Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi
Hacettepe University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences

https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/huniibf

ISSN:1301-8752 E-ISSN:1309-6338

Başvuru Tarihi / Submission Date: 28/02/2026 **DOI: 10.17065/huniibf.1899839**
Kabul Tarihi / Acceptance Date: 13/07/2026 **2026, 44 (Civil Society Special Issue), 1-18**

Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Financing Mechanisms in Public–NGO Partnerships: Implications for Public Fiscal Discipline

Semih Çetin[1]

Abstract

This article examines financing mechanisms in public–non-governmental organization (NGO) partnerships and how their design shapes public fiscal discipline. As public–NGO collaboration expands in response to fiscal pressures, complex social needs, and state capacity constraints, its budgetary consequences depend less on collaboration itself than on the financing modalities and accountability infrastructure that govern it. The article maps core financing models, including direct and indirect public funding, contract- and project-based financing, match-funding hybrids, self-financing and revenue diversification, and digitally enabled mechanisms. It assesses how these models reshape incentives, organizational autonomy, monitoring costs, transaction costs, and the transparency of public obligations, including contingent liabilities. The article argues that public fiscal discipline is strengthened when commitments arising from public–NGO financing are clearly recognized within reliable reporting systems and medium-term budget frameworks, accountability mechanisms are designed in a balanced manner, and audit/oversight institutions operate independently and effectively. It has been argued that, where these conditions are weak, public–NGO financing may weaken medium-term fiscal sustainability by leading to dispersed budgetary and financing channels, increased administrative burdens, hidden liabilities, and soft budget constraints.

Keywords: *Public Fiscal Discipline, Non-Governmental Organizations, Financing Mechanisms, Public–NGO Partnerships, Fiscal Governance.*

Kamu-STK İşbirliklerinde Finansman Mekanizmaları: Kamu Mali Disiplini Açısından Çıkarımlar

Öz

Bu çalışma, kamu-sivil toplum kuruluşu (STK) ortaklıklarında kullanılan finansman mekanizmalarını ve bu mekanizmaların kamu mali disiplinini nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Kamu-STK işbirlikleri; mali baskılar, karmaşıklaşan sosyal ihtiyaçlar ve devletin uygulama kapasitesine ilişkin sınırlılıklar nedeniyle yaygınlaşırken, bu işbirliklerinin bütçesel sonuçları işbirliğinin kendisinden çok kullanılan finansman yöntemlerine ve bu yöntemleri düzenleyen hesap verebilirlik altyapısına bağlıdır. Makalede doğrudan ve dolaylı kamu finansmanı, sözleşme ve proje temelli finansman, eş-finansman modelleri, öz-finansman ve gelir çeşitlendirmesi ile dijital destekli finansman mekanizmaları ele alınmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, söz konusu modellerin teşvik yapılarını, örgütsel özerkliği, izleme ve işlem maliyetlerini ve koşullu yükümlülükler dahil olmak üzere kamu yükümlülüklerinin şeffaflığını nasıl etkilediği değerlendirilmektedir. Makale, kamu-STK finansmanından doğan taahhütlerin güvenilir raporlama sistemleri ve orta vadeli bütçe çerçeveleri içinde açık biçimde tanınması, hesap verebilirlik mekanizmalarının dengeli tasarlanması ve denetim/gözetim kurumlarının bağımsız ve etkili işlemesi durumunda kamu mali disiplininin güçleneceğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu koşulların zayıf olduğu durumlarda ise kamu-STK finansmanının, bütçe ve finansman kanallarında dağınıklığa, idari yüklerin artmasına, gizli yükümlülüklere ve yumuşak bütçe kısıtlarına yol açarak orta vadeli mali sürdürülebilirliği zayıflatabileceği ifade edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Kamu Mali Disiplini, Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, Finansman Mekanizmaları, Kamu-STK İşbirliği, Mali Yönetişim.*

[1] Asst. Prof., Hitit Univesity, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences (FEAS) Akkent Campus,semihcetin@hitit.edu.tr, https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3290-1375

Atıf/Cite as: Çetin, S. (2026). Financing mechanisms in public–NGO partnerships: Implications for public fiscal discipline, *Hacettepe University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences,* 2026, 44(Civil Society Special Issue), 1-18.

INTRODUCTION

Public and NGO partnerships have become a prominent governance arrangement in public service delivery, especially in policy areas where fiscal constraints, complex social needs, and administrative capacity limits challenge the conventional role of the state. In this context, financing is not a neutral component of collaboration; it is the primary mechanism through which incentives are structured, autonomy is negotiated, and accountability is operationalized. The choice among grants and subsidies, indirect support mechanisms, contract-based procurement, project funding, match-funding hybrids, self-financing strategies, or technology-enabled instruments shapes NGOs' behavior as much as it shapes public sector fiscal outcomes. In practice, financing models act as institutional filters that determine which organizations can access public resources, how activities are prioritized, and which types of outputs become visible and rewarded. They also shape the transaction costs of collaboration by defining procurement rules, reporting burdens, verification procedures, and audit exposure features that can strengthen fiscal control but can also generate administrative burdens and procedural complexity (Cheng, 2019; Jung & Moon, 2007).

This article examines public–NGO financing through a fiscal governance view, arguing that financing designs simultaneously influence (i) NGO independence, performance, and mission orientation, and (ii) public sector fiscal discipline and accountability. On the NGO side, the funding mix affects incentive structures and organizational behavior: direct public funding can expand scale and legitimacy while deepening dependence and potentially narrowing advocacy space; contract and project-based models can standardize expectations and improve traceability while increasing transaction costs and encouraging short-termism; match-funding may diversify revenue and strengthen public trust yet privilege professionalized organizations with compliance capacity; self-financing can enhance resilience and strategic autonomy but may create mission drift where commercialization pressures dominate; and digital mechanisms may improve traceability and monitoring while widening capability gaps between large and grassroots actors. On the public finance side, these modalities interact with budgetary discipline through fragmentation dynamics and the visibility of obligations. When multiple funding streams coexist across ministries, local governments, donors, and NGOs' own revenues, consolidated expenditure control becomes more difficult and risks of duplication or priority drift rise. In hybrid and performance-based arrangements, fiscal exposure may also emerge through contingent commitments, guarantees, co-financing promises, backstop provisions, or delayed obligations that remain under-recognized in annual budgets and become costly ex post (Ebrahim, 2003).

Conceptually, this article distinguishes between fiscal governance and public fiscal discipline while treating them as closely related. Fiscal governance refers to the institutional arrangements, rules, reporting systems, accountability mechanisms, and oversight capacities through which public resources and obligations are managed. Public fiscal discipline, in turn, refers to the budgetary outcome of this governance architecture: the ability of the public sector to keep expenditures, commitments, contingent liabilities, and medium-term obligations visible, controlled, and enforceable within public budgetary frameworks. Accordingly, the article adopts a fiscal governance perspective in order to explain the conditions under which public–NGO financing mechanisms strengthen or weaken public fiscal discipline (Damasceno & Gomes, 2021).

Methodologically, this article is a conceptual and literature-based review rather than an empirical analysis. It synthesizes studies on public–NGO partnerships, financing mechanisms, accountability, fiscal governance, and public expenditure control. The literature is selected and classified according to its relevance to financing models, governance and accountability implications, and public fiscal discipline channels such as budgetary control, transparency, contingent liabilities, reporting, and audit.

Building on resource dependence and accountability perspectives, the analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it identifies the main financing models that structure public–NGO partnerships and discusses their incentive and governance trade-offs. Second, it evaluates how these financing models affect public fiscal discipline through three channels: budgetary discipline and expenditure control; hidden fiscal risks, contingent commitments, and off-budget liabilities; and transparency, reporting, and audit. The central argument is that public–NGO financing can strengthen public fiscal discipline only when commitments are visible and incorporated into credible reporting and medium-term budget frameworks, accountability requirements are proportionate, and audit and oversight institutions are sufficiently independent and capable of follow-up enforcement. Where these conditions are weak, the same financing arrangements that expand service capacity may also create fragmented funding channels, fiscal opacity, hidden liabilities, and soft budget constraints.

This study contributes to the literature by shifting the focus from whether public–NGO partnerships improve service delivery to how their financing design shapes public fiscal discipline. Existing studies often examine NGO autonomy, service performance, accountability, or public funding separately. This article brings these strands together by showing that financing mechanisms operate as fiscal governance arrangements that affect the visibility of public commitments, expenditure control, contingent liabilities, transparency, and auditability. Its main conceptual contribution is therefore to link public–NGO financing models to public fiscal discipline through an integrated fiscal governance framework.

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a typology of public–NGO financing mechanisms by distinguishing direct and indirect public funding, contract- and project-based financing, match-funding hybrids, self-financing and revenue diversification, and digitally enabled financing mechanisms. Section 3 then links financing methods to public fiscal discipline through three analytical channels: budgetary discipline and expenditure control; hidden fiscal risks and off-budget liabilities; and transparency, reporting, and audit. The conclusion summarizes the article's main argument and highlights its contribution to the literature on public–NGO partnerships, fiscal governance, and public fiscal discipline.

1. FINANCING MODELS FOR PUBLIC-NGO PARTNERSHIPS

This section classifies the main financing mechanisms used in public–NGO partnerships. The classification is based on the source of funding, the degree of public control, the duration of financial commitment, and the accountability requirements attached to each mechanism. Direct and indirect public funding models represent traditional forms of public support, while contract- and project-based financing links resources to predefined services, outputs, or time-bound interventions. Match-funding and philanthropy–government hybrids combine public and private resources, whereas self-financing and revenue diversification reflect NGO efforts to reduce dependence on external funding. Finally, digital and technology-enabled mechanisms introduce new tools for traceability, monitoring, and financial coordination. This typology provides the basis for evaluating how different financing mechanisms shape incentives, autonomy, accountability, and public fiscal discipline.

In recent years, public–NGO partnerships have become an important governance mechanism in public service delivery, especially where fiscal constraints, complex social needs, and administrative capacity limits challenge the conventional role of the state. Financing models are therefore not merely technical instruments; they shape NGO independence, performance, incentives, public accountability, and fiscal discipline (Jung & Moon, 2007).

1.1. Direct and Indirect Public Funding Models

Direct public funding refers to financial transfers made from public budgets to NGOs through grants, subsidies, or institutional support. These transfers usually create an explicit and visible relationship between the public authority and the recipient organization. Indirect public funding, by contrast, supports NGOs through tax exemptions, vouchers, in-kind support, preferential access to public facilities, or demand-side financing instruments. Unlike direct transfers, indirect support may be less visible in budgetary terms, but it can still shape NGO incentives, access to resources, and the fiscal responsibilities of the public sector.

Direct public funding is one of the most widespread financing mechanisms in public-NGO partnerships. This type of funding is generally provided through grants and subsidies. Direct funding allows NGOs to perform as a service provision providers, benefiting from their proximity to local communities, flexibility, and sector-specific expertise. Existing research suggests that direct transfers may improve program scale, legitimacy, and organizational sustainability, particularly when NGOs operate in service-intensive fields such as health, education, and social protection (Cheng, 2019; Lu & Zhao, 2019; Moran et al., 2016; Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2012).

Yet, the literature consistently highlights a tension between financial dependence and organizational independence. Public financing dependency may lead NGOs to integrate their priorities with government policies, diverging from the original purpose and diminished advocacy efficiency (Bloodgood & Tremblay-Boire, 2017). From a resource dependence view, direct public funding can alter incentive structures. It can be done by encouraging risk aversion, bureaucratization, and regulatory adherence behavior. (Jung & Moon, 2007)

Indirect funding models provide NGOs with alternatives to direct budgetary transfers. Such mechanisms may help NGOs maintain a degree of autonomy while allowing public authorities to influence service outcomes through incentives rather than direct control (Hladka & Hyanek, 2017). However, because indirect support is often less visible in budgetary documents, it may create weaker monitoring structures and uneven access, particularly for small, informal, or less institutionalized NGOs.

1.2. Contract and Project Based Financing

Contract-based financing models offer a more standardized type of public–NGO partnerships. NGOs operate in the framework of these binding agreements. These arrangements are commonly justified on grounds of efficiency, as competition for contracts may decrease costs and enhance service quality. In practice, however, contractual governance incurs significant transaction costs related to administration, procurement, reporting, and performance measurement (Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2012).

Project-based financing amplifies these dynamics by connecting funding to specific outcomes or time-limited interventions. These models increase financial control and accountability, whereas they can weaken long-term sustainability by disrupting funding flows and promoting short-term planning (Hailey & Salway, 2016). NGOs operating under project-based funding often face difficulties in retaining qualified staff, investing in organizational capacity, and maintaining consistency across multiple donors and government agencies.

In some cases, contract and project-based financing may evolve into more complex hybrid arrangements, such as joint ventures or special-purpose entities. Although these structures are more commonly discussed in the public–private partnership literature, they are relevant to public–NGO cooperation when service delivery, infrastructure, or social investment projects involve shared risks, co-investments, or long-term contractual obligations. Their relevance for public fiscal discipline lies in the fact that they may complicate financial oversight and obscure the distribution of fiscal responsibility, especially when contingent or off-balance sheet liabilities arise (Zeka et al., 2025).

1.3. Match-Funding and Philanthropy–Government Hybrids

Match-funding schemes, in which public authorities match private or philanthropic donations, seek to attract additional private resources while preserving a degree of public steering over service priorities. Public contributions can signal credibility, shared responsibility, and community commitment. The literature suggests that such models may reduce reliance on a single source of funding by encouraging revenue diversification and shared responsibility between public and non-public actors (Hladka & Hyanek, 2017; Isatayeva et al., 2018).

From a budgetary perspective, match-funding can help expand social investment without directly increasing public spending at the same rate. Its fiscal and governance effects, however, depend heavily on institutional design. Matching ratios, eligibility criteria, reporting requirements, and monitoring mechanisms determine whether these schemes promote equal access and fiscal discipline or create distortions. Poorly structured programs may impose significant administrative burdens on small organizations with limited compliance capacity (Hailey & Salway, 2016).

Match-funding can also restrict NGO autonomy when strict eligibility and reporting rules direct activities toward fundable projects rather than mission-driven priorities. Although such rules are justified by public accountability, they may reduce flexibility and innovation. With proper design, match-funding can strengthen fiscal discipline and social impact; if poorly designed, it may increase administrative burdens, sectoral imbalances, and constraints on NGO autonomy.

1.4. Self-Financing and Revenue Diversification

Amid funding fluctuations, tighter reporting requirements, and competition for public resources and donations, many NGOs rely on self-financing to enhance organizational resilience. These methods include user fees, revenue-generating activities, membership dues, grants, and market-based revenues. Revenue diversification can reduce dependence on a single source and support financial stability, autonomy, and planning flexibility (Hailey & Salway, 2016; Vacekova & Svidronova, 2014).

From a governance point of view, self-financing can alter accountability relationships. The reliance of NGOs solely on public or donor funds can lead to upward accountability, which in turn puts pressure on internal decision-making processes. Income diversification can enable broader stakeholder participation while strengthening downward accountability to beneficiaries. Accordingly, self-financing is not only a financial matter it’s also a governance choice that reshapes incentive structures within organizations.

The literature also indicates that market-based fundraising carries risks. NGOs may shift attention from socially necessary but low-profit activities toward higher-revenue areas, and beneficiary fees or commercial pricing may exclude target groups, especially where income inequality is high (Berman & Dave, 1996). If income diversification is not aligned with service priorities, revenue generation may take precedence over social objectives.

Successful self-financing requires strong internal governance, transparent financial management, and clear mission alignment (Ebrahim, 2003). Transparent reporting, separation between commercial and programmatic accounts, and internal oversight can ensure that income-generating activities support rather than undermine core objectives. Without such safeguards, commercialization may create reputational risks, distort resource allocation, and weaken civil society engagement.

1.5. Digital and Technology-Enabled Financing Mechanisms

Digital technologies are reshaping public–NGO financing by creating new possibilities for transparency, automation, and coordination. Blockchain-based systems can provide immutable records and automate disbursement rules, while artificial intelligence tools may support risk profiling, anomaly detection, predictive budgeting, and performance monitoring (Lee et al., 2016; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2025). Crowdfunding and digital donation channels can also diversify financing sources and strengthen citizen engagement. In principle, these tools may reduce transaction costs, accelerate reporting, and improve real-time oversight.

However, the benefits of digital financing depend on institutional capacity and regulatory coherence. High investment costs, cybersecurity risks, fragmented legal frameworks, and uneven digital literacy may limit adoption (Radynskyy et al., 2024). Smaller grassroots organizations may struggle with advanced reporting or verification systems, widening gaps between well-resourced and less formalized actors. Technological transparency also does not automatically create accountability; it must be embedded in clear oversight frameworks, capacity-building, and safeguards for inclusive governance.

The financing models discussed above differ in their effects on NGO autonomy, organizational sustainability, and public fiscal discipline. Direct transfers affect spending visibility; contract and project-based models shape expenditure control; match-funding creates shared commitments; self-financing changes dependency relations; and digital mechanisms reshape monitoring capacity. These differences provide the basis for evaluating whether public–NGO financing strengthens budgetary discipline or creates dispersed fiscal commitments, hidden liabilities, and soft budget constraints.

2. PUBLIC FISCAL DISCIPLINE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC–NGO FINANCING

Public–NGO financing arrangements are often framed as pragmatic tools for mobilizing capacity and proximity to communities in service delivery. Yet their fiscal consequences depend heavily on institutional design. Public fiscal discipline refers to the ability of the public sector to keep expenditures, commitments, contingent liabilities, and medium-term obligations visible, controlled, and enforceable within budgetary frameworks. Public–NGO financing may reinforce discipline when embedded in clear budget rules, credible reporting, and enforceable accountability mechanisms; it may weaken discipline when it generates dispersed funding, opaque commitments, hidden fiscal risks, or soft budget constraints (Alam & Alam, 2022; Campos & Pradhan, 1997; Dufour et al., 2025; Ebrahim, 2003).

This section advances three interconnected arguments. First, financing modalities influence expenditure control and budgetary discipline through incentive structures, administrative costs, reporting requirements, and the visibility of spending commitments. Second, hybrid and performance-based arrangements may generate hidden fiscal risks and off-budget liabilities. Third, transparency, reporting, and audit institutions mediate these relationships by determining whether financial information is transformed into effective oversight and enforceable fiscal control (Pajkovic et al., 2023).

2.1. Budgetary Discipline, Resource Allocation, and Expenditure Control

This subsection examines how public–NGO financing mechanisms affect budgetary discipline, resource allocation, and expenditure control. The main focus is on whether financing arrangements make public commitments visible and controllable, whether they support coherent allocation of resources across actors, and whether they create incentives that strengthen or weaken expenditure discipline. In this respect, the design of financing modalities, the coordination of funding channels, conditionality, and administrative cost dynamics are treated as key determinants of public fiscal discipline.

2.1.1. Financing Modalities, Commitment Visibility, and Expenditure Control

Financing modalities matter for public fiscal discipline because they determine not only how NGOs access resources, but also how public commitments are made visible, monitored, and controlled. Grants, public procurement, blended finance arrangements, project-based funding, and other support mechanisms create different accountability relationships between public authorities and NGOs. Stable and clearly defined funding arrangements may support organizational performance and service continuity, whereas poorly designed modalities may create dependency, weaken accountability, or divert resources from collectively defined public priorities (Moran et al., 2016). In this respect, the fiscal significance of financing modalities lies not only in the amount of funding transferred, but also in the rules, reporting requirements, and oversight procedures through which these transfers are governed.

Commitment visibility is central to this process. Clear budget lines, standardized reporting, transparent eligibility rules, and explicit performance conditions allow public authorities to identify who receives support, for what purpose, and with what fiscal implications. Transparency and public reporting strengthen accountability while budget oversight and auditing reduce risks from weak control over public resources (Santiso, 2006; Syamsul et al., 2026; Zhang et al., 2020). Without harmonized reporting, commitments become harder to consolidate, monitor, and align with budgetary objectives.

Expenditure control therefore depends on the interaction between financing design and the wider public financial management framework. Budgetary discipline requires that commitments arising from public–NGO financing be incorporated into planning, reporting, audit, and evaluation processes. Medium-term expenditure frameworks, responsible public financial management practices, regular audits, and performance evaluations can strengthen the link between financing decisions and fiscal discipline by ensuring that spending remains consistent with strategic priorities and medium-term fiscal sustainability (Demirbaş, 2020; Zawadzka-Pak, 2018). Conversely, weak regulatory frameworks or fragmented oversight arrangements may allow commitments to remain only partially visible, thereby reducing accountability and weakening the enforceability of fiscal rules.

2.1.2. Dispersed Funding Channels, Coordination, and Resource Allocation

In public–NGO financing arrangements, fiscal discipline becomes more difficult to maintain when funding is channelled through multiple and weakly coordinated institutional routes. Financial flows may pass through central ministries, local governments, donor programs, philanthropic actors, and NGOs' own revenue sources, making the overall fiscal landscape increasingly complex. This complexity is closely related to broader problems in public expenditure management, where weaknesses in classification, reporting, and consolidation mechanisms may obscure the true fiscal position and weaken expenditure control (Campos & Pradhan, 1997). Although diversified funding can enhance flexibility and organizational resilience by reducing dependence on a single source, it may also complicate aggregate expenditure control when financial flows are not consolidated within common reporting and monitoring systems.

Fragmented funding channels affect resource allocation through reduced expenditure visibility, higher coordination costs, duplicative spending, and priority drift. These risks increase when responsibilities and financial authority are distributed across actors without adequate coordination (Raudla et al., 2022). Evidence from decentralization and resource-splitting also suggests that divided responsibilities may strain budgetary coherence and weaken expenditure control when not supported by enforcement mechanisms (Alam & Alam, 2022; Nkundabanyanga et al., 2019).

2.1.3. Conditionality, Political Incentives, and Credibility

Conditional funding arrangements are commonly used to strengthen public fiscal discipline by linking financial support to performance indicators, reporting standards, eligibility rules, and verification procedures. In principle, such conditions can align NGO activities with public objectives, reduce opportunistic behavior, and improve the traceability of public funds. They may also support expenditure control by making continued funding dependent on documented performance and compliance with predefined rules. However, conditionality does not automatically produce fiscal discipline. Accountability research shows that reporting mechanisms may strengthen formal oversight, but they can also redirect organizational behavior toward documentation and funder-oriented compliance rather than substantive performance or mission-oriented outcomes (Ebrahim, 2003).

The fiscal effects of conditionality also depend on administrative capacity and enforcement credibility. Detailed reporting, monitoring, and verification requirements may increase administrative costs for both public authorities and NGOs. If these requirements become disproportionate, the expected gains from stricter expenditure control may be weakened by compliance burdens and bureaucratic complexity. Audit-oriented accountability pressures may further encourage organizations to prioritize procedural conformity and documentation as signals of legitimacy, even where these practices do not necessarily improve substantive service quality or allocative efficiency (Boomsma, 2024). In such cases, conditionality may generate compliance-heavy governance without producing a genuinely hard budget constraint.

Political incentives further shape the credibility of conditional funding regimes. Even well-designed rules cannot strengthen public fiscal discipline if enforcement is selective, politically motivated, or repeatedly renegotiated. Where grant allocation or contract renewal is influenced by electoral considerations, patronage networks, or discretionary political priorities, formal conditions may lose their disciplining effect (Bourdeaux, 2006). The effectiveness of rules and regulations depends not only on their formal design, but also on their enforceability and consistent application (Li et al., 2020). Therefore, conditionality contributes to public fiscal discipline only when it is embedded in an institutional environment characterized by transparent criteria, credible monitoring, consistent enforcement, and political neutrality. Under these conditions, conditional funding can strengthen expenditure control; otherwise, it may produce symbolic compliance while allowing soft budget constraints to persist.

2.1.4. Efficiency and Administrative Cost Dynamics

The relationship between public funding and NGO efficiency is more complex than the assumption that performance-linked or competitive financing mechanisms automatically generate better fiscal outcomes. Competitive funding arrangements are often introduced to discipline spending, reward effective organizations, and reduce non-program expenditures. In some contexts, particularly in larger and more structured programs, competition may contribute to tighter control over administrative or non-charitable expenditures (Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2012). From a public fiscal discipline perspective, this suggests that well-designed allocation systems can strengthen expenditure control when they link funding decisions to transparent criteria, periodic review, and verifiable performance.

However, the efficiency gains expected from public funding may be reduced when financing mechanisms generate excessive administrative complexity. Detailed application procedures, procurement requirements, reporting obligations, monitoring rules, and performance measurement systems can increase transaction costs for both public authorities and NGOs. Heavy reliance on public funding may also constrain managerial flexibility and redirect organizational resources toward compliance-oriented administrative functions (Lu & Zhao, 2019). In such cases, mechanisms designed to strengthen expenditure control may paradoxically increase the administrative costs of control itself.

A further challenge concerns how efficiency is measured and reported. Under performance pressure, NGOs may have incentives to present low administrative overhead ratios or to reclassify expenditures in ways that satisfy donor or public authority expectations. While such practices may comply with formal reporting rules, they can blur the distinction between genuine efficiency improvements and accounting presentation effects. Simplified indicators, such as administrative cost percentages or output counts, may therefore capture compliance behavior rather than substantive improvements in service quality or social outcomes. For public fiscal discipline to be meaningful, oversight systems should not rely solely on surface-level efficiency indicators. They should also consider organizational capacity, funding dependence, service quality, and the broader incentive environment in which financial reporting takes place.

2.2. Hidden Fiscal Risks, Contingent Commitments, and Off-Budget Liabilities

The previous section focused on expenditure control and the visibility of current commitments. Public fiscal discipline, however, also depends on whether future and contingent obligations are recognized within budgetary frameworks. Public–NGO financing arrangements may generate fiscal risks not only through direct transfers, but also through guarantees, co-financing promises, performance-based bonuses, backstop provisions, and delayed payment obligations. These commitments may appear limited or temporary at the time of agreement, yet become fiscally significant when triggering events occur or when temporary schemes evolve into recurrent expenditure obligations. Hidden fiscal risks therefore arise when the economic substance of public commitments is broader than what is formally recorded in annual budgets.

2.2.1. Contingent Commitments and Under-Recognition

Hybrid and performance-based financing structures frequently involve contingent commitments, guarantees, and risk-sharing provisions that blur the distinction between explicit and implicit public obligations. The fiscal discipline problem in such arrangements lies not only in the level of expenditure, but also in the timing and recognition of liabilities. Contingent commitments often remain outside headline budget aggregates until triggering events occur, at which point they may generate sudden fiscal pressures (Bova et al., 2019; Brixi, 2000; Nose, 2025). This temporal asymmetry creates incentives for under-recognition: commitments may appear manageable ex ante but become costly ex post.

In public–NGO financing contexts, guarantees, co-financing promises, performance-based bonuses, revenue backstops, or commitments to maintain service levels may represent real fiscal exposure even when they are only partially reflected in annual budgets. When fiscal reporting frameworks do not systematically identify and disclose these exposures, vulnerabilities may accumulate quietly over time, weakening medium-term planning and obscuring the true fiscal position of the public sector (Bova et al., 2019; Brixi, 2000). Risk allocation can also be ambiguous. Even when risks are formally assigned to non-state actors, governments may absorb losses in cases of underperformance, renegotiation, or service continuity pressures.

From a public fiscal discipline perspective, the central issue is therefore not merely whether contingent commitments exist, but whether they are recognized, disclosed, stress-tested, and incorporated into medium-term fiscal frameworks. If such exposures remain outside systematic reporting and audit procedures, hybrid financing models may generate fiscal illusion and soft budget constraints. Conversely, credible identification and transparent integration of contingent liabilities into fiscal governance systems can reduce sudden fiscal shocks and strengthen the sustainability of public–NGO financing arrangements.

2.2.2. Result-Based Financing and Fiscal Sustainability Risks

Results-based financing (RBF) models are designed to improve efficiency and accountability by linking payments to measurable outputs or outcomes rather than inputs. In principle, this design can strengthen public fiscal discipline by ensuring that public resources are released only when predefined performance conditions are met. By connecting financing to verifiable results, RBF schemes may reduce input-based spending pressures and encourage implementing organizations to focus on measurable service delivery improvements.

However, the fiscal effects of RBF are not automatically discipline-enhancing. Verification procedures, performance monitoring systems, indicator tracking, and reporting requirements may generate substantial transaction and compliance costs for both public authorities and NGOs (Turcotte-Tremblay et al., 2016). In fragile or low-capacity settings, these burdens may be amplified when parallel monitoring systems are created to validate results and authorize payments. Moreover, performance-based schemes may encourage strategic behavior, including gaming of indicators, prioritization of easily measurable outputs, or neglect of less visible but socially important activities (Bertone et al., 2018). In such cases, formal performance compliance may improve while substantive service quality or allocative efficiency remains limited.

RBF models may also create fiscal sustainability risks over time. Delays in verification or payment disbursement can disrupt cash flows and generate pressure for ad hoc adjustments (Jacobs et al., 2020). More importantly, temporary performance incentives may become politically or administratively difficult to withdraw once beneficiaries, NGOs, or service providers adjust their expectations. When externally financed or project-based RBF schemes end, governments may inherit pressure to maintain service levels, incentive payments, or administrative systems created during the program period (Witter et al., 2019). From a public fiscal discipline perspective, the key issue is therefore whether RBF commitments are treated as temporary project costs or incorporated into medium-term fiscal planning when they generate recurrent obligations. Without such integration, results-based financing may shift fiscal risks across time rather than reduce them.

2.2.3. Off-Balance Sheet Logic and Fiscal Illusion

Off-balance sheet logic provides a useful analytical lens for understanding hidden fiscal risks in hybrid public–NGO financing arrangements. Such arrangements may alter the timing, classification, or presentation of public obligations without necessarily reducing their economic substance. In other words, fiscal exposure may remain real even when it is not fully reflected in annual budget aggregates or headline deficit indicators. This is particularly relevant when public–NGO collaboration involves guarantees, deferred payments, co-financing promises, service continuity commitments, or risk-sharing provisions that are only partially recorded at the time of agreement.

Fiscal illusion arises when formal budget indicators understate the true scale of public exposure. In public–NGO financing, this may occur when governments use hybrid or project-based arrangements to expand service delivery while keeping some commitments outside immediate budget recognition. Although such arrangements may appear fiscally prudent in the short term, they can create a gap between recorded expenditure and underlying obligations. Corporate finance research similarly shows that off-balance sheet and hybrid financing mechanisms may affect how obligations are presented in financial statements, thereby shaping perceived leverage and risk exposure (Mills & Newberry, 2005). Applied to public financing, this logic suggests that the presentation of obligations may influence perceptions of fiscal discipline even when actual fiscal risks remain.

The problem becomes more serious when off-budget or partially recognized commitments affect future fiscal choices. If embedded obligations are not disclosed, consolidated, or monitored, governments may underestimate medium-term spending pressures and overstate available fiscal space. Off-balance sheet funding can also weaken the informational link between financial commitments and investment decisions, potentially distorting efficiency and long-term sustainability (Segura & Zeng, 2020). For public fiscal discipline to be substantive rather than merely formal, hybrid public–NGO financing arrangements should therefore be assessed according to their economic substance, not only their legal or accounting form. Commitments that create future public exposure should be identified, reported, and integrated into broader fiscal frameworks, even when they do not immediately appear as direct budget expenditures.

2.3. Transparency, Reporting, and Audit as Fiscal Control Mechanisms

Transparency, reporting, and audit mechanisms constitute the institutional link between financing design and public fiscal discipline. Financing arrangements may define commitments, but these commitments can support fiscal discipline only when they are made visible, reported in comparable formats, and subject to credible oversight. In public–NGO partnerships, this link is especially important because public resources may circulate through multiple actors, including ministries, local governments, NGOs, donors, pooled funds, and project entities. Without transparent reporting and effective audit capacity, even formally rule-based financing arrangements may generate weak accountability, fiscal opacity, and limited enforceability.

2.3.1. Transparency as Institutional Infrastructure

Transparency in public–NGO financing should be understood not merely as the disclosure of financial information, but as an institutional infrastructure that enables fiscal rules, accountability systems, and oversight mechanisms to operate across organizational boundaries. In collaborative arrangements, public resources may circulate through ministries, subnational entities, NGOs, pooled funds, and performance-based contracts. Transparency provides the information base required to identify commitments, compare expenditures, monitor implementation, and evaluate whether financing decisions remain aligned with public priorities. In this sense, it constitutes the informational architecture of fiscal governance by linking commitment, allocation, execution, reporting, and evaluation within a unified logic (Pajkovic et al., 2023).

Public fiscal discipline depends on credible and consolidated information. Budget ceilings, medium-term expenditure frameworks, and expenditure controls cannot function effectively when commitments are fragmented, partially disclosed, or reported through incompatible formats. When public–NGO financing mechanisms are integrated into consolidated reporting systems, they remain subject to formal budgetary constraints; when they operate through parallel accounts or incomplete recognition, fiscal illusion and hidden exposure risks increase (Bova et al., 2019; Brixi, 2000).

However, transparency strengthens public fiscal discipline only when disclosed information is usable, comparable, and connected to enforcement. Fiscal openness may improve spending efficiency and reduce corruption risks by limiting informational asymmetries and increasing the probability of detection (Elberry et al., 2022). Yet disclosure alone is insufficient: budget information must be accessible enough to support scrutiny and credible enough to shape perceptions of government performance and fairness (Hsu, 2024). If transparency is reduced to formal publication without audit capacity or corrective mechanisms, reporting requirements may generate formal compliance without substantive fiscal control (Pilcher & Dean, 2009).

2.3.2. NGO-Side Reporting and Stakeholder Accountability

NGO-side reporting practices are central to public fiscal discipline because public–NGO financing reshapes accountability hierarchies. The literature distinguishes upward accountability to funders, downward accountability to beneficiaries, and horizontal accountability to peers (Ebrahim, 2003). However, when public funding is tied to detailed reporting and audit requirements, NGOs may adapt their accounting systems primarily to satisfy dominant funders, especially where public resources constitute a significant share of revenues (Assad & Goddard, 2010).

This imbalance has direct fiscal implications. Upward reporting can improve procedural control, but it may also shift attention from mission outcomes to measurable outputs and documentation. Audit society pressures may encourage NGOs to produce records that signal legitimacy, even when these practices increase administrative costs or contribute to mission drift (Boomsma, 2024). In such cases, fiscal discipline may appear strong on paper while producing audit compliance rather than genuine accountability.

A more balanced accountability framework can strengthen fiscal discipline by combining public oversight with beneficiary feedback and voluntary transparency mechanisms. Downward accountability provides contextual information on whether funded activities respond to real social needs, while voluntary accountability initiatives can complement formal regulation by strengthening reputational incentives (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Yet these mechanisms are effective only when reporting requirements are credible, enforceable, and proportionate; regulation alone is insufficient if rules are weakly enforced or create excessive compliance burdens (Li et al., 2020).

2.3.3. Audit Institutions and Oversight Capacity

Audit institutions constitute a key enforcement mechanism for public fiscal discipline in public–NGO financing. Transparency and reporting generate information, but audits determine whether this information leads to compliance, correction, and deterrence. Their effectiveness depends on independence, legal authority, and operational capacity; where audit institutions are politically constrained or under-resourced, fiscal risks may accumulate despite formal reporting requirements (Damasceno & Gomes, 2021).

In public–NGO arrangements, oversight becomes more complex because financial flows often cross organizational and sectoral boundaries. Resources may move among ministries, local governments, NGOs, project entities, and hybrid financing structures, making accountability chains harder to trace. Layered oversight systems that combine internal controls, audit committees, and external review can help mitigate mismanagement, especially when audit practices extend beyond legality checks to include risk assessment, contingent liabilities, and value-for-money considerations (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2016).

The recognition and monitoring of contingent liabilities further illustrate the fiscal role of audit systems. Guarantees, co-financing commitments, and backstop provisions may remain partially invisible in annual budgets unless they are systematically identified and disclosed (Bova et al., 2019). However, audit findings matter only when they trigger corrective action through legislative oversight, credible sanctions, and institutional follow-up (Bourdeaux, 2006). Audit pressure may also shape NGO behavior by encouraging documentation and auditability, which can strengthen compliance but may also increase bureaucratization and mission drift if applied excessively (Boomsma, 2024). Thus, audits support public fiscal discipline only when independence, coordination, and enforcement follow-up are sufficiently strong.

Taken together, transparency, reporting, and audit mechanisms determine whether public–NGO financing remains a rule-bound fiscal arrangement or evolves into a source of weak accountability and hidden exposure. Transparency makes commitments visible; reporting translates financial activity into comparable information; and audit institutions transform that information into compliance, correction, and deterrence. Public–NGO financing can therefore strengthen public fiscal discipline only when these mechanisms operate together within credible fiscal governance systems. Where information is fragmented, reporting is merely formal, or audit findings do not lead to corrective action, collaboration may expand service capacity while still generating soft commitments, fiscal opacity, and medium-term sustainability risks.

3. CONCLUSION

In this article, public–NGO financing mechanisms have been examined as institutional arrangements that shape public fiscal discipline. The analysis shows that the fiscal consequences of collaboration cannot be explained simply by whether public authorities work with NGOs, but rather by how financing mechanisms are designed, recorded, monitored, and enforced. Direct public funding, contract- and project-based models, match-funding schemes, self-financing strategies, and digital financing tools each have different implications for NGO autonomy, accountability, expenditure control, and the visibility of public commitments.

The central argument of the study is that public–NGO financing may strengthen public fiscal discipline when three institutional conditions are met. First, explicit and contingent commitments should be visible, recognized, and consolidated within public expenditure management systems and medium-term fiscal frameworks. Second, reporting and accountability mechanisms should be designed proportionately: strong enough to reduce information asymmetries and corruption risks, but not so burdensome that they produce symbolic compliance or excessive administrative costs. Third, transparency and audit mechanisms should be supported by sufficient independence, coordination capacity, and enforcement follow-up so that financial information can be translated into corrective action and credible fiscal control.

These findings suggest that public–NGO financing should not be treated as a peripheral or extra-budgetary governance tool. Instead, public authorities should incorporate grants, subsidies, co-financing commitments, guarantees, performance-based obligations, and digitally mediated funding flows into regular budgeting, reporting, and audit systems. In this respect, financial commitments arising from public–NGO collaboration should be linked to explicit budget lines, reflected in medium-term fiscal plans, and reported regularly, including contingent liabilities. In addition, eligibility criteria, performance indicators, and reporting obligations should be clearly defined in financing programs; however, these requirements should be designed proportionately so that they do not create excessive administrative costs, especially for small and local NGOs. Audit and oversight processes should cover not only formal compliance but also the effective use of resources, service outcomes, and the medium-term fiscal implications of collaboration. Such integration is necessary to prevent hidden liabilities, dispersed budgetary and financing channels, fiscal illusion, and soft budget constraints. From a policy perspective, the central challenge is not to limit public–NGO collaboration, but to design transparent, auditable, and sustainable financing mechanisms that expand service capacity without weakening public fiscal discipline.

The main conceptual contribution of this article is to show that financing design is central to the fiscal governance of public–NGO partnerships. Public–NGO financing is often discussed in relation to service delivery, NGO autonomy, or accountability. This article brings these debates together and links them to public fiscal discipline. It argues that financing mechanisms affect not only how resources are mobilized, but also how public commitments are recorded, monitored, audited, and controlled. Therefore, financing design should be understood as a fiscal governance choice that shapes whether public–NGO collaboration supports budgetary discipline, medium-term fiscal sustainability, and accountable public service delivery.

REFERENCES

Alam, A. B. M. M., & Alam, M. (2022). Decentralization, resource splitting and budgetary process: An empirical study. *Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 34*(1), 67–95. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-02-2020-0017

Assad, M. J., & Goddard, A. R. (2010). Stakeholder salience and accounting practices in Tanzanian NGOs. *International Journal of Public Sector Management, 23*(3), 276–299. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513551011032482

Berman, P., & Dave, P. (1996). Experiences in paying for health care in India's voluntary sector. *International Journal of Health Planning and Management, 11*(1), 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1751(199601)11:1<33::AID-HPM418>3.0.CO;2-Y

Bertone, M. P., Jacobs, E., Toonen, J., & Witter, S. (2018). Performance-based financing in three humanitarian settings: Principles and pragmatism. *Conflict and Health, 12*(1), 28. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-018-0166-9

Bloodgood, E., & Tremblay-Boire, J. (2017). Does government funding depoliticize non-governmental organizations? *European Political Science Review, 9*(3), 401–424. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773915000430

Boomsma, R. (2024). Coping with audit society pressures: A review of NGO responses to funder accountability demands. *Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 21*(1), 41–64. https://doi.org/10.1108/QRAM-03-2022-0058

Bourdeaux, C. (2006). Do legislatures matter in budgetary reform? *Public Budgeting & Finance, 26*(1), 120–142. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2006.00841.x

Bova, E., Ruiz-Arranz, M., Toscani, F. G., & Ture, H. E. (2019). The impact of contingent liability realizations on public finances. *International Tax and Public Finance, 26*(2), 381–417. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-018-9496-1

Brixi, H. P. (2000). Contingent government liabilities: Fiscal threat to the Czech Republic? *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 41*(1), 63–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/10889388.2000.10641133

Campos, J. E., & Pradhan, S. (1997). Evaluating public expenditure management systems: An experimental methodology with an application to the Australia and New Zealand reforms. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16*(3), 423–445. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199722)16:3<423::AID-PAM4>3.0.CO;2-J

Cheng, Y. (2019). Governing Government-Nonprofit Partnerships: Linking Governance Mechanisms to Collaboration Stages. *Public Performance & Management Review, 42*(1), 190–212. https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2018.1489294

Damasceno, G. V., & Gomes, R. C. (2021). Factors in the choice of fiscal governance: A systematic literature review and future research agenda. *Financial Accountability & Management, 39*(2), 237–255. https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12311

Demirbaş, T. (2020). The experience of a medium-term expenditure framework in Turkey. In H. Kıral & T. Akdemir (Eds.), *Public financial management reforms in Turkey: Progress and challenges, volume 1* (pp. 63–90). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1914-7_4

Dufour, M., Arroyo, P., & Montecinos, J. (2025). Navigating control and performance in emergency NGOs: The pivotal role of accountability. *Academia Revista Latinoamericana de Administración, 38*(2), 209–232. https://doi.org/10.1108/ARLA-02-2024-0037

Ebrahim, A. (2003). Accountability in practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. *World Development, 31*(5), 813–829. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(03)00014-7

Elberry, N. A., Naert, F., & Goeminne, S. (2022). The impact of fiscal openness on public spending technical efficiency in developing countries. *Public Performance & Management Review, 45*(2), 254–281. https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2022.2040036

Ellwood, S., & Garcia-Lacalle, J. (2016). Examining audit committees in the corporate governance of public bodies. *Public Management Review, 18*(8), 1138–1162. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2015.1088566

Hailey, J., & Salway, M. (2016). New routes to CSO sustainability: The strategic shift to social enterprise and social investment. *Development in Practice, 26*(5), 580–591. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2016.1188886

Hladka, M., & Hyanek, V. (2017). Government subsidies to non-profit organisations and its impact on private donations: Regional and subsector models. *Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government, 15*(2), 283–301. https://doi.org/10.4335/15.2.283-301(2017)

Hsu, H.-Y. (2024). Fiscal transparency and tax morale: Is the relationship shaped by perceptions of government performance and corruption? *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 90*(3), 563–580. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208523231220599

Isatayeva, G., Turyskulov, U., Auelbekova, Z., Kaldykozova, S., Miyatbekova, Z., & Kasenova, K. (2018). The risk financing of education: University education and state matching funds programs in international comparison. *Astra Salvensis – Revista de Istorie si Cultura, 6*(12), 323–334. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=707972

Jacobs, E., Bertone, M. P., Toonen, J., Akwataghibe, N., & Witter, S. (2020). Performance-based financing, basic packages of health services and user-fee exemption mechanisms: An analysis of health-financing policy integration in three fragile and conflict-affected settings. *Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 18*(6), 801–810. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-020-00567-8

Jung, K., & Moon, M. J. (2007). The double-edged sword of public-resource dependence: The impact of public resources on autonomy and legitimacy in Korean cultural nonprofit organizations. *Policy Studies Journal, 35*(2), 205–226. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2007.00216.x

Lee, C. H., Zhao, J. L., & Hassna, G. (2016). Government-incentivized crowdfunding for one-belt, one-road enterprises: Design and research issues. *Financial Innovation, 2*, 2, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-016-0022-0

Li, K., Lu, L., Qian, J., & Zhu, J. L. (2020). Enforceability and the effectiveness of laws and regulations. *Journal of Corporate Finance, 62,* 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101598

Lu, J., & Zhao, J. (2019). Does government funding make nonprofits administratively inefficient? Revisiting the link. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 48*(6), 1143–1161. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764019859435

Mills, L. F., & Newberry, K. J. (2005). Firms' off-balance sheet and hybrid debt financing: Evidence from their book-tax reporting differences. *Journal of Accounting Research, 43*(2), 251–282. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00170.x

Moran, M., Porter, D., & Curth-Bibb, J. (2016). The impact of funding modalities on the performance of Indigenous organisations. *Australian Journal of Public Administration, 75*(3), 359–372. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12192

Nkundabanyanga, S. K., Nakyeyune, G. K., & Muhwezi, M. (2019). Management mechanisms, deterrence measures and public finance regulatory compliance in Uganda. *Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 31*(2), 178–196. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-02-2018-0008

Nose, M. (2025). Evaluating fiscal supports on the public–private partnerships: A hidden risk for contract survival. *Oxford Economic Papers, 77*(3), 806–828. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpaf001

Nunnenkamp, P., & Öhler, H. (2012). Funding, competition and the efficiency of NGOs. *Kyklos, 65*(1), 81–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.201.00528.x

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2025). *Governing with artificial intelligence: The state of play and way forward in core government functions*. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/795de142-en

Pajkovic, I., Botica Redmayne, N., & Vasicek, V. (2023). The use and perceived usefulness of public sector financial statements by politicians: Evidence from Croatia. *Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 35*(6), 180–198. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-11-2022-0170

Pilcher, R., & Dean, G. (2009). Consequences and costs of financial reporting compliance for local government. *European Accounting Review, 18*(4), 725–744. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180903334978

Prakash, A., & Gugerty, M. K. (2010). Introduction: Voluntary regulation and accountability clubs. In A. Prakash & M. K. Gugerty (Eds.), *Voluntary regulation of NGOs and nonprofits: An accountability club framework* (pp. 3–40). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180903334978

Radynskyy, S., Ratynskiy, V., Diachenko, N., Diachenko, V., Krupka, A., Lobodina, Z., Pohrishchuk, H., Dobizha, N., Shpylyk, S., & Bendiuh, V. (2024). Improving the financing mechanism for the development of local communities based on the use of digital technologies. *Eastern-European Journal of Enterprise Technologies, 2*(13[128]), 35–46. https://doi.org/10.15587/1729-4061.2024.300908

Raudla, R., Douglas, J. W., & MacCarthaigh, M. (2022). Medium-term expenditure frameworks: Credible instrument or mirage? *Public Budgeting & Finance, 42*(3), 71–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12316

Santiso, C. (2006). Improving fiscal governance and curbing corruption: How relevant are autonomous audit agencies? *International Public Management Review, 7*(2), 97–108. https://ipmr.net/index.php/ipmr/article/view/17

Segura, A., & Zeng, J. (2020). Off-balance sheet funding, voluntary support and investment efficiency. *Journal of Financial Economics, 137*(1), 90–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.02.001

Syamsul, N., Nurlailah, N., & Nurhadi, N. (2026). From transparency to accountability: Determinants of village financial governance. *Multidisciplinary Science Journal, 8*(9), 2026575. https://doi.org/10.31893/multiscience.2026575

Turcotte-Tremblay, A. M., Spagnolo, J., De Allegri, M., & Ridde, V. (2016). Does performance-based financing increase value for money in low- and middle-income countries? A systematic review. *Health Economics Review, 6*(1), 30. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13561-016-0103-9

Vacekova, G., & Svidronova, M. (2014). Benefits and risks of self-financing of NGOs: Empirical evidence from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria. *Economics and Management, 17*(2), 120–130. https://doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2014-2-009

Witter, S., Chirwa, Y., Chandiwana, P., Munyati, S., Pepukai, M., & Bertone, M. P. (2019). The political economy of results-based financing: The experience of the health system in Zimbabwe. *Global Health Research and Policy, 4*, 20. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41256-019-0111-5

Zawadzka-Pak, U. K. (2018). Responsible public finance management. In *Global encyclopedia of public administration, public policy, and governance* (pp. 5457–5462). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20928-9_2470

Zeka, B., Arun, T., & Carter, D. (2025). Financing arrangements in public–private partnerships. In J. Abor, J. Macomber, T. Arun, & V. Murinde (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of infrastructure finance* (pp. 538–551). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032712031-34

Zhang, M., Espada, M. C., Estebanez, R. P., & Urquia-Grande, E. (2020). Accounting transparency of non-governmental organizations: A bibliometric analysis. *Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, 1137*, 645–659. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40690-5_62