KİLİKYA FELSEFE DERGİSİ Sayı: 2, Ekim 2026, ss. 15-33
KİLİKYA JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Issue: 2, October 2026, pp. 15-33

Makale Geliş Tarihi |29 Nisan 2026 E-ISSN: 2148-9327
Makale Kabul Tarihi |18 Ağustos 2026 http://dergipark.org.tr/kilikya
Araştırma Makalesi | Research Article

AHLAKİ-POLİTİK BİR TEMEL OLARAK ESTETİK ÇIKARSIZLIK: KANTÇI BİR YORUM

Selda SALMAN[1]

Öz: Bu makale, Kant'ın çıkarsızlık (*disinterestedness*) kavramını yeniden yorumlayarak onun yalnızca estetik bir uğrağı değil, aynı zamanda ahlaki ve politik yaşamın transandantal zeminini oluşturduğunu savunmaktadır. Çıkarsızlık, bireysel çıkarları, yönelimleri ve özel bakış açılarını aşarak evrensel bir perspektifi mümkün kılar, bu nedenle yalnızca estetik yargılarla değil ahlak ve politika felsefesiyle de ilişkilendirilmelidir. Makale, tarihsel olarak önce ahlak alanında öne çıkan çıkarsızlık düşüncesinin estetik kurama aktarılmış olduğunu ve bu nedenle estetik deneyimin ahlaki çıkarsızlığın izlerini taşıdığını ileri sürmektedir. Kant'ın hem estetik hem de ahlaki alanda çıkara dayalı duyguları dışarıda bırakması bu sürekliliğin önemli bir göstergesidir. Bu çerçevede makale, ahlaki ve estetik alandaki çıkarsız deneyimlerin bireyleri evrensel ilkelere yönelterek politik öznelerarasılık, dayanışma ve etik ilerleme imkânlarının temelini oluşturduğunu savunmaktadır. Adil bir ahlaki-politik düzenin tasavvur edilmesi ve gerçekleştirilmesi sürecinde estetik deneyimin, çoğu zaman göz ardı edilen ancak kurucu bir işlev üstlenen bir boyut sunduğu öne sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kant, çıkarsızlık, ahlak, estetik, politika felsefesi.

AESTHETIC DISINTERESTEDNESS AS A MORAL-POLITICAL GROUND: A KANTIAN INTERPRETATION

Abstract: This article offers a reinterpretation of Kant's concept of disinterestedness, arguing that it constitutes not merely an aesthetic moment but also the transcendental ground of moral and political life. By transcending individual interests, inclinations, and particular points of view, disinterestedness makes a universal perspective possible; it should therefore be understood not only in relation to aesthetic judgment but also in connection with moral and political philosophy. The article contends that the idea of disinterestedness, which historically first emerged within the moral domain, was later incorporated into aesthetic theory, and that aesthetic experience

[1] Doç.Dr | Assoc. Prof. Dr
İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi, Ortak Dersler Bölümü, TR | İstanbul Kultur University, Department of Common Courses, TR
s.sakizli@iku.edu.tr
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6415-387X
Salman, S. (2026). Aesthetic disinterestedness as a moral-political ground: a kantian interpretation. *Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi,* (2), 15-33.

consequently retains traces of moral disinterestedness. Kant's exclusion of interest-based feelings from both aesthetic and moral judgment serves as an important indication of this continuity. Within this framework, the article argues that disinterested experiences in both the moral and aesthetic spheres orient individuals toward universal principles and thereby provide the basis for political intersubjectivity, solidarity, and the possibility of ethical progress. Finally, it is suggested that aesthetic experience offers a dimension that is often overlooked yet plays a constitutive role in the envisioning and realization of a just moral-political order.

Keywords: Kant, disinterestedness, morality, aesthetics, political philosophy.

1. Introduction

Considering Kantian aesthetics in relation to politics is unusual and often provokes controversy. This appears clearly in Hannah Arendt's *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, where political judgment draws on crucial elements of aesthetic judgment, such as *sensus communis*, enlarged mentality, communicability, and sociability.[2] I endorse Arendt's reading as a creative and accurate interpretation, but I want to highlight that aesthetic judgments accommodate broader potentials for political thinking. In this sense, this paper extends the scope of the relationship between aesthetics and politics in a primordial direction, centering on the notion of disinterestedness.

Disinterestedness constitutes a crucial subject in judgments of taste, which Kant identifies as the first moment of the beautiful. Despite its importance for aesthetic judgments, no particular work, including Arendt's interpretation, recognizes the role of disinterestedness in political thinking. I propose disinterestedness as a foundation for moral-political philosophy, for it grounds political demands such as equality and justice for all through its primordial capacity to override individual interests that nurture egoistic human tendencies. My reading offers a novel understanding of Kantian aesthetics and its relation to political philosophy by interweaving aesthetics, morality, and politics, thereby combining crucial elements of human experience, and revealing their foundational interrelatedness. I also suggest that this reading highlights the importance of aesthetics in humanity's vocation toward a better moral-political future.

To support this claim, I will underline certain historical continuities between moral and aesthetic disinterestedness and situate Kant's critical philosophy within this broader historical context, indicating that aesthetics already implicitly carries distinctly moral connotations. I then trace how aesthetic disinterestedness converges with moral principles in a symbolically and structurally significant relation, and demonstrate how this convergence provides the conceptual groundwork for a moral-political

[2] For a detailed understanding of Arendt's interpretation and controversies surrounding it, see Ronald Beiner, Jennifer Nedelsky (eds), *Judgment, Imagination and Politics: Themes from Kant and Arendt*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

interpretation, revealing the broader implications of disinterestedness for moral and political thought.

2. Against Self-Interest: Moral Disinterestedness

In 'On the Origins of "Aesthetic Disinterestedness"', Jerome Stolnitz traces the terms *interest* and *disinterestedness* through the works of eighteenth-century thinkers, especially Shaftesbury, Burke, Hutcheson, Addison, and Alison. Shaftesbury stands out as the first philosopher to use the term *disinterestedness* to define disinterested perception (1961, p. 132). Interestingly, the development of disinterestedness emerged within a framework that foregrounded *interest* as an ethical, moral, and religious term denoting self-concerns. Disinterestedness, by contrast, was positioned against selfishness, self-love, and interest, carrying a strong anti-Hobbesian implication. In this sense, "interest" did not signify the good or well-being of the 'species [i.e., human beings] and community,' thereby endowing disinterestedness with a distinctly moral and communal significance. Thus, *disinterestedness* represents an alternative value: an immediate feeling that can override self-concern or self-motivated actions.[3]

Although disinterestedness originally carried moral and ethical connotations, its meaning gradually shifted in later discourse to a primarily aesthetic term, designating not only the character of aesthetic feelings but also, at times, the perceived inutility or lack of practical purpose of the aesthetic object. In Kant, however, disinterestedness returns to its foundational role in aesthetics while simultaneously acquiring renewed moral significance through a symbolic relation.

The terms *interest* and *disinterestedness* carry distinct meanings across Kant's works, as Robert R. Clewis's analysis demonstrates.[4] Here, following Henry E. Allison's

[3] Quoted from Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* I, 315, in Stolnitz, 132 (emphasis mine). Here Shaftesbury expresses a theological concern, emphasizing the disinterested relation with God by rejecting reward-oriented, self-interested relations to the divine. Stolnitz notes that Shaftesbury centers on the contrast between selfishness and unselfishness, and indicates a transition from morality to aesthetics: aesthetic disinterestedness relates to the 'mode of attention' and 'concern' rather than to the consequences or motives determining an action (Stolnitz, 1961, pp. 133–134).

[4] Clewis classifies the uses of interest and disinterestedness across different works of Immanuel Kant. Although I do not fully endorse his reading, his categorization is instructive. He identifies five senses of interest:

Pleasure in the object's existence (*KU* 5:204, 207, 209, 249, 296; *KrV* a830n./b858n., a830/b858; *KpV* 5:160).

Rational ('pure sense-free') or sensory desire, the satisfaction of which is pleasant (*KpV* 5:79, 160; cf. *MS* 6:212–13; *KU* 5:209, 220, 221).

Self-interest: the direct promotion of one's preservation, welfare, or happiness (*G* 4:395, 418–19).

That by which reason becomes practical or determines the will: the attempt to achieve, through principles of reason, a moral or prudential end (*G* 4:414n., 460n.).

Active interaction or engagement with an object (*KU* 5:222).

categorization—who distinguishes between 'a 'pathological' or empirical interest based on antecedent desires or inclinations, and a 'practical' or 'pure' interest' grounded in a priori components— I employ the term interest to denote the former, understood here as empirical interest (2001, pp. 87–88). This usage aligns with the notion of self-interest articulated in the Groundwork, which, as Clewis also observes, refers to the 'direct promotion of one's preservation, welfare, or happiness' (p. 147). Consequently, the interest under consideration is empirical rather than intellectual or moral.

It is also crucial to avoid conflating my usage of the term *interest* with Clewis's first- and second-order interests, which operate within a distinct conceptual framework and serve a different analytical purpose in his interpretation of Kantian thought. For Clewis, moral interest and 'taking an interest in the existence or actualization of morality' constitute two different levels of interest. He distinguishes them as follows: 'The former [moral interest] is an example of first-order interest, and the latter is an instance of a second-order interest. Taking an interest in morality involves recognizing the fact that there is such a thing as (first-order) moral interest or its product, morally worthy action' (p. 151). First- and second-order interests carry positive connotations, which can obscure the distinction between empirical and pure interests. Clewis notes some tension between these different usages, at times focusing on empirical interests with positive effects—such as helping others or curating artworks to enrich aesthetic experience. While such interests may yield beneficial outcomes, they remain distinct from the primordial conditions of moral or aesthetic experience. That is, even actions motivated by positive intentions, such as supporting moral conduct, fall into the empirical or 'interested' category insofar as they enrich an existing situation rather than ground the experience itself.

Empirical interests pertain to the causality of nature, not to the causality of freedom. Kant articulates this distinction in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (5:65). In consistently delineating the foundation of moral philosophy, Kant excludes all external conditions. As he emphasizes in the *Groundwork*, moral principles cannot rest upon any empirical precondition; indeed, such reliance would compromise the integrity of the moral domain:

> (…) everything empirical, as an addition to the principle of morality, is not only quite inept for this; it is also highly prejudicial to the purity of morals, where the proper worth of an absolutely good will—a worth raised above all price—consists just in

---

He correspondingly identifies five senses of disinterestedness:

Not taking pleasure in the object's existence.

Not having a rational or sensory desire.

Not directly promoting one's preservation, welfare, or happiness.

Not attempting to achieve a moral or prudential end.

Not being partial (*KU* 5:223).

Robert R. Clewis, 'Various Senses of Interest and Disinterestedness,' in *The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 146–148.

> the principle of action being free from all influences of contingent grounds, which only experience can furnish (*Groundwork*, 4:426).

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he reiterates this danger when he writes that 'empiricism (…) destroys at its roots the morality of dispositions —in which, and not merely in actions, consists the high worth that humanity can and ought to procure for itself through morality' (CPrR, 5:71).

In this light, even the pursuit of one's own happiness—arguably the most consummate expression of interest—remains 'the most objectionable' (Groundwork, 4:442). Interest, by its very nature, cannot serve as a basis for universal value. By contrast, morality possesses universal validity, is oriented toward the good of all, and addresses humanity as a whole. Achieving such universality necessitates a deliberate detachment from personal interest, thereby grounding action in principles that transcend both individual or situational considerations.

Contrary to perspectives that place an individual's primary motivation in self-interest, Kant introduces the feeling of respect in his well-known footnote in the *Groundwork*, contending that respect effectively restrains and regulates self-love, thereby neutralizing particularistic interests (*Groundwork*, 4:401n). This feeling of respect functions as a foundational affective basis for the moral law: it possesses the power to overcome self-love and facilitates a deeper detachment from empirical, contingent inclinations.[5] Kant revisits the feeling of respect in the second *Critique*, contending that respect elevates us to recognize the authority and significance of the moral law, which 'excludes altogether the influence of self-love' (*CPrR*, 5:74). The second *Critique* further emphasizes that 'respect is always directed only to persons, never to things' (*CPrR*, 5:76). Kant insists that even when it is not sensibly perceived or represented, our 'spirit' bows before a human being who adheres to the moral law, for 'respect is a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want it or not' (*CPrR*, 5:77). In this manner, respect directs us toward an intersubjective dimension, acknowledging and affirming the moral worth of others' actions while restraining self-love.

Scholars are unlikely to object to the importance of disinterestedness in Kant's practical philosophy; yet they often limit the effect of aesthetic disinterestedness to the domain of aesthetic experience alone. However, aesthetic disinterestedness likewise carries moral and political significance and is not reducible to a mere aesthetic moment. As I will

[5] For the feeling of respect and its moral and political repercussions, see Carla Bagnoli, 'Respect and Membership in the Moral Community,' *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 10(2007): 113–28; Stephen Darwall, 'Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect,' in *Kant's Ethics of Virtue*, ed. Monika Betzler, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008) 175–200; Stephen Darwall, 'Two Kinds of Respect,' *Ethics* 88(1977): 36–49. My paper, "Respect and Struggles for Recognition: Kant and Honneth" *(Con-Textos Kantianos 20, 31–40),* also examines respect as a political concept within recognition theory.

demonstrate in the following section, this becomes evident both in the historical context of the term and in the interpretation I develop here.

3. Aesthetic Disinterestedness

As noted earlier, the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness is not an invention of Kant, but rather a concept with deep roots in eighteenth-century philosophy. Shaftesbury[6] alongside other prominent thinkers such as Hutcheson, Burke, Hume, and Alison, engaged with the idea of disinterestedness, though each approached it in distinct ways (Stolnitz, 1961). At its core, disinterestedness denotes an orientation toward an object that is detached from any concern for its practical utility or personal advantage. Among these figures, Burke emerges as a particularly significant influence on Kant. He contends that when one experiences aesthetic pleasure, one refrains from object's serviceability, ease, capacity for enjoyment, or 'interest in any sense' (Burke, 1998, p. 60).

Kant's analysis balances eighteenth-century notions with the innovative significance he assigns to them, remaining original while still recalling the moral sense embedded in the traditional understanding of interest. In this regard, I align closely with Allison's observation that 'the concept of interest is imported into the third *Critique* from Kant's moral theory, particularly the account of moral motivation and agency' (Allison, 2001, p. 87).

I should clarify from the outset that I take issue with interpretations that deny the possibility of a disinterested feeling of the beautiful, such as Paul Guyer's reading in *Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant's Aesthetics*, which tends to overlook Kant's nuanced distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable (*das Angenehme*). This distinction is crucial: whereas the beautiful is experienced disinterestedly, the agreeable is invariably tied to an interest. Accordingly, in §3 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, titled 'The satisfaction in the agreeable is combined with interest,' he defines the agreeable as something 'which pleases the senses in sensation' (*CPJ*, 5:206). Kant associates the agreeable with the attainment of a goal—gratification in every case. As Bart Vandenabeele explains, 'The agreeable does not merely please, it satisfies or gratifies (*vergnügt*)' highlighting its inherently interested structure (2001, p. 708).

By contrast, pure judgments of taste remain free from such conditions. When experiencing the agreeable, the subject may 'gladly put themselves above all judging,'

[6] For a comparison between Shaftesbury and Kant, see David A. White, 'The Metaphysics of Disinterestedness: Shaftesbury and Kant,' *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 32(1973): 239–48. White responds to Stolnitz's consideration of Shaftesbury as a Platonist and argues that Kant's understanding of disinterestedness in aesthetics has a metaphysical facet, citing Robert Zimmerman's claim that 'in aesthetic experience the mind is presented with contents from the noumenal world.' White endorses this reading, suggesting it was intended by Kant even though there is no textual evidence. This interpretation, however, overlooks that Kant does not investigate the question 'What is beautiful?'; therefore, it is not the content but the transcendental process that aims to reveal how we feel the beautiful and the sublime without relying on empirical or psychological explanations.

as the focus is on enjoyment and immediate gratification (CPJ, 5:207), whereas the pleasure derived from any interest is distinct from the disinterested pleasure of the beautiful. Recognizing this distinction both acknowledges human inclinations and simultaneously underscores the capacity to transcend them.[7] In alignment with this perspective, Gilles Deleuze states that 'aesthetic pleasure is independent both of the speculative interest and of the practical interest and, indeed, is itself defined as completely disinterested', reinforcing the centrality of disinterestedness in Kantian aesthetics (Deleuze, 1984, p. 47).

It is also important to note that Kant identifies an empirical interest in taste in §41, 'On the empirical interest in the beautiful,' which primarily concerns social interest and must be distinguished from the pure disinterestedness of aesthetic experience (*CPJ*, 5:296–297). This empirical interest is not a precondition for the experience of the beautiful but rather a consequence of it within a social context (CPJ, 5:299). Kant therefore rightly cautions that such an empirical interest to the beautiful does not generate the moral feeling that arises from pure judgments of taste.[8]

Disinterestedness, as is well known, constitutes the first moment of the beautiful in the Analytic of the Beautiful and is intrinsically connected to the other three moments. Kant defines the relationship between taste and disinterestedness as follows: '**Taste** is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction **without any interest**' (*CPJ*, 5:211). Being independent of interest implies that the object itself provides no benefit or utility.

The *Critique of the Power of Judgment* introduces disinterestedness not only in relation to the experience of the beautiful but also in that of the sublime, as both 'please *for themselves*' (*CPJ*, 5:244). In opening the section on the sublime, Kant underscores the affinity between the beautiful and the sublime, even though they diverge in crucial respects—most notably in their effects on the vital powers, which the beautiful promotes and the sublime inhibits. With regard to disinterestedness, the sublime exhibits 'a phenomenological structure that runs against the subject's sensible interests' (Clewis, 2009, p. 166). By exerting a kind of violence on our cognitive faculties—imagination and reason—the sublime generates a negative pleasure, one that the subject would not voluntarily seek. Kant explains that the '[i]nhibition of vital powers and the immediately following and all the more powerful outpouring of them' entails a strenuous activity of the imagination (CPJ, 5:245), which the subject might indeed wish to avoid.

[7] See Michael Neville, 'The Notion of Interest in Kant's Critique of Judgment,' *Philosophy Research Archives*, 2(1975): 678–707.

[8] I would like to recall Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, where she observes that high-ranking Nazi officials were often well-educated, with cultivated tastes in literature, architecture, music, and fine dining, yet committed some of the most horrific crimes in human history. See Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

Since the sublime generates a tension between imagination and reason, the negative pleasure elicited by this experience becomes a conduit for moral feeling. The conflict between the faculties reveals the significance of practical reason, thereby signaling the higher vocation of humanity (*CPJ*, 5:257).

The contribution of the sublime to moral feeling is widely acknowledged among Kantian scholars. For the purposes of this discussion, what is particularly significant is that, in explicating the nature of the sublime, Kant highlights one of the its most fundamental characteristics: in §27, he introduces the moral concept of 'respect' within the context of judgments of taste. As Paul Crowther emphasizes, the sublime bears a direct relation to morality precisely through this feeling of respect.9 Crowther further notes that respect produces an effect of inhibition, 'a checking of all those inclinations to self-love, and personal interest which are at odds with the law's universality' (Crowther, 1989, p. 22). This process entails a transcendence of nature's causality and an elevation of the subject to a supersensible standpoint. This feeling directs our attention toward a vocation that transcends our individual concerns. The term *aesthetic* here resonates with its usage in the second *Critique*, as in the *aesthetic of pure practical reason*, where it denotes the faculty of feeling (*CPrR*, 5:90).

From the Aesthetic to the Moral

As I will underline in the following pages, disinterested feelings highlight that we are not determined creatures selfishly pursuing our own interests. On the contrary, we possess something valuable that transcends our empirical existence, which brings human beings into the moral domain in a circular fashion.

The connection between aesthetics and morality in the principle of disinterestedness is not confined to the relations discussed above. Kant explicitly develops this connection by drawing structural parallels between the moments of aesthetic pleasure and the moral features they evoke, most notably in the section entitled 'On the Beautiful as the Symbol of Morality' (§59). In this pivotal passage, Kant asserts in his well-known paragraph:

[9] Crowther's interpretation draws my attention through Clewis's reference to it. Although I agree that the sublime is directly related to morality, I find Crowther's division of the sublime into artefactual, personalized, and expressive categories—whereby he also derives a feeling of respect for humanity—problematic. I acknowledge that this interpretation aligns with the argument advanced in this paper, and I am aware that Kant himself cites human artefacts as examples of the sublime, such as St. Peter's Basilica or the Pyramids, yet I find this account controversial and potentially dangerous, as there is a thin line between praising humanity for such monumental achievements and adopting an anthropocentric view that centralizes human power over nature. Indeed, in the Kantian sense, the function of the sublime is to foster humility: it transfers a sense of awe from nature to human beings, reinforcing moral awareness and revealing our smallness as individual subjects. Rather than celebrating human might, the sublime serves as a balancing mechanism that limits human faculties; the experience of the sublime demonstrates this limit through the overwhelming challenge it poses to imagination. However, a full exploration of this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper.

> Now I say that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and also that only in this respect (that of a relation that is natural to everyone, and that is also expected of everyone else as a duty) does it please with a claim to the assent of everyone else, in which the mind is at the same time aware of a certain ennoblement and elevation above the mere receptivity for a pleasure from sensible impressions, and also esteems the value of others in accordance with a similar maxim of their power of judgment (*CPJ*, 5:353).

This quotation reveals that, within the symbolic analogy between aesthetics and morality, the inherently social character of aesthetic experience comes to the fore, insofar as one acknowledges and values the perspectives of others with respect. Aesthetic pleasure, in this light, is not confined to the immediacy of pleasure but becomes a reminder of what Kant calls the nobility of human character—our 'elevation above' the determination of sensibility and empirical interests. In this context, Kant articulates four distinct analogies that systematically link the structure of aesthetic judgment to the moral domain:

> 1) The beautiful pleases **immediately** (but only in reflecting intuition, *not,* like morality, *in the concept*). 2) It pleases **without any interest** (the morally good is of course necessarily connected with an interest, *but not with one that precedes the judgment on the satisfaction*, but rather with one that is thereby first produced). 3) The **freedom** of the imagination (thus the sensibility of our faculty) is represented in the judging of [*Beurtheilung*] the beautiful as in accord with the lawfulness of the understanding (in the moral judgment the freedom of the will is conceived as the agreement of the latter with itself in accordance with universal laws of reason). 4) The subjective principle for judging of [*Beurtheilung*] the beautiful is represented as **universal**, i.e., valid for everyone, but not as knowable by any universal concept (the objective principle of morality is also declared to be universal, i.e., knowable for all subjects, and at the same time also for all actions of one and the same subject, yet by means of a universal concept.) Hence the moral judgment is not only capable of determinate constitutive principles, but is also possible **only** by means of the grounding of its maxims on these principles and their universality (*CPJ*, 5:354, italic emphasis mine).

Even though §59 is a relatively brief section, it establishes the common principles that aesthetics and morality share—namely, immediacy, disinterestedness, freedom, and universality—each of which, in turn, can be understood through the lens of disinterestedness. Immediacy signifies the absence of any temporal interval for the consideration of interests;[10] freedom denotes independence from empirical inclinations

[10] Although in a slightly different context, but highly relevant for my purposes here, Davide Panagia, in *The Political Life of Sensation* (2009), claims that due to immediacy and disinterestedness, it becomes impossible to generate 'a relationship of want between an object and the subject,' adding that 'the durational intensity of immediacy in aesthetic experience interrupts the posture of attention that has interest as its guiding objective' (26, 28). In *Ten Theses for an Aesthetics of Politics* (2016), he emphasizes Kantian aesthetics' capacity to negate the usability of an object—its capacity to satisfy a particular interest—and thereby liberates aesthetic experience from boundaries and governing principles (51–52). Panagia, with only brief references

and self-serving motivations;[11] and universality designates the demand for universal validity, a claim made possible precisely because the feeling in question is disinterested.

Here, universality occupies a distinct position. Just as morality is oriented toward the universal validity of the moral law, aesthetics likewise aspires to universality, though it does so precisely by virtue of its independence from interest. What is at stake in aesthetic judgment is not universality in the categorical sense of cognition but rather a 'supposed universality' made possible through disinterestedness. Whereas morality grounds a universality that transcends individual interests, the universality of the beautiful is articulated as a non-conceptual demand: the presupposition that, because aesthetic experience does not rely on interest, it ought to hold universally, thereby rendering the same feeling communicable and valid for others. In this way, disinterestedness initiates a movement toward what might be described as a subjective form of objectivity. As Larissa Berger emphasizes in the introduction to her *Disinterested Pleasure and Beauty*, disinterestedness gestures toward universality. On this basis, she argues that independence from interest elevates judgments of taste, enabling them to assume both social and universal dimensions, and thereby confirms the widely accepted claim that judgments of taste are not selfish but social.[12]

---

to Kant, focuses primarily on his antinormativity claim regarding disinterestedness through freedom. I must admit that Panagia's treatment is not a detailed examination of disinterestedness but rather foregrounds the immediacy of the beautiful; nevertheless, the connections he draws between aesthetics and politics are inspiring. In his aesthetic discussion, he weaves threads connecting other philosophers of Kant's era, such as Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, with contemporary thinkers including Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Rancière. In this respect, his reading is not a strictly scholarly Kantian approach but aligns with Kantian claims, as he argues in 'From Nomos to Nomad: Kant, Deleuze, and Rancière on Sensation' that both Deleuze and Rancière are indebted to Kant's insights.

[11] Allison also emphasizes that freedom and disinterestedness are closely connected, noting that 'indeed it [beautiful] is free precisely because it is disinterested' and that 'all interest (…) either presupposes or gives rise to a need,' which renders judgments unfree (*Kant's Theory of Taste*, 93–94). In this context, freedom entails liberation from interests, inclinations, and even powerful emotions such as self-love and fear. As Allison further notes, judgments of taste, by lacking a prior interest, prepare us for 'the more serious business of morality' and thus have a preparatory function, reinforced by the symbolic relationship between aesthetics and morality ('Beauty and Duty in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*.' *Kantian Review* 1 (1997): 53–81, 66–67). For Allison, 'taste can play a significant, albeit auxiliary role' both in moral autonomy and in cultivating a good will, and 'disinterested liking' fundamentally provides this preparatory function ('Beauty and Duty in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*', 69).

[12] I would like to note that I do not agree with Berger's interpretation in 'What Is It Like to Feel Beauty? The Complex Meaning of Kant's Thesis of Disinterestedness', particularly her 'maintenance' claim: 'Because the subject wants to maintain her current state which feels positively (phenomenal character of pleasure) and because the subject is conscious of the representation x causing to maintain that sense, the subject wants to maintain the representation x' (54). I rather endorse the view that the subject is not capable of maintaining the state when experiencing the beautiful, and since the beautiful is not related to the object but rather to the

Universality, in turn, opens the possibility of moving beyond a self-centered perspective by demanding that a judgment claim validity for everyone. While I will not rehearse here the concept of *sensus communis* or the process of attaining a universal standpoint through an enlarged mentality—topics that merit an extended treatment of their own and have already been explored in Arendt's *Lectures*—I nevertheless find it valuable to keep these ideas in mind (see Kant, CPJ, §40).

In addition to the connection between independence from interest and the demand for universality, the aesthetic experience of the beautiful also entails a claim to the assent of others. The feeling of the beautiful seeks acknowledgment, and through this demand it opens the space of communication and intersubjectivity, prompting one to imagine the preferences of others and to place oneself in their position. In this way, the very structure of judgments of taste discloses an experience in which individuals are drawn beyond the confines of their own standpoint.

I have moved from moral disinterestedness to aesthetic disinterestedness, demonstrating that the latter possesses both moral and intersubjective dimensions. Indeed, as Paul Guyer observes, aesthetic 'experience becomes vital because it can contribute to the development of moral feeling' (Guyer, 2005, p. 225). Such moral elevation also prompts human beings to recognize and consider other members of their species, with disinterestedness serving as the fundamental impulse that enables this broader orientation. In the following section, I will integrate the connections between disinterestedness and moral-political philosophy, offering a political reading through the lens of disinterestedness.

4. From Aesthetics to Politics of Disinterestedness

Although the relation between aesthetics and morality is widely accepted among Kant scholars, the relation between aesthetics and politics remains controversial. Arendt's reading of the faculty of judgment, and her grounding of political judgment in the third *Critique*, along with the controversies surrounding this reading, is illustrative of this debate. Arendt calls the faculty of judgment—which she attributes to Kant's discovery—as, 'the most political of man's mental abilities' (Arendt, 2003, p. 187). She wittily states that 'Kant (…) was highly conscious of the public quality of beauty; and it was because of their public relevance that he insisted (…) that taste judgments are open to discussion because "we hope that the same pleasure is shared by others," that taste can be subject to dispute, because it "expects agreement from everyone else"' (Arendt, 1961, p. 222).[13]

subject's inner mechanism—as illustrated in the free, harmonious play—the attempt to maintain either the feeling or the object that is thought to cause it is futile and a misguided endeavor. Focusing on the maintenance thesis, in this regard, diverts attention from Kant's main argument. However, this requires a more thorough investigation of Berger's thesis, which goes beyond the limits of the present paper.

[13] One may recognize that Kant's influence on Arendt is not limited to her *Lectures*.

As the objections to Arendt's reading illustrate, traditional interpretations of Kant tend to resist viewing the third *Critique* through a political lens. Yet, recognizing the relations between aesthetics and political philosophy, the third *Critique*'s political readings are not limited to Arendt. Even though I do not endorse his highly conceptualist reading, which considers aesthetic judgments as a precondition for determining judgments, Samuel Fleischacker's book *A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith* considers the political facets of aesthetic judgments. He suggests that aesthetic judgments are an essential part of 'making any judgments' and a 'condition for fostering moral and political judgment across citizenry' (Fleischacker, 1999, p. 23). A more recent book by Susan Meld Shell, entitled *The Politics of Beauty*, considers the third *Critique* in the context of the dynamics of the French Revolution and the social interest in beauty. She claims that the refinement of taste can promote the political progress of humans, which ultimately contributes to a moral vocation.[14]

I suggest that the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* serves as a gateway to political philosophy in multiple respects, from the analogy between the handmill and despotic regimes to Kant's references to the revolutions of his age. More fundamentally, I propose that there exists a *primordial* relation between disinterestedness and political thought. In the third *Critique*, this connection is mediated by morality, as disinterestedness originates as a moral concept and, as discussed in the previous section, retains its moral connotations.

Kant marks a notable departure from many political thinkers of his era, especially Thomas Hobbes, who emphasized the inherently self-interested nature of human beings, epitomized in the phrases *homo homini lupus* and *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Although Kant acknowledged the potential for self-interest and the evils that may arise from this tendency in humans, he did not regard it as a constitutive element. In his 'On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory but is of no Use in Practice,' Kant contends that Hobbes fails to recognize the autonomous power inherent in human nature—the capacity for freedom and moral judgment. Accordingly, Kant reinterprets evil as the pursuit of self-interest, yet, as Sharon Anderson-Gold underlines, 'evil cannot negate the moral significance of historical progress because it cannot destroy man's capacity for morality nor the obligation to pursue moral goals' (1994, p. 410). Similarly,

[14] I do not agree with Shell's reading. Although she claims that the implicit context of the French Revolution influenced the writing of the *Third Critique*—a thesis she shares with others—she fails to fulfill the promise of her book's title, *The Politics of Beauty*, instead focusing on the empirical and social interests of taste. In her interpretation, the distinction between empirical interest and pure judgments of taste overlooks crucial points, and at times, the lines between these distinct subjects become blurred. I argue that the cultivation and education of taste do not necessarily lead to a better political future. As noted earlier, Nazi soldiers were well-educated, with a refined and developed understanding of taste, yet they failed to judge between good and evil. Since this distinction requires a separate, in-depth evaluation beyond the scope of this paper, I will not dwell on it further.

See: Susan Meld Shell, *The Politics of Beauty: A Study of Kant's Critique of Taste*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

Paul Crowther states, 'morality is not something we can (qua rational beings) choose to refrain from' (Crowther, 1989, p. 33). It is precisely this moral capacity that enables humans to transcend immediate self-interest and aspire toward a political and ethical future marked by equality, justice, peace, and the realization of a 'beautiful social order' (Universal History, 8:22).

The human species[15] possesses a moral predisposition that differentiates it from other living beings.[16] This predisposition provides a vocation toward a better future, as the 'power of practical reason and consciousness of freedom of his power of choice' empowers humans 'even in the midst of the darkest representations' to realize justice or injustice 'done to him or, by him, to others' (*Anthropology*, 7:324). Kant firmly maintains that historical and cultural processes, cultivated through the arts and sciences, possess the capacity to liberate humans from their self-interested, animalistic tendencies and guide them toward a moral-political future. Thus, he concludes, 'No matter how great his animal tendency may be to give himself over passively to the impulses of ease and good living, which he calls happiness, he is still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by actively struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature' (*Anthropology*, 7:324). In his 1784 essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, he highlights the inherent conflict within humans caused by their dual animal and moral nature, crystallized in his term *unsocial sociability* (Universal History, 8:21–22). Similarly, in his 1797 work *Metaphysics of Morals*, he acknowledges how humans can be savage, malevolent, and prone to war or conflict (§44). Yet rather than emphasizing these negative traits and defining them as essential to human nature—thereby creating a conceptual closure—Kant situates them within a broader moral framework. Thus, Kant maintains not only that human beings are moral agents capable of orienting their conduct toward the good, but also that history itself evolves toward a more moral future, as illustrated in *Universal History*, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'* (1784), *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786), *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), and *The Contest of the Faculties* (1798).[17]

[15] Studies also provide evidence of proto-moral behavior in nonhuman primates. For example, Brosnan and de Waal's famous capuchin monkey experiment demonstrated that monkeys often rejected rewards when they perceived unequal treatment, suggesting the presence of a rudimentary sense of fairness. See Brosnan, S., de Waal, F. Monkeys reject unequal pay. *Nature, 425 (2003), 297–299*, as well as several other studies by de Waal on empathy, cooperation, and fairness in nonhuman primates.

[16] I note that I do not employ the term "species" in a hierarchical or anthropocentric sense; rather, I maintain that morality—here understood as a defining characteristic of human beings—entails the ethical treatment not only of other human beings but also of non-human agents and even the inorganic components of the planet.

[17] Although I have disagreements concerning the concluding parts of the paper, one may benefit from Pauline Kleingeld, 'Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development.' *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 16(1999): 59–80.

The emphasis on morally guided human vocation in political life subsequently influenced thinkers such as G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx, whether directly or indirectly.[18] Against the prevailing conception of human selfishness that later shaped capitalist discourse, many political theorists continue to elaborate ideas of the common good and defend the rights of others, aiming toward a more just moral-political future. I concur with Ernst Bloch that the desire for a better world becomes possible only within a Kantian moral framework that regards humans as equally capable moral agents entitled to moral consideration (Bloch, 1995).

My aim here is not to repeat, respond to, or debate the connections between Kantian morality and politics; I will simply state that I advocate the idea of moral-political development through history.[19] I seek instead to clarify the *ground* of possibility for defining a non-selfish human predisposition that makes such a political understanding conceivable. Because the question always remains: what provides the basis for such a political vision? The answer seems to be "morality"; yet, I suggest, it is disinterested moral and aesthetic feelings that recognize other human beings as equally capable of experiencing the same disinterested feeling. In that, I claim, disinterestedness underpins morality, aesthetics, and, correspondingly, politics, accounting for its recurring presence—explicitly or implicitly—across Kant's practical and aesthetic philosophy.

Therefore, it is not surprising that morality plays a crucial role in Kant's aesthetics, as presented in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*—a point widely acknowledged by scholars such as Paul Guyer, Henry Allison, and Robert Clewis. Beyond the subtle references scattered throughout the third *Critique*, Kant explicitly links judgments of taste to moral judgments in "On the Beautiful as the Symbol of Morality." Yet the connection between Kantian aesthetics and politics remains under-explored, and scholars who connect aesthetics to politics do not focus on the role of disinterestedness as a fundamental element that spans moral, aesthetic, and political thought.

In both moral and aesthetic domains, disinterestedness positions us to consider not only our own desires but also a universal standpoint encompassing other members of our species. In this regard, disinterested experience opens an intersubjective dimension, guiding us toward a sense of universality: if the agent has no personal interest in an experience, it presupposes that the experience could be valid for everyone, not merely for a particular individual. Disinterestedness thus enables us to recognize others as agents capable of experiencing the same disinterested pleasure. Reciprocally, we regard ourselves as worthy of respect when we consider others from a disinterested standpoint.

[18] I agree with Philip Kain that the political vision Karl Marx presents—a struggle for a better and more equal future—presupposes Kantian ethics. Philip Kain. *Marx and Ethics*. (New York: Clarendon Press, 2001).

[19] I largely agree with Sharon Anderson-Gold's underrecognized account in 'Kant's Ethical Anthropology and the Critical Foundations of the Philosophy of History,' *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 11(1994): 405–419. See also Pauline Kleingeld, 'Kant's Moral and Political Cosmopolitanism' *Philosophy Compass*. 11(2016): 14–23.

The threads between disinterestedness and politics are not limited to the universal and intersubjective dimensions of disinterested feeling, which Kant also values in the context of spectatorship in social and political movements. In 'A renewed attempt to answer the question "Is the human race continually improving?"' Kant provides a clear example, emphasizing the importance of the disinterested feeling of the spectator, who neither benefits from nor is directly engaged in a social action (The Contest of Faculties, 2013).

Disinterestedness thus weaves through aesthetic, moral, and political thought. In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, aesthetic disinterestedness reinforces freedom—being free from inclinations and self-interest—and serves as a symbol of moral freedom, thereby strengthening moral feeling. At the intersection of morality and politics, this freedom reminds us that, as moral agents, we deserve equal treatment. Indeed, humans appear to be the only creatures known thus far to demand equal treatment and respect.[20] It is therefore unsurprising that Kant invokes the term *respect* in the third *Critique* through the feeling of the sublime. As Crowther observes, the sublime leads us to respect others by reminding us of their worth, fostering a 'species solidarity' and highlighting a deeply political dimension of Kant's aesthetics (Crowther, 1989, p. 173). He also notes that the third *Critique*'s *raison d'être* is to reveal 'our existence as moral beings,' and indeed, aesthetic experience—whether of the beautiful or the sublime—serves to 'humanize' us (Crowther, 1989, p. 174).

Lara Ostaric also underlines the political facets of the third *Critique*. She stresses that Kant introduces 'the notion of the highest good in the *Critique* by which he understands a community of virtuous individuals who always have the other person's happiness as their own end. 'The community of individuals with the will that is selfless and directed toward the happiness of others and not the ends of one's self-love will ensure that the ends of virtuous individuals be realized' (2003, p. 111). This conception has a direct connection with a virtuous life that goes beyond the interested living of an individual, and it cannot be achieved individually. Thus, even though neither Kant nor Ostaric uses the term *disinterestedness* here, morality and common happiness are possible only by overcoming the selfish and self-interested side of humanity. It is not a personal striving but a 'collective striving,' as Ostaric puts it, which I claim falls into the political domain of disinterestedness (2003, pp. 76–81).

Kant's idea of progress, his understanding of the human tendency toward sociality, and the development of a societal structure in which humans could become more humane and valuable—as well as his envisioning of culture, art, and a '*beautiful* social order'—I claim, can all be traced to these *disinterested* foundations (Universal History, 8:22, my emphasis). In a similar vein, I suggest that the visions of thinkers who imagine a world in which humans could live together in solidarity, without being each other's adversaries, also rest on this transcendental grounding.

[20] I also recognize that some animal behavior expresses this demand, albeit to a very limited extent.

5. Conclusion

I began by tracing the historical roots of the concepts of interest and disinterestedness, arguing that aesthetic disinterestedness has deep moral connotations. I then explored their significance in Kant's philosophy, moving from moral disinterestedness to aesthetic disinterestedness. Although commonly regarded as an aesthetic concept that symbolically evokes morality, *disinterestedness* is not merely a moment of the beautiful. Rather, it carries a deeper and more fundamental significance for moral, aesthetic, and political philosophy. Disinterested feelings indicate that we are not simply creatures driven by the pursuit of private interests. Instead, they disclose a dimension of our humanity that transcends empirical determination and situates us within the moral domain.

Such moral elevation leads human beings beyond concern for their private interests and toward the recognition of others as members of a shared moral community. In this sense, disinterestedness functions as the fundamental disposition that enables this broader orientation. It opens a path toward political ideals such as a better future, equality, unity, and solidarity, and may also encompass further political dimensions that I leave for future investigation.[21]

I suggest that approaching disinterestedness from a political perspective, and rereading the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* through a political lens, contributes not only to Kant scholarship in political philosophy but also to broader discussions concerning the relationship between aesthetics and politics. Such an approach also opens new possibilities for interpreting both the third *Critique* and political theory, particularly by challenging the capitalist conception of human beings as inherently self-interested and instead emphasizing forms of commonality and dignity that extend far beyond self-interested attitudes.

I do not address the practical dimensions of politics here. Rather, I focus on disinterestedness as the primordial feeling underlying political approaches grounded in universal equality, which I regard as the most fundamental political orientation one may adopt. I recognize that one might object that politics is, by its very nature, characterized by interested attitudes. In response, I argue that interest, in the sense discussed throughout this article, tends to corrupt political judgment by privileging particular

[21] For example, albeit in a non-Kantian context, Maria Alina Asavei recognizes the importance of disinterestedness as a term denoting 'non-self-interested motivations or morally questionable motivations' from a political perspective and views it as a means of evaluating and appreciating political artworks by situating them within the sphere of morality (2018, 93). She only briefly and insufficiently references Kant, and her interpretation of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is somewhat mistaken. Nonetheless, by bringing disinterestedness—a term not widely received in contemporary art theory—into current discussions, she offers insights that I find particularly valuable, especially for those interested in the fine arts.

interests and their advocates. To overcome these interested forms of political thinking, we may return to the foundation that I have identified in this article: disinterestedness.

REFERENCES

Allison, H. E. (2001). *Kant's theory of taste*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Allison, H. E. (1997). "Beauty and duty in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*." *Kantian Review*, 1, 53–81.

Anderson-Gold, S. (1994). Kant's ethical anthropology and the critical foundations of the philosophy of history. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 11(4), 405–419.

Arendt, H. (1961). The crisis in culture: Its social and political significance. In *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought*, New York: Viking Press.

Arendt, H. (1992). *Lectures on Kant's political philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Arendt, H. (2003). *Responsibility and judgment*. New York: Schocken Books.

Arendt, H. (2006). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil*. New York: Penguin Books.

Asavei, M. A. (2018). *Aesthetics, disinterestedness, and effectiveness in political art*. London: Lexington Books.

Beiner, R., & Nedelsky, J. (Eds.). (2001). *Judgment, imagination and politics: Themes from Kant and Arendt*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bell, D. (1987). The art of judgement. *Mind, 96*(382), 221–244.

Berger, L. (2023). What is it like to feel beauty? The complex meaning of Kant's thesis of disinterestedness. In *Disinterested Pleasure and Beauty*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.

Berger, L. (2023). Introduction. In *Disinterested Pleasure and Beauty*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.

Bloch, E. (1995). *The principle of hope*. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Brosnan, S., & de Waal, F. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. *Nature*, 425, 297–299.

Burke, E. (1998). *A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clewis, R. R. (2009). Various senses of interest and disinterestedness. In *The Kantian sublime and the revelation of freedom*, 146–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crowther, P. (1989). *The Kantian sublime from morality to art*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Deleuze, G. (1984). *Kant's critical philosophy: The doctrine of the faculties.* London: Athlone Press.

Fleischacker, S. (1999). *A third concept of liberty: Judgment and freedom in Kant and Adam Smith*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guyer, P. (1978). Disinterestedness and desire in Kant's aesthetics. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 36(4), 449–460.

Guyer, P. (2005). The symbols of freedom in Kant's aesthetics. In *Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics*, 222–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kain, P. (2001). *Marx and ethics*. New York: Clarendon Press.

Kant, I. (2015). *Critique of practical reason.* Translated by Mary Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2009). *Critique of pure reason*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1991). *The metaphysics of morals*. Edited by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2002). *Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals*. Translated and edited by Allen W. Wood. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kant, I. (2007). Conjectural beginning of human history. In *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, 221–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2007). *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view.* In *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, 227–429. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2007). *Critique of the power of judgment.* Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2013). The contest of faculties. In *Political Writings*, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, 176–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2013). The metaphysics of morals. In *Political Writings*, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, 131–75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2014). Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim. In *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, 107–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1996). On the common saying: That may be correct in theory but is of no use in practice. In *Practical Philosophy*, edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kleingeld, P. (1999). Kant, history, and the idea of moral development. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 16(1), 59–80.

Kleingeld, P. (2016). Kant's moral and political cosmopolitanism. *Philosophy Compass*, 11(1), 14–23.

Neville, M. (1975). The notion of interest in Kant's Critique of Judgment. *Philosophy Research Archives*, 2, 678–707.

Ostaric, L. (2003). *The critique of judgment and the unity of Kant's critical system.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Panagia, D. (2016). *Ten theses for an aesthetic of politics.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Salman, S. (2024). Respect and struggles for recognition: Kant and Honneth. *Con-Textos Kantianos*, 20, 31–40.

Shell, S. M. (2022). *The politics of beauty: A study of Kant's critique of taste.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stolnitz, J. (1961). On the Origins of 'Esthetic Disinterestedness.' *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 20(2), 131–143.

Vandenabeele, B. (2001). On the notion of 'disinterestedness': Kant, Lyotard, and Schopenhauer. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 62(4), 705–719.

White, D. A. (1973). The metaphysics of disinterestedness: Shaftesbury and Kant. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 32(2), 239–248.