

## Turkey's Integration to Capitalism Within Uneven and Combined Development Approach: "1945-1960"

### Eşitsiz ve Bileşik Gelişme Kapsamında Türkiye'nin Kapitalizme Entegre Oluş Süreci: "1945-1960"

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#### Abstract

This article aims to criticize classical international relations theories in regard to issues of internality and externality, ahistoricism, and asociologism within the scope of historical sociology. In doing so, the article will address the uneven and combined development approach. An analysis of Turkey's integration to world capitalism between the 1940s and the 1960s will serve as a case study for this critique. The article will employ a Marxist method with a historical analysis. The article claims that historical sociology takes up international relations by embedding it in societies' historical contexts and structures. Within this framework, the uneven and combined development approach provides a significant dimension to understanding the social interactions between the domestic and the international structures within historical processes. Particularly, combined development, which connotes the amalgam of modern and backward forms of production, helps us to overcome the separation between the national and the international. For this reason, the article claims that Turkey's incorporation into capitalism after WWII contains significant dynamics of combined development (economic, political, and sociological) in both intra – and inter-state levels. Specifically, Turkey's technology transfer after the war in terms of new class dynamics emerges as a significant mechanism of combined development.

**Keywords:** Capitalism and states-system, Historical sociology, Internal and external issue, Mainstream International Relations theories, Turkey's integration with capitalism, Uneven and Combined Development.

#### Öz

Bu makale, klasik Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerini özellikle içsellik ve dışsallık sorunu, tarih ve sosyoloji dışı olma kapsamında kritik bir biçimde ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda makale, eşitsiz ve bileşik gelişme yaklaşımını irdelleyecektir. Vaka olarak Türkiye'nin 1945'ler ve 60'lar arası dönemde kapitalizme entegre oluş süreci tartışılacaktır. Marksist bir yöntem ile ikincil kaynaklar üzerinden gidilerek tarihsel bir analiz yapılacaktır. Temelde; makale, tarihsel sosyolojik bir perspektiften uluslararası ilişkileri ele alırken onu tarihsel bağlamlara ve toplumların sosyal yapılarına yerleştirdiğini iddia etmektedir. Bu çerçevede; eşitsiz ve bileşik gelişme yaklaşımı, domestik ve uluslararası yapı

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arasındaki etkileşimlere odaklanarak tarihsel bağlamlara vurgu yapmaktadır. Bilhassa; bileşik gelişme-üretim modlarının modern ve geri kalmış formlarının karışımını ifade etmektedir – ulusal ve uluslararası alan arasındaki ayrımının sorunsallaştırılması bakımından önemli olmaktadır. Bu nedenle; makale, Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonra kapitalizme eklenme sürecinin devletler içi ve devletler arasında ki düzeylerde bileşik gelişmenin dinamiklerini (ekonomik, politik ve sosyolojik) önemli bir biçimde taşıdığını iddia etmektedir. Özellikle, Türkiye'nin savaşta sonra Batı'dan teknoloji transferi ve bu çerçevede sınıf ilişkileri bileşik gelişmenin önemli bir unsuru olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Ana-akım Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri, Eşitsiz ve bileşik gelişme, İçsellik ve dışsallık sorunu, Kapitalizm ve devletler sistemi, Tarihsel sosyoloji, Türkiye'nin kapitalizme entegre oluş süreci.

## Introduction

This article aims to address a debate between the disciplines of historical sociology and international relations (IR) regarding some common problems in the international system. The article will focus on the social change of societies at both intra – and inter-levels by taking the impact of social forces into consideration. In so doing, the article will aim to transcend the duality between the national and the international spheres by raising historicism and sociology as significant components to dealing with the basic arguments of classical IR theories particularly neorealism. One of the fundamental goals of this article is to problematize the binary relationship between the national and the international in line with the U&CD approach (Kelly, 2003). The article will raise the totality of the social world by amalgamating inter and intra-state forces in terms of U&CD (Matin, 2007, p. 420). Kamran Matin claims that it is important to provide complementation between historicization of international relations and internationalization of domestic issues. Matin emphasizes that U&CD enables us to see the relationship between the coexistence of multiple societies and their endogenous processes of social change (Anievas & Nisancioglu, 2013, pp. 81-82;). Therefore, he takes U&CD seriously as a way to highlight universality, which is interactive and heterogenous, to overcome ethnocentric international social theory (Matin, 2011, pp. 2-3). Finally, this discussion will be applied to Turkey's integration with the capitalist economic system between the mid-1940s and the 1960s in line with the U&CD approach.

In this article, I will problematize several significant questions: first, how does historical sociology account for the binary conception between the domestic and the international structures within historical and sociological contexts when mainstream IR theories are considered? To this end, can the U&CD approach historically and socially explain Turkey's integration to capitalism after WWII within the context of the interactions between internal and external dynamics? In other words, what are the dynamics informing Turkey's incorporation into capitalism after the war in terms of U&CD? Specifically, how was this integration process, particularly in terms of technology transfer, shaped by new social class relations?

## **Historical Sociology and International Relations**

In this part, I will go over a significant evaluation of the mainstream IR theories, particularly neorealism from a historical-sociological perspective. For this reason, first, I will define historical sociology briefly, and then I will discuss criticisms of historical sociology towards especially neorealism in terms of internal and external issues and ahistoricism. In the following part, I will focus on two main approaches, which are Weberian and historical materialist, by giving an extra importance to historical materialism. I will also debate the relationship between the states-system and capitalism in line with some Marxist writers.

### **What is Historical Sociology?**

Historical sociology aims to cover the structures of societies within historical processes (Delanty & Isin, 2003, pp. 1-6; Abrams, 1982; Smith, 2014). In other words, historical sociology endeavors to explain the relationship between social actions which are deliberate and unintentional, and structural forces which are socially constructed. Human agency is not outside of history, rather it is constituted in structures within both time and space, and it is part of social relations; thus, historical sociology examines social processes and facts across time and space in a generalizable form (Lawson, 2007, pp. 359-360; Smith, 1991, pp. 1-7), "In my view, historical sociology is better understood as a continuing, ever-renewed tradition of research devoted to understanding the nature and effects of large-scale structures and fundamental processes of change" (Skocpol, 1984, pp.1-4). Craig Calhoun (2003) also emphasizes the importance of social change to embed the aspects of the past in specific contexts (pp. 383-386). Calhoun (1998) has problematized historical facts in terms of continuity, discontinuity and historically situated phenomena (pp. 859-868). In summary, historical sociology aims to bring the historical contexts of ahistorical sociology and sociological forces into atheoretical history (Goldthorpe, 1991, pp. 211-215; Hobden, 1998, 21-24).

### **A Brief Glance at the Relationship Between Historical Sociology and Mainstream International Relations (IR) Theories**

Historical sociology had not received a central concern in IR until the 1980s. As has been discussed in the previous section, historical sociology is an important field for understanding large – scale changes in world politics. Kees van der Pijl (2015) claims that international historical sociology (IHS) should focus on society first, then history and after that the international sphere without reifying them (p. 47). In line with Pijl's perspective; John M. Hobson, George Lawson and Justin Rosenberg address the issue of historical sociology towards IR by taking C. Wright Mills's sociological imagination into consideration (Mills, 1959).

Briefly stated, classical IR theories, especially neorealism, examine international phenomena without emphasizing a society's domestic dynamics, so they do not consider the impacts of a state's domestic relations on inter-state relations (Waltz, 2000, pp. 27-41; Wendt, 1987, pp.

340-344; Gilpin, 1984, p. 290; Walker, 1993). Classical IR theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and so on, consider the international sphere as a distinct entity from domestic forces, and in so doing, they do not emphasize the historical and the sociological dynamics of geopolitical regularities (Yalvac, 2013, p. 6). In this framework, John M. Hobson (2002) claims that Kenneth Waltz draws three types of tiers in international politics (pp. 66-68). The first one is the anarchic structure of the international system; the second is the character of units; and the third is the distribution of state capabilities. Hobson takes the second type of tier seriously because Hobson claims that Waltz conceptualizes states (not as an independent variable) in terms of functionality. To put another way, Waltz considers states as an actor emulating other strong states in the consequence of socialization in the international system, which is anarchical (Waltz, 1979, pp. 79-129; Smith, Booth & Zalewski, 1996, pp. 47-59; Buzan, 1996). Thus, Hobson defines Waltzian neorealism as structure-centric instead of state-centric. Furthermore, Robert Gilpin (1981) discusses states' capacity to adapt to the international system, but he cannot account for the effect of domestic variables on international structure (pp. 96-105). In so doing, he, like Waltz, ignores the second tier. For Gilpin, domestic forces exist as a solely intervening variable rather than an independent variable (Hobson, 2002, pp. 68-70). Additionally, neoliberalism (contrary to liberalism) takes states seriously and emphasizes anarchy but affirms other actors' roles in the international system. Yet, it also puts a barrier between societies' internal and external dynamics. (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 24-38; Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp. 40-50; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001, pp. 68-69).

On the other hand, sociology, which is to say classical social theory, deals with social formations in a society without considering the dynamics of international phenomena (Rosenberg, 2013). In this way, both classical social and IR theories cannot focus on the interactive relations between the national and the international structures. Justin Rosenberg expresses that classical social theory and IR should combine internal and external dynamics of social change historically to transcend methodological nationalism. Therefore, Rosenberg emphasizes a methodological internationalism (Chernilo, 2010, pp. 91-92).

In addition, it is useful to mention two significant concepts within IHS, chronofetishism and tempocentrism. These two concepts constitute an underlying property to understand the claims of second wave of Weberian Historical Sociology (WHS) focusing on the relationship between the states-system and capitalism and contributing to debates regarding the sociology of international relations (Hobson, Lawson & Rosenberg, 2010, pp. 16-17). I will limit myself to contend the tempocentrism in criticizing the mainstream IR theories since these theories are isomorphic or homologous through their construction of the present as naturalized and reified; in other words, to these theories, the past is equivalent to the present. Thus, world politics are considered in terms of the timeless and constant logic of anarchy. Mainstream theories take many categories (anarchy, balance of power, etc.) for granted and apply them to all times and places unproblematically (Hobson, 2005, pp. 368-369; Lawson, 2006, pp. 398-402). Therefore, all wars or conflicts are debated in anarchical environment which does not change, and all political units, such as empires and nation states, have similar and functional properties (Lawson, 2007, p. 346).

For example, Robert Gilpin claims that the nature of international relations has not changed across history (Rosenberg, 1994, pp. 94-95). Hans Morgenthau states that the objective laws have been the concrete rules of international events (Cooper, 2013, p. 574). Structural realism as understood by Kenneth Waltz (1979) has reached law-like generalizations by emphasizing the recurrence of historical events (p. 574). In this framework, Waltz considers the rivalry between the USA and the USSR as an equal component to the rivalry between Sparta and Athens. Therefore, this conflation prevents us from seeing the embeddedness of different historical contexts. Historical sociology asserts that the past and present are different entities, and the present has unique attributes. (Hobson, 2002, pp. 5-15). Additionally, as I would discuss in the following parts, historical materialist approaches in IR not only emphasized historical and emancipatory aspects of social world but also addressed its holistic property. In any case, this is one of the most prominent components of historical sociological approaches (Skocpol, 1984).

Consequently, these concepts are important owing to liberalism's and especially neorealism's ahistorical and asociological aspects since these theories reify state and use history to justify the present without focusing on spatial-temporal dynamics (Bhambra, 2011, pp. 656-661). Neorealism with many reasons cannot explain the change of the international system especially systems change. John Ruggie (1986), Richard Ashley (1986) and Robert Cox (1981) raise substantial criticisms towards neorealism, which does not consider the social change. In this context, Lawson and Hobson (2008) focus on the approach of a historicist historical sociology (pp. 7-16). E. H. Carr (1967) claims that there is no absolute truth in history which is promoted by traditional historians, and that historical relics should be embedded in broader social contexts. A dialogue between the past and the present should be provided. Historians should be able to separate significant causes from accidental causes, provide understandable meaning about social change, and be open to new interpretations and facts. Lawson and Hobson (2008) suggests that a historicist historical sociology should cover accidental, agential, contextual, and particular aspects of historical and social processes (p.17). Therefore, these scholars aim to bring historicism into ahistorical IR theories.

### **Weberian Historical Sociology (WHS)**

Marx Weber's definition of the state has a significant place in understanding why neo-Weberian scholars take the violence on the formation of states seriously. "Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Gerth and Mills, 1946, p. 78)." The state as an authority has the right to use violence on a given territory. This definition is also significant since it considers the state as an autonomous and an administrative institution. Weber (1978) claims that there is no single causal change in societies. Social change is multi-causal and multi-dimensional and includes distinct types of domains such as economy, religion etc. (Holton, 2003, pp. 27-33). Through Weber's definition of the state, Otto Hintze (1975) examines the relationship between the military organization and states' composition (pp. 178-315).

As has been discussed in the literature, WHS aims to bring society, state, and international entities not considered by neorealism. In other words, WHS aims to make up an integrated theory that contains sub-national, national and international realms. Scholars like Theda Skocpol (1979; 1985), Charles Tilly (1977; 1990), Michael Mann (1986; 1988), Antony Giddens (1985; 1993), Perry Anderson (1974), Brian Downing (1992), Thomas Ertman (1997), and Hendrik Spruyt (1994) represent the first wave of WHS.<sup>1</sup>

Broadly speaking, the first wave examines the effect of states' construction on domestic structures, and it problematizes the states system within states' construction, centralization and autonomy. In so doing, it focuses on impacts of war, military and strategic competition to understand states' centralization and sovereignty. Furthermore, scholars in the first wave of WHS focus on macro structural processes and the important place of institutions in the social world. According to Yalvac (2013), the first WHS can provide a theoretical state understanding instead of considering the state as a rational and unitary realm. Besides, the first Weberian approaches can take up the relationship between state-systems and social structures or vice versa. Hence, it can create a sociology of international relations (Hobson et al., 2010, p. 14). However, despite all these contributions, the first wave Weberian approach is criticized as a result of its formations of domestic structures in interaction with geopolitical logic deriving from timeless international anarchy (Hobson et al., 2010, pp. 15-16). This approach reproduces the main arguments of neorealism and even makes neorealism more realistic by providing sociological content (Yalvac, 2013, p. 9).

John M. Hobson (2000), in contrary to the first wave of Weberian approaches, develops a structurationist theory to explain state-society complexes in terms of socio-domestic and international global forces (also see: Bhambra, 2010, pp. 131-133). With this approach, he claims that the domestic and the international structures are embedded in social relationships. According to Hobson, states' agential power at the domestic level structurally shapes and constraints the domestic realm. Another agential power is states' influence on the international system. Hobson talks about six basic variables (history and change, multi-causality, multi-spatiality, partial autonomy, complex change, and non-realist concept of state autonomy) to examine the interaction between states and the international system in the critical thinking of Morgenthau and Waltz. Hobson endeavors to apply these ideas to a theorization of the trade protectionism and tariffs of three important countries: Britain, Germany, and Russia. Hobson (1998, pp. 300-301) specifies that these countries reacted differently to the rising commercial relations at the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century (also see: Halperin, 1998, pp. 331-336).

Eventually, Hobson raises the substantial arguments of connecting intra-state relations to inter-state relations, pursues a historical and sociological approach, and transcends Euro-centrism in IR.

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1 However, it is important to emphasize one point that although some scholars in the first wave like Perry Anderson is qualified as a Marxist, these writers are the first to import historical sociology into IR discipline and go beyond the Weberian tradition (Hobson, Lawson & Rosenberg, 2010, p. 14-16). Additionally, Skocpol, Tilly, and Mann makes up the core of this genre.

However, he is criticized since he cannot emphasize the global socio-spatial networks (Shaw, 2000, pp. 229-241). The second wave examines international relations through neorealism's pre-global conceptualization. This wave is criticized since it considers the social world as an autonomous field (Shaw, 1998, pp. 321-324). Therefore, it results in an ahistorical feature that universalizes the societal relations of capitalism and cannot refrain from tempocentrism to explain structural and systemic change (Dufour and Lapointe, 2012, pp. 97-99). Martin Shaw (1998) talk about a third wave in historical sociology that contains the new globalist forces (p. 325).

### **Historical Materialist Approaches**

Historical materialist approaches have contributed to IR discipline importantly. Some Marxist debates in IR regard the transnational class structures and modes of production. Benno Teschke (2011) claims that antagonism between capitalist and non-capitalist states have decreased, and a universal proletariat class has taken form (pp. 1090-1093). As a result of these developments, a communist cosmopolite world now exists in the international sphere. However, Marxism is criticized as an internal theory that cannot explain the states-system. Furthermore, Marxism has neglected the role of the states-system in terms of the reproduction of capitalism and has disregarded the role of capitalist geopolitics in terms of creating a socialist world. As Kees van der Pijl (2007) discussed, Marxism could not produce a perspective addressing states' external relations. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979), Marxism depicts an internal theory that cannot account for dynamics of international relations (pp. 18-37). Waltz also includes imperialist theories in these criticisms.

Some scholars such as Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding (n.d. pp. 116-120), Nikolai Bukharin, and Vladimir Lenin who wrote on imperialism emphasized the final stage of capitalism and the accumulation of capital in the core countries, but they could not account for the theoretical structure of the international system. Those scholars considered geo-political competitions, the colonization process, and WWI as an outcome of capitalism. Therefore, an instrumentalist understanding towards the state dominated their agenda (Yalvac, 2013, p. 11). For example, Hilferding (1981) argued that capitalism transformed from old free competition into several financial institutions at the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century which controlled industrial production due to the centralization and accumulation of capital in the core countries (pp. 5-10). Financial capitalism was controlled by banks and run by industrialists and needed to spread towards new markets for the extraction of raw materials. Or, Lenin (1999) discussed the imperialism as a monopoly stage of capitalism (pp. 81-92). Lenin identified WWI as an outcome of capitalist powers' territorial division to control national markets and the extraction of raw materials. Lenin claimed that the war was capitalist classes' instrument towards both worker class in their countries and capitalist classes in other countries (also see: Knutsen, 2005, pp. 293-295).

As to the World-System Analysis, it can take up the relationship between the states-system and capitalism (Wallerstein 1995). Wallerstein (1974) examines the transfer of resources from

the periphery countries to the core countries (pp. 348-353). Wallerstein (2006) claims that a central authority in the world empire provides the transfer of resources through the tributary system while the same process emerges through the market in the world economy.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, this process results in unequal exchange since the core countries buy raw materials cheaply and then sells them expensively, which cause surplus value to be possessed by the core countries (Modelski and Thompson, 1999, pp. 114-116; Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995, p. 396). However, Wallerstein is criticized for examining the states-system as a component of capitalism and pursuing a deterministic-structural perspective (Hülagü, 2014, p. 195). Therefore, Robert Cox's studies go about the relationship between the states-system and capitalism differently. Contrary to the World-System Analysis, Robert Cox draws a picture examining the relationship between state and society instead of examining the world-system in IR. Cox (1981) discusses historical structures consisting of social forces, different forms of states and world orders (pp. 135-136). He applies the concept of hegemony to inter-state relations. He takes up a capitalist class as a transnational historical block due to its transnational production forms in the international order (Burnham, 1991, pp. 74-77; Apeldoorn, 2004, pp. 142-176).<sup>3</sup>

The Amsterdam School contributes to Cox's studies by criticizing determinist historical approaches emphasizing the economic structure to understand global and regional developments. The Amsterdam School claims that the dependency school and the World-System Analysis cannot explain the transnational class formation and agency concept (Overbeek, 1993). Hence, the School examines the historical materialism of an ontological world and highlights social classes' agential power in which historical materialism is constructed as a praxis theory. (Pistor, 2005, pp. 119-123). Within this scope, Henk Overbeek (2000) critically deals with historical materialism based on nation and state-centric arguments of IR. Overbeek approaches the transnational historical materialism covering the national, sub-national and supra-national categories within state and class formations, and transnational capital movements. Social forces are examined as a transnational variable with regard to state-society complexes (Overbeek, 2000, pp. 168-183). Moreover, Kees Van der Pijl (2007) develops a unit of analysis that focuses on states' modes of foreign relations to align with Marx's modes of production (pp. 619-637). In so doing, Pijl endeavors to develop an international relations approach which focuses on production processes. He (2007) claims that historical materialist approaches reduce states' foreign relations to production relations (pp. 16-19). Therefore, he (2007) denotes that specific types of production relations and foreign relations constitute the productive forces (pp. 621-623; also see: Yalvac, 2013, pp. 10-13).

### **States-System and Capitalism**

We can talk about a prominent discussion between the states-system and capitalism in terms of why a capitalist system (which is not territorial) needs a territorial states-system (Callinicos,

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2 Also see: İslamoğlu, 2010. This book is significant in regards to how the transfer of resources from rural areas to urban areas was distributed by the central authority in the Ottoman Empire through the tributary system.

3 For more information about this debate and process in Turkey, also see: Şenalp, N/D, 191-240.



2007, pp. 533-549; Teschke and Lacher, 2007, p. 566). Many scholars debate the reasons why capitalism emerges in a combination of multiple geo-political systems instead of coming out in a combination of world governments. In this context, David Harvey (2003) separates capital logic from territorial logic (pp. 27-36). Alex Callinicos (2009) supports Harvey's theory, and claims that there is an obligatory relationship between the capitalist system and the states-system (pp. 89-94). Callinicos specifically addresses independency models of geo-political competition and seeks a realist moment to eradicate a reductionist meaning between capitalism and Marxism. However, Callinicos is criticized for arguing the states-system in a Weberian pluralist model since he emphasizes the states-system's composition within its own peculiar dynamics (Teschke and Lacher, 2007, pp. 565-580). Additionally, Callinicos is criticized by Marxist approaches for having a realist perspective (Neil Davidson, 2009, p.9; Gonzalo Pozo Martin, 2007, pp. 551-563).

Political Marxism is another significant field that examines the interaction between the states-system and capitalism by considering the structural aspects of capitalism. Political Marxists focus on the interaction between economic field and political field. They regard surplus value transferred to the political sphere through economic means in capitalist economic system whereas in feudal system, surplus value is directly transferred by the political sphere (Yalvac, 2013, pp. 15). Additionally, they claim that social property relations govern constitution and transformation of international relations (Tansel, 2014, p. 7). Elen Meiksins Wood (1995 & 2003) and Robert Brenner (1977) object to any distinction between economy and politics, which are considered autonomous and irreducible for Weberian approaches. Wood (1995, pp. 19-48; 2003) claims that modes of production are formed in historical processes, and productive systems are considered living social phenomena. However, Political Marxism is criticized for neglecting Marx's value theory. Besides, it does not take the complex analysis of capitalist production into consideration. Moreover, it cannot examine the reproduction and circulation of capital and the distribution of surplus value (Callinicos, 2009, p. 98).

Justin Rosenberg (1994) addresses anarchy and balance of power germane to debates between capitalism and the states-system. Balance of power and anarchy in traditional terms have timeless logic. Rosenberg claims that geopolitical systems are associated with different modes of production. Geo-political systems exist in interaction with the production and the reproduction of social life (pp. 4-6). In feudal systems, war and political events were employed to acquire surplus value. In this context, a balance of power could not be mentioned. In feudal geo-politics, no one aimed to stabilize the system in terms of territorial components through military means. Political units struggled for territorial competition to receive surplus value (pp. 139-142).

Benno Teschke examines class and property relations influencing international relations. According to Teschke (2003, pp. 3-7 and pp. 46-48), the Westphalian treaty is a historical myth (also see: Carvalho, Halvard and Hobson, 2011). He considers the year of 1648 as a historical stage in terms of absolutist states' formation (not in the formation of modern states-system) (also see: Tansel, 2014, p. 8). Additionally, Hannes Lacher (2005) claims that we should look at historical totalities as mechanisms of capitalism (which are different from feudal systems in terms

of geopolitics) rather than transhistorical structures (pp. 30-34). Accordingly, it is important to look at certain institutions which are internalized by societies (Lacher, 2006, p. 60). Lacher (2002) goes about the feudalism-absolutism-capitalism trilogy (pp. 147-164). Consequently, Teschke and Lacher claim that the state formation process and the distinction between internality and externality in international systems have begun before the birth of the capitalist economic system (also see: Yalvac, 2013, p. 16).

## **Uneven and Combined Development (U&Cd) Approach**

In previous parts, I discussed historical-sociological perspective on some basic concepts towards the classical IR theories, and within this context, I examined two important traditions, which are Weberian and historical materialist approaches. In this part of the article, I will discuss U&CD approach, which has been studied in IR discipline recently.

### **What is U&CD?**

Before starting to define U&CD approach which is identified with Leon Trotsky, I would like to express Trotsky's ideas about stagism. Trotsky (2008, pp. 333-335 and p. 890; 2010, pp. 14-15) objects to stagism which is stated by a number of approaches (such as the modernist and Orthodox Marxist) as pursuing a linear development that every society must move through specific modes of production (also see: Pijl, 2015, pp. 56-57 and pp. 5-6; Thatcher, 1991, pp. 235-237; Callinicos, 1982). Trotsky defends an approach to overcome the deterministic view of these approaches that some societies may pass into intermediary stages. Trotsky emphasizes a multilinear development of history (Cooper, 2013, p. 588). A country's backwardness (as has been seen in Russia) becomes an opportunity for revolution to skip the intermediary stages due to the planless and complex character of combined development (Trotsky, 2008, p. 4; Elster, 1986, pp. 54-63).

Uneven development expresses different societies within the social context (Allinson and Anievas, 2009, pp. 49-52). Trotsky expresses unevenness as a historical law (Callinicos, 1982, pp. 1-2; Wright, 1957, p. 19). He associates unevenness with the birth of capitalist economic system, which is expansionist. He claims that the economic and cultural growth of a society and absolute levels of achievement in particular fields are two significant features of uneven development (Thatcher, 1991, pp. 237-238; Linden, 2007, pp. 147-148). Capitalism can merge different levels of advancement into a connected whole, and the tempo of capitalist development is uneven. The economic and cultural level decreases as the development rate of backward countries increases and as the development rate of advanced countries declines (Trotsky, 1957, p. 19).

Combined development connotes the combination of different stages in a society's development; in other words, this is the amalgam of modern and backward formations (Novack, 2011, pp. 135-155; Löwy, 1981). Trotsky considers a society's backwardness as an important factor in order to pass on communist property from capitalist property (Elster, 1986, p. 55). According to Trotsky,

backward countries have to make leaps under the external whip due to unevenness. Imperialism worsens certain branches of industrial development in specific countries by setting them against each other. For instance, Russia had to become a part of capitalist development due to the external necessity. (Trotsky, 1957, pp. 19-21; Trotsky, 2008, p. 5).


For this reason, U&CD might be seen between different sectors in national borders and inter-state systems. Trotsky claims that one might witness antagonism or contradiction in a society. For example, in a country, someone might witness traditional peasant production (primitive in agriculture, dominated by pre-capitalist, or merchant capitalist classes) and modern industrial production (dominated by foreign capital, developed by the state, or produced through combination of these two possibilities). Production intended for national purposes (smaller and backward) and the world market might exist together. Some countries might adopt modern forms of technologies, industrial organization, and scientific thoughts in some areas while the rest of society in other areas might not be on the same level (Trotsky, 1957, pp. 58-59; Bieler and Morton, 2014, p. 38).<sup>4</sup> Concurrently, Neil Davidson (2009) admits two or more modes of production in a single formation and also focuses on intensive industrialization or urbanization in which pre-existing agrarian economies might be based on feudal or capitalist relations (pp. 14-15). And this might result in a combined development covering distinct types of capitalist development (such as competitive, monopoly and neo-liberal) in a country across a period of time (Allinson and Anievas, 2009, p. 52; Matin, 2011, p. 15).

In light of these discussions, the Russian revolution is a significant phenomenon due to its relations and interactions with capitalist expansionism (Allinson and Anievas, 2009, p. 51). Russia had to technologically compete with strong neighbors (such as the Western countries which were militarily and economically stronger and had higher political and cultural foundations) due to military insufficiency and establish new industrial institutions to narrow this gap. Therefore, this process resulted in the combination of highly developed industries with inefficient agricultural sectors because of dynamics of unevenness (Trotsky, 2008, p. 5). According to George Novack (2011), uneven and combined development appeared in Russia as the consequence of contradictory modes of production, which was in combination with pre-capitalist and capitalist relations. For Russia, combined development involved skipping specific stages due to capitalism's

4 In order to understand this combination, you can also see: Ernest Mandel, 2001, p. 559. Mandel claims that a society's agricultural sector in line with its backward properties determines the regulations of internal market due to the lack of the cumulative growth, which means passing certain thresholds, such as capital accumulation, types of industrial organizations, etc., so this process creates a break upon societies' industrialization. Significant amount of capital is diverted into other spheres, such as real estate from industrial sphere. If I apply this to Turkish case, Turkish entrepreneurs between 1954 and 1957 mostly invested on real estate instead of industry because of maximization of profit ratio despite the fact that a dynamic internal market was available due to a rapid urbanization, an increasing construction of highways instead of railways (this is described a transition from public property to private property), and development of mass communications in Turkey. This situation resulted in the demand of industrial consumption and agricultural products. Nevertheless, the industry due to its organizational and technological aspects were not in sufficient level in Turkey, and it was risky to invest on the industry sector for entrepreneurs who were more equipped in commercial sector (Şaylan, 1974, 81). Şaylan has referred to this source for this section: Cem, 1970.

invasion into her backward entities. Trotsky claims that Russia built railroads in the line of the mechanized production by skipping over European artisan and manufacturing stages (Mandel, Accessed March 15, 2016). New types of instruments of capitalist systems created a combined social formation for class relations. Feudal and pre-feudal relations were transformed into a peculiar alignment of classes.

Overall, U&CD specifies three essential arguments as Steve Rolf emphasizes (2015; pp. 113-153). The first argument is related to the whip of external necessity on states' socio-cultural and economic development (because of military and economic superiority of other countries). The second argument is regarding the privilege of historical development which provides certain advantages to developing countries to skip intermediary stages since they import technologies, organizational and institutional forms. Finally, the third argument encompasses the process of catch-up which results in contradictions concerning capitalist crisis in the late developing countries due to amalgam of modes of production. According to Rolf, the first and the second arguments reflect relations between states whilst the third argument expresses relations within social formations. These properties of U&CD might be shown with the figure below:



### **Reconsideration of U&CD**

Although there are a number of scholars that contribute to Trotsky's approach (such as Jon Elster, Baruch Knei-Paz, George Novack, Ernest Mandel, Marcel van der Linden, etc.), Justin Rosenberg is the most significant figure who has reviewed that approach and put it in the agenda of IR.

Rosenberg (2006) claims that U&CD is a significant means to understanding the dynamics of the international system such as the balance of power (pp. 308-312).

Rosenberg (2010) asserts that U&CD as a social development is multilinear and interactive within historical processes (p. 183). A society's developmental processes take unequal spatial and temporal forms. Rosenberg incorporates Trotsky's views into an ontological presupposition, inter-societal pluralism and coexistence, and inter-societal causality (Shilliam, 2009, pp. 70-73). According to Rosenberg (2006, p. 312), classical sociology dealt with inter-societal coexistences and interactions without explaining the constitution of social orders and theorizing the dynamic properties of historical development (also see: Hobson, 2011, p. 151). Political multiplicity of the states-system is better understood through a consideration of U&CD (Rosenberg, 2010, pp. 167-171). In other words, inter-societal determinations derive from unevenness necessitating multiplicity within the inter-societal coexistence (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 320; Allinson and Anievas, 2009, pp. 52-55).

Rosenberg debates combined development as societies' obligatory interactions and their coexistence in terms of general abstraction. Societies' developmental processes are in interaction with their social structures. (Yalvac, 2011, pp. 85-88). Rosenberg (2006) and his co-authors approach the concept of development as processes of directional change which might be causally examined in terms of social relationships of particular structures (p. 330). Social development cannot be solely derived from a society's domestic structures since external conditions constitute an intrinsic aspect of social change (p. 331). As Rosenberg emphasizes, Robert Nisbet argues that through the plurality of history (its diversity, multiplicity, and particularity), many histories, chronologies, and times emerge (p. 333). Rosenberg accounts for the social totality by emphasizing multilinearity which is uneven development and interactivity which functions as combined development to examine human societies (Rioux, 2009, p. 589). This type of developmental process takes an ontological form. Geographical dimensions of states' behaviors are internationally associated with societies' internal development (pp. 312-313).

### **U&CD and Transhistorical Debates**

A review of U&CD by other scholars results in a debate regarding whether U&CD is transhistorical abstraction, or whether it is a mode of production within various concrete relationships and dynamics. In other words, this debate asks whether U&CD is a historically generalized state process or if it is a fact which is peculiar to the capitalist-industrial period.

Rosenberg (2006) claims that U&CD is a transhistorical phenomenon which is intrinsic to historical processes (p. 309). Multiplicity of inter-states relations existed before the birth of capitalism. To this end, Rosenberg endeavors to capture geo-politics' dynamics by focusing on transhistorical processes. Only capital cannot explain the issue of geo-politics. Rosenberg suggests that U&CD might capture the sociological character of historical development and highlight the transhistorical fact of geo-political multiplicity (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008, pp.

88-94). Rosenberg claims that historical processes include the multiplicity of coexisting societies and cultural forms. For this reason, he benefits from Eric Wolf's arguments (2010) focusing on different types of societies in the year 1400 (pp. 24-72 and pp. 385-391). As a result, Rosenberg aims to discuss the geopolitical aspects of combined development with the social aspects of uneven development within the spread of the world market. Rosenberg aims to transcend the dual conception between societal and international reality. Accordingly, U&CD provides a significant aspect for international historical sociology (Rioux, 2009, pp. 585-586).

Hobson deals with U&CD as a sociological feature of historical development. Hence, if U&CD is not accepted as a transhistorical fact, it seems difficult to claim a (non) European-centric perspective (Tansel, 2014, pp. 1-25; Nisancioglu, 2014, p. 328). According to Hobson (2011), Europe was more backward between the 9<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries than were other countries. European countries employed opportunities of their backwardness by benefiting from China, India, and Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, the European miracle is fetishized as a unique developmental process "*sui generis*" which is independent from the East (Yalvac, 2013, pp. 13-20). Trans-regional or trans-civilisational forces are not considered the forces of combined development between civilizations (Hobson, 2011, pp. 153-165). Notwithstanding, Hobson (2011) states that Rosenberg's endeavor to posit U&CD as a timeless presence might jeopardize the historicist aspect of IHS (pp. 151-152).

Although Callinicos (2008) acknowledges the transhistorical features of U&CD as a constitutive social dimension, he emphasizes a particular mode of production. He states that U&CD might explain the states-system, which is multiple, under capitalism (Davidson, 2009, pp. 9-11; Kiely, 2012, p. 235). Callinicos (2008) claims that U&CD as a transhistorical phenomenon might result in essentialism. In order to prevent essentialism, Callinicos recommends the concept of Robert Brenner's political accumulation since it provides a materialist aspect to account for multiplicity. Callinicos claims that more than one mode of production becomes important for examining patterns of U&CD in some types of societies, such as European feudalism in Ireland (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008, pp. 82-83).

John Glenn (2012) claims that Rosenberg should pay attention to transformative, structural and distinctive phases of production mode with conjunctural analysis, which specifies significant historical moments (pp. 86-87). Neil Smith (2008) has similar arguments and claims that the market, economic growth, and the profit motive as a form are peculiar to capitalism (pp. 1-9). In line with Smith's views, Sebastien Rioux claims that Rosenberg's approach cannot answer specific questions. Some of these unanswered questions include, why is the development uneven and combined? What are their dynamics? And how exactly do they operate? According to Rioux (2015), Rosenberg (as Robert Gilpin and Hans Morgenthau have done) considers U&CD an objective law by implementing entirely to the world historical development. Rosenberg debates U&CD as a timeless phenomenon in an obligatory way just like realist writers discuss anarchy (Rioux, 2015, pp. 92-94; Rioux, 2009, p. 591; Knafo, 2010, pp. 495-496; Teschke, 2011, 1102-1103). Moreover, Rolf (2015) claims that U&CD does not address some problems, such as

geographic unevenness, political multiplicity and development to argue with the dependency school, the World System Analysis, etc. Additionally, Kees Van Der Pijl (2015) argues that U&CD is peculiar to capitalist development as well. Although uneven development existed before the capitalist system, it was not combined in the Trotskyian sense. Therefore, if U&CD is accepted as a transhistorical fact, it naturalizes existence of political entities such as sovereign states (Pijl, 2015, pp. 61-66; Teschke, 2008, p. 180).

And lastly, Sam Ashman specifies that U&CD as transhistorical abstraction cannot account for historical processes. Ashman (2009) claims U&CD emerges in specific societal conditions and in a generalized commodity production (pp. 40-43). The capitalist mode of production is historically unique for both combination and unevenness due to its own social relations and political forms. Thus, Rosenberg's approach neglects the great transformation that capitalist relations and political forms are currently undergoing (pp. 30-32 and pp. 42-43). Ashman refuses Rosenberg's endeavor to extend U&CD beyond the origin of human society and any type of mode of production (Hobson, 2011, pp. 153-154). Allinson and Anievas (2009) use value theory to explain relations among U&CD, modes of production and geo-political competition (pp. 56-58).

As a result, U&CD approach is important to address intra-state and inter-state dynamics when we examine a social fact and to embed social relations in a historical process. Now, let's consider this approach in terms of Turkey's integration into capitalism after WWII.

## **Turkey's Integration Into the Capitalist Economic System After WWII**

In the first part of the article, I debated the possible criticisms of historical sociology towards the mainstream IR theories, especially neorealism in connected to Weberian and historical materialist approaches. In the following part, I focused on U&CD approach. In this part, I will try to apply U&CD approach to Turkey's integration into capitalism after WWII (1945-1960) by emphasizing intra-state and inter-state relations.<sup>5</sup> In essence, I aim to indicate how the technology transfer through the Marshall Plan affected Turkey's integration into capitalist system by depending on social class relations in Turkey. However, since historical sociology addresses a holistic approach, I will examine this process within political, economic, and social terms.

Some significant dynamics as an external necessity affected Turkey's integration to capitalism after the war. The first dynamic was related to Turkey's war policy because she pursued a two-sided foreign policy in order to avoid direct involvement in the war. The second dynamic was the Soviet Union's political and military pressure on Turkey in terms of the protection of the

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5 If you would like to learn more about how to apply U&CD approach to the Ottoman history, please also see: Allinson, 2011. Allinson basically takes up in his dissertation how European countries' military power, fiscal policies, and tax collection systems as a whip of external necessity forced the Ottoman State to mimic European countries' economic, political, and social structures during the "Tanzimat" period. Allinson addresses this process as "turning foe in tutor" because of uneven and combined development. Or, you can also see: Allinson and Anievas, 2010, p. 210. These scholars focus on the relationship between pre-capitalist and capitalist U&CD so as to understand the Ottoman State's relations with other European countries by examining the process between 16<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Turkish Straits and demanding the lands in Northeast Turkey, which Turkey perceived as a threat (Zürcher, 1995, pp. 302-303). In 1947, the U.S. established the Truman Doctrine and assisted Turkey in military and economic fields against the threat of communist Soviet Union. From Turkey's perspective, this assistance was important because the Soviet Union's influence would decrease. For this reason, Turkey was backed up within military and economic fields so as to ensure her national security. In the following years, the U.S. established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to contain the Eastern block by guaranteeing the security of the Western block. Within this framework, Turkey applied to NATO for membership and sent her troops to the Korean War (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, p. 400).

After the war, the international system that was shaped according to logic of the liberal market influenced Turkey's relations with the West. Firstly, the Bretton Woods System (BWS) was established to improve trade and fiscal policies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were two of organizations developed to ensure the principles of the BWS. In 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to liberalize world trade. However, one of the most important dynamics transforming Turkey's domestic structure was the Marshal Plan (1948), which had a vital place in American foreign policy. Basically, the Marshal Plan gave an economic role to Turkey to supply raw materials and food for European countries. This plan prevented Turkey from industrializing because she began to invest in the agricultural sector during the Republican People Party (RPP)'s governance, which was under İsmet İnönü's leadership. For example, tractors first came to the country in 1949 in line with decisions taken for liberalization by İnönü government in 1947. In the following years, the Democrat Party (DP) under Adnan Menderes's leadership eagerly maintained the RPP's policy for an agricultural development, which served the DP's liberal economic interests (Pamuk, 2010, pp. 25-26). For this reason, the DP continued importing various types of equipment including tractors in order to increase agricultural production. At the outset of the 1950s, the amount of new arable lands increased, and highway construction expanded.

The DP became successful in its agricultural policies due to the mechanization and use of fertilizers. Additionally, good weather conditions and the Korean War positively influenced agricultural production through the exporting of agricultural products such as cotton (Oran, 2013, pp. 480-486). However, after mid-1950s, this situation changed rapidly in unfavorable ways due to European countries' improvement in the agricultural sector, bad weather conditions and the Korean War's end. Yet, according to some experts, Turkey's economic decline during this process stemmed from a planless economic policy. What is more, other scholars, including Stefanos Yerasimos (1975) claim that agricultural decline during this period was the consequence of the supply of foreign credits; therefore, foreign aid dropped one-tenth in the next years when compared to the year 1950 (p. 1381).

All these discussions showcase that unevenness between societies in the international system in line with the pressures of the other states forced Turkey to pursue an unplanned and a complex economic development. After WWII, the Turkish economy was opened to foreign dynamics in



a planless form in line with the principles of the liberal market; therefore, the Turkish economy faced various types of crises. The Turkish economy had a deficit in contrary to a surplus of trade before the mid-1940s (Boratav, 2009, pp. 101-102 & 107-109). The DP could not perform an extra taxation to lower inflation because of its political background. The state was under the impact of foreign forces, landowners and merchants who opposed sustainable economic growth. The agricultural surplus was not transferred to the industrial field, and farmers were more supported than peasants. Individual savings were transferred to estates rather than to productive forces (Trimberger, 2003, pp. 154-155). Therefore, Turkey's economy was in trend which caused its foreign debts to go up. In order to pay foreign debts, Turkey received financial aid from the IMF in 1958, and in the same year, the Turkish government devalued her currency from 2.80 TL to 9 TL. Turkey's failure in terms of economic context existed in association with some political and social crises in the following years (Oran, 2013, pp. 486-491).

After WWII, Turkey's economic integration with the West contained significant relations within political and social fields. Economic liberalization was seen in political fields because the liberal market necessitated an electoral system. The Soviet threat, Turkey's war policy, and Turkey's ties with the United Nations Charter for the democratization process accelerated the process of political liberalization during the İnönü's period. Turkey declared war on Germany in 1945 to participate in the UN conference, which was one of the steps for the liberalization process (Yerasimos, 1975, p. 1345). In this context, the National Development Party (NDP) in 1945, the DP in 1946, and "the Millet Partisi" (National Party) in 1948 were established (Karpat, 2004, p. 72). Thus, first steps for the composition of a multi-party system were taken in the democratization process by the İnönü government (Zürcher, 1995, p. 308). Additionally, the RPP was moderating statist policies and approaching free enterprise more positively and would withdraw the 17th article of "Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu"<sup>6</sup> in terms of the land reform. What is more, the secular tradition was being moderated, and McCarthyism was beginning to show its impact on leftist ideologies while religious tolerance was high. Furthermore, "Köy Enstitüleri" (Village Institutes) would be reformed (Zürcher, 1995, p. 311). Consequently, Turkey developed strong relations with the West between the mid-1940s and the 1960s by collaborating with it in every sphere in her foreign policies (Oran, 2013, pp. 491-494).

The picture that has been described so far, particularly within the context of the Marshall Plan and the other sorts of international organizations played a significant role in Turkey's integration with the capitalist economic system between the mid-1940s and the 1960s. Turkey's desire to benefit from the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was a direct indicator of this external necessity so as to protect her existence in relationship to the strong state, which was the Soviet Union. Unevenness among societies in social meaning after WWII created a combined development due to the motivation of external pressures on the Turkish state. Yet, combined development did not solely exist between Turkey and the other societies but also emerged in her domestic social formations. Because of the Marshall Plan, Turkey received technological support from the

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6 The 17th article aimed to redistribute the expropriated lands (above 50 decares) run by tenants (Pamuk & Keyder, 2013).

Western countries especially the USA to increase her agricultural production (Yerasimos, 1975, pp. 1361-1364) but due to a lack of industrial development, Turkey faced serious problems in the process. This article will continue its examination with social formations in domestic structure particularly new class formation after the war.

During WWII, some social groups benefited from the war conditions. Those groups did not want to lose their advantageous social status. They constituted their own political parties and pursued a domestic and foreign policy that were harmonious with international conjunctures. As we know, during the war, Turkey passed the Wealth Levy law which brought an obligation to especially minority groups (non-Muslim groups) to receive their extraordinary earnings via a tax reform. This process resulted in a damaged relationship between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. During the war, earnings based on the black market and speculations enriched specific social groups such as the commercial bourgeoisie and landowners. Hence, the Turkish government aimed to control these earnings via the Wealth Levy. However, the Wealthy Levy was abrogated in 1944 as a result of criticisms from England and the USA (Zürcher, 1995, p. 290). In addition to the Wealth Levy, Toprak Mahsulleri Vergisi (Soil Products Tax) for larger farmers, “Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu,” and Village Institutes created discontent for specific groups in society. Yet, interest groups, bourgeoisie cliques and Anatolian commercial capital owners had close relations with high bourgeoisie and political cadres. Therefore, they were not against the economic milieu during the war except for a couple of changes (Boratav, 2009, pp. 95-96). Turkish bureaucracy after the war aimed to control the reconstruction of the country in line with etatist ideology (Karpat, 2004, pp. 153-157; Yalman, 2002, pp. 9-10). A corporatist model defending public interests rather than individual interests became influential in this period. However, the Soviet Union’s threat and Turkey’s war policies resulted in Turkish governments’ aligning itself with the West in line with a liberal understanding (Trimberger, 2003, p. 152).

In light of dynamics emerging during the war in terms of class formations, according to Çağlar Keyder (1988), bourgeoisie revolution after the war emerged as a successful dimension to mobilize the masses. Political power was no longer under the control of bureaucracy due to market mechanisms, and a corporatist solidarism defending national wellbeing under the impact of market principles. Individuals would be freer from arbitrary restrictions of bureaucracy and pursue more independent policies. Yet, a substantial majority of the Turkish population during the period after the war were living in the countryside, and they were small producers. Therefore, only a tiny proportion of Turkish society was characterized in capitalist production relations.

Political power was under the DP’s control after a new election in 1950. Bureaucracy faced a split in its political power (Keyder, 1988, pp. 204-206). The DP received vital support from landowners due to the RPP’s policies regarding land reforms. But, Adnan Menderes, who was a landowner, opposed those reform movements (Kasaba, 1993, pp. 54-56). For this reason, the DP aimed to strengthen private enterprise and its political power based on province. Trimberger claims that DP became successful through representing a class formation based on the land and garnering

the support of the peasant class with its rural policies. Revolution from above, which is "Kemalist" revolution, could not succeed the DP's policies (Trimberger, 2003, p. 140).

In summary, after the 1950s, liberal principles progressed against absolutist rule, and this transformation happened in Turkey's political, economic, and social formations. Paternalism and reformism coming from above were refused. During the 1950s, bureaucracy lost its power under new political and economic conditions, and it was replaced by state managers, which were influenced by bourgeoisie relations. This transformation not only influenced the formation of bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie but also affected social and geographical mobility. Peasants began to migrate to urban areas due to uneven and combined development (Zürcher, 1995, p. 329), and populist policies were influential in pushing them into the capitalist sector as workers and consumers.<sup>7</sup> However, towards the ends of the 1950s, market mechanism made an unfavorable impact on DP's policies. Political management gained a significant power intended for economic policies. A planless economic system did not consider the dynamics of the world market, and the industrial bourgeoisie was not content with DP's policies. Therefore, the intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and bourgeoisie criticized the DP's populist policies, and the 1960 coup emerged (Yerasimos, 1975, pp. 1415-1416). The coup solely brought an innovation in terms of administration. New political order after the 1960s aimed to combine market liberalism and capitalist development in a planned way by strengthening the state's administrative role to manage internal and external aspects of economic policies (Keyder, 1988, pp. 206-213), "The Turkish economy is still an underdeveloped and dependent economy despite a planning tradition of some thirty years or longer. This is the main paradox to be observed. No other country with so long an experience and effort can now be found at the bottom of the underdevelopment scale." (Gunce, 1967, p. 25).

It is important to emphasize one point that during the period before WWII, Turkey had followed an economic policy under the leadership of the state which was responsible for using government capital, supporting enterprises and controlling new industries. Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's presidency, Turkey aimed to industrialize (instead of emphasizing the agricultural development) with statist policies (Yerasimos, 1975, pp. 1294-1315; Zürcher, 1995, pp. 287-289; Karpat, 2004, p. 230). Two five-year plans reducing import in the 1930s emphasized a balance of trade and local demand with the establishment of native industries (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 391). This feature of Turkish economic development constituted a contrast with the market logic which was liberalized in the years following WWII.<sup>8</sup> As I have mentioned before, modernization theory contains a unilineal development and in this context, the USA gave a role to Turkey to advance in the agricultural sector. Turkey would hereby pursue specific stages for industrialization as the USA had done in the past. Many experts came from the USA to give some advice to Turkey

7 If you would like to learn more about how international migration emerges as a mechanism of uneven and combined development in line with social-class and property relations, also see: Evans, 2016, pp. 1-13.

8 According to Korkut Boratav (2009), Turkey's economic growth between 1930 and 1939 was 5.8 %, and this proportion was 7.9 % during the period of 1933-1939 (p. 72). The economic growth of the 1946-1953 period was 10.3 % (p. 101), but this proportion was 4.4 % between 1954 and 1961 (p. 111). Also see: Tezel, 2002, 487-489.


towards the end of the 1940s, and those experts recommended that Turkey did not pursue a statist economic policy anymore and indoctrinate an equal competition between Turkish and foreign capital. For example, M. W. Thornburg, American government expert, was against industrial investments especially heavy industry. In line with Yerasimos's arguments (1975), Turkey was given a role to supply raw materials to European countries which faced significant demolition after the war (pp. 1351-1353). Hence, Turkey would concentrate her energy on agriculture and mining. In return for this, she would be militarily equipped against the Soviet threat: "The World Bank provides no incentive for Turkey to give up her industrialization goal. The thing which is incentivized, the way of reaching this goal in the quickest way, is to give priority to agricultural development." (Yerasimos, 1975, p. 1354).

The İnönü government enacted the encouragement of foreign capital in 1947, and the Menderes government made a law facilitating investments of foreign capital in 1954. Foreign capital acquired different types of concessions (Trimberger., 2003, p. 153; Yerasimos, 1975, pp.1357-1358). Moreover, Turkey passed a law which ordered principles of extracting oil. With these policies, the Turkish economy was liberalized in line with the interests of market logic. In other words, foreign capital and financial credits occupied substantial themes in Turkish policy for the integration with capitalism (Yerasimos, 1975, pp. 1339-1340). Turkey aimed to mechanize her agricultural sector, and to construct highways to facilitate transportation, which resulted in the need for oil. However, all these attempts could not be realized. The economic role given to Turkey just after the war prevented Turkey from skipping intermediary stages. Turkey experienced an agricultural transformation (a certain amount of the lands had low productivity and a precapitalist mode of production) (Yerasimos, 1975, pp. 1404-1405) instead of in the industrial sphere. Turkey acted contrary to the valid logic which suggests that if a country aims to advance, she must increase her industrial production. As Gencay Şaylan (1974, p. 81) specified, the land is a limited resource, so it is not possible to increase agricultural production (Ismail, 1970, p. 138). Even though technological investments ensure the increase in agricultural production, this situation results in unemployment since the working population will increase. Thus, it becomes important for underdeveloped countries to primarily focus on the industrial production.

The DP emphasized economic growth during the 1950s although Turkey did not experience an increase of production because the Turkish government received cheap credits especially from the USA and provided financial aid to various social groups; thus, development was not targeted and Turkey could not skip intermediary stages to become on the same level as Western countries in the next decades. The DP government did not positively approach a planned economy since such an economy was associated with statism. Industrial factories carried on political interests which caused economically poor organizations. These features of Turkish development did not enable large scale investments to emerge during the 1950s (Zürcher, 1995, pp. 327-328). This resulted in contradictive processes as will be seen below, and in the following years, Turkey had to begin a model of import substitution industrialization.

As connected to arguments which have been contended so far, Turkey faced different types of contradictions during the integration process with capitalist economic system because both pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production coexisted. Hence, the third component of uneven and combined development took form in social formation. First, as Trotsky emphasized, combined development might be seen in different sectors and exist between small and large-scaled industrial productions. As industrial production was at low level,<sup>9</sup> small scaled industries were pervasive in Turkey. For example, 98.1 % of small-scaled industrial enterprises were employing less than ten workers. Moreover, many large-scaled industries were producing consumer goods such as food, alcohol, and tobacco which were dependent on agriculture and textile industries (Yerasimos, 1975, pp. 1385-1388). Therefore, these examples prove that Turkey underwent combined development at the national level during this period.

In summary, the table below addresses Turkey's integration into capitalism after WWII in line with U&CD approach:



## Conclusion

This article aims to examine the interaction between historical sociology and IR. The article problematizes the binary structure between domestic and international spheres, state-centrism and Euro-centrism, ahistoricism and asociologism, and capitalism and the states-system. Historical sociology causally aims to embed the international structure in domestic forces and historical processes. Trotsky developed U&CD to examine the dynamics of the Russian revolution. In so doing, he raised significant arguments which emphasized the multilinear properties of historical development. This article argues against approaches defending a linear development model for societies. External necessity is the main component that causes backward societies

<sup>9</sup> Commercial, construction and industrial sectors were respectively receiving 52 %, 3.1 % and 0 % of credits in 1950. But, these rates were 46.8 %, 6.9 % and 2.7 % in 1955 (Yerasimos, 1975, p. 1413).

to undergo great transformations in economic, political, and socio-cultural fields. Societies contain an amalgam of modes of production to catch up to advanced societies. Rosenberg is the most important scholar recasting Trotsky's arguments to fit within the discipline of IR. He identifies the multiple, multilinear, and interactive dynamics of social development (in its inter-societal meaning) to transcend controversial aspects of IR theories especially neorealism. He focuses on political multiplicities and geo-politics' social properties within a historical and sociological framework. According to Rosenberg, U&CD might assert a sociological explanation and pluralistic forms of the international system in a non-reified way when compared to neo-Weberian and neo-realist theories. However, the central criticism directed to Rosenberg concerns his attitude towards the place of U&CD in the full process of historical development. Hence, scholars like Callinicos criticize him for naturalizing U&CD by focusing on its transhistorical properties.

U&CD provides significant arguments to understand Turkey's integration with the West between the mid-1940s and the 1960s. Combined development deriving from uneven development explains Turkey's incorporation into capitalism by relating domestic forces to international dynamics. Therefore, U&CD develops an analytical model that focuses on historical and sociological variables to problematize the social change Turkey experienced during this period. U&CD emphasizes social forces at the domestic and international level without falling into the trap of state-centrism and Euro-centrism. It examines how the international system which is composed of a combination of advanced and unadvanced entities has socialized Turkey.

As I explained in the previous part, Turkey's integration into capitalism after WWII emerged, especially through the Marshall Plan because Turkey imported technology transfer from the USA thanks to social class (and even property) relations in Turkey. The reason why Turkey aimed to integrate to the capitalist system was based on Turkey's war policies and Soviet Union's pressure on Turkey. When we look at this process, it is seen that Turkey emphasized the agricultural production rather than the industrial production when compared the process before the war. The DP was against any genre of the industrial production since it reminded a statist economic and political system. The DP represented bourgeoisie rather than bureaucracy. Therefore, the DP focused on the agricultural production with the support from the USA (but this process may be traced back to the RPP period after the war). However, the DP could not pursue a planned economic system, and in the following years, Turkey faced a capitalist crisis that significant problems within economic, political, and social terms existed. The emergence of the 1960 coup continued the integration with the capitalism in a more planned way.

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