahiya Doctrine" was first time explicitly stated (Khalidi, 2014: 5-13).

What happened in Dahiya during the operation, that is to say Dahiya doctrine, was expressed by General Eizenkot as "what happened to every village that opened fire in direction of Israel happened there". Namely, every place that was believed to be military base was exposed to disproportionate force and inflicted great damage, and this method was applied as a plan (Hirst, 2010: 396). What made Israel's method a doctrine was buried in his statements such as "the sites that attack Israel will be exposed to great destruction by using excessive force", "the sites that attack Israel are not civilian, but military bases, will be targeted", "this method is not an advice, but a plan". These statements also draw a frame for strategic and tactic level of the method, in short, the doctrine (Khalidi, 2014: 5-13).

Within the same frame, Eizenkot underlined that Israel's approach would not be finding and destroying thousands of rocket launchers, by doing so they would not spill the blood of Israeli soldiers, instead of this approach they would demolish Lebanon ignoring protests from around the world. Eizenkot also cleared that they would pound Shiite military related 160 villages, that they would not show mercy on

targeting the national infrastructure controlled by Hezbollah, and that those statements were not threats of a fiery officer, but an approved plan. The doctrine outlined by Eizenkot was not aiming at making a distinction between good and bad Lebanese. In Israeli mind, Lebanon was captured and multilaterally dominated by bad people, namely Iranian Hezbollah, and so Lebanon was an enemy (London, 2009: 228).

This reductive approach required an eliminating stage. The eliminating process sought to create a new security order in the region. The change focused on shrinking Hezbollah's political and military capacity, that is to say, minimizing its role in Lebanese government (Hirsrt, 2010: 400-401; Samaan, 2013: 151). So, Israel did not hesitate to use excessive military force to inflict costly infrastructural destruction and to punish civilians deteriorating their living condition in order to break their any-possible-utility-chain with Hezbollah (Cook, 2009). The destruction was intended to cause social paralysis to obtain required political impact. Thus, a rift between Hezbollah and people was demanded to force Hezbollah to step back (Weizman, 2010: 17-18). Another objective of the civilian-oriented approach was to deprive Hezbollah from recruiting human sources and sheltering in the southern part of Lebanon (Norton, 2007: 138).

National Security Advisor, Major General Yaakov Amidror explained Israel's manner in context of the doctrine with these sentences "Those who are around Israel must understand that Israel has certain red lines and Israel's retaliation will be intentionally disproportionate. We, as a small country, do not have luxury of responding proportionately" (Gross, 2008: 8). But, in spite of disproportionate military force, Israel left Lebanon with two major problems: the great loss of civilians and the failure in military objectives. These two problems started a new phase in Israeli military literature as Prime Minister Olmert stated "Lebanon War is the first war which Israel's military leaders have understood that classic war era is over" (Baram, 2011: 76).

3. THE REAPPEARANCE OF THE DOCTRINE: OPERATION CAST LEAD IN GAZA

Upon Hamas' rejection of pro-violence attitude, recognition of Israel and previous agreements after its electoral victory in Gaza in January 2006, Israel began an economic embargo (Erlanger, 2006). Gaza was already under Israeli military siege and there was an armed conflict with Hamas in Gaza border. In the wake of Hamas' attack on an Israeli military control point in Gaza-Israel border, which killed two soldiers and abducted two others, the dose of military activity increased (it reminds Hezbollah's method in Lebanon in 2006). Military escalation brought about Operation Summer Rains (28 June-26 November 2006) and Operation Autumn Clouds (31 October -8 November 2006). Even if these two operations were presented as rescue operations, the actual intention was to establish deterrence, to make political-military change in the region and to keep Hamas under pressure (Hirst, 2010: 331-332).

Hamas was pressured by land and sea blockade and then Israel declared Gaza as hostile territory on 19 September 2007 (Hirst; 2010: 58). During all of this, Hamas' rockets were responded by Israeli artillery. Ongoing duel gained tranquillity with 6-months truce that entered into force on 19 June 2008. But, when Israel entered Gaza in November in order to destroy border tunnels, clashes resumed. And, Israeli Security Cabinet's instructed on 25 December for preparing further military phase (Hadad, 2008). In fact, the preparation was not new (as was in case of Lebanon). The potential targets were ready 6 months ago for maintaining the initiative swiftly (Radiv, 2008). Besides, Israel revealed that the enemy's weak points would be attacked disproportionately (Baram, 2011: 77).

As the preparation for military response was proceeding, another process was going on. After the Lebanon operation in 2006, a group of officers was trying to develop the experiences gathered from the battle ground. Major General Giora Eiland was describing that strategy as "the goal should not be defeat of Hezbollah when there is a possibility of military intervention; the goal should be destruction of national infrastructure and the infliction of intense suffer on people". General Eiland was claiming that these

approaches would be far more effective than other elements for changing Hezbollah's manner (The Goldstone Report, 2010: 85-86).

After emergence of these ideas as possible strategy in October 2008, Colonel Gabriel Siboni composed following principles; a) Israel should act immediately, rapidly and decisively against the enemy's actions and threats by resorting disproportionate military force, b) this response should include the engagement and the punishment which will necessitate long and costly restoration term, c) the attacks should target both the enemy's military capacity, economic interests and civil power centres that support the organization. Thus, a considerable decrease in hostility and an increase in deterrence should be obtained. More important than these, Colonel Siboni was pointing at Gaza and drawing attention to giving up the cat and mouse game which means finding and destroying rocket launchers¹ (The Goldstone Report, 2010: 85-86). Underlining these matters, Siboni was bringing to the fore that Israel's response could not be limited by a specific case. According to Siboni, the response must be generalized for similar threats and the response should be disproportionate in the fashion of giving a clear message to the attempts which could harm Israel's security (Caverley, 2014: 296-300). Consequently, Israel's operational modality was similar to Siboni's approach.

Having completed the preparations, Operation Cast Lead began with the first bomb drop of 100 tons on 100 targets on 27 December 2008 (Caverley, 2014: 398). Israel's announced objectives were a) to destruct the weapons, equipment and infrastructure used for bombing Israel, b) to reduce the fighting capacity of Hamas, c) to create new realities in the region and d) to form of a security environment for Israelis (Witte and Raghavan, 2008). The political frame and the method of the operation was fixed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni's statement "Israel is a country that when you fire on its citizens it responds by going wild – and this is a good thing" (Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009: 332).

While the operation was at bombardment phase, Israel Armed Forces Spokesman Major Avital Leibovich explained that everything related to Hamas was legitimate target (Witte and Raghavan, 2008). Israeli leaders thought that the significant amount of Gazan people was cherishing Hamas and allying with Israel's regional enemies (Flibbert, 2011: 65). In addition, because Israel accepted that Hamas was still a terrorist organization even though it was elected, its civilian components were seen as parts of the terrorist structures and military efforts. Accordingly, Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Dan Harel interpreted civilian elements related to Hamas as expedient targets (The Goldstone Report, 2010: 87-88).

In the end, the concept foresaw for Hamas' military organization covered civil infrastructure (Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009: 21). And, "the first 150 targets" understanding (it means most important 150 targets to be hit, derived from Lebanon operation in 2006) was carried to Gaza by increasing it up to 600 (Hirst, 2010: 401). Deputy Chief of General Staff, Major General Dan Harel clarified that this operation was different than previous ones, that not only terrorist and rocket launcher but also whole Hamas government and its all wings were hit, that Israel did not want to see even a Hamas building and that Israel aspired to change the game (Dadon, 2008).

Operation Cast Lead, which was in air and artillery bombardment mode, was reinforced by ground operation as of 4 January. Until that date, 526 of 600 targets had been hit (Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009: 1002). During operating in Gaza, Deputy Prime Minister Eli Yishai's statements (made on 6 January) such as "Gaza should be destroyed so that they understand not to fight with us", "This is a great opportunity to destroy all terrorist houses, by this way, they will think twice before launching rocket" (The Goldstone Report, 2010: 87), and his similar restatement (made on 9 January) "I think everything must be destroyed, so thousands of houses, tunnels and industrial facilities

¹ General Eizenkot's approach was considered important because of his seniority and Colonel Siboni's thoughts were taken into consideration because of his experience in the field. "The Goldstone Report", 86.

will be demolished” were defining Israel’s intentions and expectations regarding the operation (Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009: 332).

As the operation was completed on 19 January, the dimensions of the mentioned disproportion came in sight. Authorities declared death toll in Gaza respectively as Gazan 1444, Israeli 1166 and Fact-Finding Committee 1387-1414. Different sources revealed that the number of civilian Gazans killed was 726-925 and that some 340 of them were children (.Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009: 10, 1007) The number of wounded was 4336. House stock of 6400 was completely destroyed or rendered unrepaired, some 46.000 others were moderately damaged. This amount corresponded to %15 of the total building stock. The total damage in Gaza was in the range of \$ 1.6-1.9 billion (Editorial, 2009: 210-211; Weizman, 2010: 11). Besides, during the operation, %17 of Palestinian agricultural land was destroyed, another part of %30 was rendered unusable (Black, 2009). Some %60 of the soils in the north of Gaza were damaged in order to hamper farming activities. And some %35-60 of the agricultural industry (Beaumont, 2009) and around 600-700 factories, small industries, businesses and shops were battered down (Hass, 2009). In the same period, Israeli casualties were 10 troopers and 3 civilians (Zeitsoff, 2011: 940-941).

The purpose of the Operation Cast Lead was to change the political environment by allowing Hamas to enjoy much less attention and support. And, Israeli leaders’ the minimalist expectation was to incite Gazan people to accuse Hamas of their sufferings and to reduce the legitimacy of the organization. This expectation was directly related to the acceptance that Hamas could not be affected powerfully by the loss of combatants (Flibbert, 2011: 65). Therefore, the operational method was based on making Hamas-affiliated people suffer as much as possible, not destroying rocket launchers in order to compel the organization to acknowledge the defeat and to beg for a cease-fire (Baram, 2011: 77; Hirst, 2010: 398).

The mentioned Israeli intention is understood from Deputy Prime Minister, Eli Yishai’s statement “even if the rockets they have launched land on open areas or sea, we must destroy 100 houses for each of rockets” (Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009: 332), and Minister of Interior, Meir Sheerit’s statement “inflict Gazan people 100 times more losses they have given you” (Byman, 2011: 200).

It was expected that the way of the operation (civil destruction) would produce more deterrence. All places thought to be related with Hamas combatants and weaponry were struck heavily without hesitation even if they were civilians site (including mosques, hospitals, educational institutions, even UN buildings) (Hirst, 2010: 401-402; Byman, 2011: 194, 198). A sensitivity less than Dahiya operation was shown during Operation Cast Lead (Harel and Issachoroff, 2009).

At the end of the operation, it was expressed in the government statement, connecting the size of the destruction with the degree of the deterrence, that the deterrence against future attacks was established as planned (Behind the Headlines, 2009). Prime Minister Ehud Barak denoted that the operation was carried out by violating proportionality and that the operational method would be guiding doctrine in Israel’s future wars. Israel described the operation as self-defence action and claimed that the heavy damage inflicted on civilians while hitting Hamas did not violate war laws (Weizman, 2010: 12, 18-19).

But, UN Fact-Finding Commission on the Operation Cast Lead deduced that the disproportionate destruction and violence against civilians in Gaza were part of an intentional policy. The commission underlined that Israel hit not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure in order to get a decisive result (Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009: 114). The commission’s impression, namely, the similarity of Gaza operation to Dahiya case, was accepted by outsiders and security analysts too (Harel, 2014; Khalidi, 2014: 5-13; Katz, 2010; Flibbert, 2011: 65; Bhatt, 2012: 820; Harel, 2008).

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ISRAEL'S FURTHER SECURITY CLAIM

Since Israel was established through war and has maintained its survival by means of continuous armed struggle, military principles and acceptances have always been vital in statecraft and community life. Accordingly, the content of security concept has been composed of resorting arms and keeping security-oriented mind. At the stage of resorting arms, the dose of military response has been considered important in order to prevent the security anxiety. The damage inflicted on the enemy, on one hand, has satisfied this feeling, and on the other hand, reinforced self-reliance since it is thought that the damage debilitates the enemy and rasps its aggression.

Both Israel's military operation in Lebanon in 2006 and its method (the Dahiya doctrine) are pretty much correlated with this depicted picture above. The same is also valid for Gaza. The conflict environment in both Lebanon and Gaza corresponds to a composition of a) unconventional tactics and structures, b) indiscriminate violence used as terror method and c) a public security problem at chaotic level. In this composition, Israel mostly does not sensitive enough to differentiate combatants or non-combatants in order not to risk its soldiers. And this turbidity between combatant and non-combatant or civilian is used by Israel as a flexible facilitator for military acts and goals. It can be said that the doctrine's employment as a flexible form of military action is closely related to blurring the concept of civilian. In context of this association, Israel accepts that the harmed non-combatants are not in fact civilians, that are in the way of aiding and abetting the combatants and that civilians act as armed elements when appropriate. And also, Israel wants public opinion to have the same mind and quests a legitimacy through its own acceptances.

The doctrine is disproportionate for Israel's favour because a) it is based on if and only Israel's own security necessity, b) Israel believes to fight against specific enemies who intend to annihilate Israel, c) Israel aims at winning under all conditions without restraining itself. Israel's expectation from the disproportion is to seize the military initiative on the battleground as quick as possible. What is aspired via serious destruction and unbearable losses is to increase the enemy's psychological trauma, and then to refer it to desperation, and in very end to cause to change its political/military behaviour. Disproportion dose functions as force multiplier in the military success.

Inflicting great damage and causing serious casualties, Israel tries to direct the attention of potential threats to survival efforts and compensation of the losses rather than maintaining a ideology against Israel. Thus, Israel attempts to put pressure on not only actual threats but also potential threats. Because Israel estimates in line with historical experience that it is not possible to completely defeat a terrorist organization and to demolish its ideology, Israel's goal is to harm to the belief that keeps the ideology alive and to disappoint the enemy society regarding their ideology. By doing so, the terrorist organizations' futuristic discourses are minimized, and the organizations' efforts for gaining reputation in Islamic world are tried to be prevented, and the aspirations for being a national army which protects people from Israeli attacks are blocked.

Israel tries to create a sensation, through the damage given to the enemy, that they can gain nothing from their actions and that there will be greater costs for their small gains. The message to the other party is that, if they attack Israel, they have to take into consideration unbearable sufferings which will be determined by Israel in terms of size and timing. Israel aims at coercing public to question their political and military stance. Their response is tried to be used as a pressure tool on the organization. It can be said that it is tried to contribute to Israel's security by creating internal quarrel and diverting the attention from Israel to the organization. From this perspective, it can be claimed that the doctrine goes beyond a classical deterrence and a retaliation reaction.

Israel's heavy bombardment on the enemy region is related to carry the skirmish to the enemy soil (as a traditional military attitude) and to decrease the possibility of a land operation and its possible losses. Minimal causality expectation in Israeli sense necessitates heavy enemy losses and disproportionate response. And the other reason of disproportion comes from the Israeli traditional approach, which is "soldiers can only be protected by a devastating firepower". Due to all these mentioned acceptances, the doctrine produces in practice approximately 1/100, Israeli casualty/enemy casualties rate.

Israel has accepted that its classical war method, which is "totally defeat the enemy and solve the security problem", cannot be applied on terrorist organizations. Due to this fact, the doctrine's another task is to establish deterrence against foe organizations. In this mentality, the life of deterrence correlates with the size of the destruction inflicted on the foe. The first thing to be determined about the doctrine in context of deterrence is that it is not a new understanding, but its new update.

The update has been in form of adding an extra recovery time by giving serious harm to the foe rather than intimidating. In this effort, the doctrine is used to interrupt the military escalation for Israel's favour with a sudden and powerful stroke and to divert the escalation to the enemy's expense. It can be claimed that Israel assesses to face an attack or threat again, accordingly it does not prefer short-term tactical deterrence, but strategical deterrence that will change the rules of game even though it costs a lot (military and civilian casualties, diplomatic problems etc.).

Taking the doctrine from the viewpoint of deterrence, it can be concluded that a) the doctrine establishes a connection between the enemy's substantial losses and the solution of security problem, b) Israel does not believe in proportionate use of force for an effective deterrence, c) Israel correlates the doctrine's deterrence capacity with demoralization level of the targeted enemy.

Looking Israel's expectations from the doctrine, it can be said that Israel believes a doctrine that can place the idea of "Israel is a tough rival to cope with" into the foe's perception. Since the myth of Israel's invincibility has been damaged first by Yom Kippur War in 1973 and then by Hezbollah in 2006, the revival of the myth is considered important by Israel. If revival is not achieved, it must be replaced by another tool. The tool's function must be based on making the conflict to the enemy highly priced. What was seen during Operation Cast Lead is precisely that understanding. In line with that understanding, it can be inferred that Israel may put the doctrine into operation in the event that it fails in any future armed conflicts and seeks a solution for fortifying its people.

As Israel knows that each small-scale attack sharpens antagonism against Israel, it tries to keep destructive power over bearable threshold of the enemy. But, by doing so, there is possibility of providing deterrence, but when the destruction reaches to the limit of "nothing to lose", the doctrine will cause a consolidation and participation to the organization rather than deterrence. As a result, Israel's expectations for deterrence may not come true and the enemy's attention may direct to re-establish its military capacity for resisting against Israel. Under this situation, Israel may not have a chance other than totally annihilate them. If the annihilation is not achieved, it seems impossible under international and national pressure, Israeli deterrence will be eradicated. It can be witnessed during the conflict that the sizable destruction on civilians supplies a support and legitimacy to the targeted organizations, exhausts Israel's military capacity, weakens Israel's self-defence claims and paves the way for future Israeli casualties.

From this critical perspective, it is difficult to say that the doctrine can establish a credible deterrence since it contributes to a vendetta and an internal disagreement in Israel. Taking the vendetta issue into consideration, it can be claimed that Israel perhaps intends to have an enemy to fight in the future, to convince the public that there is a strong enemy against Israel and to keep the idea of fighting against Israel's enemies alive. For, all these are thought by Israel as the guarantee of the consolidation of Israel's public on the ground of security and related matters as long as the violence dose/size is controlled.

Another point to be added from the doctrine to Israel's military/political expectations and goals is its punitive feature. Israel historically considers to punish the mass who is thought to be enemy or enemy-related civilians. This thought carries the whole background regarding the historical enemy to the actual conflict area, and more than that, it paves the way for taking revenge of casualties in order to raise the morale of Israeli society and for presenting the enemy's heavy losses as military achievement to motivate Israeli masses especially when there is no strategic gains.

While the size of the destruction is interpreted as deterrence, the foe tries to obtain legitimacy through the innocence image. Due to this balance, Israel cannot convert physical destruction into the foe's psychological and sociological depression. This result prevents a deterrence planned for the next armed conflict, and so the armed aggression potential of the other party remains intact.

Looking at the expectation from the doctrine, despite of its possible negative aspects, it can be foreseen that Israel will be inclined to use excessive military force since military/political stance will not be compromised. It can be claimed that resorting excessive military force, namely the doctrine, will be in two forms; a) direct deterrence against the elements to be targeted, b) indirect deterrence against elements (both within and out of Israeli borders) who want to test Israel. Taking into consideration the relationship between the threat and the doctrine, it can be concluded that an escalating armed conflict may induce Israel to carry the doctrine into the battlefield. In addition to political or military choice, high threat perception may cause a demand from Israeli society since the doctrine has been positioned as a morale provider and a self-reliance tool.

It can be said that the doctrine is an alternative or/and complementary application or/and a fait accompli creator with other security related options in both Lebanon and Gaza. So, it is difficult to claim that Israel has deployed the doctrine singly. It can be pointed out that the doctrine may be put into action as force multiplier or used compatibly with classical military methods especially when there is an ineffectiveness at strategic/tactical levels. This inference can be supported by Israeli attitude that destroys urban infrastructure and puts pressure on the organization via the ravage as a result of failure in the tunnel-web-supported-armed-conflict method. In addition to its mentioned functionalities, the doctrine can be treated as a) a measure that tries to solve the occupational problems and the loss of Israeli troops, b) a militaristic counter-terrorism solution for the organizations which form in irregular army fashion, c) a way that makes the enemy sentenced to the terms of Israel.

The doctrine reveals that Israel tries to deliver a symbolic manifestation of Israeli military might to its enemies. In this frame, the doctrine is compatible with the grand strategy that accepts the tenet of "the peace can only come after defeating the enemy by using force", and the small strategy that covers such principles "be first to hit, seize initiative, make the war on the enemy territory and strengthen Israel's position by using military force". It is observed that the security holes originated from the failures of the grand and small strategies are tried to be filled by the doctrine. Basic security hole is the inability in carrying the war to hostile territory due to rockets launched to Israel.

If a generalization is made about Dahiya doctrine, it can be said that it is a choice for Israel rather than a military necessity and that there is no a universally accepted balance between military requirements and humanitarian values. Owing to modus operandi, the doctrine has an association problem with the concepts of self-defence, just war and no-choice war. Although close threat makes resorting military force legitimate to some extent, the use of force indiscriminately and disproportionately overshadows, even annuls, the legality of resorting military force.

Due to the mentioned reasons, the possibility of re-use of the doctrine for further security claim is closely related to Israel's capacity of resistance against the international pressure. In order to get international support, it is necessary to prepare the public opinion for the essentiality of a military interference in the way of the doctrine. Otherwise, the followings are barely options to resort the doctrine;

a) to show the way of intervention as if it is within legitimate limits, b) to get international actors' supports, c) to put it into action when the attention of international public opinion is drawn to other major events, d) to resort it by ignoring all criticism and reactions. But, whatever choice is preferred by Israel, all actions within any choice will be recorded in the history.

Although the implementation of the doctrine is problem-ridden from ethic, law, diplomacy and humanitarian aspects, the results that have come from its execution are suitable for functioning as data base which Israel can use in determining its realpolitik and its operational capacity/capability inside and outside of the country. In the same scope, it can be said that Israeli excessive force loaded security manner gives an idea of how far military force-oriented security actions can be stretched.

CONCLUSION

Even though the doctrine developed its identity in Lebanon, in fact, it has been built on the memory of feelings of hostility and otherization since the statehood. The basic motivation of the doctrine is to wipe off Israel's enemies via an overwhelming military force. This acceptance carries all violence tools to the conflict frame. When considered from this point, it can be said that the doctrine is not sensitive on universally adopted military necessity and discrimination of non-combatants from combatants, but solely focuses on Israel's political/military interests and expectations. Therefore, it can be concluded that the doctrine with its destructive impact will always have potential to find a position in Israel's security agenda. This inference is also in sync with Israel's practice of collective punishment.

Taking this association into consideration, it can be asserted that the doctrine may remain in force as a military method unless the terrorist organizations' attitude against Israel is changed and until Israel finds a more effective method than the doctrine. In addition, it can be foreseen that all disproportion-oriented operations which are insensitive to discriminate non-combatants have potential of conversion into Dahiya doctrine. Israel's proximity to the regions that have strong feeling of hostility facilitates the doctrine come to the stage again. But, on the other hand, re-stage of the doctrine will strongly depend on persuading international public opinion (or leading actors) about Israel's security fragility and on cyclical convenience. Because the re-stage quest of the doctrine will reveal a perception management process, any Israeli effort in this direction may be diagnosed as a new re-execution seeking.

It can be said that the doctrine has improved the militaristic point of view in context of security claim through mistakes and achievements even though it has many problematic aspects, and that the doctrine has accumulated precious experiences for future security policy even if it has costed a lot. Experience accumulation is not only on its own, but also it is for other countries that need to fight against insurgency movements in build-up areas. They will learn lessons from what Israel has done good or bad. In the event that other countries carry the doctrine's or its near practice into their fighting field, Israel will have chance to defend its thesis. Due to this fact, it can be claimed that Israel will share its positive experiences in order to encourage them.

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