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Rational Comprehension of Philosophical Reality: Worldview and Its Historical Forms

Abstract

This article explores the philosophical worldview and its historical forms as a unique means of understanding the world, rooted in the human mechanism of cognition. The rational comprehension of the world is deeply complex, much like the mechanism by which a person understands themselves. It is widely accepted that humans are historical beings shaped by historical processes. A modern example is how humanity's relationship with nature now reflects a deeply developed level of understanding. Since ancient times, humans have attempted to understand the regularities governing all natural phenomena and processes. In this sense, rational comprehension is not merely the emergence of human intellectual power or essence, but a universally accepted reality throughout human history. The article discusses the existence of reality and its rational comprehension from the first perspective, rational understanding must be grounded in the interaction between all components of reality and from the second, the process is understood temporally—as containing the duration and continuity of existence—and is viewed as a dynamic development. The central philosophical task today is to analyze and resolve the new realities that human intervention introduces.

Keywords: *Worldview, Rational Comprehension, Human Cognition, Religion, Reality*

Felsefi Gerçekliğin Akılcı Kavranışı: Dünya Görüşü ve Tarihsel Biçimleri

Öz

Bu makale, insanın bilişsel mekanizmasına dayanan, dünyayı anlamanın özgün bir yolu olarak felsefi dünya görüşünü ve onun tarihsel biçimlerini incelemektedir. Dünyanın akılcı kavranışı, tıpkı insanın kendisini anlama mekanizması gibi son derece karmaşıktır. İnsanların tarihsel süreçlerle

şekillenen tarihsel varlıklar olduğu genel kabul görmektedir. Bunun modern bir örneği, insanlığın doğa ile ilişkilerinin artık derinlemesine gelişmiş bir anlayış düzeyini yansıtmasıdır. Antik çağlardan bu yana insanlar, tüm doğal olguları ve süreçleri yöneten düzenlilikleri anlamaya çalışmışlardır. Bu anlamda akılcı kavrayış, yalnızca insanın entelektüel gücünün veya özünün ortaya çıkışı değil, insanlık tarihi boyunca evrensel olarak kabul edilen bir gerçekliktir. Makalede, gerçekliğin varlığı ve onun akılcı kavranışı iki açıdan ele alınmaktadır: Birincisi, rasyonel anlayışın, gerçekliğin tüm bileşenleri arasındaki etkileşime dayandırılması gerektiğidir. İkincisi ise bu sürecin zamansal olarak—varoluşun sürekliliğini ve devamlılığını içeren—dinamik bir gelişim olarak anlaşılmasıdır. Günümüzde temel felsefi görev, insan müdahalesinin ortaya çıkardığı yeni gerçeklikleri analiz etmek ve çözümlemektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Dünya görüşü, Akılcı Kavrayış, İnsan Bilişi, Din, Gerçeklik*

Introduction

The core idea of rational understanding is to study reality according to the norms of reason and to recognize the role of human beings as active participants in this reality. Thus, rational thinking attempts to comprehend the individual within the context of human–nature relations, mediated by sociological and psychological environments. These relations—shaped by human–nature–society interactions—are carried out according to a purposeful activity program based on human needs and interests.

Reason is a capacity—the possibility a person actualizes in the face of any situation. In this sense, reason is inherently human. Long before the development of structured rational thought, even in primitive conditions, humans relied on the capacity of reason. The core feature of rationality in philosophical terms is not merely thinking centered on reason, but rather the notion that only reason can determine what is "true." (Adorno, 2018). Yet the term "truth" is not a product of rationality; it is a concept assigned to it. For philosophy, "truth" holds the same value that "rightness" does for rationality. Comprehension of this rational rightness is only possible through intellectual perception of reality.

Like many other philosophical concepts, rationality has a historical dimension. It is not a static concept but one that evolves through historical processes—marked by internal contradictions and diversity of meanings (Feuerbach, 1881). Over the past two centuries, particularly with the Enlightenment at the core of intellectual life, humanity began to understand itself, nature, and the entire world as governed by rational laws. This understanding enabled humans to conceptualize the world based on reason. As a result of rejecting metaphysics—especially by socialist philosophical schools—humans came to see themselves as both bearers of a "world reason" and creative participants in it (Feuerbach, 1881).

1. Crisis of Rationality and the Decline of Enlightenment Thought

However, the deep intellectual crisis caused by World War I and II initially cast doubt on rationality, especially among philosophers with socialist leanings. Thus, the belief that comprehending anything must occur solely within the normative framework of reason began to face strong philosophical criticism. From the mid-20th century onward, severe critiques emerged claiming that "comprehension" was not the same as what is "comprehended," delivering a critical blow to rationalist philosophical thought (Frobenius, 1932). In the past two centuries, rational perception, understanding, and interpretation of the world became central themes in philosophical research. Today, however, reason is increasingly perceived as a measure of despair, the root of crises, and the sole means threatening human life. After World War II, early traces of this anti-rational sentiment appeared in the plays of Adamov and Ionesco, the films of Antonioni and Resnais, the paintings of Dubuffet, the novels of Beckett, and the aphorisms of Cioran (Delacampagne, 2010). Though initially unnoticed, these expressions of skepticism toward rationality gradually transformed into a “cold disdain” by the 1980s—an outright rejection of the Enlightenment doctrines of Western civilization (Bahi, 2020). Philosophical thought itself seems to have fallen into a torrent of internal contradictions, fragmenting its own cognitive capacities, tearing down its conceptual frameworks, and, most importantly, abandoning its fundamental concepts in unprecedented ways. Today, only a few philosophers continue to defend the philosophical stance and reasoning models of Enlightenment thinking. Unfortunately, these few persist in a narrow and tedious manner, clinging to rational thought as though it were the final bastion of modernist idealism. In the face of advancing technology, the natural intellectual capacities of human beings—left to the mercy of artificial intelligence—are being reshaped by a different kind of rationality (Najafov, 2025a). This rationality does not aim at comprehension of the human being but instead renders the instruments of understanding into simulations within vast networks of artificial representation. A large army of analysts, inspired by Gadamerian methodology, attempts to decode the structures of reason but increasingly concedes that modernity is “the most perfect failure” (Feyerabend, 1989). In such circumstances, revisiting the classical question of “rational comprehension of philosophical reality” and seeking new avenues for philosophical reflection resembles describing the eruption of a long-extinct volcano (Feyerabend, 2015). Rather than constructing new frameworks, contemporary philosophers reveal, through chaotic narratives, the deep-seated problems that rationalism has produced—tracing the collapse of philosophical reasoning and its perceived irrelevance (Najafov, 2025b).

2. The Relocation of Philosophical Reality

The view that reason is a creative, controlling, and transformative force is a foundational thesis of religious thought. The Torah references logos as the origin of all things. In Islamic philosophy, there is a distinction between the Creator's absolute intellect (universal reason) and the human's limited intellect (particular reason). Similarly, the early philosophical schools of Miletus, Ionia, and Athens also regarded reason as the primary measure of understanding (Huizinga, 2018). Ordinary people often treat reason as an abstract criterion—a non-material function of thinking. In this view, reason becomes a marker of subjective maturity. The point of divergence between religion and philosophy lies not in the existence of reason, but in who defines and directs it. Philosophy regards reason as a foundational force, whereas religion considers it a component of divine will (Harvey, 2019). With Immanuel Kant, philosophy became a public form of thought, severing its ties with metaphysical infinity. Consequently, reason evolved from merely a tool of power to an instrument of creation, transformation, and judgment. Hegel further advanced this by proposing that nature is a manifestation of the Absolute Idea, and that humans—being the most ideal form of nature—can realize the Absolute. For Hegel, thought and being are one and the same. This identification of thought with being introduced a split in post-Hegelian philosophy over whether existence could truly be grasped in a purely rational or idealistic way (Latour, 2004). From this context, the “Critical Theory” tradition began to move toward immanent thought, taking reason as the only means of human cognition. As capitalist development progressed, shifts in the relations of production and the emphasis on labor as a measure of intellectual activity transformed worldviews previously grounded in metaphysical terms. These were replaced by more interventionist concepts of nature (Jones, 2018). Marx reclassified reason within the framework of human–labor–value relations, redefining rational thought as the only viable mode of human action. This reframing positioned human–nature, human–labor, and human–human relationships as the core of rational engagement. Thus, the human being was no longer only a thinking entity, but also a creative one. The world was reimagined as a “shared space for human activity,” material and non-material, where reality could be shaped by human involvement (Marx, 1979). This new framework enabled human beings to perceive reality not as something external but as something emerging from within—sometimes from the world itself, and even from within the human being. In immanent thought, humans not only created rational laws but also became subject to those very laws. This historicization of human existence made it possible to interpret the world as a dynamic and evolving totality. At the same time, it highlighted the unity of the

past, present, and future within the human experience (Najafov, 2025c). Eventually, humans began to recognize that in identifying and interpreting the facts and concepts of the objective world, they were simultaneously transforming themselves into objects—participants within the very reality they sought to understand.

3. From "Who" to "What": The Shifting Ontology of the Human

In the profound and radical shift occurring within philosophical thought, the conception of "who the human is" was increasingly threatened by the rising discourse around "what the human is." Within this framework, the relationship between being and science—introduced by rational thinking—created new relational forms that enabled the realization of political, legal, material, and spiritual dimensions of human life (Jameson, Lyotard, & Habermas, 1994). The creative force and truth-value of scientific reality began to shape humanity's understanding of itself, others, and nature. As conceptions of topos (space) evolved rapidly, the vitality of immanent reality became increasingly evident in the face of transcendental truths.

4. Rational Stubbornness and the Rational Darkness

By 1980, Marxist philosophy began to recognize that metaphysical philosophers had fallen into a critical error in their conceptualization of "reason" (ratio) and "truth." This crisis revealed itself in political relations where knowledge (as "form") and power (as "relation") began to diverge. Even David Harvey, a prominent Marxist thinker who maintained a firm ideological stance, acknowledges in *Rebel Cities* the dominant role of capital relations. Yet, he also concedes the emergence of divergent forms of relationality that destabilize rational constancy, and admits the presence of a "new darkness" that escapes rational comprehension (Harvey, 2019). Within Marxist thought, what was once conceived as "common spaces" in the name of society—namely, proletarian interests—were increasingly described not as enduring public processes, but as ephemeral and externally vulnerable anti-social modes of relation. In this context, amid the tragic finale of a world in collapse, a kind of epistemological stubbornness emerged—marked by the desperate attempt to explain unsolvable contradictions using even more radical rational frameworks. This resistance was mirrored in caricatures such as *The Simpsons*, where parody became a form of philosophical commentary (Kallinikos, Aaltonen, & Marton, 2013). During the 1960s Paris crisis, the concept of "human–space confrontation" emerged prominently. As shown in Jean-Luc Godard's film *Two or Three Things I Know About Her*, the few rational foundations of knowledge about reality were shaken so deeply that the only remaining philosophical memory was the unresolved conflict between hostile, irreconcilable parties (Kallinikos, Aaltonen, & Marton, 2013). An unfamiliar dimension of

space, once hidden from human thought, was suddenly revealed in a grotesque, unnatural light—portrayed as the swamp of a great war humanity had waged against nature. Following this came a wave of grim environmental news that brought space—that is, the world—face to face with reason in all its starkness, undermining humanity's belief in its rational victories. Not only capitalists but also socialists began to lose sleep over the increasingly "irrational" image of space. New philosophical currents responding to this disillusionment began to take root, breaking through the icy persistence of rational stubbornness. During the Cold War, space was reimagined as a global threat and repositioned at the core of human relationships. The central concern shifted from a desired "future time" to the historicity of a space that had no past. Philosophical urgency turned to reconstructing this spatial history as swiftly as possible (Feyerabend, 1989). Kant's framework of "space–time" as necessary for rational thought gradually gave way to what Henri Lefebvre later conceptualized as the "space–space" game—a reorientation that replaced time with space as the primary dimension of critical inquiry (Sloterdijk, 1988).

5. Reality Norms as a Worldview

Unlike the traditional Islamic conception of the cosmos, the 14th-century Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun articulated the world as a space for human self-realization and creative action—asserting that the ultimate purpose of history is tied to this agency. His classification of historical-temporal dynamics into genesis–development–decline in *Muqaddimah* is anchored in spatial constructs (mulk), suggesting a geography-bound notion of human reality (Najafov, 2025b). The view that human reality is bound to topos—introduced by Ibn Khaldun and later developed by Descartes and Kant—initiated a rational trajectory framing the human being as a topological model. However, this did not eliminate all metaphysical possibilities of reality. For instance, contrary to popular belief, Copernicus's discovery did not decentralize the human from metaphysical space; instead, it rooted the human more deeply into it through mathematical-physical dependence. By decentering the Earth, the Copernican revolution diminished the Earth's universal essence and emphasized the relativity of its place in the cosmos (Meyer, 2015). More critical than the shift of the Earth's position was the reorientation of the concept of "day" and the recognition of the interconnection between space and time. Time, previously perceived as external and circular, was linearized and embedded within space through heliocentric cosmology. Kant reframed this in terms of the spatio-temporal conditions of the world's intelligibility, locating time within space as a condition of possible experience (Najafov, 2025b). This territorial shift in worldview—now centered on a mobile, sun-

illuminated Earth—posed the mathematical and physical structure of nature as a fundamental philosophical challenge. Despite these changes, the transition in scientific-philosophical thought was not inherently problematic for Christian theology. Rooted in Aristotelian cosmology, it did not reject rational reality. For Augustine, "nature" was not analyzed through natural laws but within an ethical framework. The crux of the tension between religion and philosophy lies in the shifting reality of the human being parallel to that of the world. The modern worldview, shaped by Copernicus, Newton, and Kant, removed the human from theological submission and embedded them into complex material relations. Consequently, the human being became a "historical agent"—no longer a passive believer but an active participant in natural processes. As a result, the human was conceptualized as a topological entity, an "ideal living type" grounded in spatial context (Sloterdijk, 1988). The next philosophical challenge became the redefinition of reality's new norms—earthbound and shaped by relational dynamics. Science, as form, became the primary means of understanding the world, while power—political, moral, and economic—was understood as relation.

6. The Language of Rationality

How do rational truths express themselves? This question became central with Hegel. In *Metahistory,* Hayden White identifies four rhetorical modes of historical rationality:

•Tragedy

•Comedy

•Judgment

• Romance

These are regarded as performance stages of rational truth. However, they are not fixed or mutually exclusive. Hegel famously proposed that history, in its philosophical form, resembles comedy rather than tragedy, emphasizing life's superiority over death through irony. Thus, the philosophy of history asserts that consciousness of life's supremacy renders the human being's ironic nature more vital than their tragic one (Hegel, 1899).

According to Hegel, historical consciousness of the self unfolds in four stages:

1. For-itself
2. In-itself for-itself
3. From-itself for-itself
4. In-itself in-itself

The final stage represents a cultural moment in European history where self-consciousness realizes both itself and the world (Qoriçeva, 1991). Life advances continuously

along a progressive linear path. By rejecting circular models of history, Hegel portrayed historical development as ascending from primitiveness toward the highest stage. Though idealistic, his concept of the "Absolute Spirit"—which he equated with rational self-awareness—suggested that a collective of self-realizing individuals shapes the consciousness of the world (Taylor, 1991). Hegel's groundbreaking claim was to equate being with thought. His concept of dialectic represented this realization of world history as the self-actualization of the Absolute. Marx agreed with Hegel on the staged progression of historical development but inverted his dialectic, arguing that Hegel's idealism failed to grasp material reality (Hegel, 1967). Drawing on Feuerbach's critique of religion, Marx replaced the idealist Absolute with the historical rationality of material relations—specifically, labor, capital, and class. For Marx, world history is essentially a tragedy—one marked by continual class conflict. Philosophy's role, he argued, is to find the formula to end this global drama, achievable only through proletarian revolution (Feuerbach, 1881). Thus, Marx viewed history's end as the final tragedy: the annihilation of one class by another. He assigned the role of executor to the proletariat, which would lead the transition from oppression to emancipation. In contrast to Hegel, who placed the rational state at the center of history as the manifestation of "pure reason," Marx considered the state as the last obstacle in the class struggle, destined for dismantling (Wiggershaus, 1994). Despite this, Marx never dismissed the emotional or moral dimensions of humanity. Emphasizing the German distinction between *Verstand* (understanding) and *Vernunft* (reason), Marx argued that overcoming historical suffering requires a rational awakening to one's collective memory. Rationality, therefore, was not the erasure of suffering but the tool for its comprehension. Marx's rationality, while a means to overcome tragedy, is still rooted in the tragic consciousness of historical existence. As Adorno later argued, suffering (*Leid*) is the only real historical constant across all class formations.

How, then, can humanity construct itself in rational positivity after confronting its own catastrophic past? Hegel attempted to resolve this with comedy—but failed. Nietzsche offered a different solution. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he depicted the tragedy of the "last man"—a being who experiences the "death of God." The truth of this rational reality is communicated to humanity by Zarathustra, who heralds the end of human transcendence (Tarter, 2019). Martin Heidegger, interpreting Nietzsche's "last man" in *Was heißt Denken? (What Is Called Thinking?)*, redefined this as the realization of "the being of beings." He rejected Hegel's identity of being with thought, proposing instead a return to "being as being." The tragedy lies

in the existence of "beings" themselves. Humanity, as a being among beings, simultaneously loves and laughs at its own catastrophe.

Trapped between madness and disaster, reason leaves humanity no option but to play. This existential play introduces *homo ludens*—the human as player. According to Johan Huizinga, all these philosophical stages—Absolute knowledge (Hegel), revolution (Marx), self-negation (Nietzsche)—are scenes in which humanity plays, returning us to the classical problem of mimesis (Marx, 1979).

6.1. Homo Ludens – Self-Understanding between Reason and Madness

In his pursuit of a middle ground between rationalists and empiricists, Immanuel Kant positioned reason between two realms: truths derived from experiential validation and those founded on metaphysical (transcendental) principles. In this context, reason resembled a boat adrift on a vast sea—on one side, the terrifying unknown evoked by the ocean's expanse; on the other, the necessary experience to navigate its waves. Yet, this boat lacked a harbor. For philosophy, the harbor is the human being itself (Latour, 2004). What does it mean when the human, conceived as a harbor, exists adrift in the sea of the world? This question has long preoccupied philosophers, dating back to Plato. When posed rationally, the dilemma becomes clearer: if reason confines us within a repetitive cognitive mechanism, how will a human—who realizes the superiority of life over death—contemplate existence? What does rational thought ultimately achieve when it rescues us from metaphysical illusions and casts us onto the stage of reason? If the human is an actor, and their fate a prophecy, what does it mean to participate in a play with both rational and irrational elements?

At times, such questions become essential for philosophical reflection—not merely contemplating the knowable, but entering its stage. This is equally the stage of comedy and tragedy. Frobenius's critique of rational determinism and Johan Huizinga's portrayal of play as a non-serious yet symbolically potent expression of imagined reality reflect this perspective. Huizinga's theory suggests that humanity maintains deep connections with a rational world devoid of "seriousness." While reason offers human beings virtues on the path to self-realization, the morally ambiguous depths of play reveal a socio-cognitive condition that lies outside of absolute tragedy or comedy (Kolodny & Brunero, 2013). Although Enlightenment thought tried to rationalize play as a pedagogical instrument, turning "truth" into a kind of game, human engagement with the world often resists full realization through the logical norms of language. The fact that play maintains deep links with the external world does not place it outside the bounds of rationality. Rather, in modern cultural frameworks, play is situated at the

very center of rational expression. The real question is: to what extent can reason grasp the cognitive "stage" we inhabit?

Consequently, rationality is increasingly perceived as an instrument—a mediating process. Yet, this instrumentalization may render rationality conservative or even radical. As reason becomes radicalized, play transforms into a psychological tool, losing its traditional ritual value and serving instead as a means of personal relief. In this transformation, rationality becomes a "process" rather than a fixed form. According to several philosophers, what is often forgotten is this: rationality has illuminated the "dark voids" of human understanding through reason—not by becoming a game, but by revealing the reality behind the game (Qoriçeva, 1991).

6.2.Illuminating the "Dark Voids"

The 19th century is often referred to as "the age of science." Both technical and human sciences underwent rapid institutionalization. Nearly all emerging scientific classifications justified themselves on rational foundations. This movement away from rigid traditional beliefs played a central role in liberating the human mind from mystical-religious constraints. Scientific progress brought intellectual autonomy.

Notably, science during that period was perceived as almost "untouchable." Religious authorities often did not criticize science itself but opposed the ideological, moral, or radical socio-political changes it catalyzed. Even in the East, the need to "adopt European science" was emphasized. Philosophers, including Marx, celebrated science as a liberating force in the struggle for social emancipation. Science was universally applauded and recognized as the foundation of a new worldview (Marx, 1979). Philosophers, however, only began grappling with science's deeper implications much later. Paul Feyerabend, in addressing the question, "Were we deceived by science?" offered both yes and no. While acknowledging the redemptive role of science in the 17th–18th centuries, he questioned its inherent salvific character. According to Feyerabend, the ideologies formed from the 19th century onwards were themselves products of scientific thought. Thus, science itself must be subject to critique (Feyerabend, 1978). Until then, scientific criticism was largely internal—focusing on particular problems rather than questioning science's nature. In the 20th century, particularly amid new political and social crises, the determining role of science and scientists began to evoke fear in modern Europe. Philosophical critiques warned of science becoming "church-like," raising doubts about rationality's promises. Feyerabend argued that scientific truths are never neutral and that their legitimacy often rests on rhetorical "grand claims." He emphasized the disturbing

impact of humanity's dominion over nature—enabled by science's pursuit of control. For example, the atomic devastation in Japan, he argued, was not just a political act, but also an expression of the scientific will to dominate nature (Feyerabend, 1987). To the question, "Must we obey scientific truths?" Feyerabend's answer was a clear "No." In fact, strict adherence to scientific truths threatens human freedom. He argued that modern power structures and scientific institutions collaborate closely: bourgeois governments elevate certain discoveries that align with their interests, turning science into a servant of capital. Science's institutional power is far more limited than assumed. Without political support, science cannot significantly shape or transform public identity. It has become an internal weapon of the modern state, and the politicization of scientific discourse serves a broader political agenda.

Feyerabend's sharp critique parallels that of Ludwig Feuerbach, who criticized religion in the name of religion itself. Just as Feuerbach subjected faith to rational inquiry, Feyerabend challenged science in the name of its own standards—even rejecting it in some instances. "Science is always riddled with contradictions, arrogance, ignorance, and lies. These are not obstacles to progress but its preconditions." (Feyerabend, 1987). Feyerabend challenged scientific methodologies developed by Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, Karl Popper, and Imre Lakatos, arguing that none of these address humanity's ethical, metaphysical, spiritual, or emotional concerns. While science may construct a flawless world, it cannot ensure human happiness or even humanity's recognition of itself within that world.

This critique reinvigorated philosophical interest in the "human-as-human" question in the context of rationality. Unlike Marx's and Nietzsche's visions of the "new human," Feyerabend addressed the anxiety of becoming a "non-human" within a rational world. Crucially, this crisis coincided with the emergence of postmodernist critiques. While postmodernism remains grounded in rational realities, it argues that the "modern defense of the world" was not founded on truth. Rather, this defense undermined human-human and human-nature relationships and dismantled what was once called the "social environment" (Marx, 1979). Interestingly, this perspective is not exclusive to postmodernists. Key figures of neo-socialist thought—namely, representatives of the Frankfurt School—also voiced similar concerns. Founders like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, along with later thinkers such as Claus Offe, Claus Eder, and Albrecht Wellmer, argue that modern industrial society has severely constricted and fragmented social relations. At the heart of this critique lie capitalism's exploitation of science in every domain and the rise of a monolithic, totalitarian system.

7. The New Agenda of Rationality – A Space for Everyone

Despite Paul Feyerabend's harsh critiques aimed at science, in practice, science continues to function as the primary instrument for governing human relationships. Coupled with the integration of technology into everyday life, the world now confronts a new rational condition that compels philosophers to reassess legal and political frameworks. German philosopher Jürgen Habermas argues that such "communicative" forms of interaction demand new public spheres.

As a critic of advanced capitalist industrial societies, Habermas contends that rationality has been buried within liberal institutions. Yet, he asserts, reason still possesses new potential—capable of creating a truly "space for everyone" (Habermas, 2019). He observes that each historical era loses its distinctive powers, and as memory of history wanes, connections between the present and historical radicalism are formed by narratives celebrating heroes or by perceptions of cultural collapse. Habermas warns of an "anarchistic intent to obliterate the truth of history"—a destructive force emerging alongside modernity's rebellion against traditional norms. For him, modernity is fundamentally an act of revolt against normative tradition and moral utility (Habermas, 2019). Habermas and others are apprehensive about traditional social and religious sentiments reclaiming influence—potentially filling the void left by rational spaces. Tatyana Goricheva draws parallels between postmodernism and Orthodox spirituality—highlighting philosophical linkages between Nilus the Stylite and Emile Cioran—which seem to confirm Habermas's concerns about reason's displacement (Qoriçeva, 1991). Habermas insists that reason must retain its instrumental function. He refers to this as "mediated reason," and emphasizes its unique capacity to generate a space inclusive of all voices. The concern lies not in reason's intrinsic failure, but in its subordination within liberal ideology. To address this, Habermas proposes a dual strategy:

*Reject any modernity that seeks to normalize itself as tradition.

*Reexamine the concept of rational language—especially its historical and social origins—and acknowledge its current inability to address urgent, practical questions.

He observes: "Modern culture has begun to crush everyday values and disrupt the natural order. Under the sway of contemporary power, boundless self-realization and authentic self-experience have become dominant individualistic drives." Habermas argues that human nature itself has been profoundly transformed by modernity. People now operate under new natural norms—and should be evaluated according to those new paradigms rather than traditional moral frameworks. We now face urgent philosophical questions such as: What is the future of human

nature? Advances in genetic engineering have enabled profound self-intervention—even prior to birth. With technologies such as genetic pre-implantation diagnostics, we must now consider future legal frameworks addressing public versus biological parenthood. Concurrently, shifts in morality have led to concerns about "immorality." Despite modernity never being radically anti-moral, Kantian universality and religious moral forms have always coexisted in tension. In Habermas's pluralist secular society, rational acceptance requires publicly acceptable secular motivations—not ones tied to pre-19th-century doctrines. As biotechnological progress challenges traditional moral "gagging orders," modernity must reckon with instrumentalization of human biology and the ethical frameworks necessary to regulate it (Habermas, 2019). Habermas critiques new conservatism for failing to seriously engage with these evolving social structures. He encourages the creation of new spatial possibilities from intersubjective relations—spaces that are not the top-down impositions of tradition (Habermas, 2019). He also notes that the essence of rationality itself has shifted: reason now operates as "influencing reason," not solely scientific reason. Therefore, rather than focusing solely on modernity's disruptive effects, we must attend to the practice of communicative logic and the ethical cultivation of new public spheres. Philosophy, he argues, must help establish the "space for everyone"—a worldview grounded in shared rational discourse.

Conclusion

The expansive vista opened by rational inquiry has transformed metaphysical perspectives into worldly concerns. Kant's profound influence shifted philosophical attention from infinite abstractions to worldly realities. Through rational thought, reason itself became an opportunity—revealing the field of the possible and the limits of impossibility within human nature. Science has not only reshaped political, cultural, and socio-economic foundations of modern life but has also enabled the creation and production of entirely new possibilities. Modernism ushered in a realm of potential that transformed both the world and human nature—making humans themselves objects of production. Today, the philosophical question has evolved: it is no longer simply *"Who are we?"* but *"Where are we?"* In light of our long historical journey, contemporary reality demands that we grasp, through rational means, the natural laws operating among us as humans. Rational comprehension has become less about the raw power of intellect and more about positioning its value in guiding humanity's next phase. In this new era, reason must not only understand reality in accordance with its own norms, but also assertively craft new spaces for humane intervention.

Conflict of interest

I declare, I have no any conflict of interest.

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