NATIONALIST OR NATIVIST POLITICS?
CASE STUDY OF THE DANISH PEOPLE’S PARTY

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Abstract

Radical right-wing European parties are developing politics of resistance, criticism, and a certain amount of backlash, either towards European integration or, more broadly, towards globalisation. Nonetheless, and as addressed in this article, the question is in what context do radical right-wing parties pursue these policies? Is it a national backlash or an attempt at cultural reproduction in an era of acculturation within multiple civil societies of the European Union (EU)? In becoming more transnational in terms of customs, capital, and people flowing across borders, it is becoming increasingly difficult to analyse radical right-wing European politics via modern nationalism. For this very reason, this article attempts to clarify the politics of the radical right via nativism, thereby opening a debate about the native and non-native within the European context. The article supports this hypothesis with the case study of the Danish Peoples Party (DPP). According to the findings reported in this article, the nativist politics pursued by the DPP exceeds the ordinary definition of ‘nation,’ defining both ‘Danishness’ and ‘Europeaness’ in terms of nativism in Europe, rather than in terms of nationalism.

Keywords: Nationalism, Nativism, Danish People’s Party, Party Politics, EU

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MİLLİYETÇİ Mİ YOKSA YERLİLİK SIYASETİ Mİ? DANİMARKA HALK PARTİSİ VAKA ANALİZİ

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Yerlilik, Danimarka Halk Partisi, Parti Politikaları, AB

Introduction
Starting with the post-war era, the European continent witnessed an increasing—not to mention an uneven development—of radical right-wing parties (e.g., the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League, the Polish Law & Justice Party, the True Finns, etc.). A number of scholars (Kitschelt, 1995; Fennema, 1997; Golder, 2003; Carter, 2005) characterise these parties as xenophobic, chauvinist, and even racist, whereas other scholars (Griffin, 2000; Hainsworth; 2000; Betz, 2007), to some degree or other, prefer to call these parties far-right, radical-right, extreme right, or simply populist. Even though right-wing parties promote harsh discourses (often times with diverging motivations), one could say that they do not adhere to the modern understanding of nationalism. The reason why these parties are categorized as being nationalist is that they promote anti-immigration rhetoric and cultural
protectionism. In confronting an era of ‘post-mass nationalism,’ it is becoming ever more impossible to fuse culture and politics into the same domain. The disintegration of politics and culture, as well as the weakening of state functions—as argued by Delanty (2000:134), ‘transgression has become the blurring of the spheres of cultural modernity and the loss of autonomy that comes with this weakening...’—introduces in nativist politics a rhetoric of “otherness” which is causing, not only an alienation amongst the “native” and the “other,” but also an alienation between the natives who do not share the same views within the same community. Clearly nativism is not a new phenomenon, however with the rise of the radical right parties in Europe we are witnessing a reinterpretation of nativism via a sifting of the immigrants on whether they belong to the community or not. At this point the other requires focus, the paper aims to question the nation within a reformulation based on not a binary classification between the native and the non-native but on a ternary, including the invasive as well. This brings the issue to what Marcuse (1972: 102) termed as ‘an alienation from alienation,’ or the formation of a group consciousness rather than a national consciousness. Maier and Rittberger (2008: 250) share the same view, acknowledging that this as ‘an identity shared by fellow Europeans forming a distinct civilization with its own history, culture, tradition and religion.’ In displaying this political attitude, however, they also become a member of those who contest this view. In Waever’s (2000: 259) words, this relates to a ‘‘certain fear of coming too close to the centre of Europe’’ whilst remaining in an in-betweenness ‘of being both part of Europe and separate from it’ which, itself, correlates with nativist politics. However, the concept of nativism alongside the inclusion and exclusion dichotomy in Europe via ‘politics of selective exclusion’ (Betz, 2007:34) requires further evaluation which is addressed in the paper with a case study of the DPP. The preference of the DPP is that, it makes visible the ternary grouping via

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1 For Delanty, ‘‘...cultural [imagination] must be seen in the context of the de-[territorializing] and [the] globalizing of [the world] community. The new discourse [regarding] community [is] not [that] of the traditional peasant communities about which the founding fathers of sociology wrote; community is de-centered, contested and is thereby open to new interpretations. Nor is it a moral order based on cultural consensus, or a moral voice, as the communitarian philosophies would have it.’’ Gerard Delanty, Modernity and Postmodernity, Sage Publications, London, 2000, p.128

2 The term ‘invasive’ is derived from the metaphor ‘invasion’ of Europe used by radical right-wing political parties very often reflecting their campaign for protecting not only their beloved nation but Europe as a whole against the alien on the march to Europe. See, J. Rydgren, The Populist Challenge. Political Protest and Ethno-nationalist Mobilization in France, Berghahn Books, NY, 2003.
embracing the immigration issue from its very establishment as a part of its nativist politics.

It is the aim of this paper to investigate and understand the motives driving the nativist politics of the DPP using real-life evidence. For this reason, a certain amount of space is given to multiple sources of documentation containing party documents, party working papers, as well as the speeches given by members of national parliaments from 2001 to the present date. In using the data collected, the article interprets these to find links between the outcomes and research question. The research method utilised by the case study examined by this article explores the phenomenon of nativism in order to understand its occurrence, not to mention its very representation, by a particular political party whilst in political discourse—namely, the radical right party since it is the party which manifests the differentiation between native, non-native and invasive the most. With the rising tide of Euroscepticism, radical right-wing politics have become a salient element throughout Europe. Embracing both nativist and Eurosceptical attitudes, however, does not count for these parties’ nationalism. The parties’ nativist politics is against the alien, in this case in Denmark, while the Euroscepticism the party persists, covers opposition to the aliens outside Denmark simultaneously. This argument is supported by the evidence elucidated in the DPP case study.³ In fact, this issue is a part of the ongoing debate regarding the existence of nationalism itself; whereas, for some, nationalism seems to still be haunting the European continent (Calhoun, 1993; Bartelson, 2001; Smith, 2001; Campbell, 2007), for others, although they believe that it still exists, they believe that it is either weakening or that it is, in fact, an anachronism (Creveld, 1999; Delanty, 2000; Habermas, 2001). Since the concept of nationalism is a broad term which can neither be easily defined nor theorised upon seeing as there are many different types of nationalism⁴ (See Vincent, 1995; Özkırımlı, 2000), this article

³ Besides “nativism,” other scholars have emphasised other terms in the academic literature as well, such as “ethno-pluralism” (Rydgren, 2007), “cultural fundamentalism” (Stolcke, 1995), the “new right” (Declair, 1999), and “racism without races” (Balibar, 1991), just to mention a few. For more on this, see Anders Hellström and Peter Herrik, “Feeding the Beast: Nourishing nativist appeals in Sweden and in Denmark,” CoMID Working Paper Series, No.1, 2011, p. 8.

⁴ As Smith (1983) proposes: “There is an increasing literature on the problematic of “nationalism(s).” It is clear that many circumstances influence the belief and advocacy of nationalism; as a result, nationalism reflects many ambitions. Therefore, there are ‘...distinctions between “territorial” and “diaspora” nationalism; “modernization,” or “reform,” nationalism and “conservative” nationalism; “unification” and “separatist” nationalism; “nation-building,” or “state,” nationalism and “sub-national,” “anti-
concentrates on cultural nationalism\(^5\) in particular, with special attention paid to Ernest Gellner (1983) and Eric J. Hobsbawm (1990), who have both made remarkable contributions to nationalism, especially in terms of analysing nationalism in terms of culture. It is not a coincidence that these two scholars and their theories are evaluated within this article. Even though they are both considered members of the modernist school, and even though they adopt different theories towards nationalism, they nevertheless both argue for the discontinuity of nationalism.

**The Discontinuity of Nationalism in the Theories of Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner**

The modern school of nations and nationalism argue that both “nations” and “nationalism” are modern constructs. A vast number of orthodox theories regarding nationalism argue that nationalism arose from several processes of change, including capitalism, industrialism, secularism, etc. (Smith, 1994: 377). Secondly, modern theories emphasise the important role that political and economic elites had in shaping this process through social-engineering (Hobsbawm, 1992), instrumentalism (Brass, 1979), modern constructs and artifacts of men’s convictions (Gellner, 1983), political movements seeking state power (Breuilly, 1994), etc.

Nationalism brought along processes of transformation which resulted in the establishment of the nation-state. One of these processes of transformation was the cultural dimension. This is tackled by the abovementioned scholars. Hobsbawm posits that both nations and nationalism are products of what he names “social-engineering.” For Hobsbawm, the social-engineering attributed to the political and economic elite resulted from the “invention of tradition.” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983:1-5) For him, traditions first invented the nation itself and then later helped it to survive. Traditions are defined by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983: 1) as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate colonial,” or “post-imperial” nationalisms; “official” and “insurgent” nationalism; “majority” and “minority” nationalism; and between “state-framed” and “counter-state” nationalism. One study listed thirty-nine types of nationalism. See A.D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, Duckworth, London, 1983, p. 211–29.

\(^5\)“Cultural nationalism is a nationalism according to which members of groups sharing a common history and societal culture have a fundamental, morally significant interest in adhering to their culture and in sustaining it for generations.” See, Chaim Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, NY, 2003, p. 1.
certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with a suitable historic past.’’

According to Hobsbawm, though, the periods in which these traditions were made and used were the 19th and 20th centuries. After the postwar era, however, using these traditions in the name of nationalism is no longer important. During the 19th and 20th centuries, it was very important to build strong nation-states alongside competitive national economies. After the postwar era, though, there no ‘territorially bounded national economy [anymore], since [during] the 1960’s the role of the national economies has been undermined by major transformations in the international division of labor whose basic units are transnational, and multinational’ (Hobsbawm, 1992: 183). Hobsbawm does not argue that both nations and nationalisms will disappear from our world; however, what he underlines is that the importance, or mission, of this phenomenon has started fading away. In his own words: ‘‘Nation-states and nations will be seen as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the new supranational restructuring of the globe. Nations and nationalism will both be present but in subordinate, and often rather minor roles’’ (Hobsbawm, 1992: 191). Regarding European integration at this point, it is clear that the attitudes of the political parties are shifting from nationalism to nativism, seeing as locating the “other” within a European context becomes awkward.

On the contrary, it will inevitably have to be written as the history of a world which can no longer be contained within the limits of “nations” and “nation-states” as these used to be defined, either politically, or economically, or culturally, or even linguistically. It will be largely supranational and infranational, but even infranationality, whether or not it dresses itself up in the costume of some mini-nationalism, will reflect the decline of the old nation-state as an operational entity. (Hobsbawm, 1992: 191).

As Hobsbawm indicates, the traditions and national organisations for creating or securing the state and the national economy are no longer a matter of nationalism. As he states: ‘‘Nationalism is historically less important. It is no longer, as it were, a global political programme, as it may be said to have been in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. It is at most a complicating factor or a catalyst for other developments’’ (Hobsbawm, 1992: 181). The increasing amount of labor movements, both within and outside Europe, has changed the concepts of the “in-group” and “out-group.” Alongside European integration, the radical right rhetoric has extended the concept of the “in-group”
to Europeans. In order to clear the picture, the head of the DPP’s parliamentary group Peter Skaarup stipulates that:

> Immigration is causing a big integration problem. If you get very many in a very short time it’s very difficult. We want to help people in their own countries. It is not possible to help the whole world in Denmark ... We have grave problems in Denmark with immigrants who are not here to contribute but are more here to contribute to their own economy... ] (Peter Skaarup, Public Speech, June 16, 2015).

As noticed above, national identification can be related strictly with other elements such like, religion; however this at the same time stretches the national identification far beyond the national borders. Gellner, on the other hand, in his book Nations and Nationalism, firstly describes the relationship between the state, the nation, and nationalism. Briefly, for Gellner (1983: 6), ‘’... Nations, like states, are a contingency and not a universal necessity,’’ adding that ‘’neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances’’ (Gellner, 1983:6). Moreover, Gellner argues that nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that ‘’they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy’’ (Gellner, 1983:6). For Gellner, the age of nationalism is explained in terms of the transition from agrarian to industrial society and, more importantly, has given birth to what he names “high cultures.”

Nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population ... It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind. (Gellner, 1983: 57)

Gellner (1983) identifies three phases of human history: the hunter-gatherer, the agro-literate, and the industrial. He does not attribute much importance to the first two phases. This can be understood from how he defines the term “nationalism.” For him, nationalism is ‘’primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’’ (1983: 1). That is why, for Gellner (1983:1), nationalism is ‘’a theory of political legitimacy.’’ That is the reason why Gellner links this definition to that of the state, which he typifies as being the ‘agency within society that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence. States only exists [sic.] where there is division of labor, and the state is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order’’ (Gellner, 1983: 4). In order to
survive, this political principle requires a culture to disseminate the will of the masses by means of sharing; for Gellner, however, this is required only in the era of nationalism. This is one of the reasons why Gellner posits that ‘‘Nationalism creates nations, not the other way around’’ (Gellner, 1983: 56).

According to Gellner, this political principle may not always exists, as some states may also include foreigners, non-nationals, or people who remain unmixed with others, thereby resulting in vagueness regarding who the national group is. That is why Gellner argues that:

The infrastructural investment made in them can be relied on to perpetuate them. Partly because many boundaries have already adjusted themselves to the boundaries of these cultures, and partly because the nationalist imperative is now so widely respected that developed societies seldom defy it brazenly, and try to avoid head-on confrontations with it; for these various reasons, late industrial society can be expected to be one in which nationalism persists, but in a muted, less virulent form. (1983: 121-122)

As argued above in the theses of both Hosbawm and Gellner, the need to institute or impose an education system for rationalising the language and the creation (or at least the securing) of a non-dependent economy is obsolete. These conditions are becoming less important for countries integrated into the global economy, especially in the realm of the EU (Bauman, 1995: 250). It is evident that multi-nationalism does not have the capacity to fulfill rising ambitions. The problem is that, in most multi-national states, there is no public institution that can serve as the vehicle for developing new models of the national identity of the dominant group. This leads to what Kymlicka (2011: 289) terms an “ambivalence of identification.” The modern literature presents no tools with which to investigate the national phenomenon. Instead, it offers ‘‘a portrait of nationalism in absolutes: either nationalism is linked to the modern state or it is, by definition, no longer nationalism itself’’ (Laible, 2008: 28). The decline of nationalism, with its resulting lack of proper political, bureaucratic, psychological, and cultural traditions, as well as the proper mechanisms for implementing all these, makes it problematic whether it is suitable to label the contemporary radical right in Europe as pursuing and representing nationalist politics.
Contemporary Debates on the Decline of Nationalism and the Rise of Nativism

The rapid transformation of the nation, which is becoming more and more multiethnic, multicultural, and multi-national (see McNeill, 1986) in Europe, is weakening the importance of nationalism, which is becoming a void and useless positioning. The modern nation-state is not sufficiently capable to handle the issues of contemporary Europe. The diverse interventions which Europe has implemented from both below and above are very clear signs of this. For Beisheim et al. (1999):

Political denationalization has been defined as a process whereby institutions at the level of the nation-state are losing ground not only to international institutions but also to institutions at the sub national level. Thus denationalization is proposed to refer to fragmentation as well as to integration. (cited in Goldmann, 2001: 20)

The European integration process is causing, on the one hand, fragmentation within the nation-state, the dismantling of society, and the birth of different politics. For instance, one of the leading figures of the radical right-wing in Europe, Jean Marie Le Pen, once stated that: ‘‘the socio-economic cleavage has lost any relevance, and has been replaced by opposition between the proponents of a cosmopolitan and those of a national identity’’ (cited in Bornschier, 2008: 89). The political and economic relations between the Member States, the regions, the nations, and the supra-nation are becoming significant in contemporary Europe (see Smith, 1992; Weiler, 1995). Starting with the post-Maastricht era, with the introduction of EU Citizenship and the development of standards for minority protection and asylum procedures, it is becoming awkward to defend the traditional national community. As a result, the impositions of uniform laws, customs, and—to some degree—cultural traits are dismantling the nation, while at the same time creating common grounds at the EU level. As a result, integration at the supranational level is pushing European states to come closer in terms of their political and social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. For instance, one of the assumptions of nationalism is the strengthening of national identities via state institutions. In today’s European nation-state system, however, this is becoming more and more disputed. It is widely questioned how to evaluate national-belonging—something which shelters both a collective identity and individual rights and responsibilities. With a great amount of human rights and minority protection initiatives imposed on the nation-state by the European integration, the issue becomes multi faceted.
At this point, nativism, a concept very associated with nationalism has started occupying right-wing politics in Europe. Nativism, according to Perea (1996), is the policy of protecting the cultural dominance of the native citizens by both favouring the native inhabitants and blaming—or at least being critical of—immigrants or immigration, which are perceived as spoiling the existing order, or even blamed for creating a parallel society (pp. 1-3). Unlike nationalism, however, nativism does not insist on imposing homogeneity through assimilation; rather, it emphasises integration. As Bogl and Matscher (2008; cited in Karner, 2011: 189) explain, integration means “not to force others to abandon their cultural and social identities, nor to fully submerge [them] in the host-society. However, they do have to acknowledge and work around local values, and existing laws must be adhered to…” The aim of establishing a socially cohesive society—or what Cantle (2008) refers to as “Community cohesion”—rests on a loyal, respectful, peaceful, secular, as well as a liberal, society. At this point the questioning comes into being in a form of who embraces the abovementioned values and who does not. According to Mudde (2007) nativism “holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that the non-native elements are threatening the homogenous nation-state” (p.19). These definitions of nativism unveils problems of how to address the non-natives. It is clear that with the rising tide of mass immigration, it is becoming difficult to approach nativism. At this point the DPP is a special case in interpreting nativist politics, the party breaks down the problematie via introducing a new grouping, namely the invasive. This emerging new aspect of nativist politics in Europe exceeds the boundary of the nation and becomes a European wide political discourse and policy making.

As a result of European integration, apparently an attitude of (European) nativism is rising rather than nationalism. This means that people are becoming “simply protectionist in relation to their own culture” (Mudde, 2007: 16-17) by protecting it from what is perceived as foreign. This contradicts another component of nationalism: namely, “otherness.” Using the discourse of the “politics of selective exclusion” (Betz, 2007: 34), radical right parties are actually blurring their sense of belonging to the nation. Radical right-wing parties target specific groups and minorities (Black, Muslim, and Roma), addressing these groups as being “invasive,” as well as “non-European.” A redichotomization of ‘us’ and ‘them’ requires a clarification. It is clear that a nation-bounded we vs. the foreign is uncertain. In the case of Denmark, there is the native Danes, the non-natives alike with different origin, and the invasive (inferior to the formers) who have nothing similar, often labelled as the alien or deviant. For instance, a party MP from the Danish People’s Party (from 2001
Soren Krarup’s speech hints at how this nativism reflects exclusion in Europe:

It should not be difficult to understand that Arabs and Africans are so different from the Danish culture, tradition and language that it will be very difficult for them to integrate in Denmark. (...) It is clear that when we have to give citizenship, it plays an important role whether the person is for example a Christian Asian. I think that a Christian Asian has greater chances of being integrated than a Muslim Asian, naturally (cited in Holm, 2005: 103).

The DPP therefore qualifies Danishness with Christian values. A Christian Asian, for instance, is acknowledged as being more similar to Danish values than an Arab or Muslim. Immigrants with a Middle Eastern background are acknowledged as being a threat to Danish values because of their not wanting to integrate with Danish society but, rather, maintain their own ways of life. Similar arguments are shared among right-wing parties across Europe. These parties target some groups but not others, such as Blacks in Southern Europe and the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, both of whom are addressed as being invasive who share little to nothing with Christian or European values. For example, the far right populist Pim Fortuyn shared a similar view: namely, that “it is different to accept someone who comes from a similar cultural background, when compared to someone who is completely different from our culture” (cited in Caldwell, 2011: 339). The same views are shared by parties like the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), which has a clear anti-Roma agenda, calling them “inadaptables” and “petty criminals”—both of which are examples of a shared discourse held by many right-wing parties throughout Europe. This brings the discussion to yet another assumption of nationalism—i.e. that of the nation responding collectively when a threat is perceived. Instead of creating solidarity, however, this perception has led to discord within the national community.

The DPP utilises nativist rhetoric which rests on cultural factors containing humanist, pacifist and tolerant ideas. For example, the DPP lists the Danish values which must be defended as being “the freedom of speech, equality, broad-mindedness and tolerance” (DPP Working Program, 2007). The same argument was carried out by former Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen back in 2003: “…Danes differ from many immigrants in having a freedom-loving and rights-respecting culture which will not allow gender discrimination, the politicization of religion, or genital mutilation” (cited in Hedetoft, 2010: 114). These statements merit to be evaluated in terms of nativism, seeing as the
host community is open to integrate with the immigrants just as long as they participate in the country’s culture and obey the law. In an interview former party leader of the DPP, Pia Kjaersgaard answered the question of ‘for how many generations does it take for an immigrant to be characterized simply as Danish?’ The answer is as follows;

They are Danish if they behave and are regarded as Danish and that is why I am opposed to the word nydansker [new Dane]. I think that is a ridiculous word. You are Danish when you have a Danish citizenship and the rights and duties it entails. But you must live up to it (Pia Kjaersgaard, Public Interview, July 20, 2013)

As emphasized in the abovementioned citation it is not only about the citizenship acquired by the immigrants, but the way they integrate or at least are willing to integrate into the host society. Or contrary it causes damage for both sides which is discussed in-depth below in the light of the explanatory reformulation outlined above.

**Analysis of Nativism: Case Study of the Danish People’s Party**

Denmark remains one of the leading Member States in terms of political participation, especially with relation to issues regarding the EU. Popular attitudes towards European integration in Denmark are very complex. Nonetheless, a majority of the Danish people support economic integration in Europe as long as it does not also affect Danish autonomy very much. Manifesting these views, the leading party, which is known for its Eurosceptic attitude regarding Europe, is the DPP. As argued above, there are two motivations behind the DPP’s nativist and Eurosceptical attitude: the first is anti-immigration, and the second one is the protection of culture. The party’s Eurosceptical stance runs parallel with its nativist politics.

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6 Sorensen remarks that this level of political participation ‘arguably [reaches] an extent that is unparalleled in other European countries. The argument is supported by the fact that there have been as many as six referenda on European issues in Denmark, while the majority of member states in EU15 have held none. Interestingly, the word for referendum in Danish is folkeafstemning, meaning “people’s vote.” The frequent use of the word folk (people) in the Danish language is, in fact remarkable, and illustrates the degree to which sovereignty is placed with the people in Denmark: Apart from folkeafstemning, Danes name their parliament folketing, although the word parliament is part of the Danish vocabulary, and refer to their political system as folkestyre (people’s rule) and members of parliament as folkevalgte (elected by the people).’ Catharina Sorensen, “Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared: A Sceptical Assessment of the Concept,” *DIIS Working Paper*, No. 25, 2004, p. 20.
The Danish People's Party was founded in the mid 1990s as a right-wing, (soft) Eurosceptical party. The party centers its politics mainly on anti-immigration rhetoric, the protection of Danish cultural heritage, a pro-welfare orientation, and the strict rule of law. The DPP, like the other main parties of Denmark, harshly criticises the EU while, at the same time, not seeking to withdraw from it. It is evident that ‘Euroscepticism in Denmark is not based on an outright rejection of the EU’ (Knudsen, 2008: 153) seeing as they actually remain enthusiastic about many European policies. The DPP remains anti-federalist and supports an Intergovernmental type of EU. The DPP is similar to many political parties, especially within the UK, seeing as they strictly defend the country’s parliamentary sovereignty and reflects hostility towards any power which attempts to supersede that sovereignty. The DPP is gaining more and more support from Danish citizens. It gained success in the 2001 elections, receiving 12% of the votes; this slightly increased in both 2005 (13.2%) and 2007 (13.9%). Even though it slightly fell in 2011 (12.3%), in the most recent Danish elections in 2015, the party doubled its votes (26.6%). From 2001 up to date the issue of immigration is centered in the middle of the party objectives as the party programme speaks of:

[...] The Danish People’s Party is in favour of cultural cooperation with other countries, but we are against giving other cultures, building on completely different values and norms than ours, leverage in Denmark. The way of life we have chosen in Denmark is outstanding. It is conditioned by our culture, and in a small country like ours it cannot survive if we permit mass immigration of foreign religions and foreign cultures. A multicultural society is a society without coherence and unity, and, consequently, existing multicultural societies over the globe are characterised by a lack of solidarity and often by open conflict, as well (DPP, Party Programme, 2001).

Beginning from the 2000s and lasting up to 2011, the party supported the country’s coalition governments (i.e. supporting the pro-EU government, which accords with the party; its supporting role did not include EU issues) in

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7 Knudsen argues that: “...in spite of the fact that Denmark’s governments are often coalition, minority ones, they have never changed over European issues, not even in the wake of rejected referendums against the will of the current government. First, an important factor is that whereas the establishment at large—that is, the large majority of the political parties and mainstream media—is broadly pro-EU, they have accepted a nuanced, Soft Eurosceptic approach to the EU since the early 1990’s.” Ann Christina Lauring Knudsen, “Euroscepticism in Denmark,” in Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.), Oxford University Press, NY, 2008, p. 153.
Denmark which, in turn, gained certain compromises, such as reform packages in 2002 on tightening immigration, or budget negotiations, etc. For instance, the Danish People’s Party’s current leader Kristian Thulesen Dahl explains the party’s success on tightening immigration as follows:

They are changing society. We are not in favor in having for example a mosque’s call for prayer [...] It’s not that they are Muslim that is not the problem. It is that people coming to Denmark, living in Denmark, must respect the society (Kristian Thulesen Dahl, June 14, 2015).

As clearly demonstrated above, the DPP is not against immigration but seeks to place some restrictions on it and make it more controllable by the government. By this way, the party believes that the immigrants will be integrated into the Danish society properly. As the party separates on one hand, the ‘non-native’, willing to integrate and causing no harm and being even beneficial for the Danish community, on the other hand the ‘invasive’ who are not willing to integrate and altering the Danish community via their own values and norms. This policy is related directly with the country’s EU membership as a result of the open borders and free movement. When it comes to issues regarding EU affairs the DPP is not so enthusiastic about further EU integration. The party has defined its EU policy objectives on a case-by-case basis. It supports issues, such as a common trade policy, the environment, and general cooperation at the EU level. The party’s programme demonstrates this support as follows:

We oppose the development of the EU, which is going towards the United States of Europe. The Danish People’s Party wants a close and friendly cooperation in Europe but cooperation should be limited to areas such a trade policy, environmental policy and technical cooperation. We oppose the introduction of a European political union (Danish People’s Party, 2008).

The EU, however, at present has already evolved into a political union after the signing of the Maastricht treaty and, as a result, the party is not that clear about its opposing the ‘European political union.’ For the DPP, the agenda and programme for developing Europe are both designed by the political elite in a process involving only politicians and public administrators who do not listen to the common people. The governing parties in Denmark, though, support the opposite position. In a recent EP speech, the Prime Minister Thorning Schmidt argued that “what the Community Method really means is that Europe is no longer ruled by the strongest, but that Europe is now ruled by law and
democracy and that is worth defending’’ (EP Speech, January 18, 2012, Strasbourg). The cross cutting of European issues is seen from the abovementioned speeches in terms of two different party stances on the integration process. Another important reason for the DPP’s opposing further European integration is its belief in power moving away from the peoples of Europe to the technocratic elite (Danish People’s Party, Work Program, 2009: 60).

The party criticises the major weaknesses of the EU administration, such as irresponsible management and waste of the European taxpayer’s money, widespread corruption, and nepotism (DPP Work Program, 61-62). The party believes that the European Commission is increasing its powers for the purpose of becoming a European government. As the party puts forth: “the Commission management is characterized by self-sufficiency and strong closedness. We want the EU Commission to be transformed into a proper official body subject to the Council of Ministers’’ (DPP Work Program, 63). This refers to the intergovernmental approach, which places the Council of Ministers at the heart of European integration. No matter whether it is the intergovernmental or federal approach, however, what is argued in this thesis is that the Union’s development is inevitably giving birth to diverse views about integration and, with the extension of the QMV in the Council, as well as the increasing role of the EP, the EU will still have a permissive national framework. The main obstacle for this, however, is the lack of democracy.

It is important to stress that, whether a federal or intergovernmental Europe, Euroscepticism is accepted as a democratic form in Denmark, where any criticism or opposition towards the EU needs to be debated, rather than silenced. The Danish parliament ensures its existence by financing Eurosceptic activities. Denmark is an exceptional case in this matter seeing as Eurosceptics are granted a number of privileges that are not proportionate to their (lack of) representation in parliament seeing as the Danish political system is relatively generous in how it treats minorities. The parliament financially supports Eurosceptics and Euro-supporters beyond the political parties through the EU Board. As a result, this gives them equal access to financing EU-related information for ‘a debate-creating purpose,’ regardless of their European orientation. Each year, the parliament allocates money towards this purpose, and has granted special appropriations during all referendum campaigns. The political parties in the parliament and the two extra-parliamentarian Eurosceptic parties usually get a fixed share of the annually allotted amounts (Knudsen, 2008: 164).
Apart from the democratic deficit and issue of sovereignty, the issue of immigration is high on the agenda of the DPP. The 2001 party programme was entitled as: ‘‘Common values – common responsibilities.’ The Danish values of solidarity and community are considered to be threatened from several sides. According to the DPP the reason of these threats is the immigration policy in Denmark which the party devotes itself to fix. The party is not asking for a ban on immigration, contrarily supports it, however with the clause mentioned below.

[...] we have always said that people who come to Denmark and contribute positively should be welcome. But we have to admit that Denmark faces a lot of problems with people who don’t want to join the Danish society and who make demands to have rights that affect us, and we are against that (Pia Kjaersgaard, Public Interview, July 20, 2013).

Another figure in the DPP, MP Kristian Thulesen Dahl, supports these ideas, confirming that ‘‘It all depends on which kind of foreigners it is, where they are from and what their businesses are.’’ The factor behind this kind of opposition to immigration is cultural. The nativist politics of the DPP rests on cultural elements. For instance, MEP Mogens Camre stated the following at the time:

[...] take in cultural traits from the Western world, such as freedom, democratization, equality, education, economic reform and limitation of population growth. [Developing countries] are poor: poor because their culture denies progress, innovative thinking, science, freedom – and work. They will never succeed in improving their lives, if they do not follow our culture’s path (Mogens Camre, Member of the European Parliament, Danish People’s Party, June 14, 2004).

According to the abovementioned view, western societies display a ‘politics of selective exclusion.’ The DPP’s ‘nativist’ politics goes beyond the Danishness exhibited towards a European, or what the party calls a western, type of culture, or solidarity, which actually contributes to nativism rather than to nationalism in correlation with the party’s Eurosceptical attitude. For instance besides the EU, Denmark also shares a great depth of solidarity with the other Nordic States but when it comes to the issue of immigration the DPP stresses the importance of border controls and criticism of neighboring countries arguing that ‘‘If the Swedes want to turn Stockholm, Gothenburg or Malmö into a Scandinavian Beirut, with clan wars, honor killings and gang rapes, let them do it. We can always put a barrier on the Öresund Bridge’’ (Pia Kjaersgaard, Public Speech, February 19, 2005). The parties’ anti-immigrant
attitude qualify who should belong to Europe and who should not. As addressed earlier one of the main characteristics of nationalism is the issue of “otherness.” Otherness is applied towards any foreign group outside the nation. The DPP, however, does not apply this otherness to Europeans (and all those they would consider to be followers of European values). For the party, this otherness stands for the Muslim and Black minorities of Denmark and Europe. The party’s 2001 book ‘Denmark’s future. Your land, your choice,’ for instance, reflects fears regarding Islam. According to the party, “multiculturalist and multiethnic experiments have again opened the doors to the middle Ages, which the Danes [...] had left behind centuries ago” (DPP Pamphlet, 2002/1: 2). The party argues that Islam and Muslims are incompatible with western values. As argued by Eisenstadt (2000), many of the attachments do not belong or rest on the nation-state anymore, but on the ethnic, local, regional or transnational levels. At this point, the DPP bases its arguments on the transnational dimension, melting their anti-immigration rhetoric into a (non-)European dimension. For Karolewski and Suszycki (2007: 190), these occur as “pan-European movements to combat the Islamization of Europe... At the same time placing anti-immigrant politics within the wider context of globalization, where the EU is viewed as an ally” — in this case, defining both Danishness and European simultaneously. For instance, according to the party’s political programme, “our cohesion is threatened by immigration and the arrival of refugees from countries outside the Western cultural sphere” (Danish People’s Party, 2007: 1). The wording ‘Western cultural sphere,’ however, requires some attention. It is clear that the party is willing to advocate a kind of Fortress Europe which should only belong to the European and, as a result of the open borders within the EU, the party reflects scepticism about the EU, which itself is blamed for causing these immigration problems. The issue is addressed at the EU level and can be extended to a European, Western, Christian culture. For instance, Mogens Camre has demanded that “Denmark should withdraw from [the] UN Refugee Convention and [...] block EU’s Charter for Fundamental Rights” which he finds something aimed against the Europeans (Speech, May 2004). The abovementioned demonstration is a good example of the tangled relationship between human rights and nationalism. Within the realm of human rights, this demonstration certainly is not desirable; however, if this is to be evaluated under nationalism, the statement “against Europeans” requires special attention. Just like human rights, the issue of nationalism exceeds the national boundary — i.e., in this case, becoming more European.

For instance, Kitschelt (1995: 8-9) has argued that support for the right-wing parties— in this case, the DPP (sharing similar arguments)— depends on their
ability to combine market-liberal economic policies with ‘‘an authoritarian and particularistic stance on political questions of participatory democracy, of individual autonomy of lifestyles and cultural expressions, and of citizenship status.’’ As a result of this view, a European Union that combines a common internal market with strong barriers against a flow from outside the EU territory is exactly what the agenda of the DPP includes. The party argues that most immigrants ‘‘belong to communities of faith and cultures, which lies far away from the democratic and Christian worldview’’ (Danish People’s Party, 2007: 5) and that ‘‘certain cultures have a family structure that is significantly different from the Danish and Western’’ (DPP, 2007: 6). For instance, the DPP Work programme includes the following argument:

The EU has long since reached a size which itself impedes the democratic decision making [process]. [The] Danish People's Party is extremely concerned to extend cooperation with new, unstable states, and we are opposed to inclusion of countries outside the Western culture group. We are opposed to the accession negotiations with Turkey, which is not a European country, and whose culture makes it incompatible with Europe. Only a small part of Turkey, a few percent of land area, is located on the European continent. Turkey belongs to the Middle East and its people are not Europeans. (Danish People’s Party, Work Program, 2009: 63)

As argued by the DPP, the issue of “Danishness,” or its historical origins, does not draw any distinction between Danish and other Western cultures. There is, however, reference to the modern, secular, democratic Western culture, as compared with non-Western cultures (Black, Muslim, and, to some degree, Roma, etc.). The former party leader Pia Kjaersgaard expressed in 2003 that the ‘‘EU-elite in its Babel tower dreams eating [of] at the restaurants in Brussels and Strasburg is one thing. What the ‘‘old cultural Europe’’ of the people wants is something else and much more down-to-earth’’ (Pia Kjaersgaard, Public Speech, September 15, 2003 cited in Meret, 2010:139). Kjaersgaard makes reference to what she calls the ‘‘old cultural Europe,’’ again extending the issue to the European level, which makes reference to both Christian and European values. The far right parties posit the argument that ‘‘Europeans are Christian’’ and that they demonstrate their ‘‘national ethnic uniqueness which invokes the Christian and historical heritage of European citizens as a way to justify the exclusion of outsider groups’’ (Fligstein et al., 2012: 14).

The point requiring attention in these demonstrations is the reference made to Europe and/or European values—norms which clearly exceed the boundary
of the nation—and, secondly, reflects the fragmentation within the nation. As Bauman (2004: 7) argues, Europe is defined in terms of a ‘European culture’ that knows no borders, and Europe, he argues, ‘is allergic to borders.’ That is why modern notions of “solidarity,” “alliances,” “consensus,” and “universal rights” require merging with contemporary notions of “difference,” “plurality,” “multi-perspectivalism,” and “micro politics” (Best and Kellner, 2001: 116).

Conclusion

Alongside the parallel processes of European integration and globalisation, doubts and the questioning of the future of nationalism will remain high among academics, as well as the political elite. The paper emphasises the modern theories regarding nationalism. It does not argue that nationalism is disappearing; rather, it suggests that its inversion into nativism in Europe requires attention. As a result, the article finds that the motivation behind rightist politics cannot be explained in terms of nationalism, but in terms of “nativism”. The nativism pursued by the radical right cannot be properly understood via the native – non-native dichotomy, but requires the inclusion of invasive as well. At this point the DPP is a very interesting party as it is setting the agenda of nativism, targeting the invasive not only in Denmark but also in Europe. The party discourse and politics forces one to think of a re-dichotomizing of the ‘we’ and ‘them’ problematique. It has been a long time since the nation-states of Europe have entered a tunnel of political acculturation, and the EU is engendering in its political parties the powers to adapt to and re-evaluate their policies both at a national and EU level. That is why every move or political discourse developed by the radical right is beset, not only by the subject of the nation-state, but also by other parties located in different Member States as well. As a result, the DPP remains affected as well as engaged with its counterparts across Europe by means of transnational party groups by means of pursuing nativist politics, as well as political attitudes and discourses towards immigrants. The nativism pursued by the DPP covers no racist rhetoric, only cultural rhetoric. As debated in the article, the DPP contains rhetoric which favours the “in-group” of Europeans and disfavours the “out-group,” defining them as non-Christian, non-European, and non-Western. The DPP claims to represent the native-born cultural community, Nevertheless, it does not claim to further close a dominant, oppressive community belonging only to native-born Danes. Actually, the party leaves room for migrants, if adaptable, to integrate into Danish society. At this point, the conclusion raises a broader question on how to evaluate the cultural distinction which, in turn,
requires further investigation seeing as, can migrants become natives in Europe or, at the very least, in Denmark.
References:


