The Analysis Of EU’s The Western Balkan Enlargement

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Abstract

Enlargement of the European Union is one of most important development not only in European politics but also in the world politics in general. The European Union had accepted ten thirteen new members from 2004 to 2013 and these new members were mainly consisting of Eastern European and Balkan countries (only Malta and Cyprus were exceptions). In this context, the enlargement of the Union to Western Balkans is very important issue which had to be taken into consideration. In this article it is aimed to elaborate the achievements and failures of the EU enlargement strategies in the three Western Balkan countries. It will be analyzed that whether could it be accepted that there is a comprehensive enlargement strategy of EU for Western Balkan countries and why EU enlargement process was culminated in achievement in some countries such as Croatia and Slovenia, but it failed in another countries such as Serbia in the first decade of 21.century. This question will be assessed in line with the two fundamental theories of regional integration namely, rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. In the research study, it reached that sociological institutionalism provides more appropriate perspective for the purpose of explaining the different results of enlargement strategy in the Balkan countries.

Key Words: EU Enlargement Process, Western Balkans, Rationalist Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism

AB’nin Batı Balkan Genişlemesinin Analizi

Özet


Anahtar Kelimeler: AB Genişleme Süreci, Batı Balkanlar, Rasyonel Kurumsalçılk, Sosyolojik Kurumsalçılk

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Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union is a very important political process both for the organization itself and the international relations of Europe in general. While enlargement was always an important process, its salience has increased since the end of the Cold War. The EU has initiated unprecedented enlargement process since the EFTA enlargement of 1995. The EU had accepted ten new members in 2004 which were mostly post-communist countries of East Europe. But the EU has not only enlarged East, but also it has begun to incorporate Balkan countries such as Slovenia in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The EU also recognized candidate status to Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia and it accepted the potential membership perspectives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo in line with the decisions of the Thessalonica Summit. There is important point in this process which has to be enlightened. The EU included all the Eastern European countries at the same time, in 2004, as members, but in Western Balkan enlargement the situation is different. The EU incorporated Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia in 2013, and it has not given membership status to other former Yugoslavian countries. The Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia were parts of the former Federal Yugoslav Socialist Republic and they have similar economic, social, and historical features. Especially the Croatia and Serbia have same civil war experiences and both countries have accused of not implementing the international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the civil war. The important puzzle is that, why EU accepted Slovenia and Croatia as members but not accepted Serbia and why the EU gave to some of these countries candidate status such as Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, and some of them only membership perspective such as Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania (Albania is not a former Yugoslavian country but in this article is classified with the former Yugoslavian countries due to its economical, political and social similarities with the former Yugoslavian countries). And it is important to elaborate that could one mention about a consistent and comprehensive enlargement policy of EU towards the Western Balkans and does the EU assess the Western Balkans as a region such as Eastern Europe or does it regards the region in a country specific foundation? The aim of this article is to answer these questions in accordance with the general assumptions of two fundamental theories of regional integration namely, rationalism and constructivism. In the first chapter a definition of the organizational enlargement in line with the academic literature will be made. In the second chapter, the definitions of the rationalism and constructivism and their hypotheses, predictions, independent and dependent variables in the field of EU enlargement process will be elaborated. In the third chapter, the EU’s Western Balkan enlargement in line with these hypotheses and predictions will be analyzed.

1. Definition Of Enlargement Process

According to Schimmelfenning, enlargement is a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms of a relevant organization (Schimmelfenning,2002: 503). Institutionalization may be regarded as a process which transforms the actions and interactions of the social actors to similar normative directions (Schimmelfenning,
The difference between horizontal and veridical institutionalization is equal to difference between “widening” and “deeping” (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 505). In the case of horizontal institutionalism, which refers to widening, the number of the actors who adopt the institutional norms and rules of the organization increases and organizational norms and rules spread beyond the formal borders of the organization (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 506). Enlargement is also a gradual process. It is not occur only by means of membership. Some actors may adopt the norms and rules of organization through the organization’s conditionality, externalization, socialization, or imitation mechanisms. Some actors may be aligning with organization’s policies, norms, and rules in selective areas (for example situation of EEA and EU’s exceptional relationship with the Swiss). Among the member states, some actors may also participate in organizational practices in different times or they may pursue a selective compliance such as United Kingdom (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 507). In sum, the Enlargement process could be regarded as widening of adoption of European norms, rules, practices, and model of governance beyond the formal borders of the relevant organization. Some academics, who support mainly constructivist assumptions, regard the enlargement as unification borders of in international community and the international organization which presents relevant international community’s values and norms. (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 510; Bull, 1995: 23-35). There is also an important issue has to be elaborated. Some academics confuse the definitions of enlargement and Europeanization each other. In the other words, they assume the both concepts as a single phenomenon. In this regard, it could be fruitful to take into consideration the Europeanization’s definition. According to Radelli, Europeanization could be defined as construction, diffusion, and consolidation of European governance model (Radaelli, 2003: 30). But it should be assumed that this definition is necessary but not sufficient and lack of a large scale generalization. Johan Olsen referred the Europeanization as a research process which stresses dynamic of evolving of the European polity (Olsen, 2002: 924). According to Olsen, it is not so important to describe Europeanization as a stable meaning. It is important to enlighten how the term of Europeanization could be useful for understanding dynamics of evolving European polity. Consequently, it is so appropriate to take into consideration the phenomena of the Europeanization rather than its stable meanings as indicated above (Olsen, 2002: 925-926). Olsen stressed that the Europeanization has five different phenomena namely, changes in external borders (expanding the territorial space of EU or enlargement), developing institutions at the European level (the process of central-building institutions of EU), central penetration of national system of governance (domestic adaptation of EU model of governance), exporting forms of political organization (assessment of how European developments impact and are impacted by system of governance and events outside the Europe), political unification process (the assessment of the degree which Europe is becoming more unified and stronger political entity) (Olsen, 2002: 927-929). Consequently, the Europeanization is very large process which incorporates structural, institutional, agency level dimensions and many phenomena as indicated above. The Enlargement process is one of these phenomena rather than a separate issue. However it is also important to indicate that these phenomena of Europeanization are complementary rather than the contradictory. All of them are correlated to each other. For example it is hardly to explain the domestic change (central penetration of national system of governance) or exporting forms of political organization (assessment of how
European developments impact and are impacted by system of governance and events outside the Europe) without existence of central institutions of EU and it is impossible to elaborate the enlargement process (expanding the territorial space of EU) in the absence of a central institutionalization of EU level actors which provided EU body of law and European governance or without the domestic change (central penetration of national system of governance) Consequently the enlargement is a phenomena of Europeanization and it should be elaborated in this large point and it is correlated with the other phenomena of Europeanization.

In this context, the enlargement is not a separate phenomenon; in contrast it is a part of large scale Europeanization process. The next chapter the rationalism and constructivism theories and I their hypotheses, predictions, independent and dependent variables in the field of EU enlargement process will be elaborated.

2. Rationalism And Constructivism And Their Respective Hypotheses For Enlargement

According to rationalism, the actors are rational actors and they strive to maximize their gains in the interactions with the other actors. Rationalism assumes logic of consequently which emphasizes the importance of individual and material interests in decision making process (Abbott&Sinidal, 1998: 3-20). In rationalist theories, the causal status of the institutions such as EU remains secondary to that of individual and material interests. They mainly provide constraints and incentives, not reasons, for actions, they alter cost/benefit calculations, but not identities and interests, because the identities and interests are assumed pre-given such as benefit maximizer and self-interests actor (Abbott & Sinidal, 1998: 25-32). Some authors of rationalism, regards international institutions as clubs or voluntary groups which assumes that members would not join or remain in the club unless a net gain resulted from membership (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 509; Sandler & Tschirhart, 1998: 481-490). The rationalism also emphasizes the regulative role of the institutions which means that the institutions provide the constrains and control the states against the each other and they facilitate the collective action (Sandler&Tschirhart, 1998: 492-493). In other words, rationalism stresses the instrumental, regulative, and facilitating functions of institutions, but it also emphasizes determinative role of the states. In line with the definition of rationalism above, Schimmelfenning reached hypotheses of enlargement for applicant and member states and also organization itself (EU). The rationalism assumes for applicant and member states that expected individual costs and benefits determine the applicants and member states’ enlargement preferences. States favor the kind and degree of horizontal institutionalization that maximizes their benefits (Schimmelfenning,2002:510). Consequently, according to rationalism, enlargement would occur provided that net costs of enlargement would not exceed the net benefits of enlargement for both applicant states and member states. These costs and benefits may be in realm of economic, political, or social issues or they may relate to absolute gains or relative gains. In the all situations, the actor make a sensitive cost/benefit calculations and make up their minds in line with conclusions of this calculation (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 512). For example, the accession process of United Kingdom should be elaborated for the purpose of enlightening the rationalist perspective. United Kingdom had suffered from the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in its way to EU membership in 1970’s.
The UK had to consent the very costly sanctions of the CAP in exchange for full membership. According to rationalism, the UK made cost/benefit calculations for membership. The cost was fiscal cost of the CAP, but the benefit was the accession to the European Free Market, and it used its preference in favor of free market due to its high economical and commercial interdependency to European Free Market. On the other hand, the main veto player of the UK on its way to full membership, France which was the main beneficiaries of CAP, had accepted the membership of the UK in 1973 due to UK’s concessions on the CAP. Because, the benefits of the UK’s contributions to CAP budget had exceeded the costs of the full membership of the UK to EU which would culminate in reduce of France’s leverage in EU’s decision-making bodies. In this example both an applicant country (UK) and a member state (France) pursued their interests by means of cost/benefit calculations in line with the rationalism (Padoan, 1997: 107-110). Rationalism assumes a similar cost/benefit calculation for organizations too. According to rationalism, an organization (or one can say EU) expands its institutions and membership if, for both the member states and applicant states, the marginal benefits of enlargement exceed the marginal costs (Padoan, 1997: 115-133; Schimmelfenning, 2002: 512).

Consequently, an organization expands at a point which marginal costs equal to marginal benefits. And this point should be accepted as optimal size of the organization (Padoan, 1997: 134). But it is important to indicate that rationalism does not presuppose a net gain for each member in an organizational enlargement. Some members may not obtain a net gain, but the bargaining powers of the states come into consideration in this regard. There are two possible way for rationalism; first one is that, member states that expect net losses from enlargement will agree to enlargement if their bargaining power is sufficient to obtain full compensation by means of side payments by the winners. Or second one is that, the winners of enlargement will threaten loser for their consent to enlargement with exclusion with credibly and for looser the cost of exclusion should exceed the cost of enlargement (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 513). In the EU politics, there is no any example of exclusion of looser that did not consent to enlargement, but in the case of compensation, we should give the exclusion of Poland and other new members of the Easy Europe from the CAP for a long time. Despite Poland was a member, it had excluded benefits of the CAP, due to provide the consents of some of old members such as Spain and France due to alleviate the costs of their agriculture sectors (Moravcsik&Vachudova, 2003: 17).

On the other hand, according to constructivism which assumes logic of appropriateness, argues that actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper and socially accepted behavior in a given rule structure. These collective understandings and intersubjective meanings structures influence the way actors define their goals, interests and identities and what they perceive as rational action (Wendt, 1992: 19-38; Olsen, 1997: 157-162). There are no any stable and pre-given interests and identities, and the self-help international system is not a stable structure of the global politics. The actors define their actions in accordance with the mutual interactions among themselves and their definition of threat changes in line with the actors’ identities and perceptions (Olsen, 1997: 164-168). As an example, a nuclear power Iran and a nuclear power Canada does not constitute similar threat perception and cost/benefit calculations for United...
States or United Kingdom, the rationalism could not explain it, because it assumes the behavior of actors as homogenous regardless of their mutually constructed identities and interests. Thus, the determinative factor of actors’ actions is their identifications with a specific international community which set rules, norms, interests, and way of doing things for their actions. Consequently, rather than maximizing their subjective desires, actors strive to fulfill social expectations in a given situation in line with the general norms, rules and identical features of the their relevant international community (Olsen, 1997: 172). The constructivism focuses on socialization process by which actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of relevant international community. Actors are socialized into new norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and identities accordingly (Checkel, 1999: 83-114). In line with the definition of the constructivism, it possible to reach some hypotheses for the enlargement of an organization. According to Schimmelfening, for applicant states and member states the hypothesis is similar; “The more an external state identifies with the international community that the organization represents and the more it shares the values and norms that define the purpose and the policies of the organization the stronger the institutional ties it seeks with the organization and the more member states are willing to pursue horizontal institutionalization with this state.” (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 513). According to constructivism, the hypothesis for organization in the realm of enlargement is that; “the organization expands its institutions to outside states to the extend these states share its collective identity, norms and values” (Schimmelfenning, 2002: 515) This assumption stresses the issues of cultural match between organization and applicant state and degree of this cultural match is correlated with the willingness of organization to accept the relevant applicant state. On the other hand, if we take into consideration the optimal size of the organization, the constructivism assumes that enlargement will continue until the cultural borders of international community and formal borders of international organization match (Sedelmeier, 2003: 13-15). These hypotheses assume the “Europeaness” of the relevant applicant state and values, norms and identity of international community as independent variables of the enlargement.

First, the Europeaness issue will be elaborated. These hypotheses do not take into consideration the specific differentiations between the members of the organization, in the other words, the member states attitudes towards the applicant states are assumed homogenous, but this assumption is lack of sufficient explanation for a possible generalization. For example, it cannot explain why the Mediterranean member states such as Spain and Italy were reluctant to Eastern enlargement, despite Germany and UK were drivers of this enlargement. According to constructivist point of view, there must not be any deviation among the members of an international community in the realm of enlargement process; in contrast it assumes more deviation in the applicant states because they are exposed general political, sociological, and economical reorientation (Sedelmeier, 2003: 38). But as indicated above, in some conditions the member states may demonstrate different responses for different policies (say enlargement policy). Second puzzle appears in the conception of European International Community. According to Bull, international community comes into being when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests, common norms, common practices and common values, forms a community in the sense that they conceive themselves to be
bound by a common sets of rules in their relations with each other, and share in the working of common institutions (Dunne, 2006:131-135). But, the constructivism with its indicated definitions and hypotheses could not explain what will happen if there is a tension among the community value and norms among the member states. In this regard, the discourse analysis occupies an important section for the purpose of dealing with this puzzle, and it leads us to take into consideration the processes of arguing in the relevant actors’ domestic spheres. Thomas Dietz’s discursive nodal point (DNP) concept could be useful for the purpose of solving this puzzle. According to Diez, DNPs are the concepts in the political debate which around meaning is stabilized (Dietz, 1999: 16). In the other words, DNPS are contested concepts and due to stabilize the meaning of these concepts and fill them with meaning, there must be discursive articulations among the actors (Dietz, A1999: 29-35). For example, the concept of “European Community” should be regarded as a DNP, because neither the meaning of “Europe”, nor meaning of “community” is firmly established, either one only comes into being through discursive articulation. This discursive articulation has potential to modify old, or construct new identities and norms (Dietz,1999:37; Schimmelfenning, 2002: 516). And member states, applicant states and organization itself by means of this discursive articulation mutually and as an ongoing process, redefine the boundaries of their international community and by reinterpreting the identity and values again and again, they create many “us” and “they” or “other” perceptions or many conceptions of “European Governance” from conception of common market (as in UK case) to conception of Federal Republics of Europe (Schimmelfenning, 2001:47-55).

Another example, we should give the conception of “genocide” in Srebrenitsa in Bosnian Civil War. In the Serbian public this genocide was discursively articulated as self-defense of the Serbians in the civil war and EU’s sanctions on the Serbia due to its incompliance with the decisions of the International Criminal Court of the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was articulated as EU’s bid for breaking the solidarity of the Serbian national territory and it was also articulated in the realm of securitization due to speech acts’ of Serbian media and policy makers, but in the EU these atrocities articulated as genocide and Serbia was accused for making genocide. But in Croatia, the EU’s desire from compliance with the ICFY was articulated in very different perspectives. In Croatia, both the media and policy makers did not articulate the civil war atrocities in line with securitization perspectives and the submission of the Brigadier Ante Gotovina to ICFY was not resulted in public turmoil in contrast to large scale public turmoil due to submissions of the Radko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic to ICFY in Serbia. Consequently, the discursive approaches will be elaborated in the case studies of this article. However, in the next chapter, the EU’s enlargement process in three Western Balkan countries in line with the rationalism, constructivism and as a radical version of constructivism discursive approaches will be analyzed.

3. Analysis Of EU Enlargement Process In Western Balkans

3.1. Analysis of EU Enlargement Process in Western Balkans in Rationalist Perspectives:

The rationalism paves the way for cost/benefits calculations. As it indicated above these possible costs and benefits of a relevant political action such as enlargement has a significant importance in the realm of constituting of the states’ preferences (Moravcsik, 1993: 473-477). The
rationalism also emphasizes the secondary and limited power and influences of the international organizations (Moravcsik, 1993:478). In the other word, as the clubs, the international organizations only have an instrumental and efficiency-provider role not only in the realm of constituting of the states’ preferences, but also in the realm of the bargaining process (Schimmelfenning, 2001:48).

Consequently, in this article, in line with the rationalist assumptions which were indicated above, the Western Balkan enlargement process of EU will be assessed in accordance with the member states’ preferences. The first issue is that, why the some of member states’ preferred a Balkan enlargement and what were the possible costs and benefits of this enlargement round for the member states. At first possible issue may be security perceptions of the member states. The 9/11 2001 terrorists attacks and the globalization has reasoned the erosion of the conventional understandings of the many concepts in social sciences since beginning of 21 Th century. The concepts of security and threat have been one of them. In the age of globalization, the realist meaning of the security has transformed from the hard power perspective which was based on the principle of balance of power to asymmetric perspectives such as organized crime, terrorism, and illegal immigration (Sedelmeier, 2003: 39). This transformation has not only changed collective understanding of threat conception but also located the human security in the headline of the security organizations. The Western Balkans had experienced the most dramatically war in the Europe since the Second World War and the civil war of the former Yugoslavia has culminated in prevalence of the organizational crimes, increase of the illegal immigration and atrocities such as genocide in the Europe (Seroka, 1978: 269). Consequently, an unstable Western Balkan geography might produce a security threat to some of the member states which are close to Western Balkans in particular, to entire Europe in general. The member states such as Austria and Germany might pursue and support the membership of the Slovenia and Croatia due to that threat perception (Subotic, 2003: 10). On the other hand, the Western Balkan countries might argue that, without the prospect of EU membership, their countries would become politically and economically unstable, threading European security and welfare with illegal immigration and organized crime for increasing their bargaining power against the European countries in the realm of membership perspective (Subotic, 2003: 11). If one takes into consideration the past experiences of the Western Balkan countries this hypothesis has some possibility, but self-inflicted chaos is no credible bargaining strategy, because it is in the self-interests of the reform-minded governments and civil war experienced public of the Western Balkans to develop stable political and economical systems.

On the other hand, it is also important to indicate that the EU has the capacity to defend itself as efficiently against the spill-over of Western Balkan instability and it also achieved this mission in the period of Yugoslavian Civil War. On the other hand, the EU does not allow for accessions of the countries which do not achieved internal stability on their own, as a fundamental principle. Another important issue, the security threat of organized crime and illegal immigration are not exceptions of the Western Balkans. In this regard, Ukraine, Moldova and North African states provides the same threat, but EU does not recognize them a membership perspective. On the other hand, this security consideration point of view could not explain the exclusion of the Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia in the enlargement round of the 2004 and 2013. The Slovenia was the most stable country of the post Yugoslavian states and it presented the less security threat to Europe relative to Croatia.
and Serbia (Radaelli, 2003: 23). If the internal instability and its produced threat towards the Europe had been the main driver of the enlargement, the most instable countries such as Serbia and Macedonia should have had the priority for accession. The other explanation should be the economic considerations. But the economic interdependence between the member states and the Western Balkan states is highly asymmetrical in favor of the EU, consequently Western Balkan countries does not have the bargaining power to make the member states accept their bid for joining the EU (Radaelli, 2003: 42). On the other hand, the drivers of the Western Balkan enlargement such as Austria and Germany were in minority and could not credibility threaten the more reluctant governments with any attractive unilateral and coalitional alternative outside the EU framework (Subotic, 2018: 12). There is also another puzzle; the drivers of the Western Balkan enlargement namely, Austria and Germany were also reluctant to other Balkan countries membership except Croatia and Slovenia. Consequently, it is hardly difficult to mention about a consistent enlargement strategy for all the member states in Western Balkans. In some extend, one should mention about the commercial considerations of the member states such as Germany which has a large export capacity in Western Balkans, but in this regard Serbia had the biggest economy among the post Yugoslav states, thus it could had the priority for accession, but EU preferred Slovenia which has the smallest economy among the post Yugoslav states and Croatia which has more smaller economy relative to Serbia (Arman, 2007: 34-38). On the other hand, the Western Balkan enlargement threatens to create particularly high costs for the poorer, less developed, and more agricultural members such as Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. These costs result from trade and budgetary competitions (Arman, 2007: 42-45). And though rich border countries such as Austria, Germany and Italy in some extend, will face immigration pressures or social dumping due to geographical proximity, high unemployment in the Western Balkans and high wage differentials. (For example only in Italy there is nearly 1.5 million Albanians who had immigrated the country with legal and illegal procedures. Albania had included in membership perspective, in a future time when Albania become full member, it may result in a more comprehensive social dumping for Italy) (Arman, 2007: 54). Another problem is that, the Western Balkan countries will be become structural net recipients. Today the member Western Balkan countries such as Slovenia and Croatia are net recipients. Consequently, The EU transfer to these countries will outweigh their contributions to Community budget. On the other hand, possible membership of the Western Balkan countries will also affect the Common Agriculture Policy, the Eastern European countries and Mediterranean countries will be net losers which are the main beneficiaries of the CAP today (Yalova, 2007: 22-25).

In sum, the rationalism could not explain the possible Western Balkan enlargement process, in accordance with the cost/benefit calculations, the member states preferences would have been resulted in association agreements. While the association agreements would provide the liberalizations of Western Balkan countries economies, it would protect the EU from some economical costs and social dumping. But EU preferred a membership perspective for Western Balkan countries and it also it accepted two of them as full members. On the other hand, rationalism remained in puzzle of why the EU preferred the Slovenia and Croatia as members but not other Western Balkan countries such as Serbia at the same time, despite their similar economic and social conditions. Consequently, the rationalism is unable to explain the Western Balkan enlargement
preferences of the EU. Thus it is necessary to pay attention the second theory, namely constructivism or social institutionalism.

3.2. Analysis of EU Enlargement Process in Western Balkans in Constructivist Perspectives:

As it had indicated above, the constructivism maintains a close relationship between the community and the organization which represents the values and norms of this relevant community. In this regard, it is necessary to enlighten whether the Western Balkans are included in the European community or not. In another aspect, we should analyze how the Europe defines the Balkans. We should begin with the term of the “Balkanism” which had been stressed by the Europe since the beginning of the 19 Th centuries. The Balkanism is a term which is similar to orientalism. It stresses the cultural, civilizational, social, economic, and political differences between the continental Europe and the Balkans (Todorova, 2003: 43; Arman, 2007: 151). The Balkanism has some joint points with the European’s long lasting intellectual bias namely, orientalism. But the difference between Balkanism and orientalism is that, in the case of orientalism, the East has regarded as uncivilizational, undeveloped and barbarian, and according to orientalists the European values, norms, political and economic systems has an undisputable superiority over the Eastern systems and the East hast to comply with the European values, norms, political and economic systems for the purpose of reaching the European civilization (Said, 1999: 23-45). The orientalism also emphasizes the backwardness, laziness and ignorance of the East people and their obligations to assistance of the West for defeating this backwardness and ignorance (Said, 1999: 56-67). In the other words, orientalism stressed the clean distinctions between the Europe (and West) and East in realm of values, norms, political and economic systems in favor of the Europe (Said, 1999: 68). It should be indicated that there is also a clear “us” and “other” distinction and the Europe has right to simulate this backward, lazy and ignorant “other” (or we should say East) to itself by means of destroying its values, norms, political and economic systems (Fergusson, 2012: 23-34). In case of Balkanism, the Balkans is not regarded as completely East, but not exactly European on the other hand (Hammond, 2006: 8). The Balkans is regarded as half backward, half lazy, and half undeveloped by the Europe, in the other words, we should mention about a half orientalist point of view and a half “otherness” in the case of Balkanism (Todorova, 2003: 236; Arlı, 2004: 22-33). Some authors define the Balkans as a civilization junction which combine the “other” (or we should say backward East) and “us” (Europe or West), in this regard the Balkans are neither European nor Eastern, they are in somewhere between civilized Europe and backward East (Hammond, 2006: 14; Carrier, 1992: 195-196). The Balkanism conception is necessary to enlighten the subliminal ideas of Balkans in minds of the Europeans which had been constructed by centuries of experiences; it has lack of sufficient explanation capacity for analyzing the EU’s Western Balkan membership perspective (Todorova, 2003: 46-48). In line with the Balkanism perspective, the Balkans is not in the community of Europe and they do not share the similar identical, cultural, and political properties with the Europe (Todorova, 2003: 53-55). In the other words, it assumes an overgeneralization which cannot explain the traditional and long lasting membership assistances of same European countries such as Austria and Germany to membership of some Balkan countries such as Croatia and Slovenia (Lavenex&Schimmelfenning, 2006: 141). Consequently, one needs additional explanations. In this
regard, the Balkanism is not valid for all the Balkan countries regardless of their historical, ideational, and cultural properties. The relationship policy of the Austria and Germany to some Balkan countries such as Slovenia and Croatia had an important impact on these countries’ ways of the full membership (Lavenex & Schimmelfenning, 2006: 142-143).

The Austria and post-Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia have had a historical partnership since the age of the Austria-Hungary Empire. They had identified with the same cultural structure which had shaped by the Habsburg monarchy which was the important advocator of the Catholic sect in the Europe (Stoianovich, 1994: 78). On the other hand, Germany, Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia had a fate partnership which came from the First and Second World Wars. Despite Slovenia and Croatia were part of the Yugoslavia in the time of Second World War, They, especially the Croatians, supported the Germans in the Second World War against the Tito’s partisans and Ustaches which were the paramilitaries Croatian groups fought by the Yugoslav army and Serbians Chetnics in favor of German army. This historical enmity was one of the main reasons of the Yugoslavian civil war in 1990’s (Stoianovich, 1994: 80). Consequently, the Austria and Germany has been regarding the Croatia and Slovenia as a part of the European community and they convinced the other member states this claim by means of their relative powerful penetration capacities (Arman, 2007: 78-79). In the other words, the Croatia and Slovenia, even though they are the part of the Balkans, are identified as European or “us” by the Austria and Germany, in contrast to other Balkan countries, especially Serbia, which remained in the conception of “other” or “Balkan” for a long time. On the other hand, the Croatians and Slovenians had been also identified themselves as Europeans rather than Balkans (Kulenovic & Petkovic, 2016: 107). They have especially suggested and stressed their Catholic identity not only for the purpose of identification to Europe, but also for stressing their distinctiveness among the other Yugoslav nations (Maple, 2004: 630). This political aspect was not only a formal governmental view, it has prevailed to large scale parts of the Slovenian and Croatian public and it has a long lasting discoursive root (Visnja, 2003: 11; Arman, 2007: 97). On the other hand, in the Slovenian and Croatian public, their Slav race partners such as Serbians, Macedonians and Montenegronians are labeled with their orthodox identities rather than their common Slav identities for the purpose of emphasizing their distinctiveness form the others (or Europe’s others) and we should mention about a consistent alienation between the Slav identity and self-identity in the Croatian and Slovenian collective understandings of the “nation” conception. They consistently emphasis their Europeaness rather than their Slavic identity (Kulenovic & Petkovic, 2016: 110). This large scale pro-European identification had an undisputable utility for Croatia on its way to full membership to EU. For example, in contrast to Serbia’s irreconcilable responses to ICFY (International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia) in realm of submission of the war guiltiest due to high domestic turmoil, the submission of the Ante Gotovina who was a war criminal of Croatia in civil war was not reasoned in a great domestic turmoil in the domestic public due to high identification with the Europe and general public discourse of that was a condition and requirements of European norms (Arman, 2007: 90-98).

In the case of Serbia, there is a very different situation than the Croatia. The Serbia could not achieve the transformation of the intersubjective understandings and its extreme nationalist identity
aftermath of the civil war and Dayton agreement. In contrast, the establishment of the peace in the former Yugoslavia was regarded as withdrawal or surrendering by the much of the Serbian public and elites (Subotic, 2010:12). The civil war and atrocities of the ethnic conflict radicalized the people in all former Yugoslavian states but radicalization in Serbia was at the top. Despite the EU membership was a big reward for the Serbia due to its bad economic conditions and its isolation from the international community, this reward could not deal with this radicalization and the Europeanization of Serbia could not achieved smoothly (Ron, 2003: 22-25). The main obstacles of Europeanization in Serbia and its refusal to comply with requirements of the ICFY which were the submission of the Serbian war criminal such as Ratko Mladic, Sloban Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic to ICFY and to end the presence of the old Milosevic regime’s members in the military, police, secret service and public service (Ron, 2003: 33-35). The Serbian governments after the overturning of the Milosevic had not provided the absolute monopoly over the use of force due to their existence of old regimes in the important places in the government (Ron, 2003: 48-50). Consequently, this political structure blocked a “clean break” with the Milosevic period and due to political fragmentation in the Serbian domestic politics, all the governments had to make coalition or include their coalitions the pro-Milosevic supporter parties such as Radical Party, and this domestic political reality, together with a coup possibility of the army which maintains many Milosevic supporters, created a reluctance in all Serbian governments in the realm of compliance with the ICFY requirements (Kut, 2005: 77-79; Ron, 2003: 70-73). On the other hand, many members of the old regime’s paramilitary group leaders, integrated officially or semiofficially into the police force (Ron, 2003: 81-83). In addition, many of paramilitaries has taken part in the regular organized crime after the war and they had large networks of conspirators across the region and they were highly motivated to protect themselves at all costs against the ICFY, as they proved in the assassination of the Dindic who was the pro-European prime minister of the Serbia (Arman, 2007: 100). On the other hand, the Serbian Church appeared as a veto point. Because the Serbian Church has an important effect on the Serbian public which none of the Serbian political leaders could dare to initiate a confrontation with the church. And the church was regarding the war criminals such as Ratko Mladic, Sloban Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic who were the war criminals of civil war as national heroes rather than murders (Kut, 2005: 92-95; Todorova, 2003: 101-104). This structural position of the domestic politics, of course has important roles in the realm of refusing of the European Union demands in Serbia, but they only be intervening variables, the independent variables should be that the Serbia could not achieve the transformation of the its intersubjective understandings and its extreme nationalist identity aftermath of the civil war and Dayton agreement and Serbians were lack of the historical and identical ties with the Europe such as Croatians and there was no European identity in Serbia (Arman, 2007: 111-114; Todorova, 2003: 115-116). Because societal participation in the criminal past was widespread and multilayered in Serbia (Arman, 2007: 124-129). There were participants of political elites, the church, intelligent service, and the military who remained in power after the transition and actively blocked transitional justice projects. Then there was literal, physical participation by direct perpetrators, troops and paramilitaries, who now led civilian lives and most intractably, there was “psychological participation” of a significant majority of the population who approved of the nationalist project in its general terms (Kut, 2005:
It is important to indicate that, Milosevic had ruled the Serbia during the civil war with a high public support and consensus (Kut, 2005: 135). Consequently, despite the same political costs, the intersubjective understandings of civil war and identities were culminated in very different conclusions in the realm of compliance of the ICFY decisions in Serbia and Croatia. The discursive approaches might provide a necessary explanation in this regard. The Serbian public largely refused to believe that Serbians have committed war crimes, and they blamed other nations and ethnic groups for starting the wars; they also distrusted international community and by proxy international justice institutions, mostly the ICFY (Arman, 2007: 141). Another important issue is that, the Serbian public regarded the civil war and even the genocides and war crimes as a consequence of an international war and self-defense of the Serbia, in the other words, according to Serbian public consensus, Serbia was in war with the enemies and it was struggling to defend itself against them (Arman, 2007: 148; Kut, 2005: 122; Todorova, 2003: 132). This point of view has great contradictions with the general idea of the European Union in the realm of priority of international humanitarian law (Arman, 2007: 151; Fletcher&Weinstein, 2008: 573-580; Kerr, 2004: 75-77). And even more significantly, Serbian elites displayed strong ideological reluctance to Europeanize, because these elites and most of the Serbian public had believed a narrative that Europe had a significant role in the Yugoslav breakup and wars that ensued, in the other words, there was a great suspect ions in the minds of Serbians in the field of reliability of the European Union, they considered that the EU scarified the Yugoslavia for its interests by supporting the independence of the former Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the most dramatically and recently Kosovo and Montenegro (Kerr, 2004: 84-85; Arman, 2007: 148). Consequently, there was no consensus between the Serbia and EU in the realm of the dealing with the requirements of the ICFY. In this regard, we could accept the concept of “compliance with decisions of the ICFY” as a discursive nodal point (DNP) between Serbia and EU. According to articulations in the EU, the genocides of 1990’s in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Bosnia had an important impact on this sensibility among the members of international community (Kerr, 2004: 91-99). This attitude of the international community made cooperation with the ICFY as the EU’s primary measurement of Serbia’s acceptance of international justice standards (Kerr, 2004: 103-114). Because cooperation with the ICFY was a measurable indicator, the number of suspects arrested and transferred to The Hague and the number of documents and testimonies sent could all be classified, systematized, and easily counted, it soon became the major, if not the only, EU measurement of how far along Serbia was in adopting the idea of addressing crimes from its recent past. This, in turn, then became shorthand for Serbia’s readiness to participate in the European community (Arman, 2007: 155). According to articulations in the EU, Serbia could get rid of Balkanism perspective and could transform a European one provided that it would comply with the decisions of the ICFY. In the other words, the articulations in the Europe combined the Serbia’s Europeaness with its compliance with the decisions of the ICFY (Kut, 2005: 109). On the other hand, in the Serbia the articulations of compliance with ICFY decisions framed in very different perspective. In Serbia, the issue of compliance with the ICFY decisions had articulated as an inequitable requirements of the Europe rather than an requirement of international law and Serbia had compelled to comply with these requirements due to avoid isolation and sanctions. As a consequence of this articulation, the
Serbian government designed a policy of “voluntary surrenders” (Arman, 2007: 156; Fletcher&Weinstein, 2008: 592). According to this strategy, the action to surrender of the war criminals to ICFY had injected the Serbian public as patriotic duty, both Serbian government and Serbian Orthodox Church declared that Serbia was suffering because of a few individuals, whose patriotic duty was to surrender so Serbia could move (Fletcher&Weinstein, 2008: 600; Kerr, 2004: 134). Then, the Serbian government passed the Law on the Rights of Inductees in the Custody of the International Criminal Tribunal and Members of Their Families, which provided financial assistance for the war criminals’ families (Arman, 2007: 157). This strategy was clearly aimed at the domestic political audience. The Serbian people were told only that these suspects were leaving for The Hague because it was the international community’s “requirement,” or as an act of patriotic duty. They were repeatedly told by their government that these transfers were opening up doors for Serbia to join the EU and they would prevent the sanctions on the Serbia (Kerr, 2004: 129-130; Arman, 2007: 160). The articulation were also not constituted around what crimes these individuals were indicted, how these crimes came about, who the victims were, what the scope of abuse was, or any other details regarding the substance of indictments. Instead, they masked in the guise of voluntary surrenders, dealing with the past was repackaged as acts of patriotism for which the state was grateful. And so the stepped-up pressure from the ICFY and other international actors did not translate into any substantial changes in Serbian understanding of its own history, nor in any attempt to address past abuses in a systematic way (Arman, 2007: 160-161; Kerr, 2004: 141). In the other words, the articulations in Serbia combined the compliance with the ICFY decisions with the injustice or inequitable requirements of the EU and international community. Consequently, it could be mentioned that there was a conflict of debates between Serbia and Europe. There is an important point which has to be indicated. As mentioned above, in the Croatia the submission of the war criminals was not culminated in serious domestic turmoil as it happened in Serbia. This situation should be explained with its close identification with the European community (Todorova, 2003: 133-145). The Croatian public might interpret the submission of general Ante Gotovina as a requirement of their European identity, but in Serbia the same event (submission of war criminals) might interpret as involuntary concession of Serbia in exchange for EU membership and recognition as an equal and legitimate member in the international sphere. The course of these articulations in Serbia may have many reasons, but the main reason could be that, Serbian identification of itself might be more close to its Slav nationalist identity, rather than its European identity. If one takes into consideration the EU’s position, it should be claimed that EU empowered more strict conditions to Serbia than the Croatia (Kerr, 2004: 143; Arman, 2007: 161). Because, according to EU, Serbia had not been a member of European community such as Croatia and Slovenia, instead it was the member of Balkans, but it was on the way of being member of European community, so if Serbia would aimed to accomplish this aim, it had to comply with the requirements of international law (Todorova, 2003: 135). In sum, it could be assumed that both Serbia and EU were lack of close identification with each other. Due to that, the Serbian path to full membership lagged relative to Croatia and Slovenia. But aftermath of the submission of the Karadic in 2011 and Serbian decision for full compliance with the ICFY, The EU-Serbian relation has advanced dramatically in a path to full membership. Today the Serbia has accepted as a candidate country to EU, but this development
remained too late due to sociological factors which were indicated above. But it's also important to indicate that the Serbia has not dealt with its identical problems yet. The Kosovo issue is most important evidence of this situation. The Kosovo has not recognized by the Serbia as an independent state yet, due to Serbia’s identical, historical, and political ties with the region. EU recognized Serbia as a candidate country and it is possible that the EU will recognize the same status for Kosovo in a foreseeable future. It is a great puzzle that how EU will solve this problem.

In case of Montenegro, there is more different situation than Croatia and Serbia. The Montenegro has been a state of Federal Yugoslav Republic which was consists of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006 by means of national referenda, with a proportion of %55 separation votes, it separate its path with the Serbia despite it had shared the similar identical properties with the Serbia (Caspersen, 2006: 105). The Montenegro has demonstrated a radical identity transformation which depended on denial of old Yugoslav identity which was labeled in the field of Balkanism (Todorova, 2003: 151; Dragan, 2004:80). Aftermath of the independent, the political elites of the Montenegro such as prime minister Milo Djukanovia, have initiated an identity transformation process in favor of European identity rather than Balkan identity (Dragan, 2004: 82). This transformation could be analyzed in line with Wend’s critical strategic identity theory which could be assessed in frame of constructivism (Wendt, 1992: 428). According to this theory, there must be two basic preconditions. First, there must be a reason to think of one in novel terms. This would most likely stem from the presence of new social situation that cannot be managed in terms of preexisting self-conceptions. Second, the expected costs of intentional role change cannot be greater than its rewards (Wendt, 1992: 429). In the case of Montenegro, the preexisting self-conceptions of Balkans and Europe were not complying with the new social situation due to demolishing of the Yugoslav Federation. On the other hand, Montenegro was under threat of isolation if it would have continued to identify itself with the Serbia in particular, New Yugoslavia in general (Dragan, 2004: 85). Consequently, the conditions and circumstances of Montenegro were very appropriate for an identity transformation. According to critical strategic identity theory, when these conditions are present, actors can engage in self-reflection and practice specifically designed to transform their identities and interests or in Wendt’s terms, they “change the games” (Wendt, 1992: 439). The decisions of elites of Montenegro such as prime minister Milo Djukanovia, were complied with these expectations. The Montenegro has begun a radical identity transformation struggle aftermath of the independence, it is also important to indicate that the independence of the country from the New Yugoslav Federation is also important example of this transformation endeavor. This identity transformation has two fundamental stages. The first stage in intentional transformation is the breakdown of consensus about old identity commitments (Todorova, 2003: 154). In the Montenegro case, old identity commitments centered on the pro-Yugoslav nationalism and anti-European assumptions which regarded the Europe as forerunner of actors who had role in the period of former Yugoslav Federation’s breakdown (Arman, 2007: 169). In the Montenegro, this old identity commitments were transformed to a pro-European one and the historical ties with the Montenegro and Europe has injected consistently not only to national public, but also to international public (Kut, 2005: 142-145). And the Montenegrin elites and governmental institutions have stressed the Europeaness of the Montenegro in a consistent way by means of all collective broadcasting instruments (Arman, 2007:
170; Todorova, 2003: 167). The second stage of the theory is to construct one-self in the minds of the others in accordance with desired identity perception (Wendt, 1992: 433). In the other word, second stage emphasizes to provide the rethink of others’ own ideas about self and other. According to this stage, the Montenegro had to provide rethinking of Europe about its definition and perception of Montenegro. In the other words, the Montenegro had to convince the Europe that it had been a historical member of European normative community and it would be accepted as a member to EU which represents this normative community in the international sphere. Consequently, it should be assumed that Montenegro had struggled to erase its half-backward Balkanian perceptions in the minds of the Europeans (Kut, 2005: 151). The Montenegro has initiated serious undertakings for the purpose of achieving this aim. In 2005, the Montenegro accepted the Euro as its national currency, in 2006 it broke down its historical partnership with the Serbia which, as indicated above, has serious problems with the EU; in 2007 Montenegro ratified the Association and Partnership Agreement with the EU. On the other hand, the EU not only recognized membership perspective of Montenegro, but also it provided many financial and economic aids to Montenegro (Arman, 2007: 171). In sum it is assumed that the Montenegro will be a full member of the EU in a foreseeable future because it has not only transformed its self identity, but also it has transformed the it’s perceptions on the minds of EU decision makers. In 2010, the Montenegro has been declared as candidate country for EU, thus we should assume that the identity transformation struggles of the Montenegro had culminated in net achievement.

Conclusion

In this article, a comprehensive theoretical perspective had attempted to frame in the realm of Western Balkan enlargement initiations of EU. The EU’s Western Balkan enlargement perspective was analyzed in line with both rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (constructivism) which are the fundamental regional integration theories. The EU has initiated many enlargement rounds since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. But all of these rounds have been motivated by different logic of actions. And we should assume that the EU has begun its Western Balkan enlargement round in 2013 by means of accession of the Croatia in the EU as a full member. (The Slovenia’s accession might be accepted as beginning of the Western Balkan enlargement, but most of the scholars regard the Slovenian membership under the name of Eastern enlargement of 2004) In my opinion, last two rounds of the enlargement namely Eastern enlargement of 2004 and East Balkan enlargement of 2007 and as a new enlargement round of Western Balkan enlargement have different logic of actions relative to other enlargement round. They could be explained more precisely through the logic of appropriateness for EU side. Maybe one assumes that the Iberian and Greece enlargement rounds should be regarded under same logic, but there were not a comprehensive identity transformation in these countries in the time of accession. One should mention about a political transformation or administrative transformation but not a comprehensive identity transformation. Because these countries’ public and their historical ties had been assessed as European by the EU. The Europeannes of Spain, Portugal, or Greece had never discussed not only in the domestic politics of these countries, but also in the discursive context of the EU. On the other hand, there were not a strict separations and constraints between these countries and EU in the realm
of freedom of movement and goods during the pre-accession periods, in the other words, there was not a barrier of iron curtain such it happened between the East and Balkan countries and EU. The only barrier was the anti-democratic regimes (Franco regime in Spain, Salazar regime in Portugal and Militaristic regime in Greece) and economical backwardness’s of these countries. The Europeanization of these countries was inquired with their political regimes and there was not an ideological competition between the EU and publics of these countries as it was between East and EU. Consequently, the Mediterranean enlargements were accomplished more smoothly than the Eastern and Balkan enlargements. In contrast, the East and Balkan enlargement has presupposed not only political and economic transformations, but also it presupposed a comprehensive identity transformations, it presupposed the denial of the past in these countries. This may be regarded as a normal process, but it is important to indicate that nearly three generations had grew up by a socialist tradition in these countries, and transition to liberal democracy put a comprehensive burden not only on economic issues but also on the public culture of these countries. Consequently, the post-socialist countries not only changed their economic and political systems, but also they changed their frames of international community with its norms, rules, identities, and way of doings things. Consequently, we should explain the East and Balkan enlargement more appropriate through the sociological institutionalism. After the diversity of the East and Balkan enlargements is mentioned, we should separate the features of these enlargement rounds. In the East enlargement, despite some insufficiencies of the applicant countries in the realm of their economic, political, and sociological structures, the EU incorporated these countries, regardless of their shortcomings, at the same time. But in Balkan enlargement, we observe a more conservative EU against the shortcomings. The Slovenia accessed to EU in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and lastly Croatia in 2013. But most of the Western Balkan countries have not been a member yet due to their shortcomings. On the other hand, the EU has not pursued a consistent pre-accession process in line with a timetable towards Western Balkan countries. As mentioned above, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia had candidate status in different times, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania are still lack of candidate status, and despite they had gained membership perspective. In contrast the East enlargement, it is impossible to mention about a comprehensive and collective enlargement strategy in the Western Balkan enlargement process. The EU has initiated a multi-speed enlargement strategy for Western Balkans which emphasizes the diversities of the Balkan countries in the realm of their readiness to membership. One may claim that the EU preferred this strategy for the purpose of dealing with its digestion problems, but in my opinion, it is lack of sufficient explanation capacity. Because all the total populations of all Western Balkan countries namely, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, is less than the population of Poland. In the East enlargement, the EU included nine countries in addition to Poland, and it also included Romania and Bulgaria with a total population of nearly forty millions only three years later than the East enlargement. The main reason of the EU’s conservativeness to Western Balkan countries in the realm of accession should be identity problems (existence of insufficient identical transformation) rather than the digestion problem. Because, the Western Balkan countries have begun to transform their identities towards Europeanisms, but they have not accomplished this process yet. The recognition problem between Serbia and Kosovo still has not solved, the ethnic problems in
Macedonia has not still completely compromised, the consolidation of the governmental capacity which was established by Dayton agreement in 1995 still has not completely achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the border problems between Bulgaria and Macedonia, between Montenegro and Serbia, between Albania and Greece still has produced problems. The most striking, nearly in all the Western Balkans countries, there are corruption and backtracking (not compliance with the reforms in the practices despite they accepted by legislation bodies) problems at an intolerable levels. Consequently, we should mention about incompliance with the obligations of European community, rather than the digestion problem of EU. It is obvious that all the Balkan countries will be members of EU in the future, but this membership will be a conclusion of construction of a “European Balkan” identity which will terminate old considerations of ethnic conflicts and spoils of civil wars.
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