



## Validity of Public Administration Reform Outcomes: The American Experience with Strategic Planning and the Government Performance and Results Act

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**Abstract:** The US Government performance and results act of 1993 (GPRA) was a public law that enforced the implementation of strategic planning in the American Federal Government. GPRA and a presidential request established pilot projects and reinvention labs respectively to experience the important provisions of the act, fostering innovation, and share the experience with other agencies in the US. This research explores the validity of the results produced by the pilot projects and reinvention labs by using Karl Popper's philosophy of science and Donald Campbell's methodology. While the paper questions the methodology of GPRA, it provides lessons for public policy makers for strategic planning in Turkey. The findings of the paper suggest that reform proposals need a firm methodology that creates an experimental society for increasing the validity of reforms.

**Keywords:** Public management, GPRA, strategic planning, experimental society, scientific validity

## Kamu Yönetimi Reform Sonuçlarının Geçerliliği: Amerikan Stratejik Planlama Tecrübesi ve Devlet Performans ve Sonuçlar Yasası

**Özet:** Devlet Performans ve Sonuçlar Yasası (GPRA), Amerikan federal devletinde stratejik planlama uygulamasını zorunlu kılan 1993 tarihli bir kanundur. GPRA ve ABD başkanının talebi doğrultusunda, söz konusu kanunun önemli hükümlerini test etmek, yenilikleri teşvik etmek elde edilen sonuçları diğer kamu kurumlarıyla paylaşmak üzere pilot projeler ve "yeniden keşfetme laboratuvarları" oluşturulmuştur. Bu araştırma söz konusu pilot projeler ve yeniden keşfetme laboratuvarlarında elde edilen sonuçların geçerliliğini Karl Popper'in bilim felsefesi ve Donald Campbell'ın yöntemini kullanarak değerlendirmektedir. Çalışma, GPRA'nın yöntemini sorgularken, stratejik planlama uygulaması açısından Türk kamu politikası yapıcılarına Amerikan uygulamasından elde edilen dersler hakkında bilgi vermektedir. Çalışmanın bulguları, reform hareketlerinin, alınan sonuçların geçerliliğini arttıracak deneysel bir toplum anlayışını oluşturan sağlam bir yönteme ihtiyaç duyduğunu göstermektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kamu işletmeciliği, GPRA, stratejik planlama, deneysel toplum, bilimsel geçerlik

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## INTRODUCTION

New public management in form of “reinventing government” movement has important implications for many countries that seek for more efficient and effective government for decades. Drawing on British and American experience as well as developments in management and economics literature, Osborne and Gaebler published their famous book *Reinventing Government* (1992). The new book became a focal point in Clinton and Al Gore’s reorganization effort for the American Federal Government. Besides being a well-known example of the new public management, The US federal agencies went through a process in 1990s that Turkey goes through today<sup>2</sup>. A reform proposal that involved strategic planning and performance based budgeting was enforced by law in the American federal government in 1993. The US experience employed pilot projects along with innovation centers, so called “reinvention labs” to experience the important provisions of the act, foster innovation, and share the experience with other agencies. However, early practices of pilots and innovation centers could be valuable resources for public administration reform initiatives only if the results were scientifically valid.

This paper attempts to reveal the American experience with pilot projects and reinvention labs to provide insights about strategic planning process for Turkish policy makers. Therefore the paper discusses the American experience and the validity of the results achieved through pilot projects and innovation centers. The main question of the paper is whether the results taken by the pilot projects and reinvention labs under Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as part of the reinventing government movement in the American Federal Government were valid. The paper proposes an alternative perspective based on Karl Popper’s philosophy of science and Donald Campbell’s methodology.

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<sup>2</sup> As a requirement by “Programmatic Financial and Public Sector Adjustment Loan” agreement with The World Bank on June 12 2001, Turkey had to take steps towards strategic planning (Yılmaz, 2008). Later, The World Bank demanded Turkey to introduce Public Financial Management and Control Law of 5018 that would be enacted in June 2003. This law laid the foundation for the strategic planning and performance based budgeting in Turkey. High Planning Council determined eight pilot organizations for strategic planning in 2002 and these organizations prepared their strategic plans in 2006. Moreover, State Planning Agency introduced a regulation based on the Public Financial Management Law of 5018 in 2006. The regulation number 26179, “The Procedure and Principles of Strategic Planning in Public Agencies” required most public agencies to prepare and submit their strategic plans by January 31 2009. Moreover, the law also created a link between the strategic planning and the budgeting process that asked public agencies to create performance plans in accordance with their strategic plans for three years.

## **NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND REINVENTING GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT**

Reinventing government movement, a type of “new public management” evolved from “managerialism”<sup>3</sup>. According to Christopher Hood (1991), the core of new public management in the public administration involved modern Taylorism in form of scientific management and business oriented techniques and institutional economics including public choice, transaction cost approaches, and principal-agent models. Reinventing government was the most important paradigm of public administration to create an improved government through process and service improvements especially during the 1990s in the USA. Ted Gaebler and David Osborne’s book *Reinventing Government* (1992) importantly contributed the emergence of this movement as a national phenomenon in the American federal government. Gaebler and Osborne’s book was a synthesis of different approaches. While they suggested and showed the real life examples of a shift from bureaucratic government to an entrepreneurial one, the book was influenced by managerialism in Britain and integrated the fair market and privatization literature of Savas (1982) and the excellence in management literature of Peters and Waterman (1982). The new approach had 10 important principles: (1) Government should act as catalyst- steering rather than rowing; (2) government should empower rather than serve; (3) government should be competitive; (4) government should be mission-driven rather than rule driven; (5) government should be result oriented and should not base its actions on inputs; (6) government should be customer driven; (8) government should anticipate rather than cure social ills; (9) government should decentralize, and (10) government should be market-oriented.

Clinton and Gore Administration used the ideas of Gaebler and Osborne to reform the federal government through their reform initiative, *The National Performance Review*<sup>4</sup>. The National Performance Review teams examined every cabinet department and 10 agencies for preparing their report. The motto of the NPR was “from red tape to results, creating a government that works better and costs less”. The National Performance Review (Gore, 1993) aimed at both less expensive and more efficient government, while

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<sup>3</sup> The core of reinventing government paradigm was implemented under a different name, “Managerialism” in the U.K. by the election of Margaret Thatcher. Managerialism can be defined as, the importation of business management practices, designed specifically to increase profit and efficiency, into public agencies (Denhard in Edwards, 1998)

<sup>4</sup> The national performance review relabeled as National Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPR) was the tenth reorganization effort reforming the American federal government.

changing the culture of the national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and empowerment (Corbacioglu, 2005). The NPR had four key principles: Cutting red tape, putting customers first, empowering employees to get results, and cutting back to basics that is producing better government for less (Gore, 1993).

NPR resulted in the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993 that reorganized both management and budgetary issues in the American Federal Government (GPRA-Public Law 103-62). However, it is important to note that all these theoretical and practical developments under new public management, reinventing government movement, NPR, and GPRA was a logical continuation of the progressive reform movement (Shafritz, 2005). The philosophy of the continuing improvement included lessons from former reforms such as Planning-Programming Budgeting, Management by Objectives and Zero-Based Budgeting (Kettle, 1994). However, NPR was the first of the reforms that was enforced by law, instead of executive orders or presidential pleas (Radin, 1998).

Similar to the Public Financial and Management Law of 5018 in Turkey, GPRA focused on clarifying missions, setting program goals, and measuring performance toward achieving the goals as well as performance based budgeting by linking the goals to the budgetary process. Main objectives of GPRA was to hold agencies accountable for achieving program results; to stimulate reforms with a series of pilot projects that could be used as examples for others; to promote a focus on results, service quality, and public satisfaction; to improve congressional decision making by providing information on achieving statutory objectives and relative effectiveness of various programs; and to improve internal management of the federal government.

The act required regulatory agencies to prepare strategic plans covering at least five years and update them at every three years. Along with the strategic plans, the federal agencies also prepared annual performance plans covering each program activity set forth in the agencies' budget. The plans had to include agencies' annual performance goals and performance measures. Finally, the act required agencies to prepare annual reports on program performance for the previous fiscal year. Agencies reviewed and discussed their performance concerning performance goals established in their annual performance plans. If an agency could not meet a goal, it was supposed to explain reasons and recommend actions to meet them if possible. Office of Management and Budget<sup>5</sup> (OMB) had the responsibility

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<sup>5</sup> Office of Management and Budget (OMB) "...assists the President in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and to supervise its administration in executive branch

for the implementation of the steps and timetable.

### **WAS THERE A SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GPRA?**

Although National Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPR) showed high commitment for the success of GPRA, neither NPR nor Government Result and Performance act of 1993 (GPRA), or OMB implemented a scientific methodology to produce *valid* outcomes. Government Accounting Office<sup>6</sup> (GAO) provided almost all-logistic support to the federal agencies for the implementation of GPRA. Besides roadmaps, GAO produced various research reports to help solve problems and make the transition easier. However, it did not go further for a scientific methodology that caused question marks about the validity of the results achieved.

Reinvention labs and pilot projects were two initiatives that were expected to help implementation of GPRA. While the pilot projects were a provision of GPRA, the reinvention labs were a plea of the president. However, both the reinvention labs and the pilots were far away from providing scientific validity for the program outcomes of a given agency.

Federal agencies attempted to follow the requirements of GPRA. To do so, they used the explanations by GAO, experiences and insights from pilot agencies and reinvention labs. However, there was no sign that they considered alternative explanations or rival hypotheses that threatened the validity of program outcomes. The agencies also lacked a critical environment, a disputatious community of truth seekers that could be a base to rule out the alternative explanations to the outcomes.

Below section of the paper will provide some theoretical information before revealing the methodological problems related to strategic planning in the implementation of GPRA.

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gencies... In addition, OMB oversees and coordinates the Administration's procurement, financial management, information, and regulatory policies. In each of these areas, OMB's role is to help improve administrative management, to develop better performance measures and coordinating mechanisms, and to reduce any unnecessary burdens on the public" (OBM 2008).

<sup>6</sup>The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)"... is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the "congressional watchdog," GAO investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars... GAO provides Congress with timely information that is objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced (GAO, 2008).

## THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

### *Validity of Outcomes*

Validity is the best available approximation to the truth or falsity of a proposition (Cook and Campbell 1979). There are four kinds of validity; statistical conclusion, internal (local molar causal), construct, and external (proximal) (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Dunn has added context validity to this list (Dunn, 1998). Campbell's introduction of threats to validity represents the alternative explanations (rival hypotheses) that threaten the validity of a policy outcome.

Threats to statistical conclusion validity are ones that results in drawing false conclusions about covariations that answers to the question if presumed independent and dependent variables are related (Cook and Campbell, 1979). These threats are plausible rival hypotheses that may render the claims about the effect of policy intervention ambiguous or uninterpretable (Dunn, 1998).

Local molar causal validity (LMCV) is the approximate validity of inferences affirming that if two or more variables within a complex system of interdependent factors are related (Dunn, 1998). LMCV emphasizes on a complex treatment package, and ask the question if this complex treatment package make a real difference in this unique application at this particular place and time (Campbell, 1987).

External validity is the generalizability of policy outcomes to other *settings, persons, and times*. Threats to external validity are rival hypotheses that challenge the approximate generalizability of policy outcomes to other settings, persons and times (Cook and Campbell 79).

Construct validity is the adequately conceptualization, measurement, and definition of theoretical constructs that forms the propositions in a theory (Dunn, 1998). Threats to construct validity are alternative explanations (rival hypotheses) that challenge adequate conceptualization, measurement, and definition of theoretical constructs.

Dunn has added context validity to the original list of Cook and Campbell (Dunn, 1998). The context validity is important for discovery of the proximal range of rival hypotheses. It is the validity of inferences that a social scientist has estimated the proximal range of rival hypotheses.

Employment of falsification and rival hypotheses can be critical in increasing the validity of results taken in any project. Karl Popper's *Philosophy of Science* and Donald T. Campbell's methodology provides important insights for the pilot projects and reinvention labs as well as the results achieved since considering the alternative policies or rival hypotheses are important for plausibility of knowledge claims.

### ***Falsification and Rival Hypotheses***

Various philosophers of science have recognized the importance of rival hypotheses thereby ruling out alternative explanation of phenomena. Among more contemporary ones, Popper has been the most explicit and systematic in recognizing this necessity (Cook and Campbell 1979). Testing for Popper means trying to falsify a hypothesis not trying to confirm it (Diesing 1991). Testing that leads to confirmation of a theory can never prove a theory to be true, although failing to confirm a prediction can falsify the theory under the test (Cook and Campbell 1979). According to Popper, it is easy to find supporting evidence for a theory if one looks for it hard enough. The reason for it is that our observations always involve some selection and interpretation of facts in the light of our theory (Diesing 1991). In other words, observations are theory-laden and using confirmation instead of falsification can lead a scientist wrong conclusion.

Instead of confirmatory evidence, specifying and searching for facts (rival hypotheses) that can refute a hypothesis are essential for a scientific inquiry and growth of knowledge (Diesing 1991). According to Popper, finding some falsifying facts would lead a scientist to correct the false part of his theory or to give it up. However, failing in falsifying would not lead confirmation but to corroboration (Cook and Campbell 1979; Diesing 1991). This means that the theory has not falsified or disconfirmed yet, but is open to other falsification attempts. Popper accepts the corrigibility of theories. To him, trial and error as well as learning from mistakes through falsification is very important. Campbell, who is from Popperian philosophy of science tradition, also accepts fallible, corrigible, and contingent features of knowledge claims like Popper. However, he goes further to marry Popper's philosophy and methodology with modern research design. The result is policy research and program evaluation known as quasi-experimental design, rival hypotheses and threats to validity (Dunn, 1998).

Use of falsification and rival hypothesis is closely related to critical, disputative an organizational and societal cultures. Therefore, while proposing their methodology, Popper and Campbell provide insights for building such a critical environment. An open society is crucial for the

employment of critical thinking and rival hypotheses in search of truth for Popper. Rationality, disputation, and critical thinking are important themes of the Popper's famous piece, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Diesing, 1991). According to Popper, an open society is one in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions; have learned to be to some extent critical of taboos; and base their decisions on authority of their own intelligence (Diesing, 1991).

Campbell's experimenting society is based on the Popper's open society (Campbell 1997). An experimenting society is important for the validity of a given policy's outcomes. It vigorously tries out possible solutions to recurrent problems and makes multidimensional evaluations of outcomes (Campbell, 1997). Furthermore, when the evaluation of one reform is ineffective or harmful, the experimenting society moves on to try other alternatives (Campbell, 1997). The experimenting society is an active society (Campbell 1997) that values exploring and trying out possibilities without falling an over advocacy trap. Therefore, it is an honest society, committed to reality testing, self-criticism, and avoiding self-deception (Campbell, 1997). This means a nondogmatic society that is open to falsification of a truth claim or a public policy implemented. An inquiry for a public policy is guided by the importance of the problem, rather than a prior commitment to solutions favored on political ideology (Dunn, 1998). Members of policy sciences community and citizens as well as policy makers seek to discover solutions for social problems by systematically testing the plausibility of alternative policies in the experimenting society (Dunn, 1998).

According to Campbell, the experimenting society includes mutually reinforcing community of truth seekers, who are important for the validity of truth claims and outcomes of a given public policy:

"The validity of scientific truth claims does not come from the innate or indoctrinated honesty and competence of a single scientist. It comes, rather, from competitive replication and criticism, from fear of humiliation due to failed replication efforts, from competition for discovery and eminence so organized as to disclose (rather than cover up) error, incompetence, and fraud" (Campbell, 1997:389).

Staying together in focused disputation, attending each other's arguments and illustration, monitoring and keeping each other honest until some working consensus emerges are essential characteristic for this disputatious community of truth seekers (Campbell, 1997).



Although the scope of a reform for critical work environment for the federal government has to go beyond the federal agencies, Campbell's sociology of science still provides insights reform proposals such as GPRA. It can help for both the validity of program outcomes and creating a critical work environment.

The below section of the paper will evaluate results of GPRA, the pilot projects and reinvention labs. The paper will go further and propose an alternative perspective to create a critical environment that could have been used to increase the validity of results in implementation of GPRA.

## **METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS**

### ***The Reinvention Labs***

Reinventing Labs became a responsibility for each agency after President Clinton's request in 1993(GAO 96-69). According to this request, the federal agencies would designate organizational units, programs, or new or ongoing innovative initiatives as reinvention labs to foster innovation and help the federal government transform itself. For these purposes, they tested or prototyped new reinventing government initiatives. As opposed to the pilot projects, the reinvention labs were not for the implementation of GPRA, but for all kind of innovation in the federal government. They were change agents for both agencies and the federal government (NPR 1993). However, criteria to define these change agents did not exist (GAO 96-69). Therefore, the labs did not have a common practice about how to work. The labs also lacked coordination among themselves across the country. They did not communicate enough with NPR taskforce too. According to the GAO report (GAO 96-69), it was crucial to establish a clearinghouse of information for the success of the reinvention labs. Some statutory and regulatory constrains also decreased the effectiveness of the labs for expected innovations (GAO 96-69). Moreover, the labs had insufficient or no data. Most of the labs did not collect pre-lab data before starting their activities (GAO 96-69). Finally, some labs even did not believe that collecting post-lab data was useful for them (GAO 96-69).

Although addressing above list of problems was important, it would not have been sufficient for the scientific validity for claimed achievements since the labs and the federal agencies had not considered the rival hypotheses that threatened the validity of their outcomes. Moreover, the labs did not have a critical environment that was open to disputations and competition, while people could stay in close communication for priority in specifying the

innovative way to improve an agency's quality, effectiveness and efficiency of services.

### ***The Pilot Projects***

While reinvention labs were for all kind of innovative activities, the pilot projects were just for the implementation of GPRA. They were established to experience the important provisions of the act and to share the information with other pilots and agencies (GAO 97-109). The act required three kinds of pilots for the implementation of GPRA as follows: Pilot projects for performance goals, pilot projects for accountability and flexibility, and pilot projects for performance budgeting. The pilots were real life federal agencies and pioneers for GPRA's different provisions. They attempted to produce information and solutions to the possible challenges that the federal agencies might encounter.

Establishing the strategic and annual plans was critical for the success of GPRA. However, were the federal agencies successful in this process? Both literature and GAO did not answer positively. Problems in the process can be summarized as follows:

- The need for the reflection of a balance between competing policy priorities was a significant difficulty for the agencies. (GAO 97-113)
- It was difficult to choose which program elements to be included in multi program agencies (Radin 98) .
- Congress's intention to cut unsuccessful programs might lead agencies to set easier goals to achieve (Mervis 1996).
- Changing environment of an agency made it challenging to develop annual plans (GAO 97-138).
- Pressure from different stakeholders decreased the quality of the process (Radin 97).

Moreover, the pilot projects had crucial problems in evaluating the results achieved. Although collecting the accurate and qualified data was important to compare the performance results with the goals in the annual performance plan, there were doubts about quality, completeness and comparability of the data collected (GAO 97-138). Especially for the most states, federal data was not high priority thereby they did not emphasize the reliability of it (GAO 97-138). The GAO stressed that no matter who collected the data, it was a challenge to ascertain the accuracy and quality of performance data for the pilot agencies. (GAO 97-138). However, the scientific validity for the outcomes required more than addressing this problem. The pilots and the

federal agencies did not consider the rival hypotheses. Neither, they created an environment open for competition, disputation, as well as communication in between for their efforts.

### *Threats to the Validity of Outcomes*

There were threats that risked the internal and external validity of outcomes in the implementation of GPRA. History was an internal threat to the validity of a program's outcomes of an agency thereby the outcomes of GPRA. History becomes a threat when the observed results may be due to some external factors that take place between pretest and posttest (Cook and Campbell 79). This was an important problem when agencies measured their program results. The outcomes of an agency program could originate from other programs of the same agency or from other external factors. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 's efforts to decrease accident and injury rates represented a good example for the latter one. The strategic mission of OSHA was "to assure so far as possible every working man and women in the nation with this mission. OSHA worked its way to eliminate hazards causing accident and injury". However measuring the difference OSHA efforts made in a given year was questionable. GAO founded that decreasing or increasing numbers of injuries were open to influence of some external factors such as business cycle, use of new and safer technology, and changes in laws or regulations (GOA 97-83) that in turned significantly decreased the internal validity of the results taken by OSHA.

To generalize any causal relationship to other settings, analyses of the setting have to be done (Cook and Campbell 79). Interaction of setting and treatment was a serious threat to generalize the outcomes from the reinvention labs and Pilot projects to other agencies. When looked at the process, there were important barriers for such a generalization in practice. All the pilots and labs were chosen among volunteer agencies that had higher motivation to implement the requirements and meet the goals of the agency or to find innovative solutions for the problems. (GAO 96-69 GAO 97-138). However, other agencies could not have the same level of motivation to implement the GPRA. According to a GOA survey (97-113), many non-pilot agencies did not show enough commitment as opposed to the pilots. Another problem was about resources. The pilot agencies had extraordinary technical resources including access to program evaluation that other agencies could not have (GAO 97-138). Moreover, change resistant bureaucratic culture, mistrust, and operation within a hierarchical and rigid structure hindered the implications of recommendations of the pilots and reinvention labs at least in some other settings. Moreover,

different organizational cultures of the federal agencies exacerbated this situation (Ban 95).

Making strategic planning part of an agency's organizational culture, the agency top management needed to initiate and insist on it (Schein 1997; Nadler et al 1995). According to GAO, Lack of top management support in some agencies was an important problem for the implementation of GPRA (GAO. 96-69). Given this situation that was not experienced by volunteered pilots, it was difficult to have the same performance to achieve strategic mission and goals without the leadership support in other agencies.

Despite the threats to internal and external validity, most results from the pilots and reinventing labs without sufficient analyses and findings were generalized to other settings. However, such a generalization was scientifically problematic.

This section of the paper has so far discussed the problems related with falsification, rival hypotheses, and the validity in the implementation of GPRA process. Along with these factors, creating a critical environment is important for truth seeking and validity of the outcomes. The following section will discuss the means of creating such an environment that could have been the case in the implementation of GPRA and similar reform initiatives.

### **AN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING**

Developing successful strategic, annual plans, and evaluating the program results requires critical disputative organizational culture along with employing falsification, rival hypotheses, and avoiding threats to validity in reform initiatives. However some structural changes in the organization are also critical for moving towards to a critical organizational culture. These structural changes both encourage and establish a disputative and competitive environment among agency employees, while involving other stakeholders, policy analysts, scientists, and citizens outside the government for analyzing, evaluating, cross examining, and validating the outcomes of the agency's outcomes. Donald Campbell's approach (1987) provides important insights about how to develop such a critical environment.

#### ***Two Separate Teams for Plans and Annual Performance Reports***

To have more than one team working on strategic plans and annual performance reports is crucial for the critical, disputative and competitive work environment, since the validity of outcomes come from competitive replication and criticism. Development of multiyear strategic plans, annual performance goals and reports are sequential. Therefore, two separate teams

could work on all of them in an agency. Although each of the teams has the same target, they work independent from each other. However, it is important to inform teams about each other's results and let analyze each other's data.

### ***Avoiding Problem Monopolies***

The shortages of funds and technical personnel as well as the belief that an individual scientist can produce scientific validity encourage managers to assign each specific problem to an individual or a team in an agency (Campbell 87). However, this is harmful for the intended critical environment. Any agency, lab or pilot should not assign a specific problem to an individual or a team, while developing strategic and performance plans, or performance reports. Assigning the problem to more than one individual or group would lead each one to corroborate and correct another's solution, and criticize and build upon it. It can be also useful to establish some cross agency teams to find solutions to some common problems.

### ***Facilitating self-criticism***

It is important to shape an organizational culture to be open to self-criticism. This let people talk about their failures and mistakes, instead sweeping them under the rug (Campbell 87; Arygris and Schon, 1996). This would be helpful for learning from mistakes for doing a better job. GPRA teams should have been welcomed to disclose their failures, as well as their successes. Even teams that worked on strategic mission, goals, and performance reports could have put the imperfections in their job as an appendix to their report. Because the GPRA required the agencies to explain reasons when a program performance did not meet the expectations, creating self-critical organizational culture would have helped implement this provision effectively.

### ***Reanalysis and Use of Independent Experts***

Independent reanalysis of data that leads to outcomes of a program is important for disputatious and truth seeking experimental society (Campbell 87). Availability of such data gives opportunity to double-check a program, or as a whole the policy outcomes by any stakeholders. Both supporting the critical environment and facilitating reanalysis independent researchers and policy analysts could play more important roles. As well as studying GPRA related initiatives and help correct mistakes, these people could have provided necessary information regarding agency goals and strategies for

dissenting stakeholders that were interested in monitoring the decisions of an agency

### **A Written Communication Mean and Government Conferences**

A periodical newspaper or journal supported by internet and intranet could have contributed the new organizational culture and critical-competitive environment of the federal agencies. This written communication could include the current problems, achievements by teams, successful outcomes, and other GPRA related issues. Such a communication mean could encourage employees working on their tasks by recognizing their contribution, besides facilitating information exchange across the GPRA community, including agencies and stakeholders.

Moreover, the federal agencies, including the reinvention labs and the pilots could have shared their experiences, exchange their ideas, discuss major difficulties and successes to overcome important problems, and inform each other about successful program results through government conferences that were open to independent researchers and representatives of different stakeholders.

### **CONCLUSION**

The US Federal government experienced various reform initiatives of which the reinventing government was the 10<sup>th</sup> one. The progressive reform movement will continue to produce new reform initiatives for public organizations as well as private and nonprofit ones. However, one thing that will never change is the importance of methodology of any given reform movement to produce valid results.

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as part of the reinventing government initiative focused on strategic planning and performance based budgeting in early 1990s. The US federal government employed pilot projects and reinvention labs for the implementation. The goal was having early successful examples, experience and necessary information shared with other federal agencies.

However, despite their good intention and intense efforts, policy makers and implementers did not think significantly about how to create a scientific methodology for the analysis and evaluation of the results before the early success stories and findings were generalized to other federal agencies. If many credible scholars like Christopher Pollit and Patrick Dunleavy calls

public management and reinventing management dead<sup>7</sup>, the lack of a scientific methodology has played an important role at least for the reinventing government and the GPRA.

Popperian philosophy of science and Donald Campbell's methodology could have provided important insights for establishing a scientific methodology in a critical environment in which falsification, rival hypothesis and validity are seriously considered. This did not happen. As a result, the pilots and reinvention labs produced scientifically problematic outcomes.

Turkey goes through a similar process especially for the strategic planning as required by the Public Financial Management and Control Law of 5018. Although this paper has focused on the American case, there are lessons to take from the American experience. Public administration reforms require solid methodology. As long as a scientific methodology is not employed to evaluate the achieved results of the pilot organizations and other public agencies that have prepared or are preparing their strategic plans, the benefits of the strategic planning process can also be very limited in Turkey.

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<sup>7</sup> See Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert (2004). *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler (2006). *Digital Era Governance: IT Corporations, the State, and e-Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

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