
FATİH ÖZKAN
Hacı Bayram Veli University

This book, *Universal in Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy (An Analysis in the Axix of Avicenna)*, was written to analyze the extent of the influence of Aristotelian methodology on almost all disciplines, especially in logic, theology and law, which have emerged in the Islamic world since the tenth century. The author, in its preface to the book, especially thanks to James Richard Davis, the author of the book, *Aristotle on the Relationship of Perception and Thought*, which contributed greatly to the formation of the framework and conceptual scheme of this Book.

The problem of the universals is one of the most central issues in the history of philosophy. Particularly, it constitutes the basic reference of all subjects related to the 'knowledge' of Medieval Philosophy. The main references for this problem can be listed as follows: First, Aristotle and Aleksandros's psychology and universal doctrines; second, the theories of self and reason of classical psychology; third, the concepts, definitions, propositions and syllogism theories of classical logic; fourth, quality, quantity, status, relevance and ownership categories; fifth, the first principles of metaphysics; sixth, discussions of divine and human knowledge; seventh, the universal status of moral principles. (p. 9).

According to Akkanat's argument, the Aristotelian science paradigm forms the general framework of the middle ages Islami-
ic philosophy. The main interest of this study, which is shaped within this framework, is the metaphysical universal. Metaphysics is a top discipline. Because, on the one hand, it explores divine issues in terms of its subject; on the other hand it dictates its principles to the sub-sciences. In addition, it identifies the principles, topics and areas of research of other disciplines and examines the common concepts that these disciplines will use in their research under the heading of 'general concepts' (el-umûru'l-âmme). The universal is directly related to the mental concepts used in all disciplines as well as to the particular entities that most of the sciences are working on. This relationship network has an irresistible relationship with other networks when Aristotelian systematic is mentioned, and minds who want to know things must use Aristotelian methodology. (p. 13)

Before discussing the subject of universals, the author emphasizes that the philosophy used in the name of Islamic philosophy in the classical period does not have the same meaning as the philosophy used today. According to him, the concept of philosophy used in that period corresponds to science in today's terminology. “For example, as the philosophers distribute the religious sciences to various units under the word of philosophy, religious sciences are now distributed to various units under the word of social sciences. Science is a superstructure, and the name of this superstructure is the philosophy at that time.” (p. 16)

After this expression which is an introduction to Akkanat's work, we can give information about the content and scope of the work. The work consists of two parts. The first chapter is entitled Aristotelian Psychology and Universals. The second part is the title of Psychology and Universals in the Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy. In both chapters, psychological and epistemological progress was followed under similar headings in the formation of knowledge. In the second part, the problem of universals has been analyzed by taking Avicenna center.

According to this, in classical/rational psychology consisting of Aristotelian theses, the senses and mind are examined in terms of being the epistemological tools that can eliminate the curiosity of human, not from medical and biological perspectives. The process which begins from singular objects in the ex-
ternal world and progresses until they emerge as a concept or as a principle form the basic research area of Aristotelian psychology. The last lines of the Posterior Analytics contain adequate and sufficient arguments for this process: “... memory comes from the senses and experience comes from memory (from the accumulation of memories about the same thing). Because a single experience consists of many memories. It is the principle of art or knowledge from the whole universal (that is, one and the same in most of all things) that is based on experience or soul. (Art deals with the things that happen, what knowledge is, what it is.) So neither these forms come to us in a certain form innate nor are they more cognitive than other situations.” (p. 24.)

Aristotle's approach to abstraction on universals is important in terms of determining a general framework. In summary, there are many objects similar to each other, these objects come with an external sensation to reach a certain multiplicity in the inner sensation and this multiplicity into a single understanding with various mental activities in mind constitutes the basic conditions for creating a holistic meaning. Aristotle explains this by analogy to a defensive strategy developed by a military unit that is subjected to a fierce attack. Accordingly, the remaining soldiers in the defenses are placed individually against the enemy. Aristotle likens it to the fact that each of the singulars creates a universal meaning in the mind through our senses. The soldiers here represent singular objects. However, when these soldiers form a pure side by side, instead of seeing them as individual soldiers, we speak of a general meaning that they create. (pp. 26-27)

Although Islamic philosophers adhere to Aristotelian psychology and doctrine of universals, they have revealed many new and original views on these issues. Akkanat deals with the original ideas developed by Islamic philosophers on these issues under three headings. The first is the originality of the inner senses. Avicenna has added the inner senses to the imagination ability and the fantasy. In this respect, he argued that apart from Aristotle, active intellect showed the universals in singular forms to material Intellect through imagination ability. In addition, Al-Farabi and Avicenna built the prophetic status on a trilateral relationship, which is ensured by the coordination of active intel-
lect, human intellect and imagination. The prophets also have practical knowledge in conjunction with the theoretical, and again have both the divine field and the singular knowledge of the past and the future.

The second original analysis of Islamic philosophers has been about intellects. Avicenna added to his theory of Aristotelian intellects the intellect, which was in the capacity as a function. He determined this function to differentiate the active intellect effect on human intellect in two ways. Accordingly, if active intellect influences material intellect to give the first principles or the first intelligible, intellect is created in the capacity. If he acts to show the universal meanings of forms, the actual intellect is revealed. As it is to be remembered, Aristotle suggested that the first principles were derived from the outside world by induction. In fact, both Al-Farabi and Avicenna established the working principle of the mind in medieval psychology, and they established a very strong basis for them. (p. 485)

Another thesis of Islamic philosophers about intellects is about acquired intellect. Aristotle did not set an ability to keep intelligible and suggested that the mind should, again and again, abstract everything that he wanted to think. Because according to him, the material can only accept one form. Since the two forms cannot appear at the same time in the material, they will not be able to think of both ideas at the same time. Although this point of view was based on the Alexandrian texts, the Islamic philosophers tried to overcome this problem with acquired intellect. Acquired intellect contains not only each of the universal meanings but also the proposition groups that are compounded from several meanings. Thus, both theoretical and practical reason can think of them as they wish. (p. 486)

The third of the original analysis of Islamic philosophers and perhaps the first order in the context of the problem of universals are the intelligible meanings. On the one hand, Aristotle argued that the meanings in the mind are universal, and on the other hand, it is a meaning that comes from many singularities. However, he did not give any explanation about the structure and condition of a meaning that came to mind for the first time. If the first thing that comes to mind is singular, it is not possible to have it in mind. If it occurs in the mind, it is not yet universal,
so it is not intelligible. If experiences are made up of many memories, then experiences must be naive universals. However, Aristotle says that intelligible meaning only appears in the mind. So what is the structure and nature of this first meaning? Al-Farabi and Avicenna say that the meanings that come to mind from the outside world are singular meanings and judgments. They are not yet universal; therefore they cannot be the subject of science. At this stage, Avicenna makes them subject to a dual assessment. All the meanings, substantial and accidental species. Hence, in our minds, firstly, species-specific meanings begin to form. (p. 486)

Meanings are subject to three evaluations according to the existence and ways of being. The fields of existence are the divinity, the external world, and the human mind. Before it exists in the outer world and in the mind, the meaning of all singulars and universals exists in God. These occur in the human mind with the sensation, after they occur in the outside world with various causes. The issue of universality is also related to the meanings of the mental existence style. The universal meanings that exist in the mind are dealt with in three parts as natural, logical and mental. Natural is the meaning we have gained from the outside world. Logical is a genus, species, distinction, characteristic and general accident. Intellectual is the universal meaning that is compounded from natural and logical. (p. 487)

At this stage, the problem arises as to what is ‘universal’ or ‘universal meaning’. Avicenna’s second resolution on intelligible is that he interpreted the condition of ‘many things’ in a highly original manner. Aristotle stipulated the existence of multiple carriers in the external world. This, however, requires a situation that occurs after sensation. In other words, if we obtain from other singular singulars that we have derived from singulars, or if we can load many singular singularities that are actually actual, the meaning can be universal. In other words, if we derive a meaning from the singulars that we obtain from other existing singulars, or if we upload it to many actual singulars, the meaning can be universal. Such an argument leaves two questions unanswered. If the universals have necessarily the actual carriers in the external world, then will the meanings that we have only built in our minds and which are not directly outside the
carrier, such as propositions and syllogisms, will not be considered universal? While God knows everything and the vastness he knows is not in the outside world yet, what is it that he really knows? In order to overcome these two problems, Avicenna had to reinterpret the very expression of the Aristotelian universal. He reserves the expression, ‘many things’ in the definition. On the other hand, he divides the plurality into three groups in terms of his actual presence in the outside world, his existence in terms of possibility, and his absence. A meaning fictionalized by the universals of the mind - because it is already constructed with universals - is universal only, and it is not obligatory to exist in the outside world. Sometimes meaning can be loaded with more than one singular. God knows the whole universe and its contents with their own attributes, and when it forms such a universe, the universe and its components are fully compatible with it. We see here that Avicenna developed scientific arguments in accordance with religious thought or made the requirements of religious thought compatible with scientific propositions. (pp. 487-488)

Avicenna’s third analysis on intelligible is about the existence of universals in the external world. Universals are universally absent in the outside world. They exist in the style of existence in accordance with the conditions of the outside world. Therefore, there is no humanity in the outside world; there are people established with humanity. That means that the universals are preceded by singularities in the outside world. However, such a situation does not mean that there existed universals in the outside world, and then that singulars occurred in these universals. It is the causality that establishes singulars in the outside world and they exist in the universal meanings. The universals are the meanings that exist in divine knowledge.

“It seems that the Muslim philosophers, on the one hand, subjected the scientific texts of their period to a qualified reading, identified problems, analyzed them and had long debates on them. On the other hand, they tried to reflect their basic sensitivities to the scientific thinking they inherited with logical forms. The scientific thought they elaborated was discussed in many respects, but when it was taken from the medieval science paradigm, it crossed both Aristotle and Alexander.” (p. 488)