

Instructions for authors, permissions and subscription information:

E-mail: bilgi@uidergisi.com

Web: www.uidergisi.com



Turkey's Nuclear Agenda: Domestic and Regional Implications

Gökhan Bacık, Sammas Salur*

Assoc. Prof. Dr., Zirve University, Department of Political Science

* Assist. Prof. Dr., Fatih University, Department of Political Science

To cite this article: Bacık, Gökhan and Salur, Sammas, "Turkey's Nuclear Agenda: Domestic and Regional Implications", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 6, No 24 (Winter 2010), p. 99-116.

Copyright © International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted, or disseminated, in any form, or by any means, without prior written permission from UİK, to whom all requests to reproduce copyright material should be directed, in writing. References for academic and media coverages are beyond this rule.

Statements and opinions expressed in *Uluslararası İlişkiler* are the responsibility of the authors alone unless otherwise stated and do not imply the endorsement by the other authors, the Editors and the Editorial Board as well as the International Relations Council of Turkey.

Turkey's Nuclear Agenda: Domestic and Regional Implications

Gökhan BACIK and Sammas SALUR*

ABSTRACT

The article studies the nuclear agenda of Turkey from two grounds: material and non-material. Both bases are discussed at length regarding Turkey's position in international policy at regional position and domestic level. Turkey's changing policy at home and abroad are analyzed over a sensitive issue, the nuclear, to grasp whether it would be annoying a nuclear gone state with negative aspirations or a state successful for combining its nuclear need with its liberal agenda in the region and at home. Methodologically, the issues are discussed over 'the norms model'. In order to anatomize the Turkey's changing role in the region the new institutional approaches of Turkey to neighboring countries are handled. Referring relations with her neighbors the materialistic grounds of the nuclear- rather than an identity matter- are explored especially addressing Turkey's energy hunger and its need of stability in regional setting.

Keywords: Nuclear Energy, Turkey, Iran, Security, Norms Model.

Türkiye'nin Nükleer Enerji Siyaseti: İç ve Dış Etkenler ÖZET

Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin nükleer enerji ilgili gündemini maddi ve maddi olmayan temeller üzerinden irdelemektedir. Her iki temel de Türkiye'nin uluslararası pozisyonunun bölgesel ve iç politika düzlemlerinde ele alınmasını gerektirmektedir. Çalışma, Türkiye'nin iç ve uluslararası düzeyde izlediği politikadaki değişiklikleri nükleer enerji gibi hassas bir konu üzerinden izlemektedir. Buradaki amaç değişen politikaların ülkeyi nereye taşıdığına görülmesi istenmesidir. Bir diğer deyişle, Türkiye'nin uluslararası hukuka saygılı bir nükleer ülke mi yoksa nükleer enerji ihtiyacını iç ve bölgesel anlamdaki liberal gündemiyle buluşturan bir ülke mi olacağı tartışması yazının temelini oluşturmaktadır. Metodolojik anlamda; temel problematik 'normlar modeli' üzerinden ele alınmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Türkiye'nin bölgesel politikalarının anatomisinin çıkarılması amacıyla komşu ülkelerle ilişkiye geçtiği "yeni kurumsal yaklaşım" ele alınmıştır. Bölge ülkeleriyle ilişkilerde Türkiye'nin nükleer enerjiye ve bölgedeki istikrara duyduğu ihtiyaç kimlik sorunundan bağımsız olarak maddi temeller üzerinden tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nükleer Enerji, Türkiye, İran, Güvenlik, Norm Modeli.

* Gökhan Bacık, Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of Political Science, Zirve University, Gaziantep, Turkey. E-mail: gokhanbacik@zirve.edu.tr. Sammas Salur, Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of Political Science, Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: ssalur@fatih.edu.tr.

Turkey announced a sophisticated nuclear energy program amidst the discussions raging over the Iranian nuclear program. The AKP¹ Government, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, adopted Law 5654, which is designed specifically to regulate the nuclear energy sector. This new law clearly has in mind a liberal and private-sector-based nuclear market.

Turkey's escalating energy needs have raised the avoidance of energy deficit to top-priority social issue. Predictably, the new Turkish nuclear energy program (TNEP) is very appealing to investors, for it aims to construct ten nuclear reactors by 2020, which no doubt promises huge economic opportunity. Having reactivated earlier plans to develop a nuclear generation capacity, Turkey is now aiming to build 5.000 MW nuclear power plants to meet its energy demand, which is expected to rise by 70% by 2020.²

For sure, realisation of the nuclear program will transform Turkish foreign policy, or at least the international public image of the country. However, regional balances can hardly be set aside in any conjecture about how the TNEP may transform regional politics. Notably, the TNEP may impact dramatically on the public and political image of Turkey, if the controversy about the Iranian nuclear program is anything to go by. But it is also true that no actor on the international stage has levelled the accusation that Turkey has a hidden agenda to develop nuclear weapons. To a large extent, Turkey's decision about its nuclear program has come over as a *fait accompli* in the face of a burgeoning demand for energy in a climate of substantial increases in the price oil.

Nuclear energy is usually defended on materialistic grounds by states aspiring to become producers of it. The connotations of 'nuclear', however, work on the public and personal consciousness well beyond the confines of materialist reasoning. Therefore, the nuclear issue, be it energy or weapons related, should be analysed also from a non-materialistic perspective, which includes several fuzzy issues such as identity, honour, pride, and even power. It is for this reason, some have argued by insisting on nuclear energy that, Turkey is reforming the traditional foreign policy formulated by Atatürk in the 1930s.

Equally important is how the TNEP may affect bilateral relations between Turkey and several other actors, such as the EU, Iran and Russia. Naturally, regional actors will update their definitions of priorities *vis-a-vis* Turkey, if she successfully manages to accomplish her nuclear energy program. Along with many other classifications, a nuclear-based 'haves' and 'have-nots' classification is also functional in analysing regional politics in the Middle East. There is a nuclear-free zone compressed between Russia, Israel and Pakistan. It is well known that Turkey and Iran are two great, aspiring nations in the zone. Therefore, how the image of Turkey will transform itself in the eyes of some other regional states is of considerable importance.

This article, in the light of the issues raised above, studies the TNEP from two inter-related perspectives. The first perspective focuses on the rationale and aims of the TNEP: What does the TNEP stand for? Why does Turkey, a candidate country for EU membership

¹ AKP-The Justice and Development Party, (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*).

² Yusuf Yazar and H. Hüseyin Erkaya, "Turkey: Energy Status and Expectations", *SETA Policy Brief*, No. 6, January 2008, p. 1.

with strong strategic links to major powers such as the US and NATO, need to update its traditional stand on nuclear energy? The second perspective focuses on foreign policy. As usual, the reactions of major international actors are significant hints that prognosis takes on board. It will conclude with some projections on how the TNEP may affect Turkish foreign policy, one of which will emphasise the likelihood that the nuclearisation of Turkey, albeit for energy purposes only, will raise the strategic value of Turkey's relationship with the Western world. In other words, a nuclear energy-producing will have become the new construct that necessarily remodels the construct that is presently its relationship with the West.

Historical background

Turkey has a long record of failed nuclear projects. The history of nuclear energy can be traced back to the 1950s.³ In 1955, Turkey signed an agreement with the US to co-operate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The first nuclear reactor was constructed in 1961, for research and training purposes. However, the research reactor was closed down for technical and financial reasons in 1977. Later, in 1980, a French company constructed a 5MW reactor in Ankara, again for educational purposes. That reactor, too, was shut down in 1993. In the meantime, Turkey had made several unsuccessful forays into nuclear energy production: A plan for constructing a reactor for electricity was decided in 1965. It failed after military rule established itself in 1971. The next set of plans, initiated during the 1970s, also failed during the 1980 military *coup d'état*. The suspensions of major nuclear energy programs after military *coups d'état* were not accidental: Those suspensions were the military juntas' efforts at presenting themselves as harmonious players in the international community.

Then Prime Minister Turgut Özal once again initiated a nuclear agenda in the 1980s. Financial constraints certainly contributed to its downfall. But there were other, more fatal reason for that: The 1986 Chernobyl accident quickly changed the public stance. As Turkey was part of the area directly affected by the Chernobyl fallout, mass-demonstrated public aversion to the idea of the nuclear put huge pressure on the Özal Government. Public opinion quickly turned to favour non-nuclear energy.

The Rationale of the New Plan

Energy Demand

Law 5654 was enacted by Parliament with a special-memorandum clause entitled "general justification", which presented the rationale of the new nuclear energy program. The memorandum lists several major reasons for building nuclear energy stations.⁴ The first group of reasons outlines pragmatic generalities, such as: energy is expensive, especially

³ In writing the following historical presentation, we have excessively used Ayhan Demirbaş, "Energy Facilities and Nuclear Power Program by 2020 in Turkey", *Energy Sources*, Vol. 23, No 4, 2001, p. 410-413.

⁴ "Genel Gerekeçe", TC Başbakanlık Kanunlar ve Kararlar Genel Müdürlüğü, B.02.0.KKG.0.10/101-1313/5007. 31 October 2006.

since the 1974 crisis; oil, excessively used for electricity production, is in limited supply; the use of oil in electricity production is environmentally dangerous, given its CO₂ consequences; and the high level of energy demand can be met by new technologies of energy production. The next group of reasons underlines that nuclear energy is a reality of the modern world, as it is extensively used: there are 441 nuclear power stations in 30 different states. Moreover, 80 percent of all nuclear energy is produced in OECD countries, and 12 states are currently building 27 new power stations. There is a positive know-how effect in nuclear-energy production, whereas that is not true of other industrial sectors. These reasons are tied together with the observation that even if Turkey were to utilise her renewable energy resources and all alternative ones, it will nevertheless face energy crisis in the medium and long term. The official teleology is that Turkey is acutely energy hungry, and that hunger, given its growing economy, cannot be assuaged without recourse to the nuclear energy option.

Validating the realism of this memorandum is the fact that energy demand plays a vital role in nuclear politics in Turkey. The Turkish economy has experienced an average growth rate of almost 5 percent over the past twenty years. The real GDP growth rate is around 7.4 percent now. Turkey lacks significant domestic energy resources, and what it does have is far from enough for satisfying the demands of its rapid economic growth. A concomitant extra 7 percent energy is needed each year.⁵ The country's grossly a-symmetrical supply-and-demand curve creates several major problems: Turkey needs a large volume of energy. The ratio between energy production and consumption in Turkey in 2004 was 1/3.5.⁶ Today, Turkey's energy demand is growing at a rate of 8 percent per year. Over the next 10 years, about 3.500MW of new energy generation capacity has to be installed annually to meet the country's demands.⁷ Current energy production is far from fulfilling the demands of the market, so the situation is worsening.

The Rise of the Nuclear Lobby

The environmentalist movement in Turkey mostly involved in issues out of nuclear concern. Environmentalism, as a social movement, had nothing to do with nuclear issue for the nuclear was not in agenda. Actually, environmentalism in Turkey has been "tamed" especially by the state itself, NGOs, TV and universities and so on. In other words, a proactive environmentalist lobby couldn't be structured by hampering the rebellious and critical nature of the movement. Thus, the issue of environmentalism evolved into a hollow discourse under above mentioned structural polity.⁸ From another perspective, the main reason behind that negation is about low life standards when compared to countries in which both life standards and environmentalism go hand in hand. Subsequently, the major sectors of the energy-consuming public (industrial-

⁵ Yazar/Erkaya, "Turkey: Energy Status and Expectations", p. 1.

⁶ *ELA Energy Reports*, 2004, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/world/country/cntry_TU.html (Accessed on 13 March 2009).

⁷ Ayhan Demirbaş, "Turkey's Energy Overview Beginning 21st Century", *Energy Conversion and Management*, Vol. 43, No 17, 2002, p. 2349-2356.

⁸ Akin Atauz, "Çevreci Hareketlerin Türkiye'yi Sarsmayan Onyılı", *Birikim*, No. 57/58, January-February, p. 20-21.

ists and businessmen) give significant stimulus to the nuclear agenda almost with no considerable reaction from environmentalist circles. Coping with an ever-shrinking energy market, the industrialists have managed to create a strong pro-nuclear lobby that has been bringing pressure to bear on the government for several years. Rahmi Koç, head of Koç Holding, one of the leading producers in various fields, has declared unequivocally that nuclear energy is a “must have” in electricity production. He has opined candidly that political fidelity and the positive resolution of the nuclear issue, and the opening of the nuclear industry to the private sector, are the essentials of the nuclear program. On his estimate, if Turkey does not liberalise its energy market, including the anticipated nuclear component of it, the state’s budgetary facilities will not be able to meet the necessary investment level, which, he claims, will be a whopping \$70 billion dollars by 2020.⁹

This limitation of the state-budget capacity serves as Koç’s major argument for the importance of attracting foreign investment to the nuclear field. He adds also that Turkey’s being a potential nuclear power can strengthen the Turkish hand in the international arena even while it is seeking support for its nuclear program.¹⁰ Many prominent industrialists share his views. The Ankara Chamber of Trade, like many other similar unions, has deemed the nuclear option inevitable, given Turkey’s acute energy hunger.¹¹ The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), the biggest and the most influential organisation of industrialists, has publicly supported the Government’s nuclear agenda.

The government also reinforced its liberal approach towards nuclear issue via both legal and structural ways. Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) designed as an ad hoc authority. By a short glimpse on law 5.710, about construction and management of nuclear power stations that was accepted in 2007, one can easily realize the liberalisation of the Turkish energy market. It’s especially true since energy issues are handled out of classical bureaucratic style by EPDK, which has a prominent role in the context of the above mentioned law.

The TNEP, unlike its predecessors whose “going nuclear” efforts had failed, does not exist as a pure politico-ideological framework. Rather, it operates in a complex, rational and influential social and economic milieu. It therefore commands respect, and its stand is visibly a valid one.

Dependency Fear

Also motivating the nuclear agenda is the fear of dependency. Turkey has become dependent on energy-supplying states like Russia. The political elite see this as a grievous cause for concern. The ratio of energy-sector dependency, according to certain official calculations, may become as high as 78 percent in 2020.¹² To a large extent, Turkey is already dependent on Russian energy because it receives it through complex energy-delivering systems such as the Blue Stream pipeline. For years, Turkish politicians have tried to minimize this dependency with attempts to take delivery through alternative routes. In order

⁹ Yazar/Erkaya, “Turkey: Energy Status and Expectations”, p. 2.

¹⁰ “Nükleer Santrali Gizli Bir El 20 Yıldır Engelliyor”, *Zaman*, 31 July 2007, p. 7.

¹¹ “ATO’dan Nükleer Santral Raporu”, *Milliyet*, 24 November 2007, p. 11.


¹² “Erdoğan’dan Enerji Açığı Uyarısı”, *Radikal*, 24 February 2004, p. 9.

to avoid dependency on one state, Turkey seeks to patronise a diversity of markets, which, in turn, forces Ankara to be in alliance with several energy-producing countries.

However, the energy diplomacy that almost single-handedly determined the basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War era has contended with difficulties such as extreme risk, heavy expense and the need to manoeuvre in unstable region. Turkey cannot command the energy market according to her priorities, nor can she establish a stable energy regime, given the never-ending problems in her suppliers' region. Thus on the one hand Turkey tries to maximize her prowess in energy diplomacy, but on the other hand she tries to minimize her dependency on her current suppliers. The lack of a stable energy regime in the region has created many problems, including that of trust, which is in short supply even among the regional states. In the past, energy-providing states like Russia and Iran have not hesitated to vary energy transactions unilaterally, nor to impose arbitrary prices.

The failure of the European Energy System

The political elite in Turkey perceive the nascent European energy system as an important guarantee of their energy market's stability. The harmonisation of its energy market with the EU's has become one of the major agendas of Turkish foreign policy. However, despite the many well prepared documents on the European energy regime, the Turkish market's harmonisation with it seems, after notable failures, to be a kind of pipe dream, at least for the foreseeable future. European states demonstrated a preference for following their independent energy agendas, even at the expense of harming the spirit of the European Energy System. For example, despite the EU-backed Nabucco project, several European states (Germany, Greece, Belgium and Italy) have signed energy agreements with Russia, which dismayed Turkey. In consequence, the failure to erect a functional European energy regime has constructed another motive for Turkey to search for different energy resources. The ongoing problems in European energy market have forced Turkey to seek alternative resources and models.



Source: EIA International Energy Annual

A Matter of Identity Politics?

Usually, states embarking upon nuclear programs argue that economic and energy-supply concerns are their major motivations.¹³ The critical question to be asked is whether their nuclear status associates with their state identity. Focusing on “the norms model”, we are well advised to check whether there are norms that deliver state identity as a product of aspiration to nuclear acquisition. Since institutions resemble one another in institutional isomorphism, in the new institutionalism a nuclear symbol might become as emblematic in the way that flags, airline logos and Olympic team colours are. In other words, ‘gone nuclear’ might become the symbol of “we are in the international top-dog arena.”¹⁴

A crucial question in this vein is, “does the nuclear energy program have an emotional basis in Turkish foreign policy or is it a politics of pride more than of rational and material needs?” As stated above, the symbolic meaning of nuclear is more than observed in developing countries. Not surprisingly, nationalist and Islamist political parties and groups have championed the nuclear agendas in Turkey as well. The iconic leader of the Turkish Islamist movement, Necmeddin Erbakan, has always emphasized the nuclear. For him, the nuclear is a major symbolic field in which Muslim states should be active, since it is a “must quality” for being a strong state.¹⁵

The nuclear option has always been an essential platform of the leading names in the MHP, a pro-nationalist political party. Both Enis Öksüz and Ramazan Mirzaoglu, who served as ministers, argued that Turkey should develop the technology to produce a nuclear bomb.¹⁶ Since pro-nuclear narratives emerge from marginal nationalist and religious groups as well, “the norms model” is a valid descriptor of the nationalists and Islamists.

The vague link between the nuclear and identity needs further clarification. First of all, nuclear power is seen as a shortcut by the relevant publics. Set against the dominant Western power, nuclear power is readily construed as the guarantee that certain conditions – such as independence, security and honour – can be protected. Societies that set store by those conditions believe that their states may become great powers in a very short time once they are nuclear powers. A perfect freedom from foreign power – be that the US’s, Israel’s or other Western powers’ – is perceived as the pre-condition of a capacity to focus on domestic social and economic problems.

Recall that many Eastern societies’ histories include experiences of dependency in forms, such as colonialism and imperialism, and more recently economic dependence. Dependency is inimical to concepts of national identity. To the mind of the nationalist, it is *de rigueur* to correct dependency conditions. Gawdat Bahgat explains that a shortcut to this end offers in nuclear weapons, those being the most deadly ever invented. Their

¹³ Daniel Poneman, “Nuclear Policies in Developing Countries”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4, Autumn 1981, p. 568.

¹⁴ Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons”, *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996/97, p. 73-75.

¹⁵ “İslam Ülkeleri Nükleer Güce Sahip Olmak Zorunda”, *Milli Gazete*, 29 May 2006, p. 9.

¹⁶ “Interview with Enis Öksüz”, *Akdeniz Postası*, 3 November 1997, p. 5.

deadliness makes them the “great equalizer”, in the sense that their possession diminishes the gap between strong and weak nations.¹⁷ The nuclear option frames a palatable historical perspective, by filling up the huge power gaps created by history. This is the crux of the populist dimension of nuclear programs. For this reason, nuclear programs are the winning electoral and public-policy positions in domestic realm.

Is it logical to read the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government’s recent nuclear energy program in the light of the above explanation? Indeed, the AKP differs from the Islamists and nationalists on many issues, from foreign policy to the economic program. The AKP’s reformist policies, such as improving relations with Armenia and promoting dialogue with the Kurdish leaders, are especially unacceptable to the nationalists. Behaviours of this kind show that the AKP Government has taken a new stance, especially in foreign policy, which can be defined as a new functionalism.

Pragmatism and flexibility are keywords for understanding the AKP’s position. In contrast to the former normative discourse, the AKP has preferred a materialistic and functionalist approach. It is thus that the AKP has, in a relatively short period, made unprecedented changes in the handling of several traditional problems of Turkish foreign policy, not least of which is the Cyprus issue.¹⁸ In more theoretical terms, the AKP should be seen as part of the great transformation of Turkish Islamists in the post Cold War era. This transformation refers to a paradigmatic shift from a nationalistic stance to a more global one.

As part of this transformation, the AKP elite have begun to change their former understanding of world politics. Broadly, this entails a departure from the Turkish political position during the Cold War era. A hidden imperialistic ideology existed throughout the Cold War years, which then unfolded as a euphoria that held at crescendo fervour for about ten years between 1990 and 2000. Actually, this was the result of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis of history, come to fore after 1945 to mould almost all political parties, some of them influenced from the Turkish side, others from the Islamic one. However the euphoria of the 1990s has given way to a *realpolitik* way of thinking, as evidenced by accession talks with the European Union.

The post-imperial trauma which came to the fore in the post-Ottoman period can be identified as the historical reason of such a paradigm. The traumatic element was in the difficulty of becoming a small nation-state after long centuries of commanding a mighty empire. In practical terms, this condition voiced itself in a kind of implicit *revanchism* with sentiments like “Turkey should be an influential power”, and “Turkey should be a leader country”. However, for complex reasons which can be summarized by methodological necessities as follows, the imperialistic ideology is losing ground today.¹⁹ Turkey is becoming an open society which has deep and complex relations with the global world at all levels of modern life.

¹⁷ Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 26, No. 1, April 2005, p. 25.

¹⁸ Gokhan Back, “Turkey and Pipeline Politics”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2006, p. 302.

¹⁹ Several associated traumas impact of the psyches of all Muslims. In a sense, Muslims still experience the trauma with the post-Caliphate world order, and are still in the process of adjusting to it. See Naveed S. Sheikh, *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Policy in a World of States*, London and New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 20-29.

Confirming the above-presented theoretical analysis, the AKP so far has not approached the nuclear energy program as an “identity politics” matter. Instead, it has presented this program as a necessity in face of the country’s energy needs. This Government, in order to vindicate itself before the domestic and international public, has followed what is a simple but functional agenda: Importantly, it carefully avoids using the nuclear issue in daily politics. Unlike in Iran, no high-level politician has made a propagandist use of it.

Actually, from the very beginning of its new nuclear program, Turkey has been in consultation with the International Atomic Agency (IAEA). El Baradei visited Turkey in 2006. During that visit, he assured that the IAEA will support the Turkish program with legal and technical advice, amongst other things by reviewing the draft nuclear law, and by helping with safety, security and quality-assurance matters, and with the management of public information campaigns.²⁰ To boot, the IAEA declared the TNEP “logical” and worthy of the Agency’s support.²¹

Turkey Compared with Iran

Turkey’s nuclear energy program necessitates a comparative analysis with the case of Iran. It is well known that the Iranian nuclear program is a major concern for the international community since its inception. The US and the major EU powers suspect Iran of having a hidden agenda to produce nuclear weapons.²² Turkey announced its nuclear energy program in this political setting. However, no negative reaction to the Turkish program has surfaced to date. Indeed, early reactions indicate that the international community is supportive of Turkey. But why, the question forces itself, does the international community trust Turkey? Apart from the several ideological or normative debates, there are certain structural reasons that distinguish Turkey and Iran.

Unlike Iran, Turkey has never had a revolutionary foreign policy. Iran has been a revolutionary state since 1978. Despite the relatively moderate eras like that of President Khatami, the fervour of Iranian revolutionary foreign policy has not ended; instead, it has been an ever-evolving stage of new forms. The Iranian nuclear agenda may thus easily be explained as an extension of this revolutionary foreign policy. That policy has seen Iran acquiring a brand new identity with the overthrow of the secular regime of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Contemporary global developments have necessitated a modification of this characterization. As Chafetz explained in a different context, if you insist on a communitarian identity, you have to test your economic strength, culture, ideology etc. internationally, for they are meaningless otherwise.²³

²⁰ “Director General Discusses Turkish Nuclear Energy Planns in Ankara”, 13 July 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/dg_turkey.html (Accessed on 14 June 2008).

²¹ “Erdoğan Nükleer Engelden Kaygılı”, *Radikal*, 22 May 2005, p. 3.

²² To read several reactions from important Western leaders and institutions, see Joschka Fischer, “The Case for Bargaining with Iran”, *The Washington Post*, 29 May 2006, p. 6.

²³ Glenn Chafetz, “The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 57, No. 3, August, 1995, p. 748.

Unlike Iran, Turkey has never been a revolutionary state. Instead, Turkey has been a “sober minded” Westphalian state. Since 1923, the two major principles of Turkish foreign policy have been the avoidance of any challenge to the *status-quo*, and the projection of a pro-Western attitude.²⁴ Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy, which is the continuation of an Ottoman diplomatic tradition, has been so strong that it could not be distorted by any government. Turkey has been part of many major Western international settings, such as the Marshall Plan, the OECD, NATO and the European Custom Union, and is today an EU candidate. Third-way ideologies in Turkish foreign policy, such as the Islamists’, the non-alignment movement’s or of the promoters of more specific ideas like ‘the Russian option’, have always been marginal. Political parties that had been critical of the pro-Western foreign policy did not change this position during their terms in office.

As stated above, Turkey has always refrained from mounting a system-wide challenge to the *status quo*. Nor has she ever indicated a geographically ambitious mindset. Even though she felt the loss of her historical lands in the Balkans and the Middle East keenly, no Turkish government has ever voiced an irredentist agenda. Irredentist sentiment has surfaced only in marginal groups’ slogans.

Turkey has an established, highly sophisticated and complex relationship with the Western society of states. Especially since she began her EU accession, Turkey’s involvement with the West has become intense: The Union now exercises surveillance over Turkey in all fields, from agriculture to the economy. As an aspiring member state, Turkey must harmonise her policies with that of Europe. It is also true that the EU aspiration is not only an elitist one that takes place at foreign-policy level: Despite the many problems, at least 54 percent of the Turkish public support Turkey’s membership to the Union.²⁵ Since 2002, the pro-EU AKP has won two consecutive general elections and acquired a substantial dominance in local elections by occupying most of the local seats. Therefore, anti-EU policies are likely to court high political costs. In short, Turkey, compared with Iran, is submissive to international norms and principle. A significant departure from the traditional pro-EU orientation seems highly improbable.

Turkey is thoroughly acquiescent in a highly complex adaptation process controlled by the Union. The European Commission publishes its yearly Progress Reports to evaluate the state of play in terms of Turkey’s accession to the Union. In these reports, the EU analyses Turkey’s performance as an open democracy fully observant of the rule of law, and it expects to see that observance in the judicial system, and in the regulation of transportation, fisheries, intellectual property, etc., as well as in macro- and micro-economic developments. Naturally, the yearly reports include detailed attention to energy production. As the 2005 Report makes clear, the Union evaluates Turkey’s energy position according to “European energy policy objectives”. Turkey is asked to harmonise with the energy *acquis* of the Union.²⁶

Referring to the Government’s nuclear energy program, the Commission reminded that Turkey is party to the IAEA agreements that entered into force in 1981. But it acknowledged the need for certain preliminary steps. First, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority’s (TAEA)

²⁴ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2003, Vol.1, p. 46-47.

²⁵ “Türkiye’de AB’ye Destek Yüzde 54”, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/394508.asp> (Accessed on 4 August 2007)

²⁶ European Commission, *2005 Progress Report*, Brussels, 9 November 2005, p. 85.

administrative capacities and resources have to be strengthened considerably before the licensing process for building nuclear power plants might begin. The TAEA itself, currently a body of the Ministry of Energy, should be transformed into a fully independent regulatory authority with its own budgetary resources. Also, the Commission appreciated the progress made with regard to nuclear safety and radiation protection, for several regulations concerning radiation safety had been adopted during the period reported. The Commission concluded that Turkey needs to ensure its compliance with the Euratom Treaty requirements and procedures. There is also the reminder that, according to relevant international agreements, Turkey already has an obligation to consult neighbouring countries on proposed nuclear installations, and to provide information that allows them to conduct their own impact assessment.²⁷

As the above discussion sought to note, the level of dependency between Turkey and the Western society of states is very sophisticated, to the point that it is not comparable with Iran's position in international relations. Turkey is tightly linked to a complex system of European surveillance that subsumes her nuclear program. Not only in the nuclear field but also in general, Iran is well short of enjoying anything like a comparable interdependence with the West. In a sense, Turkey's recognition of the EU's unrestricted right of surveillance is a structural guarantee of success for its nuclear program. Thus, the cost of conflict between Turkey and the EU on the nuclear issue would be seriously destructive. Iran's potential range of manoeuvres against Europe is very considerably bigger than Turkey's.

At this point of the discussion it should be obvious that Iran's nuclear strategy is comprehensively unlike Turkey's. Today's Turkey challenges only its domestic politics on the nuclear issue (It is instructive to remember that the earlier suspensions of the nuclear program were motivated by the intention to safeguard harmonious relations with the international community). Meanwhile, she is sparing no effort in the self-set task of letting the world community know that it is moving gently away from being a bipolar "bureaucratically controlled" regime to becoming part of the interconnected, global materialistic quest for nuclear energy.

The Regional Setting

An article published by International Herald Tribune in 2006 argues that Turkey's nuclear program puts her position at risk in many areas, among them her aspiration to EU membership, her relations with the US, and her security in the regional context. Also, Turkey's nuclearisation may send other countries in the same direction.²⁸ This article gives no quarter to the fact that no substantive criticism of nuclear-headed Turkey has come from the US or the EU. The Turkish Energy Minister has visited his counterpart in Washington for a discussion on co-operation. The visit included a tour of the nuclear reactor at Lake Anna. Indeed, the US has offered to help build Turkey's first nuclear power plant. And, as noted above, supportive remarks have come from the IAEA. However, no matter how the TNPE is perceived by the Western world, another equally important issue is how the regional powers may react to its program. As a number of events in the Middle East have demonstrated, regional balances are as important as domestic priorities. The TNPE will have to be mindful of this.

²⁷ 2005 Progress Report, p. 87.

²⁸ Jon B. Wolfsthal and Jessica C. Varnum, "Heading of Ankara's Nuclear Temptation", *International Herald Tribune*, 10 August 2006, p. 7.

Iran

How the TNEP may affect Turco-Iranian relations deserves special attention. Turkey and Iran are, in many issues, in competition. Their dyadic relationship is born of a complex historical legacy that precedes secular Turkey and Islamist Iran. As the first principle of this dyadic relationship, the rise of one state is perceived as risky by the other. Thus, the rise of Iran in the region puts the Turkish position at risk in many fields. So, the Iranian nuclear program can be deemed the catalyst that gave momentum to the recent Turkish nuclear energy program. A retired general has said: "If Iran has more power than Turkey that is a danger for Turkey". His dictum is an apt summary of the Turkish military's, and to some extent, of the political elite's, position.²⁹ There is a core belief that Turkey should counterbalance Iran in any field, including the nuclear.

At no time during the Iranian crisis has Turkey ever challenged Iran's right to nuclear production for peaceful purposes. Prime Minister Erdoğan has displayed his unhappiness over the pressure on Iran. He has also articulated his concern that Turkey may come under similar pressure. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Government has been criticised by several US and EU officials for being "too soft" on Iran for its nuclear program.

Actually, Turkey's position with regard to the Iranian nuclear crisis is difficult. On the one hand, she is seen as a reliable representative of Western intensions regarding Iran. Speaking to a Turkish news channel, El Baradei aired his view that, as a fellow Muslim nation and neighbour of Iran, Turkey has a major role to play in convincing Iran to resume talks on its nuclear program, and in helping Western governments understand Iran's point of view.³⁰ Unlike the Western states, Turkey has insisted on Iran's natural right to use nuclear energy in peaceful ways. Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has been emphasised several times by high-profile Turkish leaders. What is unacceptable to Turkey is the prospect of Iran producing weapons of mass destruction.³¹

Turkey's relatively moderate policy on Iran has a consistent rationale. First, Turkey needs Iranian energy supplies. The volume of energy imported from Iran is of great importance to the Turkish market. Turkey, naturally, does not want to jeopardise its continuing supply. Iran is the major counterbalance of Russia on the energy market. In this sense, Iran's is a unique position in Turkey. A very recent case has affirmed this: Russia has almost perplexed the Turkish project to bring Central Asian gas to Europe. Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have just made a decision to build a new gas pipeline. This may leave in abeyance, or even set aside, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project³² that was to transport Central Asian gas to Europe from Turkmenistan.³³ That pipeline was to have been connected to the South Caucasus pipeline in

²⁹ Dorian Jones, "Turkey's Nuclear Ambitions: More Nuclear Power in the Black Sea", *Qantare*, 12 May 2006, www.qantare.de (Accessed on 14 May 2007)

³⁰ "Baradei: Türkiye'nin Rolü Önemli", *Radikal*, 7 June 2006, p. 5.

³¹ Yigal Schleife, "Caught in the fray: Turkey Enters Debate on Iran's Nuclear Program", *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2 February 2006, p. 8.

³² Kulpash Konyrova, "Putin deal torpedoed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline plans", http://www.neurope.eu/view_news.php?id=73862 (Accessed on 17 May 2007).

³³ South Caucasus Newswire, "Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project: Azerbaijan might transit Kazakh gas to Georgia", http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/depeches.php?idp=1064 (Accessed on 23 April 2007).

Baku, by means of a new Nabucco pipeline, the construction of which is now in doubt. Russia's gaining access to Turkmen gas and winning approval for a direct pipeline around the Caspian was a further blow to the prospects of the construction of Nabucco.³⁴ In rapid reaction to this Russian-created situation, Turkey signed a co-operation agreement with Iran. Although this agreement was criticised by the US, Turkey decided to import Turkmen gas *via* Iran.³⁵

Several other factors exist to set the contemporary Iran-Turkey relationship: (i) As a regional state with its own nuclear energy program, Ankara cannot indulge a comprehensive condemnation of Tehran. For one thing, there is no realistic basis for it. So even though Turkey is with the Western states in pushing Iran for transparency, she is committed to defending the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (ii) Turkey has a good and growing trade volume with Iran. The USD\$1 billion trade volume of 2000 had grown to USD\$4 billion by 2005. Unlike the unstable neighbours like Iraq and other states with weak trade volumes like Georgia, Iran stands as a strong trading partner. (iii) Regional issues and security are of great importance. Turkey needs Iran's support on many issues, from the PKK problem to the Iraqi problem. The two countries have similar views on many of those issues, including the Iraq and PKK questions.³⁶ The historically competitive relationship between Turkey and Iran has paradoxically created pockets of accord, especially on security-based concerns.

In consequence, despite the expectations of some, no great rift between Turkey and Iran is likely, especially not on the nuclear issue. Gülden Ayman argues that for certain reasons, Turkey does not perceive the Iranian nuclear program as a threat. According to Ayman, the Iranian-Turkish relations in no way create a sovereignty crisis for either of the two sides. The balance of power between these two regional actors is such that neither side has the dominating position. In other words, Turkey and Iran balance each other. Very significant in keeping this balance steady is that both states are against the idea of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.³⁷ Hostility to the creation of a Kurdish state has forged a tacit but functioning entente among Turkey, Syria and Iran. These states' desire to protect the regional *status quo* should be analysed carefully.

However, some analysts believe that an armaments race may emerge between Turkey and Iran, as neither will tolerate a tilt in the balance of power.³⁸ In fact, the contemporary Middle Eastern state system depends on such a balance mechanism between Turkey and Iran, Iran and Israel, etc. The regional actors will be quick to react to any substantive structural changes in those established balances. Thus, if the international community fails to prevent Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the Turkish stand may change radically. The worst-case scenario is that an Iran with nuclear weapons will force Turkey, and perhaps some other states, into nuclear armament.

The European Union

In its 2006 Progress Report, the EU noted that Turkey's capacity to fulfil *acquis* requirements regarding nuclear energy is fairly advanced. It was careful to emphasise that the independ-

³⁴ Miriam Elder, "Putin triumphant in Turkmen gas deal", *The St. Petersburg Times*, 15 May 2007, p. 4.

³⁵ Iran Focus, "US Criticizes Turkey-Iran Gas Deal", <http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=11876> (Accessed on 16 July 2007).

³⁶ Recall that Iran has raided PJAK in recent times. Bernd Kaussler, "Iran moves against PJAK in Northern Iraq", *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 29, No.4, September, 2007, p. 4-5.

³⁷ Gülden Ayman, "İran Nükleer Krizi ve Türkiye", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006, p. 42-43.

³⁸ Saad Muhyu, "Türkiye ve İran Nükleer Silah Yarışına Girebilir", *Radikal*, 4 September 2006, p. 9.

ence of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority is highly desirable. At present, this Authority's supervisory responsibilities are not separated from its research function, nor from its role as the promoter of nuclear energy. The Union does not approve of this. Besides, the Union is of the opinion that a substantial upgrading of existing facilities is needed, among them the radioactive-waste management and storage facilities. Also, the Union has reminded Turkey that she has not yet acceded to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, to which Euratom became a contracting party in January 2006.³⁹ Finally, the Union has insisted that Turkey has an obligation to consult neighbouring countries on proposed nuclear installations, and to provide information that allows them to conduct their own impact assessment.⁴⁰

The EU's apparently tolerant attitude to the Turkish nuclear program needs close analysis, for both sides have their own interests and security concerns. Turkey's first major concern is the status of her candidacy for EU membership. Given this, no major change is expected in Turkish foreign policy. As a candidate state, Turkey is expected to harmonise its foreign policy with the Union's. The *acquis* necessitates the harmonisation of foreign policies. By nature, the integration of states presumes the need for a re-direction of loyalties.⁴¹ Political integration, therefore, means the re-organization of national matters, including foreign policy, in such a way that their 'centre' is 'new', i.e. not that which it was before integration. The EU makes a similar obligation of engagement in an adaptation process in foreign policy.

A further reason for the EU's tolerant position towards the Turkish nuclear energy program is a pragmatic one: The EU's dependence on energy imports will increase steadily in the period 2010 to 2020. That dependency is growing daily. The EU does not have the resources needed to cover its domestic demand for energy. As a result, Europe is forced to import fossil energies from outside the Union. Given these conditions, the EU has defined four political targets: managing demand, diversifying European sources, a streamlined internal energy market, and controlling external supply. Under the rubric of controlling external supply, the Union confirms that the EU must enter into strategic partnerships with major potential suppliers. In May 2003, the Union declared its support for modernising energy-supply systems through large-scale infrastructure projects.⁴²

The increase in energy consumption in European countries now requires new supply routes. The Turkish option is defined by the priority axes as decided in the TEN-E Guidelines. Accordingly, the EU will need to be connected to the Turkish network by 2010 if it is to receive gas from the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East. As the Turkish corridor is expected to become a major transit route in the following decade, the possible construction of two Balkan routes, to Austria *via* Southeast Europe, and the pipeline connection from Turkey to Greece and Italy, is foreseen. The issue of connecting the European and the Turkish energy systems is critical. This is perceived as an essential step by the EU in order to be connected with the energy resource in the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East.

³⁹ The European Commission, *Turkey 2006 Progress Report*, Brussels, 8 November 2006, p. 49-50.

⁴⁰ The European Parliament Policy Department, *EU-Turkey Relations in the Field of Energy*, EXPO/B/KM/2006, 20 April 2006, p. 9.

⁴¹ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, London, Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 19.

⁴² Bacık, "Turkey and Pipeline Politics", p. 294-295.

In brief, facing a huge energy demand, the EU needs the Turkish corridor. This strategic reasoning naturally helps the Turkish position. Since Turkey has such geographical importance in terms of sustaining the supply of energy to the European market, her stability in terms of energy must be protected. Abnormal levels of fluctuations on the Turkish energy market are unwanted situations for Europeans. This gives good ground for the expectation that the nuclear option, already under the strict supervision of the EU, will keep the Turkish corridor stable and safe.

Russia

Russia has been interested in the Turkish nuclear energy program from the very beginning. In an interview published in a Turkish newspaper, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov said that Russian companies are “greatly” interested in Turkey’s plan to build its first nuclear power plant; they are making preparations to tender for the facility’s construction rights. In fact, it was reported that *Atomstroieksport*, the leading Russian company implementing inter-governmental agreements on building nuclear facilities overseas, has decided to take part in the Turkish nuclear market.⁴³ As expected, if Turkey keeps moving ahead with her nuclear program, Russia will come forward as the state most ready to co-operate with her. Naturally, a nuclear contact between Turkey and Russia may easily transform the traditional relationship between the two states.

The “nuclearisation” of Turkish-Russian relations may change the traditional perceptions of the ongoing patterns. Russia, as a state with a high level of knowledge in the nuclear field, might become available to Turkey as the natural alternative source of technical information, and as a state on whose political co-operation she can safely rely. Since the end of the Cold War era, Russia has managed to keep her relations with Turkey relatively good, thanks to two major factors: trade and energy. Both countries have been fairly successful in keeping certain political crises out of the ambit of economic considerations.

As a regional power and an ally of the US, Turkey is influential in regional relations. Should a significant level of co-operation on nuclear matters build up between Russia and Turkey, Turkey’s role in the region will have gained an extra dimension that will diminish the value of her US-ally status. Turkey’s closeness to the US came to fore by strategic means after the Stalinist efforts to blackmail the straits, and was then riveted by NATO membership. Today, any co-operation on the nuclear issue may lead to such a strategic relation in the long run. Actually, Russian leader Vladimir Putin, after meeting former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in June 2006, announced that he had proposed co-operation in nuclear energy and space exploration (another very strategic field) to Turkey.⁴⁴ The crucial effort for Turkey is to secure the political support of a strong country. A good volume of trade, too, is well worth pursuing with any country with a strong trade capacity, remembering that the earlier nuclear projects were all abandoned for financial reasons. On both these considerations, Russia looms large as a significant partner for Turkey. The rise of the nuclear as a third factor will absolutely consolidate this partnership. In so doing, the energy based inter-dependence between these two countries will be tightened, yet there will be expansion, too, in other matters.

⁴³ “Türkiye Hamlesi”, *Milliyet*, 31 May 2006, p. 7.

⁴⁴ “Russian moves construction of nuclear power plant in Turkey”, *RIA Novosti*, 15 May 2006, p. 5.

Bulgaria and Armenia

Bulgaria, even though about to be a member of the EU soon should be mentioned as Turkey's neighbour and as a country has favoured using of nuclear power for electricity since 1956. The energy ministry of Bulgaria is responsible for nuclear power industry. Regarding safety issues, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) was set up under the safe uses of Nuclear Energy Act 2002 and the Kozludly Nuclear Power Plant plc. NRA is a member of Western European Nuclear Regulator's Association (WENRA) since 2003 and undertaking the nuclear functions related to the EU accession.⁴⁵ Bulgaria, as a party to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is under NPT safeguard agreement since 1972. Even though it's not a Euratom member, it signed an additional protocol with IAEA in 2000.⁴⁶

Armenian nuclear power plant Metsamor was constructed in 1970s and started commercial operation in 1979. The plant produces about 40% electricity of Armenia. Even though the plant was closed due to earthquake of 1988, it was reopened by the government to meet electricity deficit of the country. For installation of new 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant, some serious studies are about to be finished. The country needs a new plant since the current one doesn't meet international safety conditions. The US supports Armenian plans to construct a new nuclear power plant. Besides, engineering and technological upgrades, management and operational safety issues have all been handled by the US aid and technological support.

Both awaited Bulgarian membership to the EU and membership to remarkable atomic institutions are good news for Turkey. Turkey's full membership application to the EU also tightens Turkey's nuclear hand since Bulgaria would be good example in that sense. Nuclearisation of the US-Armenia relations can be read as a further legitimization of Turkey's nuclear programme since the US involved in a nuclear issue in the region. Armenia, albeit a revisionist country even at marginal sense regarding some ultra-nationalist elements, the euphoria by the visit of Turkish president to Armenia has easing the relations between both countries. Thus, nuclear Armenia is never a threat to Turkey. Actually, what interested Turkey is not a nuclear threat but rather a safety of neighbouring countries' nuclear power plants.

Conclusion

For sure, the nuclear energy program has the capacity to trigger changes in Turkish foreign policy. If her nuclear energy program reduces Turkey's dependency as expected, she will alter her policies towards Iran and Russia. However, as long as Turkey's commitment to the Western society of states is duly rewarded, either in the form of EU membership or strategic co-operation with the US, a dramatic change is not realistically expected. Some analysts argue that the nuclear agenda may change the traditional Turkish foreign policy that is playing within the rules of the game.⁴⁷ Can the TNEP introduce major revisions in Turkish foreign policy to the extent that it precipitates a crisis in Turkey's relations with the West? It is hardly possible to answer with an unqualified affirmative. The nuclear option may change Turkey's preferences. In the past, when the nuclear-energy based connections with major Western states such as Germany and Canada

⁴⁵ World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Bulgaria", <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf87.html> (Accessed on 8 August 2008).

⁴⁶ International Nuclear Safety, "Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plant Profiles", <http://insp.pnl.gov/-reports-pocketbook-armenia.htm> (Accessed on 7 August 2008).

⁴⁷ Karl Vick, "Energy, Iran Spur Turkey's Revival of Nuclear Plans", *Washington Post*, 7 March 2006, p. 4.

ran into trouble, Turkey did not hesitate to search for alternatives, such as Argentine. But they were short-term reactions that could not divert the route of Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, the level of dependence between Turkey and the Western states is much more sophisticated today than it has ever been in the past.

The current data and conditions do not validate the expectations of some that Turkey might try to acquire nuclear weapons in the long term. The cost of a non-European foreign policy orientation for Turkey would be destructive. As stated before, the first condition for such a dramatic change is a fundamental rupture between Turkey and the West. However, it should be underlined that the post-Cold War developments consolidate the link between the international system and Turkey. In a sense, Turkey has re-entered the system, especially in the last two decades. Today, Turkey is eager to adopt the standards of the Western system through membership of the EU. More important to Turkey is that the volume of her exports is now around USD\$100 billion. This trade figure is another basic sign of the dawning of a new era in the system for Turkey. Thus, a major tension between Turkey and the system in the era of her late re-entry has no fertile ground. Strengthening links with the major players in the global world offers solid and unprecedented opportunities for Turkey in economic, strategic and diplomatic fields.

Important for future developments is, how Turkey perceives several security mechanisms, such as the NATO security guarantee. The reluctance of several NATO members, among them Germany, to deploy NATO defence forces on Turkish territory in 1991 has created a kind of paradigmatic shift among the Turkish elite. If such incidents recur, Turkey's present stance will change. Some European states' growing reluctance to welcome Turkish membership of the EU is of similar importance. These situations may change the Turkish stand in two major ways: As it happened in 1991, Turkey may lose its belief in the Western guarantee systems. Secondly, the Turco-sceptics in the EU, such as France, and their manoeuvres to delay Turkish membership, may turn the Turkish public in favour of nuclear weapons. As several prominent experts, such as Olivier Roy, have argued, if Turkey feels it is alone in the system, the nuclear option is nothing more than rational. Thus, rejection of the Turkish membership of the EU may have extraordinary consequences. Structurally, the major mechanism that keeps Turkey out of the nuclear camp is the security guarantee offered by the West.

As a state still not part of the EU, Turkey has to cope with many challenges by herself. Turkey is in a zone of wars and threats. Facing this milieu, in which several sorts of dependencies put her national interest at risk, rational behaviour for Turkey is to secure her energy market. Paradoxically, states that had no significant connection for reasons of trade, nor ground for co-operation for any other reason, are now connected through pipelines and energy corridors. However, a pipeline connection with a state like Turkmenistan, which still has major internal problems, is no guarantee of another state's long-term national interests. Energy co-operation in such an environment creates an unbalanced inter-dependence, and this does not foster trust at the regional level. In such an environment, the TNEP may move to rectify Turkey's energy dependency. Naturally, Turkey, with a capability of producing nuclear energy, may choose to elevate her image against other states', given that it is in a region where competition among states is acute. But, no matter how the future unfolds, the real and present task of the TNEP is to deploy a balanced strategy that achieves two things: (i) the acquisition of a nuclear-energy production facility to overcome Turkey's severe dual problems of looming energy deficit and dependency; (ii) the retention and exploitation of the opportunities the global system is presently making available to Turkey.

Bibliography

Akdeniz Postası, 3 November 1997.

Atauz, A., "Çevreci Hareketlerin Türkiye'yi Sarsmayan Onyılı", *Birikim*, No. 57/58, January-February: 20-32.

Ayman, G., "İran Nükleer Krizi ve Türkiye", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006: 25-61.

Bacık, G., "Turkey and Pipeline Politics", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2006: 293-306.

Bahgat, G., "Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 26, No. 1, April 2005: 25-43.

Bernd Kaussler, "Iran moves against PJAK in Northern Iraq", *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 29, No.4, September, 2007: 4-11.

Chafez, G., "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 57, No. 3, August, 1995: 743-775.

Demirbaş, A., "Energy Facilities and Nuclear Power Program by 2020 in Turkey", *Energy Sources*, Vol. 23, No 4, 2001: 401-415.

Demirbaş, A., "Turkey's Energy Overview Beginning 21st Century", *Energy Conversion and Management*, Vol. 43, No 17, 2002: 2349-2356.

EIA Energy Reports, 2004, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/world/country/cntry_TU.html (Accessed on 13 March 2009).

European Commission, *2005 Progress Report*, Brussels, 9 November 2005, p. 85.

Haas, E. B., *The Uniting of Europe*, London, Stanford University Press, 1958.

<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/394508.asp>

International Herald Tribune, 10 August 2006.

Milli Gazete, 29 May 2006.

Milliyet, 24 November 2007.

Milliyet, 31 May 2006.

Oran, B., *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2003.

Poneman, D., "Nuclear Policies in Developing Countries", *International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4, Autumn 1981: 568-579.

Radikal, 22 May 2005, p. 3.

Radikal, 24 February 2004.

Radikal, 4 September 2006.

Radikal, 7 June 2006.

RIA Novosti, 15 May 2006.

Sagan, S. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb", *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996/97: 54-86

Sheikh, N. S., *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Policy in a World of States*, London and New York, Routledge, 2003.

TC Başbakanlık Kanunlar ve Kararlar Genel Müdürlüğü, B.02.0.KKG.0.10/101-1313/5007. 31 October 2006.

The Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 2006.

The European Commission, *Turkey 2006 Progress Report*, Brussels, 8 November 2006.

The St. Petersburg Times, 15 May 2007.

The Washington Post, 29 May 2006.

Washington Post, 7 March 2006.

www.qantare.de

Yazar, Y. and Erkaya, H. H., "Turkey: Energy Status and Expectations", *SETA Policy Brief*, No. 6, January 2008.

Zaman, 31 July 2007