

CARROT AND STICK APPROACH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EVALUATION THROUGHOUT TURKEY'S ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

The carrot and stick approach is an approach used by realists in explaining hard power in the Discipline of International Relations. Hard power actors use the carrot and stick approach to make other actors do what they want. According to this, other states are trying to get things done by punishment that they do not want to do, while the state is rewarded for doing what they want. The European Union is also one of the actors who have applied this approach to third countries. The EU has requested that this approach be awarded to other states by way of reward or punishment. One of the states towards the EU has applied this approach is Turkey. The EU began negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005 (carrot), and the European Commission suspended the negotiations in eight categories because of the problem with Cyprus in 2006 (stick). But after recent developments between the two sides, the EU's carrot and stick approach have begun to reverse, and the EU has not been able to do what it wants to Turkey in this policy. This study will examine Turkey-EU relations by considering some events such as Positive Agenda and Cyprus problem in the negotiation process within the framework of the carrot and stick approach. This framework will try to analyze why this approach works and where Turkey-EU relations will go on.

Keywords: Turkey, EU, Carrot and Stick Approach, Negotiation Process, Hard Power.

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ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERDE HAVUÇ VE SOPA YAKLAŞIMI: TÜRKİYE’NİN AB İLE KATILIM MÜZAKERELERİ ÜZERİNDEN BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

ÖZET

Havuç ve sopa yaklaşımı, Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde realistlerin sert gücü açıklarken kullandıkları bir yaklaşımdır. Sert güç sahibi aktörler, diğer aktörlere istediklerini yaptırmak için havuç ve sopa yaklaşımını kullanmaktadırlar. Buna göre diğer devletler söz konusu devletin istediklerini yaptıklarına ödüllendirilirken yapmak istemedikleri şeyleri ceza yöntemiyle yaptırmaya çalışmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği de üçüncü devletlere karşı bu yaklaşımı uygulayan aktörlerden biridir. AB, bu yaklaşımla istediklerini diğer devletlere ödül ya da ceza yöntemiyle yaptırmaktadır. AB’nin bu yaklaşımı uyguladığı devletlerden biri de Türkiye olmuştur. AB Türkiye ile 3 Ekim 2005’te müzakere sürecine başlarken (havuç), 2006 yılında Kıbrıs ile yaşanan problemden dolayı Avrupa Komisyonu sekiz başlıkta müzakereleri askıya almıştır (sopa). Ancak son zamanlarda iki taraf arasında yaşanan gelişmelerden sonra AB’nin uyguladığı havuç ve sopa politikası ters tepmeye başlamış ve AB, bu politika çerçevesinde Türkiye’ye istediklerini yaptıramamıştır. Bu çalışma havuç ve sopa yaklaşımı çerçevesinde müzakere sürecindeki Pozitif Gündem ve Kıbrıs sorunu gibi bazı olayları ele alarak Türkiye-AB ilişkilerini inceleyecektir. Bu çerçevede söz konusu yaklaşımın neden işlemediği ve Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin nereye gideceğini analiz etmeye çalışacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, AB, Havuç ve Sopa Yaklaşımı, Müzakere Süreci, Sert Güç.

1. INTRODUCTION

The carrot and stick approach roots could be based on the prize and punishment system of Pavlov, as a traditional motivation theory.³ Saying good and bad, reward and punishment are what motivates a rational creature, John Locke claimed that reward and punishment are motivational

³ R. J. Herrnstein, “Method and Theory in the Study of Avoidance”, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 76, No. 1, 1969, p. 49-69.

forces that cause much inland behaviors.⁴ This approach motivates people to discover desirable behaviors and makes them attractive with rewards. Sometimes, the criminal system pushes people towards doing what they want.⁵ The carrot-stick approach actually originated from a story about the donkey. According to this story, it lets find that the best way to run a donkey is to put a carrot on the end of a rod and hang it in front of it, and then hit it with a stick. The carrot was considered a prize to carry a bee, and the stick was considered a punishment.⁶

In the context of this approach which is also used in the education system, a teacher keeps in front of a learner, in other words, the teacher promises high scores in examinations if the student studies hard. On the other hand, when there is a failure in the student, he punishes him for a total sum by hitting him with a stick.⁷

Generally speaking, the law carries sticks more than carrot in the system. Administrative agencies are trying to improve the behavior of citizens through sticks. However, it is also possible to say that the carrot was a correct strap. For example, patents and copyright laws encourage citizens to invent inventions or produce new things. According to the Turkish Competition Law, there have been deterrent sanctions such as sticks, money, imprisonment and compensation. Carrot is a rewarding system that allows those who apply for the regret program to receive a discount from the penalty. Competition law provides for cooperation with itself in the case of violation of competition law by using this dilemma.⁸ In this respect, deterrence will also be provided to prevent violation of the competition law. Therefore, when a person works efficiently and performs a performance, a reward is given. When the performance is decreased, a stick is shot. But this policy needs to be applied with caution so that it will have a positive motivation effect on the people in the organization.

However, carrot and stick approaches have also been used in the economy. Starting from the economic human model, considering the economic dependency and selfishness of the person, the foreground of economic awards and supervisory tools has been put forward. The basic

⁴ Simon Gächter, "Carrot or stick?", <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~dieckman/reprints/Gaechter2012.pdf> (15.12.2016).

⁵ Isabella Brusati Consulting, "Change Management Consolidation: Why The Carrot and Stick Approach Does Not Work", <http://isabellabrusati.com/new-podcast-change-management-consolidation-why-the-carrot-and-stick-approach-does-not-work/>, (17.12.2016).

⁶ Aida M. Perez, Coercive Diplomacy in the 21 st Century: A New Framework for the Carrot and Stick, University of Miami, International Studies Dissertation, Miami, 2015, p. 34.

⁷ Jonothan Mc Clony, "The New Persuaders: An international ranking of soft power", Institute of Government Discussion Paper, No. 20, 2012, p. 2.

⁸ Daniel J. Bernstein, "Of Carrots And Sticks: A Review Of Deci And Ryan's Intrinsic Motivation And Self-Determination In Human Behavior", Journal Of The Experimental Analysis Of Behavior, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1990, p. 323-332.

approach to this audit culture, which consumes management time and energy, has been to find and evaluate accusations instead of going to the source of problems.⁹

According to a group of authors such as Lewie Diaz and Den Ouden, there is a flaw in the structure created by this policy.¹⁰ Because forcing people to accept behaviors they do not accept is based on a fear system, not a motivational system. When there is no action to be taken or it is done incorrectly the stick applied to the employees does not motivate the employees to do the jobs, it creates fear and prevents the work from being done properly. If they do not follow the instructions given to the employees, the stick system is applied to them and even if they do not follow the instructions given to them in fear.¹¹ In such a case, the policy often leads to a decrease in productivity, a bad job, and even damage to jobs. For example, sometimes due to work with awards or prize-penal methods, the focus is narrowed down to rewards and creative thinking is hampered.¹²

“The stick and carrot approach”, an article appeared in the Economist Journal on December 11, 1948, in the International Relations Discipline, generally, examined when hard power is addressed. According to this, hard power has a carrot and stick policy, which is in possession of it, to do everything that the state wants. In such a case, if the state makes a request, a promised award is given, and if it does not, the sanction is imposed.¹³

The European Union is emerging as an organization that implements this policy in the international system. The EU, which implements the policy of carrots and sticks for states that want to join the EU, always has the right to say the last word thanks to this policy. The same situation is seen in Turkey-EU relations and many other, whole Western Balkan states. For example, after questioning Cyprus in 2006, Stefan Füle said that “Turkey should develop relations with Cyprus in

⁹ Halil Saylı, “Geleneksel Yönetim Paradigmasının Sınırlayıcı Alanlarına Karşı Post-Modern Yönetim Paradigmasının Geliştirici Alanları”, Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi, Cilt 10, Sayı 2, 2008, s. 181-200.

¹⁰ James Andreoni, William Harbough and Lisa Vesterlund, “The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, 2003, p. 893-902.

¹¹ Fred Dupuy, “The Carrot and the Stick: Soft Power and Hard Power, Foreign Aid and Military Might”, UKNDA Discussion Paper, No. 42, 2012, p. 1-2.

¹² Igor Petkovic, The Motivation Paradox: Why Is a Carrot-and-Stick Approach Contra-productive, Tomas Bata University in Zlin Faculty of Humanities Bachelor Thesis, Zlin, 2013, p. 15.

¹³ Matteo Pallover, Power and Its Form: Hard, Soft, Smart, London School of Economics, Master Thesis, London, 2011, p. 80-83.; Emel G. Oktay, “NATO’nun Dönüşümü ve Kamu Diplomasisi’nin Artan Rolü”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 9, Sayı 34, 2012, s. 125-149.

order to progress negotiations with the EU”¹⁴.

In this sense, this study will examine Turkey-EU relations in the period between 2005-2016 as a part of the carrot and stick approach. It is not possible to evaluate all of the developments experienced during this period. Therefore, it will be made evaluations on the basic developments in this period. Under normal circumstances, the expected criteria of carrot and stick approach is to be concluded by reward or punishment. However, Turkey-EU relations have not been able to handle carrot and stick policy.¹⁵

In other words, this study will attempt to verify that the carrot and stick policy has remained dysfunctional by considering developments based on the important events in the period 2005-2016. The study will primarily focus on the role of the carrot and stick policy in the Discipline of International Relations and then review the main events in the period between 2005 and 2016 and assess the final status of the carrot and stick policy and the subsequent actions. The authors will use basic documents and secondary sources such as progress reports, enlargement strategy documents and other reports that are prepared by EU institutions and Turkish Government.

2. CARROT AND STICK POLICY IN THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The carrot and stick approach entered the Discipline of International Relations for the first time after an article published in the Economist magazine on December 11, 1948, after World War II. According to this policy, which is used in the analyzes made about hard power, the carrot is the reward given by the state when it accepts the will and the reward, whereas if the stick is not fulfilled, it implements the weak state by means of economic, political and psychological pressure tools.¹⁶ Under this policy, military and economic power are being put into the form of reward or punishment to try to change the attitude of other states. In this sense, states that use the carrot and stick policies, use this policy to

¹⁴ Amanda Paul, “Turkey-EU Relations: Forever Engaged, Never to be Married?”, <https://eu.boell.org/en/2015/07/08/turkey-eu-relations-forever-engaged-never-be-married>, (19.01.2017).

¹⁵ Guenther Seufert, “TESEV’in kamuoyu araştırması üzerine: Türkiye’de Dış Politika Algısı”, http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tesevin_Kamuoyu_Arastirmasi_Uzerine_Turkiyede_Dis_Politika_Algisi.pdf, (20.12.2016).

¹⁶ Pınar Bilgin and Berivan Eliş, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, p. 9.

discipline other states.¹⁷

After increasing the influence of economic power after the Second World War, carrot and stick policy began to take place in international politics. Economic power has not only have a carrot, but also a stick. Carrots are at the tip of the stick. The economic power uses the stick according to circumstance. Therefore, the carrot and stick approach is encountered in the discourses of soft power.¹⁸

An actor who has a hard power can do anything he wants with an act of reward or punishment. As a result, it is aimed to make the desired thing with carrot and stick.¹⁹ In the 1960s, the concept of power began to be increasingly seen as the ability to direct the system, while the use of direct power elements such as military and economic power was taken as the basis. The creation of an agenda that prevents or limits the use of counterparts of power in this period has become one of the main sources of use of force. In the 1970s, Neo-Realist theorists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, approached the pattern of indirect power, from the traditional lines of liberalism.²⁰ In these years, neo-realists have shifted toward the perception of power, which is defined as the "carrot and stick" method in practice, as the sociologist Steven Luck's power, as "the ability to influence the other side in the direction of our wishes beyond the bend or agenda setting".²¹

However, when it comes to soft power, situations arise such as influencing the ideas of other states that can not be made with military power with their own culture, values and images.²² So if soft power is successful, you will not need the carrot and stick policy as opposed to hard power.²³ A state, with its own values and image, "is able to make the policies that other states want by attracting other states without their

¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Amerikan Gücünün Paradoksu*, Gürol Koca (çev.), Literatür Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2003, s. 4.

¹⁸ Sait Yılmaz, "Avrupa Birliği ve Post-modern Jeopolitik", *Kafkas Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi*, Cilt 3, Sayı 3, 2012, s. 185-214.

¹⁹ Christopher Layne ve Bradley A. Thayer, *American Empire: A Debate*, Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2006, s. 84.

²⁰ Aigerim Raimzhanova, "Power In IR: Hard, Soft, And Smart", *Institute for Cultural Diplomacy and the University of Bucharest*, 2015, p. 6.

²¹ John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power", *Essential Readings in World Politics*, Karen A.Mingst ve Jack L. Snyder (ed.), W.W. North & Company, New York, 2008, p. 61-62.

²² Leyla Yıldırım, *Türk Gücü*, Ufuk Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2014, s. 26.; Süleyman Çağrı Güzel, "Dış Yardımlarda Destekleyici Bir Unsur Olarak Kültürel Diplomasi Ve Yunus Emre Enstitüsü Örneği", *Atatürk Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi*, Cilt 30, Sayı 2, 2016, s. 343-359.

²³ Umut Uzer, "21. Yüzyılda Tek Kutupluluk Tartışmaları", *Bilge Strateji*, Cilt 5, Sayı 8, 2011, s. 69-93.

arms”²⁴.

The United States, for example, is using the approach by this means Nowadays when petroleum is one of the most important sources, the US rewards the oil-producing countries that cooperate with it, in a variety of ways and puts an embargo on Iraq that does not cooperate with itself while applying the carrot strategy and implements stick strategy by excluding Iran from the international system.²⁵

Carrot and stick approach is applied by withdrawing the commercial advantages especially made to the EU for the promotion of human rights and democracy, which are the main issues of International Relations which have been put on the agenda since the 1990s.²⁶ The state may be awarded a prize for international field cooperation or an international political membership. In case these elements are implemented by the state and placed in their systems, However, it is expected that certain conditions will be fulfilled for this. In the absence of such conditions, a stick policy will be implemented in order to stop the promised award to the state.²⁷ For example, Serbia and Montenegro refused to sign an agreement with the United States on the International Criminal Court. The US Congress did not approve the planned financial aid for military training for Serbia and Montenegro.²⁸

In the European Union, the conditionality principle has been formalized at the Brussels Summit in 2007, with the use of the carrot and stick policy within the context of the conditionality principle since it was established. For example at the Brussels summit in 2007, the Commission agreed to prepare an impact report covering the effects of the enlargement process, including Turkey, Croatia and the Balkan countries.²⁹ In the Enlargement Strategy Paper, there will be no enlargement without harmonization with the institutional structure of the Union, taking permanent safeguards to avoid the unfavorable influence of the Union, the

²⁴ Jeffrey, Haynes, “Religion and International Relations After 9/11,” *Democratization*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2005, ss. 398-413.; Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, No. 94, 2008, pp. 94-109.; Ahmet Fethi Gün, “Çatışma Çözümleri Bağlamında Kamu Diplomasisi Kobani Olayları”, *Barış Araştırmaları ve Çatışma Çözümleri Dergisi*, Cilt 3, No. 1, 2015, s. 26-41.

²⁵ Bilgehan Emeklier ve Nihal Ergül, “Petrolün Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki Yeri: Jeopolitik Teoriler ve Petropolitik”, *Bilge Strateji*, Cilt 2, Sayı 3, 2010, s. 79.

²⁶ Svea Koch, “A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union”, *World Development*, Vol. 75, 2015, p. 97-108.

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. 28.

²⁸ Jelena Petrovic, “Stick And Carrot: All You Wanted To Know About The Policy of Conditionality But Didn't Dare To Ask”, *Western Balkan Security Observer*, Issue 4, 2007, p. 54-61.

²⁹ Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council 14/15 December 2006 Presidency Conclusions”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf (16.01.2017).

possibility of long transition periods and the possible effects of enlargement on the Union budget.³⁰

According to this paper, EU's enlargement will be done according to "3C" (consolidation, conditionality and communication) policy. From these policies, which make Turkey's full membership difficult, according to the consolidation policy, it is understood that the enlargement will be synchronized with the integration so that the Union will not be damaged in the subsequent enlargements. That is, candidate countries will expect the Union to prepare itself, even if all conditions are met for full membership. The conditionality policy is intended to fully enforce the rules for all candidate countries from now on. The conditionality principle in the European Union is defined as the expected conditions for candidate countries to fulfill before they become a member and the candidate countries in the enlargement policy of the EU stand out as an important mechanism of action in terms of sound and sustainable implementation of the required reforms. The main objective of the conditionality principle in terms of the EU is to prepare the candidate countries for membership and to be guided accordingly in the process so that they become a part of the EU system when they become members.³¹ Membership conditions have contributed to the greater role of the EU in the international role and the strengthening of this role. However, such conditions have delayed the membership of the candidate countries and led to the EU's control of the enlargement process, especially in the context of the differentiation principle.³² The communication policy is intended to strengthen communication between the governments and peoples of the member states of the Union. It is also expected that efforts should be made to prepare their own people for the membership of the candidate countries.³³ It has also been noted that no candidate countries other than Turkey and Croatia will be committed to full membership and no date will be given beforehand.

3. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS: SPEAK SOFTLY BUT CARRY A BIG STICK NEGOTIATION

³⁰ European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007 Including annexed special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members, Brussels, 2006, p. 5.

³¹ A Mayhew, *Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 160.

³² E. K. Smith, "EU Membership Conditionality", Cremona, M.(der.). *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 106.

³³ Füsün Arsava, "Türkiye-AB İlişkileri", [http://iibfdergisi.ksu.edu.tr/Imagesimages/files/4\(1\).PDF](http://iibfdergisi.ksu.edu.tr/Imagesimages/files/4(1).PDF), (19.11.2016).

FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

At the Luxembourg Summit held on 16-17 December 2004, the Negotiating Framework Document on Turkey was adopted on June 29, 2005, upon the decision on the accession negotiations with Turkey to started on 3 October 2005. According to the Negotiating Framework Document, negotiations starting with Turkey were not guaranteed as a result, negotiations were clear, Turkey needed to take into account all of the absorption capacities and the Copenhagen Criteria.³⁴

The EU has decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey (*carrots*) because it believed that the Copenhagen Criteria fulfilled the political criteria at the Brussels Summit on December 17, 2004, but has been shown in the criteria in the negotiation framework document. When looked at the principles of negotiations, it was stated that the speed of negotiations depended on the achievement of Turkey in meeting its membership conditions. In other words, Turkey will not be a member if it does not fulfill the conditions for membership. If Turkey wants to become a full member of the EU, it has to comply with the necessary conditions. On the other hand, while the main objective of the membership negotiations initiated with Turkey is considered to be full member of the EU, it is stated that the membership period of Turkey will be evaluated according to the absorption capacity of the Union. Moreover, if Turkey does not become a full member of the Union, it would be closely linked to Europe.³⁵

However, the EU stated that the negotiation process has begun as Turkey has met the Political Criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria adequately. But, Turkey has also noted that over time, it may suspend membership negotiations in case of permanent and serious violations of the basic criteria on which the Union is built. Accordingly, in the case of serious and continuing violations of the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, which constitute the basis of the Union in Turkey, the Commission recommends that the negotiations be suspended on its own initiative or at the request of one third of the member states and that negotiations be resumed recommend the necessary conditions. The EU Council of Ministers will make a decision about the necessary conditions for the resumption and resumption of negotiations

³⁴ Selami Kuran, "Müzakere Çerçeve Belgesinin Değerlendirmesi", MÜFH-HAD, Cilt 13 Sayı 3-4, 2007, s. 1-18.

³⁵ "Negotiation Framework", https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf, (16.01.2017).

with the qualified majority.³⁶ In this sense, Turkey has begun negotiations for fulfilling the political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria, as stated in the Negotiating Framework Document. However, it was emphasized that the negotiations would be suspended by the EU if Turkey violated the political criteria.

4. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND CYPRUS

After the signing of the Negotiating Framework Document, the Screening Process including the first sighting of the Turkish and Union *acquis* in the negotiations that started on 20 October 2005, and the process was completed on 13 October 2006. It was agreed that the negotiations should be carried out at 35 headings afterward. On 9 November 2005, the Accession Partnership Document was updated by the EU Commission and approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 23 January 2006 and presented to Turkey.³⁷ On June 12, 2006, the chapter of “Science and Research” was opened and temporarily closed.³⁸

However, after the Additional Protocol was made in 2004 to harmonize the 10 member states, the last member of the Union, to the Ankara Agreement, a problem with Cyprus began to arise. Following the signing of the Additional Protocol by Turkey on 29 July 2005, Turkey issued a declaration that the relations would continue in the same way that the signing of the Additional Protocol did not recognize Cyprus because the Republic of Cyprus was not the original partnership state established in 1960. On top of that, states such as Greek Cypriot Administration of South Cyprus (GCAS), Greece and Austria have made explanations to open Turkey's ports and airports to the GCAS transportation vehicles and define the state within the scope of the Customs Union.³⁹ On September 21, 2005, the EU issued the Declaration of the Union and the Member States and stated that Turkey is the EU member of Cyprus and that the

³⁶a.g.m., https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf, (16.01.2017).

³⁷ Official Journal of the European Union, “Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey (2006/35/EC)”, http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Apd/Turkey_APD_2006.pdf, (19.01.2017).

³⁸ ETCF, “Information on EU-Turkey relations”, <http://www.etcf.org.tr/EN/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D313AAF6AA849816B2EF3143C82B0599388A>, (13.01.2017).

³⁹ TEPAV, “17 Aralık 2004- 3Ekim 2005 Sürecinde Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinin Analizi ve Sürecin Devamına Yönelik Çıkarımlar”, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1271246766r4823.17_Aralik_2004_3_Ekim_2005_Surecinde_Turkiye_Avrupa_Birligi_Iliskilerinin_Analizi_ve_Surecin_Devamına_Yonelik_Cikarimlar.pdf, (30.09.2016).

Additional Protocol for the extension of the Ankara Agreement to 10 new members should be implemented in a complete and indefinite manner, and that the continuation of negotiations is also dependent on it.⁴⁰ On this basis, Turkey followed a decision of the Council of Ministers *No. 2006/10895* published in the Official Gazette on September 28, 2006, and followed a method of applying the Customs Union to the new Union member countries without opening air and seaports to Cyprus ships and aircraft.⁴¹

On 29 November 2006, the European Commission received a recommendation decision on the suspension of negotiations on eight chapters, which was approved at the Brussels Summit on 14-15 December 2006. The EU maintained negotiations with Turkey as a reward and on the other hand tried to punish the negotiations with Turkey on eight occasions because the Additional Protocol did not apply to Cyprus and wanted to force them to do what they wanted. But it did not succeed. Turkey, on the other hand, has not taken a tough step to break relations with the EU and has maintained its position on the Cyprus issue.

5. ROADMAP FOR READMISSION AGREEMENT AND VISA LIBERALIZATION

On December 16, 2013, Turkey signed the "Roadmap" and the "Readmission Agreement" prepared by the Union to remove visas. With these agreements, it was a misconception that Turkish citizens will automatically obtain visa liberation within three or three and a half years. Because the stay of visa application depends primarily on Turkey's fulfillment of the obligations under the Roadmap and the Readmission Agreement. Whether these obligations have been fulfilled or not, they would have been monitored and reported by the Commission, and if the obligations were fulfilled, the decision would have been approved by the EU Council of Ministers and Parliament.⁴²

On the other hand, the union that is disturbed by the recent ban on trips, bans on Internet sites such as You Tube and Twitter services, carries serious concerns about the application of the separation of powers and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Considering that Turkey-EU relations have gained new impetus with the recently opened new

⁴⁰ Sanem Baykal ve Tuğrul Arat, "AB İle İlişkiler 1990-2002", Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler Yorumlar, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, s. 361.

⁴¹ Resmi Gazete, "Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı", <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/09/20060928-2.htm>, (19.01.2017).

⁴² Nilgün Arısan Eralp, "AB Ülkeleri Türkiye'ye Vize Uygulamasını Kaldırıyor Mu?", TEPAV Değerlendirme Notu, Sayı 201344, 2013, s. 1-4.

chapter, the European Commission has argued that Turkey has raised doubts about its commitment to the values and standards of the Union even though it supports the Union's full membership process and stated that this would harm EU membership negotiations.

On October 13, 2014, the European Commission published a report on the obligations that Turkey has to fulfill under the Road Map for Visa Liberalisation. Suggestions such as the work of Turkey in the passport and population management system, cooperation in the area of immigration and international protection, changes in the anti-terrorism law are seen as important steps while the development of the use of biometric passports and the continuation of the changes in the anti-terrorism law have been made. EU Commissioner and Chief Negotiator Volkan Bozkır, who was also in Brussels at the same time, said that a new EU Strategy Paper was prepared and that relations will continue in this light.⁴³ On October 16, 2014, Bozkır met with Stefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and the Union's Neighborhood Policy, and the Cyprus issue, the events in the Southeast and Kobani, and the Modernization of the Customs Union were on the agenda. Turkey also signed a partnership agreement with the SMEs' Competitiveness Program (COSME), which the EU designed for the 2014-2020 period. In this respect, it was aimed to increase the competitiveness of SMEs in Turkey and the scope of activity of the Association expanded.⁴⁴

Within these stimulating developments, the European Commission published its first report on October 20, 2014, to assess progress made in visa liberalization. In this report, it was stated that Road Map 72 is formed from needs and collected under five headings. According to the report, further steps should be taken when passport operations, anti-terrorism and positive steps on migration were taken.⁴⁵

At a meeting held on 20 January 2016, at the European Parliament, Commissioner for the Enlargement Johannes Hahn stated that Turkey has increased tensions between the government and the Kurdish community and warned Turkey to return to the peace process. Hahn said that this move would be an important step for membership negotiations and would undermine the security situation in the south of the country.⁴⁶ European Commission released III. Progress Report about Visa Liberalization

⁴³ Dilek İştık Ateş, Gamze Erdem Türkelli ve Dilek Aydın, AB-Brüksel: Brüksel'de Bir Hafta, Sayı 40, 20 Ekim 2014, s. 2-3.

⁴⁴ a.g.m., s. 2.

⁴⁵ European Commission, Report From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap, Brussels, 2014, p. 31-43

⁴⁶ Euractiv, "Hahn urges Turkey to return to the Kurdish Peace Process", <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/hahn-urges-turkey-to-return-to-the-kurdish-peace-process/> (09.12.2016).

Roadmap in May 2016. According to this report, the European Commission has stated that Turkey has completed 65 of the 72 criteria.

In addition, it was emphasized that Turkey has achieved positive results in organizing crime and terror struggle, and the cooperation between Turkey and EU strengthened in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, the report said that if the seven criteria were not met when six were completed, the negative impacts on security in the EU would be resolved.⁴⁷

The process of visa exemption and readmission agreement between the two sides was going to be positive while the coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, negatively affected the process. Against the coup attempt, Turkey has not found the support it desires from the EU, and moreover, Turkey is exposed to serious criticism for its applications. The European Union has tried to make the applications that Turkey wants in the framework of carrot and stick approach but it has not been very successful. The next section will try to address those who survived the coup attempt.

6. 15 JULY COUP ATTEMPT AND FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS

On July 15, 2016, after a coup attempt by a group of soldiers of Fethullahcı Terrorist Organisation (FETO), millions of people were thrown into the streets and united against the coup.⁴⁸ Almost 250 people lost their lives and more than 2,000 people were injured in the coup attempt.⁴⁹ The first reaction to the coup attempt came from Russia and Turkey did not see the expected support from the Western countries. According to some officials in Turkey, the EU only condemned to the failure of the coup attempt. This situation caused problems in EU and Turkey relations.⁵⁰ Therefore, due to Turkey's prejudice, Turkey is approaching the EU and some problems are emerging between the two

⁴⁷ European Commission, Joint statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn on the situation in Turkey, Brussels, 2016, p. 1-8.

⁴⁸ Omer Aslan, "The July 15 th failed coup attempt in Turkey: Causes, Consequences and Implications in Comparative Perspective", <http://sharqforum.org/2016/07/31/the-july-15th-failed-coup-attempt-in-turkey/>, (04.12.2016).

⁴⁹ Galip Dalay, "The 15 th Failed Coup Attempt in Turkey: Structural Roots", <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/08/15th-failed-coup-attempt-turkey-structural-roots-160830082818169.html>, (07.12.2016).

⁵⁰ European Council on Foreign Relations, "EU-Turkey relations after July 15: Turning the page", http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_eu_turkey_relations_after_july_15_turning_the_page7124, (07.12.2016).

sides.⁵¹

Updating studies of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU have also been continued. In October 2016, however, Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, found the decision to close the operation of the Republican Newspaper on 31 October 2016 and 15 Kurdish media. Jagland warned Turkey about democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms, stating that the European Convention on Human Rights is also valid for emergencies. EP Secretary General Martin Schulz says he sees the operation in Cumhuriyet Newspaper as a violation of freedom of expression.⁵² Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn find that the restrictions imposed on the education system, the judiciary and the media in Turkey are unacceptable. However, Mogherini and Hahn criticized the arrest of Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality Co-Chairs Gülten Kisanak and Fırat Anlı, who had gone to work with democratic elections, and invited Turkey to democracy and rule of law.⁵³

On 24 November 2016, however, a meeting was held in the EP General Assembly on the grounds that Turkey did not comply with the EU values stipulated by the EU authorities and in the Progress Report, and took difficult measures. According to the European Parliament, which condemned the unsuccessful coup attempt, the Turkish government took disproportionate measures under the emergency situation. According to the parliament, there are a number of issues of arrest, and issue of articles. On the other hand, there are debates about the re-implementation of the death penalty in Turkey. All this is contrary to European values. For this reason, Parliament's proposal, including temporary suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey, was adopted with 479 yes, 37 denials and 107 abstentions.⁵⁴ In the decision, Turkey was told that it had to strictly adhere to the EU, and in this consultation decision, it was promised that the process would be reviewed again after the emergency applications. President Erdogan said that Turkey would not be able to end its relations with the EU in the face of this decision and that Turkey would seek alternative after the negotiations were stopped.⁵⁵

⁵¹Zeynep Alemdar, "Three Scenarios for Turkey-EU Relations after July 15 th", <http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/three-scenarios-for-turkey-eu-relations-after-july-15th-4144.html>, (05.12.2016).

⁵²Daren Butler and Humeyra Pamuk, "Turkey rejects Europe's 'red line' on press freedom after detentions", <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKBN12W3NK>, (15.12.2016).

⁵³BBC, "Turkey attempted coup: EU says measures unacceptable", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36861154>, (07.12.2016).

⁵⁴European Parliament, "European Parliament resolution on EU-Turkey relations", <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2016-1276&language=EN>, (25.11.2016).

⁵⁵EU Observer, "Turkey still open to EU despite differences", <https://euobserver.com/tickers/136089>, (11.12.2016).

After the recommendation of the European Parliament on 24 November 2016, after 1 December 2016, Dutch diplomats say Germany, the European Commission and many other countries should continue negotiating membership with Turkey; But said he did not intensify efforts to stop membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Dutch diplomats were worried about the support of radical groups in countries with anti-immigration and negative views on Islam, and in the EU, argued that it would be better for the EU to stop it for fear of negotiations with Turkey.⁵⁶

Despite all these negative developments, on 8 December 2016, the European Commission published the Fourth Progress Report of the EU-Turkey Declaration. Despite the difficulties in implementation, the European Commission has said that the process has progressed considerably and that there has been a significant decline in the number of people who work illegally, especially the Aegean Sea. For example, in October 2015 an average of 10,000 people a day tried to cross the Aegean Sea illegally, but this number has dropped to 90 since March 2016. However, it is stated that 7 out of the 72 criteria in the Road Map still exist and it is emphasized that these criteria must be fulfilled for the process.⁵⁷

7. CONCLUSION

This article aimed at bringing into the academic discussion a “stick and carrot” approach to the International relations. As mentioned at the beginning, this approach is used by the states that possess hard power. The article analyzed Turkish-EU relations in the context of Turkish accession negotiations with the European Union from 2005 to 2016. According to Joseph J. Nye, hard power, unlike soft power (a term coined by himself), includes not only military power but an economic strength of the state.⁵⁸ The EU as a supranational entity, might not have a military component of power, but surely has an economic strength at the global level. That is why stick and carrot approach could be applied in the context of Turkey-EU relations. The European Union has used the carrot and stick

⁵⁶ Euractiv, “Dutch join push for EU-Turkey accession talks freeze”, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/dutch-join-push-for-eu-turkey-accession-talks-freeze/>, (04.12.2016).

⁵⁷ European Commission, “Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers”, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4321_en.htm, (16.12.2016).

⁵⁸ Stacia George, “To Collude or Collide? How Combining Hard Power and Soft Power Can Be a Problem or the Solution”, Smarter Power Working Paper Series, Washington, 2014, p. 36.

approach to make requests to third countries. The EU, which has increased its sanitary power through this approach, has also retained its last word of mouth.

When a number of incidents in the negotiation process was addressed, the EU continued to apply the carrot and stick policy to Turkey. The EU, which has started accession negotiations with Turkey as a candidate country, has started negotiations with Turkey since Turkey fulfilled the political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria. But, due to the problem caused by the Additional Protocol to Cyprus, the EU has tried to punish Turkey and make further requests.

The Positive Agenda has been published to improve the relationship between the two sides due to problems experienced by Cyprus, and there has been little progress in relations. The process of liberalization of the visa liberalized under the Positive Agenda has significantly improved the relationship between the two sides. There was a summit on 29 November 2015 regarding this process. The following decisions were made at the Summit:

- The process of fulfilling the criteria within the scope of the Action Plan for the liberalization of visa application will be accelerated.
- The EU will hold an immigrant agreement with Turkey for 3 billion euros
- The second evaluation report of the European Commission's visa liberalization period will be published in March 2016
- The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement will be fully implemented from June 2016.
- The third report on visa liberalization will be issued in the autumn of 2016 and if the criteria are fully implemented, the removal of the visa application for short-term visits to Schengen Region will be completed in October 2016.⁵⁹

The EU has not completed the process of visa liberalization, although the decisions are in this way, as Turkey does not fulfill all the criteria that must be fulfilled for visa liberalization.

⁵⁹ European Council, "Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement", 29/11/2015. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/>, (13.12.2016).

However, after the coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, the EU said that it condemned the coup attempt in Turkey and supported the institutions selected by democratic means. After the coup attempt, the EU warned Turkey about the constitutional amendment, as the practices of the Turkish government were contrary to EU values. On November 24, 2016, the European Parliament adopted a recommendation for the withdrawal of accession negotiations with Turkey, as Turkey did not consider the EU's warnings. However, this decision has not been approved at the EU summit.

The European Union has not been very successful even if it has applied the approach of carrot and stick to have it do what it wants to Turkey. The success of this approach depends on the integration of the sanction power on one side in the relations between the two sides. It is known that the EU has provided significant gains to Turkey. But it is clear that Turkey has contributed to the EU in many areas such as political, economic and security, and will contribute even more if Turkey is a full member of the EU. For this reason, the balance between the two sides is not overwhelming. It seems normal that the approach of carrot and stick does not give the expected effect in favor of the EU. In this sense, the stronger the EU is able to say the last word to the third countries, the greater the impact of the carrot and stick approach. However, in Turkey-EU relations, it is unlikely that this power will increase in favor of the EU in the current order.

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