

A “POLITICAL” THEORY OF ISLAMOPHOBIA: A GHOST BEDHSEET BEYOND THE MINORITY AND MAJORITY*

Sümeyye SAKARYA**

Abstract

Although Islamophobia has received considerable attention in recent studies, these studies have rarely discussed Islamophobia in Muslim societies. While one of the reasons for this is the essentialisation of identities, the other one is the under-theorisation of Islamophobia. This paper argues that these reasons are the symptoms of the failure to recognise the primacy of the political. This failure leads to under-theorisation by confining Islamophobia to case studies, predominantly “Muslim minority” experiences where antagonism, therefore the political nature, is clear and mainly between Muslims and non-Muslims. As a result, the theoretical tools developed based on them cannot explain the “Muslim majority” or unprecedented instances where antagonism operates differently and goes unnoticed. It is unnoticed because the neglect of the political inhibits the comprehension of political identities in the Islamic context by reducing Muslimness to a depoliticised subjectivity, which causes the conviction that Muslims cannot be Islamophobic. To surmount this problem, the paper initially introduces the political and what its primacy means in socio-political analysis through Ernesto Laclau’s political ontology. Then, it mobilises it to present a political theory of Islamophobia through Salman Sayyid’s definition.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Ernesto Laclau, Primacy of the Political, Salman Sayyid.

İSLAMOFOBİNİN “SİYASAL” BİR TEORİSİ: AZINLIK VE ÇOĞUNLUĞUN ÖTESİNDE BİR HAYALET ÇARŞAFI

Öz

Son yıllarda İslamofobi, akademik çalışmalarda büyük bir ilgi görmesine rağmen, bu çalışmalar, Müslüman toplumlardaki İslamofobiği nadiren ele almıştır. Bunun nedenlerinden biri kimliklerin özelleştirilmesi iken, diğeri de İslamofobinin

* This article is a revised and expanded version of the unpublished conference presentations delivered at the States of Islamophobia (Studies) Inaugural Conference and the Fourth International Conference on Islamophobia: Examining the Cultural and Geopolitical Dimensions of Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Countries.

** Assist. Prof. Dr, Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, sakaryasumeyye@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5738-0222>

yeterince teorize edilmemesidir. Bu makalede, bu nedenlerin, siyasal olanın önceliğini fark etmedeki başarısızlığın belirtileri olduğunu ileri sürülmektedir. Bu başarısızlık, İslamofobiye vaka çalışmalarıyla, ağırlıklı olarak da antagonizmanın, dolayısıyla da vakanın siyasal doğasının belirgin olduğu ve çoğunlukla da Müslümanlar ile gayrimüslimler arasında görülen “Müslüman azınlık” deneyimleriyle sınırlandırarak yetersiz teorileştirmeye yol açmaktadır. Sonuç olarak da bu çalışmalar dayanak kabul edilerek geliştirilen teorik araçlar “Müslüman çoğunluğu” ya da antagonizmanın başka şekilde işlediği ve fark edilmediği benzeri görülmemiş durumları gerektiği gibi açıklayamamaktadır. Bu durumlar fark edilememektedir zira siyasalın görmezden gelinmesi, Müslümanlığı siyasetten arındırılmış bir öznelliğe indirgeyerek İslami bağlamdaki siyasal kimliklerin anlaşılmasını engellemektedir. Bu anlaşılama hali de Müslümanların İslamofobik olamayacağı şeklindeki yaygın inanca sebep olmaktadır. Bu problemin üstesinden gelmeyi amaçlayan makalede, öncelikle Ernesto Laclau’nun ontolojisi aracılığıyla siyasal olanın ne olduğu ve siyasal olanın öncelliğinin sosyo-siyasal analizde ne anlama geldiği ayrıntılı bir şekilde izah edilmektedir. Daha sonra da Laclau’nun siyasal ontolojisi kullanılarak Salman Sayyid’in İslamofobi tanımı üzerinden İslamofobinin siyasal bir teorisi sunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamofobi, Ernesto Laclau, Siyasalın Önceliği, Salman Sayyid.

Introduction

A review of the Islamophobia scholarship reveals two prominent trends in the literature: an overwhelming interest in societies where Muslims are demographic minorities (Allen, 2011; Bayraklı & Hafez, 2022; Lean, 2012; Patel, 2017; Zempi & Awan, 2019) and an indifference toward Muslim (-majority) societies. However, the relatively recent research on it in Muslim societies (Aktay, 2010; Aslan, 2019; Bayraklı & Güngörmez, 2022; Bayraklı & Hafez, 2019; Kassem, 2023; Yel, 2022; Yel & Nas, 2014) demonstrates the global nature of the phenomenon. This recognition compels us to reconsider the current status of Islamophobia studies, as it implies the absence of the experiences of the “majority” of Muslims in the literature. This absence prevents the full comprehension of Islamophobia as a global phenomenon, one that involves interactive relations between different and sometimes dissimilar instances of it in shifting contexts.

In this paper, I undertake this reconsideration in three parts. Firstly, by reflecting on the potential reasons for the focus on “minority” cases, I identify the essentialisation of identities, which is evident in the question of whether Muslims can be Islamophobic - and under-theorisation of Islamophobia as the two fundamental problems in mainstream literature. I use essentialisation of an identity as characterisation some contingent features of an identity as its whatness and necessary features. I argue that these problems are symptoms of the disregard for the primacy of the political. A proper understanding of Islamophobia, therefore, requires us to acknowledge this primacy and develop the necessary tools for its analysis. Secondly, I introduce the concept of the

“political” and explain what its primacy means through Ernesto Laclau’s socio-political ontology. Finally, I mobilise his ontology firstly, to show the limitations of the dominant literature, then, to present a political reading/theory of Islamophobia as a ghost bedsheet¹ through the work of Salman Sayyid. I assert that Sayyid’s definition, which exemplifies this ghost bedsheet, is particularly useful for understanding “Muslim majority” cases, as reflected in his conceptualisation of Kemalism. Sayyid develops Kemalism as an analytical metaphor to describe the post-Caliphal regimes of Muslim societies and sees it as Muslim-style Islamophobia.

1. ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES IN THE CONTEXT OF MAJORITY AND MINORITY

Although it may not seem difficult to construe the focus on “Muslim minority” cases in Islamophobia studies, a reflection on the supposed normal can reveal the underlying predicaments within and in relation to it. Identifying the reasons for this focus can shed light on the neglect of Muslim societies. Also, it helps us uncover fundamental problems that need to be addressed in current scholarship. Thus, the central question becomes: why is there such an overwhelming interest in and production about Muslim minorities in Islamophobia studies? Three key features of the minority context stand out here: asymmetric power relations, which increase the number of cases; the relative ease of detecting the cases due to a high-level of sedimentation or their transparency, and the comparative ease of analysing them, again, due to the high-level of sedimentation.

Firstly, the minority-majority context *often* creates asymmetrical power relations that facilitate discrimination and antagonistic acts against minorities, particularly by individual members of the majority or its institutional representatives. As a result, such societies have countless incidences of antagonistic nature where the target is Muslim or Islamic in general, including mosques, the Qur’an alongside Muslims. This creates an abundance of “cases” for scholars, where members of the powerful majority antagonise less powerful representatives of Muslim minority. On the other hand, the mere fact that the target of the action is Islamic, for instance, a Muslim, does not automatically make the act Islamophobic. A member of the majority might antagonise a Muslim in the same way they would antagonise another member of the majority over a purely personal issue, such as failing to repay a debt or committing theft. Despite this possibility, if the antagonistic action is indeed Islamophobic, *it becomes much easier to identify it as Islamophobic*. This is the second feature of the minority context and mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, the perceived identities of both the perpetrator and the target in relation

¹ Ghost bedsheet refers to the classic ghost costume made by dropping a plain white sheet over someone to make them look like a ghost. In the popular culture, this is how a ghost becomes visible or identifiable. I use it metaphorically as a tool to identify Islamophobia.

to Islam are often more sedimented, therefore, transparent and fixed. Without much deliberation, the target is typically seen as a minority Muslim, while the perpetrator is viewed as a majority non-Muslim or its institutional representative. This transparency or overtness of identities naturalises the type of relationship between them and Islam for spectators. That naturalisation makes these identities and their interrelations more apparent to the public. For instance, an Arab or even a Sikh wearing a turban, as seen in the case of Balbir Singh Sodhi (Singh, 2012) or a woman wearing a hijab is immediately perceived as Muslim. However, a white or French perpetrator is automatically assumed to be non-Muslim. Similarly, a mosque is directly identified as Islamic, while the act of throwing a pig's head in front of a mosque by a supposed non-Muslim in a non-Muslim society is straightforwardly interpreted as an anti-Islamic act. Therefore, the minority-majority context enables more sedimented and naturalised associations between Islam and the actors in the perceptions of the public. Secondly, this naturalised affinity contributes to the contextualisation of antagonistic actions as Islamophobic. The meaning of the action becomes more fixed, leaving little room for interpretation. In other words, when antagonism is directed at a perceived Islamic identity by a perceived non-Islamic identity, with Islamophobic reasons, observers will be prone to identify the act as Islamophobic without further analysis. However, it is also important to note that "Islamophobic reasons" does not necessarily mean intentions or motivations considering the option of unawareness. To clarify, consider a contrasting case in which the perpetrator is perceived as Muslim. A notable example would be the hijab burnings by the protesters in Iran. Is it Islamophobic for Muslim women to burn a hijab in protest against the Islamic Republic? Perhaps yes, perhaps no. A similar question can be asked also hijab bans in countries like Türkiye and Bangladesh: Is it Islamophobic for Muslims to ban hijab? Again, perhaps yes, perhaps no. However, the key point is that this is not a question many would ask if a perceived non-Muslim in a "Muslim minority" society were to burn a hijab or it is banned in such a society. These examples illustrate that naturalised affinities and fixed identities, facilitated by the minority-majority context, make identifying Islamophobia easier for scholars.

Thus far, my arguments may appear to suffer circular reasoning, as I have begun with the assumption that those actions were already Islamophobic, only to conclude that they are. More importantly, I conducted this process without defining Islamophobia. However, the examples and situations I have mentioned from the minority cases are so transparently apparent and commonsensical that they may not require a definition for the public. If I state by borrowing from Heidegger's reflection on scientific inquiries, our worldliness as experience and interpretation - here about Islamophobia - gives a ground (Heidegger, 1962, p. 30). This ground provides us with the basic tools of the field we analyse - here Islamophobia. Until a "crisis" in these tools occurs - a disruption that would challenge the adequacy of our existing tools and definitions - the relationship between the analysis and its objects remains

unchallenged (Heidegger, 1962, p. 29). In this context, the need to define Islamophobia or develop entirely new theoretical frameworks is rendered unnecessary. For example, in daily life, we rarely feel the need to explicitly define a cat or a leopard, as we are generally able to identify and distinguish these animals with ease. Only when confronted with ambiguous or less obvious instances, such as a Bengal or Ashera cat, might we find it necessary to reconsider our definitions. Similarly, the extensive body of research on Islamophobia has furnished us with a sufficiently rich and nuanced conceptual toolkit to recognise and address many apparent instances. In such instances, we are not required a new definition - except, perhaps, in cases that are ambiguous and less obvious. And the minority context exhibits an abundance of occurrences of apparent nature. Therefore, scholars are not required to develop *new* theoretical tools. Conventional theories and tools are readily applied to *such cases* without the need for radically new approaches. In other words, producing research is epistemologically easy, partly explaining the surplus in minority scholarship: just choose and apply an existing good theory to current cases.

While these preliminary points may help explain the scholarly focus on minority contexts, they also offer insight, mainly two cues, into the relative lack of attention given to Muslim societies. Firstly, they demonstrate the assumption of a necessary relationship between perceived identities and their associated meanings. Nevertheless, such essentialist assumptions may do more harm than good in specific settings, leading to concealment and misrecognition (Meer, 2012). For instance, in minority cases, where the meanings are more sedimented and firmly established, there is less room for interpretation. In these contexts, the perpetrator is likely to be aware of their actions will be perceived as Islamophobic by spectators, including the target. As a result, it becomes less probable that such actions and their motivations will not be Islamophobic, since the perpetrator is likely to adjust their behaviour to avoid any such perception. Hence, having a well-established tool derived from this essentialism can be instrumental in identifying and analyse these clear-cut cases. On the other hand, this essentialist assumption can obscure more than it illuminates in contexts where meanings are less fixed or differently sedimented. The tools designed for the more straightforward cases of Islamophobia may fail to detect dissimilar ones. Therefore, the different instances will go unnoticed or be dismissed when somehow detected. Whereas undetected Islamophobic microaggressions (Sue et al., 2007) or institutionalised Islamophobia can exemplify such instances for the minority context, the relative lack of studies on “Muslim majority” contexts is another proof to this concealment.

This concealment takes us to the second cue: the under-theorisation of Islamophobia. While the scarcity of tools for dissimilar cases has already demonstrated this under-theorisation, the mentioned focus on minorities and the reasons for it help us to construe it. As stated, when sedimented and

transparent enough, things do not require further questioning, and the existing theories are sufficient. For instance, along with Islamophobia, I did not define antagonism because it was transparent enough in the given cases. On the other hand, when we encounter dissimilar occurrences that somehow remind us of or relate to those plain instances - mainly when they form a pattern as family resemblances - we start to search for ways to make sense of them. An example of such endeavour is the studies on racism in post-racial times. Since overt forms of racism, such as official or public segregation, are not welcomed in post-racial times, racism altered its forms. Therefore, a scholarship that responds to these post-racial forms of racism has emerged (Goldberg, 2015; Lentin, 2014, 2016; Tate & Bagguley, 2017). Similarly, there is a new scholarship on everyday Islamophobia and its more subtle or institutional forms beyond overt antagonistic cases (Babacan, 2023; Husain & Howard, 2017; Mamdani, 1998; Patel, 2017; Shryock, 2010; Tyrer, 2013). However, this new scholarship also primarily draws on minorities or global Islamophobia exerted by Western hegemony, such as military invasions, media representations, or international policies and reports. Thus, even when Islamophobia is studied as a global phenomenon (Allen, 2011; Sayyid & Vakil, 2010), it is often framed around Muslims *as a global minority*, with the identity of the Muslim target being relatively fixed, in contrast to the non-Muslim/non-Islamic hegemon as the perpetrator. Muslim societies, where the hegemony and perpetrator are also mostly Muslim/Islamic, are mostly excluded from the picture. As a result, theoretical works that accompany this empirical case studies remain local and symptomatic. The relations and logic of Islamophobia as a global phenomenon cannot be fully understood. Consequently, asymptomatic cases are not recognised, and Muslim societies epitomise such cases.

This discussion brings us to the question of the Muslim/Islamic perpetrator who makes the case asymptomatic: Can Muslims be Islamophobic? The existence of this question is more striking than its possible answer, since it is conditioned on the assumption that "no" can be an answer. It is striking because we do not ask whether non-Muslims can be Islamophobic. Instead, we directly assume that they can be. This difference of assumptions for Muslims and non-Muslims demonstrates essentialism and naturalisation regarding identities. The main idea behind such assumptions is that Muslims cannot be antagonistic against Islamic/Muslims. However, an abundance of experiences in Muslim societies, such as the criminalisation of hijab (Kaya Osmanbaşoğlu, 2015), closure of tariqas, and political bans for anti-secularism (Elbasani & Somer, 2015, p. 176; Gomez-Perez, 2017, pp. 187–188; Islam, 2011; Mecham, 2004, pp. 341–346), exemplify antagonism by Muslims against Islamic/Muslims. On the other hand, we rarely see that those antagonistic acts perpetrated by Muslims are regarded as Islamophobic, while similar actions committed by non-Muslims are interpreted as Islamophobic. This denial of antagonistic capacity to Muslims-*qua*-Muslims against Muslims due to their Muslimness shows the depoliticised

understanding of Muslim identity. Moreover, Islamophobic acts by Muslims further prove this depoliticised perception of Muslim identity. For, these antagonistic acts target the politicisation of Muslims by reducing their identity to private piety by depoliticising them, as exemplified by the mentioned experiences.

While those remarks, though prelude, enable us to construe the current state of Islamophobia scholarship regarding minority-majority preferences, they also shed light on its limitations. Two primary problems in these remarks are Islamophobia's under-theorisation and the essentialisation of identities. The absence of tools to detect different contexts, the inclination towards overt cases, and silence on Islamophobic antagonism by Muslims, all stem from these problems. However, these two problems are not independent of each other. If Islamophobia were theorised adequately, we would have had tools to identify and analyse it in less familiar contexts. On the other hand, if we did not essentialise identities, we could have better theorised Islamophobia by understanding identities in transforming conditions.

One way of seeing this co-dependency is by analysing these problems as symptoms of the same cause: neglecting the primacy of the political. Here, it might be argued that because all these mentioned identities, such as Muslims and non-Muslims in the minority context, are already defined through their "antagonistic" relationship in the analysis, they are inherently political. This is the case even in most general and basic sense of the "political" (Schmitt, 2007). Therefore, they cannot be essential because their identities are constructed through the enemy-friend distinction. There are two sides to this criticism, which makes it contextually right. That the conventional theories work in conventional settings, like overt minority examples, demonstrates their success in terms of understanding the political. However, their failure to address Islamophobia in other contexts reveals their limits in identifying the political, therefore, antagonism. This point relates to *the primacy of the political* rather than the political itself. For, as it will be delineated in the next section, when a form of antagonism or the political achieve normalisation, it institutes and becomes the "social". In minority contexts, even if we study antagonism between a hijab burner and hijabi, the identities of both are already established. So, we do not focus on the primary political moments where these very identities are instituted. Instead, we study their established, sedimented forms, which are social. In other words, although our analysis has a political component, as it partly focuses on antagonism, it is more a social analysis than a political one. That is because it does not need to focus on the primacy of the political. The failure to recognise this primacy confines Islamophobia to case studies, where the enemy-friend distinction, and therefore the political nature, is clear, and mainly between Muslim and non-Muslim. Then, this confinement leads to the under-theorisation mentioned earlier. As a result, the theoretical tools developed from these case studies cannot explain "Muslim majority" or unprecedented instances where the enemy-friend distinction operates

differently and goes unnoticed. It is unnoticed because the neglect of the primacy of the political inhibits the comprehension of political identities in the Islamic context by reducing Muslimness to a depoliticised piety. This depoliticised understanding of Muslim identity causes the conviction that Muslims cannot be Islamophobic. Furthermore, this understanding engenders Islamophobia by denying political agency to Muslims-qua-Muslims. Therefore, a proper understanding of Islamophobia requires us to acknowledge this primacy and then develop the necessary tools to analyse the experiences. In the following sections, I will initially introduce the concept of the “political” and what its primacy means through Ernesto Laclau’s socio-political ontology. Then, I will mobilise his ontology to present a political reading of Islamophobia through Salman Sayyid’s work.

2. THE PRIMACY OF THE POLITICAL

Although there are various approaches to the concept of the political, it is possible to identify two main currents in political theory. The first, a more positivist approach, considers the political-politics as a system determined by natural laws, foundations or an essence. However, with the 19th century, this traditional approach began to be questioned. A novel perspective emerged, which views society as an incomplete, contingent and historical phenomenon without any essence. This new approach, rejecting universal and fixed foundations, prioritises the “political” as the source and creator of change and society (Kaya, 2018, pp. 117-118; Marchart, 2007). Theorists such as Carl Schmitt (2007), Jacques Rancière (1999), Chantal Mouffe (1993, 2005) and Ernesto Laclau (2006; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) have been important names in this shift. Although their conceptualisations of the political differ, they share common patterns. For example, all define the political as a field of conflict and struggle, resulting in antagonistic relationships. Similarly, they regard the political as inherent in all social relations. Therefore, they maintain that we cannot separate the political and social entirely. More significantly, they do not consider identities as given or essential. Instead, they argue that identities are collectively constructed through political, and therefore antagonistic, processes (Kaya, 2018, p. 118).

In this paper, I employ Ernesto Laclau’s socio-political ontology, as his work provides a comprehensive framework for political analysis beyond merely defining the political. In outlining his socio-political ontology, Laclau (1990, pp. 5–41) identifies four interrelated characteristics of social relations. Firstly, they are always contingent. Secondly, they are always power relations. Thirdly, there is the primacy of the political over the social. Finally, they possess radical historicity. Laclau draws on Husserl’s distinction between sedimentation and reactivation to expand on these ideas. Husserl argues that scientific disciplines operate through routinisation by taking the results of previous scientific research for granted. In the meantime, the original investigation that generated the contemporary-routinised one is completely

forgotten. He calls routinisation and forgetting of origins “sedimentation”, while “reactivation” refers to “the recovery of the ‘constitutive’ activity of thought” (Laclau, 1990, p. 34).

Laclau states that the “moment of original institution of the social” reveals its contingency. It demonstrates that other historical options could have been instituted. Yet, the social that we know now was instituted through the repression of these alternatives. In other words, the revelation of its constituted character also reveals its contingent nature, showing that it was not necessary. Laclau (1990, p. 34) calls this moment “the terrain of the original violence, of the power relation through which that instituting act took place”. This is where the second feature, power, becomes clearer: as all objectivities are constituted by repressing what threatens them, social identities are constituted through the act of power (Laclau, 1990, pp. 31–32). Therefore, to understand the conditions of existence of any social identity, we must examine the power relations that make its existence possible. At this stage, exclusion becomes a central theme. The constitution of any identity is conditioned by what it denies. Since power is the precondition for any identity, its elimination disintegrates the social fabric. However, power is always somehow violent and creates violent hierarchies. In that sense, power both makes society possible and, paradoxically, makes it impossible. Thus, any project of emancipation is limited to transforming the “root” of the social - the types of hierarchies - rather than completely eliminating them (Laclau, 1990, pp. 32–33). Emancipation(s) can only institute another social (order) through the act of power, rather than eliminating power altogether. If the act of institution is successful, possible alternatives and the traces of the original contingency disappear, and we forget the origins. As a result, the instituted - social - order assumes the form of a mere “objective presence”. Laclau calls this the moment of sedimentation. He also states that because this objectivity is built on the exclusion of other alternatives, the disappeared traces of the exclusion are always somehow present. Yet, depending on the level of sedimentation or its completeness, the contingent nature and original dimension of power may not be immediately visible. Therefore, he concludes that objectivity is “constituted merely as presence” (Laclau, 1990, p. 34).

On the other hand, in the context of the social, reactivation as a return to origins is not an option. We cannot return to the historical antagonistic and suppressed alternatives because, in the new context, those alternatives will be different. Therefore, Laclau (1990, p. 35) states that reactivation is a rediscovery of the contingency of objectivity “through the emergence of new antagonisms”. That way, rediscovery can also “reactivate the historical understanding of the original acts of institution”, revealing contingency. After introducing Husserl, he moves on to the distinction between the social and the political:

“The sedimented forms of ‘objectivity’ make up the field of what we will call the ‘social’. The moment of antagonism where the

undecidable nature of the alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully visible constitutes the field of 'political'." (Laclau, 1990, p. 35).

He argues that this distinction constitutes social relations, but the boundary between them is constantly displaced. Hence, there will never be a harmonious and transparent society. Although this may sound pessimistic, this nature of society yields optimism: it enables and promises "a radical transformation through struggle" (Laclau, 1990, p. 36). If society were objective, with an essence, the struggle could not change it. It would only change by itself without permitting any interference, since its identity would be necessary. Thus, the political has primacy due to its constitutive power, as the social cannot exist without it. It constitutes the social. Finally, Laclau concludes that all these features of social relations reveal their radical historicity. Since everything is constructed and contingent, there can be no foundation (such as the economic base in Marxism) or a necessary historical trajectory. Therefore, a historical understanding of anything requires deconstructing its meaning by tracing it back to its original conditions of existence (Laclau, 1990, p. 36).

These four features propose "a non-objectivist conception of the social" (Laclau, 1990, p. 36), which has significant implications for a political analysis. First, we need to reactivate and, therefore, rediscover the power relations that constitute its objectivity to understand any society. That is because, the society is instituted through exclusion, which is an exercise of power that displays the conditions of existence of that society. Second, any analysis of the identity of socio-political actors should focus on to what extent they manage to constitute themselves, rather than who they are as objective identities. Therefore, it should analyse the dislocations preventing the fulness of those identities and the contingency of their conditions of existence (Laclau, 1990, p. 36). Last, such an analysis should stop assuming that relations and identities are "something" and instead should examine what they failed to be (Laclau, 1990, pp. 36–38).

Knowing what to do to analyse social relations and identities, we can now ask how to conduct the analysis: how to examine power relations, the dislocations preventing the fulness of identity, the contingency of conditions of existence, and what those identities failed to be. The answer lies in studying antagonism. Power relations operate for and through antagonism. Dislocation results from antagonism. Antagonism generates and reveals contingency. And antagonism blocks the full constitution of identity, preventing it from becoming what it failed to be. Therefore, antagonism is the central theme in any political analysis. This centrality also highlights the primacy of the political, since the moment of antagonism constitutes the political (Marchart, 2007, p. 279). Nevertheless, despite its centrality, I have not introduced antagonism beyond saying it is about exclusion, denial, or negativity. Laclau (1990, p. 17) defines antagonism as "that which prevents the constitution of

objectivity”. An antagonising force denies and violates identity by making its constitution impossible. This denial is through an outside, which blocks the full constitution of the identity of the inside. On the other hand, since all identities are relational and require a constitutive outside, antagonistic identities are also the conditions of existence for each other (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 122–127). Laclau calls this connection between the affirmation and concurrent denial of identity “contingency”. He understands contingency as the impossibility of precise fixation due to the lack of any necessary relationship between the essence and the existence of a thing. By threatening the existence of an identity, antagonism reveals this identity’s contingency. The exteriority of the conditions of existence of the identity - the threatening antagonising force - shows its contingency. Furthermore, as the result of antagonism is not predetermined, the conditions of existence of the identities are also contingent. Therefore, the objectivities of identities will constantly be threatened and depend on their conditions of existence, which are located outside. As a result, the identities of things will continuously be redefined and transgressed (Laclau, 1990, pp. 16–22). However, contingency and threat assume an already-existent identity. An antagonising force cannot threaten the existence of an identity without simultaneously affirming its existence. In all situations, “objectivity is partially constituted and also partially threatened”, and “the boundaries between the contingent and necessary are constantly displaced”. Thus, Laclau (1990, p. 27) concludes that “this interplay of mutual subversion between the contingent and the necessary is a more primary ground, ontologically, than that of a pure objectivity or total contingency”.

This brief account of Laclau’s socio-political ontology demonstrates that analysing identities and relations as “something” cannot explain the object of the analysis. Instead, such an analysis would be a study of the “social” as sedimented objectivity. It would hinder the comprehension of the phenomenon with its forgotten “origins”. Consequently, the logic, relations, and conditions of the existence of the phenomenon cannot be properly understood. Instead, any socio-political analysis should begin with a proper reading of the political, therefore antagonism, in the given context. Only the moments of antagonism can reveal the power relations that constitute and block identities, thus exposing the conditions of existence of the phenomenon. In the next section, I will delineate what such a political analysis means for Islamophobia studies. To this end, I will first discuss the limitations of mainstream Islamophobia studies through the lenses of Laclau’s framework. Then, I will offer Salman Sayyid’s definition of Islamophobia as a political analysis that includes “Muslim majority” cases.

3. ISLAMOPHOBIA AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON OR A GHOST BEDSHEET

I initially identified the fundamental problem in Islamophobia scholarship as the disregard for the primacy of the political. Then I explained

the primacy of the political and its implications. However, I have not linked the scholarship and implications, though it might be clear to the reader. The discussed features of the dominant Islamophobia literature epitomise an analysis that presumes an objectivist conception of society. It studies the relevant phenomena and context as "something". In other words, it will focus on the social, sedimented objectivity instead of the political, conditions of existence of the phenomenon. One ramification of this focus is essentialism. Since sedimentation includes forgetting origins, contingency and historicity, an objectivist analysis will assign transhistorical and necessary characteristics to "things". For example, it will essentialise Muslimness into certain features that are expected to appear in the same way regardless of time and place. The interpretations of the Muslim subject in Europe, which argue that if we understand Islamic doctrine, we understand Muslim identity, illustrate such essentialism by minimising the role of agency. They assign a necessary, linear relationship between the Muslim subject and, for instance, the Qur'an (Meer, 2012, p. 189). This denies the historicity and contingency of Muslim subject(s), which are reflected in their differences. Similarly, the idea that Muslims cannot be Islamophobic exemplifies this essentialism. It assumes that being Muslim has a necessary feature that non-Muslims may not have: the inability to be Islamophobic. Likewise, it essentialises Islamophobia into a specific form, drawing on minority context instances manifested in the hijab ban, the Qur'an burning, or individual attacks by non-Muslims. As such, under-theorisation becomes another ramification of the objectivist reading. The phenomena of Islam, Muslimness, Islamophobia, or antagonism have highly sedimented meanings in the given contexts. And they do not require a theorisation beyond already established symptomatic readings. As a result of under-theorisation, the logic and relations of Islamophobia as a global political phenomenon remain unknown. This makes it difficult or impossible to identify Islamophobia in other contexts. Manifestations, forms and meanings of antagonism, Muslim, and Islamophobia can change as transforming conditions reshape the power relations that construct the form. Nevertheless, family resemblances persist, maintaining partial totality, objectivity, and continuity of identity despite these transformations. A comprehensive understanding of any identity would require a thorough and flexible theory to recognise those family resemblances.

One way of considering such a theory of Islamophobia is by analogising it to a ghost bedsheet. In a haunted house, the ghost will leave traces. These might include breaking objects, changing their places, or leaving the locked doors unlocked. When we are unaware of the ghost - as we do not see it, so claim it does not exist - and the logic of its operation, our solutions will be symptomatic, such as replacing glass objects with steel or plastic ones, nailing them down, or fixing the doors. However, with our changing strategies, the ghost, whom we do not know exists, will also change its haunting style. After a particular stage, some forms of haunting will disappear because they will no longer work. Nevertheless, the ghost will continue to haunt the house in

unnoticed and unprecedented ways. Since noticing and responding to every single haunting of the ghost are impossible, particularly for its future actions, the only way to resolve the issue is to deal with the cause: the haunting. Therefore, instead of, or at least beyond, addressing all problems as individual cases, we need to recognise the relations among them, the ghostly logic operating behind and through them, and their conditions of existence: the existence of the ghost as a phenomenon. A ghost bedsheet that enables us to see, identify, and name the ghost by making it visible is a significant and necessary step towards solving the matter. Because, after naming the problem as a ghost haunting, it would be easier to figure out the relations and, more significantly, the logic of haunting. And knowing the logic of haunting can provide us with the tools to prevent future hauntings or even repress the ghost. A political theory of Islamophobia functions as a ghost bedsheet. It maps out the logic of Islamophobia and enables us to name it in its altering forms. That is because, instead of focusing on the sedimented practices as objective identities, let us say the individual instances of haunting without even knowing they are “haunting”, it focuses on the political, which constitutes the conditions of existence of Islamophobia - the ghost.

Salman Sayyid’s work on Islamophobia, which partly draws on the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, exemplifies this ghost bedsheet. It is particularly useful for the “Muslim majority” cases due to his conceptualisation of Kemalism, which can be considered an extension to his definition of Islamophobia. Sayyid states that he sees Islamophobia “as a form of governmentality” and “the attempt to deny Muslim agency with reference to a westernizing horizon”. He argues that “Islamophobia is the systematic regulation and disciplining of Muslimness by reference to a westernizing horizon” (Sayyid, 2014, p. 19; Sayyid, 2018, p. 423). By “Muslimness”, he means “a process of identification by which a Muslim subjectivity is articulated” rather than “a fully formed Muslim identity” (Sayyid, 2018, p. 423). Therefore, referring to Laclau’s political analysis, this definition does not stress “who the social agents are, but the extent to which they manage to constitute themselves” (Laclau, 1990, p. 36). Although it “begin(s) with the explicit ‘objective’ identities of the social agents – those making up their ‘fullness’” (Laclau, 1990, p. 36) by identifying them as Muslim, it “go(es) on to emphasize the dislocations adulterating that fulness” (Laclau, 1990, p. 36) by referring to “a process of identification” and “articulation” (Sayyid, 2018, p. 423). Laclau maintains that dislocation results from antagonism. The dislocations in the case of Muslimness result from “the systematic regulation and disciplining (...) by reference to a westernizing horizon” (Sayyid, 2018, p. 423). Sayyid regards a westernising horizon as “the assemblage practices, protocols and values that project the future in terms of ... westernization”. Through these disciplinary and regulatory practices, Islamophobia undermines “the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves into the future” (Sayyid, 2014, p. 14) and denies them political agency. The need for those disciplinary and regulatory practices arises from the conviction in “the

antagonistic nature of Muslimness". In this sense, Islamophobia erupts as a response to the cases where the requests for Muslim autonomy are considered "as interrupting the future direction of a society away from becoming modern and prosperous: in other words, becoming western" (Sayyid, 2018, p. 423). Muslimness, as the antagonistic, therefore constitutive other of the West, shows the contingency of the West. Any practice of Muslimness emerges as a new antagonism that functions as a reactivation, engendering a rediscovery of the contingency of the objectivity of the West and its form of life.

Considering that my request for anti-essentialism in the previous sections is required by the primacy of the political, the "westernizing" part of this definition places a limitation on the theory. This is because it is also plausible to refer to other horizons. More specifically, any horizon that articulates a relationship of antagonism with Muslimness can replace "westernizing horizon". Therefore, putting the West at the very centre of the definition of Islamophobia, as a necessary feature, still carries implicit essentialist tendencies despite the fluidity of the "westernizing horizon". One example we can consider is the case of the ethnic cleansing of Uyghurs. Starting from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkistan) with intense Han immigration in the mid-1900s, China has pursued a project of sinicisation through violent indoctrination. The forced education of the Chinese language, legal system, and culture in internment camps, referred to as "vocational schools", "re-education" camps, or "hospitals", already illustrates this sinicisation (Çaksu, 2020). However, Chinese authorities consider sinicisation of Islam as "the final solution". They regard Islam as a "disease" and "extremism", justifying the internment of Muslims as a process of treatment in "re-education hospitals" (Çaksu, 2020, p. 191). Therefore, in its Chinese-style, Islamophobia becomes the disciplining of Muslimness by reference to "a sinicising horizon". On the other hand, due to the continuing hegemony of the West in the global imagination, Sayyid's definition remains useful in the current context, particularly for Muslim majority countries. Even in the case of the Uyghurs, the official partnerships between state-level institutions in China and the UK, and especially Chinese authorities' references to the UK's Prevent strategy and expertise on counter-terrorism (CVE - Countering Violent Extremism) in managing Uyghurs, show a reference to a westernising horizon (MEE Staff, 2022). Hence, I endorse Sayyid's definition as it stands, since it works for most contemporary contexts, including the Uyghur case in China.

Furthermore, his conceptualisations of Muslimness and westernising horizon - referring to the processes of articulation rather than to "fully constituted objective entities" - render them "floating signifiers" whose signifieds are contextual and contingent (Sayyid, 2018, p. 423). This contextuality allows us to interpret a wide range of practices as Islamophobia through family resemblances. This is particularly significant given the diverse manifestations and expressions of Islamophobia, which make it challenging

to claim that Islamophobia carries a particular characteristic in all its different instances. Therefore, Sayyid (2014, p. 14) concludes by arguing that “There is no essence to Islamophobia; instead, there is a series of overlapping elements that constitute a coherence”. Moreover, the relationship between Muslimness and Islamophobia highlights the centrality of Muslim political agency and the West in the definition (Sayyid, 2010, p. 15). This centrality of Muslim political agency, combined with the contextuality, permits Sayyid to read the political experiences of Muslims in “Muslim majority” countries through the lens of Islamophobia, such as expanding on Kemalism as Muslim-style Islamophobia.

Sayyid proposes Kemalism as an analytical tool to explain the post-Caliphal orders of Muslim societies with nationalist, westernising, modernising and secularising programs. This metaphor is significant to the discussion of Muslim political identity, as all these regimes have attempted to de-centre Islam in socio-political order through these programs, instead creating a secular, homogenous “nation” as the centre (Sayyid, 1997). This theorisation enables Sayyid to construe Kemalism as an Islamophobic governmentality that regulates and disciplines Muslim political agency “by reference to a westernizing horizon”. In this sense, Kemalism arises as the form of Islamophobia that is dominant in Muslim societies where the “political order dominated by Kemalism and, in these cases, Muslim agency is overdetermined by quests for the unravelling of absolutism and greater accountability”. Sayyid adds that he means by Kemalism is not the order initiated by Atatürk in the early republican times in Türkiye. Beyond this, “it is a global project to westernize Islamic societies and communities by articulating modernization as westernization.” Therefore, he includes regimes by “Reza Khan, Nasser and Suharto” as well (Sayyid, 2018, pp. 424–425).

However, Sayyid does not explore the dynamics of Islamophobia as Kemalism in Muslim societies. How Islamophobia travels through the Muslim world, what its conditions of existence are, how it functions and in which forms, and what kinds of relations it has with other forms of Islamophobia are questions awaiting answers. A recent work, *Making Sense of Islamophobia in Muslim Societies*, by Bayraklı, Hafez and Faytre (2019) in the edited volume *Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies*, tackles such questions, though without naming the experiences as Kemalism. They list four main aspects of Islamophobia in Muslim societies. Firstly, epistemic racism, which centres the West as the only legitimate tradition of thought, also operates in Muslim societies through westernised elites, who see Islamic knowledge and experience as inferior (Bayraklı et al., 2019, pp. 7–8). Secondly, these westernised elites regard Islam as a threat to the European-style secular nation-state model and seek to regulate it and Muslim identity accordingly (Bayraklı et al., 2019, pp. 9–10). Thirdly, referring to Sayyid, the authors argue that Islamophobia makes the existence of Muslim political identity impossible in Muslim societies as well. Lastly, self-orientalisation, stemming from the

previous aspects, all of which reflect both a legacy and continuation of (self)colonialism, situates Islam as an ontological threat and engenders hate attacks on it (Bayraklı et al., 2019, p. 13). The examples they provide to expand on these aspects are almost identical to Sayyid's formulation of Kemalism in his initial book, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (1997). For instance, to illustrate self-orientalism, they list the discourse of Aryan race in Iran, Egyptian elites' reference to Pharaonic heritage and Pan-Arabism, Turkish Kemalists' articulation of pre-Islamic Hittite and Sumerian ancestors, and Tunisian elites' stress on the non-Muslim legacy of Phoenician civilisation (Bayraklı et al., 2019, p. 14). Similarly, when explaining the Kemalist policy of westernisation, Sayyid (1997, p. 69) mentions Kemalists' initial orientalisaiton of the Orient to "de-orientalise" it through westernisation and how that meant de-Islamisation. Likewise, while detailing the nationalism policy through which Kemalists created a new national (Turkish, Iranian, Egyptian) identity based on racialisation to replace the Muslim identity, Sayyid (1997, p. 66; Sayyid, 1997, pp. 71–72) gives the example of Sumerian and Akkad civilisation in Türkiye, Aryanist ideology in Iran, Mesopotamianism of Baathists and Mediterraneanness references by anti-FIS Algerians. However, unlike Bayraklı, Hafez, and Faytre, Sayyid does not develop the link to Islamophobia in that early work, while Bayraklı, Hafez, and Faytre do not situate or develop their cogent explanations into a comprehensive theoretical framework, like Kemalism, or the one which implies Kemalism as an extension.

Muslim regimes' or elites' disciplining of Muslimness by reference to a westernising horizon emerges as the heart of both works. The main argument of both is that Muslim political agency is antagonised and denied because it interrupts the westernising horizon - the project of nation building in a western-style. This common point reveals at least two things. Firstly, both in minority and majority contexts, "Islamophobic discourses depict Muslims and their culture as a threat to the modern secular way of life" (Bayraklı et al., 2019, p. 16). Therefore, Islamophobia is a global phenomenon that denies Muslim agency by reference to a westernising horizon. Secondly, there is an irony in Kemalism, therefore Islamophobia. This denial of agency essentialises Muslim identity into a depoliticised piety. Kemalist or Islamophobic hegemony in Muslim societies aims to discipline Muslimness into an apolitical form. However, as this disciplining creates antagonism by making alternative manifestations of Muslimness an enemy, it further politicises Muslim identity. Thus, while striving to avoid the political, these regimes place it at the very centre of their Islamophobic projects, revealing the primacy of the political in understanding Islamophobia. However, mainstream literature's tendency to essentialise identities and under-theorise Islamophobia, while focusing on minority cases, prevents recognition of this primacy. This lack of recognition, in turn, inhibits a global and comprehensive analysis of Islamophobia, particularly in Muslim ("majority") societies. Consequently, the irony, identified in this paper as a peculiarity of Muslim-

style Islamophobia - Kemalism -, remains unnoticed, further perpetuating and reinforcing the practice of Islamophobia.

Conclusion

In conclusion, despite the growing body of research on Islamophobia, little attention has been paid to Islamophobia in Muslim societies. This neglect stems from the essentialisation of identities and the persistent under-theorisation of Islamophobia, both rooted in a failure to acknowledge the primacy of the political. By focusing predominantly on “Muslim minority” experiences, where antagonism is overt and framed in “non-Muslim” - “Muslim” terms, existing scholarship has produced theoretical tools unsatisfactory to address “Muslim majority” experiences of less visible forms of antagonism. Therefore, a political analysis of Islamophobia, as exemplified by the work of Sayyid and proposed through engagement with Laclau’s ontology in this paper, is necessary to read Islamophobia as a global phenomenon that haunts the lives of Muslims regardless of their status as a minority or majority. Surmounting these problems can enable us to understand identities in their altering forms and the experiences of the “majority” of Muslims. This is required to save Muslim identity from its depoliticised perception, which is reduced to private piety. That is because, this depoliticised perception not only prevents us from recognising Islamophobic acts perpetrated by Muslims - since we assume they cannot be political as being Islamophobic - but also incites Islamophobia to discipline Muslimness into this depoliticised form.

Hakem Değerlendirmesi: Dış Bağımsız

Yazar Katkısı: Sümeyye SAKARYA: %100

Destek ve Teşekkür Beyanı: Metnin ilk versiyonlarının sunulduğu konferansların katılımcılarına ve dergi hakemlerine yapıcı yorumları ve önerileri için teşekkür ederim.

Etik Onay: Bu çalışma etik onay gerektiren herhangi bir insan veya hayvan araştırması içermemektedir.

Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı: Çalışma ile ilgili herhangi bir kurum veya kişi ile çıkar çatışması bulunmamaktadır.

Peer Review: Independent double-blind

Author Contributions: Sümeyye SAKARYA: 100%

Funding and Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the participants of the conferences where the initial versions of the paper were presented, as well as the journal reviewers, for their constructive comments and recommendations.

Ethics Approval: This study does not contain any human or animal research that requires ethical approval.

Conflict of Interest: There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person related to the study.

References

- Aktay, Y. (2010). Islamophobia in Turkey. In S. Sayyid & A. Vakil (Eds.), *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives* (pp. 195–206). Hurst and Company.
- Allen, C. (2011). *Islamophobia*. Routledge.
- Aslan, A. (2019). The Politics of Islamophobia in Turkey. In E. Bayraklı & F. Hafez (Eds.), *Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies* (pp. 71–92). Routledge.
- Babacan, M. (2023). “Were you treated differently because you wore the hijab?”: Everyday Islamophobia, racialization and young Turks in Britain. *Ethnicities*, 23(1), 64–87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968221126196>
- Bayraklı, E. & Güngörmez, O. (Eds.). (2022). *Türkiye’de İslamofobi*. Vadi Yayınları.
- Bayraklı, E. & Hafez, F. (Eds.). (2019). *Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies*. Routledge.
- Bayraklı, E. & Hafez, F. (Eds.). (2022). *European Islamophobia Report*. Leopold Weiss Institute, Austria.
- Bayraklı, E., Hafez, F. & Faytre, L. (2019). Making Sense of Islamophobia in Muslim Societies. In E. Bayraklı & F. Hafez (Eds.), *Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies* (pp. 5–20). Routledge.
- Çaksu, A. (2020). Islamophobia, Chinese Style: Total Internment of Uyghur Muslims by the People’s Republic of China. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 5(2), 175–198. <https://doi.org/10.13169/islstudj.5.2.0175>
- Elbasani, A. & Somer, M. (2015). Muslim secularisms in the European context. In M. Rectenwald, R. Almeida, & G. Levine (Eds.), *Global Secularisms in a Post-Secular Age* (Vol. 2, pp. 171–188). De Gruyter.
- Goldberg, D. T. (2015). *Are We All Postracial Yet?* Polity.
- Gomez-Perez, M. (2017). “Political” Islam in Senegal and Burkina Faso: Contrasting approaches to mobilization since the 1990s. *Mediterranean Politics*, 22(1), 176–195. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1230947>
- Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time*. (Trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson). Blackwell Publishing.
- Husain, A. & Howard, S. (2017). Religious Microaggressions: A Case Study of Muslim Americans. *Journal of Ethnic & Cultural Diversity in Social Work*, 26(1–2), 139–152. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15313204.2016.1269710>

- Islam, M. S. (2011). "Minority Islam" in Muslim Majority Bangladesh: The Violent Road to a New Brand of Secularism. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 31(1), 125–141. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2011.556893>
- Kassem, A. (2023). *Islamophobia and Lebanon: Visibly Muslim Women and Global Coloniality*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Kaya, A. (2018). Gannuşi'nin "Siyasetsiz" Siyaset Felsefesinin Kritiği. *İnsan & Toplum Dergisi*, 8(1), 115–142. <https://doi.org/10.12658/M0232>
- Kaya Osmanbaşıoğlu, G. (2015). The Politics of What You Wear on Your Head. *Middle East Critique*, 24(4), 389–406. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2015.1066068>
- Laclau, E. (1990). *New Reflections on The Revolution of Our Time*. Verso.
- Laclau, E. (2006). Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of Radical Politics. *Critical Inquiry*, 32(4), 646–680. <https://doi.org/10.1086/508086>
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2001). Beyond the Positivity of the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (2nd ed., pp. 93–148). Verso.
- Lean, N. C. (2012). *The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims*. Pluto Press.
- Lentin, A. (2014). Post-race, post politics: The paradoxical rise of culture after multiculturalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(8), 1268–1285. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2012.664278>
- Lentin, A. (2016). Racism in public or public racism: Doing anti-racism in 'post-racial' times. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 39(1), 33–48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1096409>
- Mamdani, M. (1998). *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. UNISA Press.
- Marchart, O. (2007). *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Mecham, R. Q. (2004). From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(2), 339–358. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000174842>
- MEE Staff. (2022, May 17). Elite Chinese police college drew on UK's Prevent strategy for Uyghur policy. *Middle East Eye*. Accessed on 31 May 2024 from <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/china-uyghur-policy-draw-uk-prevent-strategy>
- Meer, N. (2012). Misrecognizing Muslim consciousness in Europe. *Ethnicities*, 12(2), 178–196. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796811431>
- Mouffe, C. (1993). *The Return of the Political*. Verso.

- Mouffe, C. (2005). *On the Political*. Routledge.
- Patel, I. (2017). Emergence of Institutional Islamophobia: The Case of the Charity Commission of England and Wales. *ReOrient: The Journal of Critical Muslim Studies*, 3(1), 23–49. <https://doi.org/10.13169/reorient.3.1.0023>
- Rancière, J. (1999). *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Sayyid, B. (1997). *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. Zed Books Ltd.
- Sayyid, S. (2010). Out of the Devil’s Dictionary. In S. Sayyid & A. Vakil (Eds.), *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives* (pp. 5–18). Hurst and Company.
- Sayyid, S. (2014). A Measure of Islamophobia. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 2(1), 10–25.
- Sayyid, S. (2018). Islamophobia and the Europeanness of the other Europe. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 52(5), 420–435.
- Sayyid, S. & Vakil, A. (Eds.). (2010). *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*. Hurst and Company.
- Schmitt, C. (2007). *The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition* (G. Schwab, Trans.). University of Chicago Press.
- Shryock, A. (Ed.). (2010). *Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend*. Indiana University Press.
- Singh, S. J. (2012, July 11). *Islamophobia, Sikhophobia And Media Profiling*. HuffPost. Accessed on 2 January 2025 from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/islamophobia-sikhophobia-and-media-profiling_b_1654692
- Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A. M. B., Nadal, K. L. & Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. *American Psychologist*, 62(4), 271–286. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.62.4.271>
- Tate, S. A. & Bagguley, P. (2017). Building the anti-racist university: Next steps. *Race Ethnicity and Education*, 20(3), 289–299. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2016.1260227>
- Tyrer, D. (2013). *The Politics of Islamophobia: Race, Power and Fantasy*. Pluto Press.
- Yel, A. M. (2022). Islamophobia as a Phenotypical Racism: The Case of the Islamic Style of Clothing in Turkey. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 7(1), 12–24.

- Yel, A. M., & Nas, A. (2014). Insight Islamophobia: Governing the public visibility of Islamic lifestyle in Turkey. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 17(5), 567–584. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549413515258>
- Zempi, I. & Awan, I. (Eds.). (2019). *The Routledge International Handbook of Islamophobia*. Routledge.