

KADDAFİ SONRASI LİBYA'NIN GÜVENLİK DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

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ÖZ

Kaddafi sonrası Libya politik istikrarsızlık, ekonomik çöküş ve iç savaşla şekillenmiştir. Birbirine rakip Şafak Operasyonu ve Onur Operasyonu, 2011 sonrası hiçbir grubun tek başına otorite sağlayamaması üzerine birbiriyle savaşmaktadır. Bu hükümetlerin hiçbiri devlet olma gerekliliklerini yerine getirememekte ve Libya'nın nüfusunda memnuniyetsizliğe yol açmaktadır. Cihadist gruplar, bu memnuniyetsizlik ve Libya'nın parçalanmış yapısından yararlanmışlardır. Libya'nın geçirgen sınırları cihadist grupların yabancı cihadistleri Libya'da kullanmasının önünü açmıştır. En güçlü ve en tehditkâr cihadist terörist grup IŞİD, Irak ve Suriye'den sonra Libya'da da bir merkez kurmuştur. Libya'dan, Kuzey Afrika'daki diğer ülkeleri ve Avrupa'yı tehdit etmektedir. Aralık 2016'da Sirte'deki üssünden kovulmasına rağmen, IŞİD'in militanları yakalanamamış veya öldürülememiştir. Yeniden güçlenip Sirte'yi alana kadar, ülkenin ortasındaki çölde saklanarak düşük bir profil göstermektedir. Terörizm tehdidinin yanında Libya'nın sınırları üzerindeki kontrol kaybı Libya'yı, Sahra-altı Afrika, Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'dan gelen göçmenler için transit bir göç merkezi yapmıştır. Bu durum Suriye'den gelen göçlerle sarsılan Avrupa için bir tehdit arz etmektedir. Terörizm ve göçmen tehditlerine karşı, Avrupa Birliği Libya'da istikrarı sağlamak ve göçlerin önünü kesmek için politik, ekonomik ve sosyal önlemler almaktadır. Fakat Libya'da politik istikrarsızlığı bitirecek, tüm tarafları içerecek bir hükümet kurma deneyimi başarılı olamamıştır; bu yüzden istikrarsızlık ve iç savaş devam etmektedir. Daha da önemli olarak, IŞİD'in Libya'daki varlığı Libya'daki güvenlik durumunu kötüleştirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Libya, Güvenlik, İslam Devleti, Avrupa Birliği

Jel Kodu: H56, R50

ASSESSING SECURITY OF POST-GADDAFI LIBYA

ABSTRACT

Post-Gaddafi Libya is characterized by political instability, economic collapse, and civil war. The rival governments Operation Dawn and Operation Dignity have been fighting with each other as no single group effectively succeeded in establishing authority since 2011. None of these

governments fulfill basic requirements of being a government, leading to dissatisfaction among Libyan population. Jihadist terrorist groups have taken advantage of this dissatisfaction emanated from Libya's fragmented situation. Libya's porous borders enable these groups to recruit foreign jihadists. ISIL the most powerful and threatening jihadist terrorist group, establish a base in Libya after Syria and Iraq. From Libya, it threatens North African countries and Europe. Although ISIL was driven out of Sirte in December 2015, its militants were neither captured nor killed. ISIL keeps low profile by hiding in desert in middle part of the country to regain its strength to recapture Sirte again. In addition to terrorism threat, Libya's loss of control over borders made Libya a transit country. The migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and the North Africa migrate to Europe by using Libya. This also threatens Europe whose stability had already been shaken by migrants coming from Syria. To counter terrorism and migrant threat, the EU tried to initiate political, economic, and social measures to provide stability in Libya to reduce flow of migrants. The creation of unity government that is supposed to bring political stability, however, failed so the instability and civil war in Libya still continues. More importantly, ISIL presence worsens security situation in Libya.

Keywords: Libya, Security, Islamic State, European Union

Jel Codes: H56, R50

INTRODUCTION

Arab Spring, which has started in 2010 led to collapse of several authoritarian regimes across North Africa and the Middle East. New structures after Arab Spring have emerged in the context of transnational ethnic, sectarian, and tribal conflicts. These conflicts prevented any of the groups from establishing authority in their respective territories. This power vacuum diminished the border controls of the countries that experienced Arab Spring. In this new environment, as a result of loosening border controls, spread of terrorist activities, and massive immigration are posing security threats especially neighboring countries and Europe.

This study attempts to analyze post-Gaddafi Libya security situation after the central government had collapsed. Libya's northern part has been ravaged by civil war between Operation Dignity led by retired general Khalifa Hifter and Operation Dawn organized by Islamist groups and Misratan groups. Taking advantage of this civil war, ISIL gained a stronghold in Sirte. Although ISIL has been defeated, the fragmentation in the northern part, which produces human resources for extremist groups still continues. Another element which increases Libya's security risks is the erosion of southern borders. Extremist groups located in Nigeria and Mali contribute to instability by providing human resources to fighting groups in Libya without encountering any resistance at borders. Furthermore, the erosion of Libya's southern borders made Libya as a transit country for African migrants. This massive migration poses threat to Europe, have already been shaken by Syrian migrants, as much as terrorism threat.

Libya with its fragmented nature needs foreign assistance in structuring its security strategy. The European Union affected by the instability in Libya is the most important international organization which participates in Libya's political restructuring. According to the EU, security is achieved economic and political stability. Economically, the EU concentrated on precautions which prevent complete collapse of Libyan economy including providing financial assistance and development of health and education system. Yet, the implementation of these points depends on political stability. Politically, the EU defends a federal structure which would include different political groups and tribes. The ability of this administration can only be realized by a decisive international coalition which would provide military support in case it is needed.

THE CONSTELLATION OF SECURITY IN GLOBALIZATION

The most important architecture for the new agenda of security is globalization. In post-Cold War international setting, the threat of nuclear destruction has given way to new threats. Nationalist, ethnic, religious, and separatist movements manifested in terrorist activities are growing concern. Drug trafficking, organized crime, and regional conflicts are becoming universal in scope as the world is more interconnected (Ivanov, 2003). Borders are avoided and bypassed by the transnational networked forces. States also bypass borders to fight with these forces (Germond, 2010:208).

In post-Cold War, reconceptualization of security is experienced on two axes coupled with a dynamic of globalization. Firstly, threatened object changes in that not only the states, but also, more deeply into the states, societies and the individuals and, outside the states, the regional institutions (such as the EU) or the international system as a whole are being threatened. Secondly, threatening object changes in that the traditional conceptions of defense to include various new threats which are not exclusively military. Threats are born and proliferate beyond one's external boundary (Germond, 2015:13).

Thus, the world is interdependent in diverse areas such as economic security infectious diseases, terrorism, climate change and the environment, governance and military conflict; and that its very dynamic nature has moved beyond the mere protection of a state's territorial integrity and sovereignty to sensitive issues like inter-state's cohesion in fighting various global vice. A striking example of this interconnectedness is how a failed state's inability to contain infectious disease in its borders can infringe the security to even powerful states (Kapuwa, 2012:57). These failed states provide ground for terrorist groups to flourish. Failed states that cannot provide jobs and food for their people, that have provided the parts of territories to warlords, and that can no longer track or control their borders send an invitation to terrorists(The New York Times, 2005). In addition to terrorism, failed states are linked with destabilizing migration to

neighboring countries as it had happened in 1980s and 1990s in the case of Afghan refugee flow in Pakistan (Newman, 2009:429).

The next chapter will present Libya's security environment after the revolution that toppled Muammar Gaddafi. Libya shows the characteristics of a failed state in which the monopoly of state authority has dissolved, different warlords claim political authority, jihadist groups operate, and terrorist organizations conduct attacks. Its porous borders enable flow of refugees from sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East as well as Libya to enter into Europe.

LIBYA AFTER THE OUSTER OF GADDAFI

A defining aspect of the Libyan revolution was the emergence of local power centers. The National Transitional Council (NTC) established after the revolution was ineffective in providing unity. Its leadership proved to be insufficient to manage various competing tribes. The main reason for this weakness was while attempting to gain international recognition, the NTC invested less effort in coordinating and supporting local forces. In Misrata and Bingazi dozens of different groups composed of civilians and led by local notables emerged. The loyalties of these brigades lay firstly with their own tribes and cities. Several brigades that fought on eastern front were recruited from people who were close to Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which had led an insurgency against the regime during the 1990s and had a base in the north-eastern cities of Darnah and Bayda (Lacher, 2012:167). The Failed State Index for the year 2012-2013 reflected dim situation concerning governance capacity in Libya. The Libyan interim government entered the list of 60 failed countries (Buera, 2015:112).

Max Weber defines state as a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of force within a given territory (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:2). However, the armed force in Libya after the revolution is categorized as hybrid. Because of its weak control the NTC tried to establish a measure of control over the armed groups by putting them on its payroll. But this arrangement has impeded the development of the national army. The armed groups were even more emboldened to pursue self-serving and political agendas (Wehrey, 2014). Fractured and self-serving political agendas brought about division of political authority. In Libya, tribal clashes have been frequent after the toppling Gaddafi. Berber and black Africans continue to clash with Arab tribes in the center and south of Libya, vying for control of the towns and outposts. These conflicts proliferated in the absence of Gaddafi's iron fist, which was suppressing the traditional tribal rivalries and local identities (Shkolnik, 2012:4).

The division that had existed after the revolution increased when retired General Khalifa Hifter's launch of his campaign, Operation Dignity, which aimed at eliminating terrorist movement first in Benghazi and later in all of Libya. Hifter's Operation Dignity has faced enormous resistance. Dignity's

opponents were Libya's Islamists, militias based in the western coastal city of Misrata, which saw the Dignity offensive as a thinly-veiled attempt to shift the balance of power in Libya in favor of former Gaddafi officials. Islamist-Misrata bloc launched offensive, known as Operation Dawn, in Tripoli against militia factions from the western city of Zintan that had aligned themselves with Operation Dignity (Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, 2015:11). Civil war erupted between Operation Dignity a coalition of eastern tribes, federalists and disaffected military units; and Operation Dawn, an alliance of Islamist forces aligned with armed groups from Misrata (Wehrey, 2014). In addition to this partition, Libya's Fezzan region located in the southwestern Libya is not controlled by Operation Dawn or Operation Dignity. Tribal warfare has expanded and become a zero-sum game. The absence of governmental authority led to proliferation of arms, alcohol, drugs in Fezzan region. These activities provide financial sources of illegal migration. (Abderrahmane, 2015).

Although Operation Dawn and Operation Dignity claim to control their respective areas, they are far from possessing governing capacity due to dire economic circumstances. The longer the conflict between two loosely organized political entities persists, the further Libya would deteriorate. Central Bank remained neutral and continued the payment to military and militia forces aligned with opposing sides in the internal conflicts. This attitude dried up Libya's reserves. The Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook estimated that Libya's 2015 budget deficit was 49% of GDP (Blanchard, 2016:12). The infrastructure of the country collapsed. The electricity was frequently out of service and most business was at a standstill; revenues from oil, the country's greatest asset, have dwindled by more than ninety per cent (Anderson, 2015).

Fading economy would further destabilized Libya and eroded the legitimacy of loosely established Operation Dawn and Operation Dignity. Key tribes which form these two coalitions are less likely to show loyalty if their demands are not met. For example, Ibrahim Jadran, a charismatic warlord in Eastern Libya shut down three of region's four oil ports, announcing the formation of his own oil company as his group's self-declared government of Cyrenaica, an ancient Roman province of eastern Libya (Daragahi, 2013). In such a setting, the rise of terrorist and extremist groups became more likely. Ansar Al-Sharia, Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, Derna Mujahidin Shura Council, Ajdabiya Revolutionary Shura Council are among these groups. The most dangerous group increasing its activities in Libya is the Islamic State which expanded its geographical base in Iraq and Syria with the collapse of state authority in these countries. It took advantage of lack of governance in Libya and established a base in Libya.

THE RISE AND FALL OF ISIL IN LIBYA

Amidst civil war between Operation Dawn and Operation Dignity, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) has gained ground. ISIL named its

territories in Libya- Wilayat al-Barqah, Wilayat al-Tarabulus and Wilayat al-Fizan. Although ISIL's wilayat strategy resembles Al-Qaeda franchise strategy, there is one fundamental difference. Al Qaeda wanted to use its franchises to attack Western countries to force them to stop supporting 'apostate' Arab regimes. On the other hand, ISIL's main priority is building out its caliphate, which is evident in its famous slogan *baqiya wa tatamaddad* (remaining and expanding). ISIL has had a clear model to support this strategy: fighting locally, instituting limited governance and conducting outreach (Zelin, 2015). ISIL's territorialization strategy used in Syria and Iraq is replicated in Libya, which consists of two stages: pre- or partial territorial control and full territorial control. In the first phase of territorialization ISIL was involved in the establishment of sleeper cells, the infiltration of other groups, and the creation of front groups. After establishing physical control over a territory, ISIL raised its flag on buildings, lamp posts and anywhere in between, not only to stake its claim to the territory, but also to show it is there to stay. It controlled infrastructure, enforce its strict rule and collect taxes to reinforce its rule (Zelin, 2016:1-3).

In Libya, ISIL's strategy suggests that it has a gradual strategy to connect with jihadi networks that existed. Its recruitment endeavors have started since 2014. Reports suggest that powerful Libyan militias connected to mainstream Islamist parties had been showing signs of interest in ISIL, which could give the group access to much greater influence (Smith, 2014:5). ISIL found a fertile ground in Sirte to flourish. Sirte is the hometown of Muammar Gaddafi's tribe. Since the revolution members of Gaddafi's tribe were killed and their homes were ransacked. ISIL have recruited some of Gaddafi tribesmen and former army officers, who have become sympathetic to ISIL leadership, dispatched high level officials to Libya. A number of young Libyan fighters who were once members of the al-Battar brigade, which fought against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, were sent back to Derna to establish an ISIL base (El-Gamaty, 2016).

ISIL's campaign to seize full control of Sirte was jumpstarted on February 8, 2015, when it took over al-Nawfaliyah some ninety miles to the east. ISIL took control of the radio station, the Wataniya television studio, the immigration center, Ibn Sina Hospital, the University of Sirte and local government buildings. In late May 2015, ISIL seized al-Qardabiya Air Base and the Great Man-Made River irrigation complex; then on June 9, it took Sirte's power plant (Zelin, 2016:5-6). It encouraged foreign jihadists to migrate to Libya. Libya, thus, would serve as a both exporter and importer of foreign jihadists. In March 2015, ISIL's English online magazine *Dabiq* featured an article in which Libya had become an ideal land of *hijrah* for those who find difficulty making their way to Shām (Syria) particularly those of our brothers and sisters in Africa. The foreign fighters in Sirte comprised

nearly seventy percent of ISIL member according a Misratan intelligence official (Barr & Greenberg, 2016).

After gaining a foothold in Libya, ISIL sought to expand to Libya and other North African countries. The next target of ISIL for expansion was Misrata due to its closeness to Sirte. In May 2016, several villages and key crossroads were captured by ISIL. The mobilization of militants could slow down ISIL expansion (Al Jazeera, 2016). Even after its defeat in December 2016, ISIL continues its terrorist activities in Misrata. In September 2017, a courthouse was targeted by the ISIL, leaving 4 people dead (The National, 2017).

The jihadist writer Abu Moaz al-Barqawi wrote a post titled 'Come to the fold of the caliphate,' declaring that ISIL seeks to eliminate the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian borders; he cited the creation of the 'Euphrates Province' conjoining towns in Syria and Iraq as a precedent (Engel, 2015). According to the Tunisian authorities, up to 1,000 Tunisians are currently fighting or training in Libya (Kausch, 2015:3). ISIL militants from Libya attacked the visitors of the Bardo museum in neighboring Tunisia in 2015. Another Libyan jihadist involvement was that perpetrator of the June 2015 terror attack on a beach in Tunisia received training in Libya (Schnitt, 2015:13).

ISIL's Libyan wilayats have established networks with other wilayats in Africa. Sirte's relationship with Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiya, known as Boko Haram, is an example of Libyan ISIL's connections in Africa. Libya's ISIL had helped Boko Haram in its organization and operations. A former Nigerian militant similarly claimed that Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiya (Boko Haram) now answers to ISIL commanders in Libya. Moreover, there are allegations that Wilayat Sinai was being directed by Libyan ISIL. In February 2016, a security official in North Sinai told an Egyptian newspaper that he had intercepted phone calls between Wilayat Sinai militants that indicated that Wilayat Sinai was receiving instructions from Libya-based official (Barr & Greenberg, 2016). In September, 2015, Agila Saleh Essa Gwaider, Acting Head of State of Libya, points out rising ISIL threat the general debate of the General Assembly's: "This entity aims at stretching from Mauritania to Bangladesh and making the whole region subject to the law of the jungle, claiming it as the 'Rule of Islam'"(The United Nations, 2015).

In June 2016, Libyan forces strongly supported by France and US troops started the offensive to drive ISIL out of Sirte. Control of Sirte and its basin are of critical significance as it ranks 13th among the world's petroleum provinces and it contains 80 percent of the country's oil reserves (Plaw & Pilch, 2018). In early December, Libyan forces captured most of Sirte. Yet, all ISIL militants were neither captured nor killed. In June 2016, CIA director John Brennan told the US congress that ISIL had between 5,000 and 8,000 fighters in Libya. As a result of this offensive, only 500 militants remained in Sirte before it was captured. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian

warned that the fall of Sirte caused other ISIL militants to flee other parts of Libya (Pearson, 2016). This statistic shows that ISIL militants shifted their base to avoid annihilation. Although the capture of Sirte diminished ISIL capability in Libya, this success was a temporary one. The fragmented structure of Libya enabled ISIL to regroup and conduct its activities. In 2017, ISIL began its attempts of recapturing Sirte. It had already established a strong presence in the city of al-Nawfalya, to the east of the city, and, as of December 2017, it controls an area ranging as far south as Waddan in central Libya. According Ibrahim Mlitan, a security commander in Sirte ISIL operates in an area of 40,000 square km surrounding Sirte. The increasing threat of ISIL prompted the United States to resume its airstrikes (Plaw & Pilch, 2018). Despite US efforts, the civil war in the north continues. In this environment, IS appears to maintain its supply of people disillusioned by the ineffective power bases in Libya.

Libya's neighbors closely follow the situation in Libya and take security measures. In January 2017, Chad closed its borders with Libya, fearing an influx of jihadist. Algeria has opened a new air base to guard its frontiers. Tunisia has built a 200km earth wall along its border with Libya (The Economist, 2017). Europe, which is 400 km away, is also being threatened. The instability and erosion of borders have made Libya as the main entry point to Europe.

MIGRATION THREAT AND MEASURES TO BRING STABILITY TO LIBYA

Migration from Libya has shown differences between pre- and post-2011. The most important change is obviously in the numbers. The number of migrants passing through the central Mediterranean route increased more than four-fold from 39,800 in 2008 to 170,760 in 2014. Other migrant flows have also been diverted to Libya. Migrants from South Sudan Chad, Niger, the Horn of Africa, and Syria use Libya as a transit zone to migrate to Europe (Toaldo, 2015:2).

This was perceived as a security threat by European policy makers. In 2006, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said in an interview with Europe 1 radio some 800,000 migrants are in Libya hoping to cross to Europe (The World Bulletin, 2016). Le Derian has also expressed his concerns concerning terrorism risks of migration in an interview on French television Sunday: "When the Mediterranean weather is good, there is a risk that (IS militants) will make the crossing, mingling with migrants. It is a major risk" (The World Bulletin, 2016).

The instability in Syria and Iraq resulted in huge flow of migration to Europe which caused social and security problems for the EU in 2014 and 2015. Current instability in Libya has a potential to produce same effect. On 19 April, 2015, a shipwreck that caused over 900 people drowned, marked the symbolic start of the migrant crisis in Mediterranean. The EU Joint Foreign

and Home Affairs Council approved a ten-point plan which includes more funds and much wider area of operations, launch of anti-smuggling operation, and establishment of a new return programme for rapid return of irregular migrants (Toaldo, 2015:5).

The most important political development was the establishment of unity government brokered by the United Nations known as the Government of National Accord in December 2015. The final agreement will establish a nine-member council led by a Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj. The Presidential Council is tasked with overseeing a transition to end the political chaos and armed conflict that has plagued Libya since the fall of leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The Presidential Council calls on the international community and organization to deal with the council and to stop communicating with other groups (The Guardian, 2016). The first signs for future of GNA's authority in Libya were positive. Along Libya's western coast, 10 cities announced that they will no longer support the rebel government in Tripoli but will now support the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). The second-largest party in Operation Dawn, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party, has backed the GNA. Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj arrived at Tripoli and delivered a speech on March 30. EU member states agreed to impose sanctions on those who obstruct unity government (The Japan Times, 2016).

Yet, forces from Misrata ousted ISIL from its stronghold in Sirte after eight months of fighting. The victory of forces from Misrata against ISIL deprived GNA of popularity and legitimacy that may be gained through fighting with ISIL. Libya has now three, instead of two, weak governments. GNA, the internationally recognized one, is losing ground. Two military blocks exist: The Libyan National Army and its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter who support Tobruk based government and the Misratan fighters who back Tripoli based government (Stratfor, 2016). Still, Italy continued its collaboration with GNA in stopping migration flow. In August 2017, Italy announced that it would deploy two military ships to Libya to deter illegal migration. Italy's Parliament also passed a "code of conduct" for NGOs operating search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean by requiring NGO rescue boats take armed police onto their vessels to crack down on human smugglers (Fox & Lorenzo D'Agostino, 2017).

In addition to political and military support, the EU aids Libya in restoring effective governance and socio-economic conditions. The EU allocated €120 million in bilateral support to Libya in 37 projects across six sectors: civil society; governance; health; youth and education; migration and protection; and support to the political process, security and mediation activities through the [European Neighborhood Instrument](#) (ENI) and the [Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP). In 2017, €10 million, focusing on urgent needs in the health sector, such as maternal health, blood transfusion services, nurse training, mental health and non-

communicable disease prevention was provided. These efforts mainly aim at curbing refugee flow by improving Libya's economy. More direct funds were also allocated. The EU has mobilized €182 million on migration-related projects, €162 million under the [EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) (EUTF) and €20 million as bilateral assistance. Since 2017, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa contributed to the voluntary humanitarian return of more than 20 000 vulnerable migrants to their homes, supported with reintegration assistance in their countries of origin (European Union External Action, 2018).

CONCLUSION

Libya is one of the countries which experienced the movements which aimed at getting rid of authoritarian rulers. Muammar Gaddafi who ruled Libya over 40 years was ousted and killed. However, Libya has been ravaged by instability, fragmentation and civil war after the revolution. Currently, there exists three weak governments in northern part of Libya whereas the southern part of Libya experiences anarchy. These governments consist of various groups, and factions that sometime fight with each other.

Having taken advantage of current instability ISIL established a territorial base in Sirte in which 80 percent of Libya's oil resources exist. Although ISIL had been driven out of Sirte in 2016, it regained its strength since the fragmentation continues. ISIL now plans to retake Sirte and to spread its terrorist activities across the region. Libya's North African neighbors and Europe closely follow ISIL activities in Libya fearing that these activities continue targeting them.

Besides terrorism, flow of migrants emerged as a security threat as number of migrants arrived in Europe quadrupled since 2011. The EU took political, economic, and social measures to stop flow of migrants. The most important step was to establish a unity government backed by the United Nations. However, this government failed to gain consent of other groups that support rival governments. Thus, it only increased number of governments instead of uniting Libya. The EU also initiated financial aid and restructuring institutions which aimed at revitalizing Libya as a state. Nevertheless, the existence of multiple governments will probably undermine these efforts.

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