

**THE SOUTHERN FLANK: POLITICAL DILEMMAS  
AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS**

**By**

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## THE SOUTHERN FLANK: POLITICAL DILEMMAS AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The southern flank of NATO offers a wide range of perspectives, more than any other NATO region. It is isolated from Central Europe and is geographically fragmented. The principle focus of orientation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in this region is maintaining freedom of transit in the Mediterranean. Naval power, therefore, plays a dominant role in defense planning and force projection for the region.

Recently, Admiral William J. Crowe, former NATO commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, lamented that NATO is still based on the outdated assumption that war would begin in Central Europe rather than the Persian Gulf or the Middle East. Crowe called this strategy «shaky.» (1).

Moreover, this region's strategic importance has been dramatically increased by events in the area. Turkey is the only alliance nation in the Middle East and it sits on the flank of any Soviet thrust into Iran or the Persian Gulf. Straddling the Straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, it virtually controls the Soviet Union's only means of egress into the Mediterranean, while Greece monitors Soviet use of the Aegean Sea and contributes to the naval readiness of the Adriatic Sea. Geostrategically, both Greece and Turkey lie athwart the direct avenues of Soviet expansionism into the Arab world and Africa.

Geographically, the southern flank is unique and complex as compared to the Central Front. First, there is the profound difference in how forces are arrayed and power is projected. The terrain is rugged, the area sparsely populated and off-

road mobility is difficult. Employment of heavy vehicles is, at best, difficult. In the Central Front there exists a framework of substantial stability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, stability which includes geography, as well as political and military considerations (2). Combat would take place in an environment characterized by dense population, urbanization, a highly developed logistics network, with significant networks of road and rail facilities. This clearly structures the reactions of the parties involved and thereby limits the type of actions that can be taken. In the southern region the boundaries between the two alliances are less distinct. It is the Mediterranean which serves as the common denominator for East-West presence in the region (3). In the Central Front the two superpowers and their allies have assigned basically analogous missions to their forces. But in the southern flank both the United States and the Soviet Union have interests that transcend their respective alliances. Relations with the United States are more important to Greece and Turkey than their NATO commitment. In fact, both countries tend to evaluate their national security concerns from a nationalistic perspective, thus detaching them from the «Atlantic» context. Greece today views the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union as being lesser threats than Turkey, its neighboring NATO ally (4). Such interpretations color both nations' views toward the United States and NATO, and directly effect how crises will be met in this region and perhaps the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Both superpowers have major client states in this region. These complex relationships could lead to circumstances wherein the superpowers confront each other exclusively in defense of these interests or those of their client states.

There are, however, three common denominators shared by all. First, the Mediterranean Sea washes their shores and is seen as a vital throughway. Second, the presence of the United States' Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Union's Fifth Escadra condition events. Last, the politico - economic conditions of Greece and Turkey, as well as the other nations in the region,

in most cases, reveal signs of more or less marked instability, leading to expectations that changes might occur and thereby significantly alter the existing status quo.

### **THE MILITARY BALANCE**

From the standpoint of security, geographic characteristics of the southern flank make sea power a critical component for reinforcement and resupply of ground forces. This circumstance, of course, underlines the need for effective sea control; otherwise, coherent defense of the southern flank is difficult, if not impractical.

For many years, the U.S. Sixth Fleet operated virtually unhindered in the Mediterranean. In the late 1960s and 1970s, however, the Soviet Fifth Escadra greatly expanded its presence, which in turn has facilitated promotion of Soviet diplomatic objectives in the region. From a coastal navy with a principal mission of displaying the flag, the Soviet navy today has developed significant sea-denial capabilities (5). In short, the Soviet naval build-up has produced an uneasy balance in the Mediterranean in the sense that the United States and NATO no longer exercise undisputed control of the area. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is not in a position to deny the West the maritime routes in the Mediterranean or in the Middle East. Control or denial of the sealanes by the United States or the Soviet Union ultimately hinges on land-based air power. Lacking effective sea-launched airpower to inflict major damage on the Sixth Fleet, the Soviets could do so by land-based air power (6). Launching Backfire (TU-26s) and Blinder (TU-22s) bombers from bases in the Crimea makes the Sixth Fleet, as well as the entire Mediterranean basin, vulnerable (7). In addition, Libya possesses a force of Soviet - built aircraft which far exceeds that country's reasonable defense needs and which have the potential to affect the entire region (8). If the

Soviet Union deployed a mixed force of Backfire bombers, MiG fighters, and Sukhoi fighter-bombers on Libyan airfields, it would considerably shift the balance of power away from the United States Sixth Fleet and NATO. There is a consensus in intelligence estimates indicating that Colonel Muammer Qaddafi would grant the Soviet Union the use of these facilities in an East-West confrontation. This underscores the importance of land-based tactical aircraft stationed in Europe, and in particular in Greece and Turkey (9). Most of the deployable aircraft in Greece and Turkey are at least twenty years old, but the current assumption is that the United States and the Soviet Union could, if necessary, provide newer and more effective aircraft (e.g., F-15 and F-16; MiG-25s, 27s and SU-25s) if necessary. The upgrading of the Greek and Turkish air forces with new fighters, either F-16s or F-18s, will greatly enhance their air capabilities (10). Presently, Turkey is negotiating with Egypt for the purchase of 35 F-5E (Phantoms). This is an interesting exercise in bazaar bargaining since Saudi Arabia is underwriting the Turkish purchase. With this acquisition the Turkish air force will retire F-100s, a Korean War-vintage craft. At present, the Warsaw Pact far exceeds the NATO forces in total number of tactical aircraft, while the Alliance still has an edge in equipment as well as in fighting capabilities (11). NATO is not only bringing into service new fighter aircraft (e.g., Tornado), but it has augmented its aircraft with newer avionics and advanced laser-guided and precision-guided munitions. It has also enhanced its overall capabilities with the deployment of early warning and control capabilities (AWACS, E-2CS, and Nimrods). These systems can be positioned to the southern flank if the situation warrants. Without the protection provided by tactical aircraft, however, the Sixth Fleet is vulnerable.

A further complicating factor is the expansion and modernization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact land forces in the southern flank. Current estimates are that the Warsaw Pact nations have deployed some 35 divisions on the Greco-Turkish border in contrast to NATO forces numbering some 32 divisions, mainly infantry units. Most of the Warsaw Pact divisions are mecha-

nized, and armored, and possess a favorable tank ratio of about three-to-one. They are on terrain suitable for armored offensive operations and could easily be reinforced by at least two airborne/air mobile divisions. The task of the Greek and Turkish forces is rendered difficult defensively by the narrowness of the area between the borders (Thrace) and the Aegean Sea (30-50 miles in width), although it is likely that in any general war the bulk of the Bulgarian forces would be directed eastward toward the Dardennelles and Istanbul. In the east Turkey has a 380 mile land frontier with the Soviet Union. The terrain is mountaineous and rugged and favorable for defensive operation. Turkey's Third Army at Ezurum faces some 15 motorized infantry divisions classified as category 3 (12). Both Greek and Turkish forces are lacking anti-tank weapons, radar and armored attack helicopters, and many of their weapons systems, especially the Turkish ones, require updating, being in some cases vintage World War II (13). In addition, both are lacking command, control and communications systems (C<sup>3</sup>) for more effective battlefield control. Massive modernizations programs are in effect but economic constraints are taking their toll.

The Soviets have deployed intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) including the 3-MIRV, SS-20s, in the north-west Crimea and northern fringes of the Transcaucasian Federation. Presumably, some of these missiles would be targeted on NATO's southern flank (14). In response, the United States, with NATO approval, will soon place medium-range Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Neither system will be extended to Greece or Turkey (15).

If Greece was neutralized, Turkey would be isolated from the nearest friendly land border by 800 miles of rugged and unfriendly terrain (16). A Warsaw Pact thrust from Bulgaria could then assail the Bosphorous and Dardennelles without fear of a flank attack. Communications between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean and NATO would be complicated. If, on the other hand, Turkey was attacked or

decided to remain neutral, Greece's eastern flank would be exposed to Soviet naval and air attacks and Warsaw Pact forces could attempt to reach the Aegean through Thrace, unhindered from the East. The Soviets would still have the arduous task of paralyzing military bases on the Greek islands and simultaneously keeping a wary eye on the Sixth Fleet.

### THE POLITICAL VARIABLES

Despite shifts in the military balance on NATO's southern flank, military power may be irrelevant in resolving the problems facing the region. The Soviet Union, for the most part, has been opportunistic, responding and reacting to problems it did not create and has not resolved. The problems stem from political, economic and social changes in Greece and Turkey and in the international environment of the past two decades, which directly affect their relations with the United States and NATO. Foreign policy in Greece and Turkey is but an extension and reflection of domestic bickering and alignments. It revolves around the Greek-Turkish conflict and its numerous political, economic, and military strands.

The cohesion of NATO is minimally discussed. Each party has some legitimate grounds for dissatisfaction with NATO members, particularly with the United States. A closer examination of the respective politics of each nation will shed additional light on the overall problems facing the southern flank.

#### Greece :

The election of the charismatic Andreas Papandreou and PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Union) in 1981 (17) reflects a shift toward the left and some disillusion with the Western Alliance and the United States.

Papandreou's campaign centered on the slogan «*allaghi*» (change) - change across all sectors of society. According to PASOK's ideology, Greece is an economically underdeveloped state, and is politically, economically and militarily dependent on the West. The previous post-World War II conservative governments pursued, according to Papandreou, a «mono - dimensional» policy of dependence that led to a series of concessions, policy ambivalence and sacrifice of sovereign rights vital to Greek interests (18). During the campaign Papandreou called for fundamental innovation in the domestic and foreign policy areas. His was the party that was going to change everything, but which in effect has changed very little.

On the domestic side PASOK's promise of change is most evident in a broad range of liberalizing social legislation (19). but economic measures have been some-what less far-reaching than expected. Papandreou's pledge of nationalization has been translated into a vague policy aimed at greater worker participation in decision making (20). Inflation is still high (about 20 percent), and stagnating production, falling investments, export and invisible earnings in decline, unemployment on the rise and a weakening of consumer demand, do not portend well for Greece's economic prosperity. The projected increase for 1983 in the GNP is estimated at a low of 2.0 percent (21). The recessionary policies introduced by Papandreou have not as yet taken hold (22). These domestic factors have imposed a strain on the government resulting in a more militant foreign policy. Papandreou's militancy stance feeds his anti - Americanism and propensity toward nonalignment, which he sees as the proper affiliation for Greece. Prior to his electoral victory he called for Greece's withdrawal from NATO, a reappraisal of Greek membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), and a tougher position on the issues that confront Greece and Turkey (Cyprus and the Aegean Sea). Accession to the seat of government has had a tempering affect on Papandreou's



action: the rhetoric has been strident, but devoid of action. He has stated that Greece «does not want to take unilateral measures and pull any surprises and is prepared to discuss relations with NATO and the United States in the belief that mutually acceptable solutions to differences can be found.» (23). He reasons that any withdrawal from NATO or the closing of U.S. military facilities will only result in a «tilt» toward Turkey by the United States and NATO.

Papandreou, in a letter to President Reagan on February 4, 1983, declared that preserving «...the balance of power in the Aegean» is a basic condition for achieving a defense and economic cooperation agreement (DECA) (24). In fact, he has stated that «...the threat we perceive and feel comes from one of our allies, Turkey. We do not feel ourselves threatened from the north.» (25). This explicitly meant that the unwritten practice established by the U.S. Congress in the mid-seventies of a 7-10 ratio, Greek to Turkish military aid, must be continued.

As a result of his pragmatism, Greece and the United States initialed a new defense and economic cooperation agreement which insures the continued presence of American military bases in Greece for at least five years (26). Athens also received a vague commitment from the United States permitting Greece to halt any use of the bases that would threaten Greek relations with friendly countries in the Middle East. Greece may further curtail activities of the bases in the event of a national emergency. Maintaining the 7-10 ratio. Greece will receive \$500 million in military aid; Turkey's share will be \$755 million. For Greece the agreement is a watershed. For the United States it relieves a major irritant in U.S. - Greek relations and removes a serious obstacle to resolving the other political and military issues confronting the southern flank.

One critical constraint on Parandreou is the Greek armed forces. They are staunchly nationalistic, very pro-Western, and they share the commonly-held perception that both the United States and NATO favor Turkey. The perpetuation of such laden

nationalistic issues as the 7-10 ratio, the conclusion of a favorable DECA agreement. Cypress and the Aegean Sea benefit Papandreou and permit him to continue conducting his foreign policy largely without interference from the military, who have a historical proclivity toward intervention (27).

Papandreou's ultimate vision continues to be the dissolution of all coldwar military alliances, including NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Recently, he advocated the establishment of a nuclear free zone for the Balkans (28). Today, there are approximately sixteen bases on Greek soil that contain U.S. nuclear weapons.

NATO is viewed as an extension of American cold-war policy which, Papandreou would argue, has been responsible for subverting Greek sovereignty and national interests, failing to guarantee Greece's frontiers against Turkish threat, and the 1967 military dictatorship and the 1974 Cyprus conflict.

Recent polls (Table I) indicate that strong opposition exists to Greek membership in NATO and that Greeks hold unfavorable opinions about the United States, more so than the Soviet Union (29).

**TABLE 1**

**Public Opinion Attitudes Toward The Western Alliance  
(In Percentages)**

	Greece	UK	France	FRG	Italy	Belgium
Favorable Opinion of the US	18	46	55	73	63	49
Unfavorable	80	44	32	24	21	22
Favorable Opinion of the USSR	36	14	13	20	13	11
Unfavorable	60	74	73	77	68	68
Confidence in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe:						
A great deal or fair amount	22	56	39	61	49	43
Not very much or none at all	74	35	38	35	28	33

The poll suggests that a majority want Greece to «completely get out of NATO» (53%), want U.S. bases to «go» (70%), and consider the presence of U.S. forces on Greek soil a source of additional danger to their security (52%) (30).

A partial explanation of the deleterious relations with the United States is attributable to two basic causes. The first was the U.S. policy toward Greece under the Junta (1967-1974). Many Greeks today contend that the United States has frequently meddled in the politics of their country (31), and that it is somehow responsible for the installation of the Junta government. In fact, the Junta went out of its way to encourage the allegation of complicity, thus assuming the mantle of legitimacy. Although no concrete evidence to support these claims exists, it was true that initially the United States did not denounce the regime. The tedium of rationalization and false hopes employed by American policy-makers to justify their attitudes toward the Junta disappointed not only ousted parliamentarians, but led to the deterioration of public attitude toward the United States.

The short-term gains for the United States were rewarding. American bases in Greece remained available during the June 1967 war and the September 1970 crises in Jordan. The Nixon administration was successful in negotiating home porting privileges for the Sixth Fleet in the Pireaus region. George Papadopoulos, the initial junta strongman, not only displayed his loyalty to NATO, but also held secret meetings with Turkey over the knotty Cyprus issue, and even attempted to bring «the renegade» Archbishop Makarios into line (32). Failing that, Athens then orchestrated a series of aborted attempts against the Archbishop's life, in the belief that the United States wanted Cyprus as part of NATO and hoped to remove Makarios' dangerous influence by supporting **Enosis** (Union) with Greece (33). This led to the ill-fated coup d'etat, initiated by the then-junta strongman, D. Ioannides, to overthrow the legitimate Cyprus government of Makarios. This event, of course, was the second cause for deteriorating relations with the United

States. Inevitably, the stability of relations between Greece and the United States impacts on NATO and directly on Turkey as well.

**Turkey :**

With the advent of a multi-party system in the 1950's, Turkey has experienced intermittent, and at times, severe political instability. Twice in recent history (1960 and 1971) the Turkish armed forces have intervened in the political arena. Despite these interventions, Turkey made considerable headway during this time, toward establishing democratic institutions. Two major personalities and their followers dominated the political scene: Bülent Ecevit's Republican Peoples Party, and Süleyman Demirel's Justice Party. Both Demirel and Ecevit harbor deep personal antagonism toward one another that compounded basic differences between the major political parties. These differences made it impossible for either party to govern (34). Consequently, minor parliamentary groups exercised disproportionate influence and, what was worse, caused deadlocks and ensuing paralysis in the legislative process (35).

This instability was aggravated by a rapidly growing, yet deficit-ridden, economy and social disruptions because of industrial growth. The resulting flow of people from the rural to urban areas produced the gecekondus (shanty towns) which were the spawning grounds for terrorism that gripped Turkey during this period (36). Uncertainty on her borders, due to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and the demise of Shah Pahlevi in Iran further exacerbated conditions. The combination of domestic social tensions and insecurity on the borders was apparently too much for the Turkish military to bear. For a third time, in September, 1980, they intervened. A National Security Council, headed by Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren, assumed authority. This coup d'etat was not unexpected (37). The reluctance of the military

to undertake this coup lies in the fact that their two previous attempts were not completely successful, although constitutional government was restored quickly.

Since the military takeover inflation has receded to about 25% from an all time high of over 100% in 1980, the Turkish economy grew by 4.2% in 1982, and is projected to reach the 7% level in 1984 (38). Terrorism has been dramatically reduced. Martial law authorities have been «even-handed» in prosecuting terrorists, whereas even-handedness was a commodity unfamiliar to the previous civilian governments.

Within a year the National Security Council had taken steps to reinstitute democracy. As a first step, a Consultative Assembly of 160 members was established in 1981 and mandated to draft a new constitution, with the primary intention of strengthening the office of President, and strengthening a two-party system. The latter was in order to break the parliamentary impasse which gave minority parties disproportionate strength in forming coalition governments. The constitution containing 176 articles (39) was ratified by popular referendum in November, 1982, and this same referendum elected General Evren as President of the Republic for a seven year term (40). On April 24, 1983, the National Security Council approved the law governing the activities of political parties. The political arena was immediately invaded by dozens of aspirants (most of whom were newcomers to politics) trying to form new parties (41).

The parliamentary elections that took place in November, 1983, have moved Turkey toward the restoration of civilian rule. The Turkish parliament resumed its activities with an entirely new membership and a new form. The center-right Motherland Party, led by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, commands a comfortable majority with 212 seats of the parliamentary seats. This and the other two parties (National Democratic Party - 71 seats, and the Populist Party - 117 seats) represented in Parliament were established in August, 1983, with the consent

of the National Security Council. Former political leaders and their parties were barred from politics. With the election of the Ozal government the National Security Council transformed itself into the Presidential Advisory Council. Its purpose is to advise President Evren on major international and domestic issues, but in practical terms it not only serves as a liaison between the Turkish Armed Forces and the civilian regime, but more importantly, as a guardian so that the pre-1980 political, economic, and social excesses should not again prevail.

The revival of political parties introduces uncertainties into Turkey's political life. There are bound to be some tremors permeating the political system during the next several months until relationships between the military, the new parties, and the ousted politicians become clear. Uneasiness may prevail if it appears that political power is likely to slip into unwelcome hands or if terroristic activities resume as a result of politics. There is no doubt that the military government's goals reach beyond establishing law and order; they seek a long-term transformation of Turkey into a more stable democracy by reshaping public institutions.

General Evren and the National Security Council were quick to emphasize, after their intervention in 1980, that Turkey would remain an active member of NATO and continue close relations with the United States. In addition, Turkey's concerns focus on its proximity to the Soviet Union and the instability of its Middle East neighbors.

The Cyprus conflict of 1964 marked the turning point in Turkey's foreign and national security policies (42). This was not merely because of frustrations when Turkey was prevented from pursuing a national policy about Cyprus. More important was the realization that subtle changes were taking place in the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union that were bound to affect security relationships between the United States, NATO and Turkey. The Johnson letter directly

contributed to this feeling (43). This forced Turkey to re-examine its view of the security afforded by NATO. No longer did it appear to provide firm, all-embracing and nearly automatic collective security. Although NATO continued to be the basis of Turkey's security policy, it remained for the 1974 Cyprus crisis to precipitate the most serious damage to the relations between Turkey, the United States, Greece and NATO, and to benefit the Soviet Union.

#### GREEK-NATO-US-TURKISH IMBROGLIO

As on previous occasions when the Cyprus issue flared, the overriding United States concern was not the rights or wrongs on either side or the fate of the two communities on the island, but rather the best way to limit the potential damage to NATO and to the American strategic interests in the Mediterranean. Thus the United States sought to defuse the situation and, above all, to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey that would be disastrous for all concerned. While the American intervention in 1963-1964 had succeeded in averting a confrontation between these two NATO allies, it did nothing to further a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem.

In July 1974, acting on orders from Athens, Greek military forces, backed by the Cyprus national guard, attempted to overthrow the government of Archbishop Makarios (44). This time Ankara invoked its right of intervention without waiting for reaction from Washington.

Most important it aroused the resentment of both allies, each of which felt that the United States had betrayed it in supporting the other. The immediate impact was felt by NATO with Greece's withdrawal from the military wing. Six years would lapse before Greece would return to the integrated military command structure.

Turkey's response was less immediate, but in the long run may prove more injurious. The most serious cause of friction between Ankara and Washington (resulting from the Cyprus crisis) was the arms embargo imposed by the United States Congress in 1975, and ultimately rescinded in 1978 (45). This action, regarded by most Turks as an insult to a loyal ally, aroused widespread Turkish indignation (46). The lifting of the embargo and the 1980 United States - Turkish Defense Agreement improved relation, but Turkish pride and national sensibilities had been offended, and these have traditionally been potent political forces in Turkey. Recently, Minister of Defense Haluk Bayulken warned the United States that «[A]n embargo against Turkey will be perilous for Turkish-US relations.» The ... «Turkish people will not tolerate another test of pressure like the arms embargo.» (47). In particular, faith in the United States as a dependable ally has been burdened with an extra psychological dimension, and will in the future manifest itself in «unanticipated ways in how Ankara proceeds in its relations with the United States and NATO.» (48).

The lifting of the embargo strengthened Papandreou's hand domestically. Papandreou, who was the first Prime Minister to visit Cyprus, has been emphatic in rejecting any solution imposed by force, and refuses to «de-internationalize» the problem or to allow NATO to serve as a mediator (49).

The Cyprus imbroglio has festered for years. It culminated on November 15, 1983, when the leader of the Turkish minority, Rauf Denktash, declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus an independent state. The Turkish Cypriots, with less than 20 percent of the population, control about 30 percent of Cyprus with the assistance of some 17,000 Turkish forces. This move by Denktash is fraught with dangers. The emergence of the Turkish Cypriot state changes the political and military map of the area. It will increase tensions between East and West and it will complicate life in NATO and the Balkans. Furthermore, it perpetuates the conflict between Greece and Turkey, even more than previously. Also, it violates the United



Nations resolution on maintaining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus and undermines the recent efforts of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to work out a settlement between the Greek and Turkish communities. Lastly, a permanent split will greatly complicate the United States' relations with both Athens and Ankara. It might lead again to pressure in Congress to embargo arms to Turkey, as in 1974.

This declaratory step by Denktash should not be regarded as irreversible. There is a ray of hope. In proclaiming a Turkish Cypriot state Denktash also renewed his commitment to negotiate for a single «federated state» composed of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This has been his goal in negotiations for years. So it is not necessary to take what has been done as a **fait accompli**. An optimistic view is that Denktash has staked out a new hard position in the difficult negotiations that must follow. Perhaps there is room for creative rather than condemnatory diplomacy.

In addition to Cyprus, two other issues complicate relations between these allies. The first issue concerns the right to explore for minerals, primarily oil, beneath the Aegean Sea. Under international law, nations have a right to explore for mineral wealth on their continental shelf, but the Greek Islands (Chios, Kos, Lesbos, Samos, etc.) and the Turkish mainland share the same shelf. Based on the 1958 Geneva Convention concerning the Continental Shelf, Greece maintains that these and other islands have their own continental shelf. Turkey contends that these islands have special characteristics that require a special solution. Further clouding the issue are the limits of the territorial waters surrounding these islands and the militarization and fortification of them and others (e.g., Rhodes). This quandary viewed by Turkey as provocative and in general appears to be a violation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (50). This latter problem led Turkey to create the Army of the Aegean (51). By way of retort, Greece has strengthened the High Military Command of the Interior and Islands (ASDEN) and created «D» Corps with headquarters in Xanthi

(60 miles from the Turkish border) to offset the mobilization and deployment of troops on the Maritsa River. In general, however, Turkey currently does not consider Greece a potential threat.

The second issue concerns the control of airspace over the Aegean. This was partially resolved in February 1980, when civil aviation flights over this area were resumed. The question of the two countries' military flights into the area still remains deadlocked, awaiting settlement within the framework of NATO (52). The linkage between the bilateral, Aegean issues and the Cyprus questions remain unclear, since progress on one would presumably create an environment of greater trust for moving forward on the other. To date, however, neither Greece nor Turkey has attempted a bold initiative to break the impasse (53). Time is waning! Papandreou is perhaps one of the very few Greek politicians today who can negotiate with Ankara and arrive at some resolution of these knotty problems. Such a meeting would be reminiscent of the E. Venizelos - K. Atatürk Summit in 1930 when these two leaders reconciled their outstanding differences (54).

#### **CASTING ABOUT**

Greece and Turkey's preoccupation with each other, their differences with the United States, and their disappointment in Western Europe's level of assistance, caused each to cast about in the international arena for supporters.

#### **The Soviet Connection**

The issues that divide the Alliance in the southern flank benefit the Soviet Union. Greece today views the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as less threatening than her ally, Turkey. Turkey's view of the Soviet Union and the threat it poses is

colored not only by its extensive geographic exposure, but by historical relations with its northern neighbor.

Neither country presently fears a Soviet attack. Instead, both have responded favorably to Soviet overtures for improved relations by exchanging high level diplomatic visits. More importantly, both nations have consummated major trade agreements with the Soviets.

In the case of Turkey, no significant change in policy has taken place since the arrival of the Evren government. Today, the Soviet Union is one of Turkey's major trading partners, and as such, Turkey receives more aid than most Third World nations. It compares quite favorably with aid currently given to Turkey by Western nations. Specifically, in 1982 a new trade pact was signed which stipulated a 33% increase in commerce: the Soviets pledged to provide oil, fertilizer, timber and electricity in exchange for Turkish textiles and foodstuffs. This agreement was considered a setback for the United States' effort to limit western economic ties with the Soviet Union because of the Polish dilemma.

Soviet intentions are for a neutral Turkey; but an independent Turkish foreign policy which stays loyal to contractual ties with the West, and undertakes a step-by-step restoration of confidence between the two, is to be encouraged (56). Being adjacent to Turkey gives the Soviet Union a natural advantage and conditions her to think of Turkey as part of her defensive perimeter. A politically neutral or friendly Turkey can relieve Soviet vulnerability from the south, even if it cannot totally eliminate concern (57).

One can interpret Greece's relations with the Soviet Union in the last two years as part of an effort to diversify Greek foreign policy. Papandreou has described Greece's foreign policy «... as an independent and multidirectional policy. This means they are striving for friendly relations and the development of cooperation with all countries, irrespective of their bloc membership.» (58).

Specifically, relations with the Soviet Union have been improving steadily in the last five years. By 1979, Greece was importing a large amount of oil and began increasing contacts in the fields of shipping, tourism, sports, and commerce. In the same year, an agreement was signed to provide Soviet commercial and auxiliary combat ships with repairs at the Neorion Shipbuilding Company on the Island of Syros. Although this development raised some consternation in Washington and NATO circles, Greek officials view Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean as part of US-Soviet strategic rivalry in the Middle East and Africa and not a direct threat to Greece's security (59).

Beginning in 1982, coinciding with the beginning for the renewal of the DECA agreement with the United States, the Soviet press began more favorable coverage of Greece. This culminated in February 1983 with the visit of Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Tikhonov to Athens, where he was given the «red carpet treatment.» (60). This visit resulted in a series of long-term agreements in economic, industrial, scientific and technical fields (61).

The agreement does not represent any significant new level of cooperation, but the visit by Tikhonov aroused interest in the United States and NATO because it was the first by a Soviet Prime Minister and gave rise to ongoing concern about Papandreou's foreign policy. It cannot be assumed, however, that Greece today is moving toward a position where greater Soviet influence could be imposed on Greek policies. These relations have brought no fundamental changes in the Soviet's position: they have not supported the issue of Cyprus or the question of airspace and seabed jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea, except rhetorically.

Both Greece and Turkey have intensified their relations with their Balkan neighbors at all levels—in trade, tourism, industry, and economics. Indeed, they seem to be competitors in these fields. Relations with Bulgaria have been normalized

as long as the borders remain quiet and the Soviet Union stations no troops there (62). Relations with Albania are correct. If the Albanians invite the Soviets to return to the naval base at Vlore (their «window» to the Mediterranean until May 1961) and if a crisis in Yugoslavia brings pro-Soviet leadership to power, neither Greece nor Turkey can afford to take a relaxed attitude toward Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean. A Soviet foothold on the Adriatic would outflank and isolate Greece and Turkey and could make communications between NATO and the southern flank more difficult. Equally, if Greece were lost to NATO, the movement of war material by sea to Turkey and Italy in wartime would be severely disrupted.

In summary, Greece's major objective in the Balkans has not been to secure allies against Turkey but rather to relieve her borders from tensions in case of an attack from Turkey (63). Turkey senses vulnerability (especially from Bulgaria), which ensures that top priority will be given to the security of that region. It is the Warsaw Pact that weighs on Turkish priorities and plans, and not the individual Balkan members.

### **The Middle East**

Both Greece and Turkey recognize the economic and political significance of the Middle East and have in the last five years exerted their efforts toward expanding relations in that region.

Turkey's intent is to be accepted as a friend of the Arabs, and on closer look, is a coming to terms with her historical past (64). In addition, these political developments took place at a time when Turkey's economy was in dangerous straits. Its dependency on Arab oil, which amounts to about 80 percent of its consumption, was clearly a vital variable in its reproachment with the Islamic world (65). As relations improved with certain key Arab countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait) (66). Turkey began to be more assertive in Western forums about a special knowledge of and access to the Middle East.

These shifts represent economic self - interest for Turkey, acknowledgement of certain cultural realities among the Turkish masses ,among whom Islamic practices are gaining in importance, and an awareness of a special contribution it can make to European states, who are also dependent on Persian Gulf oil (67).

Saudi Arabia, in particular, assists Turkey economically and militarily for the sake of regional stability. This is a necessity in light of Iran and the impact that a fundamentalist Islamic state has on the entire region. In addition, the Iran - Iraq war further contributes to the instability of the region (68). It is interesting to note that Turkey's relations with Iran are intriguing, not only because that country is a direct antithesis, under its present leadership, of Kemalist secularism, but also because Turkey has had to quietly combat efforts by the Teheran government to export its Islamic revolution. Iran is leaning heavily on Turkey for the export of cereals and products and possibly for political mediation (69). In fact, Turkey is the only nation in the area on good terms with both Iran and Iraq (70).

Ankara's relations with Syria, its neighbor to the south, are correct but distant. Sources of discord are present. The Turkish province of Hatay (Alexandretta) is claimed by Syria from time to time. In addition, Syria's radical secular regime has funneled arms to and supported Turkish rebels (71), especially the Armenians, who have undertaken terrorist attacks on Turkish diplomats throughout the world. Furthering this estrangement is Syria's close relations with the Soviet Union (72).

The Libyan connection that developed after the 1975 United States arms embargo is an important source of financial assistance for Turkey: an energy source at concessionary prices, millions of dollars in grants, and an employment of some 100.000 Turkish construction workers. Recently, problems have begun to surface in their relations, as Libya's

financial position is faltering due to oil prices (73). Turkey will not forget that Libya came to her assistance during the Cyprus dispute, at which time Libya transferred to the Turkish Air Force five F-5's, including spare parts. More recently, Libyan air force officers are being trained by Turkey (74).

What is the price tag for Turkey's connection with the Arab world? In the past few years Arab nations have indicated that Turkey's NATO connection need not be an impediment to closer ties. The declaration of its special relationships to the Middle East is also relevant for Turkey's position with regard to possible NATO responsibilities beyond the NATO arena. Some Turkish diplomats have indicated that Turkey in the past was too acquiescent and did not adequately protect its own special needs and interests. Below the surface also lies some skepticism and a loss of confidence in the United States because of the Embargo episode. Turkey's reluctance to publically embrace the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) does not mean that Turkey would refuse to assist Saudi Arabia or other Persian Gulf states, if approached. Rather, it means that Turkey has become more explicit about its other regional orientations, and reserves the right to determine when and how Turkish soil will be used. Each case will be judged on its individual merits.

Although Greece has strong historical and economic ties in the Middle East, her focus presently is on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Papandreou's PASOK solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) cause. Party ideology was the basis of the decision five days after the election to invite PLO leader Yasser Arafat to visit Athens. The visit, Arafat's first to a EEC contry, took place in December, 1981. In the process, the PLO's mission was upgraded to the same level as Israel's. Greece participated actively in the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut in August of 1982 (75), and Padandreou has sharply condemned all recent unilateral Israeli actions in Lebanon. Greek suport of the PLO has naturally strained relations with Israel, although Athens insists that its support of Israel's right to exist as a state has not been effected.

Libya's Muammar Qaddafi was expected in Athens in April, 1982. It is not at all clear why Qaddafi's visit was postponed. Security reasons may have been a factor, or, as was rumored in Athens, American pressure was telling.

Greece's perspective in the Middle East is symbolic of its new independent foreign policy. Its policies, however, have wider implications concerning how military facilities in Greece will be used by the United States and NATO. For example, will intelligence surveillance missions out of Athens Air Base (Ellinikon) be continued against Libya under this new agreement? Can the RFD or logistical support for such a force be deployed from Greece?

### MEETING THE THREAT

There are few signs of an emerging solution to the problems in the Alliance's southern flank. Diversity and adaptation are the major trends of the day and possibly for the indefinite future. They inevitably make for uncertainty as far as political-military commitments are concerned. They result in eschewing of any long-range institutional arrangements that stability and security usually require. The overall political and social fluidity in the Mediterranean and the Middle East-Persian Gulf has therefore increased further. In particular, the events in the entire Middle East region have put into motion a whole series of developments that are bound to have repercussions outside of the immediate region. They add a new political - military dimension which the Alliance is ill prepared to handle.

In strategic terms, it is difficult to de-couple the Middle East-Persian Gulf region from NATO's southern flank. Neither the Western powers nor the Soviet Union presently have established permanent forward bases in this region; thus the logistic constraints on anything more than «presence» missions



would be formidable unless greater investments are made. With the exception of the permanent United States base at Diego Garcia, all facilities in the Persian Gulf are temporary and whatever might be stored at them will be under the control of the host government (76). To this extent, the region is a vacuum, and the military force that settles in place first will have greater tactical advantages. In this context, continued United States access to Greek and Turkish bases and possible access to Egypt, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain could be crucial. From a strictly geographical standpoint the Turkish bases are the best placed strategically (77). Examining Figure I, shows the nominal approximate combat radii for American based in Turkey, east of Incirlik, makes the strategic value of the Turkish bases evident. With the F-111s, strike missions could cover the important sources of attack from the Transcaucasus and Crimea, and could also reach all important sites in the Gulf region (78). An F-15 fighter or the F-16s or F-18s (one of the types will ultimately be purchased by Greece and Turkey) might perform both intercept as well as strike missions. For most of the aircraft with shorter combat radii Turkey might provide the only bases in the area from which attacks could be initiated. Eastern Turkey has at least four excellent bases (Mus, Batman, Erzurum and Diyarbakir), which are now being remodeled and their runways expanded in order to serve this purpose. In all, Turkey has some 26 U.S. and NATO bases. Seven are air force installations, one is for the Army and the remainder are primarily storage and logistical sites and intelligence bases. Four of these intelligence installations are major operations - Siyabakir, Sinop, Karamürsel, and Belbaşı. These installations also have the advantage of being part of the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment stations (NADGE).

The major installations in Greece utilized by the United States and NATO are: Souda Bay and Iraklion air bases in Crete and Ellinikon Air Base in Athens; Nea Makri naval communications stations near Athens; and another twenty that serve as communications sites and storage units for nuclear weapons. Use of these Greek bases provides, among other




Figure 1. Turkish-based Aircraft Radii

things, direct operational and logistical support for the Sixth Fleet, important communications links, reconnaissance information, surveillance of Soviet and other nations' activities (e. g. r Libya, Syria) in the Eastern Mediterranean, support for U.S. and NATO airlift and logistics flights, and ammunition and supply storage sites. Loss of access to these bases would make the task of carrying out their functions much more difficult and complicated.

It is important to note that air and naval facilities in other countries in the Middle East-Persian Gulf would require considerable capital investment to bring them up to standards (See Table II). Beyond that, most of the Middle East countries are extremely sensitive about a visible U.S. presence (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia, etc.) (79). The U.S. is usually granted

TABLE II

**Rapid Deployment Force Facilities  
in the Persian Gulf Region**

	Air Force	Army	Navy
Bahrain	1		1
Diego Garcia (1)	1	1	1
Egypt	5	1	2
Kenya	1	1	1
Oman	3		1
Somalia	2		2
Saudi Arabia	2		1

(1) The U.S. base is in a quite different category from the facilities of the other countries. It is currently the only permanent U.S. base between Manila and Naples. A coral atoll, the island is situated at the virtual center of the Indian Ocean.

Source: James D. Wooten, **Regional Support Facilities for the Rapid Deployment Force** (Washington: Congressional Research Service), 1982.

discretionary use rights with respect to facilities and required to consult with the host government on major exercises and deployments. This suggests that the allegiances of the respective countries would play a major role in determining the success or failure of any major operation in the region. Moreover, most of these nations are in the throes of modernization, and the maintenance of political and economic stability will be telling in the kind of support they may provide.

On paper, the Soviet Union has great geographical advantages over the West, especially in the context of operations against the Persian Gulf. The Soviet border is only 600 miles from Iranian ports on the Gulf, and Soviet forces in Afganistan are just 400 miles from the Straits of Hormuz. Their lines of communication are much shorter (and probably entirely overland) than those of U.S. forces. Soviet forces would have to travel only one-seventh as far as U.S. units coming from the United States and they could use both long and short-haul aircraft. However, the U.S. probably has more capable friends and allies in the region who could provide vital support in a crisis or war.

A Soviet attack against Iran would be almost impossible to stop unless there was an early strategic warning and if U.S. forces were already deployed in forward positions and if the Iranians were equipped, trained and ready to fight. Obviously, the farther the scene of conflict from Soviet borders, the more difficult Soviet logistical problems would be, and the easier it would be for the United States and its allies to mount a counteroperation.

The NATO Alliance has yet to face squarely the problem of protecting its own direct interests in the Persian Gulf. Since the 1967 war, NATO members have often been explicit about limiting NATO's interests and responsibilities to the formal treaty area, which stops at the eastern borders of Turkey and at the Tropic of Cancer.

In May, 1981, NATO, for the first time, officially recognized the need for its members to help facilitate area deployment by

other members and to compensate for any gaps in NATO's force structure that might result from such deployments. These suggested areas of cooperation included the Middle East - Persian Gulf. This was further reaffirmed in the NATO ministerial communique of June, 1983. Specifically, this communique recognizes that situations may arise which threaten the vital interests of the West, and if it is established that NATO's common interest is involved they will engage in timely consultation. This communique **assumes** the support and assistance of virtually all NATO members (80). Based on historical experience, however, it may be difficult for the United States to acquire firm approval of the members for RDF operations or to compensate for the diversion of U.S. forces (81). The communique states «that member nations, **as they may decide**, have a wide and diverse range of possibilities from which to choose in making useful contributions to promote stability and deterrence in regions outside the treaty area involving vital western interests.» (82).

Should NATO «redraw» its boundaries to formally include the Middle East-Persian Gulf? In strategic terms the answer should no doubt be yes. In political terms, however, it is very difficult to imagine this happening without a major precipitating crisis. Too many ambiguities abound within NATO regarding defense priorities to make this a realistic alternative.

Nevertheless, the political considerations do not mean that greater cooperation and agreement within NATO or external threats is not possible. Because of the geographic proximity of Greece and Turkey to the Middle region, it makes sense to think of them as part of the Soviet Union's southern front, which stretches from the Adriatic to Pakistan (83). Within this catchment area lie many of the potentially explosive scenarios that may involve NATO and Soviet military power (e.g., Yugoslavia, Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, Afghanistan, etc.). It is necessary, therefore, that some formal recognition by NATO's leadership (beyond mere consultation) and individual country initiatives, take place for linking «local» conflicts and overall Western

strategic interests. It would go a long way toward eliminating the artificial boundaries that assume NATO's wartime responsibilities stop at Turkey's eastern border. Anything short of this will still require that the United States continue to take the initiative. There may be no need to redraw NATO's institutional map, but there is a need to accept the fact that this map may be irrelevant in a future war, since it no longer encompasses all of NATO's major assets (84).

In the complex milieu of the 1980s, alarmism regarding the growing Soviet threat is not an effective source of policy. This does not imply that the Soviet threat no longer exists, but the threat today is less immediate and less direct. More important, in the case of Greece and Turkey, neither regards it as the principal source of their insecurity. The need for an assertive and cooperative policy among the Allies spills over into the Greco-Turkish imbroglio. This type of assistance would blunt any Soviet attempt to exploit instabilities, both real and latent on the southern flank. Such a policy is even more important in view of the potential for instability elsewhere in southern Europe (i.e., Yugoslavia) and the Middle East.

The domestic political scene, particularly in Greece and Turkey, does not permit imaginative moves by their political leaders in reconciling differences. In fact, both countries are likely to seek greater autonomy in foreign relations, much to the chagrin of the United States and NATO. To attempt the prevention of such a development might alienate them and further weaken their ties with the West. U.S. and NATO leaders should recognize these shifts in policy as concomitant developments resulting in the ever-changing domestic and international environment.

Both Greece and Turkey must be assured that they are valued members of the NATO community, and they must be urged to share goals that include, but extend beyond, the narrow boundaries of national security and regional settings. Only under such conditions will both countries make positive

contributions to collective defense, and only under such conditions can the United States and NATO repair the fissures in the southern flank and reestablish genuine cooperative relations with both allies.

We may now be at the watershed where NATO objectives in the eastern Mediterranean are better served by affording greater credence to political, rather than military, means. This is especially significant in light of the potentially explosive situation in the Middle East-Persian Gulf. As a result, the eastern Mediterranean now takes on additional import as one of the most strategically critical sea areas, and any reduction in U.S. or NATO strength shifts the balance of power toward the Soviet Union. The key to a secure Mediterranean rests in a stable and durable southern flank

## NOTES

1. Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1982, p. 28.
2. Problems within Eastern European countries, such as the Polish crises, are considered as internal problems of the Warsaw Pact. Overall stability between the two alliances is not affected.
3. Turkey has a 380 mile land frontier with the Soviet Union. Greece borders the Balkan states of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.
4. This affects and complicates the command structure of NATO.
5. The Sixth Fleet usually consists of 1 aircraft carrier, 14 escort vessels, 5 nuclear submarines, and 58 combat aircraft. The Fifth Escadra is composed of 1 helicopter carrier, 8 escort vessels, 8-9 attack submarines with nuclear capabilities. These forces are part of the Black Sea Fleet deployed out of Sevastopol. Soviet land-based aircraft are also part of the Black Sea Fleet. The Soviet navy, because of its lack of access to port facilities in the Mediterranean, will utilize anchorages. These are primarily found in Greek waters off the coast of Kithera Island, northern Cyprus, and east and south of the Island of Crete.
6. A Kiev class carrier with 15-20 Forger A-Vistol aircraft periodically deploys in the Mediterranean. The Forgers have a combat radius of about 200 miles.
7. The Backfire bomber has a combat radius of 3400 miles, while the Blinder's radius is 1,925 miles. Both are air refuelable.
8. Libya's air force inventory includes Blinder bombers, plus Mirages and MIG-23 and MIG-25 fighters.
9. The flexibility of the air force in deploying its aircraft makes comparisons difficult.
10. A decision by both governments should be forthcoming shortly. The final decision may rest on which company provides the best «offset» package. This will provide the purchasing country with a chance to finance and co-produce a good part of the aircraft. These «offsets» often include the production and sale of a country's commercial products.
11. For example, an F-4 Phantom is a good match for the most advanced aircraft that Bulgaria and Romania possess (MIG-23s).
12. Category 3 units are about 25% of strength, possibly complete with fighting vehicles (some obsolescence).
13. Greece's armed forces are far better off regarding modernization than those of Turkey. Turkey will very shortly begin to upgrade her M-48 tanks with the new 105mm gun and new diesel engines. With these modifica-



tions, they will be able to hold their own against Russian armor, except for the T-72.

14. Nuclear warheads are stockpiled in both Greece and Turkey. Both may expect to suffer Soviet counter strike and preemptive measures.

15. Recently General K. Evren did not rule out the possibility of such systems being deployed in Turkey.

16. Thanos Veremis, *Greek Security Considerations* (Athens: Papazis-Publishers, 1980), p. 103.

107. PASOK won by an absolute majority with 49.06% of the vote and 172 out of 300 seats in Parliament. The New Democracy Party received 35.86% of the vote and 115 seats, and the Communist Party of the Exterior 10.92% of the vote for 13 seats.

18. Van Coufoudakis, «Ideology and Pragmatism in Greek Foreign Policy.» *Current History*, December 1982, p. 426.

19. Changes relating to the separation of church and state, civil marriages, family law, and women's eligibility for education and pensions.

20. Coufoudakis, *op. cit.*, p. 427. Recent legislation takes away from public sector employees the right to call a strike, except when a majority of the members have voted by secret ballot.

21. For details see *Greece Quarterly Economic Review*, No. 2 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Ltd., 1983).

22. The Drachma was devalued by 15,5% and there was a draw-down of the nation's oil reserves to reduce petroleum imports, in order to reduce the deficit.

23. Coufoudakis, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-429.

24. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, Vol. VII. February 7, 1983, p. 51.

25. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, June 3, 1983, p. 52.

26. Complete details have not, as yet, been released. But the agreement is understood to include U.S. assistance in helping Greece's infant arms industry.

27. Attempted coups d'état continue to plague the polity of Greece, as recently as six months ago. When Papandreou took office he also became defense minister. He is wary of the military, especially the army. In February, 1983, a major reshuffling took place at the senior officers' level. He forced many of the senior ranks to retire so that younger and more sympathetic PASOK officers could be advanced.

28. *FBIS*, Vol. VII, May 16, 1983, p. 56.

29. Panayiotis Dimitras, «Greece's New Isolationism?», *Public Opinion Quarterly*, February/March, 1983, pp. 14-15. This survey of 700 individuals was carried out in the Greater Athens area where 1/3 of Greece's population resides. Given the relative regional homogeneity of Greek political behavior the results have 5-7 percent bias.

30. *Ibid.*

31. See Lawrence Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
32. Thanos Veremis, *Greek Security: Issues and Politics* (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Papers*), p. 19.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Six coalition governments have ruled Turkey from early 1970 to 1981.
35. In the six months prior to the *coups d'état* 136 ballots were cast for office of President, yet no one could be elected because of party feuding and the disproportionate influence of minor parties.
36. Undermining the legitimacy of the polity were armed uprisings of Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities. In 1980, 200-250 people a month were being killed between various warring groups. To stem the flow of armed attacks, Ankara recently (with the permission of Iraq) crossed their mutual borders with 20,000 armed troops and gendarmarie (across a 25 mile front) in order to eliminate base camps of the rebels.
37. *FBIS*, Vol. VII. January 2, 1980.
38. *Turkey Quarterly Economic Review, No. 2* (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit, Ltd., 1983).
39. In addition, there are 16 provisional articles pertaining to the transitional period of Evren's seven year Presidency.
40. Ninety-two percent of votes cast favored passage of the constitution. These votes cast represented 91% of the electorate.
41. The new parties will have to secure 10% of the vote. This will be the threshold percentage to secure representation in Parliament.
42. Duygu Bozoğlu Sezer, «Turkey's Security Policies» (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Paper*, 1981), pp. 36-37.
43. In the mid-1960's, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü suggesting that the United States might not come to Turkey's aid in the event of a Soviet attack. Consequently, Turkey decided against intervening in Cyprus despite what it perceived as a legitimate pretext under the Zurich-London accords of 1960 of 1960 to intervene on behalf of the island's 18 percent Turkish minority. Johnson's letter humiliated Turkey and made the Turkish armed forces appear to have been manipulated by the self-interest of the U.S. For details of President Johnson's letter and President İnönü's reply, see *Middle East Journal*, summer, 1966, pp. 386-93.
44. It is estimated that over 10,000 Greek officers and NCO's had come to Cyprus secretly.
45. For details see *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981).
46. Predictably, Turkey responded by temporarily closing 26 U.S. - Turkish bases.
47. *FBIS*, Vol. VII. May 13, 1983, p. T1.

38. Interviews conducted in Ankara at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 28, 1981.

49. The United Nations adopted a resolution on May 13, 1983 calling for the early withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, the return of refugees to their homes, and a renewed effort by the UN Secretary General to find a solution to the problem. As a result of this resolution bizonal talks have been suspended.

50. Both Greece and Turkey observe the six-mile limit in territorial waters, If Greece extends the limit to 12 miles, Turkey has given notice that it would be a *casus belli*.

51. The Army of the Aegean (4th Army) is more on paper than a reality.

52. The exact command and control arrangements in the Aegean are still in conflict. Greece would like to re-establish the pre-1970 control arrangements. As a result of the new arrangements under the «Roger's Plan» two centers were created: one commanded by a Turkish general in Izmir, and on the Greek side, a headquarters in Larrisa controlled by a Greek officer. This latter headquarters has not, as yet, been established.

The Aegean conflict festers daily with accusations from both sides that their territorial air space has been infringed. In March 1983, Greece refused to participate in a NATO exercise when the Island of Lemnos was excluded. This island is strategically located almost at the mouth of the Dardanelles.

53. A further aggravating issue for Turkey was Greece's admittance into the EEC in 1980. This was a psychological blow for Turkey because of how she views her relations with the West.

54. In June 1983, at the NATO Ministerial meeting the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers met and discussed problems of mutual concern. This meeting has now spawned additional ones, beginning in July 1983 between senior foreign ministry officials to discuss tourism and economic problems.

55. **U.S. Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. A report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives (Washington: U.S. Printing Office, June 1983), pp. 24-25.**

56. To date, Moscow has avoided linking economic aid to specific political demands. The 1978 Turkish-Soviet agreement entitled «Principles of Good-Neighborly and Friendly Relations» did state that neither nation would allow the use of its territory «... for the commission of aggression or subversive actions against the other state » Literal interpretation of this clause would prevent the operation of U.S. and NATO surveillance bases along Turkey's northern frontiers.

57. Sezer, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

58. FBIS, Vol. VII, May 13, 1983, p. S4.

59. After 1981, Greece did not permit the Soviet auxiliary units of

the fleet to be repaired at Neorion. Since Papandreou came to power this action has been rescinded.

60. A prelude to Tikhonou's visit to Athens was the visit of K. Karanlis to Moscow in 1979.

61. For details see **FBIS**, Vol. VII, February 23-25, 1983. This agreement provoked the EEC to ask for clarification because bilateral economic agreements are not in keeping with EEC membership.

62. Many of the weapons that the terrorists possessed throughout the chaotic anarchistic period of the 1980s originated in Bulgaria. The flow of weapons and terrorists has slowed down in the last year.

63. Veremis, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

63. Sezer, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

65. James Brown, «Turkey's Policy in Flux», **Current History**, January 1983, p. 37.

66. Turkey's trade links with Egypt and Jordan have been tenuous in the past, but are presently being strengthened.

67. **U.S. Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Greece and Cyprus**, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

68. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia serve on the Islamic Goodwill Mission, which seeks a resolution of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

69. An exchange of prisoners took place between Iran and Iraq out of Ankara on May 1, 1983. It was through the auspices of the International Red Crescent.

70. **U.S. Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Greece and Cyprus**, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

71. In March 1973, Foreign Minister Ilter Türkmen visited Damascus and was given assurances that aid and comfort would not be given to terrorist groups.

72. Turkish military leaders profess no concern over the newly installed Syrian SA-5s with Soviet crews, which pose a threat to Incirlik's operations and areas where the 6th Fleet operates in the eastern Mediterranean.

73. Libya has of late, not been fulfilling her contractual obligations to Turkish contractors and laborers. **FBIS**, Vol. VII, May 10, 1983.

74. **FBIS**, Vol. VII, August 25, 1981.

75. During the siege of West Beirut, Greece accepted 200-300 wounded Palestinian fighters for treatment in Greek hospitals.

76. James P. Wooten, **Regional Support Facilities for the Rapid Deployment Force** (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1982), p. 2.

77. Albert Wohlstetter, **Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf** (Marina Del Rey, California: European American Institute for Security Research, 1981), p. 180.

78. A NATO fighter-bomber (F-111) flying out of Mus could cover the entire Transcaucasian border region without having to refuel, and put NATO planes some 550 miles from Teheran and 700 miles from the mouth

of the Persian Gulf. By contrast, the RFD base at Ras Banas, Egypt is at least 1,000 miles from the Persian Gulf.

79. Recent discussions between the United States and Egypt on the Ras Banas base have been stalled. If these negotiations falter the RDF force would lose one of its important staging areas for the Persian Gulf.

80. Both Greece and Spain reserved a part or all of their government's position on this communique.

81. Both France and Britain have cooperated in providing forces for the Middle East-Persian Gulf. France has a large permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean (12-20 combat vessels) operating out of Djibouti and Mayotte. The French forces include approximately 6,000 ground forces. Britain is less visible in her military presence but has extensive military advisors throughout the Persian Gulf. Also, she conducts naval exercises annually in the region.

82. Emphasis added by the author.

83. Geoffrey Kemp, «East-West Strategy in the Middle East-Persian Gulf.» in Kenneth A. Myers (ed.), **NATO The Next Thirty Years** (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 220.

84. *Ibid.*