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TÜRKİYE'S REGIONAL POLICY AND GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR (2020)

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Abstract: This article examines Turkey's regional policy and its changing geopolitical role during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The study analyses the legal and strategic framework of military cooperation between Baku and Ankara, focusing particularly on the 2010 Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance Agreement. Furthermore, it places particular emphasis on the transformation of regional defense capabilities through the integration of advanced military technologies, including the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the adoption of modern operational doctrines. The article describes in details the transition of relations between the two countries from military dependence to technological partnership through strategic projects such as the 'HAKİM' Air Command and Control System. This new structure, stretching from the Aegean Sea to the Caspian Sea, is conceptualized by the author as a 'Geostrategic Umbrella'. Furthermore, this argues that this military coordination is the only guarantee for the security of the global-scale 'Middle Corridor' project. Ultimately, the Middle Corridor concludes that this strategic architecture, institutionalized by the Shusha Declaration, has laid the foundation for lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus by creating a strong deterrent against external intervention. Moreover, the research examines Turkey's diplomatic efforts to redefine the roles of international mediation structures and to promote the principle of regional responsibility for security in the South Caucasus, emphasizing Turkey's active role in the region. The author assesses the changing balance of power in the South Caucasus region, the dynamics among key regional actors, and the impact and consequences of the conflict's outcome on the development of a new security architecture in the South Caucasus.

Keywords: Karabakh, Turkey, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus geopolitics, military-technical cooperation, UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), balance of power, regional security.

TÜRKİYE'NİN BÖLGESEL POLİTİKASI VE JEOPOLİTİK KONUMLANMASI: İKİNCİ KARABAĞ SAVAŞI (2020) BAĞLAMINDA

Öz: Bu makale, Türkiye'nin bölgesel politikasını ve 2020'deki İkinci Karabağ Savaşı sırasında değişen jeopolitik rolünü inceliyor. Çalışma, özellikle 2010 Stratejik Ortaklık ve Karşılıklı Yardım Anlaşması'na odaklanarak, Bakü ve Ankara arasındaki askeri işbirliğinin hukuki ve stratejik çerçevesini analiz ediyor. Ayrıca, insansız hava araçlarının (İHA) konuşlandırılması ve modern operasyonel doktrinlerin benimsenmesi de dahil olmak üzere gelişmiş askeri teknolojilerin entegrasyonu yoluyla bölgesel savunma kapasitelerinin dönüşümüne özel önem veriyor. Makale, 'HAKİM' Hava Komuta ve Kontrol Sistemi gibi stratejik projeler aracılığıyla iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin askeri bağımlılıktan teknolojik ortaklığa geçişini ayrıntılarıyla ele alıyor. Ege Denizi'nden Hazar Denizi'ne uzanan bu yeni yapı, yazar tarafından 'Jestratejik Şemsiye' olarak kavramsallaştırılıyor. Dahası, bu askeri koordinasyonun küresel ölçekteki 'Orta Koridor' projesinin güvenliğinin tek garantisi olduğu savunuluyor. Sonuç olarak, Orta Koridor, Şuşa Deklarasyonu

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ile kurumsallaştırılan bu stratejik mimarinin, dış müdahaleye karşı güçlü bir caydırıcılık yaratarak Güney Kafkasya’da kalıcı barış ve istikrarın temelini attığı sonucuna varmaktadır. Dahası, araştırma, Türkiye’nin uluslararası arabuluculuk yapılarının rollerini yeniden tanımlama ve Güney Kafkasya’da güvenlik için bölgesel sorumluluk ilkesini teşvik etme yönündeki diplomatik çabalarını inceleyerek, Türkiye’nin bölgedeki aktif rolünü vurgulamaktadır. Yazar, Güney Kafkasya bölgesindeki değişen güç dengesini, kilit bölgesel aktörler arasındaki dinamikleri ve çatışmanın sonucunun Güney Kafkasya’da yeni bir güvenlik mimarisinin gelişimine etkisini ve sonuçlarını değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Karabağ, Türkiye, Azerbaycan, Güney Kafkasya jeopolitiği, askeri-teknik işbirliği, İHA’lar, güç dengesi, bölgesel güvenlik.

This article argues that Turkey's support for Azerbaijan goes beyond a conventional alliance, permanently transforming the balance of power in the region (especially against Russia) within the framework of the Regional Security Complex Theory; that this process has been institutionalized through military integrations such as the HAKIM Project and UAV technology; and that, ultimately, Turkey has made the South Caucasus a secure component of global energy and trade routes (the Middle Corridor).

The Second Karabakh War began on September 27, 2020, in response to the large-scale provocations committed by the Armenian armed forces along the front line in July 2020. The counteroffensive operation of the Azerbaijani Army later termed the “Iron Fist” lasted 44 days and resulted in the end of the thirty-year occupation and the restoration of territorial integrity (Ternovaya i Çapkin, 2025). The decisive role in achieving this historic victory and in elevating Azerbaijan’s military capacity to a qualitatively new level was played by the close cooperation established with Türkiye over many years. These relations are based both on deep historical and ideological foundations and on official strategic documents.

The legal basis of military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Türkiye is the “Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan,” signed in 2010. The most important feature of this Agreement is the provision that if one of the parties is subjected to an armed attack or military aggression by a third state or group of states, the attacked party shall be supported. (10, m.2). After the signing of this Agreement, numerous joint military exercises were carried out between the two countries (Erarslan, 2021, p. 328).

Since 1992, a series of official military cooperation agreements have been in force, and especially the principle of mutual support contained in the 2010 Agreement has strengthened the geopolitical foundation between the two states. This relationship is characterized by the political discourse of “one nation, two states” (Avatkov, 2022, p. 91) and this ideological basis defines the essence of Türkiye’s support to Azerbaijan and has been concretized in the military sphere.

In particular, the cooperation agreement in the field of the defense industry, signed in 2017, laid the foundation for the preparation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces’ command staff by Turkish experts.

In this context, a research question arises: Was Turkey's military-technological and diplomatic support during the Second Karabakh War limited to ensuring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, or did it fundamentally alter the traditional status quo in the South Caucasus, transforming Turkey into the region's new security architect and key geopolitical actor?

1. Methodology and Analytical Framework

This study employs a qualitative research design based on a case study and policy analysis of the Second Karabakh War. To evaluate Türkiye’s geopolitical role and the transformation of the regional balance of power, the research integrates two primary analytical lenses:

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT): Developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, this theory serves as the primary framework for understanding the South Caucasus as a distinct sub-complex. The study analyzes how Türkiye's "One Nation, Two States" doctrine and military-technological integration (UAVs, HAKİM Project) shifted the regional security dynamics, challenging the long-standing Russian-led status quo and the failed mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group.

Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Principles: The legal dimension of the conflict is analyzed through the lens of international law. The study examines Türkiye's diplomatic strategy of framing Azerbaijan's counter-offensive within the right to self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter) while identifying Armenia's 30-year occupation as a continuous violation of international legal norms.

In this article, data were collected using a multidimensional triangulation method, including official documents such as the 2010 Strategic Partnership Agreement and the Shusha Declaration, technical reports from ASELSAN, analyses from think tanks like TEPAV, decisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, and UN Security Council resolutions.

2. Analysis within the Framework of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

Buzan and Wæver (2003) emphasize that in "security complexes" such as the South Caucasus, the national security concerns of local actors (Azerbaijan and Armenia) are inseparable, and this interdependence creates a "security dilemma." In this context, an increase in the military potential of one side is automatically perceived as an existential threat by the other, plunging the region into a hopeless "stalemate." Cornell (2011) notes that when this regional dynamic is combined with Russia's "divide and rule" strategy, the conflict transcends the local framework and becomes a "sub-complex" where major powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran) struggle for influence. Specifically, according to RSCT, the security intersections in this geography are so intense that any change in the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh fundamentally undermines the security balance not only of the local parties but also of neighboring global and regional powers (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Cornell's (2011) analysis reveals that this structure is a significant factor influencing Azerbaijan's post-independence foreign policy, which must navigate between regional pressures and an international balance of power strategy.

3. The Position of Armenia and Russia

During the occupation, Armenia tried to present itself as a "guarantor" of Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming in its official statements that the events in Nagorno-Karabakh were being controlled by "the local population and some volunteers" (Interview: Serzh Sarkissian, 2006, p.43-44; International Crisis Group, 2011:2). In this way, it aimed to avoid international legal responsibility and create the impression that Nagorno-Karabakh was solving its own problems as if it were an independent state. However, the Armenian army directly participated in military operations from 1992 to 1994, partaking in battles with its regular units (Yunusov, 2005, p. 43).

In his article "Azerbaijan since independence," Cornell argues that Russia's "ruling" role in the region is actually a strategy to manipulate the conflict in order to keep both sides dependent on it (Cornell, 2011). Therefore, during the conflict, Russia provided significant military support to Armenia, and with Russia's support, Armenia armed itself by establishing its own national military units, entering the war in a superior position.

Particularly during the Khojaly massacre in 1992, the 366th Russian Motorized Rifle Regiment in the region provided significant support to Armenian units and played a crucial role in this attack (Yunusov, 2005, p. 43; Johannes RAU, 2008, p.38; Human Rights, 1994, p. 5; De Waal, 2003, p.203). Following these events, Russia's simultaneous arms sales and

mediation have led academics to question the credibility of the Minsk Group. Although the Minsk Group has been partially successful in “preventing war” for 30 years, its “peace Paris” position has weakened its status as a “neutral arbiter” as a co-chair of the Minsk Group. This has, in turn, strengthened the view in Azerbaijan that the Minsk process is a mechanism to legitimize the occupation and buy time. Furthermore, the UN Security Council has adopted four resolutions demanding the immediate withdrawal of the occupying forces from Azerbaijani territory.

4. The Structural Failure of the Minsk Group and Regional Security Dynamics

The OSCE Minsk Group’s activities between 1992 and 2020 have been characterized in academic literature as a state of “diplomatic paralysis” in terms of both methodology and structure. This state of affairs, which Gerard Libaridian (2017) named “peace as a process,” resulted in the parties adopting a strategy of “appearing to be negotiating” rather than a genuine solution, effectively serving to preserve the status quo. This diplomatic inertia, combined with the OSCE’s lack of sanctions mechanisms, has enabled Armenia to ignore relevant UN Security Council resolutions for decades. Boban and Blažević (2023) emphasize that the “facilitative mediation” model implemented by the Minsk Group has been limited to creating an unproductive dialogue platform rather than offering persuasive solutions to the parties. This methodological weakness is a regional “dead end” in the context of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s (2003) “Regional Security Complex Theory” (RSCT). According to the RSCT, the security concerns of Azerbaijan and Armenia are inextricably linked. This “security dilemma” is made worse by the conflicting geopolitical interests of the co-chair countries: Russia, the United States, and France. As Svante Cornell (2011) has noted, this tripartite structure has turned the region into a playground for great power competition. As a result, the Minsk Group has achieved partial success in “war prevention” over the past 28 years. However, it has completely failed in “peacebuilding.” The lack of leverage of diplomatic mechanisms, as noted by Thomas de Waal (2013), has become the main factor making a military solution inevitable in 2020. The ineffective mediation mission on the November 10 declaration has lost its power from both academic and practical perspectives.

It was at this point that Ankara’s position during the Second Karabakh War emerged as a regional alternative to the biased and ineffective activities of the Minsk Group (Avdaliani, 2020; Middle East Monitor). By putting forward the principle of removing the monopoly of the co-chairs and resolving the problem by regional actors, Turkey confirmed its role as a legitimate actor in the future peace architecture of the South Caucasus. (Kramer, 2021; Avdaliani, 2020). This strategic approach was calculated to free the region’s fate from the dictates of extra-regional forces and consolidate the new geopolitical reality emerging as a result of the joint efforts of Azerbaijan and Turkey within the framework of regional cooperation.

5. Türkiye’s Regional Policy and Geopolitical Context

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created a geostrategic window of opportunity for Türkiye at a time when major global actors were preoccupied with domestic political agendas, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the resulting macroeconomic challenges. In this favorable international context, Türkiye succeeded in fundamentally changing the regional status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Türkiye is currently not only a strategic leader in UAV technology but also an actor actively shaping the security architecture of the South Caucasus. Türkiye’s increased entry into Azerbaijan’s UAV supply market is of critical importance in many analytical dimensions.

The Second Karabakh War transformed the regional balance of power in the South Caucasus. Turkey's diplomatic and military-political support to Azerbaijan during this process

significantly strengthened its presence in the region. Türkiye's official military cooperation including the graduation of hundreds of Azerbaijani officers from Turkish military academies and continuous training and education acted as a critical combat multiplier for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and proved decisive in victory. Türkiye is one of the main actors in the South Caucasus, and the region has special geopolitical importance for Ankara. Türkiye is interested in the development of transportation-logistics and energy chains, participating directly in these projects, and ensuring that these routes extend through its territory. Relations with Azerbaijan play a key role in boosting Türkiye's influence in the region and in developing the Turkish vector of its foreign policy. The territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia had long shaped the development of the South Caucasus and maintained high conflict potential in the region, affecting the interests of external actors. Despite numerous attempts to resolve the dispute through diplomatic means, the irreconcilable positions of the parties, their unwillingness to establish communication, and the transformation of the Karabakh issue into an element of self-determination for both Baku and Yerevan predetermined the impossibility of a peaceful settlement (Markedonov, 2018, p. 136).

The events of 2020 that led to the restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Although Ankara had long sought to increase its political and economic influence in the region, competition with other states particularly Russia limited these opportunities. Additionally, Türkiye's ambitions in the region caused concerns among other external actors interested in maintaining the existing balance of power.

5.1. Türkiye's Political and Diplomatic Support During the War

From the moment the Second Karabakh War began, Türkiye, at the official level, demonstrated unconditional and resolute political support to Azerbaijan. Statements by Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan unequivocally expressed Türkiye's complete support for Azerbaijan's counteroffensive operations aimed at restoring its territorial integrity.

This support was not limited to rhetoric; it manifested itself in defense of Azerbaijan's position in international organizations and platforms, including NATO and the UN. With this determined stance, Türkiye aimed to prevent attempts of external intervention in the conflict and to expand Azerbaijan's military-political maneuvering space (Erarslan, 2021, p. 317).

The core of Türkiye's diplomatic support was the complete and unconditional defense of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territorial integrity. Turkish officials regularly referred to UN Security Council resolutions on Karabakh 822, 853, 874, and 884 (Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi [BMGK], 1993), emphasized Armenia's role as an occupying force, and stated that Azerbaijan's military operations on its own territory constituted the right to self-defense under international law (Foreign Affairs, 2020; AKPM, 2005).

This strategy placed Azerbaijan's military operations within the framework of international legitimacy, neutralized Armenia's statements about a "humanitarian catastrophe," and conveyed the true essence of the war the goal of ending the occupation to the international community.

6. Military Cooperation and Transformation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces

Türkiye's increasing support to Azerbaijan, particularly through the transfer of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems, became clearly visible. The use of "Bayraktar TB-2" UAVs during the Second Karabakh War created a qualitatively new dynamic on the battlefield and made a decisive contribution to Azerbaijan's victory. These UAVs ensured Azerbaijan's military superiority, secured air dominance, and became a key factor enabling ground forces to reach operational objectives without obstruction.

6.1. Transformation of Military Forces

Over the past thirty years, Azerbaijan's General Staff (GS) was transformed from a Soviet doctrine-based institution into a structure aligned with Western (NATO) standards, following the Turkish and German models. This evolutionary process was primarily carried out through military cooperation with the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and officer exchange programs, enabling the development and implementation of successful operational-level campaign strategies.

While the First Karabakh War took place between two forces with Soviet military heritage, the second war occurred between an army that still retained an outdated structure and newly transformed Armed Forces integrated into Western standards.

Türkiye's official military cooperation training and education, graduation of hundreds of officers from Turkish military academies, as well as joint exercises served as a critical combat multiplier for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

These modernization efforts were funded by oil revenues, prioritizing the transition of the army from the old Soviet model to a NATO-standard doctrine and modern equipment. Training provided by the Turkish Armed Forces in accordance with NATO standards enhanced the combat readiness of Azerbaijani personnel, enabling flexible decision-making in the context of "Modern Warfare." As a result, the Azerbaijani army fielded a military force equipped with ultra-modern UAV tactics and technologies, modern doctrinal campaign design and planning, and operational principles close to those of NATO (Shahbazov, 2020).

6.2. Decisive Role of UAV Technology

Türkiye's UAV development in its national defense industry is now being transferred to Azerbaijan, becoming a catalyst that changed the balance of military forces on the Karabakh front. From a defense-economic perspective, TB-2 creates a strong position for Türkiye in the Azerbaijani arms market, previously dominated by Israel (Kasapoğlu, 2020; Toksabay, 2020), including reactive artillery, armored personnel carriers, missiles, as well as "Bayraktar TB2" UAVs and their munitions (Guzayerov, 2023 p. 60).

The sixfold increase in sales in 2020 demonstrated the intensity of Türkiye's support and directly influenced the course of the war. The "Bayraktar TB2" UAVs had a literally "game-changing" effect in the war (Marston and Forrest, 2021; Erickson, 2021, p. 1).

The main tactical role of the Bayraktar TB2 UAVs was to provide uninterrupted reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Their success stemmed from the fact that Armenia's outdated Soviet air-defense systems, including the S-300 complexes, were ineffective against small UAVs. (Erickson, 2021) and by disabling these systems and armored vehicles with high precision, the UAVs created a qualitative superiority on the battlefield. As a result, UAVs played an undeniably significant role in Azerbaijan's offensive operations. The main tactical role of the Bayraktar TB2 UAVs was to create continuous Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Their success stemmed from the ineffectiveness of Armenia's outdated Soviet-era air defense systems, including the S-300 complexes, against small UAVs (Erickson, 2021) and by destroying armored vehicles with high precision, they created a qualitative difference on the battlefield. The UAVs created a qualitative difference on the battlefield by destroying these systems and armored vehicles with high precision. Consequently, the UAVs played an evidently significant role in Azerbaijan's offensive operations (Gatopoulos, 2020) and paved the way for its victory (Bershidsky, 2020). They became the key factor that ensured Azerbaijan's air superiority and allowed it to achieve its operational objectives unimpeded (Erickson, 2021, p. 4) and paved the way for its victory (Bershidsky, 2020). They became the main factor ensuring Azerbaijan's air superiority and enabling it to reach its operational objectives without obstruction (Erickson, 2021, p. 4).

6.3. Strategic Coordination and Outcome

Türkiye's shift in regional policy became particularly evident after the July 2020 Tovuz clashes during the joint military exercises. The fact that shortly before the war, in July and August, the Turkish and Azerbaijani Armed Forces conducted joint military exercises, as well as Türkiye's stationing of two F-16 fighter jets in the city of Ganja (Keddie, 2020) is characterized by two primary strategic outcomes: the enhancement of operational readiness and coordination affecting the course of the war, and the delivery of a strategic deterrence signal.

The joint exercises were critically important for testing operational plans between the Azerbaijani and Turkish armies and aligning their command chains. Consequently, by maximizing the sides' joint operational capability, they served as a strong tool of diplomatic and psychological strategic deterrence. These exercises signaled to the Armenian leadership Türkiye's firm and open support for Azerbaijan and that, if necessary, it could directly influence the course of military operations (Kramer, 2021).

Experts note that in 2019 alone, 13 joint Türkiye–Azerbaijan military exercises were conducted. After the summer exercises of 2020, a Turkish military contingent remained in Azerbaijan, and this contingent is believed to have participated in operational planning, UAV operations, etc. (Baqaeva, 2025, p. 102-103).

According to Defense Industry Minister Haluk Görgün, by implementing the joint HAKİM air command and control system project, Türkiye and Azerbaijan will extend their shared air-space control zone from the Aegean Sea to the Caspian Basin. Through this project implemented by ASELSAN, the air forces of both countries not only ensure control over Azerbaijani airspace but also gain the capability to conduct joint operations ((Defence Turkey, 2021; ASELSAN, 2021; HAKİM, 2021; HAKİM, 2023).

7. Broader Geopolitical Goals and International Implications

Türkiye's "unconditional" support for Azerbaijan reflected Ankara's broader regional ambitions and geopolitical objectives. This turning point was mainly associated with the deepening of Türkiye–Azerbaijan relations after the failure of Türkiye's 2008 Armenia normalization policy and the shift away from the AKP's earlier "soft-power" foreign policy approach.

First, energy security and economic interests were among Ankara's primary strategic goals, as Azerbaijan is vital for Türkiye's energy security (gas imports grew by 23% in the first half of 2020) (Keddie, 2020) and SOCAR is the largest foreign investor in Türkiye (Annual Report, 2020).

Second, Türkiye aimed to strengthen its regional influence, transform into a dominant regional power, and play a more active role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in a context where it viewed the OSCE Minsk Group as ineffective.

Third, Ankara sought to establish a leverage balance with Russia. Instead of completely eliminating Russian influence in Karabakh, Türkiye's aim was to obtain geopolitical leverage that could be used to strengthen its position in disputes in Syria or Libya by exploiting Russia's vulnerabilities in the Caucasus (Keddie, 2020).

Fourth, the rise of nationalist figures within the AKP made Caucasus geopolitics a domestic political priority. As a result, Türkiye's firm support transformed the region's geopolitical landscape, undermining Russia's long-term dominance and ensuring Azerbaijan's military superiority. However, this support also carried risks related to Russia's "red lines." Although Moscow tried to exclude Türkiye from ceasefire negotiations, Türkiye's military-technological success made it inevitable that its interests would be considered in the reshaping of the regional order.

Türkiye's role in Azerbaijan demonstrated not only its ability to modernize the armed forces of an allied nation but also its potential to provide strategic added value to the transatlantic alliance, both within and beyond its own jurisdiction (Yalçınkaya, 2021).

According to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye's support to Azerbaijan during the 44-day war was part of Ankara's effort to secure a "rightful place" in the world order alongside the United States and Russia (Avdaliani, 2020).

Conclusion

Thus, in 2020 the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan conducted a successful joint operation aimed at recapturing the strategically important and historically significant occupied territories of the Karabakh region from Armenian control. This operation enabled Azerbaijan to achieve its strategic objective of restoring most of its territories. The design of the campaign clearly demonstrated the hallmarks of operational art by effectively balancing aims, methods, and means. Operationally, Azerbaijan's joint planning, preparation, and high combat efficiency created a decisive advantage over the Armenian forces.

As a result, the success of Azerbaijan's 2020 Karabakh military campaign was the logical outcome of a long-term period of professionalization and modernization within its military institutions (including the acquisition of high-precision strike capabilities), complemented by firm political decision-making.

Azerbaijan's strategic victory in the autumn of 2020 is primarily explained by investments in asymmetric military capabilities and the tactical and operational superiority provided by Turkish/Israeli UAVs. The main tactical role of the "Bayraktar TB2" UAVs was to ensure continuous reconnaissance and surveillance, enabling uninterrupted monitoring of enemy positions and supply lines even in mountainous terrain. Their success became possible because Armenia's outdated Soviet air-defense systems (including S-300s) were ineffective against small UAVs. This allowed the TB2s to operate without hindrance.

This war, described as an example of a "post-modern conflict" in which UAVs outperformed traditional ground forces, demonstrated that although UAVs do not win a war alone, they become a decisive factor transforming military doctrine by enabling the success of ground operations.

Azerbaijan's significant investment in Special Forces complemented precision-strike capabilities. Supported by Türkiye, these forces extended combat operations deep into the enemy's rear, targeting and destroying command networks, critical infrastructure, and air-defense systems.

Türkiye's support was not limited to military supplies. Under the legal framework of the 2010 Strategic Agreement, Ankara not only ensured the application of international law in favor of Azerbaijan but also disrupted the regional status-quo at the diplomatic level, including the role of the Minsk Group.

In conclusion, the Second Karabakh War became a decisive turning point in Türkiye's regional policy, allowing Ankara to strengthen its geopolitical position in the South Caucasus and strategically balance Russia's long-term influence. The war also demonstrated the high effectiveness of the "one nation, two states" strategy in reshaping the regional balance of power through military-technological integration.

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