

RICHARD E. WAGNER: BUCHANAN'IN BİLİMSEL KİŞİLİĞİNİN SADIK VÂRİSİ*

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Giriş

2025 yılı başında editörlüğünü yaptığım iki ayrı derginin iki ayrı sayısını 20. Yüzyılın en önemli politik iktisatçılarından biri olarak gördüğüm Nobel Ekonomi ödülü sahibi James M. Buchanan'a ayırdık:

Opera Omnia James M. Buchanan

Buchanan'ın meslektaşları ve öğrencileri ile yapılan söyleşiler

Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi

<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/hiad/issue/93774>

Opera Omnia James M. Buchanan

Buchanan'ın sosyal bilimlerin muhtelif alanlarına yaptığı katkıları özetleyen makaleler ve tercümeleler

Ekonomi Bilimleri Dergisi

<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ebd/issue/92371>

Bu iki birbirini tamamlayan proje kapsamında Buchanan'ın akademik kariyeri boyunca öğrencisi olan, aynı kurumda uzun yıllar meslektaşı olarak görev yapan ve birlikte ortak yazarlık yapan Richard E. Wagner'e de yer verdik. Wagner'le bir

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söyleşi gerçekleştirildi,² ilave olarak Buchanan ile birlikte kaleme aldığı bazı çalışmaları Türkçe'ye tercüme edildi.³

Opera Omnia James M. Buchanan adını verdiğimiz proje kapsamında Wagner ve Buchanan arasındaki yarım asırlık akademik dostluğu kaleme almanın tarihe bir not düşmek anlamında değerli olabileceğini düşündüm. Bu kısa blog yazısının amacı Buchanan-Wagner vefalı birlikteliğine vurgu yapmaktan ibarettir. Hiç şüphesiz Richard E. Wagner akademik yaşamı boyunca kamu maliyesi ve kamu tercihi alanlarına yaptığı katkıları dolayısıyla hakkında kapsamlı bir makale ve hatta kitap yazılmasını fazlasıyla hak etmektedir.⁴ Wagner'i Buchanan'ın gölgesinde kalmış bir akademisyen olarak görmek yanlış olur. Richard E. Wagner 1963 yılından bugüne yaklaşık 60 yıl boyunca idari görevler yapmasına rağmen akademik verimliliğini düşürmeyen üretken bir bilim insanıdır ve sosyal bilimlerin birçok alanına önemli katkılar sunmuştur.

Wagner: Kısa Biyografi

Richard E. Wagner, 28 Nisan 1941'de Jamestown'da (Kuzey Dakota) doğdu. 1958'de Fullerton'daki liseden mezun olana kadar çeşitli devlet okullarına gitti. Sonraki birkaç yılını ABD ordusunda görev yaparak geçirdi. 1963 yılında Güney Kaliforniya Üniversitesi'nde ekonomi bölümünden mezun oldu. Aynı yıl Virginia Üniversitesi'nde lisans üstü eğitimine başladı ve 1966 yılında bu üniversite'den James M. Buchanan'ın danışmanlığında doktora derecesi aldı. Irvine'deki Kaliforniya Üniversitesi, Tulane Üniversitesi, Virginia Politeknik Enstitüsü, Auburn Üniversitesi, Florida Eyalet Üniversitesi'nde görev yaptı.

² Özkan, A. 2025. "Richard E. Wagner ile James M. Buchanan'ın Kamu Borçlanmasına Katkıları ve Mali Muhafazakarlık İlkesi Üzerine Bir Söyleşi". Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi, 17(3), 18-22.

³ Buchanan J.M. and R.E. Wagner, 2025. "Mali Muhafazakarlık (Eski Zaman Mali İnanışı)". (Tercüme Eden: A. Özkan), Ekonomi Bilimleri Dergisi, 17(3), 1-14. ; Buchanan J.M. and R.E. Wagner, 2025. "Mali İlkelere Dönüş". (Tercüme Eden: A. Özkan), Ekonomi Bilimleri Dergisi, 17(3), 15-27. ; Buchanan J.M. and R.E. Wagner, 2025. "Keynezyen Maliye Ve Fonksiyonel Maliye: Yeni İncanın Yayılışı". (Tercüme Eden: A. Özkan), Ekonomi Bilimleri Dergisi, 17(3), 28-57.

⁴ 2023 yılında yayınlanan bu kitap Wagner'in kamu maliyesi, kamu ekonomisi, kamu tercihi, anayasal politik iktisat alanlarına yaptığı katkıları takdir eden bir çalışmadır. Bkz. Boettke P.J., Coyne C.E., 2023. (eds) *The Legacy of Richard Wagner*. Fairfax, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University. *Advanced Studies In Political Economy*.

1988'de George Mason Üniversitesi'nde Holbert L. Harris Ekonomi Profesörü oldu. 1989-95 yılları arasında Ekonomi Bölümü Başkanlığı ve 1998-2004 yılları arasında Lisansüstü Çalışmalar Direktörlüğü görevlerinde bulundu ve bu görevi 2006-2012 yılları arasında ikinci kez üstlendi. 2022 yılında emekli oluncaya değin George Mason Üniversitesi, Ekonomi Bölümü'nde çalıştı.

Bugüne kadar, kamu maliyesi, kamu tercihi, hukuk ve iktisat ve iktisadi düşünceler tarihi gibi alanlarda yirmiden fazla kitap ve akademik dergilerde 200'den fazla makale yayınladı. 2023 yılında Universidad Francisco Marroquín (UFM) Wagner'e sosyal bilimler alanında bu bilim kurumunun en büyük ödülü olan fahri doktora unvanını verdi.

Wagner American Economic Review, the Journal of Law and Economics, Kyklos, Public Choice, the Journal of Monetary Economics, the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, the National Tax Journal, the Policy Studies Journal, the Cato Journal, the European Journal of Law and Economics, Constitutional Political Economy, the Journal of Law and Politics, the Review of Austrian Economics, Regulation, Critical Review, the Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Public Finance Review, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, the Journal of Institutional Economics, the Review of Political Economy, and The American Journal of Economics and Sociology gibi dergilerde makaleler yayınladı.

Öte yandan 1989-1997 yılları arasında Constitutional Political Economy adlı derginin ortak-editörlüğü görevini sürdürdü.

Buchanan'ın Bilimsel Kişiliğinin Sadık Vârisi

“Kendimi Buchanan’ın ilim ehli kişiliğinin minnettar bir mirasçısı olarak görüyorum.”

“I consider myself a grateful inheritor of his scholarly being.”⁵

Richard E. Wagner

Buchanan'ın öğrencileri ve meslektaşları arasında belki de en uzun süre birlikte çalıştığı ve birlikte kitap ve makaleler kaleme aldığı akademisyen Richard E. Wagner olmuştur. Buchanan ve Wagner arasındaki hoca-öğrenci, ortak yazar ve

⁵ Wagner, R.E. 2013. “James M. Buchanan and Me: Reminiscing about a 50-Year Association”, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 31: s.59.

meslektaş ilişkisi tam tamına 50 yıl sürdü. 1963 yılında başlayan birliktelik Buchanan'ın vefat ettiği 2013 yılına değin devam etti. Wagner Güney Kaliforniya Üniversitesi'nde ekonomi bölümünden mezun olduktan sonra Buchanan'ın görev yaptığı Virginia Üniversitesi'nde doktora eğitimine başladı. 1966 yılında mezun olduktan sonra altı yıl Virginia Politeknik Enstitüsü'nde (1973-79) ve 25 yıl George Mason Üniversitesi'nde (1988-2013) Buchanan ile birlikte çalıştılar.

Wagner doktora derecesini aldıktan hemen sonraki yıl James M. Buchanan ile birlikte *Demokratik Toplumda Kamu Borçları* adını taşıyan bir monografi yayınladı.⁶ Bu kısa ama önemli kitapta devlet borçlanmasının olumsuz etkileri analiz edildi. 1970'li yıllarda ise Buchanan ve Wagner John Maynard Keynes, keynezyen iktisatçılar ve fonksiyonel maliyecilerin maliye politikası yaklaşımlarını ağır bir dille eleştiren kitap ve makaleler yayınladılar.⁷ Buchanan ve Wagner'in ortak yazılarını içeren *Anayasal Demokraside Mali Sorumluluk* adını taşıyan kitabı ise Keynezyen iktisadın iradi-ihiyari, takdiri maliye politikalarını eleştiren ve buna alternatif olarak anayasal maliye politikası önerileri içeren çok kıymetli çalışmalardan oluşmaktadır.⁸

Buchanan ve Wagner kamu borçlanma sorununu esasen Keynezyenlerin "müdahaleci devlet" anlayışına ve denk bütçe ilkesini erozyona uğratan açık bütçe politikalarına bağlamaktadır. Yazarlar birlikte kaleme aldığı "*Bay Keynes'in Sonuçları*" başlığını taşıyan monografıta şunları yazmaktadır (Buchanan ve Wagner, 1978:27):

"Entelektüel hata bütünüyle politikacılar tarafından yapılmış değildir. Hatadan aynı zamanda iktisatçılar da sorumludur. Önemli bir sorumluluk taşınması gereken 'akademik yazar', düşünceleri hem Amerika'da hem de İngiltere'de yerleşik ekonomistler tarafından eleştirel olmayan bir şekilde kabul edilen Lord Keynes'tir. Keynes'in fikirlerinin kötü etkilerine dair artan tarihsel kanıtlar görmezden gelinmeye devam edemez. Keynezyen iktisat politikacıların harcama ve vergi koyma zorunluluğu olmadan

⁶ Buchanan, J. M. & R.E. Wagner, 1967. Public Debt in a Democratic Society, Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

⁷ Buchanan, J. M. & R.E. 1977. Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. New York: Academic Press. ; Buchanan, J. M., R.E. Wagner and J. Burton, 1978. The Consequences of Mr. Keynes, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

⁸ Buchanan, J. M. & R.E. Wagner, 1978. Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy, Leiden: Martinus Nijhof.

harcama yapma yönündeki olağan istekleri üzerindeki etkili kısıtlamayı ortadan kaldırdı ve onları sorumsuzluğa sevk etti. Soğukkanlı bir değerlendirme, Keynezyenizmin siyasi açıdan uzun vadede demokrasinin bekası için ölümcül olabilecek önemli bir hastalığı temsil ettiğini göstermektedir.”

Wagner ve Buchanan bu ifadelerini kaleme aldıkları kitap ve makalelerinde oldukça etkili argümanlar ve sert eleştirilerle dile getirmişlerdir.

Öte yandan Wagner’in Keynezyen açık bütçe politikası, mali disiplin ve mali sorumluluk ahlakından uzak borçlanma politikası, refah devleti ve sosyal transferlerin olumsuz sonuçları üzerine kaleme aldığı çalışmaların çok önemli olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Wagner’in Buchanan ile birlikte olan akademik dostluğu Buchanan’ın vefatına kadar sürmüş olmasına rağmen ikili arasındaki akademik yazarlık serüveni maalesef çok uzun süreli olmamıştır. Wagner 1980’li yıllardan itibaren Buchanan’ın çizgisinde ve fakat kendine ait özgürlük alanında çalışmalarını sürdürmüştür.

Richard Wagner yaklaşık 50 yıllık kamu maliyesi/kamu tercihi kariyerine 2010’lı yılların başlarından itibaren *Bütünsel Politik İktisat (Entangled Political Economy)*⁹ adını verdiği bir yeni araştırma programını dâhil etmiştir. 2020 yılında kurulan *the Entangled Political Economy Research Network (EPERN)*¹⁰ *Bütünsel Politik İktisat* üzerine yapılan araştırma çalışmalarını teşvik amacına yönelik bir girişimdir. Neoklasik paradigmaya meydan okuyan bu oluşum Adam Smith ve Carl Menger’e kadar uzanan bir politik iktisat geleneğinden esinlenerek karmaşıklık, mübadele, koordinasyon, evrim ve ağ teorilerinde bulunan içgörülerden yararlanarak, iç içe geçmiş politik iktisat çalışmalarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu yeni araştırma programı klasik politik iktisat temeline dayalı Evrimci Kurumsal İktisat (Evolutionary

⁹ “*Entangled Political Economy*” kavramının Türkçe’ye “*Bütünsel Politik İktisat*” olarak tercüme edilmesinin doğru olmadığı ya da eksik olduğunun farkındayım. Fakat daha uygun bir karşılık bulmakta zorlanıyorum. “*İç İçe Geçmiş Politik İktisat*” ya da “*Bütünselik Politik İktisat*” şeklinde ifadeler de Türkçe açısından kulağa çok hoş gelmiyor. Wagner bu alanı “karma ekonomi” dışında bir kavram olarak ele almaktadır. Bkz. Tuszynski, M.P. and R. E. Wagner. 2015. “From Mixed Economy to Entangled Political Economy: A Paretian Social-Theoretic Orientation.” *Public Choice* 164 no. 2. 103-116.

¹⁰ <https://www.entangledpoliticaleconomy.org/our-network>

Institutional Economics), Avusturya İktisat Okulu ve Virginia Politik İktisat Okulu öğretilerinin ilke ve metodolojilerini kullanarak piyasa ve devlet gibi mübadele kurumlarındaki mübadele, etkileşim, koordinasyon ve çatışma alanlarını analiz etmektedir.

Bütünsel Politik İktisat, Wagner tarafından sosyal koordinasyonun anlaşılmasını sağlamak ve ekonomiyi sadece pazar (piyasa) olarak değil, toplum çalışması olarak yeniden kurmak için geliştirilen bir araştırma çerçevesidir.¹¹ Bu çerçeve, bireyleri, özel ve kamu sektörlerini, rekabetçi ve işbirlikçi boyutlar boyunca iç içe geçmiş olarak kurumlar olarak ele alır. Bütünsel politik İktisat ve ortodoks politik İktisat arasındaki temel farklar Wagner tarafından şu şekilde özetlenmektedir:¹²

“Ortodoks çerçevede siyaset ekonomi dışındadır; alternatif çerçevede ise ikisi birbirinin içinde yer alır. Ortodoks çerçeve, ekonomiyi rasyonel tercih bilimi olarak ele alır; bu çerçevede toplum, insanların piyasaya girdi sağlamak ve piyasadan ürün almak için hareket ettikleri aktörler olarak görülür. Alternatif çerçeve ise ekonomiyi, nesnel toplum olan gerçek bir sosyal bilim olarak ele alır. Ortodoks çerçeve, evrensel bir fayda fonksiyonu aracılığıyla kaliteyi niceliğe indirger; alternatif çerçeve niteliğe daha önem verir. Bütünsel politik İktisat eski bir kavramdır ve yeni değildir. Bu kavram, ekonomiyi dengeli bir toplumda bireysel eylem bilimi olarak ele almak yerine, bir sosyal bilim olarak ele alır.”

İktisadi düşünceler tarihinde belki de ileride *Wagneryan Politik İktisat* adı verilecek olan bu programa bir yer var mı onu bilemiyorum, onu zaman gösterecektir. Ben şahsen İktisatta disiplin çoğaltma eğilimlerinin bir eleştirmeni olduğumu da burada

¹¹ Wagner, R. E. 2016. *Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar ; Ayrıca bkz. Tuszynski, M.P. and R. E. Wagner. 2015. “From Mixed Economy to Entangled Political Economy: A Paretian Social-Theoretic Orientation.” *Public Choice* 164 no. 2. 103-116.

¹² Wagner, R. E. 2014. “Entangled Political Economy: A Keynote Address.” *Advances in Austrian Economics* 18. 15-36, s. 20. Wagner 2024 yılında *Akıl, İdeoloji ve Demokrasi: Karmaşık Politik Ekonomi Üzerine Bir İnceleme* adını taşıyan bir de kitap yayınlamıştır. Bkz. Wagner, R.A. and Tuszynski, M.P. 2024. *Reason, Ideology, and Democracy: A Study in Entangled Political Economy*. Cham, Switzerland. Palgrave Macmillan.

not etmek isterim.¹³ İktisatçıların kendilerince önemli isimler keşfettiklerini sanarak disiplin üretmelerini çok da doğru bulmuyorum.¹⁴

Wagner'in Kaleminden Buchanan'la 50 Yıllık Akademik Dostluk

“Jim Buchanan kendini akademik dünyaya adanmışlık ve coşkuyla adadı, öğrencilerinin ve meslektaşlarının da aynısını yapmasına yardımcı olmakla ilgilendi.”

Richard E. Wagner

Wagner Buchanan'ın vefat ettiği yıl kaleme aldığı bir makalesinde onun öğretmen ve araştırmacı kişiliğine dair düşüncelerini paylaştı. Bir öğrencisi olarak 50 yıl öncesinde sınıfta gözlemediği Buchanan'ı şu sözlerle anlatıyordu:

“Buchanan bir marangoz olsaydı, sınıf onun atölyesi olurdu. Öğrenciler, Jim'i iş başında izleyerek, onun yaptıklarını taklit ederek ve kendi yapılarını oluşturarak ondan öğrenmek için orada bulunan çıraklar olurdu. Dinleyerek ve izleyerek değil, yaparak öğrenirdiniz. Elbette, biraz dinler ve izlerdiniz, ama önemli olan yapmaktı. Sınıfta size çivi çakmayı, tahtayı düzleştirmeyi veya yaptığınız kalıplar için açi kesmeyi göstermezdi. Bunları kendi başınıza pratik yapabiliirdiniz. Bu tekniklerin temellerini sınıf dışında öğreneceğinizi varsayardı. Öğrenciler, Jim'den yayınlanabilir eserler oluşturmayı öğrenmek için orada bulunan çıraklardı. (...) O her zaman ileriye bakardı ve Jim'in ileriye dönük vurgusu, Charlottesville'deki o günlerden beri benimle birlikte olan bir şeydir. (...) Buchanan, beni büyük ölçüde etkileyen bilimsel yazıları ile dünya çapında tanınmaktadır, ancak ben onun öğretim faaliyetleri boyunca sergilediği örneklerden de büyük

¹³ Aktan, C.C. 2023. Kaotik İktisat: "İktisat Enflasyonu" ve İktisadın Alt-Disiplinlerinde Anormal Çoğalma”, RG Preprint.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381297313_KAOTIK_IKTISAT_Iktisat_Enflasyonu_ve_Iktisadin_Alt-Disiplinlerinde_Anormal_Cogalma

¹⁴ Wagner'in 60 yıllık başarılı kariyerinin ardından Kamu Maliyesi, Kamu Tercihi ve Anayasal Politik İktisat alanlarından bir ölçüde ayrılarak 2010'lı yılların ortalarından itibaren “Entangled Political Economy” adıyla bir araştırma alanına yönelik çalışmalarını doğrusu öğrenmeye ve anlamaya çalışıyorum. Richard Wagner'in tez danışmanlığını yürüttüğü bazı genç akademisyenlerin Wagner'i etkilediğini düşünüyorum ve doğrusu bunu biraz “boş heves” olarak görüyorum.

ölçüde etkilendim. Bu örnekler, sınıfta başlayan ve onun danışmanlığında yazdığım doktora tezi ile sona eren bir süreçti.”¹⁵

Wagner yazısında Jim Buchanan’ın hayatında çok önemli bir figür olduğunu, birçok yönden gözlem ve etkileşim yoluyla ondan edindiği bilgi ve tecrübeyi ileriye taşıdığını not etmektedir.

Richard Wagner Buchanan ve Virginia Politik İktisat Okulu üzerine kaleme aldığı birçok makalesinin dışında 2017 yılında *James M. Buchanan ve Liberal Politik İktisat* adını taşıyan kapsamlı bir kitap yayınladı. 2019 yılında ise yaklaşık 1000 kusura sayfadan oluşan editoryal kitap (*James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy*) içerisinde akademisyenlerin Buchanan üzerine yazılarını bir araya getirdi. Wagner kitabın hemen başında kaleme aldığı yazısında Buchanan’ın sosyal bilimler alanında bir bilge olduğunu anlatarak Buchanan takdir ve övgülerini sundu.¹⁶

Wagner’e Takdir ve Saygı

Richard E. Wagner ile 1987 yılının Kasım ayında tanıştım. Henüz 24 yaşındaydım; birkaç İngilizce kelimeyi bir araya getirip doğru dürüst bir cümle kuramadığım için Kamu Tercih Merkezi’nin kıdemli araştırmacıları ile karşılaştığımda hep mahcup ve utangaçtım. *Brown Bag Luncheon* toplantılarında da soru sormadığım ve katkı sunmadığım için kendimi hep ezik hissettim. Merkez’de çalışan kompleksli ve egosu yüksek akademisyenlerden hep uzak kalmaya çalıştım. Buchanan, Betty Tillman, Viktor Vanberg, Richard Wagner ve diğer bazıları katıyen böyle değillerdi; mütevazı, hoş görülü ve karşısındaki kişiye nezaketle yaklaşan kişilerdi. Wagner’le birkaç küçük sohbetim dışında ve güler yüzle selamlaşma dışında bir diyalogum ve iş birliğim olmadı. Bununla birlikte Wagner’in Buchanan’la birlikte ve tek yazarlı olarak kaleme aldığı kitap ve makalelerden tüm akademik kariyerim boyunca geniş ölçüde istifade ettim.

¹⁵ Wagner, R.E. 2013. “James M. Buchanan and Me: Reminiscing about a 50-Year Association”, *Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice* 31: 43-59.

¹⁶ Wagner, R. E. 2019. “Who was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant? In: James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, ed. by Richard E. Wagner. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1-9.

Çalışmamın başında da ifade ettiğim üzere kaleme aldığım bu kısa yazı *Buchanan Opera Omnia* projesine bir katkı olarak hazırlanmıştır ve ana amacı münhasıran Wagner'in bilimsel kişiliğine ve katkılarına hasredilmiş değildir.

Buchanan'ın öğrencisi, meslektaşı ve ortak yazarı olarak Wagner'i Buchanan'ın vefalı dostlarından birisi ve Kamu Tercih Okulu'nun önemli bir teorisyeni olarak görüyorum.

EK. RICHARD E. WAGNER: BİBLİYOGRAFYA (1966-2025)

Kitap ve Monografiler

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