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An Analysis of Kuçuradi's Concept of Value

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Abstract

Although the concept of value is often addressed in terms of personal perspectives, cultural differences, and relativism, in Ioanna Kuçuradi's philosophy it is grounded as a concept related to the existential possibilities that human beings possess as a species. In this context, the aim of this article is to analyze the concept of value within Kuçuradi's distinction between value and evaluation and to reveal the determining role of correct evaluation in ethical life and human rights. In line with this aim, the initial part of the study will briefly examine the definitions, types, and the general framework of the concept of value, and will address the philosophical grounds of Kuçuradi's approach to the problem of value and evaluation. Subsequently, the role of evaluation in understanding value will be examined from Kuçuradi's perspective, and it will be argued that evaluation should not be limited to subjective interests and temporary judgments, but rather should serve to reveal the qualities inherent in the object itself. Within this framework, the distinction between value attribution and value judgment will be clarified, and the philosophical significance of correct evaluation will be established. It will then be emphasized that stereotypical evaluations lead to ethical conflicts and value-related problems, whereas correct evaluation constitutes a fundamental condition for living in a genuinely human way, thereby opening the discussion on the ethical dimension of value. In the final stage, the concept of value will be analyzed in terms of its practical implications for human life, and it will be argued that, in Kuçuradi's perspective, human rights should be understood as universal ethical principles independent of cultural norms. As a result, the study demonstrates that a proper understanding of value is not only a theoretical necessity but also a practical one, and that the protection of human rights is possible only through an understanding of evaluation grounded in knowledge of value.

Keywords: Value, values, evaluation, value appraisal, value attribution.

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Kuçuradi'nin Değer Kavramı Üzerine Bir Çözümleme

Öz

Değer kavramı çoğu zaman kişisel bakış açıları, kültürel farklılıklar ve görelilik bağlamında ele alınsa da Kuçuradi'de değer, insanın tür olarak sahip olduğu varlık olanaklarıyla ilişkili bir kavram olarak temellendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda makalenin amacı, değer kavramını Kuçuradi'nin değer-değerlendirme ayrımı çerçevesinde çözümleyerek doğru değerlendirmenin etik yaşam ve insan hakları bakımından taşıdığı belirleyici rolü ortaya koymaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda çalışmanın başlangıç kısmında değer tanımları, türleri ve tartışma zemini kısaca incelenecek; Kuçuradi'nin değer ve değerlendirme sorununa yönelişinin felsefi gerekçeleri ele alınacaktır. Ardından Kuçuradi açısından değer anlaşılmada değerlendirmenin rolü incelenecek; değerlendirmenin öznel çıkarlar ve geçici yargılarla sınırlı kalmayıp, şeyin kendisinde bulunan niteliklerin doğru biçimde açığa çıkarılmasına hizmet etmesi gerektiği ortaya konulacaktır. Bu çerçevede değer atfetme ve değer biçme ayrımı görünür kılınarak doğru değerlendirmenin felsefi önemi temellendirilecektir. Devamında, ezbere değerlendirmelerin etik çatışmalara ve değer sorunlarına yol açtığı; buna karşılık doğru değerlendirmenin insanca yaşamın temel koşulu olduğu vurgulanarak değer etik boyutu tartışılacaktır. Son aşamada değer kavramı, insan yaşamını doğrudan etkileyen pratik sonuçları bakımından çözümlenecek ve Kuçuradi'nin perspektifinde insan haklarının kültürel normlardan bağımsız, evrensel etik ilkeler olarak anlaşılması gerektiği ele alınacaktır. Sonuç olarak çalışma, değer kavramının doğru anlaşılmasının yalnızca teorik değil, aynı zamanda pratik bir zorunluluk olduğunu; insan haklarının korunmasının da ancak değer bilgisine dayalı bir değerlendirme anlayışıyla mümkün olacağını göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Değer, değerler, değerlendirme, değer biçme, değer atfetme.

1. Introduction

In general terms, the concept of value appears as “the quality or characteristic that indicates the degree of importance of something, making it meaningful, desirable, useful, or an object of interest” (Cevizci, 2015, p. 112). Accordingly, the value of a thing is the quality that determines its importance. In another definition, the concept of value is described as “that which emerges in the relation of a person—as a being who desires, has needs, and sets goals—to an object; since the ways in which people have needs and their various desires multiply evaluations, one encounters countless types of value” (Akarsu, 2019, p. 49). The diversity in the ways individuals experience needs and desires increases differences in evaluations, thus leading to the emergence of innumerable types of value. This subjectivist approach inevitably brings to the fore the problem of value, which is one of the most significant ethical problems of our time. Indeed, today it is a common situation that value and values vary from person to person; what is considered valuable for one individual may be regarded as worthless by another. The primary reason for this lies in the fact that value is shaped within the framework of the meaning attributed by the individual. The existence of different perspectives among individuals leads to different modes of interpretation and, consequently, to different evaluations. As a result, since individuals attribute meaning both to themselves and to things largely in relation to their own selves and interests, value becomes a phenomenon that varies from person to person (Tepe, 2009, p. 7).

The concept of value has been grounded in various ways by different thinkers throughout the history of philosophy. In ancient philosophy, Plato located value in the realm of unchanging ideas, arguing that it possesses a reality beyond the human being (Plato, 2022). In contrast, Protagoras, representing the Sophist tradition, put forward the view that “man is the measure of all things,” thereby asserting the subjectivity of value (Plato, 2011). In modern philosophy,

Immanuel Kant established a normative ground by relating value to a universal moral law based on reason (Kant, 2002). By contrast, Friedrich Nietzsche developed a critical approach to universal conceptions of value by arguing that values are created by human beings (Nietzsche, 2010). In the twentieth century, Max Scheler defended the objectivity of values and argued that they exist within a certain order, thereby addressing the philosophy of value within a systematic framework (Scheler, 2011). These approaches offer different answers to the question of whether value is a quality grounded outside the human being or a phenomenon that emerges within human-related processes. Ioanna Kuçuradi approaches this debate within the framework of the value of the human being and the problem of correct evaluation, developing an ethical understanding grounded in the knowledge of value. In this context, Kuçuradi emphasizes that values are not merely the result of subjective inclinations; rather, there are different modes of evaluation, and the confusion of these modes leads to serious conceptual problems (Kocaman, 2021, p. 7). Therefore, her approach requires addressing the problem of value not merely in terms of personal preferences, but in relation to the nature of evaluative knowledge. Indeed, "if values consist merely of subjective inferences, then in a life whose extent of conscious design by the human being is itself debatable, the existence of some values independent of the individual requires explanation" (Balanuye & Çetin, 2015, pp. 197–198).

Within this framework, questions such as the variability of value, the possibility of attaining knowledge of value, and the determination of criteria for evaluation gain importance. The distinctions put forward by Kuçuradi make it possible to address these questions in a systematic manner. This article aims to analyze the concept of value from the perspective of Kuçuradi's philosophy based on these questions. The main objective of the study is to present the conceptual framework of the distinction between value and evaluation within the context of Kuçuradi's understanding of value.

2. The Nature of the Concept of Value in Kuçuradi's Philosophy

Kuçuradi distinguishes between two different uses of the concept of value. The first use of the concept of value emerges in the field of economics. In this sense, the concept of value is not related to values in the ethical sense; rather, it is concerned with the product of human labor, objects, money, and the use value of an object (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 40). Therefore, from Kuçuradi's perspective, this type of use of the concept of value has no direct relation to the concept of value in the ethical domain, which is based on philosophical knowledge; instead, there exists only an indirect relationship between them.

The determination of the price of an object is related to its value. As its value increases, its price also increases; thus, there is a direct proportion between value and price. The increase or decrease in the value of an object is determined by the extent to which it satisfies a need. This, in turn, gives rise to relativity in the concept of value, because needs and the degree of those needs vary from person to person. In this regard, Kuçuradi emphasizes that attempts within economic value theories to develop an objective measure for determining the value of goods are inevitably unsuccessful. She explains the reasons for understanding value in economic terms as follows: the failure to recognize the distinction between value and values; the inability to see that both value and values are related solely to human beings and to the problem of

meaning; and the confusion between the processes of evaluation, attributing value, and valuation (Kuçuradi, 2022, pp. 40–41).

By emphasizing the distinction between value and values, Kuçuradi defines the concept of value on the basis of the possibilities inherent in a thing. According to her, value depends on the qualities of a thing and constitutes a kind of characteristic, whereas values are existing things or possibilities (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 41). Accordingly, “value” and “values” are distinct concepts: “value” is the distinguishing quality of a thing, while “values” are the possibilities put forth by human beings. Thus, the concept of value, or the value of a thing, emerges in its difference from others.

Kuçuradi clearly presents another distinction in the same work: “‘The value of the human being’ is one thing, and ‘the values of the human being’ are another; by the value of the human being is meant the human being’s special position, as a species, in relation to other beings (everything non-human), in other words, the human being’s unique place in existence” (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 42). In line with this distinction, the values of the human being are phenomena that emerge through human actions and become visible through the realization of structural possibilities specific to human beings. Indeed, according to Kuçuradi, these values are human phenomena that arise within the conditions of existence, such as “knowledge, sciences, arts, philosophy, technique, morals, and cultures” (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 42). Within this framework, values are not domains of being independent of human beings; rather, they are phenomena that emerge through human actions and the realization of human possibilities.

While “the value of the person” refers to the individual’s particular position in relation to society, the values of the person are the possibilities that arise directly or indirectly in interpersonal relations, such as “love, honesty, loyalty, respect, and justice” (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 41). “The value of a person” is the meaning that the individual reveals through the actions realized throughout their life as a whole. This value is not limited to possessing values such as honesty or loyalty, which are valid only in interpersonal relations; rather, it expresses the unique meaning constituted by the historical and individual integrity of the person. “The values of a person,” on the other hand, are not those that encompass universality or the experiences of others, but rather those that become prominent within one’s own life. For this reason, a person’s values may differ from one individual to another, since, from the individual’s perspective, the worth of something is related to its position among other things.

For Kuçuradi, the concept of value is a concept that pertains only to human beings. The reason why this concept concerns only human beings lies in the fact that it is related to human achievements. Since it is the human being who attributes value, it is not possible to speak of a value that exists in things by themselves. Things possess qualities and functions; it is the human being who evaluates them in accordance with these qualities and functions. In this respect, the human being confers new dimensions upon things or beings. Thus, the human being also engages in classifying things as valuable or not valuable. The point that distinguishes what is considered valuable from what is not, through evaluation, is its place in human life. As Kuçuradi states, what determines value is “(...) the extent to which they contribute to the expansion of human possibilities of experience and action” (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 44). Therefore, from the

perspective of the individual, evaluation is shaped in accordance with the developments and innovations it brings to human life.

Kuçuradi divides values into two categories: personal characteristics and personal experiences. Values related to personal characteristics are those acquired through actions such as being honest or being just, whereas values related to personal experiences—such as trust, respect, love, and gratitude—are values gained through interpersonal experiences. Values acquired through personal experiences emerge in relation to a particular person and within a specific period of time. Kuçuradi provides the following example: Trust is a value attained in relation to a particular person, over a certain period of time, as a result of that person not making mistakes and acting in accordance with ethical values (Kuçuradi, 2020a). Therefore, within this framework, it would not be incorrect to say that values belonging to personal experiences are shaped within the framework of values related to personal characteristics.

Values related to personal characteristics are identical with virtues. For Kuçuradi, Aristotle's virtues are also related to personal characteristics concerning the individual, such as being moderate. In Kuçuradi's thought, the distinction between "value" and "value judgment" is fundamental. Value is the distinguishing quality inherent in a thing and specific to its kind; whereas value judgments (such as good–bad, right–wrong, etc.) are qualifications determined by the moral environment, culture, and historical period in which individuals are situated. For this reason, value judgments are variable and contingent; they may differ from person to person and from one era to another. According to Kuçuradi, a large portion of rote evaluations stems from substituting value judgments in place of values. The task of evaluation is not to say "good" or "bad," but to reveal the value inherent in the thing itself. Access to the knowledge of values, therefore, is possible through evaluation. Hence, from this point onward, it is necessary to address value from the perspective of evaluation.

3. The Problem of Evaluation within the Framework of Kuçuradi's Concept of Value

Kuçuradi addresses the concept of value together with evaluation and draws attention to correct evaluation. According to her, "if by evaluating individual things we understand not putting forward value judgments about them, but understanding them and seeing their status in terms of value, then doubting the possibility of correct evaluation and claiming that correct evaluations cannot be made becomes groundless" (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 44). As can be understood from this statement, the possibility of correct evaluation depends on what is understood by evaluation. In other words, as long as we consider evaluation as the process of analyzing the meaning of individual things and their status in terms of value, it is possible to make a correct evaluation. For Kuçuradi, value already exists in the thing being evaluated and constitutes its structural feature; therefore, correct evaluation is nothing other than revealing this existing or structural characteristic. Accordingly, evaluation, from Kuçuradi's perspective, is the act of disclosing the value-status present in things—such as actions, persons, or works—on the basis of what is.

Kuçuradi states that the primary reason for writing this work is that “the same people, the same events, the same situations, the same actions, the same decisions, the same works, and even the same phenomena are evaluated, interpreted, and explained differently by different individuals” (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 5). According to her, these differing evaluations create conflict, as each is put forward as a correct evaluation. For this reason, the problem of correct evaluation holds a significant place “for people of our age, whose ideal is democracy” (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 5). This is because individuals shape their preferences and actions as a result of evaluation.

However, for Kuçuradi, the central problem lies in the confusion between evaluation and valuation; therefore, these two concepts must be distinguished. Evaluation is the act of revealing the value already present in things, whereas valuation is the act of attributing value to things based on what the individual considers important. As Kuçuradi states, “in valuation, the attributed value—that is, value judgments—may be related, on the one hand, to the constantly changing needs and interests of the evaluator, and, on the other hand, to the moral framework valid at that moment” (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 45). This situation may lead to the denial of what truly has value and to the attribution of value to what does not.

Attributing value is an evaluation that arises on the basis of an individual’s subjective interests, needs, or personal concerns, whereas valuation (appraisal) relies on prevailing moral norms and value judgments; therefore, even if this process may be independent of personal interest, it does not reveal the intrinsic value of the thing itself. For this reason, neither of these types of evaluation constitutes correct evaluation. This situation shows that both attributing value and valuation often render the real value of things invisible; therefore, correct evaluation is necessary in order to attain the knowledge of values. Precisely for this reason, the task of the thinker is to reveal the basis of what is happening and to help those who cannot see this basis to see it; only in this way can one guide what is happening, set limits to action, and look with hope upon efforts to enable human beings to live in a humane way (Kuçuradi, 2022, p. 6). Because, for Kuçuradi, the value of a thing is not related to the value attributed or assigned to it, but is a quality inherent in it. In this case, it is clear that correct evaluation differs from both attributing value and valuation. As Kuçuradi states, “evaluation is the perception of a meaning in reality; the perceived meaning is either related to the structure of the evaluator, being a result of that person being as they are, or it is a result of the moral framework valid in that era or environment” (Kuçuradi, 2016c, p. 10). In both cases, value does not emerge as an intrinsic quality of the thing itself.

In summary, evaluation can be divided into three types: attributing value, valuation (appraisal), and correct evaluation. Attributing value is the act of assigning value to something based on an individual’s subjective interests, needs, or concerns; valuation is an evaluation based on prevailing moral judgments. Since neither of these types reveals the intrinsic value of the thing, they do not constitute correct evaluation. Correct evaluation, on the other hand, is the activity of revealing the value that already exists within the thing itself. According to Kuçuradi, this takes place in three stages. For example, in evaluating a literary work, the first stage is to understand it—that is, to determine what the author intends to convey; the second stage is to situate the work within its field or to determine its place—its distinguishing characteristic; and finally, to determine its importance or to show what it means for our world and what these possibilities signify in terms of ethical values. For the realization of this third

stage, philosophical knowledge of value—especially of ethical values—is required, that is, knowledge of the value of ethical values (Kuçuradi, 2020a, pp. 95–97). Thus, correct evaluation becomes possible through revealing the value inherent in the thing through these three stages. It is therefore evident that attributing value and valuation remain distant from these stages and, consequently, from correct evaluation. Many ethical problems are related to attributing value and valuation—in other words, to forms of incorrect evaluation. For this reason, the problem of value and evaluation must be addressed within the framework of Kuçuradi's ethical approach, which is grounded in the knowledge of the value of the human being.

4. The Ethical Dimension of Value and Values in Kuçuradi

Within the framework of her ethical view, Kuçuradi emphasizes the necessity of following a path that will lead human beings to the knowledge of value and values (Köseoğlu, 2021, p. 87). According to her, the knowledge of value and values constitutes the fundamental condition for human beings to evaluate the world, what is happening, and their own actions correctly. For this reason, evaluation appears not merely as a cognitive activity, but as an activity inherent in the ontological structure of the human being (Kuçuradi, 2016c, p. 17). Human beings establish their relation to the world through evaluations and determine their orientations, choices, and actions accordingly. This demonstrates that evaluation is directly related to the ethical domain.

However, for Kuçuradi, what is decisive is not the mere existence of evaluation, but how it is carried out. In this context, "rote evaluation" plays a central role in the emergence of ethical problems. Attributing value and valuation (appraisal) constitute the primary forms of such evaluations. Attributing value refers to assigning value to things or actions independently of their own nature, based on the individual's subjective interests, needs, or concerns. In this case, evaluation is carried out not on the basis of the structural features of the evaluated object, but from the subjective position of the evaluator. Valuation, on the other hand, emerges as a type of evaluation based on specific value judgments or pre-established moral frameworks. In such evaluations, it is not the thing itself, but a previously accepted normative framework that becomes decisive.

The common feature of these two forms of evaluation is that they do not reveal the intrinsic value of the thing. On the contrary, they render the value of the thing invisible. For example, evaluating a law solely in terms of whether it aligns with personal interests does not reveal the value that the law holds for human life; rather, it reduces evaluation to the criterion of individual benefit. Similarly, interpreting a natural event as a "divine punishment" is not based on understanding the structural features of the event itself, but on placing it within a ready-made framework of meaning. Although such evaluations appear to produce meaning, they do not, in fact, enable access to the knowledge of value.

According to Kuçuradi, such incorrect forms of evaluation also lie at the basis of ethical problems. Human beings act in accordance with their evaluations and shape their lives through these actions. For this reason, incorrect evaluations lead to incorrect actions, and incorrect actions give rise to ethical problems. Therefore, the solution to ethical problems is possible not only through the regulation of actions, but through the transformation of evaluation processes. The fundamental condition of this transformation is the acquisition of knowledge of value. The

knowledge of value involves a correct understanding of what things or actions are, what possibilities they contain, and what these possibilities signify for human life. In this sense, correct evaluation is defined as an activity that reveals the knowledge of value and directs action in accordance with this knowledge.

In Kuçuradi's ethical understanding, this issue becomes concrete in the context of human rights. According to her, "the source of the idea of fundamental human rights is the knowledge of the value of certain structural possibilities of the human being as a species" (Kuçuradi, 2007). In this context, human rights emerge not as products of social agreements or cultural norms, but as practical consequences of the knowledge of human value. The structural possibilities of the human being—such as thinking, making sense, and grasping values—constitute their value. Human rights, in turn, are understood as ethical principles that make the protection of these possibilities possible. Within this framework, the protection or violation of human rights largely depends on the manner in which individuals evaluate persons and actions. Evaluations based on attributing value or on value judgments render the value of the human being invisible; by contrast, correct evaluation reveals the value of the possibilities that the human being possesses as a species. Therefore, the protection of human rights depends not only on legal regulations, but also on the existence of individuals capable of making correct evaluations. At this point, Kuçuradi also draws a distinction between morality and ethics. Morality consists of the norms, rules, and value judgments that are valid within a particular society and, in this respect, varies from one culture to another. Ethics, on the other hand, is a field that questions these norms and is grounded in the knowledge of human value; therefore, it is not relative (Kuçuradi, 2020a). For this reason, acting ethically does not merely mean conforming to social norms. On the contrary, ethical action requires that the norms themselves be evaluated in terms of human value. This, in turn, is only possible through possessing knowledge of ethical values.

Kuçuradi's concept of "human dignity" also holds a central place in this context. Human dignity refers to having an awareness of the value of being human (Kuçuradi, 2021). This awareness determines not only the individual's attitude toward themselves but also toward others. An individual who is aware of their own value is also able to recognize the value of others, and this recognition constitutes the foundation of ethical action. Therefore, human dignity plays a decisive role in the establishment of ethical relations. In this framework, human rights documents are also regarded as ethical texts that set forth how the value of the human being should be protected in practice. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a fundamental ethical framework that expresses how every human being ought not to treat another (Kuçuradi, 2021b). The universality of these documents does not stem from their belonging to a particular culture, but from their derivation from the knowledge of human value.

In conclusion, for Kuçuradi, the ethical dimension of the problem of value and evaluation emerges in direct relation to human actions. Subjective forms of evaluation, such as attributing value and valuation, lead to actions that disregard human value; in contrast, correct evaluation reveals the possibility of an ethical life grounded in human value. For this reason, ethics is understood not merely as a normative domain, but as a field of knowledge based on the capacity to make correct evaluations. The establishment of a more livable world, therefore, depends on individuals' ability to develop their capacity to evaluate on the basis of knowledge of value.

5. Conclusion

As a result of the analysis conducted, the following points become clearly evident: for Kuçuradi, the concept of value is directly related to the nature of evaluation. Value is the particular place of a thing among others of the same kind (Kuçuradi, 2020b, p. 95). When evaluation takes the form of attributing value, it moves away from correct evaluation and acquires a character dependent on personal interests, expectations, and inclinations. This situation renders evaluation subjective and variable, thereby creating the ground for the emergence of ethical problems. In this context, rote evaluation prevents the disclosure of the structural value of the evaluated thing and the formation of knowledge of value; moreover, it fosters social or intersocietal conflicts based on the exclusion of differences (Kuçuradi, 2014, p. 40).

Evaluation centered on personal interest varies from person to person, as it is shaped by emotions, desires, and expectations; this, in turn, distances evaluation from reality and makes rote evaluation inevitable. On the other hand, valuation (appraisal), being an evaluation based on a particular value judgment, does not constitute correct evaluation. According to Kuçuradi, both of these modes of evaluation are not concerned with the real value of the evaluated thing and thus take the form of rote evaluations (Kuçuradi, 2019). In contrast, correct evaluation—much like a doctor diagnosing a patient—reveals what exists in the thing being evaluated and enables the recognition of what ought to be done. In this respect, correct evaluation emerges as the fundamental condition for ethical life and the preservation of values.

The distinction Kuçuradi draws between value and value judgment provides an important opportunity for understanding the confusions present in the ethical domain. The fact that value judgments vary culturally and historically demonstrates that they do not always function in a value-preserving manner. For this reason, whether ethical norms become value-preserving or value-destroying is directly related to how they are applied—in other words, to correct evaluation (Kuçuradi, 2020a).

Within this framework, one's attitude toward value should be shaped not through attributing value or valuation, but through correct evaluation. This is because attaining knowledge of value is only possible through correct evaluation. Ethical values must be adopted through an evaluation free from self-interest, and actions must be determined accordingly (Kuçuradi, 2023b). Indeed, acting merely for the sake of interest is not ethical, just as conforming to a value solely in accordance with social expectations is not ethical either. The fundamental condition of a life in accordance with values is to carry out what ought to be done without self-interest.

Acting on the basis of self-interest leads to value problems, and one of the most significant examples of these problems emerges as the issue of the protection of human rights. According to Kuçuradi, this problem is, first and foremost, a problem of philosophy and stems from the insufficient understanding of the relationship between human rights and the knowledge of human value (Kuçuradi, 2016b, p. 10; Kuçuradi, 2016a, p. 83). Indeed, "one of the greatest absurdities of our time is that, in official or unofficial politics, some human rights are recklessly violated in the name of other human rights, while terrorism—whether illegal or 'legal'—mercilessly kills people before everyone's eyes" (Kuçuradi, 2023a, p. 126). This situation raises

the question of with what kind of consciousness human beings should take a stance in the face of ethical problems.

In this context, the attitude of being able to say “no,” symbolized in Albert Camus’s *The Rebel*, expresses the possibility of setting an ethical limit grounded in the knowledge of value. Kuçuradi’s statement “I am human; I do not do this” likewise demonstrates that human beings can consciously limit their actions on the basis of value knowledge (Camus, 2020; Kuçuradi, 2021b). The protection of human rights is possible not only through institutional arrangements, but also through individuals who are capable of grasping these values and directing their actions accordingly (Çüçen, 2018, p. 169).

At this point, regarding Kuçuradi’s understanding of value, it is possible to agree particularly with her emphasis that value cannot be reduced to subjective preferences and that correct evaluation is the activity of revealing the value inherent in the thing itself. This approach offers an important opportunity for grounding objectivity in the ethical domain. Nevertheless, Kuçuradi’s approach can be positioned more clearly when considered alongside other ethical theories. For example, there is a significant parallel between Immanuel Kant’s universalist ethical understanding, which treats the human being as an end in itself, and Kuçuradi’s emphasis on human value. By contrast, Max Scheler’s approach, which considers values within a hierarchy and order of priority, allows for a different understanding of the relations among values. Kuçuradi, however, rather than establishing a predetermined hierarchy among values, bases her approach on revealing value in each concrete situation through correct evaluation. In this respect, her approach occupies an original position distinct from other theories of value.

One of the strongest aspects of Kuçuradi’s understanding of value is that it separates value from subjective preferences and grounds it in the activity of evaluation. At the same time, the fact that correct evaluation requires philosophical knowledge and the capacity for conceptual analysis may limit its applicability on a broad scale and may give rise to inequalities among individuals in terms of evaluative capacity. This situation suggests that Kuçuradi’s emphasis on ethical values education can be read not only as a pedagogical preference, but also as a philosophical response to the limitations of correct evaluation.

In conclusion, Kuçuradi’s understanding of value provides the philosophical foundation for an ethical life grounded in the knowledge of value and for the protection of human rights. This approach demonstrates that human rights can be safeguarded not only through normative regulations, but through individuals who reflect knowledge of value in their actions, thereby offering a significant contribution to contemporary ethical debates. In this context, the practical counterpart of the concept of value, as approached from Kuçuradi’s perspective, is the unconditional protection of human rights; the most concise expression of this understanding is found in Kuçuradi’s statement: “Whether we like them or not, the real skill is to protect the human rights of those we do not like” (Kuçuradi, 2021b).

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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