

ON THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE THIRD WORLDISM

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Öz

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dünya Üçüncü Dünya halklarının uyanışına doğdu. Yüzyıllar boyunca “gelişmiş” Batı ülkelerinin hâkimiyetinde yaşamış halklar savaş sonrası silahsızlanma, barış, ekonomik adalet, gibi söylemlerle bezenmiş bir Üçüncü Dünya projesine yoğun ilgi gösterdiler. Bu makale Üçüncü Dünya projesinin tarih yazımını incelemektedir. Bu anlamda çalışma mevcut tarih yazımına toplumsal hareketler düzeyi, devletler düzeyi ve uluslararası düzey olmak üzere, üç düzeyde odaklanacaktır. Söz konusu üç düzeyde makale ilk olarak halkların dünyanın farklı coğrafyalarında verdiği mücadeleleri konu alacaktır. İkinci olarak, milliyetçi hükümetlerin anti-emperyalist mücadelelerini konu alan eserlere odaklanılacaktır. Son olarak ise, uluslararası düzeyde anti-emperyalist ve anti-kolonyalist mücadele veren Bağlantısızlar Hareketi masaya yatırılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Üçüncü Dünya, Anti-Emperyalizm, Ulusal Kurtuluş Mücadeleleri, Bağlantısızlar Hareketi.

Üçüncü Dünyacılığın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü Üzerine Bir Tarih Yazımı

Abstract

After 1945, Western countries witnessed the awakening of the Third World. People of underdeveloped countries, who had been subjected to domination by developed Western countries, showed an interest towards a project of the Third World; the underlying motto of which was shaped by disarmament, peace, and social and economic justice. This project aimed to embody a radical break from the economic, political, social, and cultural paths which were devised in the West and then imposed on the rest of the world. This paper will analyze the historiography of this project. In this context, this paper will approach such literature from the lenses of social movements that emerged in the Third World, of nation states and of international relations. Through social movements, it will firstly focus on the people's struggles in the different regions of the so-called Third World. Secondly, the paper will analyze academic works whose main subject is the anti-imperialist struggles of different nationalist governments. And lastly, it will criticise scholarly works on the Non-Alignment Movement, which

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pursued an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist political agenda at the international level.

Keywords: The Third World, Anti-Imperialism, The National Liberation Struggles, The Non-Alignment Movement.

Introduction

After 1945, Western countries witnessed the awakening of the Third World. A considerable number of people including peasants, workers, the urban poor as well as intellectuals and politicians struggled against colonialism and imperialism in an attempt to put an end to the economic, political, social, and cultural dependencies of their own countries. Although it is true that the especially anti-imperialist struggle is also an intrinsic feature of Soviet socialism, this paper will not analyze all kind of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles all over the world. Rather, it will analyze the historiography of the struggles waged against colonialism and imperialism in the Third World. The main thesis of this paper is that the historiography of the Third World analyzes these struggles at three levels; as social movements, states, and as international politics.

Focusing on the first level of analysis, it is evident that social movements aimed to overthrow colonial - or native - governments that were seen as an extension of imperialism. Where successful, they attempted to build a socialist platform into their national ideologies to combat capitalist classes and imperialist forces. At the second level of analysis, it is apparent that some state and government leaders argued for breaking their countries' economic dependence and political relations with the Western world. Their main aim was to develop their countries as a whole, rather than transforming only their social structures. At the third level of analysis, one can see that Third World countries acted together to construct an equal and multilateral international economic and political system. In doing so, they created a Non-Alignment Movement and drafted a Third-Worldist ideology.

Among the historiography on the struggles waged in the Third World, Gerard Chaliand's *Revolution in the Third World*¹ and John Foran's *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*² present a general picture of revolutionary movements in the Third World. Then came Jeffrey Paige's article "The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America"³ and Jose A. Moreno's article "Class, Dependency and Revolution in the Caribbean: Preliminary Considerations for a Comparative Study of Aborted and Successful Revolutions"⁴, (both were published in *Revolutions in the Third World* edited by Quee-Young Kim). They look at the revolutions and revolutionary processes in Latin America at the social movement level. In the same vein, William LeoGrande in his article "Central America"⁵ and Henry Dietz in his work "Revolutionary Organization in the Countryside: Peru"⁶ (both edited by Barry M. Schutz and Robert O. Slater in the collection *Revolution & Political Change in the Third World*), analyze the revolutionary struggles waged in Latin America. In addition to these, Richard Gott's *Cuba: A New History*⁷, Sergio Bitar's *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*⁸, John P. Entelis's

¹ Gerard Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World* (London: Penguin Books, 1989).

² John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

³ Jeffrey Paige, "The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America," in *Revolutions in the Third World*, ed. Quee-Young Kim (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991).

⁴ Jose A. Moreno, "Class, Dependency and Revolution in the Caribbean: Preliminary Considerations for a Comparative Study of Aborted and Successful Revolutions," in *Revolutions in the Third World*, ed. Quee-Young Kim (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991).

⁵ William LeoGrande "Central America," in *Revolution and the Political Change in the Third World*, eds. Barry M. Schutz and Robert O. Slater (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990).

⁶ Henry Dietz, "Revolutionary Organization in the Countryside: Peru," in *Revolution and the Political Change in the Third World*, eds. Barry M. Schutz and Robert O. Slater (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990).

⁷ Richard Gott, *Cuba: A New History* (London: Yale University Press, 2004).

⁸ Sergio Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1986).

*Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*⁹, and William J. Duiker's *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*¹⁰ explain the policies and strategies of revolutionary movements during the fight against imperialism and colonialism.

For the fight against imperialism at the state level, several articles analyze the political actors who shaped the anti-imperialist struggles during the Mosaddeq government in Iran, notably *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*¹¹ (edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne). At the international level, while A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune look at the Non-Alignment Movement in their book, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*¹², Vijay Prashad examines the rise and fall of the Third-Worldist ideology in his *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*.¹³

At all three levels, the Third World should be considered as a failed political project. At the level of social movements, the success of the revolutionary groups depends upon their ability to take power and then to build an equal and just society. The movements which perceived socialism solely as an ideology of economic development and which excluded the workers and peasants from state mechanism largely failed. At the level of the state, the main aim of government leaders was to break their countries' economic and political dependency on imperial powers and use their natural resources for ambiguous national interests, rather than transforming the social structure of their individual countries. In conclusion, some of these leaders gradually shifted their nationalist ideologies and capitulated to the established world order in the 1980s and 1990s. Others were overthrown by the alliance of

⁹ John Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).

¹⁰ William J. Duiker, *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

¹¹ Gasiorowski, Mark and Byrne, Malcolm eds., *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004).

¹² A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (Connecticut: Third World Books, 1986).

¹³ Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations* (New York: New Press, 2007).

imperialist powers and their native collaborators. At the last level, Third-Worldism lost its revolutionary zeal with the dramatic change of the Third World leaders' economic and political choices. The assaults from the New Right and the demise of socialism as an ideal in the 1980s were other important factors in the loss of revolutionary enthusiasm in the Third World.

Before Beginning: on Colonialism and Imperialism

Before jumping into a critical reading of the mentioned monographies, it is necessary to analyze the meanings of colonialism and imperialism. Although it is true that several empires throughout the world history invaded the other lands, the European conquest of the other parts of the world which began after the 16th century ushered in a new epoch in the sense that European conquests, as different from their preceding examples, did not just take away the resources and wealth of invaded lands, they also shaped the economic and social structure of the latter and created new inequalities and/or escalated the existing ones. In this regard, this “new” colonialism played a vital role in the existence of capitalism in the Western Europe. Therefore, the colonialism is defined as the forcible takeover of land and economy.¹⁴

At the same time, we must pinpoint a difference between imperialism and colonialism. Like colonial practices, the imperial ones have rooted in the early imperial rules of such as, the Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire and so on. However, the meaning of the term has changed in time. In the capitalist age, imperialist practices did not necessitate a direct control unlike the imperial practices of the pre-capitalist times and colonial practices both pre- and after capitalism. In this sense, political independence does not automatically translate into an economic independence, vice versa, an economically imperial country, as in the case of the USA, may wield a economic and military control over the entire globe without

¹⁴ Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 3-5, 20.

having a direct political control. As a result, imperialism can function without colonies, but colonialism cannot.¹⁵

Despite the differences between the terms, it is very difficult to separate anti-colonial struggles from the anti-imperialist ones in the case of the Third World. As such, anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles are more or less combined under the flag of Third Worldism. The liberation project of the Third Worldist ideology assumed both an economic and political independence from the oppression of the West to a certain degree.¹⁶ In this regard, by the Third World struggles, and Third Worldism, this article refers to a program underlined by economic, political and cultural emancipation from the oppression of the colonial and imperial forces represented by the developed, capitalist West.

Social Movements in the Third World

In his book, *Revolution in the Third World*, Gerard Chaliand examines the general framework of revolutions in the Third World. He mainly claims that although revolutionary waves after the Second World War were seen as the hope of humanity in the world, the expectations from these waves were never realized. Firstly, the majority of revolutionary movements in the Third World could not create strong links with local people and consequently, they failed. Secondly, after taking power, the revolutionary movements created a kind of bureaucratic state in which oppressed people were excluded from the decision-making processes. According to Chaliand, this outcome was an inevitable result of the Leninist party formation which these movements developed. This highly centralized and hierarchical party organization model was adopted to execute power in the name of the proletariat or peasantry, but in practice, the majority of workers and peasants were excluded from power. The ultimate result was the alienation of revolutions from people of the Third World.

¹⁵ Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, 7.

¹⁶ Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 16.

Before analyzing revolutionary struggles, Chaliand depicts a picture of the Third World in which big landowners and state administrators constitute the ruling class. The large peasantry was tied to their landowners with the mechanisms of debt and they were doomed to exist under miserable conditions. After the infiltration of capitalism (through colonial and imperial means) into the Third World, this ruling class was replaced with a newly created state bureaucracy under the imperial or colonial rule. The main responsibility of this bureaucracy was to maintain economic production to support the growing metropolises of imperial or colonial forces. Chaliand claims that this new bureaucracy led to the first anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements which initially existed as conservative movements and later evolved into national ones. After the Second World War, the national movements erupted into national-socialist movements, (mostly inspired by the Chinese Revolution in 1949) national liberation movements against colonialism in Africa and populist currents and governments against imperialism in Latin America.¹⁷ According to Chaliand, these revolutionary movements can be classified under the three categories of armed struggles, national liberation movements, especially in Africa, and as national and social struggles.

Chaliand analyzes the armed struggles in Latin America, Africa and Asia. He looks firstly at Latin America where he argues that the armed struggles there mainly emerged as a result of the Cuban Revolution in Latin America. The revolutionaries in Latin America were buoyed by the success of the guerrilla movement in Cuba and they tried to apply the same strategies in their own countries. Chaliand claims that, despite their enthusiasm, most of the guerrilla struggles in Latin America failed. First of all, they underestimated the power of their states, which were not weak and corrupt like the Batista dictatorship in Cuba. Secondly, the guerrillas could not penetrate into the life of the peasantry, which they defined as the vanguard class of revolution. Most of the guerrillas came from the urban middle class and most of them were not familiar with rural life. The guerrillas were generally not

¹⁷ Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 1-21.

cognizant of the real problems of the countryside. Furthermore, most of the guerrillas could not even speak the language of the peasants. For example, few guerrillas in Peru could speak the native tongue of the rural areas, Quechua, and few could communicate with local people well. The leaders of the revolutionary movement, such as Che Guevara, barely knew the problems and conditions of peasantry in Bolivia.

In Colombia, the legal political parties and their clientelist webs were influential among the peasants and the course of political events did not transform into revolutionary activities among the peasants. For Latin America, Chaliand mostly sees the reason for failure as the inability of the revolutionaries, though he barely touches on the structural conditions that the guerrillas faced.¹⁸ Then, Chaliand addresses the question of colonial struggles, especially in Algiers. He claims that although the majority of the population supported the revolutionary anti-colonial movements in this country, the victory was not secured by this support. Rather than rising from the strength of guerrilla struggles, independence came as a result of political, social and economic deterioration of the colonizing country, namely France.¹⁹

Chaliand maintains that armed movements in Asia were more successful. In order to understand the success of armed struggles, Chaliand focuses mainly on Vietnam and analyzes the political tradition and social structure of Vietnamese people. He claims that there was a strong political tradition of rebellion among the Vietnamese due to the Confucian tradition which encourages the overthrow of corrupt governments by its people. The guerrillas could, therefore, easily convince people to fight for them against both the French colonial government and then the Diem regime in South Vietnam. Furthermore, Chaliand argues that village communes, in which the peasants got engaged in communal work, were common throughout the history of Vietnam. Thus, the idea of socialism was not far away from the hearts and minds of the

¹⁸ Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 39-66.

¹⁹ Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 66-74.

peasantry. Based on this political structure, the guerrillas could build strong relations by speaking the same language with the peasants, respecting their dignity and participating in their communal work. In contrast, French and then South Vietnamese and American troops alienated the peasants by humiliating them and inflicting violence upon them.²⁰ In his analysis of armed struggles, Chaliand is more convincing when he examines Vietnam. Unlike his analysis of Latin America, where he barely touches on the structural conditions, Chaliand carefully analyzes how structural conditions inhibited or accelerated the armed struggles in Asia.

After exploring armed struggles, although he does not say anything about how he perceives their bureaucracies, Chaliand deals with how the anti-imperialist and socialist revolutions created a state structure in which social groups were excluded and bureaucratic classes maintained the power. He firstly sheds light on the anti-imperialist national revolutions, in this case the Nasserist movement in Egypt. After taking power with a coup d'état, Nasser used the discourse of the oppressed nation in his international relations. He mostly wanted to save his country's economic and political development from imperialist pressures. However, his egalitarian rhetoric remained discursive and to make the things worse, he did not touch on reality in domestic affairs. The state and the economy began to be controlled by a small number of administrative elites. The bureaucrats interpreted socialism only as a means for industrial development. Under this assumption, they nationalized industry and expanded the state-controlled economy, but they did not try to change the class structure of the country. Rather, they constituted a new class and held the power and wealth in Egypt.²¹ Chaliand claims that the socialist governments, which took power by mass support, tried to change the economic and social structure on behalf of peasants and workers. But unlike anti-imperialist national revolutions, a small bureaucracy continues to

²⁰ Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 90-98.

²¹ Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 100-108.

hold power and does not allow the oppressed groups to participate in the decision-making process.

In this context, Chaliand shows the Vietnam Revolution as an example. He admits that the revolution launched considerable reforms in education system and health care, and it was able to meet the basic needs of the poorest sections of the society. However, it failed in creating a democratic mechanism wherein the decision-making process operates from bottom to top. For example, the decisions regarding agricultural and industrial production were taken by the top officers within the party.²² According to Chaliand, this was the result of the Leninist party model which the leading party of these revolutions constructed. Chaliand superficially analyzes this party model and claims that the Leninist party was an organization of small groups in the Russian Revolution and, after taking power in 1917, they created a bureaucratic state in which Russian peasants and workers did not take part. The same process happened in all socialist states including China and Yugoslavia.²³ At this point, Chaliand's argument is not clear enough as to why the Leninist party model necessarily resulted in bureaucratic state power.

According to Chaliand, the revolutions in the Third World mostly failed. Chaliand claims that few of the armed struggles succeeded in taking power in the Third World. The anti-colonial movements taking power in Africa turned out to be bureaucratic states which were alienated from their people. Nor did anti-imperialist states in the Middle East try to change the social structure of society, and their idea of equality remained solely as the equality of nations in international affairs. In the countries in which the socialist movements successfully took power, bureaucracy controlled the political power and eventually retarded development in favour of material benefits.²⁴

²² Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 140-146.

²³ Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 148-165.

²⁴ Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, 186-191.

In this sense, it can be said that Chaliand's argument about the reasons for failure or success of armed struggles is convincing. Nevertheless, with regard to armed struggle, he mostly analyzes the policies of the guerrilla groups. However, he does not take the social, political and economic structures of the regions into the account that the guerrillas challenged, except for the Vietnam context. He is also convincing in explaining the bureaucratic nature of anti-imperialist national revolutions and socialist revolutions, but he is not necessarily arguing enough as to under which structural conditions these revolutions evolved to become bureaucratic states. To recap, Chaliand's work is insufficient in explaining the underlying conditions of his rationalization and thesis.

Like Chaliand, John Foran examines not only revolutionary struggles, but also revolutionary governments in the Third World in his book, *On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. Foran is certainly more successful in explaining the structural conditions under which these struggles are waged. To this end, Foran depends on a theoretical model which claims that neither structures, nor the actions of agencies by themselves, can give us a sufficient grasp of the elements required to understand revolutions. In fact, a more balanced approach between the questions of how agencies act in a certain set of structural conditions and to what extent structural conditions allow agencies to act in that way, should be constructed.

Foran, then, proposes the combination of five interrelated causal sets for the Third World Revolutions; 1) dependent development, 2) a repressive and exclusionary state, 3) the existence of a powerful culture of resistance, 4) an economic downturn, 5) a world-systemic opening.²⁵ Then, Foran analyzes the revolutionary movements and processes in the Third World by searching for the combination of these factors. To achieve this goal, he classifies the revolutions as successful or failed revolutions and

²⁵ Foran, *Taking Power*, 2-18.

he firstly deals with the revolutions that succeeded in holding power.

Under this subheading, Foran analyzes social revolutions and anti-colonial revolutions through the lens of his theoretical model. Under the first category, he examines the Mexican Revolution between 1910-1920, the Chinese Revolution, the Iranian Revolution and the Revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua. As an example, in the Cuban Revolution he searches for the existence of his causal sets. In this context, Foran holds the view that the dependent development in Cuba resulted in a highly fragmented and antagonistic class structure. While on the one hand, wealthy classes and the ruling class, which rely heavily on their relations with the US, exploited the natural and human resources of the country, the poor people lived in miserable conditions in the cities and in the countryside with a high rate of unemployment and temporary employment. Furthermore, this dependent development resulted in the existence of an economic structure which mostly subjected to mono-crop production, namely sugar. Under these conditions, most basic goods were imported from the US. Regarding state structure, Batista and his colleagues controlled the state, excluded other groups from the administration and violently oppressed whomever they felt acted against his power.

For his third causal factor, Foran claims that there was a violent and strong culture of resistance which was inherited from the Cuban Independence War with the Spanish Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. During the peak of revolutionary movements in 1958 and 1959, the price of sugar and tobacco decreased in the world markets and production of these commodities was disrupted by revolutionary movements. When all these causal factors combined with the US's lack of support for the increasingly corrupt Batista regime, the populist coalition of working classes, middle classes, students and landless peasants overthrew the regime in 1959.²⁶

²⁶ Foran, *Taking Power*, 57-65.

For anti-colonial revolutions, Foran highlights the five above-mentioned causal factors in the cases of Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Vietnam. In this section, he primarily states that colonialism was the driving factor of these revolutionary processes, leading to a dependent development in which societies were polarized between the wealthy classes in the center of cities and poor classes, especially in the countryside and in urban shantytowns. He also points out that colonial states created oppressive state mechanisms and excluded the larger masses from participating in state administration.

Under the category of rebellious political culture, he argues that strong nationalist sentiments have existed among the majority of people since the beginnings of colonization. The coup d'état which overthrew the Salazar dictatorship in 1974 in Portugal, and the defeat of the US in Vietnam, paved the way for a world-systemic opening for anti-colonial movements. Foran links the economic downturn in the colonies to repercussions from the world economic crises of the 1970s and it had significant impact on the periphery of the world.²⁷ Within this framework, he discusses the successful revolutions in Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Vietnam in detail. As an example, for Vietnam he defines three revolutionary processes: the liberation of the North in 1945, the French defeat of 1954 and the revolutionary war against South Vietnam and the US between 1959 and 1975. For the last process, Foran argues that the South Vietnamese economy was highly dependent on US aid and imports. The state elites mostly benefited from this economic transaction between South Vietnam and the US. Furthermore, the government in South Vietnam did not allow mass participation in legal politics and violently repressed any social opposition.

A rebellious political culture also took shape during the time of resistance against the French. Furthermore, the Confucian culture, which proscribes the overthrow of corrupt regimes by the populous, was another parameter in this rebellious culture. Foran

²⁷ Foran, *Taking Power*, 88-90.

claims that the US economic crisis of the 1970s and the rise of domestic political opposition in the US against the Vietnam War created the way for world-opening system.²⁸

After these examples of revolutionary success, Foran evaluates the revolutionary failures in order to justify his theory. He holds the position that the absence of the elements cited as his causal factors is the reason for failure of revolutions. In this section, he examines Bolivia, Chile, Iran, Grenada, Jamaica, Guatemala and Nicaragua. For example, he claims that the dependent development in Chile created an unequal structure. A class struggle tradition can also be attributed to this country, especially after the first quarter of the twentieth century. Chile also witnessed an economic downturn in the last period of the 1960s. At this point, although Foran argues for the world-systemic opening and repressive state apparatus, his argument on these two causal factors are not convincing. Importantly, he misses the significance of a strong legal political tradition in Chile as explained by other scholars²⁹. Foran claims that some of these factors were reversed in the process of revolution, after the period of socialists. During the time of the socialist government, the economic downturn undermined the revolution, the coalition carrying the socialists to power, was fragmented and the US decided to intervene in Chile.³⁰

To conclude the point, Foran tries to justify his theoretical models by examining the revolutions in the Third World. His model successfully analyzes the acts of revolutionary movements within the structural conditions that encircle them. In this sense, this book is a good example of social movement and revolution literature. On the other hand, as with every theoretical model, Foran's model does not sufficiently explain all revolutions in the Third World, including Chile's. Foran accepts the failure of his model in the Chilean case and makes some mid-range generalizations, rather than all-

²⁸ Foran, *Taking Power*, 131-145.

²⁹ For this tradition, see Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy* and Lois Hecht, *Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and the Search for Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

³⁰ Foran, *Taking Power*, 158-180.

encompassing ones. Despite this weakness, his work is a significant contribution to literature about the revolutions in the Third World.

The Regional Struggles

Unlike the attempts made by Chaliand and Foran, most of the works on revolutions in the Third World do not even have a try at constructing vast generalizations. Instead, they analyze one region or one country and make mid-range generalizations. In this context, Jeffrey Paige in his article “The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America” and Jose A. Moreno in “Class, Dependency and Revolution in the Caribbean: Preliminary Considerations for a Comparative Study of Aborted and Successful Revolutions,” (both published in the book, *Revolutions in the Third World*, edited by Quee-Young Kim) and William M. LeoGrande in his article “Central America” (in *Revolution & Political Change in the Third World* edited by Barry M. Schutz and Robert O. Slater) engage in revolutionary processes in Central America and Caribbean.

There are some other works focusing attention on the individual countries of Latin America such as Herry Dietz’s article “Revolutionary Organization in the Countryside: Peru” (in *Revolution & Political Change in the Third World* edited by Barry M. Schutz and Robert O. Slater), and Richard Gott’s book *Cuba: A New History* and Sergio Bitar’s *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*. In addition to these, John P. Entelis goes over anti-colonial war and the socialist experiment waged in Algeria in depth in his book called “*Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized.*” Lastly, William Duiker addresses the historical developments which paved the way for revolution and then socialist policies in Vietnam, in his book titled “*Vietnam: Revolution in Transition.*”

All of the studies mentioned above analyze some revolutionary failures in the Third World. While some of them perceive the intervention of imperialist forces as the main reason behind these failures, others point out the deficiencies of the economic programs, hierarchical structure of movements and/or

incompatibility of revolutionary ideals with assumed culture of societies. Their common point, however, is that none of these studies places emphasis on how ordinary people were influenced by the revolutionary movements and transformations and responded to them.

In his article, Paige analyzes the different political and social developments in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The main questions he raised can be formulated as follows: Although all of these countries had similar social compositions and common colonial histories, why then did a socialist revolution occur in Nicaragua, while a military regime existed in El Salvador and a democratic regime was maintained in Costa Rica?³¹ By answering these questions, he is critical of Barrington Moore's assumption of the social roots of democracy, which argues that the institutionalization of democracy can be provided by the development of a strong bourgeoisie. As counterpoint to this argument, Paige claims that the bourgeoisie in Latin America did not play such a role. On the contrary, that group supported authoritarian regimes.³²

According to Paige, unlike Europe, no coalition existed between land owners and industrial bourgeoisie in these three countries. In fact, dependent economy created a mono-crop economy in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicaragua and coffee producers became the bourgeoisie; that is, the landed classes and industrial bourgeoisie organically overlapped. These two groups supported the authoritarian regime in El Salvador. Furthermore, small landowners and middle classes in the cities fought against the bourgeoisie, which had demanded a limited democracy under its own control and provided the transition to a democratic regime in Costa Rica. The coffee producers could not engage well with the world economy and this backward community supported the Somoza dictatorship. That regime was destroyed by the informal

³¹ Paige, "The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America," 37-38.

³² Paige, "The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America," 39.

and dispossessed proletariat of both the cities and the countryside.³³

Although Paige's criticism of Moore is key to understand the class configurations in Latin America, his argument is that revolutions depend on a single factor: class configuration. According to his model, revolutionary success or failure seems to be the natural extension of class configurations in a particular country. His model also reduces the state to simply a tool of the classes. In this regard, he misses the importance of politics as an autonomous force in the revolutionary processes.

Like Paige, Jose Moreno puts emphasis on class configurations in order to explain the Haitian Revolution in 1804 and Cuban Revolution in 1959. Furthermore, he only deals with the examples of successful revolutions and at this point, he misses the revolutionary processes themselves. For Moreno, dependent development and its results were the main factors for the Haitian and Cuban revolutions which ended this dependent relation.

According to Moreno, the dependency of Haiti on France, and Cuba on the US, resulted in backward economies and determined class configurations. In Haiti, the ruling class and wealthy class constituted the same class and they were mostly white. Their loyalty was to France and the French bourgeoisie, rather than to Haiti. In Haiti, the small land owners and mulattos demanded the participation in the state administration and the right to vote in the National Assembly, as inspired by the French Revolution. To gain strength, they leaned heavily on the poor black slave majority in the population. Although Moreno does not explain this point in detail, he claims that the slaves initiated a political movement and showed their opposition to existing political, social and economic structures by burning and destroying the sugar and coffee

³³ Paige, "The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America," 40-41.

plantations.³⁴ Moreno holds the view that similar to the wealthy classes in Haiti in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the wealthy classes in the twentieth century Cuba were dependent upon the US both politically and economically. These classes were composed of small groups of industrial and financial bourgeoisie. In addition to a small middle class, the balance of the population was made up of landless peasants and the urban poor. The Cuban revolution was initiated as a reaction to the dictatorship of small wealthy classes, who supported by the middle class. After the revolution, they broke dependent relations with the US and were successful in maintaining power.³⁵

Like Paige, Moreno represents a highly reductionist approach by reducing the revolutionary processes in Central America to the dependent development and class struggles. Furthermore, as it occurs in Paige's explanation, states and complex political developments are not included in Moreno's explanation.

Unlike Paige and Moreno, LeoGrande explains the Central American revolutionary movements and revolutions during the 1970s and 1980s by looking at multi-causal factors like undeveloped social and economic structures, states and the ideology of revolutionaries. The first factor, according to him, is the US-supported capitalist infiltration of this region in the 1960s, resulting in social reconfiguration and mass poverty. In the countryside, the peasants lost their lands as a result of an export-oriented economic model and were the cause of urban poverty after their migration to cities. Secondly, the states in Central America responded violently to the reform demands of these classes and paved the way for revolutionary movements. On the whole, LeoGrande anticipates the rise of revolutionary movements in the moments of increasing social inequalities, combined with

³⁴ Moreno, "Class, Dependency and Revolution in the Caribbean: Preliminary Considerations for a Comparative Study of Aborted and Successful Revolutions," 47-49.

³⁵ Moreno, "Class, Dependency and Revolution in the Caribbean: Preliminary Considerations for a Comparative Study of Aborted and Successful Revolutions," 49-53.

state suppression of demands for social and economic reforms. Thirdly, for him, the idea of independence from the US (which he saw as the main reason for underdevelopment), Marxism, and Christian liberation theologies³⁶ were all important components of the ideologies of the revolutionary movements in Central America.

Within this same framework, LeoGrande analyzes the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 and the revolutionary movements in El Salvador Guatemala. In Nicaragua, the decisive moment was the state oppression of those demanding reform. The repressive characteristics of the state resulted in the shifting of oppositional group support to the guerrillas, who subsequently overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. In El Salvador, the army's intervention in the 1972 elections and exile of political leaders resulted in the coalition of different guerrilla groups and the eruption of civil war. The state then included the political opposition in the legal processes in 1984 by ordering new elections. This fragmented the coalition of the guerrillas. In Guatemala, the repressive regime in the 1970s sparked action from existing guerrilla movements. The government decreased the level of oppression in the cities and implemented huge military operations in the countryside. These operations reduced the strength of the guerrilla troops.³⁷

In conclusion, as different from Paige and Moreno, LeoGrande is more successful in explaining the revolutionary processes in Central American by constructing a model which analyzes multi-causal factors like social classes, states and ideologies. In this way, his explanation effectively presents how agency operated in these structural conditions.

³⁶ Liberation theology is derived from Christian theology and emphasized upon the liberation of oppressed people. It emerged in Latin America with the studies of several clergy in Latin American Catholic Church, such as in Brazil and Uruguay. The Black Theology in the USA and South Africa was inspired by the liberation theology.

³⁷ LeoGrande, "Central America," 145-151.

Henry Dietz, in his article on the revolutionary struggle in Peru, analyzes the *Sendero* movement by analyzing some of its key characteristics such as ideology, leadership, organization. His main concern is how this movement was at least partially successful in some parts of Peru. In his explanation, Dietz barely touches on structural conditions. He weaves his explanation around certain traits of the movement, and his main question remains to some extent unanswered in his article.

Dietz states that the *Sendero* movement had its seeds in the region of *Ayacucho*. According to him, the main reason for the existence of this movement in *Ayacucho* was its underdevelopment. The commercialization of agriculture disrupted the traditional peasant economy and the state did not initiate land reform in the region. Furthermore, there had been traditional peasant rebellions in this region in the form of millenarianism and chiliasm.³⁸ However, Dietz does not investigate to what extent these traditional movements influenced the *Sendero* movement.

After explaining the rise of this group, Dietz examines the successful ideology and strategy of the *Sendero* movement. According to him, this movement applies a Maoist strategy, which is based on sudden assaults by guerrilla troops on military bases, that will be followed by a retreat. This strategy also assumes permanent guerrilla bases in the countryside and the construction of intricate relations with peasants. Dietz claims that this movement was indeed successful in creating permanent guerrilla bases in some regions, yet it could not expand its influence in other regions.³⁹ He does not explain why the *Sendero* movement became influential in *Ayacucho*, but why it could not expand its influence to the other regions in Peru. In this examination, the underdevelopment and poverty in *Ayacucho* are insufficient explanations for answering these questions.

Richard Gott in "*Cuba: A New History*" presents a political history of this country. The revolutionary struggles and the

³⁸ Dietz, "Revolutionary Organization in the Countryside: Peru," 122-123.

³⁹ Dietz, "Revolutionary Organization in the Countryside: Peru," 124-134.

evolutionary government established in 1959 in Cuba are his main focus points. In this history, he mainly discusses the critical historical moments of the Cuban revolution. In this discourse, the structural conditions are like shadows. That is to say, he does not clearly explain how underdevelopment in Cuba affected the strategy of revolutionaries against the government and their strategy of building socialism. Furthermore, many Cuban leaders and important politicians are at the centre of his analysis, but not the ordinary men and women who waged this revolution.

According to Gott, until the 1950s when the Castro's revolutionary movement began, Cuban history was full of rigid class and racial hierarchies. They were the heritage of colonial rule under the Spanish Empire. Furthermore, due to the Spanish Empire's economic interests, the Cuban economy revolved around only one crop in a year and sugarcane. Although the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed violent upheavals in Cuba against this empire, both the economic and social structures, and external dependency remained unchanged after independence. The Cuban Republic was dependent upon the US, both economically and politically. In addition, whites constituted the majority of population in the state administration and bureaucracy. Despite being in minority, wealthy classes composed of industrial and financial bourgeoisie and big landowners manipulated the state mechanism for their own benefits. And also, state officials tried to gain material benefits from this corrupt system.⁴⁰

In the other part of his analysis, Gott examines the revolutionary struggle waged against the Batista dictatorship between 1952-59 and the evolution of this national movement into a socialist one. He focuses mainly on the ideology of the guerrillas. He claims that Castro's emphasis on popular sovereignty, land reform, the nationalization of industry and independence from the US were the main reasons behind the public support that the guerillas had. By depending on this national ideological framework,

⁴⁰ Gott, *Cuba: A New History*, 1-146.

Castro established a large coalition. Thus, he could overthrow the regime.

After the change in power, the next decisive moment for the Cuban Revolution was the increasing tension between Cuba and the US. In this context, Gott argues that the nationalization of industry and land reform by the Castro government were highly criticized by the US government of the time. As a response, the US did not buy Cuban sugar, the sale of which was the backbone of the Cuban economy. Then, Cuba began to construct economic relations with the USSR and expropriate all American enterprise within its borders. After these developments, Gott argues that Castro decided to take the revolution in the direction of socialism and gradually closer to the USSR.⁴¹

Gott depicts this era as the witness of three important developments. Firstly, by assisting the Soviets, Cuba gave up Guevara's suggestion to diversify its economic production, but instead, continued their focus on the sale of sugar. By selling its sugar to the Soviets, plus importing basic necessary goods and industrial and agricultural machineries, Cuba tried to maintain its economic activity. Secondly, Gott suggests that an exodus from Cuba began when its socialist character became clear. And thirdly, Cuba began to assist revolutions in the other parts of the Third World, lending economic and military support.⁴²

Gott analyzes Cuba up until the mid 1980s as an era under Soviet domination. He claims that Cuba mostly gave up assisting Third World revolutionary movements and Castro became trapped in Soviet diplomacy regarding international relations. Their economic dependency on sugar remained and the Soviets perpetuated their industrial and agricultural aid. Technicians, goods, machinery and financial aid poured in from the Soviets and, as a result, high living standards were maintained in Cuba. Castro began to organize his party in line with the Leninist model. He

⁴¹ Gott, *Cuba: A New History*, 150-184.

⁴² Gott, *Cuba: A New History*, 203-220.

banned all opposition and intellectuals began to criticize the socialist government in Cuba.⁴³

According to Gott, the last notable period of Cuban history began in the mid 1980s when Gorbachev took power in the USSR. At first, Castro criticized Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies. Then, the amount of aid coming from the Soviets decreased and, with the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and Russia, the Cuban economy simply went bankrupt. In this period, Gott looks at two important developments; the new economic reforms of the socialist government and increasing American aggression aimed at destroying the socialist government in Cuba. In the first instance, the standard of living in Cuba fell and in order to find financial resources, the government began to support tourism. This support resulted in US dollars arriving in Cuba and the social gap between those who could reach the dollars and those who could not widened. Furthermore, by allowing the operation of private enterprises such as private restaurants and bars, the government undermined its stance on egalitarianism. The US later tightened its economic blockade on Cuba under the Toricelli Act of 1992.

Despite all these troubles, why did Cuba not give up on socialism? According to Gott, there are three main reasons for this. First of all, Castro and the party did not give up their socialist ideals and saw this period as a temporary one. Secondly, they explained all problems which they faced to the masses in a detailed manner and gained their support. Lastly, the Cuban people were aware of the fact that the collapse of socialism would simply mean that the poor would lose any gains that they had made after the revolution.⁴⁴

This sympathetic account of the Cuban Revolution is very successful in presenting its vital turning points. However, Gott does not try to examine the associations between these turning points. Instead, his book seems to be composed of unrelated fragments.

⁴³ Gott, *Cuba: A New History*, 233-242.

⁴⁴ Gott, *Cuba: A New History*, 280-306.

Furthermore, he does not mention the role of ordinary people until the last part of his book. Therefore, his explanation of revolution mostly depends on the charismatic personalities and acts of Castro, Guevara and Castro-Ruz, as if these leaders had brought about the revolution by themselves and had presented it as a *fait accompli* to the Cuban masses.

While revolutionary movements took power by using force in some contexts, such as Cuba, some of them took power through elections as it happened in Chile. Sergio Bitar, in his 1986 book called "*Chile: Experiment in Democracy*", successfully penetrates into the economic and political developments during the failed revolution of the Allende regime and explains the history of the socialist experiment. More importantly, he was one of the members of the socialist government and, therefore, he is sympathetic to the aims and goals of the Unidad Popular coalition. However, this sympathy does not prevent Bitar from criticising its economic policies. Indeed, his main issue in this book is that how the socialist government became economically vulnerable. Nevertheless, he argues that the single-minded focus on the economic policies of the socialist government is an inadequate explanation of this vulnerability since the main problem faced by the UP was how to gain and hold political power. In fact, the economic policies of the era came out of the conflicts over political power. But in general, Bitar successfully analyzes the political economy of the socialist revolution in Chile.

According to Bitar, the main economic aims of the Allende government were twofold; the first is that the new government set about to nationalize the means of production and demanded populist participation in the management of economic production. The second is that the government aimed to provide equal income distribution to society in general and derive the necessary social support to remain in power⁴⁵. Although Bitar approves the overall gradual framework of the UP's economic policies to transform Chilean society and he claims that the pace of expropriation of the

⁴⁵ Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, 25-29.

national firms is viable, he is highly critical of the implementation of these policies.

First of all, he claims that the UP has no clear strategy for the management of national plants following expropriation. For example, after nationalizing the copper mines, the UP government failed to find the credit and technology to maintain production. Also, the socialist government has no well-defined plan to provide for the participation of workers in the management of the plant⁴⁶. The government could not solve the problems of lack of incentive, capital and technology deficits, or inadequate technical assistance in agriculture after expropriating land. Secondly, and more importantly for Bitar, the socialist government underestimated the repercussions of the macro-economic changes on the micro-economic level. The prime example of this ignorance was inflation. In order to explain this, Bitar claims that different social groups had already begun to make demands on the Christian Democrat government during the 1960s. When the UP took power in 1970, the expectations of these groups were quite high. These demands were integrated with the UP's general framework to increase social gains for the working and middle classes. Although in the first year these policies increased the public support for the regime, in the second year they created a fiscal debit. However, the UP had no means or strategy to tackle the inflation which appeared as a result of the fiscal debit and wage-price spiral⁴⁷.

According to Bitar, these economic hardships were magnified by the increasing social and political opposition. He criticizes the economic determinism of the socialist government by claiming that economic processes did not directly and rapidly reflect on the political process. The UP made an inaccurate prediction and falsely assumed that after expropriating the big national firms, the economically weak bourgeoisie would lose its political power. But, Bitar claims that this did not happen. Secondly, although the UP government presumed to derive the support of the middle classes

⁴⁶ Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, 64-65.

⁴⁷ Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, 55.

as a consequence of its anti-monopolistic economic policies, the middle classes were hesitant to support the regime due to an accelerating class conflict within small scale firms. Consequently, only some sections of the middle classes participated in oppositional groups⁴⁸. And finally, working class radicalism undermined the gradual policies of the government and polarized the political camps⁴⁹. In his explanation, Bitar accuses the socialist government of seeing political power as an extension of economic power. By drawing onto such a criticism, he has impressively pointed out that the socialist government wrongly assumed that the whole middle and working classes could have supported the government if their material gains had been increased. Bitar convincingly argues that this highly economic determinist assumption ignored the differences within the middle and working classes. He highlights that the socialist government undertook a theoretical class analysis only, but it did not successfully implement this analysis into the reality of Chilean life.⁵⁰ According to him, this is yet another fatal error for the Allende regime.

It can be derived from Bitar's explanation of Chilean political tension, especially during the last two years of the socialist government, that the UP government could not overcome its external and internal political hardships. Due to increasing social opposition, the UP government began to lose the support of the Christian Democrats in the National Congress. Since the UP had no majority in the congress and insisted on fealty to the procedures of democratic processes, this support was vital for them. Consequently, the government tried to make a compromise with Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC) and promised to give some concessions in its economic policies. But this time, the radical social base and partitions within the UP coalition obstructed the government's compromise with PDC. The UP could not solve this

⁴⁸ Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, 76-70.

⁴⁹ Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, 72-73.

⁵⁰ Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, 200-203.

dilemma and became paralyzed under the threat of increasingly severe political struggles⁵¹.

Although Bitar sometimes reduces the problems that challenged the socialist experiment down to the incapability and programmatic errors of the UP government, he successfully constructs multi-causal explanations in order to analyze the Allende period. His analysis is based on the complex interaction of multiple actors like classes, political parties and institutions. He focuses on the reasons for the economic failure of the socialist government, but he does not see political or social spheres as an extension of economics. He explains both the interplay between these spheres and their internal dynamics.

Like Latin America, the revolutionary movements had huge impacts in African political and social life after the Second World War. In Africa, anti-colonial wars coincided with socialist struggles. One of the most well-known examples of this was the war waged against the French in Algeria. After gaining their independence, the revolutionaries in this country tried to build a socialist state. John P. Entelis analyzes this process in his book, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*.

Entelis mainly draws the attention to the revolution that Algeria instituted was successful in creating a stable political and economic system, especially, after the revolutionaries chose a more moderate path in their economic, social, and political premises and policies. He provides in depth analysis of the historical, cultural, social, economic, political and foreign policies in Algeria. It must be underlined that Entelis examines these factors as if they existed totally independently from each other. The main weakness of this book is the lack of meaningful connections between historical, cultural, economic, and political developments that existed in Algeria.

For historical developments, Entelis argues that the Ottoman domination in Algeria did not change the social and economic

⁵¹ Bitar, *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, 100-103.

structure of this country, since the goal of the Ottomans was to extract tax from people in Algeria. Nevertheless, the French domination resulted in the total change of state, economic and social structures. They firstly constructed a repressive state mechanism excluding the average Algerian. Secondly, they institutionalized private land ownership which resulted in a large population of dispossessed peasantry. Thirdly, and closely connected to these developments, the majority of this population began to flow to the cities which were modernized under the colonial regime. Two polarized classes emerged in urban areas. On the one hand, there was the white, wealthy French settler class, but on the other hand there emerged the poor, mostly unemployed Algerian class.⁵²

Entelis mentions the special situation of Algeria as an example of the dispossessed peasants in the country and unemployed Algerians in the cities constituted the social bases of Algerian nationalism, which emerged during the nineteenth century. Algerian nationalism was firstly composed of intellectuals who demanded the right to participate in state administration. Entelis argues that these demands reached a peak during the First World War, when the Algerian masses fought for France. When their demands were not met after the war, their nationalism became radicalized. According to Entelis, during the 1920s, even though Algerian nationalism was represented by three different wings as liberals, radicals and Islamists, the anti-colonial war was mainly waged by radicals whose ideology was composed of a mixture of nationalism, Marxism and Islam. The radicals depended on the urban paupers and landless peasants. Their main challenges were the fragmented structure of their organization and the strength of the French war machine. In fact, increasing violence and the cost of war resulted in massive protests and an economic downturn in France. Ultimately, France had to accept the independence of Algeria in 1962.⁵³ At this point, Entelis argues that the radical socialist policies and the personalized style of rule of the

⁵² Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 17-34.

⁵³ Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 48-57.

first two leaders, Ben Bella and Boumedine, resulted in a highly fragmented party structure. After a long fight, Benjedid took power and changed the direction of the revolution.⁵⁴

Entelis' analysis of the cultural and social structure of Algeria derives from the assumptions of the modernization theory.⁵⁵ Depending upon this theory, he argues that there are no classes in Algerian social structure. The society was historically divided between the state elite and the masses and the reason for current social discontent was this bifurcation. His main assumption is that the colonial regime created a highly polarized social structure in which the French settlers, the state administrators and bureaucrats constituted the top level of hierarchy. And at the bottom of the social hierarchy, there were the displaced, uneducated and jobless urban paupers who had inclinations toward radical and violent politics. Although the revolution tried to end this dichotomy, in fact, it continued to exist and the revolution only increased social discontent.

According to Entelis, there are two primary reasons for the perpetuation of this polarized social structure and social discontent. Firstly, Islam was the central framework for the worldview of the poor masses and most of them refused to send their children to secular schools, which were seen as the main

⁵⁴ Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 57-67.

⁵⁵ As it existed after the WWII, the modernization theory is an attempt to explain the transition from "pre-modern/traditional" society to "modern" one. Assuming that in Western developed countries wherein the transition to modern societies is successfully completed, social welfare and prosperity is achieved and social conflicts are resolved by and large, this theory suggests to undeveloped countries to take same steps and to adopt modern practices if they want to make the same achievement. According to this theory, unlike the developed countries in which the main social division existed between classes, undeveloped countries are mainly divided by state elites and poor sections of society which mostly live in a traditional way. In order to transform such a structure and to modernize the society, rapid industrialization and urbanization programs must be launched. Although this theory lived through its heydays in the 1950s and 1960s, it was challenged during the succeeding periods. It returned to the agenda of social sciences in the 1990s; however, it still remains a controversial approach.

institutions to inject revolutionary ideas into society. Secondly, the masses had no means of access to the modern communication tools that were employed to diffuse the national and Marxist ideology of the regime. Entelis also proposes that rapid industrialization and urbanization dovetailed with the insufficient social services to create unmanageable cities and further increased discontent.⁵⁶ In this sense, Entelis seems to base his ideas on a Durkheimian analysis, arguing that industrialization and urbanization dissolves existing social ties and results in social disturbances. However, he doesn't look at whether the old traditional structure did really represent a society bereft of any conflict of interest.

Entelis then analyzes the economic policies of the revolution, which were born of the assumption that political independence had to be followed by economic independence and a strong economy. In this case, they chose the socialist development path, which was very fashionable during the 1960s and 1970s in Third World countries. In his analysis, Entelis claims, however, that first Ben Bella's and then Boumedine's strategies for transitioning to socialism through rapid industrialization simply failed. Ignorance of agricultural issues and rapid industrialization resulted in mass migrations to the cities, where the industrial infrastructure was not developed enough to absorb all these new urbanites. This created huge unemployment and poverty problems in the cities. Furthermore, this rapid industrialization increased Algeria's foreign debt. Only then did Benjedid give up the strategy of heavy and rapid industrialization. He decentralized the economic structure and gave individual enterprises more opportunity to control their production quantities and strategies. Benjedid also allowed the private sector to construct new enterprises and enticed them to work with state enterprises. In agriculture, he provided credits to the private farms and increased the price of agricultural goods.⁵⁷ Even with all these developments, Entelis argues that socialist ideals were not given up during this period. At this point, Entelis does not explain his definition of socialism, but he tries to

⁵⁶ Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 80-108.

⁵⁷ Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 133-154.

bolster his theory by claiming that most industrial enterprises were still in the hands of the Algerian state.

In the political sphere, Entelis holds the position that the revolution brought the idea of a state which would work to the benefit of the poor. On the other hand, Entelis claims that the large majority of poor people were excluded from state apparatuses. Technocrats and state bureaucrats were the real decision makers behind the social and economic policies. According to Entelis, although Benjedid did not open political channels to mass participation, he put in place democratic rules for the appointment of technocrats and bureaucrats. While they were appointed under the Ben Bella and Boumedine government according to their political loyalty, technical capabilities became the main criteria for holding positions under the Benjedid regime.⁵⁸

Entelis claims that the Benjedid government gave up on projecting radical socialist policies on the international stage in the same way it abandoned radical policies in economic and political spheres, like the nationalization of agriculture and the declaration of socialism as state ideology. Under Ben Bella and Boumedine, the Algerian Revolution was supporting radical national liberation struggles in the Third World during the 1970s. They began to make compromises with Western powers during the 1980s under Benjedid.⁵⁹ In this regard, Entelis's book can be seen as the story of the gradual moderation of the radical Algerian Revolution. For Entelis, this was the true path for Algeria since the Algerian people did not gain much from the radical economy and political strategy of the revolution. At this point, although Entelis does not talk about how much the Algerian population gained from the Benjedid's policy moderation, he approves those policies, since they created a stable system. However, Entelis doesn't address the question of the social costs of such political instability and ignores the large scale political chaos that erupted in Algeria during the 1990s. Moreover, throughout his book, Entelis analyzes the rise and failure of the

⁵⁸ Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 163-177.

⁵⁹ Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 180-200.

Algerian revolution assuming a division between state and society. Such an outlook ignores the effects of classes and class struggles on political, economic and social life.

Another country in which the national liberation war merged with the socialist struggle was Vietnam. William J. Duiker explains the transition of the Vietnamese Revolution from a radical phase to a more moderate one in his book "*Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*." His main thesis is that although the socialist government in the North was successful to a certain extent, they failed in their social and economic policies after unification with the South in 1976. Therefore, the revolutionaries in Vietnam had to give up their radical policies and choose more moderate ones. In order to explain this process, like Entelis, Duiker embraces the historical, cultural, social, and economic developments that transpired in Vietnam especially after the tenth century.

Duiker's analysis firstly focuses on the historical turning points that resulted in the unification of Vietnam under the socialist government. According to him, the goal of French colonial rule in Vietnam was the extraction of natural resources. To support their economic interests, the French also created a repressive state. These two developments caused an alienation of the Vietnamese masses from the government and the emergence of radical and armed guerrilla struggles. After the defeat of the Japanese, who had invaded the region during the Second World War, the Vietnamese guerrillas used this political opportunity to create a government with the most powerful armed forces in the region. When the French and the US intervened, a war began between the Vietnamese forces and the French troops and the country was divided into two parts; North and South Vietnam.

As a result of this war, a peace agreement was signed in Geneva between France, South Vietnam and North Vietnam in 1954. This agreement states that the fate of the country would be decided by an election, but the government in South Vietnam refused to hold elections. This government was highly repressive and alienated a large segment of society by not undertaking the

land reform peasants were demanding; and also by favouring Christianity against Buddhism and by oppressing any oppositional groups. In this atmosphere, the government decided to initiate war again in 1960 and the guerrilla groups started their actions in the south. This time, the US supported South Vietnam. After a long and costly war, the US decided to pull back their forces and North Vietnam overthrew the regime in the South, uniting the country in 1976.⁶⁰

According to Duiker, the highly influential Confucian culture, which was widespread among poor peasants and which supported the overthrow of corrupt and repressive government by the people, and the subordination of individual needs to communal needs were the main reasons for the success of Vietnams' coupling of nationalism with Marxism. At this point, his comprehension of Marxism remains very superficial and this is evident when he claims that Marxism was close to Confucianism since they both proposed the subordination of individuals to the community. By depending on this assumption, Duiker claims that this national ideology mixed with Marxism and influenced the peasants and workers that had already been alienated by the colonial government. After the establishment of South and North Vietnam as separate countries, South Vietnam failed to institutionalize democratic principles. The Diem government created a paternalistic regime and appointed his supporters to crucial positions in the state administration. That meant the South began to be controlled by a small elite.

In the North, however, the government firstly used the rhetoric of nationalism and independence, rather than Marxism in order to strengthen its power. The government also constructed a strong link to the Vietnamese masses by establishing local representatives. Especially after declaring Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of state and beginning to build socialism, the local

⁶⁰ Duiker, *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*, 36-77.

representatives became the main tool of the government to ensure mass support for the regime.

Despite the success of communist party in the North, Duiker claims that the party could not diffuse its influence in the South after unification in 1976. Duiker asserts that the main reason for the failure of socialism in the south was the historical difference between the Southern and Northern Vietnamese. While the people in the South historically developed more informal relations and individualistic attitudes, the people in the North were historically inclined to community-oriented lifestyles, formal relations, and a hard working philosophy. At this point, Duiker claims that socialism was not appropriate to the so-called characteristics of the people of the South.⁶¹It can be claimed here that this highly essentialist explanation of human nature ignores the repercussions of historical developments on people. People in South Vietnam have witnessed first a colonial government and then highly violent independence and socialism struggles. It is, therefore, questionable to say that their basic characteristics remained unchanged. Furthermore, this explanation perceives people in the South as a homogenous entity. To explain the failure of socialism in the South by looking at the national traits of its people is still an unconvincing argument.

In the economic sphere, Duiker claims that French colonialism retarded economic development in Vietnam; however, he does not explain how this underdevelopment influenced the pursuant economic policies of North and South Vietnam. According to him, after the division of the country, South Vietnam applied a kind of capitalist economic model which alienated the broader society from its government. Under the pressure of landowners, the government could not institute the land reform. Furthermore, South Vietnam remained dependent on US aid to meet the basic needs of its society. Nevertheless, Duiker claims that the state elites

⁶¹ Duiker, *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*, 86-124.

used this aid to increase their own wealth, rather than meeting the demands of the people.

Duiker sees the economic policies of North Vietnam as more successful. Although the collectivization of agriculture did not result in the efficiency the government expected, policies of industrialization, nationalization and equal distribution of wealth provided basic goods and the means to satisfy the needs of their society. After unification, the socialist government's main concern was to nationalize industry in the South and collectivize private farms. However, they were aware of the fact that agricultural production decreased after collectivization in the South. Furthermore, the government could not find the necessary external aids in order to maintain production in industry. Duiker claims that the government abandoned the idea of heavy industry and central planning starting from the mid 1980s. After the collapse of socialism in Russia, the government allowed the existence of private enterprises in agriculture and industry.⁶²

According to Duiker, the radical cultural policies of the socialist government failed, too. He claims that these policies mainly aimed to put an end to the American culture. They were also an attempt to undermine the long-standing traditional culture in the South. Duiker especially accuses the socialist regime of not understanding the cultural elements of the people of Vietnam. For example, he states that these policies insulted the Confucian culture as being backward and oppressive, while, in fact, Confucian culture had presented a sense of humanity and dignity to the Vietnamese masses for hundreds of years.⁶³

In conclusion, Duiker claims that the revolutionaries followed a clever strategy until taking power, but then they failed. According to Duiker, this was the result of an incompatibility of the national characteristics of the people in Vietnam with socialist ideals. He claims that the Vietnamese demanded independence, but not socialism. Moreover, he holds that socialist policies did not heal the

⁶² Duiker, *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*, 130-161.

⁶³ Duiker, *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*, 179-193.

problems of the people. On the contrary, socialism in Vietnam deepened these problems.⁶⁴

Although Duiker's book has certain merits, especially in its discussion of the success of the revolutionary struggles, it does have certain failures. First of all, there are not sufficient and strong links between different chapters and the book has no coherency within itself. Secondly, he mostly attributes the failure of socialism to "essential traits" of people in Vietnam. Although Duiker claims that these traits developed historically, he analyzes them as unchanging and eternal ones. Thirdly, he analyzes the society in Vietnam as a homogenous and monolithic entity. In his examination, he ignores the class, gender and cultural differences among the people in Vietnam.

On Nation States in the Third World

Anti-imperialist struggles were also waged by some governments wanting to break their dependent relations with colonial and imperial forces, rather than transforming the class configurations of their country. This caused conflict with the imperial powers at the state level. One well-known example of this kind of struggle was waged by Mohammed Mosaddeq's government in Iran, which ended with a coup d'état 1953. As Fakhreddin Azimi emphasizes, Mosaddeq and his movement advocated a political neutrality in the foreign relations of Iran and aimed to put an end to the economic dependency of the country on the foreign powers; these goals were in comply with the agenda of the Third-Worldism.⁶⁵ The articles in the book, "*Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne)", successfully cover the political struggles waged between 1945 and 1953 in Iran. This book has a certain coherency, since the articles complement each other by analysing the different political actors and struggles.

⁶⁴ Duiker, *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*, 226-227.

⁶⁵ Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 133.

According to these articles, political developments were mostly determined by internal political struggles and the British Empire's response to Iranian nationalism. However, the US' decision to intervene in political affairs to protect the influence of the capitalist camp eventually determined the fate of Mosaddeq regime. In his introduction to this volume, Malcolm Byrne states those internal political conflicts emerged around the Mosaddeq regime and its opponents. Mosaddeq tried to establish a regime which would be immune to Britain's involvement in the internal affairs of Iran, with the help of his eclectic and heterogeneous organization, the National Front.⁶⁶

On this topic, Homa Katouzian, in his contribution to this volume, claims that the aim of Mohammad Mosaddeq was to initiate democratic principles in Iran and develop his country in economic terms. To this end, Mossadeq assumed that Iran's dependent economic relations with the Western powers had to be broken by nationalizing the oil industry, and the revenues from the sale of that oil had to be spent for the common good of all Iranians. Britain, who had profited hugely from Iranian oil, fiercely opposed the Mosaddeq government. The British tried to find an alliance within Iranian political circles. Within those circles, Shah, as another prominent political actor in Iran, seemed most sympathetic to the British position, but he could not act against the Mosaddeq policies, which were supported by the majority of population. There were also Anglophile Iranian circles in the Iran Majlis and in the media who argued that nationalization could antagonize the British.⁶⁷ In his conclusion, Katouzian claims that the alliance between the British, Shah and his supporters, and the British collaborators in the Iranian political circles paved the way for a coup d'état.

⁶⁶ Malcolm Byrne, "Introduction," in *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, eds. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. xiv.

⁶⁷ Homa Katouzian, "Mosaddeq's Government in Iranian History: Arbitrary Rule, Democracy, and the 1953 Coup," in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne eds. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 5.

Like Katouzian, Fakhreddin Azimi mainly analyzes the oppositional forces and their political strategies to undermine the Mosaddeq government. According to him, in addition to the royalists in the Palace, the anglophiles in the media and National Assembly and some radical Islamist groups weakened the nationalist government. The most important contributing factor to the overthrow of the regime, ironically, came from some ex-supporters of the National Front who had abandoned the Mosaddeq camp in 1951 and 1952.⁶⁸ For Azimi, all these political circles acted to undermine the Mosaddeq regime. The Anglophiles and ex-supporters of Mosaddeq were committed to using every means at their disposal to destroy him and they planned a coup d'état with the financial and organizational aid of the British and the US. The American government chose to collaborate with the British government due to the uncompromised stance of Mosaddeq on the oil issue.⁶⁹ In Azimi's view, the logic of the Cold War entered into the scene at this point. In the climate of the Korean War, and especially after Truman taking power, the US had decided to be more active in Iran in order to curtail a possible Soviet influence.⁷⁰ As opposed to the cohesive US-British-Iranian alliance, the main weakness of the Mosaddeq government was the fragmented structure of the coalition on which they were dependent. Although the majority of the population in Iran supported the Mosaddeq government, this fragmented coalition could not convert this support into a popular movement.

Mary Ann Heiss, in her article, "The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti-Mosaddeq Coup of 1953", examines the repercussions of the international boycott of Iranian oil and the weakening of the Mosaddeq government. She contends that the administrators of the company issued a statement and supported

⁶⁸ Fakhreddin Azimi, "Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Resources," in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne eds. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 33-34, 41.

⁶⁹ Azimi, "Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Resources," 55.

⁷⁰ Azimi, "Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Resources," 73-75.

the boycott of Iranian oil at the international level. The company argued that the Mosaddeq government had no legal rights to cancel the company's concessions unilaterally. The British and US governments supported this statement. British and American oil companies owned most of the tankers used to carry oil to international markets and the large British and American oil companies decided to not buy Iranian oil.⁷¹ According to Heiss, the Mosaddeq government tried to sell Iranian oil in other ways, but all their efforts were in vain. For example, the government used an Italian ship to carry its oil, but the ship was forced by British naval vessels to British Aden and local authorities impounded its cargo in Aden's port.⁷² At the end, Heiss claims that the economic boycott was successful in undermining the regime. According to her, the British could not win this fight without the support of the Americans.⁷³ She also contends that the US was just as responsible as the United Kingdom for paving the way for coup d'état in 1953.

Byrne, in his other article in "*Mohammad Mosaddeq*," also assigns a vital role to the US in undermining the national government and supporting the coup d'état, while contending the British played relatively a minor role.⁷⁴ He analyzes the US's changing attitude to the events in Iran and claims that although US policy makers did not get involved in the fight between the Mosaddeq government and the British government, they were aware that Iran was one of the important countries to defend the Middle East against the communist threat.⁷⁵ Especially in the climate of the Korean War, the US became gradually more

⁷¹ Marry Ann Heiss, "The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti Mosaddeq Coup of 1953," in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne eds. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 179-185.

⁷² Heiss, "The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti Mosaddeq Coup of 1953," 195.

⁷³ Heiss, "The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti Mosaddeq Coup of 1953," 200.

⁷⁴ Malcolm Byrne, "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953," in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne eds. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 207.

⁷⁵ Byrne, "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953," 207-208.

aggressive toward the actors that were perceived as threats to the interests of the Western alliance. Iranian oil was important for the US, both economically and politically.⁷⁶ Byrne claims that these conditions combined with the escalating frustration between the Mosaddeq government and the British government to overthrow the existing regime in Iran. The Eisenhower administration became convinced that Britain was not strong enough to defend the interests of the Western alliance in the region, so the US had to intervene and overthrow the Mosaddeq regime.⁷⁷

In conclusion, the Mosaddeq regime, which represented an anti-imperialist stance against Western imperialism and demanded the economic independence of its country, was overthrown by the efforts of internal and external forces. In order to explain these processes, the articles in this book convincingly explain the main interests and political positions of said external and internal forces. Each of them analyzes a different dimension of the events leading to the coup d'état and, this edited book has a certain coherency. On the other hand, none of them touches on an important question: What were the effects of the Mosaddeq's economic and social policies at the societal level? We cannot see the repercussions of Mosaddeq's national policies on Iranian society in this volume. The main weakness of this book was the absence of involvement from the Iranian masses, who were important political actors during the Mosaddeq regime in Iran.

On Third World Ideology Against Imperialism and Colonialism

The anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle of the twentieth century was also waged at the international level. Vijay Prashad in his book, *"The Darker Nations,"* analyzes the existence and development of the Third-Worldism, internationally. The various states of the Third World created the Non-Alignment

⁷⁶ Byrne, "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953," 212-213.

⁷⁷ Byrne, "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953," 223-226.

Movement and tried to challenge the unequal structure of world systems. A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune analyze the creation and development of this movement in their book, "*Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments.*"

Singham and Hune weave their narration around the declarations and discussions produced in the summits and several gatherings of the bureaucrats of the Third World countries. They effectively developed a sympathetic analysis from within this movement, but they barely touch on the effects of this movement on world politics. Unfortunately, their analyses do not explain the effects of this movement on actual political developments. Furthermore, although they emphasize that this movement consisted of different countries which held varying ideological positions, they do not explain how these differences reflected upon the movement itself. While Singham and Hune claim that they analyze the evolution of this movement over time, their description of the Non-Alignment Movement seems to be one of an unchanging and monolithic entity in their book.

Singham and Hune see Non-Alignment as a social movement with a certain set of aims and an organized structure. Thus, they firstly focus on its goals and organizational framework. According to Singham and Hune, this movement aimed to bring the world peace and end the nuclear arms race between the US and USSR. In fact, this movement did not defend an unconditional peace. The Non-Alignment Movement, rather, differentiated just wars from unjust ones. Singham and Hune argue that, for the most part, the Non-Alignment Movement's anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles waged in the Third World were just wars. The movement defended the unconditional independence of individual countries from the imperialist and colonial countries. Moreover, the movement defended the right of self-determination for all nations.

In addition to peace and independence, the Non-Alignment Movement also argued for the transformation of unfair world economic structures to a more equitable one. This movement claimed that colonialism and imperialism resulted in the

underdevelopment of the Third World countries and that this underdevelopment was the main reason for the existence of an unequal world structure. The countries which were the members of this movement defended the construction of a New Economic World Order. Singham and Hune claim that the Non-Alignment Movement opposed Western cultural imperialism, which rapidly increased its influence in the Third World countries with huge developments in communication technologies. The proponents of this movement argued that communication technologies could be used in multilateral interactions among different cultures around the world, instead of using them to impose Western cultural values on people of the Third World.⁷⁸ For the organizational structure of the Non-Alignment Movement, Singham and Hune assert that its organization was democratic; each member had an equal say in the decision-making processes. Furthermore, in each summit, a chair was selected and this chair was expected to act in terms of the principles of the Non-Alignment Movement, rather than the interests of his/her own country.⁷⁹

Singham and Hune continue with analyzing the characteristics of each summit. According to them, the first three summits can be seen as the foundation of the Non-Alignment Movement. The authors assert that although each member had a different worldview, all of them had a common history which could be regarded as one of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism ???, with a further condition of economic underdevelopment and a lack of influence over international politics. Here, the authors were successful in creating a common set of principles and a common language. Singham and Hune claim that the common theme of these three summits was that the superpowers, namely the US and USSR, had no right to determine the future of humanity.⁸⁰

The fourth summit was held in Algeria in 1973. According to Singham and Hune, the common theme was economic independence in Algeria. They write that even the most

⁷⁸ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, 1-31.

⁷⁹ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, 33-43.

⁸⁰ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, 83-103.

conservative members accepted it and blamed imperialism for underdevelopment in the Third World. Furthermore, in this summit, the US was perceived to be main imperial power in the world and declarations of support for the national liberation wars against this imperial power were made. To this end, the representatives of national liberation struggles were summoned to the conventions as observers and members. By taking this action, the non-alignment movement aimed to legitimize these struggles.⁸¹

The Colombo Summit was held in 1976 and the number of socialist countries was increasing. The 1970s was marked with growing friction between China and the USSR in the struggle of the dominance in the socialist world. The discussions between countries that supported China and the countries that defended the USSR stamped their influence on this summit. At this point, the racial South African state and Israel, which were seen as the representative of colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East, were highly criticized.⁸² The next summit was held in Havana in 1979. According to Singham and Hune, this summit was highly important since the clear-cut divisions between the conservative members and radical members became apparent in the talks held there. Conservative members argued that since Havana supported the USSR in international affairs, the location of this summit had to be changed. The summit was held in Havana with the diplomatic initiative of Cuba, but everyone expected the dissolution of the Non-Alignment Movement during this time. Singham and Hune point out that this did not occur because Castro did not impose his own agenda on this summit.

At the Havana Summit, the theme was economic dependency. The speakers, especially the Latin American ones, accused Western imperialists of stealing resources from the Third World and binding the Third World to the imperialist world with debt mechanisms.⁸³ The next summit was held in New Delhi in 1983. Singham and Hune argue that this summit took a less anti-American position and

⁸¹ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, 119-144.

⁸² Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, 148-163.

⁸³ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, 169-220.

named the USSR as another imperialist power. These meetings discussed the economic crisis in the Third World and resulted in the acknowledgement of national development policies, inward-looking economic policies, and protectionist tariffs as the reasons for the crisis in the final declaration of the summit. This declaration also defended financial and monetary policies as a solution to the crisis. Moreover, it argued that economic policies must not be instigated by political concerns. Politics and economics had to be seen as two distinct spheres.⁸⁴ Although the economic declaration of this summit was very close to the neo-liberal arguments of the 1970s and 1980s, rather than the national development policies of the 1960s and 1970s, which was one of the main principles of the Non-Alignment Movement, the authors do not consider this as a broader shift in the direction of the movement.

According to Singham and Hune, the major success of this movement is that it challenged the nuclear, political and economic hegemony of Western alliance. They correctly and convincingly claim that the Non-Alignment Movement did not support a neutral policy. On the contrary, it tried to intervene in the world political and economic orders on behalf of the Third World. Singham and Hune's book is very successful in its analysis of the principles of this movement. Even so, one cannot say they have portrayed the evolution of this movement. The book does not explain, for instance, the obvious shift of this movement to a more right-wing policies in the New Delhi Summit. Furthermore, this book barely touches on the effects of this movement internationally in real political or economic terms.

Vijay Prashad sees Third-Worldism as a project which also includes the Non-Alignment Movements. Like Singham and Hune, Prashad analyzes the important characteristics and historical turning points of the Non-Alignment Movement, but unlike them, he views this movement as a microcosm of a larger project. He weaves his explanation around the cities of the Third World which represented the most important features and turning points of this

⁸⁴ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, 320-329.

project. Prashad's main thesis in his book is that the Third-Worldism as a project demanded political and economic equality in the world and incited the masses to act. On the other hand, the majority of the supporters of this project preserved the old order and elites when they took the power in their own countries. The Third-Worldism eventually gave up its ideals and blended into the capitalist world order, which can be marked with neo-liberalism and the domination of capitalism.⁸⁵In this sense, the Third-Worldism is a failed project for Prashad.

Prashad divides his book into three chapters. In the first chapter, he follows landmark events in the quest for the Third-Worldist ideology. According to him, the League Against Imperialism, which was conjured up in Brussels in 1928 with the support of the USSR and participation of Arab and African countries, can be accepted as the first important turning point for this project. The second turning point of this quest, according to Prashad, was another summit held in Bandung in 1955. The leaders of this summit were nationalist figures who interpreted socialism simply as a strategy for economic development.⁸⁶

After analyzing the foundation of this project, Prashad looks at the main features of the Third-Worldism by visiting several cities in the Third World countries. His first stop is Cairo. In this city, Prashad focuses on the importance of women in the Third-Worldism.⁸⁷ Then, Prashad visits Buenos Aires and details the economic worldview of the Third-Worldism. According to Prashad, the Third-Worldism proposed that capitalism and imperialism did nothing to develop Third World countries. On the contrary, capitalist and imperialist domination in the Third World resulted in underdevelopment by extracting natural resources from the periphery.⁸⁸ Prashad's next stop is Tehran. He claims that this city represented the fundamental struggle against Western cultural imperialism. Writers and intellectuals of the Third-Worldism

⁸⁵ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, ix-xiii.

⁸⁶ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 17-45.

⁸⁷ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 53-61.

⁸⁸ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 63-73.

argued for the development of national cultures, which would depend on a multi-national and syncretic perspective.⁸⁹ After Tehran, Prashad goes to Belgrade and Havana. For him, these two cities represent the struggle of the Third-Worldism for independence against US imperialism. Havana also represents the division between the moderates who defended a just world order, but ??? did not argue for social transformation in their own countries, and the radicals, who defended socialism within the Third-Worldism paradigm.⁹⁰

In the second chapter, Prashad analyzes the pitfalls of the Third-Worldist project. Here, he goes first to Algeria. According to Prashad, Algeria represents the exclusion of the masses from the decision-making process by the radical party or organization behind the revolution.⁹¹ Then, Prashad visits La Paz and takes the military problem into the account. According to him, Third-Worldism made a huge mistake by not dissolving the existing militaries or educating them politically after taking power. In most cases, the military powers, which were financially and politically supported by the US, overthrew the revolutionary regimes and ended the revolutionary processes.⁹² After La Paz, Prashad moves on to Bali. For him, this city represents the oppressions of communists by national revolutionaries who used the communist party and its militants in their fight against imperialism. Prashad argues that the destruction of the communists also harmed Third-Worldism since the reactionary social classes attained dominance over the political platform created in Bandung.⁹³ After Bali, Prashad also goes to Caracas and Arusha. The first city represents the battle for oil waged by the Third-Worldism against imperialism. However, the revenues extracted from oil were not used to benefit the poor in Third World countries.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 75-85.

⁹⁰ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 95-115.

⁹¹ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 121-130.

⁹² Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 130-142.

⁹³ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 151-163.

⁹⁴ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 170-190.

In the last chapter of his book, Parshad argues that the Third-Worldism was forsaken by the leaders of the Third World countries. In this chapter, he firstly goes to New Delhi and analyzes the Non-Alignment Summit held in 1983. Prashad writes that most of the speakers at this summit supported the IMF-driven globalization and neo-liberal policies which were beginning to be applied in the major capitalist countries, like England and the US.⁹⁵ After visiting Jamaica and Singapore, Prashad emphasizes that the economic development of the Asian Tigers, which can be defined as export-oriented growth, privatization, deregulation and financialization had started to be imitated by the Third World countries. However, these countries ignored the particular historical conditions out of which the Asian Tigers' economic development model grew. As a result, the neo-liberal economic model deepened the gap between poor classes and wealthy classes in the Third World.⁹⁶ Prashad's last stop is Mecca. For Prashad, this city represents the new struggle against western imperialism. Unlike the old Third-Worldist struggle which emphasized equality and secularism, the new struggle can be defined within the framework of Islamic conservatism. For Prashad, conservative social forces eventually attained domination in this struggle.⁹⁷

In conclusion, Prashad's book on the rise and fall of the Third-Worldist project, which emphasized the development of the Third World and equality within both international systems and individual countries, is highly impressive. His method of visiting the cities of each country which represent one particular characteristic and historical turning point of Third-Worldism as a project is useful. He does not, however, explain how ordinary men and women were affected by this project. Although the title of book is "*The Darker Nations*," Prashad's work suffers from a lack of explanation as to how this project changed and affected the life and worldview of ordinary people in the Third World.

⁹⁵ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 207-223.

⁹⁶ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 240-258.

⁹⁷ Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 275.

On the Historiography of Revolutions in the Third World

The current historiography of the Revolutions in the Third World can be analysed at three distinctive levels. At the first level, the works deal with the social movements which combined socialist and anti-colonialist or anti-imperialist rhetoric in their discourse and waged a revolutionary struggle against existing governments. Where they were able to seize power, they struggled to build some kinds of socialist economy and state, but, in the long run, most of these movements gradually lost their revolutionary zeal or were overthrown by coup d'états supported by the imperialist forces.

At the second level, the historiography analyzes nation states in which the leaders aimed to put an end to the economic dependency of their countries on imperialist nations. To this end, these political leaders mainly tried to nationalize industrial enterprises which had been previously operated by foreign private companies. However, they eventually adopted neo-liberal economic policies and/or were overthrown by the imperialist forces.

At the third level, the literature on the revolutions in the Third World examines the efforts by the Third World countries to challenge imperialism and the world order as a whole in an international context. These works analyze the Non-Alignment Movement and the rise and fall of Third-Worldist ideology.

As discussing the first level, Gerard Chaliand's and John Foran's books present a general picture of the struggles and revolutions in the Third World. Chaliand's book is very successful in explaining why some struggles were able to attract popular support in certain parts of the world and why others were defeated. Moreover, his argument is very convincing in that most of the successful revolutions in the Third World failed since they created a bureaucratic state and alienated the masses from the power. In contrast, Chaliand cannot show the same success when he contends that this bureaucratization was the natural result of Leninist party

model which the leading organizations of the revolutionary struggles in the Third World imitated. Critically, his analysis on the Leninist party as it existed in Russia in the twentieth century remains superficial. Furthermore, he does not explain how and to what extent the revolutionary movements in the Third World took this party model as their example. It is apparent that Chaliand's book does not adequately explain the causal reasons for the failure of revolutionary movements in power.

In this regard, John Foran's book is more successful in constructing causal relations of failures and successes of revolutionary zeal in the Third World. Foran's strong theoretical model thoroughly analyzes structure-agency relations in the processes of Third World revolutions. His explanation of the success and failures of the revolutions sheds light on causal relations very effectively. On the other hand, this over encompassing model which aims to explain every revolution in the Third World failed in one context: Chile. For Chile, it can clearly be attested that Foran's model does not fit the historical developments that occurred in this country. In this case, this model needs to be revised through further research.

In addition to Chaliand's and Foran's works, Jeffrey Paige's, Jose A. Moreno's, William M. LeoGrande's, and Henry Dietz's articles and Richard Gott's, Sergio Bitar's, John P. Entelis', and William J. Duiker's books analyze the revolutions in the Third World by examining the regions and individual countries. Among them, Paige's and Moreno's explanations suffer from a lack of multi-causal relations in their analyses. Although both Paige and Moreno very impressively present the effects of class configurations in the revolutionary process in Latin America, they miss the importance of other factors such as state, political structure and the ideologies of revolutionary movements in their examinations of revolutionary processes. Similarly, Dietz sees poverty as the only influence for the revolutionary movement in the *Ayacucho* region in Peru. It can be said that although Dietz explains the ideology, organizational structure and the acts of the armed revolutionary movement in Peru in a very detailed manner, he cannot demonstrate the same

success in explaining why this movement became influential in certain parts of Peru and not in others. Unlike Paige, Moreno, and Dietz, LeoGrande's work is more successful in constructing multi-causality by taking into account the state and political structure and international politics, as well as class configurations.

In addition to these articles, Gott, Bitar, Entelis, and Duiker deal with the revolutionary process in individual countries. Among them, Gott effectively analyzes the historical turning points for the Cuban Revolution and the effects of these historical elements on the revolutionary processes, in general. More importantly, Gott does not construct strong relations between these historical developments. As a result, his book is composed of unrelated fragments.

Bitar's analysis of the Chilean socialist experiment is very effective since it constructs multi-causal and dynamic relations between the factors which led to the fall of Allende in 1973. Like Bitar, Entelis' analysis is strong and depends on multi-causal factors when he is explaining the processes of revolutionary struggle waged against France in Algeria. Nevertheless, he is not clear enough when he is explaining the shift from radical policies to moderate policies, especially since he reduces this shift to changes in the political choices of leaders. He does not explain the underlying reasons for such a shift in their positions and here, Entelis' analysis seems to justify the moderate policies of the 1980s in Algeria by analyzing the failure of radical policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, Duiker's analysis of the historical developments in Vietnam seems to be written to justify the transition to moderate policies in the 1990s. Although Duiker's explanation is very convincing when he discusses the victory of the revolutionary movement in Vietnam, just like Entelis, he does not succeed in his explanation of the reasons behind revolutionary failures. He only explains these failures as the natural result of the incompatibility of socialist ideas with vaguely defined national traits of people in Vietnam.

The articles in "*Mohammed Mosaddeq*" edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne and the books written by A. W. Singham & Shirley Hune and Vijay Prashad analyze the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist battle waged at both state and international levels. The articles in "*Mohammed Mosaddeq*" complement each other by looking at the different political actors that were important during the Mosaddeq government in Iran. They explain the political processes during that period in a dynamic way, focusing on the shifts in political stance of different actors and the marrying of different interests. However, the articles in this book do not explain the social roots of political developments in Iran. In a similar vein, Prashad's book on the rise and fall of the Third Worldism as a process and an ideology successfully looks at the shifts in political processes, as well as the stance of actors and leaders. He does not, however, touch on how and to what extent people in Third World perceived this ideology or the effects of Third-Worldist policies on daily life. Singham's and Hune's book similarly does not emphasize the effects of the Non-Alignment Movement, which presented itself as the representative of oppressed people in the Third World, on the life of ordinary people. Nevertheless, it presents the main principles and organizational structure of the Non-Alignment Movement very well.

Conclusion

The anti-imperialist and anti-colonial projects in the Third World eventually failed in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of the countries or revolutionary movements gradually abandoned their ideals, which had been highly effective between 1950 and 1980, or were defeated. Their most obvious failure was their inability to diffuse their ideologies to the oppressed masses of their societies. Effectively, these revolutions and struggles failed to include the masses in the Third World in their efforts to create a just and equal world.

The historiography on the Revolutions in the Third World sees this history as a failed attempt, in general. Among them, Chaliand sees this failure as a result of the revolutionary

movement's exclusion of the masses from the decision-making processes and Foran looks at the dissolution of the coalition of revolutionaries and a shift in the balance of international politics. In addition to these, while the articles in "*Mohammad Mosaddeq*" analyzes the processes in which England, the US and internal opposition constructed an alliance to overthrow the nationalist government of Mosaddeq, Entelis's and Duiker's books look at how the revolutionary governments in Algeria and Vietnam turned to more moderate policies in the 1980s and 1990s. And lastly, Prashad relates the failure of the Third-Worldism as a project to the decreasing view of socialism as an ideal within the international mechanisms between states and leaders who had created this project and the capitalist world order of the 1980s.

One of the major pitfalls of all these studies is that none of them sufficiently analyzes why and how ordinary people supported and participated in the Third-Worldist movements. Neither of these studies analyzed above show how common people responded to the Third-Worldism as a political project. Even the study of Prashad whose title is *Darker People* doesn't incorporate the views, actions, desires and hopes of the ordinary people in the Third World. In this regard, we hear the voice of political leaders and elites in these studies rather than that of people. As such, the history of ordinary people and their relations with the Third-Worldism still need to be written.

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