

Systemic Determinants of Regional Cooperation: Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement since 2020

Abdullah Erboğa* & Veysel Kurt**

Abstract

Tensions in bilateral and regional relations between Türkiye and Egypt, which had escalated during the Arab Uprising, normalized since 2020. The aim of this article is to explain the relations between Türkiye and Egypt in the context isolationist and interventionist strategies in the Middle East. The differing approaches to U.S. Middle East policies under Trump and Biden have been a determining factor. Although the US has isolationist military preferences, it also intervenes in the Middle East through other means. When the US interventionist approach is low, the regional power vacuum increases, and consequently, tensions and conflicts among the actors in the region increase. When intervention is high, the opposite result occurs. Methodically, this article adopts qualitative process tracing to analyze and examine the causal mechanism. This article argues that systemic factors, rather than internal, identical or ideational factors, have been the primary determinants of change in Turkish-Egyptian relations in 2020.

Keywords: Türkiye, Egypt, US, Conflict, Cooperation.

Bölgesel İşbirliğinin Sistemik Belirleyicileri: 2020'den Sonra Türkiye-Mısır Yakınlaşması

Öz

Türkiye-Mısır ilişkilerinde Arap İsyanları süreci ile birlikte gerilen ikili ve bölgesel ilişkiler, 2020 yılından itibaren normalleşme sürecine girdi. Bu makalenin amacı, Türkiye ile Mısır arasındaki ilişkileri ABD'nin Orta Doğu'daki izolasyonist ve müdahaleci stratejilerinin etkisi bağlamında ele almaktadır. Başkan Trump ve Biden dönemlerinde ABD'nin Orta Doğu stratejilerine yönelik farklı yaklaşımları, bölgesel çatışma ve iş birliğinde belirleyici bir faktör olmuştur. ABD'nin izolasyoncu askeri tercihleri olmasına rağmen, Orta Doğu'ya siyasi söylem/diplomatik araçlarla da müdahale etmektedir. ABD'nin müdahaleci yaklaşımı düşük olduğunda, bölgesel güç boşluğu yükselmekte ve sonuç olarak bölgedeki aktörler arasındaki gerilimler ve çatışmalar artmaktadır. Müdahale yüksek olduğunda ise tam tersi sonuç ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu makale, nedensel mekanizmayı açıklamak için süreç takibi yöntemini benimsemektedir. Bu makale, 2020 yılında Türk-Mısır ilişkilerinde yaşanan değişimde içsel, ideolojik ya da kimlikel faktörler yerine, sistemik faktörün temel belirleyici olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Mısır, ABD, Çatışma, İş birliği.

*Dr. | Turkish National Defense University, Naval War College, Strategy and Security Department, İstanbul, Türkiye | abdullah.erboga@msu.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0002-4435-5220

**Prof. Dr. | Istanbul Medeniyet University, Faculty of Political Science, Political Science and Public Administration, İstanbul, Türkiye | kurtveysel@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-4619-4018 | DOI: 10.36484/liberal.1841614
Liberal Düşünce, Year: 31, Issue 121, 2026, pp. 217-236.

Date of Submission: 13 Aralık 2025 | Date of Acceptance: 3 Şubat 2026

Publication Date: 6 March 2026

dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/liberal | ISSN: 1300-8781 | e-ISSN: 2667-6486

Introduction

While the post-World War I international relations in the Middle East were being established as a modern nation-state order, the great powers continued to seek to protect their interests in the region. The newly established Republic of Türkiye, while trying to consolidate its internal stability, was also trying to adapt to the regional order and was particularly cautious in its Middle East policy. Egypt, on the other hand, was entering a period in which British domination of the Egyptian political sphere continued and there were frequent efforts to shake off colonial tutelage over the political institution.

On the centenary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1925, Türkiye and Egypt emerged as two regional powers in the Middle East. Divergent domestic and foreign policy priorities and threat perceptions have resulted in a mutually respectful but static relationship between Ankara and Cairo. The two actors, trying to adapt to the new regional order in the post-colonial Middle East, have been cautious about the conditions of the new regional order on the one hand, and the overlaps and risk factors in the bilateral relationship on the other. During the Cold War, Türkiye's main national security problem was the Soviet threat. Egypt, on the other hand, is an actor that has experienced three major wars (1948, 1967 and 1973), mainly due to Israel's expansionist and aggressive behaviours. Since the Camp David Accords in 1979, Egypt has sought to ensure its national security against internal and external asymmetric threats and to maintain the regional status quo.

Türkiye and Egypt have never had a very high level of political, military and economic cooperation or direct conflict in this century-long period. The short-term positive leaps in these three areas have not produced strategic results. In periods of strained relations, regional rivalry came to the fore, but there was no conflict between the two actors. It is therefore worth noting that the two actors did not share a common threat perception in this process, except for regional power rivalry. However, at times when Egypt and Türkiye challenged the regional status quo, it was inevitable that they perceived each other as threatening and reacted against each other. In terms of regional power distribution, Egypt's power expansion and revisionist behaviour have periodically caused discomfort on the Turkish side, while Egypt has shown status-quoist reactions in cases where Türkiye's power capacity has increased and Türkiye has claimed regional leadership.

In the early years of the Cold War, Nasser's strategy of expansion in the Middle East and Türkiye's pursuit of a regional policy within the framework

of the Baghdad Pact marked the first period of confrontation between the two countries. Egypt's abandonment of revisionist policies, as a result of its defeat against Israel and Türkiye's abandonment of its Western-oriented foreign policy due to its problems with the US in the same period caused the relations between the two countries to be stabilised until 2010. The second cycle of tension and détente pendulum experienced during the Arab Uprisings.

This study, which analyses Turkish-Egyptian relations, in light of balance of power, consists of four main parts. The first part examines the theoretical framework of the balance of power. The second section provides a critical review of the literature on the subject. The third part analyses the historical background of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Egypt from the beginning of the Cold War to 2010. The fourth section focuses on the periods of cooperation, tension and normalization during the Arab Uprisings within the framework of the relevant theoretical approach.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Turkish-Egyptian relations have been characterized by successive processes of tension and normalization. Both during and after the Cold War and the period that began with the Arab Uprisings, relations between the two countries have followed this pattern. The fundamental question that needs to be asked in order to explain the relations between the two countries in a holistic, theoretical and systematic way is the following: What is the determinant factor behind cooperation, conflict and normalization between Türkiye and Egypt?

Many academic studies have emerged to answer this question. These studies can be categorised into two groups. The first group focuses only on a specific period or analysis the relations in the context of the political identity and ideology of decision-makers. Meral argues that the principled stance taken by Türkiye at the beginning of the Arab Uprisings later evolved into an ideological context, 'paving the way for the AKP to form an alliance with actors with the same Islamist roots' (Meral, 2014). Çağaptay and Sievers also argue that an ideological affinity between Turkish decision-makers and Morsi was crucial (Cagaptay & Sievers, 2015). Özlem Tür highlights the ideological factor in Türkiye's Egyptian policy. Tür analyzes the power change in Egypt following the July 3rd coup attempt not only as a sign of Türkiye losing its leadership role in the regional/Islamic world and a key ally, but also as a collapse of its middle east strategy (Tür, 2019: 9). Özkan draws attention to the importance of internal legitimacy and identity affiliation in understanding Egyptian foreign policy and examines the tension with Türkiye after 2013 in

this context (Özkan, 2014: 408). Tetik, on the other hand, examines the impact of the identity-based transformation in Turkish foreign policy on bilateral relations. He argues that secular and conservative segments of Türkiye have different foreign policy perspectives, and that the AK Party government has a normative discourse framework shaped by majoritarianism. He argues that this normative and identity based foreign policy approach has periodically created problems in Turkish-Egyptian relations (Tetik, 2021: 15).

The second group, on the other hand, makes eclectic use of many factors, such as the influence of global powers, regime security, changes in the regional balance of power, conjunctural conditions, economic opportunities and costs. Altunışık, highlighted more domestic (ideological) factors during the rapprochement period, while emphasizing the international context along with regional issues during periods of tension (M. Altunışık, 2020: 18). Yesilyurt, analyzing Turkish-Egyptian relations since the Cold War years, used 'regional power balances, economic opportunities/challenges alongside ideologies, political identities and domestic calculations of the ruling elite in an eclectic framework' (Yesilyurt, 2020: 341). A similar approach is observed in Öztürk's study (2021: 203-207) and Magued (2016: 18-22), on the other hand, explained the rise and fall in relations between the two countries in terms of their 'national roles'. The ambiguity in defining the concept and the interpreting their foreign policy preferences as steps taken against each other weakens the explanatory claim of the study. Stein argues that Türkiye and Egypt, despite being part of the Western alliance, are attempting to shape their own regions as sub-imperialist powers. Accordingly, during the Arab Uprisings after 2013, Egypt vehemently opposed the Turkish model of Islamic democracy, viewing this not solely as an ideological motivation but as a reflection of regional power rivalry (Stein, 2025).

Studies that claim to explain Middle Eastern relations and problems at the regional level tend to emphasize political identities and ideology. The use of variables such as religion, sectarian and ethnic identities is both comfortable and convenient for providing quick answers. The explanatory claim of ideological approaches can be criticized on three points: First, it focuses solely on periods of crisis. Second, Türkiye and Egypt have ruled by the same leaders during both periods of tension and normalization. Third, despite their strained relations, Türkiye and Egypt adopted a similar stance in response to Israel's attacks on Gaza (2014 and 2018), which are a typical example of Israel's expansionist policy.

On the other hand, very few studies focus on the structure of the international system and systemic effects (Erboğa & Yiğit, 2023: 284-293; Gause, 1999). Accepting systemic influences as a variable naturally leads to a focus on the behaviour of external factors, and thus on the behaviour of great powers, rather than on individual or cultural factors. The structural approach based on great power behaviour ignores the behaviour of secondary actors and the impact of domestic factors (Waltz, 1979: 60-79). Structural realism, which focuses on the balance of power, emphasizes that structure is the main determinant of state behaviour and that therefore behaviour of the states will have similar tendencies within the limits set by the structure. This approach also emphasizes that the distribution of power affects the behaviour of states both in a region and at the global level. Accordingly, revisionist states defined as states that try to change the distribution of power in their favour and focus on power enhancement are; actors that try to maintain the existing structure and distribution of power and try to preserve their power are defined as status quo actors (Chan, Feng, He, & Hu, 2021; Goddard, 2018; Ward, 2017).

Although the terms revisionism and status quo have been used with different meanings, they are basically categorised as those who are satisfied with the existing order and those who are not (Schweller, 1994:85-88). For example, there is a clear difference in approach between the view of revisionism as imperialism (Morgenthau, 1948: 21-40). The main aim of revisionist strategy which is carried out by states through aggressive behaviour, is to change the order in their favour. Therefore, revisionism can be read as a reflection of the increase of power and the status quo as a reflection of the search for security (Ali, 2023: 21). In this sense, revisionism and the status quo have objectives beyond offensive-defensive. There is a relationship between the two concepts in the spiral of preserving the established hegemony and disrupting this hegemony (Aslan, 2024: 9).

Revisionism is often used to refer to rising non-Western actors challenging established hegemony, and the theories developed often focus on the advantages of the Western-centric status quo. One such theory is hegemonic stabilization theory, which posits that stability in the international system, and hence the maintenance of power, is possible through the existence of a hegemonic power capable of maintaining the liberal world order (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Kindleberger, 1973). Power transition theory, on the other hand, focuses on the risk of war because actors who increase the capabilities and power capacity of states, with a focus on power transitivity, naturally challenge the dominant power in control of the system. In this sense, it attempts to explain the behaviour of states by claiming that the distribution

of power is the determining factor (Organski & Kugler, 1981: 27). Defending the status quo in the international system is an ideologically Western perspective, and this is also a moral problem. Accordingly, it is argued that the perspective of Western-centric academia is motivated by the desire to maintain power, stability and the international order as Western-centric, and therefore revisionism is actually a non-Western challenge from a civilizational approach (Turner & Nymalm, 2019: 411). However, Walt, who focuses on international relations in the Middle East and emphasizes the need to focus on threat rather than power, notes that the threatening actor will be balanced by others if it has geographic proximity, overall power capacity, offensive capability, and aggressive intent (Walt, 1987: 22-26).

Türkiye and Egypt can be defined as regional powers, middle powers or secondary actors in the international system. As part of their balancing and bandwagoning strategy, regional powers generally try to prevent situations from arising that could benefit their rivals in the regional power distribution. They act through internal balancing by increasing their material capacity or external balancing by forming alliances. Therefore, it can be said that balancing behaviour is one of the most frequently used strategies in processes that have the potential to change the distribution of power at the regional level. The bandwagoning strategy, on the other hand, emerges when states act by leaning on the great power when they do not have the capacity to balance their rivals. The security and defence umbrella provided by the great power also limits the ability of the rival actor to accumulate power.

The revisionist behaviour of actors who are uncomfortable with the regional status quo first disturbs the Western actors who established the status quo. The international system in the Middle East was created by the West as an artificial order based on nation-states, non-state actors and economic/military dependence. Therefore, the desire to revise the international system in the Middle East appears as a threat to the West itself. For this reason, in the century since the Sykes-Picot order, all revisionist tendencies in the Middle East, no matter which actor they came from, were either punished by the West itself or the revisionist actor was tried to be limited by the West's balancing strategy.*

It is also necessary to focus on the intra-regional balance of power. The actors in the Middle East perceive any change in the regional balance of power

* In this sense, Israel is an exception. Israel's expansionist and revisionist behaviour was never considered as a threat by the West and was not subjected to punishment and containment, even if it had consequences that threatened the regional status quo and global stability.

as a threat and try to limit each other. The revisionist behaviour that occurs from time to time in the region is largely within the framework of the strategy of following the West in order to maintain dependence on it, even if intra-regional balancing is possible. Approaching the revisionist initiatives of Gamal Abdel Nasser-era Egypt and Erdogan-led Türkiye, which challenged the regional status quo during the Arab uprisings, and the relations between the two countries from this perspective, will allow for more favourable explanations.

Historical Background

In the early years of the Cold War, significant changes occurred in both the domestic and foreign policies of Türkiye and Egypt. Although the two countries did not pose a direct threat to each other, the fact that they were in different blocs caused them to confront each other on regional issues. Türkiye's Western-oriented policies were institutionalized with its accession to the Middle East Command in 1951 and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 due to the alignment of its regional interests with the United States of America (US). On the other hand, after the coup d'état of the Free Officers in 1952, Egypt intensified its cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Heikal, 1978: 55-75) and has employed a strategy of claiming Arab world leadership in order to consolidate domestic power and both regional and international status and regional balance of power (Doran, 1999; Yiğit, 2022). Nasser's nationalization of Suez, his support for the change of governments in Syria and Iraq, and creating the United Arab Republic under his leadership are examples of revisionist behaviour (Bağcı, 2001), because the status quo in the region was not favorable to Egypt, according to Nasser's perspective (Sayed-Ahmed, 1993: 89).

In the same period, Türkiye's policy towards the region, especially its leading role in the Baghdad Pact, was seen by the Egyptian administration as a revisionist behavior (Sever, 2012: 12; Yıldırım, 2018: 138). Egypt's defeat against Israel, and the embargoes imposed by the US on Türkiye due to the Cyprus issue led to changes in Türkiye's and Egypt's regional policy. In short, Türkiye and Egypt, had softened this strategy due to the changing regional conditions and retreated to an optimal point. The easing of tensions in relations between the two countries after 1967 is a result of this situation. As a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Türkiye was exempted from the oil embargo imposed by Arab countries on the West in 1973 (Sinkaya, 2011: 85).

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Türkiye-Egypt relations were softened compared to the previous period. During the Mubarak era, Egypt had a strategic interest in regional stability and the two actors acted together in the establishment of the D-8 in 1997. The role played by Egyptian President Mubarak in 1998 as a mediator in the tensions between Ankara and Damascus (Oktav Alantar, 2001: 144) throughout the 1990s, is important in terms of the rapprochement between the two countries.

After 11 September 2001, the rupture in global politics led to the emergence of security-centred regional politics in the Middle East. The US preference for interventionist military strategy in the Middle East. Türkiye and Egypt, which emphasize foreign policy preferences in line with the US, have reacted similarly to the regional conditions determined by US hegemony, preferring to pursue an active foreign policy. The two countries' parallel reading of systemic and regional developments led to the development of bilateral relations and an active stance on regional issues.

Following its invasion of Iraq, the US military presence in the Middle East has prevented a power vacuum in the region. Regional actors adopted their strategies in accordance with the great power's behavior. For this reason, regional powers have chosen cooperation over conflict. Türkiye responded to the complex equation created by the invasion of Iraq by strengthening its relations in the region (Larrabee, 2007: 103). Instruments such as interdependence, mediation and conflict resolution formed the discursive framework of this activism (M. B. Altunışık & Martin, 2011: 7-24). As a result of the political and economic developments observed in Turkish-Egyptian relations, the two countries agreed to base their relations on a strategic roots. President Hosni Mubarak's visit to Türkiye in 2007 and the signing of 'Turkey-Egypt Strategic Dialogue Framework Memorandum' was a new mechanism and a declaration of intent for the deepening of bilateral relations (M. Altunışık, 2020: 20). In this document, it was decided to develop bilateral political, economic and cultural relations and to hold an annual meeting at the level of foreign ministers. In the military field, the two countries signed a "Memorandum of Understanding on Training, Technical and Scientific Cooperation in the Military Field" in November 2009 (Dış Politika Kronolojisi, 2009).

Arab Uprising and Regional Balance of Power

Policies towards the Arab Uprisings led to cooperation, tensions and normalization processes in relations between Türkiye and Egypt respectively. The revisionist behaviour of one side, or the perception of the other side as revi-

sionist, leads to tension. The anti-revisionist behaviour of the parties, on the other hand, leads the two actors to meet at an optimal point.

The question of what kind of regional order will emerge has become a struggle between states (Lynch, 2018). During the Arab uprisings, Türkiye's approach to disrupting the regional status quo and supporting social movements is essentially a desire for democratic transformation in the region and a desire for change based on creating interdependence (Merçan, 2022). While Egypt shared Türkiye's perspective of change before the 2013 coup, it abandoned this approach after the coup and relations reached a breaking point. The revisionist tendencies of Türkiye's regional policy were perceived as a threat to Egypt's national security, and in this context, the actors in favour of the regional status quo and the support provided by the West contributed to the limitation of Türkiye in the Middle East. As can be understood from this point, no matter which actor changes the balance of power in the region, balancing behaviour comes to the fore and the two countries are positioned on opposite sides.

The anti-Mubarak demonstrations in Egypt reached their peak on 25 February 2011. The demonstrations clearly demanded Mubarak's resignation and a change of power. On 29 January, US President Obama called for the implementation of the principles of reform and universal human rights (Good, 2011) meant that the US supported the masses, albeit passively (Yalçın, 2015: 58). Türkiye's position became clear in a short period of time, in line with the statements of the US and other Western actors.

According to Kardaş (2011: 2), democracy promotion has never been a part of Türkiye's official discourse and it was a risky position. Erdogan's advice to Mubarak to resign (Aljazeera, 2011) was considered, and somewhat unexpected, by many as a very strong statement given the fact that. Naturally, Erdogan's call was not received well by the Arab leaders in general and Egyptian leadership in particular. Egypt's then Foreign Minister in a letter to his Turkish counterpart expressed dismay at Erdogan's statement and termed it as interference in Egypt's internal affairs (Özkan & Korkut, 2013: 170).

The main determinant of the rapprochement between Türkiye and Egypt in the first phase of the Arab Uprisings is systemic factor, rather than internal dynamics. Despite the US military withdrawal, its political position influenced regional actors. In the Arab Uprisings, both President Obama's and Türkiye's supportive attitudes imply to a harmonised foreign policy between Ankara and Washington. Therefore, their approach to the demands for democracy in Egypt was similar.

The Egyptian government under the leadership of The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which does not engage in significant foreign policy commitments, has generally adopted an attitude in line with the US and Arab League. In this context, the discourse that ‘the Syrian government should reform’ (Abdul-Aziz, 2015) prevailed, and indicated new Egyptian policy although regarding regional transformation. However certain issues, such as Türkiye’s regional role and civil-military relations, were considered potential areas of divergence between the two countries (El-Labbad, 2014: 86). Turkish-Egyptian relations, which became closer during the SCAF era, began to evolve into cooperation during the Morsi era.

However, it should be stressed that the relations that gained momentum during the Morsi era began to develop during the SCAF period. While the Morsi government has continued the traditional foreign policy legacy it inherited in many areas (Özkan, 2013: 10), it has in part differentiated itself from previous periods in terms of content and discourse. While economic outcomes are prioritized in relations with China (Ide, 2012), it can be argued that traditional policies continue with a more active discourse in relations with Africa, Saudi Arabia and the US (Grimm & Roll, 2012: 1-4). During this period, Türkiye and Egypt strengthened their economic and political ties through reciprocal official visits (Mihaila, 2012), resulting in a tangible increase in both areas (Sariaslan, 2019: 539). The improved relations between the two countries has facilitated their collaboration in resolving regional conflicts. Morsi also proposed the establishment of a new mechanism called the ‘Islamic Quartet’ with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Iran. He also openly stated that ‘Assad must leave power’ (Bilan, 2012).

Tension in Bilateral Relations

The death of the US ambassador to Libya in a terrorist attack on 11 September 2012 (on the anniversary of 9/11) was a turning point in US Middle East strategy. Since then, the Arab uprisings have become a security issue for the US rather than a matter of political transformation (Kurt, 2019: 81-82). The balance of power at the regional level has shifted once again as a result of the change in the US stance. Although the Obama administration preferred an isolationist foreign policy within the framework of the retrenchment strategy, the positive agenda it used in favour of the Arab Uprisings has completely changed and implemented a strategy focused on fighting terrorism in a way that paves the way for power competition in the region. As a result, the actors seeking change in the Middle East lost influence, while the status quo actors formed a broad alliance and sought to align themselves with the US.

The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood by a military coup was not only a domestic political issue, but also a turning point for Egypt to seek new alliances and reassess its regional status (Monier & Ranko, 2014: 62). Repositioning of the Egypt in the region naturally reflected to the Turkish-Egyptian relations. Türkiye saw the coup as a setback for the Egyptian revolution and the return of democracy and described it as 'unacceptable (Deutsche Welle, 2013). As a result of mutual reactions, Egypt declared the Turkish ambassador 'persona non grata' on 23 November 2013, and Türkiye took the same step in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. On the other hand, the US' interpretation of the the coup, as a 'restoration of democracy', (Gordon & Fahim, 2013) laid the foundation for a new alliance between the two countries and also including UAE, Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, according to Aktürk, international observers often saw the collapse of Egyptian democratization as a microcosm of the trajectory of the entire Arab uprising. (Aktürk, 2023: 351). In this equation, Türkiye which still sees the Arab uprisings as a process of political transformation stood against the US-Egyptian bloc which sees them as a security issue.

During his first term, President Trump avoided military intervention in the Middle East, instead pursuing a policy that exacerbated political and diplomatic polarization in the region. This led to a power vacuum and increased conflict among regional actors. In a context of rising security concerns, Türkiye and Egypt have diverged on three issues: The Gulf crisis, the Libyan civil war and energy competition in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The main reason for the Gulf crisis, which started in 2014 (then deepened in 2017), is that Qatar and the bloc formed after 2013 (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE) were on opposite sides of the policy towards the Arab uprisings. Qatar's relationship with the MB and Iran, which is considered a national security issue by this bloc (Erboğa, 2016: 12), paved the way for these crises. On 5 June 2017, the crisis entered a new dimension with the decision by Saudi Arabia and its supporters to impose an embargo on Qatar. On 12 July, the Saudi-led bloc published a thirteen-point list of demands, including 'Türkiye to close its military base in Qatar' (Aljazeera, 2017). From the beginning of the crisis, Egypt supported Saudi Arabia, while Türkiye not only delivered food and medicine to Qatar but also increased its military presence in the country (VOA, 2017). While US President Trump's messages in favour of Saudi Arabia (Landler, 2017) caused the crisis to deepen in a short time, the US State and Defence Departments preferred to soften the US stance (Ulrichsen, 2018: 13).

Libya was the second regional crisis facing Türkiye and Egypt. Since May 2014, the military operation launched by Haftar to seize power has dragged

the country back into a civil war environment. Egypt was one of the countries that supported this military operation, which was carried out under the rhetoric of 'fighting terrorism'. The ambivalent policy of the US has also led to Haftar's forces receiving support from many countries. While Obama supported the opposition units fighting DAESH, he remained silent and passively supported the attacks of Haftar's forces. The phone calls of President Trump and National Security Advisor Bolton with Haftar was interpreted as legitimising this actor (Megerisi, 2019: 12). On the other hand, Türkiye joined the anti-Haftar bloc in Libya with the 'Maritime Jurisdiction Delimitation Agreement' and the 'Security and Military Cooperation Agreement' signed with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) on 27 November 2019 (Al-jazeera, 2019). The support provided to the Libyan government under these agreements has had a significant impact on the balance of power in Libya and played an important role in Haftar's retreat.

The Eastern Mediterranean was the third regional issue where Türkiye and Egypt were in different blocs. The US, which has been more active in the Eastern Mediterranean than in other areas, has both a mediating and a guiding influence in the formation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (Kökay, 2021: 228). While Israel, the Greek Cypriot administration of southern Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Italy are included in the forum, which is openly supported by the United States, Türkiye has been explicitly excluded from the forum. The exclusion of Türkiye from the geopolitical and energy resource distribution in the Eastern Mediterranean is one of the reasons that led Türkiye to conclude the above-mentioned agreements with Libya.

These crises have three common threads: First, these crises have largely emerged as a reflection of the regional transformation that began in 2011 rather than tensions between Türkiye and Egypt. Second, the isolationist foreign policy of the US has created space for cooperation or conflict between the countries. This indicates that the tensions between Türkiye and Egypt are not only due to bilateral relations, but also to a clear divergence as a reflection of regional power competition.

In this period, almost all actors in the Middle East sought revisionist strategy in the power vacuum left by the United States. Naturally, the actors, acted according to their power capacities, tried to change the balance of power in the region in their favor on the one hand, and to align their national security with the strategic behavior of the US on the other. For this reason, the tensions

between Türkiye and Egypt were directly affected by the opportunities and constraints in the region during the Obama's presidency and Trump's first era.

Türkiye's revisionist behaviours was sought to be balanced by Egypt through alliances with other status quo actors in the region, and systemic constraints were used to restrict Türkiye's regional policy to a more limited scope of action. Therefore, it should be noted that the harsh tension between Ankara and Cairo in this period is a manifestation of realpolitik and external factors rather than an ideological and identity-based approach.

Normalization and Cooperation

Following the 2020 US presidential election, there has been a serious rupture in global and regional developments. President Biden's value-centered foreign policy approach has pressured nearly all actors in the Middle East, except Israel, leading regional powers to reduce their tensions. Under this pressure regional powers have begun to emphasize détente rather than competition and power-oriented approaches in order to avoid strategic costs. In fact, almost all the Middle Eastern states in tension with each other, from Saudi Arabia to Iran, Qatar to Egypt, Israel to Syria, have preferred diplomacy and normalization.

Türkiye and the other actors such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel normalized their relations as a result of reciprocal efforts. Thus, the process of normalization in the Middle East, which developed under the influence of systemic conditions, was reflected in Turkish-Egyptian relations, and reciprocal visits took place after the direct contact between the two leaders, Erdoğan and Sisi in Doha in 2022. President Erdoğan's visit to Cairo (February 2024) and President Sisi's visit to Ankara (September 2024) are important in terms of demonstrating the normalization of relations. During these meetings, 17 memorandums of understanding (MOU) were signed between Türkiye and Egypt. These included a \$15 billion trade volume target, the sale of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles, and the launch of a joint High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (Morsy, 2025: 1-7). As of 2024, the trade volume between the two countries was approximately \$8.5 billion (TÜİK, 2025). From this perspective, both actors had to update the positions they had developed since the Arab Uprisings and move towards the centre of the revisionist-status quo spectrum. Türkiye abandoned its revisionist tendency at the beginning of the Arab Uprisings, while Egypt abandoned its status quo approach centred on regime security. Thus, with the change in the political objectives

of the actors, conditions have been created that facilitate the appeasement of regional power rivalry and thus rapprochement.

Following normalization, Türkiye and Egypt have replaced their divergence on three issues with cooperation. Firstly, The end of Gulf tensions after the Al-Ula summit, Türkiye's relations with the Gulf and Egypt have improved. Erdogan and Sisi, who attended the 2022 World Cup final in Qatar, met for the first time in years. This meeting reflects the relationship between the regional powers. Secondly, the two countries that supported opposing sides in Libya have worked together to defuse the internal conflict and encourage cooperation among Libyan actors. The reopening of the Turkish Consulate General in Benghazi is an example of the steps taken to ensure peace and stability in Libya. Thus, the normalization between Ankara and Cairo is having a very positive impact on ensuring political stability by protecting Libya's territorial integrity. And thirdly, the Eastern Mediterranean, which makes the two countries maritime neighbors and has useful energy resources, is the most important area of potential cooperation for both countries. The Maritime Delimitation Agreement signed between Greece and Egypt (August 2020) has been declared null and void by Türkiye (*Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020*). On the other hand, the Egyptian government's "statement that it does not completely ignore Türkiye's sensitivities" draws attention (Göksedef, 2021). The statement that Egypt had serious losses in this agreement and that it would have more gains if it signed a maritime delimitation agreement with Türkiye (Reuters, 2021) means a call from Türkiye to Egypt for an agreement. Therefore, the softening and normalization processes in the Ankara-Cairo line have the potential to directly affect the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another rupture that accelerated normalization between Türkiye and Egypt was the Gaza war, which began on 7 October 2023. Following Hamas's attack on Israel, large-scale Israeli aggression involving Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iran has increased fragility and instability in the Middle East. It should be noted that Egypt has had the highest level of threat perception in its relations with Israel since Camp David in 1979. Israel's aggressive behaviour in the Gaza Strip, which has not only imposed serious political, economic and security costs on Egypt, but also implies a revisionist behaviour aimed at changing the regional balance of power that costs for Egypt and Türkiye, has naturally brought them closer. In this process of restructuring international relations in the Middle East, it is important to emphasize that the regional balance of power is taken into account in the Ankara-Cairo line, and the sensitivity caused by the US offering Israel the opportunity to attack

freely is an important threshold. The initial tension and subsequent normalization between Türkiye and Egypt invalidates identity and ideology-based explanations. Beside, prioritization of Israel in the threat perception of both countries has influenced the close engagement. President Trump's pressure on Israel for a ceasefire in Gaza, and his close work with Türkiye and Egypt in this context, has brought about further strengthening of Ankara-Cairo cooperation. The inclusion of Egypt and Türkiye, along with Qatar, as guarantor countries in the Gaza ceasefire agreement at the summit held in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, under the leadership of President Trump, reflects not only bilateral relations but also the regional strategic engagement between the two countries (Anadolu Agency, 2025). For example, the joint military exercises of the Turkish and Egyptian navies in the Eastern Mediterranean on September 22-26, 2025, demonstrate that bilateral relations are moving towards a strategic partnership in the military dimension (Simsek & Canakçı, 2025).

Conclusion

This article argues that regional cooperation and conflict among states stem from systemic determinants. The behavior of actors in the Middle East international system is not independent of this fact. The cycle of conflict and cooperation in relations between Türkiye and Egypt can be explained in this context. In particular, the cooperation, conflict, and normalization that emerged clearly between the two countries after 2010 were largely determined by the strategic choices of the United States. The article argues that when the US Middle East strategy is low interventionist, a regional power vacuum occurs, intensifying conflict and competition among regional actors. Conversely, it contends that during periods when the US adopts a high interventionist approach, regional actors turn to cooperation due to the absence of a power vacuum in the Middle East. Alliances, counter alliances and repositioning in the Middle East have also been the result of regional power competition. It should not be forgotten that the positioning of global players, especially the US, is crucial. The strategic preferences of the US, which have led to the emergence of various power differentials in the Middle East, have been a determining factor in escalating the rivalry and deepening the crises.

Based on this assumption, this study explains the cycle of tension and normalization in Turkish-Egyptian relations. As US interventionism in the region increases, relations between Türkiye and Egypt tend to soften, as they do with other actors. The U.S. policy of not leaving a power vacuum causes these actors to restrain themselves and avoid revisionist behavior. In this case, the

softening of relations becomes the norm. However, when the U.S. adopts a non-interventionist strategy in the Middle East, the resulting power vacuum causes actors to engage in more aggressive and revisionist behavior. Thus, the source of tension or cooperation between Türkiye and Egypt lies in the behavior of the great power. Based on these assumptions, the study concludes that relations have been strained as a result of the revisionist behaviour of both countries or one of them, while normalization and stabilization have been achieved in cases where both actors have abandoned revisionism or a balancing has taken place. How the balance of power, of which we see signs today, will be shaped in the coming periods is closely related to how behaviour of the global powers will shape regional dynamics.

References

- Abdul-Aziz, H. (2015, May 28). *The Egyptian policy on the Syrian crisis*. Retrieved from: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150528-the-egyptian-policy-on-the-syrian-crisis/>
- Aktürk, Ş. (2023). *The Arab Spring: Past, Present, and Future* (Ş. Aktürk & T. Cherkaoui, Ed.). Ankara: TRT World Research Centre.
- Alantar, Ö. Z. O. (2001). The October 1998 Crisis: The Change of Heart of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria? *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, (31), 142-161. <https://doi.org/10.4000/cemoti.710>
- Ali, A. M. (2023). *State Failure, Power Expansion, and Balance of Power in the Middle East: The Struggle Over Failed States*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44633-7>
- Aljazeera. (2011, Feb 1). Turkish PM calls for Mubarak to stand down. Retrieved from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/2/1/turkish-pm-calls-for-mubarak-to-stand-down>
- Aljazeera. (2017, July 12). Arab states send Qatar list of steep demands. Retrieved from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/12/arab-states-issue-13-demands-to-end-qatar-gulf-crisis>
- Aljazeera. (2019, Nov 28). Libya, Turkey Sign Deals on Security and Maritime Jurisdictions. Retrieved from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/28/libya-turkey-sign-deals-on-security-and-maritime-jurisdictions>
- Altunışık, M. (2020). Turkey's Relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia: From Hopes of Cooperation to the Reality of Conflict. G. Tol & D. Dumke (Ed.), *Aspiring Powers, Regional Rivals: Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the New Middle East* In (pp. 17-37). Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute.
- Altunışık, M. B. and Martin, L. G. (2011). Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP. *Turkish Studies*, 12(4), 569-587. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.622513>
- Anadolu Agency. (2025, Oct 13). Turkish President Heads to Egypt to Attend Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit on Gaza. Retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkish-president-heads-to-egypt-to-attend-sharm-el-sheikh-peace-summit-on-gaza/3715703>

- Aslan, A. (2024). Strategic autonomy in Turkish foreign policy: Defense or offense? *Comparative Strategy*, 43(6), 749-780. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2024.2409049>
- Bağcı, H. (2001). *1950s in Turkish Foreign Policy*. [in Turkish]. Ankara: METU Press.
- Bilan, V. (2012, Sep 15). The "Islamic Quartet" and Syria. *New Eastern Outlook* Retrieved from: <https://journal-neo.su/2012/09/15/the-islamic-quartet-and-syria/>
- Cagaptay, S. and Sievers, M. (2015, March 8). Turkey and Egypt's Great Game in the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-03-08/turkey-and-egypts-great-game-middle-east>
- Chan, S., Feng, H., He, K. and Hu, W. (2021). *Contesting Revisionism: China, the United States, and the Transformation of International Order*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Doran, M. S. (1999). *Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian power politics and the Palestine question*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- El-Labbad, M. (2014). Egypt: A "Regional Reference" in the Middle East. H. Fürtig (Ed.), *Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts* In (pp. 81-99). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Erboğa, A. (2016). Bölgesel Dönüşüm Süreci ve Körfez Güvenliği. *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 3(1), 9-38. Retrieved from: <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/tocd/issue/24014/180932>
- Erboğa, A. ve Yiğit, M. (2023). Bölgesel Otonomi: Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika Politikaları. *Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi*, 19(65), 282-305. Retrieved from: <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/muhafazakar/issue/81671/1409754>
- Gause, F. G. (1999). Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations. *International Studies Review*, 1(1), 11-31. Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186364>
- Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664267>
- Goddard, S. E. (2018). Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order. *International Organization*, 72(4), 763-797. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000206>
- Good, C. (2011, January 29). Obama Meets With National Security Team on Egypt. *The Atlantic* Retrieved from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/01/obama-meets-with-national-security-team-on-egypt/70478/>
- Gordon, Michael. R. and Fahim, K. (2013, August 1). Kerry Says Egypt's Military Was 'Restoring Democracy' in Ousting Morsi. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-supporters-to-end-protests.html>
- Göksedef, E. (2021, March 12). What is Ankara's roadmap in negotiations with Egypt? [In Turkish] *BBC Türkçe* Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-56375774>
- Grimm, J. and Roll, S. (2012). *Egyptian Foreign Policy under Mohamed Morsi: Domestic Considerations and Economic Constraints* (SWP Comments No. 35/2012). Berlin, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs Retrieved from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2012C35_gmm_rll.pdf
- Heikal, M. (1978). *Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World*. New York: Harper & Row Publisher.

- Ide, B. (2012, August 28). Egypt's President Visits China, Seeks Stronger Economic Ties. *Voice of America* Retrieved from: <https://www.voanews.com/a/egypts-president-mor-si-visits-china-seeking-stronger-economic-ties/1496989.html>
- Kardaş, Ş. (2011). *Turkey and the Arab Spring: Coming to Terms with Democracy Promotion?*. The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Retrieved from: <https://www.europeansources.info/record/turkey-and-the-arab-spring-coming-to-terms-with-democracy-promotion/>
- Keohane, R. O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Kindleberger, C. P. (1973). *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kökyay, F. (2021). East Mediterranean Gas Forum in the Perspective of Energy Security. [In Turkish]. *Ekonomi Politika ve Finans Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 6(1), 216-239. <https://doi.org/10.30784/epfad.852634>
- Kurt, V. (2019). *US and Transformation of Syrian Crisis*. [In Turkish]. Ankara: Kadim Yayınları.
- Landler, M. (2017, June 6). Trump Takes Credit for Saudi Move Against Qatar, a U.S. Military Partner. *The New York Times* Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/middleeast/trump-qatar-saudi-arabia.html>
- Larrabee, F. S. (2007). Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs*, 86(4), 103-114. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032418>
- Lynch, M. (2018, August 13). The New Arab Order. *Foreign Affairs*, 97(5). Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-14/new-arab-order>
- Magued, S. (2016). Reconsidering Elitist Duality: Persistent Tension in the Turkish-Egyptian Relations. *Digest of Middle East Studies*, 25(2), 285-314. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12091>
- Megerisi, T. (2019, June 26). Libya's global civil war. *European Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/publication/libyas_global_civil_war1/
- Meral, Z. (2014, May 2). Turkey and Egypt: Misconceptions & Missed Opportunities. *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*. Retrieved from: <https://timep.org/2014/05/02/turkey-egypt-misconceptions-missed-opportunities/>
- Mercan, M. H. (2022). From Strategic Caution to Strategic Acquisition: Turkey During the Arab Spring. [In Turkish]. M. Özcan & M. H. Mercan (Ed.), *Arap Ayaklanmalarını Yeniden Düşünmek: Süreç ve Aktörler* In (pp. 261-284). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- Mihaila, L. (2012, Nov 18). A new era for Egyptian-Turkish relations. *Daily News Egypt* Retrieved from: <https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/11/18/egyptian-turkish-relations-to-begin-a-new-era/>
- Monier, E. and Ranko, A. (2014). The Failure of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt's Regional Status. H. Fürtig (Ed.), *Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations After the Arab Revolts* In (pp. 61-79). New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morsy, A. (2025, May 15). Egypt and Türkiye: A Pragmatic Turn? *Middle East Council on Global Affairs* Retrieved from: <https://mecouncil.org/publication/egypt-and-turkiye-a-pragmatic-turn/>

- Organski, A. F. K. and Kugler, J. (1981). *The War Ledger*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Özkan, M. (2013). Egypt's Foreign Policy under Mohamed Morsi. *Middle Eastern Analysis / Ortadoğu Analiz*, 5(51), 10-18.
- Özkan, M. (2014). Mısır Dış Politikası Nasıl Analiz Edilmeli? Yöntem, Soru(n)lar ve Açmazlar. [In Turkish]. Kemal İnat ve İsmail Numan Telci (Eds) *Ortadoğu Yıllığı: 2013* In (pp. 393-413). İstanbul: Açılım Kitap
- Özkan, M. and Korkut, H. (2013). Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arab Revolutions. *Epiphany*, 6(1). <http://dx.doi.org/10.21533/epiphany.v6i1.59>
- Öztürk, Ş. (2021). The Changing Paradigm in Foreign Policy: Turkey-Egypt Relations. [In Turkish]. *Van Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 6(11), 196-212. retrieved from: <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1794078>
- Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2020, August 6). No: 165, Press Release Regarding the Signing of a So-Called Maritime Delimitation Agreement between Greece and Egypt. Retrieved from: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-165_-yunanistan-ile-misir-arasinda-sozde-deniz-yetki-alanlari-anlasmasi-imzalanmasi-hk.en.mfa
- Reuters. (2021, March 3). Turkey says it may negotiate maritime demarcation with Egypt. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkey-says-it-may-negotiate-maritime-demarcation-with-egypt-idUSKBN2AV1AZ/>
- Sarıaşlan, F. (2019). Türkiye-Mısır ilişkilerinde ekonomik dinamiklerin etkisi. *Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, (54), 526-559. <https://doi.org/10.18070/erciyesiibd.533177>
- Sayed-Ahmed, M. A.W. (1993). Relations between Egypt and the United States of America in the 1950s. Charles Tripp (Ed.), *Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes* In London and New York: Routledge.
- Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. *International Security*, 19(1), 72-107. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539149>
- Sever, A. (2012). *The Relations of Turkey with Middle East: A Conceptual And Factual Analysis*. İstanbul: Derin Publishing.
- Simsek, U. and Canakçı, B. (2025, Sep 19). Türkiye, Egypt to Hold Joint Naval Drill in Eastern Mediterranean. *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-egypt-to-hold-joint-naval-drill-in-eastern-mediterranean/3692718>
- Sinkaya, B. (2011). Turkey's Middle East Policy and Western Influence from Past to Present. [In Turkish]. *Adam Academy Journal of Social Sciences*, 1(1), 79-100. Retrieved from: <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/230532>
- Stein, E. (2025). Egyptian Responses to Turkey's MENA Policy from the Arab Spring to the Gaza Crisis: Sub-Imperialisms and Regional Order. *International Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-025-00699-5>
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2009). *Dış Politika Kronolojisi*. Retrieved from: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/kasim-2009.tr.mfa>
- Tetik, M. O. (2021). The Pendulum of Majoritarianism: Turkey's Governmental Self-Identity and Turkish-Egyptian Relations. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 8(2), 210-235. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798921999190>

- Turner, O., & Nymalm, N. (2019). Morality and progress: IR narratives on international revisionism and the status quo. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(4), 407-428. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1623173>
- Tür, Ö. (2019). Turkey's Role in Middle East and Gulf Security. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 13(4), 592-603. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1682305>
- Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. *Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri Ocak 2025*. (2025). Retrieved from: <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Dis-Ticaret-Istatistikleri-Ocak-2025-53900>
- Türkiye'den darbe tepkisi. (2013, Temmuz 4). *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyeden-darbe-tepkisi/a-16929127>
- Ulrichsen, K. C. (2018). Lessons and Legacies of the Blockade of Qatar. *Insight Turkey*, 20(2). <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2018202.01>
- Voice of America. (2017, July 22). Turkey to Move More Troops, Food to Qatar. Retrieved from: <https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-to-move-more-troops-food-to-qatar/3912201.html>
- Walt, S. M. (1987). *The Origins of Alliance*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Ward, S. (Ed.). (2017). *Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yalçın, H. B. (2015). The International System and Stability: A Conceptual Assessment. *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi*, 10(1), 209-229. <https://doi.org/10.17550/aid.74205>
- Yeşilyurt, N. (2020). Understanding the Sudden Rise and Fall in Turkish-Egyptian Relations after 2011. [In Turkish]. *Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences*, 29(2), 337-365. <https://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2020.29.2.0083>
- Yıldırım, Ö. (2018). The Attitude of Egypt Towards Baghdad Pact. *Tarih ve Günce*, 1(3), 125-146. Retrieved from: <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/518652>
- Yiğit, M. (2022). The Military in the Arab Uprisings: Politics and Foreign Influence: An Assessment of the Military's Stance According to Areas of Influence. [In Turkish]. M. Özcan and M. H. Mercan (Ed.), *Arap Ayaklanmalarını Yeniden Düşünmek* In (pp. 141-168). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.