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Television and Fluid Propaganda: Analysis of Al Alam Television Content with Special Regard to Lebanon's Hezbollah and Iran

*Televizyon ve Akışkan Propaganda: Lübnan
Hizbullah'ı ve İran Özelinde Al Alam
Televizyonu İçeriklerinin Analizi*

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the news content broadcast by Al Alam television, which is under the regime's control, following its editorial line a regime-aligned broadcasting approach. However, while conducting this analysis, the strategic economic and political production conditions that emerged between Hezbollah and Iran were also included in the scope of the research, and this study adopts a multi-faceted analytical perspective was attempted. In line with this purpose, an attempt was made to determine what the contents that have a common ideological flow between Hezbollah and Iran are, what ideological infrastructure these issues are created with, the status of the representations attributed to Hezbollah in the contents produced on Al-Alam television, and, in addition, the political-economic conditions between these two strategic actors. The content analysis method was adopted in the research. 184 news content broadcasts between 22.06.2023 and 31.12.2023 were examined in detail. According to the research results; the findings reveal that the news texts produced on Al Alam TV adopted an ideological language, the ideological representatives of both sides were actively included in the news texts, textual and visual codes supported the military operations carried out by these representatives in the field, Hezbollah was approached from an institutional perspective in the production of ideological conditions, Hassan Nasrallah and other Hezbollah officials were pushed to the background, and the conditions for marketing Hezbollah were created in the ideological consumption market that was produced and conveyed to the masses in a transnational manner.

Keywords: Hezbollah, Iran, Agenda Setting, Content Analysis.

Jel Kodes: R5, Z1, Z190

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı; İran'da rejimin kontrolünde hareket eden ve bu doğrultuda bir yayıncılık anlayışı izleyen Al Alam televizyonunda yayınlanan haber içeriklerinin çözümlemesidir. Fakat bu çözümleme sürecini yerine getirirken Hizbullah ve İran arasında ortaya çıkan stratejik ekonomik ve politik üretim koşulları da araştırma kapsamına alınmış ve araştırmanın çok yönlü bir okuması gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda Hizbullah ve İran arasında ortak bir ideolojik akışa sahip içeriklerin neler olduğu, bu konuların hangi ideolojik altyapı ile oluşturulduğu, Al Alam televizyonunda üretilen içeriklerde Hizbullah'a biçilen temsillerin durumu, ek olarak bu iki stratejik aktör arasındaki poli-ekonomik üretim koşulları tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Araştırmada içerik analizi yöntemi benimsenmiştir. 22.06.2023 ile 31.12.2023 tarihleri arasında yayınlanan 184 haber içeriği detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Araştırma sonucuna göre; Al Alam TV'de üretilen haber metinlerinin ideolojik bir dil benimsediği, her iki tarafın ideolojik temsilcilerinin aktif olarak haber metinlerine taşındığı, bu temsilcilerin sahada gerçekleştirdikleri askeri operasyonlarının metinsel ve görsel kodlarla desteklendiği, ideolojik koşulların üretiminde Hizbullah'a kurumsal bir perspektiften yaklaşıldığı, Hassan Nasrallah ve diğer Hizbullah yetkililerinin ise daha geri plana alındığı, üretilen ve uluslaşan bir nitelikte kitlelere aktarılan ideolojik tüketim piyasasında Hizbullah'ın pazarlanması koşullarının meydana getirildiği tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hizbullah, İran, Gündem Belirleme, İçerik Analizi

Jel Kodları: R5, Z1, Z190

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INTRODUCTION

Since the Syrian civil war that started in 2011, Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have taken important steps to demonstrate their deterrence capabilities and protect their regional and national position with hybrid warfare tactics. The most visible of these steps is the tendency to encircle the regions it sees as strategic targets within a sphere of influence in line with its own Shiite ideology. These and similar tendencies in Iran can shift the strategic balance in the region at certain times. According to some researchers, Iran's increased regional role is one of the main reasons for regional destabilization (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021). Hezbollah and Shiite militia organizations, on the other hand, are expanding their fields of activity in the Middle East with the logistics, intelligence, military, and economic support they receive from Iran (Karmi, 2020).

Although regional actors such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad have a Sunni religious terminology, the Iranian regime tends to keep its regional siege alive with such organizations (Cordesman & Kleiber, 2007: 27). From this perspective, Iran's cross-border actions are pragmatic. As an extension of this pragmatist effort, the media structure also maintains its reality as an important role tool (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2019).

In today's world, mass media, one of the leading tools that spread conflict environments by pursuing interdependence and strategic balance, has gained the power to shift the direction of modern conflicts. Today, mass media has ceased to be a power that determines the flow of simple, valuable information and has become an intermediary mechanism that shapes mutually asymmetrical networks of relationships and shapes the mental maps of the masses.

Ideological apparatuses in Iran serve all-purpose functions. One of the most important ideological apparatuses is the regime's transnational media structure. Hezbollah, on the other hand, is one of Iran's non-state actors in the Middle East and continues to play a key role as a byproduct of Iran's pressure and influence in the region (Levitt, 2021; Mroue, 2022).

Governments can produce their own power centers under certain conditions. One of these conditions is the strategy of dealing with the masses, which Lippmann (1998) describes as the "big crowd", and the other is the approval of the consent of the masses, that is, the obtaining of mass consent, through the placement of mass media in the process. These strategic goals, grounded in consent and legitimacy, are aimed at gaining power. Mass media, on the other hand, serve as a lever that produces and seeks to maintain this balance of power under certain conditions, while acting according to the interests of powerful ecosystems (Kazaz & Görgülü, 2024: 119).

The purpose of this study is to analyze the news content that broadcast on Al Alam television, which is under the control of the Iranian regime and follows a broadcasting approach in this direction. For this purpose, an attempt was made to determine the contents with a common ideological flow between Hezbollah and Iran, the ideological infrastructure in which these issues are embedded, and the status of the representations assigned to Hezbollah in the content produced by Al-Alam TV.

When we look at the national literature, many studies evaluate the current state of relations between Hezbollah and Iran (Demircan, 2021; Elhan, 2019). However, the inadequacy of studies on Hezbollah and Iran in a communication-oriented manner has been clearly observed. This is the study's strongest aspect in terms of originality. In the international literature, the strategic balance between Al-Alam television and Hezbollah has begun to attract the attention of strategic research centers. For example, Tal Beerli, who performs an important task at the Alma Israel Center for Strategic Studies (see: israel-alma.org), which acts under the control of Mossad, made some inferences about the relations between Hezbollah and Al-Alam television in his report dated May 31, 2022 (Beerli, 2022). According to Beerli, Al Alam is a media organization that directs Hezbollah's war propaganda and psychological warfare activities and gains visibility with content related to its Islamic resistance operation. This media organization has direct relations with various councils and structures.

In addition, Baghernia & Mahmoudinejat (2019) in their study titled "Media Reviews Al- Alam Versus Al-Arabiya: Iran and Saudi Arabia's Media Propaganda Tools" focused on the content of Iran's nuclear program and evaluated the with different framing conditions put forward by the two media branches within the framework of competition policies. Baghernia & Mahmoudinejat (2019) revealed that the two media outlets provide news production conditions within the framework of their countries' foreign policy goals, geopolitical competition, and national priorities.

Hassan Nasrallah and Iran's Propaganda Strategies

According to Zywiets (2020: 14), propaganda encompasses multifaceted communication goals that include "ideological conviction", "persuasion", and cognitive moods. From this perspective, Zywiets evaluates propaganda as an information-laden process related to strategic goals, involving cognitive and psychological processes. In this

dimension, propaganda can be considered a complex, systematically constructed process. Propaganda suppresses or marginalizes alternative voices, based on ideological persuasion, that reconstructs social realities (Xiong et al., 2021: 438). In other words, propaganda is an effort to "keep in the foreground" or "push it into the background".

Governments, non-governmental organizations, academia, intelligence and security units, strategic research institutes, and the private sector can design the working mechanics of the propaganda system. These systemic structures should be considered as actors that fulfill the ideological processing load of propaganda, prepare the fictional ground for propaganda, and direct social perception.

While today's economic system is facing a profound economic crisis, states need to push their own limits. In other words, states should realize their own realities by accessing alternative sources of capital. In order to achieve these goals, the US media declares a new enemy every day and draws the boundaries of the legitimate basis by giving terror embellishment to the structures declared as enemies.

Another effective strategy to use propaganda is social memory. Commemoration ceremonies and special events have an important place in shaping social memory. While commemoration ceremonies provide a legitimate basis for propaganda, they can accelerate the development of a collective national language and memory. Through the propaganda content that is produced and marketed, individuals can see the causes and justifications of the conflict. The commemoration ceremonies and special events deliberately planned by Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are an issue that should be evaluated within this framework.

Rhetorical strategies are central to effective propaganda. When emotional intonations are expressed strongly, the individual exposed to propaganda remains more open to perceiving threats. In this case, the individual cannot make a counter-reading of the propaganda, and the resistance to it is lost.

The rhetoric of Hassan Nasrallah and Ali Khamenei is shaped by military and religious terminology. The effort to confine areas of religious resistance to the agenda and to create areas of legitimacy in this direction plays a key role in the propaganda production process of both leaders. The aim of the propaganda process carried out by Hassan Nasrallah and the Iranian regime against Israel is to spread the narrative contents framed by legitimacy martyrs to the base.

Hezbollah, and the rhetoric of Hassan Nasrallah, manifests itself in the use of repetitive sentences that carry its ideological codes. This situation may have been deliberately designed as a propaganda mechanism preferred by Nasrallah and Ali Khamenei.

"Victimization" is an important element of Hezbollah's propaganda strategies as a result of its efforts to spread the culture of fear to the grassroots. Through the discourse and content of victimization, the legitimacy of the enemy is weakened, and the aim is to make the subject position of the other fragile through prejudices. Herman and Chomsky emphasize that prejudice-based victimization practices provide political advantages for policymakers and that the process of focusing on these victims makes it easier for enemy states to be perceived as bad (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The strategy of exerting influence over the victims can reinforce the infrastructure of prejudice on the masses and allow new psychological frameworks to be shaped with cognitive reality.

The realism of the narratives preferred in the propaganda process should also be considered as an important strategy. The narratives' realistic position is conveyed through a political language suitable for changing existing balances; Hezbollah has proven to the world its image as an organization that reads current cyclical changes very well and can smell them. However, it can be clearly observed that Hezbollah processes its realistic narratives with the theme of "fear" and that this threat algorithm is kept alive with framework codes that prioritize Lebanon and the Muslim world.

For Hassan Nasrallah and the Iranian regime, war and conflict circumstances have turned into a media display by Hezbollah for certain perceptions of control. The organization and leadership, which aim to keep the public base alive with voices directed at their own base, tend to confine the regime's agenda to the society's agenda through military demonstrations, indicating a skillful propaganda strategy. Given the increasing complexity of both Iran's and Hezbollah's propaganda, we cannot say that a single paradigm has been adopted.

Hassan Nasrallah and Iran use the Israeli argument intensively in their foreign policy voices for the domestic public. Hassan Nasrallah describes Israel's political and military actions as terrorist activities and continues his strategy of widening the balance of terrorism against Israel. This propaganda orientation reinforces perceptions of resistance and threat among the masses. The Hezbollah group, on the one hand, maintains its political legitimacy by claiming that the Israeli side has created the balance of terrorism. On the other hand, it uses the strategy of massively deepening the propaganda load with counter-terrorism narratives.

Following Israel's military and intelligence activities against important figures of Hezbollah, Hezbollah feels the need to resort to propaganda rituals aimed at revenge frequently. However, in cases where Hezbollah's revenge-framed narratives cannot be fully fulfilled, the resistance narrative (victimization philosophy) is intensively constructed, and accountability frameworks are prioritized in order to close the deterrence gap between Israel and Hezbollah. On the other hand, Hezbollah attaches utmost importance to the demonstration of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Israeli army in order to wage an effective propaganda war against Israel.

Rhetorical codes play an important role in the dissemination of propaganda, which is often built on political discourses. The rhetoric of Hassan Nasrallah and the Iranian regime are not based on a reading and vocalization of insecurity and threat perceptions. This manifests itself in voices that strengthen Hezbollah's legitimacy.

Herman and Chomsky (1988: 37) distinguish between valuable and worthless victims in their explanation of the propaganda model. According to them, valuable victims are an agenda-setting tool for the mass adoption of the official ideology. Worthless victims are those who are ignored or left out (Gadimov, 2015: 220). While it is not possible to maintain the official ideology through worthless victims, it is easy to heap propaganda on valuable victims. Among the valuable victims that Hezbollah has brought to the fore in recent years are names such as Qassem Soleimani, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, and Abbas Al Mousavi.

The Hezbollah organization is known as one of the rare organizations that uses many grounds to effectively employ information warfare, which constitutes the main argument for its ability to gain an advantage over its rivals/enemies. Hezbollah has tools to improve its public image, with a predominant focus on psychological warfare. Newspapers, social media platforms, radio stations, and television programs constitute the mainstay network of this psychological warfare (Clarke, 2017). Al Nur radio station (Weimann, 2008: 2) and Al Manar television station are two of the well-known propaganda networks of this organization. In addition, there have many websites and social media platforms where Hezbollah's propaganda-based practices are circulated. Among these platforms, "Kataib Hezbollah" is among the platforms that have increased in visibility recently (<https://www.kataibhezbollah.me/>)

Iran is one of the countries that coordinate its propaganda war well through television channels and social networks. It is known for his manipulative discourses, especially in order to make Shiites living in Arab regions have a militaristic appearance. In Iraq, dozens of television channels and media organs such as Al Maaref, Al-Mahdi, Al Gadeer, and Sabrin produce news content in accordance with Shiite doctrine, and propaganda acquisition reaches a transboundary character. Al-Manar television maintains its key role in establishing Hezbollah's public agenda, ensuring its mass stabilization, fostering a tendency toward collective violence, building the narrative of resistance, and constructing the militarist allegory. Al Manar television is a global media station funded by Iran and calls itself a "resistance channel" (CRS Reports, 2006; Jorisch, 2004).

It is known that social media propaganda, in line with the Iranian regime's doctrine in the Middle East, attributes a historical and religious dimension to its regional policies, using content produced by the regime's supporters and employing certain ideological codes and narratives. Among the dominant narratives shared by Iran's social media trolls, the major aim is to create the impression that "defending the holy places", "saving Jerusalem", "supporting the oppressed", "Iran's regional policies have a valid reason, and all its actions are legitimate in this way". Iran's social media propaganda generally manifests itself with emotional voices and sectarian discourses, and it is aimed at opening a sacred aura space for Khomeini and the Revolutionary Guards.

First of all, due to the sanctions blockade imposed by the Trump administration on Iran, international media companies operating regionally have been significantly affected. The Islamic Radio and Television Union has also faced US sanctions. Iran, which could not coordinate its local income sources effectively at the time, tended to expand its propaganda areas using cheaper methods. Effective propaganda tools such as Telegram have begun to be used to militarize the Shiites, to dominate the regional ideology through the Shiites, and to spread anti-American ideologies in the region against the Islamic ideology.

Iran, which has created militarist areas through these and similar networks, has not hesitated to produce content with high disinformation density in order to stand against the USA and Israel. With this content of disinformation of high propaganda value, the ideological cellular renewal of the Shiite militias in Iraq was ensured, and a reaction was produced against the central Iraqi government. During these periods, organizations such as Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, one of Hezbollah's sub-military coalitions, were quickly organized on Telegram.

The uncontrolled media problem in Iraq is seen as an important reason for Iran and the militias that act as Iran's proxies to design the public sphere. In addition, one of the important organs that directs regional propaganda activities in Iraq is the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Board. The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Board directs the ideological

flow through social media platforms, gathers Shiite militants around itself with the narrative of martyrdom, and organizes propaganda content about military operations with great care.

Iran pursues its ideological propaganda through certain key actors. One of these names is Hamid al-Husseini, a member of the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Board. Hosseini is known for his close ties with the Revolutionary Guards, one of the strategic institutions of the Iranian State. Hosseini maintains his important position in the continuation of the regional activities of Iranian-backed media systems.

Another key figure is Ali Karimian, the Secretary General of Islamic Radio and Television. Ali Karimian is an important figure who manages media propaganda with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Ali Karimian is an actor in direct contact with the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and the Qods forces, and this important name was also the former program director of Al Manar television, which is among the important propaganda tools of the Lebanese Hezbollah (Malek, 2017). Ali Karimian is an important figure in maintaining ideological media hegemony, developing media cooperation in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, and is also among the developers of media cooperation between IRNA and SANA. Ali Naderi, who is the general manager of the IRNA agency, is another important name actively carrying out his activities in the Arab regions.

Image 1. Ali Karimian, Secretary General of the Islamic Radio and Television Union



Reference: <https://aleshraqtv.iq/all-detal.aspx?jimare=6415> ; baztab.ir, 2017

Image 2. Iranian-backed Asaib al-Haq and Al-Nujaba Movement Telegram Propaganda (Syria) (Iraq)



Reference: Fadıl (2016) <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-%20world/syria/2016/12/14/>

News Production Processes and Ideological Framing

Research on news texts started to develop in the 1980s. Researchers in British cultural studies have placed ideological production at the center by examining the production, consumption, and distribution of media texts. The production conditions of news texts are variable. All kinds of visual and contextual productions that are the subject of the news are carefully selected or left out. This process of letting in or keeping out is seen as related to the reality of ideological conditions. Although news texts seem to be produced to inform the masses, they also carry a certain amount of propaganda.

Psychological and cognitive processes are effective in the reception of news texts by readers/viewers. Shaping the masses cognition with ideological tones, reviving these ideological conditions in accordance with a particular historical context, and stimulating collective memory in certain periods are achieved through news texts. Media systems play an important role in shaping the cognitive maps and mental values of the masses. While doing this, "general propositions", "implicit mental patterns," and "stereotypes" put forward by the "frames" placed in the news texts come to the fore (Fowler, 1991: 17). Cyclical changes at certain points can undermine ideological conditions. In the creation of new ideological conditions after each destruction, the language, narrative forms, and rhetorical strokes used in media texts are shaped by the new ideological climate.

Editorial practices are effective in fulfilling ideological conditions in the news production process. Editorial structures can be considered as the main elements that know the ecology of the media system well and constantly market the contents for this ecological production to the masses, as well as a dynamic structure that determines the boundaries of an ideological map in the audience with media texts and ensures the approval of an ideological climate by the masses in this direction. The continuity of the ideological flow emerges with "framing practices". Entman (1993) considers the practice of framing as "being put forward" or "ignored" of a subject. According to Entman, these frameworks, which shape the language of news texts, teach the audience how to look at the event/phenomenon. This act of teaching paves the way for the audience/reader mass to be less reflexive towards dominant ideological intonations. In other words, certain frameworks put forward in the process of making sense of news texts can be considered a main argument in the ideological siege. Vreese (2005: 51), on the other hand, sees framing as the process of interaction between readers and certain frames constructed from news texts. The editorial structure that creates this interaction environment determines the boundaries of an ideological spectacle, covers up some realities, highlights certain role practices or actors in the ideological construction process, and sometimes manipulates the individual's mental world by making ideological attributions to objects in the news production process.

The media industry's economic conditions also influence the framing strategy developed in the news production process. Economic sustainability can often be achieved through ideological sustainability, and, like every powerful system, power systems desire to spread certain journalistic language in the public sphere to legitimize their own reality to the masses. At this point, the political economy of the media becomes clear. The concept of political economy is the standard actions that individuals or institutions perform in the process of reproducing themselves. Certain actors carry out these standard actions under specific production and consumption conditions. For example, a government that wants to protect its own identity, position, and power will need key actors to maintain its legitimacy and turn public sphere gaps to its advantage. These actors are integrated into the capital-oriented system of relations and networks established by the government. These production conditions, redesigned by power and strong economic structures, constitute the core of the concept of political economy. What feeds this system and directs the production-and-consumption logic are interest groups. Various scientific circles state that these interest groups continue to play a role at all stages of production processes (Lederman, 2005: 6).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) criticize the media's double-standard position in their work "The Manufacture of Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media". According to them, the mass media aims to create a basis of legitimacy among the masses through consent, serving the interests of powerful economic systems. Propaganda plays an important role in the production of consent in the mass media, and the factors that determine the quality and direction of news content are the mass media's ownership structure, the mechanisms of control that favor power relations, and the networks established with large financing structures. These networks of relations directly shape the media's language, attitudes, ideology, and culture. Mudock and Golding (1997: 205–207) draw attention to the "reproduction of class relations" and the mediated role of mass media in the legitimacy of political economy in their work "The Political Economy of Media". According to them, mass media have the power to integrate according to conditions, to take shape in line with market conditions, to act with an industrial logic, and to affect the production and consumption dimensions of cultural products. This power can act with a commercial logic over time.

Al Alam Television

With the 1979 revolution, national media systems and institutions were first redesigned to build social capital. Media organizations that were able to integrate themselves into this new capital first had to keep the regime's language identical to their own. The regime, which achieved this within national borders in a short time, aimed to do so through new media discourse, new rhetoric, and narratives to sustain its ideology, and it was successful in this regard. However, in the 1980s, Iran's new security needs and its attempt to obtain alternative capital brought the necessity of increasing Iran's actions in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and the countries in the region to the agenda. To carry out these actions in a convenient way, it needed a new ideological discourse, a new political language, a new public consciousness, and new media organizations.

It can be said that the emergence of Al Alam television was influenced by the penetration of Western media companies in some Arab countries in the 1980s and the damage caused by American propaganda on Arab identities at that time. This television channel was established to break the current propaganda tendencies of Western media companies and put Iran's military and militia-oriented actions in the Arab regions on a legitimate basis.

Al-Alam television is a state-controlled television station established in Tehran in 2003, which adopts a broadcasting approach based on Islamic principles. Its annual budget is estimated at \$200 million (Baghernia & Mahmoodinejad, 2019: 182). This Arabic-language television news station is known as an important apparatus that strictly adheres to the ideological codes of the Iranian regime on regional issues, can read the language of social capital well, and maintains the ideological atmosphere of regional Shiite idealism. Al-Alam is a television channel that captured the attention of the entire Arab world for its comprehensive coverage of events immediately after the American intervention in Iraq. Sayed Ahmad Sadat serves as a current director of Al Alam TV.

Hamid al-Husseini is considered an influential name in the organization of Al Alam television in Iraq. Although Hamid al-Husseini was born in Iraq, he maintains contact with the IRGC and leadership representatives. The Najaf Court arrested Hamid al-Husseini for being the planner of the attack with PRG missiles on an information building in the Al Hawra neighborhood in 2021. According to Iranian officials, this arrest was carried out at the direction of the US to the central Iraqi government.

Methodology of the Research


Purpose of the Research

The research aims to determine the roles and representations assigned to Hezbollah by Al-Alam TV, which has gained room for maneuver under the control of the regime and intelligence organization in Iran, while forming public opinion. Therefore, this study focuses on the dimensions of the strategic goals between Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. With this research, what kind of representation is Hezbollah imprisoned in the propaganda-oriented content streamed on Al-Alam television, and what is the ideological basis of this form of representation? With which frameworks was Hezbollah brought to the fore on Al-Alam TV? Are the roles assigned to Hezbollah and the ideologically based actions adopted by Iran in Syria equally assigned to Hezbollah? An attempt was made to read the questions.

Sample and Limitations of the Research

The universe of our research comprises content produced by Al-Alam television. The sample consists of news content on Hezbollah produced by Al Alam television, using the purposive sampling method. The research was limited to the framed representation of Hezbollah on Al-Alam television. The main reason why we limited our research to Al-Alam television is that this television channel conveys the military, political, cultural, and economic-based actions of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria to the masses with a high propaganda orientation. During the research process, 351 news articles were identified, of which 99 did not concern Hezbollah and 24 lacked clear content. Of the remaining 228 news articles, 44 were excluded from the review due to technical deficiencies (news content incompatible with the title, content deletion). For this reason, 184 news contents were evaluated from a wide perspective.

Data Collection and Evaluation Phase



Note: The table data and code arrangements were created by the authors, and the Claude program was used for the table visualization.

Research Method

In our research, the propaganda load produced by Al-Alam TV in support of Iran and Hezbollah fighting in Syria was subjected to in depth content analysis. Content analysis is an "objective", "systematic" and "quantitative" research method to determine and define the contextual aspect of communication (Berelson, 1952: 18). Berelson defined content analysis as "the use of data to test scientific hypotheses and evaluate journalistic practices" (Krippendorff 2004: 8).

Although content analysis has a history of more than fifty years in the fields of "sociology", "psychology", "communication", "journalism", this method has shown itself especially in the field of social and behavioral sciences (Neuendorf 2002). Aziz, on the other hand, defines content analysis as follows: "Content analysis is involving how often what is written and is said according to the explanatory instruction prepared" (Aziz, 2017: 131). Content analysis can be considered as the systematic collection of information, categorization and the effort to make a correct or near-accurate inference in order to discover the possibilities of a correct reading of a problem or questions. In this respect, content analysis is an attempt to move from the part to the whole. In order to reach the whole from the parts in content analysis and to make the right inferences and analysis, the "categories" should be aimed at meeting the research questions and all the pieces obtained should be examined meticulously. For this reason, the question of "why" gains importance at every stage of the research in content analysis.

Image 3. Iran and Hezbollah: News Content on Propaganda and Economic-Political Production

Reference: <https://www.alarabiya.net/iran/2025/01/31/> اسرئيل-تشنكي-ايران-تزود-حزب-الله-بحقائب-مليئة-بالدولارات

It can be clearly observed that the Iranian regime's efforts to burnish Hezbollah in the process immediately after the Al-Aqsa Flood attacks, determining the roles it can take part in, and instilling the motivational value of the organization in the masses have been fulfilled. However, the fact that the rate of content production for Hamas in this process is at a lower threshold and intensity than Hezbollah can be explained by Iran's reliance on Hezbollah's military, psychological, and technical infrastructure capabilities rather than Hamas in this process. Another reason may have been the view that assigning a strategic role to Hamas, a Sunni formation, and describing it as a real threat directly to Israel would not be welcomed by the regime's hardline supporters and that these groups could be alienated.

The period with the fewest narratives about Hezbollah is September, with 11 news articles (5.98%). In fact, even this rate shows that Hezbollah's visibility in news texts is continuous. However, in general, this quantitative decrease may have various reasons. The first of these is that other agenda items that directly condition Iran may have emerged. However, when a reverse reading and research are done, it becomes clear that this situation is unlikely to occur.

Another reason is that "editorial preferences", which have become a structural order of the mass media and are organized according to economic production conditions, may be effective. Editors, as the "gatekeepers" of the news production process, can expand the range of topics and public comments on the agenda, as well as narrow it at certain times. For example, editorial structures are aware that the mass media can take on a disadvantageous appearance in the public eye through an actor, event, or fact presentation that frequently flourishes in the news media. Hence, they know they need to keep the editorial structure, comments, and content range "in balance" at certain points. Especially in times of political and economic crisis, keeping the masses busy with agenda items other than "social problems" can change public trust in existing mass media.

On the other hand, September 2023 has also revealed a process in which the Iranian regime faces new problems. The Mahsa Amini protests spread across the Iranian public during this period, and demonstrations became violent in many cities. The expansion of portrayals of Hezbollah in this period and the placement of Hezbollah and other regional actors in the media framework could have deepened the chaotic psychology that emerged in Iran and made the spectrum of interpretation and content unbalanced. For this reason, the role assigned to Hezbollah during these periods may have been gradually reduced.

Table 2. Forms of Hezbollah's Representation on Al Alam Television (22.06-2023- 31.12.2023)

TOTAL	POSITIVE TOTAL			NEUTRAL TOTAL			NEGATIVE TOTAL	
184	%67,4			%32,1			%0,5	
STATUS	JUN*	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
Positive Representation	%50.0	%61.5	%54.8	%36.4	%83.0	%69.4	%76.0	124
Neutral Representation	%50.0	%38.5	%45.2	%63.6	%17.0	%30.6	%20.0	59
Negative Representation	%0.0	%0.0	%0.0	%0.0	%0.0	%0.0	%4.0	1
TOTAL					Each month equals 100%			184

Table 2 shows the various forms of Hezbollah's representation. According to the table, it was clearly observed that Hezbollah, which was reported in the news media, was portrayed to the masses in a positive light (124 news, 67.4%). According to Table 2, Hezbollah's highest level of neutral presentation occurred in August (14 news, 7.6%). There may be many reasons why Hezbollah, a non-state actor, is fictionalized within the political agenda with a positive representation and role on Al Alam television. One reason is the balance of ideological and political interests between Hezbollah and Iran. Because Iran directly / indirectly protects Hezbollah and Shiite-based paramilitary organizations in the export of the regime's ideology and wants to maintain its systematic balance in the Middle East. The idea of exporting Islamic Shiite thought as a global and regional ideology is a product of the 1979 Iranian revolution. Some of the forms of representation of Hezbollah are as follows:

1. Operating against the occupation forces
2. Strengthening the spirit of resistance
3. Revering the sacred
4. Supporting the Islamic resistance
5. Directing the resistance
6. Caring about national unity
7. Representative of the Jerusalem Way

In the news content on Al Alam television, Hezbollah was marketed to the masses with the aura of a state that does not initiate the tension lines of regional security but tries to ensure the freedom conditions and peace of the region, fulfills Islamic principles, feeds on the culture of martyrdom, and has sharp military and political maneuvers.

Al Alam television marked Hezbollah as an inventory of resistance that stood against Israel, protected the sanctity, and assigned representative roles to the collective essence, both before and after the Al-Aqsa flood movement. However, after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, a partial shift in the roles assigned to Hezbollah was observed. After the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, Hezbollah was described as an important strategic threat to Israel. In this sense, Hezbollah's strong role in the armed struggle against Israel began to be emphasized. In this process, the military and operational dimensions against Hamas were partially ignored. The reason for this situation may be related to the assumption we put forward in Table 1: "The state of trust and belief in Hezbollah's military, psychological, and technical infrastructure capabilities rather than Hamas – the possibility or idea that Hamas cannot pose a real strategic threat to Israel".

In Table 3, the qualitative analysis of Hezbollah news on Al Alam television is made. According to this the table, the production conditions of news content are largely in the form of "photo texts". The use of visual and textual codes together in news content can speed up the persuasion process of the audience/reader, because the narratives, discourses, and ideological codes in the text are always harmonized with visual codes and offered for consumption through "packaging". According to Table 3, 120 (65.4%) of the 184-news content related to Hezbollah consisted of visual and textual content, while 64 (39%) consisted of video and textual content. In the visual, video, and text contents examined, it was observed that important political and military messages were prioritized in terms of timing and purpose. In terms of the content produced in the news media, Hezbollah has demonstrated its propaganda and power display conditions that they are ready for war conditions with "sensitive missile arsenals", "long-range rockets", "underground tunnel facilities", and "rocket warheads", and that they have the will and technical equipment to resist Israel's attacks.

Al Alam television covered events such as the "Jenin raid" from a broad perspective in its news content in July. The legitimacy of the struggle and resistance against Israel has been explained to the Arab world. The frames of the news text built in this period are based on responsibility and conflict.

As a means of legitimacy, Hezbollah propaganda was used in the news content, in which ideological intonations such as "Islamic resistance", "fighting against oppression", "not remaining silent against attacks", and "protecting the martyrs of the resistance" were emphasized. In addition, the supporters warned by Hezbollah were highlighted in the news content, and the propaganda that Hezbollah was an active actor in the regional war became operational.

Table 4. Those Positioned Against Hezbollah in News Content (2023-July, August, September)

TOTAL MENTIONS	ISRAEL (DIRECT)	ZIONIST ENTITY	NOT DETECTED
75	27 %36,0	9 %12,0	2 %2,7

POSITIONED ACTOR	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
■ Israel	9 %32.1	15 %41.7	3 %27.3	27 %36.0
■ Zionist Entity	4 %14.3	2 %5.6	3 %27.3	9 %12.0
■ Other Political Actors/Schools (Lebanon)	3 %10.7	3 %8.3	1 %9.1	7 %9.3
■ USA	3 %10.7	2 %5.6	1 %9.1	6 %8.0
■ Iran	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	0 %0.0
■ Western Countries	1 %3.6	Not detected	Not detected	1 %1.3
■ Occupier/Occupying Forces (Covert-Hidden)	7 %25.0	8 %22.2	1 %9.1	16 %21.3
■ Other	1 %3.6	6 %16.7	2 %18.2	9 %12.0
MONTHLY TOTAL	28	36	11	75



Table 4 focuses on the statistical information for those who oppose Hezbollah on Al Alam television. Positioning in news content operates according to the logic of keeping inside and outside. Those who are kept inside can generally be considered to emphasize, promote, or highlight an event, phenomenon, or actor in the news text. In contrast, those who are kept out can be considered marginalized, traumatized, and ignored. However, an actor who is constantly

present in a news text is either intended to convey an illegitimate quality to readers/viewers, or the legitimate grounds of this actor are sought to be stabilized. According to the table, the two actors were kept in a harmonious and orderly manner in the news texts. These are Hezbollah and Israel. According to the table, Israel, which is positioned against Hezbollah, is the other. All the legitimate bases of Israel, which are constructed as the other, are tried to be refuted by Hezbollah, which is a propaganda tactic that Hezbollah follows the most. According to the graph, Israel is positioned against Hezbollah in 27 (36.01%) of the 75 news items packaged in July, August, and September. The month in which Israel, presented as the product of a counter-reading, is most intensely conceived is August (15 news content, 20.1%). During this period, there was no agenda other than an asymmetrical and conventional war between Israel and Iran in Syria. However, in this period, the Jenin raid operations largely brought Israel to the fore as an opposing actor. It is thought that Israel, which was positioned against Hezbollah in this period, wanted to be kept in the foreground as a result of this incident. In 9 (12.06%) of the 75 news items, Israel was not directly positioned as the target, and, beyond this definition, the narratives of the “Zionist formation” were also brought to the fore. In 6 (8%) of the 75 news articles, the USA is positioned directly against Hezbollah as an actor. This attempt at positioning reveals the importance of the role assigned to Hezbollah. None of the news content portrays an Iranian portrait standing against Hezbollah. Because Iran and Hezbollah are two actors who engage in coordinated actions together to ensure regional hegemony and struggle for the realization of the common Shiite crescent. In 16 (21.34%) of the 75 news items, those positioned against Hezbollah are the occupation forces/occupiers. In this news content, the practice of covert targeting has been revealed. Hezbollah, which stands against the occupiers and resists them, is a hero according to Al Alam television. In other words, Hezbollah is a dominant actor that has never been in the shadows of Al Alam television but is constantly protected.

Table 5. Visual Presentation Forms Regarding Hezbollah on Al Alam Television (22.06-2023- 31.12.2023)

TOTAL MENTIONS	FLAG			CONFLICT AREA			NOT DETECTED	
216	64 %29,6			47 %21,8			3 %1,4	
PRESENTATION FORMAT	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
■ Flag	—	7 %25.9	8 %21.6	9 %81.8	19 %29.7	12 %26.7	9 %28.1	64 %29.6
■ Actor Hezbollah (Corporate Notation)	—	4 %14.8	7 %18.9	1 %9.1	5 %7.8	2 %4.4	1 %3.1	20 %9.3
■ Security Forces	—	3 %11.1	4 %10.8	Not detected	11 %17.2	4 %8.9	5 %15.6	27 %12.5
■ Simple Text	—	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	0 %0.0
■ Military Equipment	—	4 %14.8	6 %16.2	Not detected	10 %15.6	5 %11.1	4 %12.5	29 %13.4
■ Actor / Non-Hezbollah	—	6 %22.2	7 %18.9	1 %9.1	3 %4.7	3 %6.7	2 %6.3	22 %10.2
■ Conflict Area	—	3 %11.1	5 %13.5	Not detected	12 %18.8	17 %37.8	10 %31.3	47 %21.8
■ Martyr Image	—	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	4 %6.3	2 %4.4	1 %3.1	7 %3.2
MONTHLY TOTAL	—	27	37	11	64	45	32	216

Visual presentations in a news text play an important role in the construction of the mental patterns of the reader/audience audience. Visual codes can directly or indirectly affect the mental processes of the individual, form the basis of different thought forms for the masses, and often have a manipulative nature. Visualized objects occupy more space in the minds of individuals than political concepts. Individuals reconsider their ideological conditions

through visual narratives, tend to affirm their own identity, and approve of the exploitation of their emotional labor. Table 6 focuses on the visualization of Hezbollah in Hezbollah news presented for consumption on Al Alam television. It has been clearly observed that Hezbollah's flag and conflict environments are typed in the news contents. The flag characterizes an identity and legitimacy. Therefore, it can be clearly seen that this online television, which serves as the ideological apparatus of the Iranian regime, approves Hezbollah's public reality and places it on a legitimate basis. The visually coded instrumental approach created through the flag and identity clarifies Hezbollah's identity, and ideological realities are reconstructed through it. It was concluded that 64 (29.6%) of the 216 visual semantics consisted of flag-themed, 47 (21.8%) consisted of conflict areas, and 29 visuals (13.42%) consisted of military equipment depictions. These three types of display correspond to 64.9% of news content. In other words, the field of vision of the masses has narrowed with visual codes based on repetition over a certain fact or event. In fact, one of the main purposes of propaganda is to pave the way for the masses to approach events from a narrower framework through repetition (Cull, et al., 2003). It does not seem possible for an individual who cannot go beyond this narrowed border drawn for the masses to intersect with alternative ideologies. While the photographs of the martyrs were most intensely edited in October, the textual narratives in which the photographs of the martyrs were prioritized on other days were neglected.

Another point that draws attention during the research process is this: Martyr photos were not preferred by the news media during the periods when the conflicts between Hezbollah, Hamas and Israel intensified. During this period, Hezbollah's military and technical power was emphasized. In other words, Hezbollah was positioned in a strong position against Israel during this period.

Table 6 and Table 7. Source Outputs of Hezbollah News on Al Alam TV and Distribution of Hezbollah and Hezbollah-Related Officials on Al Alam TV (22.06-2023- 31.12.2023)

TOTAL CONTENT	OWN NEWS AGENCY			CLOSE TO HEZBOLLAH			OTHER MEDIA	
188	158 %84.0			31 %16,5			0 %0	
NEWS SOURCE	JUN*	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
■ Own News Agency (Internal Production)	8 %100.0	24 %96.0	26 %83.9	10 %90.9	36 %75.0	32 %78.0	22 %88.0	158 %84.0
■ Media Outlets Close to Hezbollah	Not detected	1 %4.0	5 %16.1	1 %9.1	12 %25.0	9 %22.0	3 %12.0	31 %16.5
■ Other Media Outlets	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected
MONTHLY TOTAL	8	25	31	11	48	41	25	188

TOTAL MENTIONS	HEZBOLLAH (CORPORATE)		HASSAN NASRALLAH		NOT DETECTED		
179	106 %59.2		7 %3.9		5 %2.8		
ACTOR / INSTITUTION	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
■ Hezbollah (Corporate)	9 %47.4	12 %32.4	9 %64.3	32 %68.1	26 %72.2	18 %69.2	106 %59.2
■ Expert / Reporter / Editor	4 %21.1	12 %32.4	Not detected	5 %10.6	6 %16.7	3 %11.5	30 %16.8
■ Other Hezbollah Members	2 %10.5	6 %16.2	2 %14.3	7 %14.9	3 %8.3	3 %11.5	23 %12.8
■ Hassan Nasrallah	2 %10.5	3 %8.1	1 %7.1	Not detected	1 %2.8	Not detected	7 %3.9
■ Haşim Safi El Din	1 %5.3	1 %2.7	Not detected	2 %4.3	Not detected	2 %7.7	6 %3.4
■ Hamas	Not detected	1 %2.7	1 %7.1	1 %2.1	Not detected	Not detected	3 %1.7
■ Prime Minister of Lebanon	Not detected	1 %2.7	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	1 %0.6
■ Amal Movement	1 %5.3	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	1 %0.6
■ Fatah Movement	Not detected	1 %2.7	1 %7.1	Not detected	Not detected	Not detected	2 %1.1
MONTHLY TOTAL	19	37	14	47	36	26	179

In Table 7, the current situation of Hezbollah officials offered for consumption on Al alam television is questioned. Within the scope of the research, 120 news contents were reached, and it was concluded that this news were densely packaged with the presentation of Hezbollah and its ideological actors. In 94 (78.3%) of the 120 news contents, Hezbollah and its ideological and key elements were framed. The actors of the Al-Aqsa Flood raid launched by the Al-Qassam Brigades affiliated with Hamas on October 7, 2023, were ignored and these actors were moved to the gray area. However, Hezbollah has been marketed as a role model and the main actor of the whole process. There can be various reasons for this. For example, Hamas is a Sunni organization and can oppose Iran's sectarian actions and strategies at certain times. However, Hezbollah has had the power to change regional balances as a second Iran since the day it was founded. For whatever reason, Iran's prioritization of Hezbollah outside of Hamas and the Al-Qassam Brigades should be considered as a result of Iran's central policies. When the distribution of Hezbollah and its ideological actors is examined, 76 (80.93%) of the 94-news content discussed Hezbollah from an institutional perspective, and 18 (19.1%) presented Hezbollah actors. Another remarkable point in the research process is that Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was screened only 1 time in this three-month period. There may be various reasons for this. Although Iran constantly supports Hassan Nasrallah in the process of building regional hegemony, it does not see him as Hezbollah's main power. Because Iran does not want a second Khomeini in the region, so it shines Hassan Nasrallah within certain limits. In the face of this situation, it is seen that Hassan Nasrallah is not in a direct crisis of confidence in Iran.

Another striking finding is that only 1 of the 120-news content directly or indirectly mentions Hamas and this act of mentioning it was not carried out in an actor-oriented manner. At this point, it is clearly observed that Iran is trying to carry out this ideological propaganda process with actors who have camouflage in accordance with the doctrine of Shiism.

The fact that Hashim Safi al-Din (4 news, 3.33%) is more prominent than Hassan Nasrallah as an actor in Hezbollah news seems to be due to Iran's potential to create a second Nasrallah. Because Hashim Safi al-Din, the head of Hezbollah's executive council, is an important actor who has made a name for himself with his strong position within Hezbollah and sharp transitions in his political reflexes. In addition, Hashim Safi al-Din, a name that has always

established a good network of relations with the Tehran administration, was a name that was related to many Iranian and Hezbollah officials. He married the daughter of "Muhammad Ali al Amin", a member of the Legislative Assembly of the Lebanese Shiite Islamic Council. He was a cousin of Hassan Nasrallah and his son Reza married Zaynab Soleimani, the daughter of Iranian revolutionary guard's commander Qasem Soleimani, in 2020. Hashim Safi al-Din was killed in an Israeli air force airstrike on Hezbollah headquarters in the Haret Hreik neighborhood of southern Lebanon. He received religious education at the Qom Seminary and was in contact with many religious schools, especially the Haqqani school.

Conclusion and Discussion

Today, propaganda activities are one of the practices applied by terrorist organizations to break the perceptions of the public and to spread a positive image transfer to the masses. Propaganda activities are evident in a series of communication mechanisms and the direction of propaganda is shaped by certain strategic situations attached to this mechanism.

Iran and Hezbollah are finding new areas of action for themselves with a common balance of interests in the Middle East. These two formations reinforce their presence with the flow of propaganda aimed at religious indoctrination, especially in Syria and Iraq, and this situation causes the continuity of the complex-based order in the region. In this process, the output values of mass media play an active role in the progress of the process. Now, mass media continue the flow of propaganda uninterruptedly, regardless of a certain place and space, and can place their strategic partners parallel to their own political economy in their own propaganda outputs.

In this study, it is clearly observed that the balance of political and military interests between Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah is inculcated through a media-mediated orientation. The content circulated through the Al Alam media outlet and the role assigned to Hezbollah can be seen as an output of Iran's regional hegemony. In the light of the data obtained, although emotional voiceovers are high in propaganda content, it has been observed throughout the research that the propaganda load is shaped on the basis of "counter-reading" and "attribution". There are no conceptual ambiguities in the propaganda content of the Al Alam media organization. This situation also shows that propaganda contents are not allowed to be coincidentally perceptual homogenized.

With the content analysis carried out in the study, it was clearly observed that Al Alam TV attributes an important role to Hezbollah for the region and humanity and that it is one of the combined forces of the "axis of resistance". Another important finding is that the ideological consumption market, which was produced through Al Alam television and conveyed to the masses in a national manner, gained momentum with the marketing of Hezbollah before the great depression that emerged in the Middle East. The positioning of Hezbollah with a military position against Israel before the October 7 Al-Aqsa Flood operation raised the question of whether the mass media could have read this threat beforehand. If the mass media has been able to read this threat before, with what tools, justifications or arguments has it been used?

In the news content of the Al Alam media organization, the main arguments of the war between Israel and Hezbollah were deliberately codified, and counterpropaganda was strongly put forward with pre-planned media planning. The military discourse of Al Alam television is aimed at countering an open threat, combating an open threat and eliminating an open threat. In the process of eliminating the threat, the culture of courage and propaganda was consciously preferred.

On Al Alam television, Israel's disproportionate position of violence against the people of Palestine and the region was reiterated, and with this strategy, the legitimacy of Israel and its administration was weakened, while on the other hand, it was aimed to strengthen the narrative structure with resistance narratives.

The Iranian regime has created media frameworks against Israel by portraying Israel as an aggressive and regional threat through Al Alam television, tried to raise morale on the regional and domestic fronts, and tried to develop the psychological course of the war in favor of itself and Hezbollah with strong and convincing arguments.


In the content of Al Alam, Hezbollah was not reduced to individuals, a media framework was not drawn over individuals, and the institutional importance of Hezbollah was emphasized. However, in the news content presented to the market, the positioning strategy towards Hamas was taken into the background, and Hezbollah was also displayed in the front screen. From this point of view, the Iranian regime and a media apparatus under the control and control of this regime may have made this choice in this context. Because if Hamas was presented to more organizations outside of Iran and Shiite doctrine, it could reduce the ideological retention of Iran and Iran's regional supporters and regime supporters.

Hezbollah's psychological and military superiority over Israel themed content on Al Alam television started to change as of December. Israel's destruction of important strategic targets against Hezbollah and Israel's gradual gain of psychological superiority may be a factor affecting this process. Although the roles and representations assigned to Hezbollah did not change sharply during this month, there was a decrease in the number of news content produced concerning Hezbollah.

After the asymmetric and psychological wars between Hamas, Hezbollah and Israel, the capacity and nature of the war between Iran and Israel have also changed. The nature and engagement of the psychological tension-based asymmetric war between Iran and Israel has reached a new dimension with the damage Hezbollah has suffered on the leadership scale. During the period of psychological conditions that Israel gained against Hezbollah, Al Alam television focused more on emotional and responsible news content, and Hezbollah's military and technical capability against Israel was partially increased. This form of preference is seen as an accurate option, because maintaining and protecting the credibility of the public in such crises or adverse situations is considered important for the media and media professionals.

Appendices

بالفيديو: هل يخشى جيش الاحتلال الدخول في مواجهة مختلفة مع حزب الله ؟



قال أحمد راشدي، ناشط في حزب الله، إن التصريح الإسرائيلي على أن القوة صمدية "إسرائيل اليوم" العنصرية حول ميكرافوت قوات جيش الاحتلال الإسرائيلي لحرب مختلفة مع حزب الله في لبنان أن هذا الميكرافوت هو لجيش الاحتلال الإسرائيلي.

المعلم - لبنان

وأشار في حديثه إلى حوار خاص لقناة العالم عبر برنامج (مع الحدث) أنه لا يمكن لمصحة أن تعمل عليه أو تستمر في تشغيلها في ظل التوتر أو الاستنزاف، حيث إن المؤسسة الأمنية ما يعنى الجيش، فهو سبيلنا والجيش الإسرائيلي.

وأضاف جدير أنه عاد الجيش وفتحنا جيش لبنان الإسرائيلي عندما يكون هناك احتمالات لتسبب مواجهة عسكرية

حزب الله يصدر بياناً بشأن احتلال "إسرائيل" للقسم اللبناني من بلدة العجور



أصدر حزب الله بياناً بشأن القسم اللبناني من بلدة العجور الحدودية حيث استولى كيان الاحتلال عليه، داعياً الدولة اللبنانية إلى التحرك لمنع تثبيت هذا الاحتلال.

المعلم - لبنان

وقال حزب الله في بيان له: إن إجراءات قوات الاحتلال "مكثت بإشياء، سباح شاك وبناء جدار إسباني حول كامل البلدة، شبيه بما تقوم به على الحدود بين لبنان وفلسطين المحتلة".

وأوضح أن هذه الإجراءات "عصفت بلدة العجور عن محيطها الطبيعي التاريخي داخل الأراضي اللبنانية، وفرضت قوات الاحتلال سيطرتها بشكل كامل على القسمين اللبناني واللبناني من البلدة، وأحضرها لادارياً بالتوازي مع فتح القرية أمام

حزب الله: ما حصل في جين لتصار لتعلق المقاومة



أكد رئيس المجلس التنفيذي في حزب الله السيد علي الدين أن ما حصل في جين هو لتصار لتعلق المقاومة المقاومة على كسر إرادة العدو غير أن العدو لم يفلح هذه في استئصال المقاومة.

المعلم - لبنان

وعلا رغبة إيمان برنامج البنية التحتية للتدخل التمس "كنا" الذي يهدف إلى مساعدة الشعب والفريق الشعبي في بيروت دعا للتصديع للبلدان إلى إجراء حوار صريح من أجل حل كل النزاعات ومها لتعاقب زعيم الجمهورية مؤكداً أن الخطاب المنعقد والتمسك به لن يفلح في حل مشاكل البلاد.

وأكد أن خطاب بعض السياسيين في لبنان يعمل على تفتيت الناس ويجعل دون بناء الدولة.

السفير الروسي: حزب الله كقوة سياسية وطنية وجزء لا يتجزأ من المجتمع اللبناني



حزب الله يصدر بياناً بشأن احتلال "إسرائيل" للقسم اللبناني من بلدة العجور



أصدر حزب الله بياناً بشأن القسم اللبناني من بلدة العجور الحدودية حيث استولى كيان الاحتلال عليه، داعياً الدولة اللبنانية إلى التحرك لمنع تثبيت هذا الاحتلال.

المعلم - لبنان

وقال حزب الله في بيان له: إن إجراءات قوات الاحتلال "مكثت بإشياء، سباح شاك وبناء جدار إسباني حول كامل البلدة، شبيه بما تقوم به على الحدود بين لبنان وفلسطين المحتلة".

وأوضح أن هذه الإجراءات "عصفت بلدة العجور عن محيطها الطبيعي التاريخي داخل الأراضي اللبنانية، وفرضت قوات الاحتلال سيطرتها بشكل كامل على القسمين اللبناني واللبناني من البلدة، وأحضرها لادارياً بالتوازي مع فتح القرية أمام

يديعون: تعاطف حزب الله على مدى 17 عاماً هو الإخفاق الأكبر لـ "إسرائيل"





كيف يقرأ الكيان الإسرائيلي على القضية من تعاطف قدرات حزب الله مع حول ذكرى حرب نوز؟

العالم - مع الحدث

ماذا يبعد اعلاهم بصروا وفق كل من الاستعداد الحرب لم تهب الساحة الداخلية ملياً؟

ما دلالة تصريح قائد سلاح الر الساسي من ان المشككة الاكر التي تواجه كيانه في تفكك الصيغ الاجنوبي؟

هل الكيان هو في منتصف استراتيجي امني مع تاي قدراته وقدراته زده وثاقا يكشف عنه؟

هذه الاسئلة كانت محور نقاش احدث حلقة من برنامج مع الحدث على شاشة قناة العالم الاخبارية



البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

دانت حركة حزب الله، العدوان الاسرائيلي العظم والمتجدد على مخيم جنين وترويع المواطنين الفلسطينيين وتدمير ممتلكاتهم واعمال القتل والاعتقال التعسفي والارهابية التي تمارسها قوات الاحتلال بظهر في ظل صمت عالمي وعربي يشجع العدو على التفادي بفاعله الارهابية الفظرة.

واشدت حزب الله في بيان له "التصدي البطولي لفصيلنا المقاوم وباءه المقيم الوسائل التي يواجهون قوات الاحتلال بكل شجاعة واثبات، موقعين فصائلنا في قيادتنا ونهضة والعربية".



البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

يري خيرا، ومزقون ان تاييد الاعلام الاسرائيلي على ضرورة "وقف كل شي والاستعداد الحرب لا خيل لها" ياتي خضية من تعاطف قدرات حزب الله.

العالم - ما رأيكم

واكد المستشار في العلاقات الدولية د. قاسم حنجر ان جيل الازم في "اسرائيل" بدأ يخاف بوضوح من تعاطف قدرات حزب الله.



البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

أكد المستشار في العلاقات الدولية د. قاسم حنجر ان جيل الازم في "اسرائيل" بدأ يخاف بوضوح من تعاطف قدرات حزب الله.

العالم - خاص بالعالم



البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

دانت حركة حزب الله، العدوان الاسرائيلي العظم والمتجدد على مخيم جنين وترويع المواطنين الفلسطينيين وتدمير ممتلكاتهم واعمال القتل والاعتقال التعسفي والارهابية التي تمارسها قوات الاحتلال بظهر في ظل صمت عالمي وعربي يشجع العدو على التفادي بفاعله الارهابية الفظرة.

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البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

اسقط حزب الله اللبناني، عصر اليوم الازم، طائرة مسيرة صهيونية فوق جنوب لبنان.

العالم - لبنان



البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

اصدر حزب الله بياناً بشأن القسم اللبناني من بلدة العجر الحدودية حيث استولى كيان الاحتلال عليه، داعياً الدولة اللبنانية الى التوكل لفتح ثغرت هذا الاحتلال.

العالم - لبنان

وقال حزب الله في بيان له، ان اجراءات قوات الاحتلال "كشفت بشاه سياج شاك وباء جدار امني حول كامل البلاد، شبيه بما تقوم به على الحدود بين لبنان وفلسطين المحتلة".



البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

بنا الحدود اللبنانية مع فلسطين المحتلة، حيث لا توجد المنطقة ايدا، فالانتهكات الاسرائيلية مستمرة بشكل دائم، بدأتنا نغزوا وحلنا جنوبي في لبنان نعرضنا لنصف مدغني من جانب كيان الاحتلال الاسرائيلي وذلك بعد اطلاق صاروخ من لبنان تجاه المستوطنات المحاذية.




البيان ٣٠ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ - ٢٠:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

شار عضو المجلس المركزي في "حزب الله" الشيخ نيل قاروق، الى "اننا صيرة اعلم الذي والطن بالظهر لنا، عدوان نوز رضا على الاستفزاز في لبنان".

العالم - لبنان

لقت خلال حامي اقيم في بلدة الجوز، الى ان "الطنم بالخير كان أشد ليلنا: لاجلنا الى "اننا لا نسي الموقف المزدوم رئيس مجلس النواب اللبناني يمشي الذي كان شريكا في صنع الانتصارات، كما ولا نسي موقف الوفاء والوطنية لرئيس افسس ايمن لعود ورئيس السابق اللبناني ميشال عون".

العالم - خاص بالعالم



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