

INTERREGIONALISM TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL ACTOR BÖLGELER ARASICILIK AKIMLARI VE AB'NİN KÜRESEL BİR AKTÖR OLARAK ANALİZİ Caner Övsan Cakas^{*}

Abstract

The European Union is the most integrated regional block in the World which presents an ideal example for the other regions. The regional integration of the EU not only includes economical components but also political, cultural and identical components which have a vital role on the way of EU's identity and interests' formations. In this article it has aimed to answer a research question namely, "Why the EU has to pursue pure interregionalism in its foreign and trade policies and what extent could EU pursue pure interregionalism?" The possible answer of this question will be elaborated in the fields of identical considerations of the EU as a social, political and cultural entity or actor in the international society and economical considerations which stresses the decreasing competitiveness of the European market compared to its counterparts. The EU may be assessed as the initial example of the actor of the post-modern or post-Westphalian multilateral framework which stresses the decentralization of governance and inclusion of the many actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations, sub-national institutions and NGO's in the multilateral decision-making process. Consequently, the EU may find its identity and interests in a post-modern conception of the state and it has to impose this regional identity of formation process to other parts of the globe to legitimize its existence not only around the world, but also on its own demos. On the other hand, EU has to impose its core standards such as labor and environment standards to other counterpart regions for continuing its welfare system without decreasing its competitiveness. As a result, The EU could achieve this strategy more

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efficiently in an international relations practice which mostly lean on pure interregionalism. Because it is easier to perceive three or four regional blocks rather than hundreds of states.

Key Words: Interregionalism, World Politics, International System, European Union, Pure Interregionalism.

Öz

Avrupa Birliği, dünyanın diğer bölgeleri için ideal bir örnek teşkil eden en fazla bütünleşmiş bölgesel blok olarak değerlendirilebilir. Zira AB'nin bölgesel entegrasvonu sadece ekonomik alanı değil, aynı zamanda kültürel ve siyasi alanları da kapsayan bir yapıya sahiptir. Bu çalışmada, AB'nin neden kendi dış politikaları ve ticaret politikalarında salt bölgelerarası bakış açısına sahip bir politikayı takip etmesi gerektiği ve söz konusu bölgeler arası politikayı ne ölçüde izleyebildiği hususunun aydınlatılması amaçlamıştır. Bu hususun analiz edilebilmesi amacıyla da AB'nin sosyal, politik ve kültürel bir aktör olarak kendisine bakış açısı ve Avrupa ekonomisinin rakiplerine kıyasla azalan rekabet gücünü vurgulayan ekonomik faktörler ele alınmıştır. AB, yönetim mekanizmasına çokuluslu şirketler, uluslararası örgütler, ulusal kurumlar ve STK'lar gibi pek çok aktörün dahil edilmesini benimseyen ve çok taraflı karar verme sürecini uygulayan post modern tarzı devlet şeklinin ilk örneği olarak değerlendirilebilir. Dolayısıyla AB'nin bu yönetişim mekanizmasını küresel çapta diğer bölgelere de ithal etmesi gerek kendi kimliğini kendi vatandasları gözünde sağlamlastırması gerekse kendi ekonomisinin rekabet gücünü arttırması açısından çok büyük bir önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışmada AB'nin bu amacını gerçekleştirebilmesi için uluslararası alanda "salt bölgeselcilik" adı verilen ve uluslararası sisteminin çok sayıda ulus devletten ziyade bölgesel birlikler olarak organize edilmesini savunan bir politikayı benimsemesi gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölgelerarasıcılık, Uluslararası Sistem, Avrupa Birliği, Dünya Politikası, Salt Bölgelerarasıcılık.

1.Introduction

It is one of the central convergence among the academics of the international relations that there is an increasing tendency of regions to assume a stronger role on the world scene and gain actorness (Soderbaum -Langenhove, 2014: 251-251; Telo, 2013, 27). Consequently, according to this hypothesis, due to increasing role of the regions, the interregionalism has been gradually gained legitimacy and it has prevailed across the world. If one takes into consideration the condition of the EU in this framework, today the EU has relations with virtually every country and region in the world. The EU has become a force in international affairs, especially in trade, development cooperation, the promotion of regional integration, democracy and good governance, human rights and, to an increasing extent security policies. The EU has official relations with the other regional actors such as African Union, ASEAN, NAFTA and MERCOSUR and these relations have been evaluating in a high speed. In the other word, it should be assumed that the EU has been demonstrating a great tendency to progress interregionalism in the international sphere (Telo, 2003: 30). On the other hand, it is important to indicate that the concept of interregionalism does not refer a stable meaning, in contrast it refers to three different types of the relations between the regions namely pure interregionalism, hybrid interegionalism and transregionalism. To understand the main idea of the article, the exactly meanings of these types have to be enlightened. First of all, some academics use the label "pure interregionalism" to signify when the EU has relations only with one distinct and formally organized counterpart region such as a free trade area or custom union (Soderbaum - Langenhove, 2014: 253). If one custom union negotiates with a group of countries from another region, but second group is out of a custom union, it refers to hybrid interregionalism such as Lome Agreement or Cotonou Agreement with ACP

(African, Carrabian and Pacific Countries) Finally, if an accord links countries across two regions where neither of the two negotiates as a grouping, then it refers to transregionalism such as APEC (Soderbaum -Langenhove, 2014: 258; Aggarwal - Fogarty, 2004: 23). However, in line with the descriptions of the different types of the interregionalism above, in this article it has aimed to answer a research question namely, "Why the EU has to pursue pure interregionalism in its foreign and trade policies and what extent could EU pursue pure interregionalism ?" The possible answer of this question will be elaborated in the fields of identical considerations of the EU as a social, political and cultural entity or actor in the international society considerations which and economical stresses the decreasing competitiveness of the European market compared to its counterparts. In the first section under the name of political and identical consideration, it will be elaborated that whether there is shift in the international society from a world order based on nation-states towards on one based on regions and interregional relations in line with some prominent theories of international relations such as liberalism, English school and constructivism. It will be also considered that whether the multilateralism of the world order which is based on mainly the collaboration of the nation-states, has been transforming to a multilateral world which has complex webs of interactions and multidimensional actors that encompasses multinational cooperations, international organizations, sub-national institutions and NGO's. In this section, the possible transformed meaning of the state and actor in the international society due to post-modernist currents also will be elaborated in line with prominent academics of post-modernism and discourse analysis such as Thomas Dietz. Then the relationship between loyalties and identities (which are mostly transformed from the national level to sub-national and supranational level due to impact of globalization) and creation of a European identity which legitimates the existence of the EU will be also

considered. Then the role of regional to regional relations in the realm of diffusion of the core norms of the EU such as democracy, human rights and rule of law will be inquired. After that impact of pure interregional regional relationship of the EU with the MERCOSUR and African Union will be questioned as case studies.

In the second section, the relationship between the pure interregionalist relations of the EU and the decreasing competitiveness of the EU market will be elaborated. The liberalization of the world markets which encompass the free movements of the goods and capitals and eliminating of the all the barriers on the trade, has transformed the world economy. The China, India and many other less developed and developing states have taken part in the global competition. The liberalization of the markets has also culminated in the prevalence of the post-fordism and constitution of a post-industrial economic structures in many developed countries. This economic and structural transformations have created great pressures on the wages of low-skilled labor and fueled the unemployment rates due to break down of the traditional employee and employer balance of power which was a conclusion of specific circumstances of Europe. On the other hand, the high labor and environmental standards and high level of social security expenditures have decreased the competitiveness of the European firms in particular, European economy in general. Consequently, a compulsory policy for Europe appears, if EU would like to save its welfare standards (such as its labor, health, environment and social security systems) and enhance (or at least save) its market's competitiveness, the increase of its innovation capacity or productivity rate is not sufficient, the EU also has to impose its regulations, rules and norms in the field of labor, health, environment and social security for counterbalancing the unprecedented rising of production capacities of other regional powers. On the other hand,

the EU has been experienced an aging population problem since beginning of this century. This situation also has been creating a negative impact on the growth rates of EU. Because the demographic factors and productivity are the two main and correlated variables of economic growth, the EU will has to increase its productivity capacity more than its commercial counterparts not only now but also in the future too. The productivity capacity of economy also has variables such as competitiveness, transparency, and labor mobilization, but competitiveness has primacy role. Consequently, the EU has obligation to enhance its competitiveness in all conditions more than the other regions and only ways of achieving it without impairing its welfare system, are innovation and imposition of its regulations which would make a financial burden on the counterpart region firms which do not make much expenditure for progressing labor and environmental standards. Thus, in line with the acceptations above the capacity of pure interregionalism in the realm of regulation imposition compared to other interregional models will be analyzed.

In conclusion section, a general assessment of the article will be reached and it will be assessed that whether pure interregionalism is right strategy for EU for increasing its efficiency and its role as a global actor or not.

2. Political and Identical Considerations

In this section, firstly it is necessary to incline the term of anarchy, international society and state conceptions in regards of their interactions with the formation of identity and interests. Despite their distinctiveness on some issues, the debate between prominent international theories of liberalism and realism based on a shared commitment to "rationalism" (Keohane, 1988: 379-396). Like all social theories, rational choice directs us to ask some questions and not others, treating the identities and interests of

actors as exogenously given and focusing on how the behavior of actors generates outcomes. (Homans, 1987: 371-402). As such, rationalism offers fundamentally behavioral conceptions of both process and institutions namely, they change the behavior but not identities or interests (Wendt, 1992: 393). In addition to this way of framing research problems, both realists and liberals (and their neo versions) share generally similar assumptions about actors that states are the dominant actors in the international system and they define security in "self-interest" term. The realists and liberals may disagree about the extent to which states are motivated by relative versus absolute gains (Keohane, 1988: 379). For realists, the anarchies are necessarily "selfhelp" systems, systems in which both central authority and collective security are absent. Consequently, according to realism the main actor namely the state is self-interests institution, which draw its behavior by means of self-help considerations in anarchic international systems where there is no authority to rule and provide collective security (Kraser, 1983: 355-368). They also deal with the relative gains of other states in a respective international collaboration, because in a self-help anarchic world, all the states would have security dilemmas and it would constitute great barriers for formation of collective action (Wendt, 1992: 393). The liberals and their neoliberal versions share the same assumptions of realism such as self-help and anarchic international system and self-interests state behavior, but they differ from realists that they assume that the states focus on the absolute gains in the international collaborations and the international organizations may deal with the collective action problem in some extent (Keohane, 1988: 384). In the other word, according to liberals, it is possible to provide some degree of international governance and security, but it would depend on the absolute gains of the states in a relevant collaborations (Keohane, 1988: 399). In sum, both rationalist theories (liberalism and

realism) assume dominant and self-interests state with the pre-given identity and interests and self-help and anarchic international system which lacks any central authority and collective security. Consequently, the states are selfish and egoist actors which only take into consideration their respective interests in international collaborations (Keohane, 1988: 400). In this system, the state is also primary actor of the international society and it favors its full sovereignty against the other actors and provides its internal order without any intervention of other states (Wendt, 1992: 398). Thus, according to this system as an unitary actor, the state is not only responsible for internal order and external defense, but also for the welfare of its citizens and civic engagement. The international society is also accepted as established on these fundamental assumptions (Wendt, 1992: 399). It is also important to indicate what the term of international society means. International society is a conception between the international system and actors. It demonstrates the shared rules, institutions, norms, ways of the interactions, shared conception of normal behaviors among the actors and shared interests and values which are considered as linking all parts of the human community in a relevant part of history (Bull, 1995: 23-24). The term of "relevant part of history" is important because it refers to transformative feature of the intersubjective understanding of the international society in accordance with its historical process (Bull, 1995: 25). However, the features of international society also directly impact the structure of the multilateral institutions of the relevant historical period (Dunne, 2001: 93-111). The international society of 20th. century which had a prominent role in the realm of the establishing the multilateral structure of today, mainly depends on the Westphalian worldorder (Wendt, 1992: 402).

The Westphalian world-order is a rationalist system which built upon sovereign states and the possibilities and necessaries for those states to cooperate with each other (Langenhove, 2010: 11). The Westphalia system

had developed slowly over the three and a half centuries after the Thirty Years Wars of the Europe (1618-1648) and it has been responsible of creation of constitutional and liberal sovereign state. It put the sovereignty principle into practice that states became what they are, territorial entities that exclude external actors from domestic authority and this is in turn opened the room for body of international law based on treaties between sovereign states (Langenhove, 2010: 13). In addition, in this Westphalian system, the states are accepted as rational actors which pursue their policies in line with the pre-given identity and interests in accordance with the features of rational choice theory which was indicated above. In the other words, the Westphalian system was established on the assumption of sovereign, dominant and rational state actorness (Wendt, 1992: 403; Langenhove, 2010: 13). According to this system, the main aim of these rational self-interests actors is to survive and enhance their gains (whether relative or absolute) in a stable self-help and anarchic international system (Keohane, 1989: 730). In line with these assumptions according to Westphalian system, the multilateralism was created as a form of cooperation among the states that institutionalizes intergovernmental cooperation and substitutes anarchy (Keohane, 1989: 731-763). In sum, in the Westphalian system, as a rationalist based system, both features (identities and interests) of actorness (self-interests, egoist, mostly security driven, sovereign, stateness) and structure of international system (anarchic and self-help system) and assumptions of international society (superiority of the state as an only dominant actor of international system, principle of nonintervention of the internal politics of territorial and sovereign state and perception of the multilateralism regarded as a form of cooperation among the states) are accepted stable and non-disputable features of the international relations (Langenhove, 2010: 12; Ikenberry, 2004: 71-87;

Soderbaum, 2006: 249-262; Ikenberry, 2004: 76). Consequently, the multilateralism of the 20th century which was established mainly at the end of the Second World War, was depending on the aim of resolving the problems between the states and blocks those consist of and under full control of states. The United Nations, NATO, IMF, World Bank, GATT and other many international organization and multilateral institutions are constructed on the basic assumptions of rationalism and Westphalian system, as a consequence they deal with the problems of the world in the intergovernmental level which depends on the privileged role of the states (Ikenberry, 2004: 77). This situation had progressed by means of the Cold War which carried on the security considerations at peak and consolidated the Westphalian system of governance (Langenhove, 2010: 13). But the second half of the 20th centruy and beginning of 21th centruy has heralded a comprehensive transformation in the main ideological trends of the 20th centruy such as modernism, rationalism and their respective assumptions (Keohane, 1988: 734). The world has been experiencing a fast and comprehensive transformations in the realm of economy, politics, social interactions and understandings due to globalization since the 1980's. The globalization, which provided a progressed interconnection between the communities and freedom of movement of the goods, capitals and people, is culminated in demolishing of the all the conceptions of the pasts (Dunne, 2001: 145). The rationalism and modernism are challenged by constructivism and discursive approaches, the Westphalian system and its prominent conception of sovereign and dominant actor of state challenged by post-Westphalian system and regionalism, multilateralism of past is challenged by the new appearing multilateralism of the post-modern world (Dunne, 2001: 146). These transformations will be elaborated below.

At the second half of the 21th century, a philosophical current namely critical theory had challenged all the consolidated school of ideas of then.

The Frankfurt School which was the founder ideological current of critical theory, was mainly presented by Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkeimer, began an ideological attack to all the modernist theories in all the scientific, political and social fields (Barry, 1995: 24-55). Some academics had commented this activity as a death of all the gross theories of the past. Gross or mega theory means a theory which aim to enlighten and explain the all the dimensions of the social, economic and political features of world society (Levin, 1987: 3-20; Althusser, 1965: 45-48). The constructivism had constituted in the large spectrum of critical theory against the assumptions of rationalist theories of realism and liberalism (Coulter, 2013: 40). According to constructivism, there is not pre-given identities and interests as it happened in rationalism. In contrast the identities and interests and the other features of actor and even provisions of the actorness are filling by meaning by means of the interaction between the actors (Coulter, 2013: 42-43). The social interactions between the actors creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behavior. These expectations on the other hand, gradually constitute the intersubjective understandings of the concepts and phenomena among the actors (Wendt, 1992: 404-405). These constructed intersubjective understandings about social world around actors are not stable and not nonchangeable and having the process of creation in line with the interactions (Wendt, 1992: 406). Consequently, there is not fixed meaning of a particular social actor or phenomena, in contrast there is long lasting and ongoing process of construction of intersubjective understanding of concepts among the actors which may prevail on the decades or even centuries (Wendt, 1992: 408). In this regard, the privileged role of nation state as a sovereign and dominant actor of international relations, the Westphalian system of the international society, the state centered multilateral system of the modern world, anarchical structure of the international system, self-interest interactions between the states and even the intersubjective meaning of the state in the realm of the modernism or Westphailan system are tentative rather than stable concepts (Wendt, 1992: 409). As an example, the anarchy is not a stable feature of international system, it exists because the interactions and expectations of the actors give permission to it for being existence (Stryker, 1987: 93). The Westphalian system is widely accepted because the interactions and expectations of the actors in the social context enabled it to be accepted and prevailed. Even the Westphalian system itself was constructed in the expense of demolishing of the feudalist world order of the middle ages. And there is no guarantee that the Westphalian system itself would not change by means of changing interactions between the actors (Stryker, 1997: 94-97). In sum, the constructivism assumes that the identity and interests and even the meanings of the concepts are treated as a part of ongoing process of being (Stryker, 1987: 97).

In this regard, it could be assumed that the globalization and the interconnectiveness between the actors and advanced increasing communication technology and increasing interdependency among the actors have culminated in a large scale transformations in the validity of the Westphalian system. For example, the globalization undercuts state sovereignty, greatly reducing its ability to regulate and govern domestic and international affairs (Harvey, 1990: 253). The many academics claim that the vacuum left by retreat of the state is already being filled by web of non-state actors above by multinational corporations and international organizations and from below by sub-national groups, NGO's and transnational activists Networks (Sharma, 2008: 2-5; Soderbaum - Langehove, 2014: 253; Harvey, 1990: 254). The increasing communication and reducing transportation cost in line with the economic interdependency and cultural interconnectiveness has changed the intersubjective understanding of the state and territorial integrity of the identical loyalty (Harvey, 1990: 255). Contemporary borders

increasingly do not correspond to the ever-changing economic, political and socio-cultural spaces on the ground, because social, political and cultural identities and citizens' allegiances have multiplied, but political boundaries have remained fixed in many setting (Sharma, 2008: 2-5). Today's humans could accommodate more than one identity on his/her character (Laclau-Mouffe, 1985: 3-33). For example, he/she can be socialist, environmentalist, black and French, consequently he may incline each of components of his/her identity in line with the time, space and conditions. He/she may collaborate in environmental activity with a liberal, but he/she may conflict with the same liberal in a socialist demonstration. His/her identity and interest would change in accordance with his position and circumstances and the advanced communication abilities make this diversification more possible. He/she may be a member of different or even conflicting social groups in the same time (Sharma, 2008: 7-8; Laclau-Mouffe, 1985: 43; Deleuze-Guattari, 2009: 38-78). Consequently, the social communities which are the collective reflections of the individual preferences could be established in multiple foundations and the nationality could be only one of them. Laclau and Mouffe called this multiplied identical features as multiplied antagonisms in their studies (1985: 38-78). Thus, in the postmodern era the nation-state does not constitute the sole identity of the social communities, in this regard, it is also not possible to mention about the internally consistent and unitary state. On the other hand, the state as a concept does not always correspond with its definition of Westphalian style which stressed territorial sovereignty and internally consistent unit (Zielonka, 2008: 467-469). There are different types of states, so-called "failed states" are hardly able to project power on their own and they hardly act as a sovereign and internally consistent actor such as Somalia, South Sudan and Congo Democratic Republic. There are also virtual states entities with small

territories, few natural resources and tiny manufacturing production, but with a high level of research, product design, financing and marketing capacity such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Lüxsemburg (Zielonka, 2008: 470). On the other hand, there are huge hegemonic states with global, political and economic power which present more than a Westphalian type of nation-state such as United States (Zielonka, 2008: 471-484). In addition to that the sole hegemony of the state as an international actor and their influences in the international system is also could be inquired. For example, some business firms and multinational corporations such as Microsoft, Exxon Mobile and Gazprom are more important not only as economic but also as political actors in the international relations (Sharma, 2008: 11). Some international organizations such as WTO may be more independent and powerful actors than many nation-states or some of transnational non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International should have great impacts on the global politics (Zielonka, 2008: 484). In sum, there are plethora of non-state actors which influence global politics in different manners and with different results and there is no sole model of nation-state which has territorial sovereignty and influential actorness capacity as assumed in the Weatphalian system, in contrast not all the states of the world correspond a simple model.

However if the states have lost their primacy positions in the international relations and none of the other actors other than states could constitute a power center which could provides regulations for markets and political issues what would be take the place of state ? The historical retreat from its Westphalian functions implies a dramatically changed relationship between the state and civil society and in particular a tendency for state to become increasingly alienated from civil society as indicated above. This process of change of legitimacy, loyalty, identity, function and even sovereignty are transferred up or down in the system, to political entities

other than state as again indicated above. This makes it necessary to transcend the conventional obsession with the nation-state as the dominant actor in the global system, and think in terms of more complex, multilevel political structure, in which state assumes different functions. On the other hand, the multilateral institutions of the Westphalian system which are mainly lean on nation-state level decision-making process such as United Nations, are consuming their efficiency in the global politics (Langenhove, 2010: 11; Ruggie, 1993: 20-56). The globalization has not only changed the economical and political structures of the world, but also it has changed the conventional threat conception of the communities (Telo, 2005: 45; Beck, 2014: 14). Because the as indicated by the German academic Ulrich Beck, communities of the new era could be called as risk communities, and the type and frequency of the risks are prevailed all around the world (2014: 15). In the other words, the globalization does not only mean free movement of goods, capitals, services and people across the borders without any barrier, it also means free movement of the risks such as drug traffic, climate changes, enviromental disasters, organized crime, international terrorism, illegal human trafics, refugees and asylum seekers problems, global heating, increased poverty, inequality of income, global health problems (such as AIDS) proliferation weapon of mass destruction and global economic crisis which are the global problems and require the global resolutions regardless of the any nation-state's will (Langenhove, 2010: 13; Beck, 2014: 15). In the other word, in a globalized world which threatened by multiplied risks, it is impossible to deal with these global risks by means of national-state level considerations (Beck, 2014: 17-36). Consequently, international community needs different multilateral institutions other then the state centered multilateral institutions of today. These new multilateral institutions should be more influential in the realm of providing resolutions and regulations for

the transformed risks of post-modern society and should lean on more effective actors than the nation-states (Acharva, 2010: 49). The nation-state centered multilateralism lacking of necessary power and efficiency for achieving this process (Acharya, 2010: 49-63). In the era of globalization, new, larger structures beyond the "state" are obviously needed and this new structure should consist of regional blocks and the new multilateralism should also lean on interregionalism which stressed the interactions among these regional blocks (Acharya, 2010: 64). The regional blocks would not only provide sufficient authority and resolutions for global risks, but also, they would facilitate the collection action problem against the global risks. Because it would be easier to negotiate and reach a resolution and provide regulation with a few regional blocks rather than hundreds of national-states (Langenhove, 2007: 19-34). In this regard, this condition stresses important question of what does a regional block will be and how would one describe it? What components would it have? What authority and what kind of cooperation would it present? Or with J.Delors words for EU, what type of political animal would regional blocks such as EU be? How would its nature be? One could prolong these descriptive questions to many areas of political sciences and it has already opened a new research field in social sciences (Edwards - Regelsberger, 1990: 17-22).

In this regard, the discursive approach which is presented mainly by the Thomas Dietz, should be proposed. The term of regionalism in general, the regional block in particular and interregional relations should be assessed as a discursive nodal points (DNP) conception of Thomas Dietz. According to Dietz, DNPs are central concepts in the political debate around which meaning is stabilized. The DNPs are contested concepts whose meaning is not firmly established and it comes into being through discursive articulations (Dietz, 2001: 5-38). The central function of DNPs in the political debate is filling them with meaning through the tying together of a

number of discourses on other, more general concepts meaning becomes stabilized and the discursive practice aimed at accomplishing this task is called articulation (Dietz, 2001: 31). The term of regional block and interregionalism are both could be assessed as DNP, and neither meanings of regional block and interregionalism is firmly established. Either one only comes into being through discursive articulation. In the other words, by means of articulation between the actors the meaning and legitimacy of the regional block conception would be fixed. And the nature of the interregional relations whether it would be pure interregional, hybrid interregional or trans regional would also be fixed by means of articulations (Dietz, 2001: 31). In this regard, the attitudes and preferences of the European Union as the most organized regional block of the world, would play a vital role in this articulation process and it should play for its better off (Dietz, 2001: 32). Because the EU has been suffering from a long lasting democratic deficit which mostly depends on the lack of European demos and sufficient adoption of the European identity among the people of Europe (Dietz, 2001: 35; Shore, 2011: 7-36). Despite, the EU has promoted a European identity as a supranational identity and stressed that it is complementary to national identity rather than contradictory to it, the aimed construction of the European identity which lean on European common cultural heritance, has failed to provide the necessary loyalty to EU among the people of Europe and the politics of the Europe has been still mostly under the influences of domestic and national considerations (Delanty, 1997: 30-34). The considerable rate differences between the turn outs of national and European level elections demonstrates this reality. In the many EU member states the turn out of EU elections hardly exceed %50, despite the turn out of national elections hardly remain under this rate (Delanty, 1997: 34-45; Shore, 2011: 13-17). Consequently, the EU needs a commonly accepted validity of a regional identity in the international society and this regional identity would be regarded as superior to national identity among the actors of international society. Thus, the EU should be hub of a large number of interregional arrangements which in turn, would strengthen its own regionalist ideology (Delanty, 1997: 34). Promoting regional and pure interregional relations not only justifies and enhances the EU's own existence and efficiency as an "actor" in eyes of its people and other regions, the strategy also promotes the legitimacy and status of EU other regions. This in turn, promotes further crosscutting regionalism and pure interregionalism around the world (Langenhove, 2007: 251).

It is important to stress that the type of the interregional relations should be pure interregionalism, because only by means of this type of interregionalism, the superior actorness of regional blocks could be consolidated (Rüger, 2002: 4). The EU should not only struggle to promote its actorness in the international and European level spheres, but also it should change the intersubjective understanding of the main actorness from nation state status to regional block status. On the other hand, actorness can be defined as the capacity of regional blocks and regional organizations to develop presence, to become identifiable, aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies and make and implement decisions (Rüland, 2002: 5-6). The EU has these capacities and it constitutes the foremost example of this type of regional entity (Rüland, 2002: 6). Consequently, the EU should export its own model of governance to other regions as a being the most integrated regional block of the world. By means of adoption of this model by the other regions, the structure of multilateralism would also change from state based form to regional based form, that would have culminated in more facilitated negotiations and would provided more conductive resolutions to global risks and would deal with the collective action problem of the actors (Rüland, 2002: 12). On the other hand, the EU should promote regionalism among the other regions, thus it should employ pure regionalism because this strategy would inspire the other regions to interact with other regions with regional organizations (Dinan, 2007: 1127). The other regions would prefer that because the asymmetric power balance between the regional blocks such as EU and themselves would force them to constitute a regional block for counterbalancing this power difference (Rüger, 2002: 6; Woolcock, 2010: 5). However, these transformations in both at actor level from state to bloc and international structure level from state based regional multilateralism to regional level pure regionalism also should facilitate the promotion of the liberal democracy, rule of law and human rights which EU asserts that they not only promote the international peace, trade and prosperity, but also constitutes the EU's fundamental principles. According to decision-makers of the EU, the promotion of the liberal democracy with its all provisions such as rule of law and human rights, constitutes the one of the main aims of the Union (Woolcock, 2010: 6-7). This preference has been indicating in the all the founding treaties of the EU (Woolcock, 2010: 7). This belief of Europeans that liberal democracy as only way to provide the peace and prosperity, may found its roots at the Immanuel Kant's republican internationalist theory or with other name perpetual peace theory (Woolcock, 2010: 11; Doyle, 1997: 80). Kant's essay of "perpetual peace" offers a coherent explanation of two important regularities in the world politics, they are the tendencies of liberal states simultaneously to be peace-prone in relations with each other and unusually war-prone in their relations with Republican representation, non-liberal states. liberal respect and transnational interdependence are three necessary and together sufficient causes of the two regularities taken in tandem (Kant, 1995: 33-45; Doyle, 1997: 82-90).

According to Kant's theory, a stable expectation of peace among the states would be achieved once three conditions were met. They are representative republican government (it includes elected legislative, separation of powers and rule of law), a principled respect for the nondiscriminatory rights of all the human (a commitment to respect human rights) and social and economic interdependence (it includes free trade and cooperated social interactions among the domestic groups) (Doyle, 2008: 50-66). Kant assumes that if the adoptions of these conditions were prevailed among the states or political communities, the number of the liberal states would enhance and this condition would lead to a zone of peace which would be established among the liberal states and regionalization of this zone would progress (Kant, 1995: 39). In the other word, Kant asserts a negative correlation between the prevalence of liberal democracy and warproneness. The historical data generally supports that hypothesis, if one takes into the consideration the construction process of the Europe at the end of the Second World War, one should observe that the democratization and regionalization of European nations and their prosperities and the peace among them has been demonstrated simultaneous progression (Shore, 2000: 21). The Europe has achieved the its regional integration and enhanced its internal prosperity and provided mostly its internal peace. Today it hardly to mention about a war between Germany and France which was very normal in the past. Consequently, despite some shortcomings such as democratic deficit, the Europe achieved this integration by means of construction of a regional identity and representing this identity as Europe in its relations with other regions and the EU should inspire the other regions for adopting this strategy more effectively by means of pure regionalism (Shore, 2000: 24). The other regional blocks of world such as African Union and Mercosur also have imitating the European Union (Dinan, 2007: 1127-1135). Today both organizations have similar institutions like EU. The African Union was

established in Adis Ababa in 2001, has a commission, a quasi-parliament or assembly, Executive Council which consists of relevant ministers of member states, an Economic, Social and Cultural Council and a Court of Justice. These institutions have similar missions with their counterparts in the EU (African Union, 2012). On the other hand, the African Union aims to promote the democracy, prosperity, rule of law and human rights in line with the free market economy and it also aims to constitute a common African identity in the Africa as the EU does in Europe (African Union, 2012). The African Union suspended the membership of the Central African Republic and Burnika Faso due to recent coup d'etat and civil war. This suspension also indicates the African Union's democracy promotion aim (Joseph, 2015). On the other hand, the Mercosur in the South America constitutes another important example of regional block construction. Despite its main purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, people, and currency, the Mercosur also demonstrates initiations for democracy promotion (Aggarwal-Fogarty, 2004: 72-84). The Mercosur had suspended membership status of one of its founder member namely Paraguay, for violating the democratic values and rules (Aggarwal-Fogarty, 2004: 97). It also established a large community with Andean Pact namely Union of South American Nations which aims a more integrated common market (Mercosur, 2015). As indicated above both African Union and Mercosur like main regional blocks of world, have progressing their integration in the field of not only economical issues, but also in social, cultural and political issues. Consequently, it should be assumed that they are in a comprehensive regionalization process which would have resulted in establishment of a regional identity like EU. Thus, the EU's pure interregional relations with these regions would enhance their self-confidence and inspire them further integration towards being a fully integrated regional block (AggarwalFogarty, 2004:103). The formation of the two regional blocks addition to EU would create an asymmetric power on the other regions' states and may lead to formulate their own regional block or to strengthen their existing regional institutions. The NAFTA would become an another regional block, the ASEAN. Schangai Cooperation Organization, Gulf Cooperation Organization or even Pacific Union also may become regional blocks. Consequently, the relations between these blocks would be pure interregional in their nature. The transformation of the dominant actorness of international system from national state to regional block and multilateralism from state centered to regional oriented, would provide sufficient efficiency for resolution of global risks and problems, prevalence of peace, democracy and human rights and facilitating the collective action (Aggarwal-Fogarty, 2004:110-122).

In sum, the EU should pursue pure interregionalism in its policies towards the other regions. These preferences would inspire them to constitute their own regional blocks, provides the EU's necessary actorness in the post-modern world, products new multilateral scene for more comprehensive resolutions for global risks and strengthens the EU's own legitimacy, existence and identity as a regional supranational actor. It should be assumed that retreating of dominant nation-state from the international system and adoption of this belief among the international society, provides the EU to promote the its regional model as new dominant actor of international system by means of pure interregional relations which would product conductive articulations among the respective actors for achieving it.

3. Economic and Social Considerations


In this section, the correlation between the survival of the European Welfare State and the promotion of model of governance, labor, health, social security and life standards of Europe in the age of globalization will


be elaborated. After that the relationship between the promoting or export of these norms and role of pure interregionalism in this field also will be considered. The Europe is the prominent example of the welfare state conception which enables its citizens a good deal of life, work, health and social standards and recognizes social assistance as a citizenship right rather than a benevolent gesture of the state (Giddens, 1997: 33-56). The term of welfare state has taken different meanings in different countries. It should be classified as Scandinavian model, Continental European model and Anglo-Saxon model of welfare states (Giddens, 1997: 39). The differences between these models mostly depend on their inclinations and assumptions about the social assistance and security. While the Scandinavian model presents the most stronger social security, Anglo-Saxon model provides the least strong one, but all of them provide considerable good welfare standards to their citizens than most of the systems around the world (Giddens, 1997: 44; Esping, 1999: 40-51). It is also important to mention about the constitution of this welfare system in Europe in particular, in West in general. The existence of welfare state in the Europe depends on two special circumstances which had appeared at the end of the Second World War, namely large scale adoptions of import-substituting industrialization strategies in the world and the existence of Soviet and communism threat in the Europe (Wahl, 2011. 45-56). Most of the developing countries had followed import-substituting industrialization strategies which they kept their levels of import protection far higher than the industrial countries to encourage domestic production of manufactures and they also restricted direct foreign investment by multinational firms in order to encourage the growth of domestic firms (Dolar, 2005: 97-123). On the other hand, the developed countries had organized an industrial model which had exactly complied with the Fordist production model that depends on the centralization of the production process by means of production band and there had been considerable barriers on free movement of goods, capital, services and people not only due to technological shortcomings but also due to political and economical preferences of the states which were depending mainly on the Keynesianism and protectionism (Wahl, 2011: 89). Consequently, until the rising of globalization of 1980's, there had been a centralized production organizations which was mainly located in the Western countries and second world countries of Soviet Union, and % 80 of world manufactures were from the developed countries (Langenhove, 2007: 11). On the other hand the demographic parameters which are regarded as one of two important variables of the growth rate were on similar degrees between West and others (McKinsey, 2014) and due to Cold War, there was a considerable communism threat against the Europe and there were also considerable supporters of the socialism inside the domestic public of the European countries. These circumstances had created a balance of power between the unions who represents the employers and capital owners in the realm of governance of the labor and social policies. For the capital owners or employees, it was a compulsory for preventing the prevalence of communism among the European public (Wahl, 2011: 112). Consequently, these circumstances had paved the way of welfare state with its all the provisions in the Europe, as it is indicated above it was not a voluntary preferences of the government elites rather it was a result of the negotiations between the unions and employers with the employee and governmental elites in a relatively equal bargaining power (Wahl, 2011: 112). These global systems had begun to change in 1970's due to two oil crisis and expanding dept crises of developing countries (Dolar, 2005: 108). In a growing number of countries, from Mexico and Brazil to India and Sub-Saharan Africa began to change their development strategies which was mainly depending on import-substituting industrialization (Dolar, 2005: 109). Thus, the majority of the developing countries has shifted from an inward focused strategy to a more outward oriented one which is mainly depending on export capacities (Dolar, 2005: 110). This altered strategy is reflected in the huge increase in developing countries integration among the and reduced trade communication and transportation costs as a result of technological advances also changed fordist production system to post-fordist one which depends on the decentralization of the production by means of cutting into parts the production band to specific units, and prevailing of the process of production around the world markets according to their specialized fields (Collier-Reinika, 2001: 1-44). By means of this decentralized production process and outsourcing practice the production bases has begun to slip low-wage intensive markets of developing countries. This transformation has also changed the nature of the international trade, before the globalization era, nearly % 80 of developing country merchandise export were primary products. Today nearly %80 merchandise export of developing countries are manufactures (Dolar, 2005: 108). On the other hand, the rate of Western Europe share of world export decreased % 47 in 1980 to % 37.1 level in 2000 (Doulas, 2005: 21). The increased production capacity of developing countries paved way of their gradually integration to global markets and most of barriers on the free movement of goods and capital had removed across the markets (Doulas, 2005: 23). These developments has had enormous impacts on the European welfare system (Wahl, 2011: 114; Doulas, 2005: 24). The EU has been suffering a low growth rate which is a vital factor and has positive correlation with the sustainability of welfare system, for three decades (see Table 1) compared to its counterparts such as USA (Table 2), China (Table 3) and India (Table 4)



Table 1: EU's Growth Rates in Decades

Trading Economics Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/gdp (18.09.2018)





Trading Economics Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp (18.09.2018)






Table 3: China's Growth Rates in Decades

Trading Economics Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp (18.09.2018)





Trading Economics Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp (18.09.2018)

As indicated above, the EU has experienced a low growth performance compared to its counterparts during the last three decades due to mainly negative effects of globalization. According to conventional wisdom of economy, the growth rate has two main variables and it has positive correlations with these variables (McKinsey, 2015). These are

demographic factors and productivity rate which is correlated with the competition and innovation capacities of a relevant market (Piketty, 2014: 78-114). In this regard, it should be necessary to compare the demographic changes which has positive correlation with the growth rate. As demonstrated in Tables 5,6,7 and 8 the EU has scored poorly than its counterparts in the realm of population growth. Meanwhile it is important to indicate that, by saving population growth, we imply the population growth which has occurred in labor force or has potential to participate in labor force (Piketty, 2014: 115). The EU has been struggling to remobilize its population such as promoting the programs which aim to include females, disabilities, socially excluded people, old people, migrant populations and young people into the labor force and this strategy has took part in all the recent official documents of EU such as Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 Strategy (EU Commission, 2012). The main aim of EU is to enhance the number of working people which in turn would have positive impact on the slow growth rates (Wahl, 2011: 234). But despite these struggles, it has seemed hardly to increase the growth by means of demographic factors due to poor population growth, in contrast, the demographic factor's negative impact on the growth rates, put further weight on the productivity factor which should fill the growth vacuum due to demographic factors. In the other words, the EU should achieve more productivity growth for passing or at least catching its counterparts which is a vital issue for EU to survive its welfare system.





Table 5: EU's Population Growth Rate in Decades

Trading Economics Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/population(18.09.2018)

The population growth between 2012-2014 is the result of enlargement, not the natural population growth.

Table 6: USA's Population Growth Rate in Decades



Trading Economics Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/population (18.09.2018)




Table 7: China's Population Growth Rate in Decades

Trading Economics Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/china/population (18.09.2018)




Table 8: India's Population Growth Rate in Decades

Trading States Index, World Bank

https://tradingeconomics.com/india/population (18.11.2015)

The EU has been also demonstrating similar and in some cases low productivity rates compared to its counterparts as such as USA, Brazil and Japan which is indicated in Table 9,10,11,12. As it is indicated above, the EU has been suffering from the demographic factors, consequently it needs more productivity growth but it has failed to achieve it. The Europe 2020 aims has direct correlation with this reality (EU Commission, 2012)





Table 9: EU's Productivity Growth Rate in Decades

Trading States Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/india/population(18.11.2015)

Table 10: USA's Productivity Growth Rate in Decades



Trading States Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/productivity (01.10.2018)






Table 11: Brazil's Productivity Growth Rate in Decades

Trading States Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/productivity (18.09.2018)






Trading States Index, World Bank

https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/productivity (18.09.2018)

The productivity growth mainly depends on the competitiveness of markets and innovation rates (Piketty, 2014: 200-256). The competitiveness of European countries does not demonstrate sufficient degrees compared to its counterparts. According to 2014 Competitiveness Report of World Economic Forum, the average competitiveness grade of core 15 members of

EU is 4.96, compared to USA 5.48, Japan 5.40, Canada 5.20, China 4.84, India 4.28 and Brazil 4.56 (World Economic Forum, 2014). If the competitiveness grade of EU has indicated with its 28 members it reduces to 4.40 which is lower than China and a little higher than the India (World Economic Forum, 2014). On the other hand, according to 2015 Global Innovation Index Report of World Intellectual Property Organization, the dispersion rates of innovation achievers among the world regions is like that : %32 East and South Asia, %31 North America, %23 EU Area and %14 the other regions (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2015). As it is indicated with quantitative data above, the EU is not performing well in both competitiveness and innovation compared to its counterparts, despite it should perform more due to its demographic disabilities for increasing its growth rate which has vital importance for EU to continue its welfare system. It should be considered that why the EU perform low competitiveness. There should be many variables for controlling this issue, but two of them will be considered for reaching a causal chain, namely, wages growth and productivity rate per person in labor market.

Table 13: Wage Growth in EU in Decades



Trading States Index, World Bank https://tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/wage-growth (18.09.2018)

As it is indicated above, despite the increasing productivity nearly in all the sectors in the EU, the wages have been reducing dramatically between 2008-2018. It happens because the low-skilled workers in European countries are now competing more with the workers in the developing world because of the trade liberalizations and post-fordist production preferences, on the other hand, it is plausible that global economic integration creates pressures for higher inequality in post-industrial developed countries, while opposite effect in poor countries (Dolar, 2005: 97-123). However, the quantitative data above demonstrate us, despite the dramatically decreasing wage growth and increasing productivity per person, the EU could not increase its competitiveness in particular, its growth in general to sufficient rate which shall necessary for survival of its welfare state. This conclusion of course should have many reasons, but one of the important reason of this conclusion is high level labor and production expenditures of EU due to its social, labor and environmental standards (Wahl, 2011: 166). An average European worker costs more than ¹/₂ times an American worker, seven times than a Chinese worker and thirteen times than an Indian worker to a firm due to higher labor and social security standards (Wahl, 2011: 167-168). On the other hand, there are many environmental standards which put considerable expenditures to European firms. According to United Nation Economic and Social Affairs Department, the EU had made highest environmental expenditures both in its public and private sectors during the last two decades (UN Economic and Social Affairs Department, 2015). On the other hand, EU has been making the higher social security and social assistance expenditure per person compared to other states (Wahl, 2011: 207). These expenditures are indispensible necessaries of a welfare state and there is no doubt about that, but they may decrease the competitiveness of the EU against its counterparts. Consequently, there are two preferences in this regard. First, the EU may dispense with its welfare standards and decrease the social expenditures of both public and private sector or as a second way, the EU may impose and promote its labor, environmental and social standards to its counterparts by means of its economic and normative power and equalize the expenditures which in turn would increase the EU's competitiveness. The first way is too difficult to achieve, because due to its democratic accountability, none of the policy-maker of EU could dare to lift or weaken the welfare standards dramatically, because it should be a political suicide (Zielonka, 2008: 73). In the other word, the European public is very keen to maintain its current standards of labor, life and health, and failure of same standards in the other countries puts European firms at a comparative economic disadvantage. The Union has no option, but to try to influence the rules of international governance by using economic and normative power. This policy is largely about exporting its own model of governance to other countries, even if this impose significant domestic constraints (Zielonka, 2008: 479). The EU has also a long lasting regulatory experience and together with United States, they imposed nearly % 80 of the international regulations (Langenhove, 2007: 11). This regulation and governance export may be realized by means of intergovernmental negotiations, but the achievement possibility is very low in intergovermental negotiations. First of all, it is too difficult to create convergences among the nearly 200 countries which have distinct priorities, preferences and circumstances. Second, it is futile to reach comprehensive resolutions for global risk such as climate change by means of intergovernmental system which consists of states with their different policies. The failure of adoption of Kyoto Protocol which was aiming to reduce green gas emission worldwide, among the nation states demonstrates this reality. Another examples of failure of intergovernmental negotiations are Uruguay and Doha Rounds of World Trade Organization (WTO). Their objectives were lower

the trade barriers around the world, and thus facilitate increased global trade. The Doha Round or Doha Development Agenda began with a ministeriallevel meeting in Doha in 2001 and its subsequent ministerial meetings took place in Cancun, Mexico (2003), and Hong Kong (2005). Related negotiations took place in Paris, France (2005), Potsdam, Germany (2007) and Geneva, Switzerland (2004, 2006, 2008), but conclusions of the Round was frustration, because no significant progress has eventuated from the negotiations and the Round failed due to considerable contentions among the countries (Fergusson, 2008). Consequently, the intergovernmental initiations may not be provided the EU sufficient achievement in the field of its norm and governance exportation. Thus, the interregional arrangements appear to be conductive. On the other hand, due to EU itself is a custom union, the trans regionalism should not be conductive strategy. In this regard, EU should make preference between pure and hybrid interregionalism. In the Table 14 prominent EU interregional agreements with the other regions and the types of these agreements are presented.

AGREEMENT	COUNTERPART	TYPE OF
	REGION	INTERREGIONALISM
Lome Agreement	ACP (African, Caribean	Hybrid Interregionalism
	and Pacific)	
Barcelona Process	Mediterranean Region	Hybrid Interregionalism
Cotonou Agreement	ACP (African, Caribean	Hybrid Interregionalism
	and Pacific)	
Economic Partnership	ECOWAS (Economic	Pure Interregionalism
Agreement	Community of West	
	African States)	
Economic Partnership	EAC (East African	Pure Interregionalism
Agreement	Community)	

Table 14: EU Agreements with Other Regions

Economic Partnership	SADC (South African	Pure Interregionalism
Agreement	Development Community)	
Economic Partnership	CARIFORUM (Carrebean	Hybrid Interregionalism
Agreement	States)	
Association Agreement	Central American States	Hybrid Interregionalism
Trade Co-operation and	South African States	Hybrid Interregionalism
Development		
Agreement		
Economic Partnership	Central American States	Hybrid Interregionalism
Agreement		
ASEM (Asia-Europe	ASEAN States, Korea and	Hybrid Interregionalism
Meeting) and	Japan	
Association Agreement		
Framework	MERCOSUR (Southern	Pure Interregionalism
Cooperation	Common Market)	
Agreement (EMIFCA)		
Economic Partnership	USAN (Union of South	Pure Interregionalism
Agreement	American Nations)	
Joint African EU	African Union	Pure Interregionalism
Strategy (JAES)		
Summit Agreement		
Valetta Summit and	African Union	Pure Interregionalism
Migration Agreement		

European Commission (2015). European Union Agreements,

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/#_other-countries, (10.09.2018)

In the case of hybrid interregionalism, in the past EU has initiated this type of interregionalism in many times as it was indicated in Table 15, but three of them namely, Lome Agreement, Barcelona Process and Singapore Issues are more important which EU failed to reach successful conclusions in the realm of norm, regulation and governance exportation. The Lomé Convention is a trade and aid agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC), and 71 African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries, first signed in February 1975 in Lome which came into force in April 1976, was designed to provide a new framework of cooperation between the then European Economic Community (EEC) and developing ACP countries, in particular former British, Dutch, Belgian and French colonies. It had two main aspects. It provided for most ACP agricultural and mineral exports to enter the EEC free of duty. Preferential access based on a quota system was agreed for products, such as sugar and beef, in competition with EEC agriculture. Secondly, the EEC committed ECU 3 billion for aid and investment in the ACP countries (Fryer, 2000: 13-54). The Lome Agreement also was including the some provisions of establishment of rule of law and respect for human rights in these ACP states, but the agreement could not bring the successful conclusions in many target states in this realm (Ravenhill, 1984: 537-574). In 1995, the United States government petitioned to the World Trade Organization to investigate whether the Lome convention had violated WTO rules. Then later in 1996, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, effectively ending the crosssubsidies that had benefited ACP countries for many years. But the US remained unsatisfied and insisted that all preferential trade agreements between the EU and ACP should cease. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body established another panel to discuss the issue and concluded that agreements between the EU and ACP were indeed not compatible with WTO regulations. Finally, the EU negotiated with the US through WTO to reach an agreement, but they could not reach a comprehensive resolution (Gruhn, 2014: 240-262).

However, the Lome Agreement followed with Cotonou Agreement between EU and the same ACP countries in 2000. The Cotonou Agreement is aimed at the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty while contributing to sustainable development and to the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy. The revised Cotonou Agreement is

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also concerned with the fight against impunity and promotion of criminal justice through the International Criminal Court (EU Commission, 2015). According to Aggrawal and Fogarty, the Lome Convention and Cotonou Agreement are examples of hybrid interregionalism in which the EU has trade and political relationship with a set of countries from other regions that are not grouped in their own custom union or free trade agreement (Aggrawal-Fogarty, 2004: 170-177; Soderbaum, 2003: 258). But as it has indicated above, the EU not only needs free trade agreements, it also needs to export its norms, regulations and governance to other regions by means of these agreements for increasing its competitiveness. If one takes into consideration the social, economic and political conditions of the ACP countries, it is hardly to mention about an EU type labor, environmental, health, social security and democracy standards. According to Freedom House and Amnesty International, most of these ACP countries are not free and commits considerable human rights violations (Freedom House, 2014; Amnesty International, 2015). Consequently, nearly more than 30 years of hybrid interregional relationship between EU and ACP countries could not bring them even the fundamental rules of EU such as rule of law or respect for human rights, thus it is doubt that how could EU impose its more complex labor, environmental and social standards and regulations to these countries. It is obvious that, without a regional organization which provide sufficient collective action capacity, it is too difficult to reach a common standards among the individual states. In contrast, the African Union has promoted EU norms more than Cotonou and Lome Agreements did (Aggrawal-Fogarty, 2004: 180). As an example, the African Union has suspended the membership of Burniko Faso and Central African Republic due to lack of rule of law and violations of human rights. If one takes into consideration another hybrid interregional relationship namely, Barcelona Process between the EU and Mediterranean countries of North Africa and Middle East in 1995, similar conclusion should be reached (Semsit, 2007: 129-130). The Barcelona Process was not a trade agreement only, it was an innovative alliance based on the principles of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation, seeking to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity (Balkır, 2007: 9-47). The EU would promote aids and open its markets to its Mediterranean partners in exchange for their adoption of European norms and policies (EU Commission, 2010). Despite the EU's struggles the Barcelona Process failed to bring prosperity, security and peace to Mediterranean, because the deep political, historical and social distinctiveness between the partners such as it happened between Israel and Palestine, and lack of a counter regional hegemonic power among them which would provide a conductive collective action, prevented the constitution of an European style governance and adoption of European norms in the region (Emerson-Young, 2007: 23-56; Emerson-Bounekeur, 2007: 12-49; Langendijk-Wiersma, 2008: 28-29; Semit, 2007: 130-153). Finally, if one takes into consideration the Singapore Issues, it is again possible to mention about failure of hybrid interregionalism. Due to failed WTO negotiations in Uruguay Round, the EU held a ministerial level conference in Singapore, in 1996 with Japan, Korea and some prominent developing countries such as China and India. In the Conference, four working groups were established in four distinct issues namely, transparency in government procurement, trade facilitations, trade and investment and trade and competition. These became known as Singapore Issues which was presenting mostly the EU's labor and environment standards, but these issues were opposed by most of the developing countries and despite the endeavors of the EU, the conference failed to reach any resolution (Fergusson, 2008). Consequently, it has made it impossible for Europe to include its core labor standards and respect for environmental standards in trade relations not only multilateral trade agenda, but also in realm of its hybrid interregional relationship (Zielonka, 2007: 481). However, it has indicated above that the EU needs a world politics which depends on interregionalism for exporting its core labor, environment and democratic standards to other regions which is indispensible obligation for increasing its competitiveness. Consequently, it has three strategical preferences namely, pure interregionalism, hybrid interregionalism and transregionalism. Due to its regional character, the EU could not prefer transregionalism. On the other hand, the past experiences of EU which were indicated above, demonstrates that, the EU has not achieved a good grade in the realm of rule setting in world agenda by means of hybrid interregionalism. Thus, only one preference remains namely, pure interregionalism. Sebastian Santander, in his case study, deals with the EU's most important strategic partnership in Latin America, namely with Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Santander explains that this partnership is based on political dialogue, cooperation and trade. He argues that the interregional partnership is designed to enhance the EU's own legitimacy and its own role as a global actor (Santander, 2002; Sonderbaum, 2003: 260). It is also contingent to add EU-African Union relations to as examples of this type of pure interregionalism. (Despite they comply with the definition of pure interregionalism, it is disputable to accept the EU's relations with SADC, EAC and ECOWAS because so called regional blocks are lack of sufficient exercising capacity of common agreements. But they may have potential to progress their collective action capacity in the future, thus EU's relations with them should be called as primitive pure interregionalism) The exercising of pure interregionalism requires existence of well integrated regional blocks over the world. Today only the EU could be an exclusive example of this type of regional block, but all over the world, it is obvious

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that there is an increasing tendency among the regional countries to constitute their own regional blocks (Sonderbaum, 2003: 263). For example, MERCOSUR in Latin America. African Union in Africa. USAN in South America, ASEAN in South Asia, Shangai Cooperation Organization in continental Asia, a possible Pacific Union in Pacific states and Australia, and Gulf Economical Cooperation Organization among Persian Gulf Arabic monarchies (they further integrated their cooperation from economical one to security one which the world witnessed in the military operation of Gulf countries to Yemen) could be the regional blocks and of course counterparts of the EU in the future. In the Woolcock terms, the EU example may constitute a domino regionalization (Woolcock, 2009). It assumed that the success degree of the pure interregionalism in the realm of exporting EU's core labor, environmental and social standards to other regions, will be appeared in the future when all these pre-regional entities transformed to real regional blocks. In this regard, it would be easier for EU to negotiate a few regional block in contrast to hundreds of states and it would also be more easy to deal with global risks and reach global resolutions due to facilitated collective action capacity.

4. Conclusion

In this article, the interregionalism and its correlation with the promotion of the EU's norms, core labor, social and environmental standards among the other counterpart regions of the world has elaborated. In first section, the political and cultural considerations are elaborated and, it is indicated that the preference of pure interregionalism as a grand strategy by the EU is compulsory due to not only for recognition of itself as a global actor, but also for adaptation of itself for transformed multilateralism in the post-modern world. In the second section, the economical considerations are taken into consideration. In this section it is assumed that due to devastating

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impacts of globalization on the EU's competitiveness, the EU has to export its core labor, social and environmental standards to not only developed, but also to developing countries. The EU only could increase its firms and markets' competitiveness without dispensing with its welfare system, by means of this export strategy. In this section, it is also asserted that the EU could achieve this aim only by means of a pure interregionalist regional strategy. It is also indicated that the success of the strategy of pure interregionalism would be appeared in the future more smoothly.

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