

## The EU Common Counter-Terrorism Policy as a Differentiated Area of Integration: A Quantitative Analysis of Differences in Legal Implementation

*Selim Kanat\*, Ekin Deniz Uyğün\*\**

**Abstract:** This study examines the differentiation in counter-terrorism policies among EU member states by analyzing the relationship between terrorist threat levels, economic development, institutional quality, and compliance with EU acquis over the 2018–2024 period. Despite the adoption of various directives to combat terrorism, member states have not uniformly transposed these instruments into their national legal systems. The main argument of the study is that member states' reluctance to cede sovereignty in the security domain and their tendency to resort to differentiated integration mechanisms constitute the primary obstacles to implementing a common counter-terrorism policy. Using a panel dataset covering all 27 EU member states and employing Poisson GLM, OLS regression, and Spearman rank correlation analyses in RStudio, the findings reveal no statistically significant relationship between terrorist threat levels, economic development, and institutional quality and acquis compliance. Compliance patterns are found to be shaped not by structural factors but by the transposition timelines of directives and the enforcement priorities of the Commission. These findings align with the sovereignty-centered approach of new intergovernmentalism and support the argument that the security domain continues to remain a structurally differentiated area within EU integration.

**Key Words:** Counter-Terrorism, Differentiated Integration, New Intergovernmentalism, European Union, Quantitative methods.

\* Doç. Dr., Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, selimkanat@sdu.edu.tr, 0000-0003-2663-3757.

\*\* Dr., Bağımsız Araştırmacı, ekindenizuygun@gmail.com, 0000-0002-2120-4649

## Farklılaşmış Entegrasyon Alanı Olarak AB Ortak Terörle Mücadele Politikası: Yasal Uygulama Farklılıklarının Nicel Analizi

*Selim Kanat\*, Ekin Deniz Uyğun\*\**

**Özet:** Bu çalışma, AB üye devletleri arasındaki terörle mücadele politikalarındaki farklılaşmayı, terör tehdidi düzeyleri, ekonomik gelişmişlik, kurumsal kalite ve AB müktesebatına uyum arasındaki ilişkiyi 2018-2024 dönemi için incelemektedir. Terörle mücadeleye yönelik çeşitli direktiflerin kabul edilmiş olmasına karşın üye devletler bu düzenlemeleri ulusal hukuk sistemlerine tekdüze biçimde aktarmamıştır. Çalışmanın temel argümanı, üye devletlerin güvenlik alanında egemenlik devretme konusundaki isteksizliğinin ve farklılaşmış entegrasyon mekanizmalarına başvurma eğilimlerinin ortak bir terörle mücadele politikasının önündeki başlıca engeli oluşturduğu yönündedir. AB27 üye devletlerini kapsayan panel veri seti kullanılarak RStudio ortamında Poisson GLM, OLS regresyonu ve Spearman sıra korelasyon analizi uygulanmıştır. Bulgular, terör tehdidi düzeyi, ekonomik gelişmişlik ve kurumsal kalite ile müktesebat uyumu arasında istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir ilişki bulunmadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Uyum örüntülerinin yapısal faktörler yerine direktiflerin aktarım takvimleri ve Komisyon'un uygulama öncelikleri tarafından şekillendirildiği anlaşılmaktadır. Bu bulgular yeni hükümetlerarasıcılığın egemenlik merkezli yaklaşımıyla örtüşmekte ve güvenlik alanının AB entegrasyonu içinde yapısal olarak farklılaşmış bir alan olmayı sürdürdüğünü desteklemektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Terörle Mücadele, Farklılaştırılmış Entegrasyon, Yeni Hükümetlerarasılık, Avrupa Birliği, Nicel Yöntemler.

\* Doç. Dr., Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, selimkanat@sdu.edu.tr, 0000-0003-2663-3757.

\*\* Dr., Bağımsız Araştırmacı, ekindenizuygun@gmail.com, 0000-0002-2120-4649.

## Introduction

Terrorism has become an increasingly important and complex international security issue since the second half of the 20th century. As terrorist attacks intensified in Europe during the 1970s, the need for common security within the European Union (EU) became ever more apparent, as hijackings, kidnappings, and assassination attempts pushed European states to seek closer cooperation. The TREVI Group, established in 1976, constituted the first concrete step in counter-terrorism cooperation by coordinating member states' law enforcement agencies. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms could not be fully achieved due to diverging national security priorities.

Despite ongoing efforts to establish a common counter-terrorism policy within the EU framework, supranational integration has not been achieved. Although various directives have been adopted, these have neither been uniformly transposed nor implemented into national legal systems. Realist approaches emphasize that states shape their security policies in accordance with national interests, highlighting the limitations of developing common policies (Waltz 1979). Within this framework, intergovernmentalism and new intergovernmentalism (NI) regard attempts to establish a common security policy as limited due to member states' tendency to protect their sovereignty (Hoffmann 1966, Bickerton *et al.* 2015a). As an alternative model, the concept of differentiated integration (DI) has attracted growing attention as a framework allowing for varying levels of integration across the EU's common policy areas (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020).

This study examines why the EU's common counter-terrorism policy has remained at the level of intergovernmental cooperation. The main argument is that member states' reluctance to cede sovereignty in the security domain and their tendency to resort to DI mechanisms constitute the primary obstacles to implementing a common counter-terrorism policy. Studies examining EU counter-terrorism policies and their differentiation dynamics through quantitative methods remain considerably limited (Gruszczak 2022), and this study aims to fill that gap. The central research question is: What are the dynamics behind the differentiation in EU member states' counter-terrorism policies and practices, and how does this differentiation affect EU-level integration?

Drawing on quantitative methods, the study examines the relationship between terrorist threat levels, economic development, and institutional quality and their impact on infringement decisions related to EU counter-terrorism acquis within a panel data analysis framework. Poisson GLM and Spearman correlation analyses are employed to reveal the relationship between threat perception and acquis compliance. In this regard, the study tests the following hypotheses:

**H1:** *There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of terrorist threat and compliance with EU counter-terrorism acquis; as the threat level increases, compliance strengthens.*

**H2:** *There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of economic development (GDP per capita) and acquis compliance; more developed countries demonstrate higher compliance performance.*

**H3:** *There is a statistically significant positive relationship between institutional quality (Rule of Law and Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism) and acquis compliance; institutionally stronger countries demonstrate higher compliance performance.*

**H0:** *There is no statistically significant relationship between terrorist threat levels, economic development, and institutional quality and compliance with EU counter-terrorism acquis.*

### **Building an EU Common Terror Policy**

The escalation of terrorist activities in Europe during the 1970s, particularly by leftist organizations such as the Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction, made the need for security cooperation more visible (Rapoport 2013, Parker and Sitter 2016). In this context, the intergovernmental TREVI Group was established in 1976 to coordinate law enforcement agencies across member states. The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985 and incorporated into the EU acquis with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, aimed at common protection of external borders and laid the foundation for EU-level institutions such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST, and FRONTEX in terms of information sharing, border control, and integrated security monitoring.

The Maastricht Treaty established a three-pillar structure providing a legal framework for intergovernmental cooperation in areas including asylum policy, migration, and counterterrorism under Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation. The Amsterdam Treaty further emphasized that the security of European citizens required closer cooperation between member states' law enforcement and judicial authorities and defined minimum rules on criminal acts and penalties in the fields of organized crime, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.

In the 2000s, the attacks of September 11 and subsequent attacks in Madrid, London, and Berlin, combined with EU enlargement, demonstrated that national practices were insufficient to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime. In this context, structures such as EUROPOL, FRONTEX, and EURODAC became increasingly central to border security and migration governance, and common opposition to terrorism emerged as closely interrelated with border security within the EU framework. In 2016, the European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) was established within EUROPOL to increase operational effectiveness in the fight against terrorism

With the Lisbon Treaty, the intergovernmental nature of counterterrorism policymaking was partially mitigated through the shift from unanimity to majority voting in internal security decisions, though not fully eliminated. The EU acknowledged the need to improve intelligence capacity and information sharing between EU institutions and national governments. A new initiative adopted in 2018 aimed to improve the Schengen Information System; however, it did not go beyond strengthening intergovernmental cooperation. This intergovernmental policy-making structure is the fundamental basis for differentiation among EU member states. In the absence of supranational and monolithic policymaking, member states retain considerable freedom in their domestic implementation processes. Accordingly, the Commission's counter-terrorism recommendations have been communicated primarily in the form of directives, granting member states discretion over implementation (Official Journal of the European Union 2007).

### **Differentiated Integration in the Formation of the EU Common Terrorism Policy**

Differentiated integration (DI) refers to the possibility for member states to have different rights and obligations with respect to common policy areas (Warleigh 2002, Brandi and Wohlgemuth 2006). Building on Stubb's (1996) typology, Schimmelfennig et al. (2022, 2023) and Schimmelfennig and Winzen (2020) categorized vertical differentiation as multi-speed, multi-tier, and multi-menu models. This study argues that the multi-menu DI model is most explanatory for EU counter-terrorism policymaking, as member states select policies suited to their preferences without converging toward uniform integration.

EU member states are parties to numerous international counter-terrorism conventions, including the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. While these instruments constituted significant steps toward common understandings, they have not been uniformly applied within the EU institutional sphere. The 1995 La Gomera Declaration identified counter-terrorism as a common priority requiring enhanced police and judicial cooperation (European Parliament 1995), and the 2002 Council Framework Decision defined the scope of terrorist offenses while leaving their definition and punishment to national laws (EUR-lex 2002).

The 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, emerging after the Madrid attacks, identified four operational scopes: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond, while explicitly acknowledging that primary responsibility rests with member states at the national level. The strategy's priorities require no delegation of authority to EU institutions, and the absence of sanctions for non-compliance clearly paves

the way for differentiation in policy implementation (Council of the European Union 2005).

The 2015 European Agenda on Security further entrenched this pattern. While the Lisbon Treaty expanded the powers of the CJEU and the European Parliament, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Ireland retained opt-outs on security matters (*Protocol No: 21* 2016). Articles 43, 72, and 326 of the TFEU collectively preserve member states' rights to protect internal security and enable enhanced cooperation on a selective basis. Although the 2015 Agenda called for better implementation of EU legal instruments and established a European Counter-Terrorism Center within Europol, the center's mandate explicitly left member states' sole responsibility for national security intact, with the Commission's role limited to establishing performance indicators (*The European Agenda on Security* 2015).

In 2017, Directive 2017/541 repealed the 2002 framework, expanding the scope of terrorism-related offenses to include foreign terrorist fighters, online propaganda, terrorism financing, border control, and criminalization of training and indirect support. The directive establishes minimum standards for definitions and sanctions while preserving the opt-out rights of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. Crucially, member states face no sanctions for non-implementation; the Commission may only refer non-transposing states to the CJEU after issuing a warning. Empirical data confirm this divergence: in 2018, Directive 2017/541 constituted 16 of the 50 late transposition cases filed, accounting for over 30% of all late transposition infringements recorded that year (European Commission, 2018a, pp. 23; European Commission, 2018b, pp. 75).

In 2020, the European Commission adopted a new strategic security document for the period 2020-2025. The adopted European Union Security Strategy Paper states that after 2019, there has been a downward trend in terrorist attacks in Europe, but hybrid threats have increased, and the threat of radical racist, and religious terrorism has increased. At the same time, it is noted that this threat is increasing along with foreign terrorist fighters. The need for a comprehensive and coherent common response to threats was re-emphasized, and four strategic priorities were identified: (i) a future-proof security environment, (ii) countering emerging threats, (iii) protecting Europeans from terrorism and organized crime, (iv) building a strong European security ecosystem.

Under its priority, the Commission acknowledged that member states "exercise discretion to apply existing legislation in different ways," noting that such divergence could weaken the internal market and hinder cross-border coordination. Under the second priority, the Commission emphasized full implementation of the existing legal framework and signaled its readiness to initiate infringement procedures. Under the third priority, while recognizing member states' primary responsibility for combating terrorism and radicalization, the Commission stressed enhanced EU-level cooperation and identified effective implementation

of counter-terrorism legislation as a key priority. Given that European security is coordinated through intergovernmental bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, EU INTCEN, ENISA, and EEAS, differentiation in implementation remains structurally inevitable (EUR-lex 2020).

Subsequent legislative developments extended this framework. Directive 2018/843 aimed to enable member states to identify and mitigate risks related to money laundering and terrorist financing (Directive 2018/843). Regulation 2021/784 established proportionate obligations on hosting service providers to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content online and to ensure its swift removal or blocking (Regulation 2021/784). In 2021, a proposal was put forward to establish an Authority for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, amending Regulations 1093/2010, 1094/2010, and 1095/2010. Adopted in 2024 as Regulation 2024/1620, the regulation established this authority with representation from each member state's Financial Intelligence Unit, aiming to create a single EU rulebook on money laundering and terrorist financing and to assess risks emanating from outside the Union (Regulation 2021/784; Regulation 2024/1620).

Evidence of differentiation is systematically documented in the Commission's annual reports on the application of EU law. In 2020, the directive on the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing recorded the highest number of transposition notifications (509), reflecting both the directive's broad scope and uneven member state compliance. In 2021, the Commission took formal steps in 41 infringement cases related to late or incorrect transposition of anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing rules, closing only 19. In the same year, 22 infringement proceedings were opened specifically for the mis-transposition of Directive 2017/541 on counterterrorism, and infringement procedures were initiated against seven member states for the mis-transposition of Directive 2013/40 on attacks on information systems. Luxembourg was referred to the CJEU in the context of organized crime linked to terrorism, and proceedings were opened against Hungary (European Commission 2022).

In 2022, the Commission launched preliminary infringement procedures against all member states regarding EU rules on the registration of beneficial ownership, while initiating specific procedures against Spain, Italy, and Latvia for non-transposition or poor implementation. Notably, only 11 infringement procedures on Directive 2018/843 on anti-money laundering could be closed during this period, underscoring persistent compliance gaps (European Commission 2023a).

In 2023, the Commission reported continued difficulties with Directive 2017/541, which criminalizes terrorism financing, training, and travel for terrorist purposes. Although 10 member states had taken transposition steps and 11 had closed infringement proceedings, non-compliant states remained. Bulgaria had not transposed Directive 2017/541, Latvia had not fully transposed the Anti-Money Laundering Directive 2015/849, and Slovakia required a reasoned opinion for its

failure to transpose (European Commission 2023b). Most strikingly, infringement procedures were initiated against 22 member states for the correct implementation of Directive 2021/784 on online terrorist content, yet only 10 fulfilled their obligations following these procedures (European Commission 2023c, 2024). Taken together, the persistent non-transposition and mis-implementation of these directives across successive years constitutes robust empirical evidence of structural differentiation in EU counter-terrorism policy.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical analysis of the EU's integration was first carried out within international relations theories, but realist theories proved insufficient to explain the EU integration structure (Waltz 1979). Classical and neo-realist approaches, while supporting the intergovernmental nature of cooperation, cannot fully account for deeper integration processes such as the Economic and Monetary Union or EU enlargement to CEE countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, neo-realism views norms and institutions as ineffective in international society, where power and self-help remain decisive (Snyder 1996). However, even if it is understood that DI within the EU and the opt-outs that member states put in the founding treaties are guaranteed by the founding treaties, it is not possible to empirically measure realism within the EU institutional structure (Michell 2005).

Since realism does not offer a detailed view of supranational integration, a theory of integration rooted in realism, intergovernmentalism, is more appropriate for the theoretical framework of our study. In the historical context, Hoffman (1966, 1995) argued that member states would resist the gradual transfer of their sovereignty to a higher authority and the primacy of the nation-state would be maintained, citing reasons such as de Gaulle's veto of British membership in the 1960s, the Luxembourg and Ionianna Accords, and the failure of attempts at political union until the 1990s. Hoffman (1966), similar to neo-realism, does not deny that states pursue power and interests, but argues that cooperation on secondary policies is more likely, while cooperation on primary policies is less likely, since each nation-state will pursue its self-interest. Hoffman (1966) attributes this to the fact that the decision-making actors in the Union are member states, not institutions. Similarly, Taylor (1983, p. 298) points to the increasing scope and status of intergovernmental institutions and structures vis-à-vis the supranational Commission.

Bringing intergovernmentalist theory into the 21st century, the New Intergovernmentalist (NI) view (Bickerton et. al., 2015b) argues that the distinction between these two policy areas became blurred in the late 1990s. According to Bickerton et al. (2015b, 2015a), migration policy, which was considered a secondary political field before the 1990s, cannot be separated from

the primary political field as it is associated with border crossings, the economy, and even national security, leading to a permeability between political fields. Schimmelfening and Winzen (2020, 2023) empirically demonstrate that the number of clauses in the EU Treaties allowing for differentiated integration on issues such as foreign policy, domestic policy, monetary policy, and core state competencies increased sharply after the 1990s, and that the *acquis* will allow for further differentiation until 2020. In this context, it can be said that anti-terrorism policies are no longer only a security issue as a primary policy area; the distinction between policies has disappeared as they have direct or indirect links with migration, free movement, emerging cyber life, free movement of goods, and many other issues.

According to the NI approach, there is no subordination relationship between the political spheres that affect each other. Member states act by considering all political spheres when making decisions within the self-help system, thus spreading the differentiation within the EU across political spheres. Thus, member states are reluctant to delegate authority to the EU supranational structure and instead of delegating authority to the institutional structure, they have sought cooperation without supranationalization through the creation of NI agencies such as FRONTEX and EUROJUST, which NI defines as “*de novo*” (Bickerton et al., 2015a; Puetter, 2012). Bickerton et al. (2015b) define *de novo* institutions as newly created bodies that have considerable autonomy, usually through executive or legislative authority, and a degree of control over their own resources. They perform functions that can be delegated to the Commission and include mechanisms for member state representation as part of their governance structure. Bickerton et al. (2015a) argue that, apart from monetary policy, similar governance arrangements have been put in place in justice and home affairs. Particularly in the areas of family law and police cooperation, member states have supported the creation and strengthening of *de novo* institutions such as Frontex and Eurojust rather than strengthening the Commission’s powers. Puetter (2014a, 2014b, 2015) argues that the European Council, Granger (2015) argues that the ECJ in *Pringle Case* (C-370/12), and Howarth and Quaglia (2015) argue that the Commission has tacitly accepted the creation of *de novo* institutions.

Counter-terrorism integration within the EU institutional structure is in a similar situation. The reason for the uniformity in the implementation of counter-terrorism policy is the reluctance of member states to cede sovereignty over such an important policy area. At this point, Wiczorek (2018) argues that EU member states should focus on creating mechanisms and institutions that will provide practical benefits in their domestic arenas, and with this practice, member states at the EU and national level should formulate counter-terrorism policies.

## Methodology

This study adopts a quantitative panel data design to examine the relationship between terrorist threat levels and EU counter-terrorism acquis compliance among EU27 member states over the 2018–2024 period. The year 2018 was selected as the starting point to ensure methodological consistency, as it represents the first full year in which infringement proceedings could plausibly commence following the entry into force of Directive 2017/541 in 2017.

The dependent variable, Infringement Count, quantifies the number of counter-terrorism acquis infringement decisions issued annually by the European Commission against each member state. Data were obtained from the European Commission Infringement Decisions Database (European Commission 2026) and restricted to four core legislative instruments: Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism, Regulation 2021/784 on the dissemination of terrorist content online, Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, and Directive 2016/681 on passenger name record data. Each infringement case was coded according to its official decision date, with infringement counts expected to reflect member state non-compliance (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009).

Terrorist threat was operationalized through two complementary indicators. The GTI score, drawn from the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024), is a composite index combining attack frequency, fatalities, injuries, and property damage on a scale of 0 to 10, preferred over unidimensional measures for its comprehensive capture of threat perception (Enders and Sandler 2011, Andreescu and Shackelford 2024). The number of terrorist attacks was compiled from Europol’s annual TE-SAT reports (Europol 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024), covering completed, failed, and foiled attacks. Arrest and conviction figures sourced from Europol TE-SAT and Eurojust respectively were also included to capture the operational and judicial dimensions of counter-terrorism, with arrests reflecting state security capacity and convictions reflecting judicial response (Argomaniz and Vidal-Diez 2015). The counter-terrorism indicators used in the dataset are presented in Appendix I.

Control variables were selected on three grounds. GDP per capita (World Bank WDI, NY.GDP.PCAP.CD) proxies administrative capacity, as higher-income states are better positioned to bear transposition costs (Mbaye 2001, Börzel et al. 2010). Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and in total terms (World Bank WDI, MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS and MS.MIL.XPND.CD) captures security priority preferences within the NI framework (Bickerton et al. 2015d). The Rule of Law and Political Stability indices, derived from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, measure institutional capacity and the risk that domestic instability may impede compliance respectively (World Bank Group 2026b, 2026a). Economic and defense indicators are presented in Appendix II, and

governance indicators in Appendix III. Descriptive statistics for the dataset used in the study are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics

|                                    | <b>n</b> | <b>mean</b> | <b>sd</b> | <b>min</b> | <b>med</b> | <b>max</b> |
|------------------------------------|----------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Infringement Count</b>          | 189      | 1.085       | 0.996     | 0          | 1          | 4          |
| <b>GTI Score</b>                   | 162      | 1.283       | 1.558     | 0          | 0.458      | 5.475      |
| <b>Number of Terrorist Attacks</b> | 189      | 2.127       | 7.457     | 0          | 0          | 80         |
| <b>Number of Arrests</b>           | 189      | 19.053      | 39.112    | 0          | 2          | 310        |
| <b>Number of Convictions</b>       | 189      | 16.852      | 31.233    | 0          | 1          | 155        |
| <b>GDP per Capita (USD)</b>        | 189      | 39429.93    | 25613.745 | 9849.384   | 31428.355  | 137781.68  |
| <b>Military Exp. (% GDP)</b>       | 189      | 1.591       | 0.713     | 0.21       | 1.5        | 4.15       |
| <b>Rule of Law Index</b>           | 162      | 1.037       | 0.575     | -0.128     | 1.039      | 2.034      |
| <b>Political Stability Index</b>   | 162      | 0.674       | 0.268     | 0.014      | 0.682      | 1.347      |

An examination of Table 1 reveals that the dependent variable, Infringement Count, has a mean of 1.09 and a median of 1, indicating that the data tend to cluster near zero and are count data in nature. Among the counter-terrorism indicators, it is notable that the standard deviations of the arrest and conviction variables substantially exceed their respective means, indicating that the distributions of these variables are strongly right-skewed. Twenty-seven missing observations are present in both the GTI score and the governance indicators: the absence of GTI score data reflects the fact that IEP did not publish a report for 2021, while the missing values in the Rule of Law and Political Stability variables are due to the 2024 World Governance Indicators data not yet having been published at the time this study was conducted. These missing values are attributable to the structure of the dataset and the analyses were carried out using the available observations. All continuous variables in the dataset were examined for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test prior to conducting the tests and analyses (Table 2).

**Table 2.** Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test Results


|                                    | <b>w</b> | <b>p</b> |
|------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| <b>Infringement Count</b>          | 0.8541   | 0        |
| <b>GTI Score</b>                   | 0.8009   | 0        |
| <b>Number of Terrorist Attacks</b> | 0.2994   | 0        |
| <b>Number of Arrests</b>           | 0.5364   | 0        |
| <b>Number of Convictions</b>       | 0.6138   | 0        |
| <b>GDP per Capita (USD)</b>        | 0.8143   | 0        |
| <b>Military Exp. (% GDP)</b>       | 0.956    | 0        |
| <b>Rule of Law Index</b>           | 0.9608   | 0.0002   |
| <b>Political Stability Index</b>   | 0.9903   | 0.3323   |

The Shapiro-Wilk test results presented in Table 2 reveal that all variables violate the normality assumption with the exception of the Political Stability variable ( $p < 0.05$ ). In light of these findings, Spearman rank correlation analysis was employed for the examination of bivariate relationships, while the Poisson Generalized Linear Model (GLM) was preferred for regression analysis given the count data nature of the dependent variable (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). Following the confirmation of the Poisson model by the overdispersion test and the recommendation of random effects estimation by the Hausman test, the analyses were completed within this framework, and OLS regression was estimated in parallel for the purposes of robustness checking. All analyses were conducted in R/Rstudio using the “*plm*”, “*lme4*”, “*AER*”, and “*corrplot*” packages (Horton and Kleinman 2015).

The study has several methodological limitations. First, the panel covers a seven-year period (2018-2024), and the sample consisting of 27 cross-sectional units is subject to certain constraints. The GTI Index did not publish a report for 2021, and therefore the corresponding values appear as NA in the dataset. Furthermore, World Bank data are available up to 2024, and values beyond this year are not available. Additionally, infringement counts reflect not only direct measures of differentiated integration but also the enforcement effectiveness of the Commission; future research may consider opt-out records and enhanced cooperation participation data as complementary indicators. Finally, government ideology and legal system type, which are considered theoretically relevant control variables, could not be incorporated into the analysis due to difficulties in accessing the necessary panel data sources for the 2018-2024 period, and are noted as a recommendation for future research.

## Findings

The findings are presented in three stages within the analytical strategy established in the methodology section. First, the distribution of infringement decisions among EU27 member states is examined at a descriptive level; second, the bivariate relationships between variables are analyzed through Spearman rank correlation analysis; and third, the relationship between terrorist threat and acquis compliance is tested by means of Poisson GLM and OLS regression models. In the first stage of the findings section, the distribution of infringement decisions among EU27 member states is examined. The total infringement decisions issued over the 2018–2024 period exhibit considerable heterogeneity across countries, indicating that compliance with counter-terrorism acquis is not evenly distributed among member states (Figure 1).




**Source:**(European Commission 2026)

**Figure 1.** Total Number of Infringements by EU-27 Member State (2018-2024)

An examination of Figure 1 reveals that Spain, Luxembourg, and Austria are the countries with the highest levels of non-compliance, each recording 12 infringement decisions. Greece, Estonia, and Bulgaria rank second with 11 infringements each. Denmark, Hungary, and Ireland, on the other hand, are among the countries with the lowest levels of non-compliance, each recording only 2

infringements. Major economies including France, Germany, and Italy, have relatively low infringement counts. An examination of this distribution indicates that infringement intensity is not directly associated with a country's economic size or level of terrorist threat. When the distribution of infringement decisions across years is examined, it is observed that the Commission's enforcement intensity exhibits periodic fluctuations. Figure 2 presents a comparative overview of the annual total infringement counts and the number of terrorist attacks across the EU.




**Source:**(Europol 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, European Commission 2026)

**Figure 2.** Comparison of the Number of Violations and Terrorist Attacks in the EU-27 by Year (2018–2024)

An examination of Figure 2 reveals that infringement counts were high in 2018 ( $n=38$ ) and 2020 ( $n=44$ ), before declining to only 2 in 2022. This sharp decline can be explained by the largely completed initial transposition processes under Directive 2017/541. The surge in infringement counts to 53 in 2023 indicates the onset of a new transposition wave following the entry into force of Regulation 2021/784. When the relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the number of infringements is examined, it is notable that the two variables do not follow a parallel trajectory: in 2021, when the number of attacks was at its lowest ( $n=14$ ), infringement counts remained relatively high, while in 2023, when attacks reached their peak ( $n=128$ ), infringement counts were also high, though this increase is understood to stem from the directive wave rather than from the threat level itself. This observation constitutes the first descriptive evidence that a simple causal relationship cannot be established between the level of terrorist threat and compliance performance, and Spearman rank correlation analysis was


applied to examine this relationship more systematically. Figure 3 visualizes the correlation coefficients between all variables.



**Figure 3.** Spearman Correlation Matrix


An examination of Figure 3 reveals that the dependent variable, Infringement Count, exhibits very weak relationships with the other variables. The correlation coefficients between infringement count and GTI score ( $\rho = -0.09$ ), number of terrorist attacks ( $\rho = -0.04$ ), number of arrests ( $\rho = 0.02$ ), and number of convictions ( $\rho = 0.00$ ) remain close to zero, indicating that these variables do not have a meaningful relationship with infringement count. A similar pattern is observed with respect to the control variables: the relationships between infringement count and GDP per capita ( $\rho = -0.05$ ), military expenditure ratio ( $\rho = 0.10$ ), Rule of Law index ( $\rho = 0.01$ ), and Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism index ( $\rho = -0.07$ ) remain at negligible levels. The threat indicators, by contrast, exhibit strong correlations among themselves: the relationships between GTI score and number of arrests ( $\rho = 0.69$ ) and between number of arrests and number of convictions ( $\rho = 0.73$ ) are markedly high. The strong positive correlation between GDP per capita and the Rule of Law index ( $\rho = 0.82$ ) reflects the structural link between institutional quality and economic development. Taken

together, these findings demonstrate that the level of terrorist threat is unable to establish a meaningful bivariate relationship with acquies compliance, and provide justification for proceeding to multivariate model analysis. In order to visualize the correlation findings more concretely at the country level, the relationship between mean GTI score and total infringement count was examined through a scatter plot. Figure 4 presents each country with a point size proportional to its mean number of arrests.



**Figure 4.** The Relationship Between GTI Scores and the Number of Violations by Country (EU-27, 2018–2024)

Figure 4 reveals no systematic pattern between GTI score and infringement count. High-threat states such as France (GTI  $\approx 4.2$ ) and Germany (GTI  $\approx 3.8$ ) exhibit relatively low infringement counts, while low-threat states such as Luxembourg and Bulgaria display high infringement counts. The nearly horizontal trend line and wide confidence band confirm the negligible explanatory power of GTI score over infringement count. Countries with high arrest capacity such as France, Belgium, and Spain also display markedly different infringement levels, consistent with the weak bivariate correlation coefficients obtained in the correlation analysis. To test this relationship more comprehensively alongside control variables, the analysis proceeded to multivariate regression. Prior to this, the Hausman specification test was applied to determine whether fixed or random effects estimation should be preferred, examining whether unobservable member state-specific effects correlate with the model error term. The presence of overdispersion arising from the count data nature of the dependent variable was subsequently examined. Results are presented in Figure 5.



**Figure 5.** Hausman Test Results

The Hausman test results ( $\chi^2 = 5.932$ ,  $df = 8$ ,  $p = 0.655$ ) reveal no systematic difference between the fixed and random effects models, thereby indicating that random effects estimation should be preferred. The scatter plot in Figure 5, which charts fixed effects residuals against random effects residuals, shows that the observations cluster relatively regularly around the 45-degree reference line, confirming that the differences in estimates between the two models are not systematic. The overdispersion test ( $z = -0.198$ ,  $p = 0.578$ ) demonstrated that the Poisson model adequately captures the variance structure of the dependent variable, and no evidence of overdispersion requiring a transition to the Negative Binomial model was detected.

Following the descriptive findings and correlation analysis, the relationship between terrorist threat and acquiescence compliance was tested through multivariate models. Poisson GLM was employed as the primary model, and OLS regression was estimated in parallel for the purposes of robustness checking. In both models, the independent variables were standardized, and the coefficients are interpreted on a scale with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Table 3 presents a comparative overview of the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and significance levels of both models.


**Table 3.** Poisson GLM and OLS Regression Results

|                                    | OLS      |        |         |        | Poisson  |        |         |         |
|------------------------------------|----------|--------|---------|--------|----------|--------|---------|---------|
|                                    | estimate | se     | t       | p      | estimate | se     | z       | p       |
| <b>(Intercept)</b>                 | 1.2391   | 0.0973 | 12.7365 | 0***   | 0.1921   | 0.0803 | 2.394   | 0.0167* |
| <b>GTI Score</b>                   | -0.2328  | 0.1417 | -1.6427 | 0.1029 | -0.2035  | 0.126  | -1.6153 | 0.1062  |
| <b>Number of Terrorist Attacks</b> | -0.1051  | 0.0986 | -1.0653 | 0.2888 | -0.127   | 0.121  | -1.0493 | 0.294   |
| <b>Number of Arrests</b>           | 0.0201   | 0.1571 | 0.1281  | 0.8983 | 0.023    | 0.1288 | 0.1787  | 0.8582  |
| <b>Number of Convictions</b>       | 0.2288   | 0.1887 | 1.2125  | 0.2276 | 0.1975   | 0.1512 | 1.3064  | 0.1914  |
| <b>GDP per Capita (USD)</b>        | 0.0489   | 0.1582 | 0.3089  | 0.7579 | 0.0377   | 0.1337 | 0.2821  | 0.7779  |
| <b>Military Exp. (% GDP)</b>       | 0.1792   | 0.1511 | 1.1861  | 0.2378 | 0.1451   | 0.1209 | 1.2005  | 0.23    |
| <b>Rule of Law Index</b>           | 0.0804   | 0.1684 | 0.4772  | 0.634  | 0.0683   | 0.1403 | 0.4867  | 0.6265  |
| <b>Political Stability Index</b>   | -0.0535  | 0.1895 | -0.2825 | 0.778  | -0.0516  | 0.1554 | -0.3321 | 0.7398  |

\*  $p < 0,05$ , \*\*  $p < 0,01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0,001$ .

An examination of Table 3 reveals that none of the independent variables is statistically significant in either model ( $p > 0.05$ ). The GTI score (Poisson:  $\beta = -0.204$ ,  $p = 0.106$ ) and number of terrorist attacks (Poisson:  $\beta = -0.127$ ,  $p = 0.294$ ), which represent terrorist threat, produce negative but insignificant coefficients. The number of arrests and convictions similarly fails to demonstrate a significant effect. Among the control variables, none of GDP per capita, military expenditure ratio, Rule of Law, and Political Stability exert a statistically significant effect on infringement count. The directions and magnitudes of the coefficients in the OLS and Poisson models are closely aligned, indicating that the findings are robust regardless of model selection. The extremely low McFadden  $R^2$  value of 0.028 indicates that the variables in the model are able to explain only a small portion of the variation in the dependent variable.

To test the robustness of the model findings, the Poisson GLM estimates were compared with the OLS regression results. This comparison tests whether the findings maintain their consistency independently of model selection and addresses the potential problem of model dependency. Figure 6 visualizes the standardized coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of both models.



**Figure 6.** Robustness Test: Comparison of OLS and Poisson GLM Coefficients

An examination of Figure 6 reveals that the OLS and Poisson models exhibit a high degree of agreement in terms of the directions and magnitudes of their coefficients. In both models, the confidence intervals of all variables encompass zero, and no coefficient reaches the threshold of statistical significance. The GTI score and number of terrorist attacks produce negative coefficients in both models, while the arrest, conviction, and military expenditure variables follow a positive direction. This consistency demonstrates that the findings are independent of model selection and that the results are robust. Accordingly, the core finding of the study is supported by both model specifications: no statistically significant relationship was detected between the level of terrorist threat and compliance with EU counter-terrorism acquis.

## Conclusion

This study examined the relationship between terrorist threat levels, economic development, institutional quality, and compliance with EU counter-terrorism acquis among EU27 member states over the 2018–2024 period within a panel data framework. When evaluated against the hypotheses established at the outset, H1, H2, and H3 are rejected and H0 is accepted.

Under H1, a statistically significant positive relationship was anticipated between terrorist threat levels and acquis compliance. However, Spearman

correlation analysis revealed only a  $\rho = -0.09$  relationship between GTI score and infringement count, while in the Poisson GLM, both the GTI score ( $\beta = -0.204$ ,  $p = 0.106$ ) and number of terrorist attacks ( $\beta = -0.127$ ,  $p = 0.294$ ) remained statistically insignificant. This finding contradicts the expectation that threat perception strengthens *acquis* compliance. Notably, high-threat states such as France and Germany exhibit relatively low infringement counts, suggesting that these states rely on national security capacities rather than demonstrating uniform EU-level compliance. Threat perception thus appears to reinforce national security priorities rather than draw member states closer to the common *acquis*, a pattern consistent with the intergovernmentalist expectation that cooperation in primary policy areas remains more limited than in secondary ones.

Under H2, economic development was expected to positively affect compliance performance. However, the correlation between GDP per capita and infringement count remained negligible at  $\rho = -0.05$ , with no significant effect detected in the regression model ( $\beta = 0.038$ ,  $p = 0.778$ ). Under H3, institutional quality was assumed to play a decisive role in compliance, yet the Rule of Law index ( $\beta = 0.068$ ,  $p = 0.627$ ) and Political Stability index ( $\beta = -0.052$ ,  $p = 0.740$ ) produced no significant results in either model. These findings demonstrate that compliance behavior proceeds independently of structural state characteristics such as administrative capacity or institutional quality, consistent with the NI argument that member states avoid delegating sovereignty in the security domain regardless of their capacity levels.

The core finding reveals that compliance with counter-terrorism *acquis* is shaped not by structural factors but by procedural dynamics such as directive transposition timelines and Commission enforcement priorities. The sharp decline in infringement counts in 2022 and their subsequent rise following the entry into force of Regulation 2021/784 in 2023 confirm this pattern. Within the multi-menu differentiated integration model, member states make different choices at the level of individual directives without any general tendency toward convergence. Member states' preference for cooperation through *de novo* institutions such as Europol and Eurojust rather than delegating authority to the Commission confirms that differentiation in counter-terrorism policy rests on a structural foundation.

These findings should be evaluated within certain limitations. The seven-year panel and 27 cross-sectional units constrain statistical power, and infringement decisions reflect only Commission-detected non-compliance rather than actual compliance levels. Future research incorporating government ideology, legal system type, and opt-out mechanisms would contribute to a more comprehensive explanation.

In conclusion, differentiation in EU counter-terrorism policy is best explained through the structurally sovereignty-sensitive nature of the security domain and the dynamics of multi-menu differentiated integration. Member states pursue a selective compliance strategy, preserving national priorities rather than delegating

authority to the Commission. Addressing this structural differentiation requires not threat-driven incentives but stronger Commission enforcement mechanisms and enhanced integration capacity of de novo institutions.

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## APPENDIX-I

|            | 2018               | 2019  | 2020  | 2021  | 2022 | 2023  | 2024  | 2018               | 2019               | 2020  | 2021  | 2022  | 2023  | 2024  |
|------------|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Austria    | Infringement Count | 3     | 1     | 4     | 1    | 0     | 3     | Infringement Count | 0                  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 1.852 | 1.655 | 1.016 | NA   | 3.261 | 2.677 | 0.953              | 0.817              | 0.957 | 1.484 | NA    | 0.291 | 0.118 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1    | 0     | 0     | 3                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 0     |
|            | Arrests            | 35    | 45    | 30    | 24   | 17    | 18    | 22                 | Arrests            | 3     | 21    | 4     | 9     | 7     |
| Belgium    | Convictions        | 36    | 40    | 20    | 37   | 48    | 39    | 64                 | Convictions        | 6     | 4     | 4     | 5     | 8     |
|            | Infringement Count | 1     | 1     | 3     | 1    | 0     | 2     | 1                  | Infringement Count | 3     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 4.06  | 3.656 | 3.043 | NA   | 1.745 | 2.769 | 1.904              | GTI Score          | 0.229 | 0.115 | 0.057 | NA    | 0     |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 1     | 1     | 2     | 1    | 3     | 2     | 1                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Bulgaria   | Arrests            | 166   | 99    | 61    | 32   | 23    | 75    | 27                 | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Convictions        | 80    | 91    | 52    | 107  | 81    | 67    | 62                 | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Infringement Count | 2     | 1     | 3     | 1    | 0     | 2     | 2                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 0.315 | 0.172 | 0.172 | NA   | 0     | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 2.901 | 2.026 | 1.721 | NA    | 1.007 |
| Cyprus     | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Arrests            | 14    | 11    | 1     | 0    | 1     | 2     | 0                  | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 5     | 1     |
|            | Convictions        | 1     | 0     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 0     | 1                  | Convictions        | 1     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Infringement Count | 1     | 1     | 1     | 1    | 0     | 1     | 1                  | Infringement Count | 2     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 0     |
| Croatia    | GTI Score          | 0.014 | 0     | 0     | NA   | 0     | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 5.475 | 5.008 | 4.614 | NA    | 4.562 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 30    | 7     | 15    | 5     | 6     |
|            | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2    | 0     | 2     | 0                  | Arrests            | 310   | 224   | 127   | 140   | 109   |
|            | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 1     | 0                  | Convictions        | 141   | 165   | 155   | 107   | 110   |
| Czechia    | Infringement Count | 2     | 2     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 2     | 1                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 1.206 | 0.42  | 0.115 | NA   | 0.922 | 1.392 | 0.616              | GTI Score          | 4.601 | 4.254 | 3.965 | NA    | 4.729 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 2     | 3     | 6     | 3     | 1     |
|            | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 1     | 6    | 0     | 0     | 8                  | Arrests            | 59    | 35    | 44    | 34    | 75    |
| Denmark    | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Convictions        | 57    | 53    | 67    | 55    | 54    |
|            | Infringement Count | 2     | 0     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 3     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 1.562 | 0.869 | 0.315 | NA   | 0.291 | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 4.291 | 4.167 | 4.182 | NA    | 4.449 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 2                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 7     | 4     | 0     | 4     | 1     |
| Estonia    | Arrests            | 2     | 4     | 1     | 0    | 1     | 0     | 5                  | Arrests            | 22    | 7     | 17    | 6     | 3     |
|            | Convictions        | 7     | 0     | 2     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 2                  | Convictions        | 33    | 45    | 12    | 4     | 1     |
|            | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Finland    | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| France     | GTI Score          | 0.315 | 0.172 | 0.172 | NA   | 0     | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 2.901 | 2.026 | 1.721 | NA    | 1.007 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Arrests            | 14    | 11    | 1     | 0    | 1     | 2     | 0                  | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 5     | 1     |
|            | Convictions        | 1     | 0     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 0     | 1                  | Convictions        | 1     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     |
| Germany    | Infringement Count | 1     | 1     | 1     | 1    | 0     | 1     | 1                  | Infringement Count | 2     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 0.014 | 0     | 0     | NA   | 0     | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 5.475 | 5.008 | 4.614 | NA    | 4.562 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 30    | 7     | 15    | 5     | 6     |
|            | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2    | 0     | 2     | 0                  | Arrests            | 310   | 224   | 127   | 140   | 109   |
| Greece     | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 1     | 0                  | Convictions        | 141   | 165   | 155   | 107   | 110   |
|            | Infringement Count | 2     | 2     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 2     | 1                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 1.206 | 0.42  | 0.115 | NA   | 0.922 | 1.392 | 0.616              | GTI Score          | 4.601 | 4.254 | 3.965 | NA    | 4.729 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 2     | 3     | 6     | 3     | 1     |
| Hungary    | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 1     | 6    | 0     | 0     | 8                  | Arrests            | 59    | 35    | 44    | 34    | 75    |
|            | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Convictions        | 57    | 53    | 67    | 55    | 54    |
|            | Infringement Count | 2     | 0     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 3     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 1.562 | 0.869 | 0.315 | NA   | 0.291 | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 4.291 | 4.167 | 4.182 | NA    | 4.449 |
| Ireland    | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 2                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 7     | 4     | 0     | 4     | 1     |
|            | Arrests            | 2     | 4     | 1     | 0    | 1     | 0     | 5                  | Arrests            | 22    | 7     | 17    | 6     | 3     |
|            | Convictions        | 7     | 0     | 2     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 2                  | Convictions        | 33    | 45    | 12    | 4     | 1     |
|            | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Italy      | GTI Score          | 0.315 | 0.172 | 0.172 | NA   | 0     | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 2.901 | 2.026 | 1.721 | NA    | 1.007 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Arrests            | 14    | 11    | 1     | 0    | 1     | 2     | 0                  | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Convictions        | 1     | 0     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 0     | 1                  | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Latvia     | Infringement Count | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 0.014 | 0     | 0     | NA   | 0     | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 0.458 | 0.229 | 0.115 | NA    | 0     |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2    | 0     | 2     | 0                  | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Lithuania  | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 1     | 0                  | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Infringement Count | 2     | 2     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 2     | 1                  | Infringement Count | 1     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 1.206 | 0.42  | 0.115 | NA   | 0.922 | 1.392 | 0.616              | GTI Score          | 0     | 0.458 | 0.229 | NA    | 0.827 |
|            | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Luxembourg | Arrests            | 0     | 0     | 1     | 6    | 0     | 0     | 8                  | Arrests            | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Convictions        | 10    | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Infringement Count | 2     | 0     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 3     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 3     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 0     |
|            | GTI Score          | 1.562 | 0.869 | 0.315 | NA   | 0.291 | 0     | 0                  | GTI Score          | 0     | 0     | 0     | NA    | 0     |
| Lithuania  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 2                  | Terrorist Attacks  | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Arrests            | 2     | 4     | 1     | 0    | 1     | 0     | 5                  | Arrests            | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Convictions        | 7     | 0     | 2     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 2                  | Convictions        | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
|            | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0                  | Infringement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |

|             |                   | 2018  | 2019  | 2020  | 2021 | 2022  | 2023  | 2024  |          | 2018              | 2019  | 2020  | 2021  | 2022 | 2023  | 2024  |
|-------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|----------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| Malta       | Infingement Count | 2     | 1     | 1     | 0    | 0     | 2     | 0     |          | Infingement Count | 1     | 0     | 3     | 1    | 0     | 2     |
|             | GII Score         | 0     | 0     | 0     | N/A  | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | GII Score         | 0     | 0     | 0     | N/A  | 0     | 0     |
|             | Terrorist Attacks | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 1     |          | Terrorist Attacks | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     |
|             | Arrests           | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 4     |          | Arrests           | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     |
|             | Convictions       | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | Convictions       | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     |
| Netherlands | Infingement Count | 1     | 2     | 3     | 0    | 0     | 1     | 1     | Slovenia | Infingement Count | 3     | 2     | 3     | 1    | 1     | 2     |
|             | GII Score         | 1.96  | 2.347 | 2.689 | N/A  | 2.077 | 2.12  | 0.577 |          | GII Score         | 4.024 | 3.354 | 2.81  | N/A  | 2.861 | 2.712 |
|             | Terrorist Attacks | 4     | 2     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 1     |          | Terrorist Attacks | 11    | 3     | 9     | 1    | 1     | 3     |
|             | Arrests           | 49    | 37    | 24    | 17   | 24    | 28    | 40    |          | Arrests           | 52    | 91    | 57    | 50   | 48    | 84    |
|             | Convictions       | 37    | 56    | 20    | 35   | 26    | 46    | 51    | Spain    | Convictions       | 120   | 97    | 32    | 51   | 42    | 29    |
| Poland      | Infingement Count | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | Infingement Count | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1    | 0     | 3     |
|             | GII Score         | 0.719 | 0.477 | 0.239 | N/A  | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | GII Score         | 3.936 | 3.45  | 2.892 | N/A  | 1.66  | 2.307 |
|             | Terrorist Attacks | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | Terrorist Attacks | 1     | 0     | 0     | 2    | 0     | 0     |
|             | Arrests           | 2     | 4     | 9     | 3    | 0     | 1     | 13    |          | Arrests           | 7     | 0     | 0     | 3    | 2     | 6     |
|             | Convictions       | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0     | Sweden   | Convictions       | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
| Portugal    | Infingement Count | 2     | 2     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 2     | 1     |          | Infingement Count | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | GII Score         | 0     | 0     | 0     | N/A  | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | GII Score         | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Terrorist Attacks | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | Terrorist Attacks | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Arrests           | 0     | 1     | 1     | 2    | 1     | 0     | 0     |          | Arrests           | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Convictions       | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0    | 2     | 0     | 2     |          | Convictions       | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
| Romania     | Infingement Count | 2     | 0     | 2     | 1    | 0     | 3     | 0     |          | Infingement Count | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | GII Score         | 0     | 0     | 0     | N/A  | 1.06  | 0.682 | 0     |          | GII Score         | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Terrorist Attacks | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0     |          | Terrorist Attacks | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Arrests           | 2     | 4     | 2     | 2    | 4     | 2     | 1     |          | Arrests           | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Convictions       | 0     | 0     | 3     | 0    | 2     | 1     | 0     |          | Convictions       | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
| Slovakia    | Infingement Count | 1     | 1     | 1     | 1    | 0     | 1     | 0     |          | Infingement Count | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | GII Score         | 0.115 | 0.057 | 0.029 | N/A  | 0     | 2.784 | 1.092 |          | GII Score         | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Terrorist Attacks | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 1     | 0     | 1     |          | Terrorist Attacks | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Arrests           | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 1     | 3     | 2     |          | Arrests           | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |
|             | Convictions       | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0    | 1     | 2     | 2     |          | Convictions       | 1     | 5     | 1     | 0    | 4     | 1     |

Source: (Europol 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, IEP 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024)

## APPENDIX-II

|                | 2018                            | 2019            | 2020            | 2021            | 2022            | 2023            | 2024            |                 | 2018                            | 2019              | 2020              | 2021              | 2022              | 2023              | 2024              |
|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Austria</b> | GDP (USD)                       | 42,382,294,973  | 44,283,642,732  | 43,439,601,158  | 48,046,363,177  | 47,321,298,968  | 534,790,720,467 |                 | GDP (USD)                       | 273,869,235,966   | 267,014,821,129   | 270,000,311,666   | 280,233,099,309   | 395,021,982,463   | 298,686,941,298   |
|                | GDP per capita (USD)            | 51,184.07       | 49,885.99       | 48,716.41       | 53,648.64       | 52,316.77       | 56,579.59       | Finland         | GDP per capita (USD)            | 49,634.25         | 48,338.18         | 48,828.65         | 53,099.14         | 50,440.36         | 53,834.29         |
|                | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 0.750           | 0.750           | 0.890           | 0.870           | 0.770           | 0.870           | 1.000           | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.370             | 1.360             | 1.440             | 1.300             | 1.590             | 2.010             |
| <b>Belgium</b> | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 3,387,982,032   | 3,338,542,768   | 3,840,077,511   | 4,196,438,731   | 3,612,733,178   | 4,422,927,951   | 5,236,693,992   | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 3,754,388,462     | 3,653,243,066     | 3,868,688,020     | 3,381,598,865     | 4,446,346,019     | 5,938,021,054     |
|                | GDP per capita (USD)            | 54,638,941,428  | 536,728,444,405 | 529,694,475,502 | 598,522,422,432 | 597,522,422,432 | 671,710,081,618 |                 | GDP (USD)                       | 2,781,578,230,884 | 2,722,593,151,717 | 2,747,926,635,110 | 2,966,433,692,000 | 2,794,788,171,607 | 3,086,250,644,138 |
|                | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 4.749.21        | 46.716.62       | 45.966.29       | 51.653.24       | 50.603.75       | 65.291.48       | 56.614.57       | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.418.18          | 1.408.28          | 1.499.86          | 43.721.10         | 40.988.64         | 44.700.14         |
| <b>France</b>  | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 4,440,126,038   | 4,761,193,701   | 5,317,451,271   | 6,243,156,670   | 6,800,161,300   | 7,629,586,389   | 8,561,203,106   | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 31,321,864,019    | 30,454,545,455    | 31,423,001,394    | 38,734,635,301    | 54,677,442,426    | 59,491,964,166    |
|                | GDP (USD)                       | 66,097,226,302  | 68,307,731,534  | 70,486,877,547  | 84,744,613,233  | 90,306,152,264  | 102,199,231,385 | 113,433,353,780 | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 4,055,433,215,202 | 3,959,894,794,039 | 3,941,398,977,074 | 4,355,251,935,441 | 4,201,021,786,439 | 4,502,307,532,490 |
|                | GDP per capita (USD)            | 9,846.38        | 10,335.72       | 10,760.21       | 12,966.15       | 13,999.19       | 15,833.21       | 17,596.02       | GDP per capita (USD)            | 48,916.17         | 47,394.87         | 47,549.25         | 53,349.25         | 50,306.32         | 54,776.77         |
| <b>Germany</b> | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.300           | 1.300           | 1.600           | 1.500           | 1.600           | 1.500           | 1.600           | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.150             | 1.240             | 1.360             | 1.300             | 1.350             | 1.490             |
|                | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 9,012,972.46    | 21,585,573.72   | 11,900,113.398  | 12,732,448.906  | 14,369,013.695  | 19,897,034.778  | 23,298,342.541  | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 46,497,575,956    | 49,078,444,693    | 53,318,701,118    | 56,153,121,240    | 67,385,198,638    | 88,438,476,390    |
|                | GDP (USD)                       | 61,667,925,719  | 61,406,771,106  | 57,599,843,541  | 69,002,365,163  | 71,196,498,671  | 85,624,153,964  | 92,983,810,329  | GDP (USD)                       | 313,298,673,694   | 307,395,698,987   | 319,360,985,555   | 218,933,801,895   | 217,990,189,601   | 324,946,187,738   |
| <b>Croatia</b> | GDP per capita (USD)            | 13,603.37       | 15,563.60       | 14,807.36       | 17,788.79       | 18,465.54       | 22,140.44       | 24,000.44       | GDP per capita (USD)            | 19,873.40         | 19,333.36         | 17,886.75         | 20,654.70         | 20,886.52         | 23,343.71         |
|                | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.540           | 1.600           | 1.700           | 1.970           | 1.800           | 1.710           | 1.790           | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 3.020             | 3.800             | 3.800             | 4.000             | 3.800             | 3.130             |
|                | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 950,382,488     | 985,762,552     | 981,389,329     | 1,360,346,003   | 1,282,110,613   | 1,439,660,333   | 1,620,055,602   | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 5,577,114,361     | 5,383,116,883     | 5,773,381,660     | 8,399,905,395     | 8,145,382,719     | 7,014,878,933     |
| <b>Greece</b>  | GDP (USD)                       | 25,754,001,348  | 26,186,667,100  | 25,555,083,854  | 30,372,642,302  | 31,218,038,929  | 35,075,433,857  | 37,634,533,332  | GDP (USD)                       | 161,184,691,014   | 164,956,602,034   | 158,448,487,754   | 183,382,485,440   | 177,002,309,544   | 223,727,788,826   |
|                | GDP per capita (USD)            | 29,303.38       | 29,227.17       | 28,193.34       | 33,937.84       | 33,321.04       | 36,625.66       | 38,674.29       | GDP per capita (USD)            | 16,602.66         | 17,012.86         | 16,386.65         | 19,036.63         | 18,428.03         | 22,229.63         |
|                | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.700           | 1.700           | 1.900           | 1.700           | 1.600           | 1.600           | 1.600           | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.000             | 1.350             | 1.350             | 1.320             | 1.830             | 2.000             |
| <b>Hungary</b> | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 450,408,880     | 463,613,972     | 483,415,023     | 541,804,636     | 532,512,390     | 558,878,311     | 598,185,758     | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 2,768,372,337     | 2,190,628,592     | 2,409,589,009     | 3,256,817,191     | 4,355,787,070     | 4,734,686,456     |
|                | GDP (USD)                       | 251,992,360,762 | 256,941,099,029 | 251,109,660,603 | 290,972,714,482 | 301,831,228,336 | 345,099,295,460 | 367,104,063,928 | GDP (USD)                       | 495,780,319,817   | 407,211,783,801   | 456,090,027,819   | 510,594,123,650   | 548,541,794,599   | 607,372,737,459   |
|                | GDP per capita (USD)            | 23,703.93       | 24,062.72       | 23,472.89       | 27,696.46       | 28,322.32       | 31,761.59       | 31,823.31       | GDP per capita (USD)            | 80,894.11         | 81,827.67         | 86,514.07         | 103,763.45        | 105,190.69        | 108,818.92        |
| <b>Iceland</b> | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.000           | 1.130           | 1.300           | 1.300           | 1.330           | 1.470           | 1.920           | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 0.380             | 0.270             | 0.360             | 0.240             | 0.10              | 0.340             |
|                | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 2,710,077,483   | 2,910,252,497   | 3,252,595,062   | 3,935,620,965   | 4,005,428,336   | 5,056,277,310   | 6,534,946,704   | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 1,107,137,377     | 1,117,740,708     | 1,144,420,381     | 1,367,738,884     | 1,164,312,099     | 1,269,225,384     |
|                | GDP (USD)                       | 355,293,374,912 | 345,001,373,013 | 355,631,021,932 | 406,110,162,888 | 400,114,306,333 | 404,651,706,118 | 424,341,721,037 | GDP (USD)                       | 2,099,435,266,459 | 2,019,606,796,584 | 1,907,483,094,079 | 2,179,207,773,596 | 2,104,007,630,319 | 2,316,727,999,333 |
| <b>Ireland</b> | GDP per capita (USD)            | 61,324.77       | 59,404.27       | 60,985.49       | 69,340.73       | 67,781.09       | 68,045.55       | 71,026.48       | GDP per capita (USD)            | 34,944.11         | 33,812.79         | 32,091.49         | 36,832.54         | 35,633.90         | 39,277.08         |
|                | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.300           | 1.370           | 1.590           | 1.360           | 1.360           | 2.000           | 2.420           | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.350             | 1.310             | 1.730             | 1.600             | 1.650             | 1.610             |
|                | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 4,538,690,187   | 4,487,779,277   | 4,887,155,963   | 5,273,669,929   | 5,475,015,488   | 8,132,066,355   | 9,959,899,779   | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 38,420,096,418    | 36,380,673,981    | 32,929,095,811    | 36,232,723,327    | 34,693,881,158    | 36,933,180,528    |
| <b>Italy</b>   | GDP (USD)                       | 31,222,632,741  | 31,873,748,770  | 31,820,771,484  | 38,226,641,740  | 37,101,101,171  | 41,470,344,395  | 43,130,419,829  | GDP (USD)                       | 33,347,935,477    | 33,696,503,951    | 33,379,927,435    | 38,183,326,765    | 38,002,198,509    | 42,779,520,937    |
|                | GDP per capita (USD)            | 35,618.14       | 34,021.25       | 35,633.99       | 27,911.17       | 28,340.38       | 30,240.01       | 31,438.55       | GDP per capita (USD)            | 17,252.17         | 17,294.98         | 17,544.35         | 20,261.89         | 20,221.10         | 22,710.26         |
|                | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.970           | 2.000           | 2.260           | 2.010           | 2.010           | 3.000           | 3.370           | Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 2.130             | 2.230             | 2.160             | 2.250             | 2.970             | 3.260             |
| <b>Latvia</b>  | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 61,945,174      | 67,035,378      | 718,112,390     | 748,980,889     | 818,278,964     | 1,235,449,715   | 1,441,919,733   | Military Expenditure (USD)      | 709,370,353       | 691,894,313       | 742,049,470       | 823,084,201       | 836,142,772       | 1,425,694,079     |
|                |                                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                                 |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|                |                                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                                 |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |

Source: (World Bank Group 2026a)

|                    | 2018                | 2019         | 2020         | 2021         | 2022         | 2023         | 2024 |
|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------|
| <b>Austria</b>     | Rule of Law         | 1.853483081  | 1.770608902  | 1.751754522  | 1.704737324  | 1.746365461  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.892189026  | 0.887600899  | 0.899554431  | 0.648710012  | 0.727989197  | NA   |
| <b>Belgium</b>     | Rule of Law         | 1.33892529   | 1.336157680  | 1.327594042  | 1.291775803  | 1.295374870  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.93769443   | 0.93893332   | 0.932078527  | 0.662682593  | 0.403853089  | NA   |
| <b>Bulgaria</b>    | Rule of Law         | -0.105849832 | -0.037413392 | -0.127672985 | -0.068868451 | -0.006857681 | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.44411188   | 0.36128423   | 0.401631027  | 0.364739358  | 0.314386448  | NA   |
| <b>Croatia</b>     | Rule of Law         | 0.30129846   | 0.483268539  | 0.234818566  | 0.275418937  | 0.36797107   | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.793678284  | 0.68510695   | 0.607283235  | 0.621595681  | 0.672363255  | NA   |
| <b>Cyprus</b>      | Rule of Law         | 0.721053481  | 0.726727247  | 0.547239065  | 0.605679333  | 0.570125759  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.48424251   | 0.444598222  | 0.28877649   | 0.422150671  | 0.409627169  | NA   |
| <b>Czechia</b>     | Rule of Law         | 1.019080266  | 1.017095339  | 1.018450618  | 1.09407232   | 1.142183661  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 1.026412845  | 0.941995680  | 0.912328005  | 0.947537839  | 0.814114571  | NA   |
| <b>Denmark</b>     | Rule of Law         | 1.73262142   | 1.83337361   | 1.806792690  | 1.895721316  | 1.899380398  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.931982338  | 0.967598736  | 0.920233727  | 0.928662638  | 0.868917704  | NA   |
| <b>Estonia</b>     | Rule of Law         | 1.203457355  | 1.247272968  | 1.335088134  | 1.389338044  | 1.426283956  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.580415547  | 0.630197763  | 0.709816992  | 0.748589516  | 0.626333905  | NA   |
| <b>Finland</b>     | Rule of Law         | 2.03499033   | 2.012629032  | 2.018592119  | 2.013476133  | 1.957899809  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.891889691  | 0.835258842  | 0.981825113  | 0.963275969  | 0.89430108   | NA   |
| <b>France</b>      | Rule of Law         | 1.396224737  | 1.371484876  | 1.298727274  | 1.259167552  | 1.180383358  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.013894104  | 0.271341234  | 0.286992836  | 0.325612366  | 0.39339217   | NA   |
| <b>Germany</b>     | Rule of Law         | 1.59175351   | 1.581319332  | 1.520127773  | 1.571804762  | 1.531995177  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.77865243   | 0.548539877  | 0.645049155  | 0.725788176  | 0.628491839  | NA   |
| <b>Greece</b>      | Rule of Law         | 0.133017321  | 0.158072606  | 0.288973033  | 0.323116591  | 0.321358578  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.153979063  | 0.162428334  | 0.115181528  | 0.101383269  | 0.106463775  | NA   |
| <b>Hungary</b>     | Rule of Law         | 0.555069685  | 0.49868227   | 0.492385805  | 0.505373418  | 0.422067136  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.737591445  | 0.761921287  | 0.837046862  | 0.798391256  | 0.678676307  | NA   |
| <b>Ireland</b>     | Rule of Law         | 1.41209441   | 1.348281622  | 1.456300735  | 1.493008018  | 1.526777506  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 1.011369386  | 0.959414449  | 0.965521574  | 0.843662620  | 0.884667397  | NA   |
| <b>Italy</b>       | Rule of Law         | 0.240623876  | 0.272471158  | 0.206662667  | 0.24048026   | 0.296974033  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.32621683   | 0.38114274   | 0.399345398  | 0.53020957   | 0.466298223  | NA   |
| <b>Latvia</b>      | Rule of Law         | 0.923100342  | 0.979084551  | 0.923146366  | 0.949516473  | 0.921031415  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.39544006   | 0.26870435   | 0.462181747  | 0.673402818  | 0.486409128  | NA   |
| <b>Lithuania</b>   | Rule of Law         | 0.923088207  | 0.985398609  | 0.948482454  | 1.074464673  | 1.060332298  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.729226841  | 0.770623563  | 0.921476960  | 0.80946818   | 0.65302541   | NA   |
| <b>Luxembourg</b>  | Rule of Law         | 1.767953899  | 1.498558210  | 1.735904002  | 1.747622013  | 1.768510461  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 1.347490549  | 1.333313584  | 1.212423233  | 1.194079518  | 1.064390063  | NA   |
| <b>Malta</b>       | Rule of Law         | 1.019972324  | 0.921630800  | 0.883726120  | 0.835411549  | 0.785654843  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 1.271609122  | 1.013645053  | 0.998477995  | 0.887514472  | 0.911014318  | NA   |
| <b>Netherlands</b> | Rule of Law         | 1.744465113  | 1.734739423  | 1.706311134  | 1.698627353  | 1.656765938  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.838232174  | 0.821324944  | 0.830933392  | 0.893059194  | 0.726799548  | NA   |
| <b>Poland</b>      | Rule of Law         | 0.376929373  | 0.391241819  | 0.524709398  | 0.425669206  | 0.428134799  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.480488688  | 0.530716519  | 0.491619498  | 0.491935543  | 0.505166444  | NA   |
| <b>Portugal</b>    | Rule of Law         | 1.107908047  | 1.106359724  | 1.156600584  | 1.105027437  | 1.112218261  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 1.115307212  | 1.051751853  | 1.008731127  | 0.937390149  | 0.795802593  | NA   |
| <b>Romania</b>     | Rule of Law         | 0.367548227  | 0.415343643  | 0.368689924  | 0.380484432  | 0.403401881  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.036318745  | 0.42255998   | 0.508950412  | 0.581789911  | 0.431146310  | NA   |
| <b>Slovakia</b>    | Rule of Law         | 0.472869635  | 0.500033498  | 0.65498803   | 0.678475678  | 0.620998740  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.736658182  | 0.667368829  | 0.633981705  | 0.617919028  | 0.443335746  | NA   |
| <b>Slovenia</b>    | Rule of Law         | 1.024478436  | 1.085900753  | 1.03958635   | 1.00180136   | 0.970905185  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.894267261  | 0.801585972  | 0.701467931  | 0.55385372   | 0.709355089  | NA   |
| <b>Spain</b>       | Rule of Law         | 0.978094101  | 0.99071175   | 0.860964477  | 0.843238262  | 0.799167693  | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.275906235  | 0.292768747  | 0.41448449   | 0.509235561  | 0.318843424  | NA   |
| <b>Sweden</b>      | Rule of Law         | 1.784075022  | 1.792161584  | 1.767410159  | 1.699357125  | 1.68508987   | NA   |
|                    | Political Stability | 0.92147594   | 1.011866358  | 0.997376800  | 1.014508009  | 0.910905123  | NA   |

Source: (World Bank Group 2026a)

## APPENDIX-III

|                                 | 2018            | 2019            | 2020            | 2021              | 2022              | 2023              | 2024              |  | 2018              | 2019              | 2020              | 2021              | 2022              | 2023              | 2024              |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Lithuania</b>                |                 |                 |                 |                   |                   |                   |                   |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| GDP (USD)                       | 54,261,791,149  | 55,132,066,226  | 57,427,038,533  | 67,057,521,009    | 71,033,884,500    | 79,189,877,116    | 84,869,215,513    |  | 106,611,673,365   | 105,843,486,334   | 107,732,602,896   | 120,511,565,913   | 115,792,972,358   | 133,578,518,424   | 149,944,065,352   |
| GDP per capita (USD)            | 19,247.23       | 19,608.79       | 20,428.65       | 23,876.46         | 25,085.78         | 27,786.01         | 29,384.02         |  | 19,573.37         | 19,406.06         | 19,735.49         | 22,123.33         | 21,317.79         | 24,614.87         | 25,992.67         |
| Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.950           | 1.980           | 2.009           | 1.950             | 2.440             | 2.710             | 3.140             |  | 1.220             | 1.700             | 1.900             | 1.710             | 1.800             | 1.840             | 2.010             |
| Military Expenditure (USD)      | 1,056,883.45    | 1,093,819,973   | 1,174,056.765   | 1,306,784,428     | 1,734,372.765     | 2,162,012.001     | 2,627,474,142     |  | 1,295,887.102     | 1,802,507,857     | 2,047,190,243     | 2,064,806,055     | 2,085,664.762     | 2,441,648,912     | 2,849,224,758     |
| GDP (USD)                       | 71,085,633,495  | 69,870,511,114  | 73,670,782,100  | 86,386,759,695    | 80,801,680,397    | 88,788,881,559    | 91,279,851,865    |  | 53,699,967,140    | 53,909,923,736    | 53,384,760,155    | 61,540,813,962    | 59,899,117,241    | 69,555,964,338    | 73,970,015,197    |
| GDP per capita (USD)            | 116,926.76      | 112,696.65      | 116,860.03      | 134,963.82        | 123,719.66        | 133,336.02        | 137,781.68        |  | 25,888.05         | 25,814.17         | 25,920.07         | 29,192.84         | 28,560.30         | 32,669.48         | 34,301.03         |
| Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 0.201           | 0.546           | 0.578           | 0.471             | 0.625             | 0.773             | 0.965             |  | 0.990             | 1.060             | 1.070             | 1.240             | 1.300             | 1.320             | 1.310             |
| Military Expenditure (USD)      | 385,275,427     | 381,773,399     | 425,168.130     | 402,365,955       | 509,800.559       | 662,492,466       | 871,643,141       |  | 529,496,123       | 577,884,013       | 567,620,747       | 762,771,994       | 775,156,295       | 912,917,405       | 951,895,000       |
| GDP (USD)                       | 16,153,779,511  | 16,331,789,531  | 16,404,663,236  | 19,739,875,611    | 18,924,276,162    | 22,610,961,526    | 24,971,574,502    |  | 1,431,643,899,327 | 1,403,696,387,686 | 1,289,783,838,971 | 1,461,244,901,853 | 1,448,830,638,407 | 1,619,481,980,720 | 1,725,671,652,742 |
| GDP per capita (USD)            | 33,382.27       | 32,421.92       | 31,823.44       | 38,095.84         | 35,638.89         | 40,905.83         | 43,898.58         |  | 30,602.42         | 29,786.52         | 27,133.94         | 30,799.48         | 30,319.20         | 33,493.22         | 35,326.77         |
| Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 0.414           | 0.491           | 0.528           | 0.446             | 0.442             | 0.505             | 0.651             |  | 1.250             | 1.220             | 1.350             | 1.340             | 1.440             | 1.470             | 1.430             |
| Military Expenditure (USD)      | 66,469,091      | 80,267,577      | 86,287,473      | 87,950,568        | 79,017,560        | 112,636,722       | 109,254,896       |  | 17,823,771,131    | 17,189,319,301    | 17,451,779,323    | 19,544,465,468    | 20,306,570,633    | 23,821,302,156    | 24,613,392,929    |
| GDP (USD)                       | 929,733,599,797 | 928,903,065,576 | 952,560,861,701 | 1,054,472,123,450 | 1,046,540,797,549 | 1,135,473,867,551 | 1,214,927,698,753 |  | 549,649,344,043   | 530,864,124,494   | 544,265,668,452   | 631,693,531,301   | 575,071,237,641   | 578,990,915,246   | 603,715,224,266   |
| GDP per capita (USD)            | 53,955.08       | 53,554.90       | 53,467.93       | 60,141.99         | 59,123.32         | 63,515.60         | 67,250.42         |  | 50,449,344,043    | 51,848.99         | 52,588.37         | 60,647.54         | 54,656.89         | 54,950.28         | 57,117.49         |
| Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.200           | 1.290           | 1.410           | 1.370             | 1.300             | 1.440             | 1.920             |  | 5,018.46          | 1,040             | 1,150             | 1,190             | 1,330             | 1,500             | 2,000             |
| Military Expenditure (USD)      | 11,114,927,470  | 12,000,671,742  | 13,085,717,542  | 14,395,695,364    | 13,623,443,394    | 16,624,020,117    | 23,179,211,260    |  | 1,040             | 1,100             | 1,150             | 1,190             | 1,330             | 1,500             | 2,000             |
| GDP (USD)                       | 594,616,687,350 | 602,083,070,145 | 605,914,237,904 | 689,170,520,665   | 695,667,120,875   | 832,451,083,996   | 917,957,066,147   |  | 5,733,822,794     | 5,839,555,791     | 6,271,385,838     | 7,582,555,970     | 7,722,479,441     | 8,754,872,951     | 12,040,289,405    |
| GDP per capita (USD)            | 11,682.81       | 13,874.52       | 16,150.95       | 18,653.51         | 18,891.21         | 22,163.27         | 25,103.57         |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 2.020           | 1.950           | 2.260           | 2.220             | 2.200             | 3.270             | 4.150             |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Military Expenditure (USD)      | 12,040,673,423  | 11,786,153,846  | 13,718,291,432  | 15,295,541,731    | 15,341,313,423    | 26,342,784,302    | 38,000,728,652    |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| GDP (USD)                       | 242,092,884,543 | 240,115,970,065 | 229,618,773,423 | 236,055,579,691   | 256,888,677,175   | 292,332,800,949   | 313,271,181,065   |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| GDP per capita (USD)            | 23,541.14       | 23,343.36       | 22,399.40       | 24,711.45         | 24,620.32         | 27,634.62         | 29,292.24         |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.340           | 1.370           | 1.430           | 1.520             | 1.390             | 1.470             | 1.530             |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Military Expenditure (USD)      | 3,245,971,441   | 3,299,373,041   | 3,267,981,366   | 3,802,503,331     | 3,566,560,568     | 4,256,152,826     | 4,441,615,585     |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| GDP (USD)                       | 241,791,427,224 | 250,080,438,512 | 259,625,048,394 | 385,071,280,114   | 295,319,437,557   | 347,757,995,759   | 382,564,217,989   |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| GDP per capita (USD)            | 12,416.13       | 12,999.61       | 13,099.18       | 14,907.98         | 15,303.55         | 18,244.42         | 20,080.21         |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Military Expenditure (% of GDP) | 1.790           | 1.830           | 2.000           | 1.820             | 1.750             | 1.600             | 2.300             |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Military Expenditure (USD)      | 4,359,021,309   | 4,613,040,397   | 5,192,321,471   | 5,390,539,335     | 5,187,965,337     | 5,628,033,536     | 8,715,729,594     |  |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |

Source: (World Bank Group 2026a)