AN EVALUATION OF TURKISH MIGRATION TOWARDS END-1995*

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I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OUTLOOK

In comparison with other OECD members, average living standarts in Turkey are low. In view of the fact that, the Turkish currency (TL) has depreciated almost 350 per cent since the outbreak of January '94 economic crisis, it is obviously not reliable and realistic to evaluate her relative stand of development just by recourse to per capita income criteria, as this is conventionally expressed in terms of US Dollars. In this regard, it is another matter of confusion, whether we get 'nominal' per capita income figures or those adjusted according to 'purchasing power parity -ppp'. Therefore, it seems more significant to refer to the UNDP Human Development Index, which takes life expectancy, education and resources into account. The 1994 index places Turkey in the medium human development category at the 68th place, among 173 countries.¹

The present economic and social outlook in Turkey can be characterised by low levels of GDP growth, the dominance of agricultural activites, high inflation, high unemployment and disguised unemployment, persistently high budget deficits, an unequitable income distribution with wide fluctuations in the labour income share of national income, an undeveloped capital market, moderate ageing of the population, the modest level of social protection and a high potential for internal and external migration.

 ILO, A General Outlook of the Structure and Implementation of the Social Security System, Report Nr. 1 (draft) Geneva, July 1995, p. 9-12.

^{*} This paper is presented to the annual OECD/SOPEMI meeting (28-30 Nov. 1995) held in Paris.

The main handicap of Turkish economy is the non-existence of stability, which is reflected by 'stop-go development' with alternate periods of high and low growth.

National income developments

Since 1988, the Turkish economy has presented a pattern of short periods of low and high growth, resulting an average growth rate of 2.8 %, compared with 4.7 % in both 1970s and 1980s. When population growth is taken into account, real per capita GDP only grew at an average annual rate of 2.2 from 1968 to 1987, but since 1988 this has fallen significantly to around 0.7 per cent.

That instability, coupled with other unfavourable factors, resulted in a serious economic crisis in 1994 with falling GNP by 6.1 % during the first quarter and 9.7 % during the second², the latter setting a record since the Second World War. However, during the first half of 1995, there has been a considerable revival by a 6.2 per cent rate of growth. This was the latest example of the stop-go pattern of the Turkish economy.

Price movements

High inflation has been the dominant feature of the Turkish economy since the late 1960s. After the stabilization measures of 1980 and up to 1988, it fluctuated at around 35 per cent. However, in the 1988-1993 period it doubled, climbing to an unprecedented rate of 120 per cent in 1994. After the implementation of the April 1994 Stabilization Package and the IMP Program. WPI and CPI declined to 38.8 per cent (which was 92.2 per cent in 1994) and to 40.8 per cent (67.2 per cent in 1994) respectively, during the first 8 months of 1995. The main factor accounting for this positive development was a significant surplus registered in 1995 consolidated budget, which was in in deficit for the previous three consecutive years. However, the high rates of monthly price rises of September and October coupled with the somewhat generous pay rises for the civil servants as well as for the public workers and pensioners are clear signals of the revival of the three-digit inflation, even-before the new year. In fact, the 4.4 per cent and 7.8 per cent monthly rises in the WPI and in the CPI in October, have

Türkiye İş Bankası, Business Bulletin 1995/2, Ankara, Sept. 1995, p.3 (in Turkish).

already increased the annual rate of inflation to 75.1 per cent and 88.3 per cent respectively for the period October '94-October '95.

Balance of payments

Turkey conventionally suffers from a structural disequilibrium in foreign trade balance. In 1993, however, the balance of trade deficit of \$14,1 billion was unprecedentedly huge-see Table 1. In 1994, on the other hand, the deficit declined to a mere \$4,2 billion, mostly owing to the austerity measures, implemented within the framework of the 5 April stabilization package. The depreciation of TL, as well as the reduction of effective demand had been effective in this favourable development.

Table 1 Foreign Trade Balance (million \$)

· · · · · ·	1993 ^a	1994 ^a	Jan-July 1994 ^b	Jan-July 1995 ^b
Imports	-29 771	-22 606	-11 997	17 97 9
Exports	15 611	18 390	9 421	11 935
Foreign trade deficit	-14 610	-4 216	-2 576	-6 044

b: The Central Bank, Foreign Relations Department-Balance of Payment division: Balance of Payments Developments, January-July 1995, p.9. Table 3

But, during Jan-July 1995, the situation began to deteriorate by again, the underlying factors being the overvalued TL -in view of the high rate of inflation- which punished the exporters and encouraged importations. Another factor to this end was, of course, the reduction of customs duties and other funds on imports vis-à-vis the EU countries. However, due to favourable developments of "other goods and services income", the current account balance gave a negligible surplus of \$6 million, while the overall balance resulted in as big a surplus as \$ 6 659 million, which, in return, increased the accumulated official reserves to more than \$ 15 billion. It should be noted that, it was especially the short-term capital movements that caused the overall balance to restore. Therefore, the present balance-of-payments equilibrium should be taken with a pinch of salt. Hot money inflows might leave Turkey, as soon as they find new investment outlets with higher return than Turkey presently pays.

Labour force and labour market developments

Main developments between 1990 and 1993-95 can be summarized as follows:

- i. For 1995, the total labour force^{*} is estimated at 20, 424 million-2.35 per cent more than 1990, slightly highen than 1993. (In compliance with the ILO standarts, the economically active persons within the 12-14 age bracket are not included in the labour force, although they are equal in number to 4.5 per cent of the labour force engaged in agriculture shown in Table 2. The relevant ratio in urban areas is much smaller-1.9 $\%^3$.
- ii. Labour participation rate is gradually declining, main reason being the exodus from rural areas, where almost all the family members are engaged in agriculture.
- iii. In spite of the considerable migration to urban centres, some 45 per cent of labour force is still active in low-productive agricultural activities. Of those working in agriculture, some 60 per cent -of which 80 per cent is female- is unpaid family workers. On the other hand, over the five years under consideration, fluctuating around 15 per cent of the labour force, the industrial population has practically not changed in percentage and even in numbers.

 Defined as the number of persons of age 15 and more, excluding members of the armed forces.

3. SPO, op cit, p. 43.

		1990	1993	1 994^a
(1)	Civilian labour force	19 954	20 232	20 424
	Labour participation rate (%)	56,7	54,2	53,2
(2)	Civilian employment	18 364	18 702	18 285
	Agriculture	8 731 (47.5%)	8 397 (44.9%)	8 166 (44.7%)
	Industry	2 773 (15.0%)	2916(15.6%)	2 880 (15.7%)
	Services	6 860 (37.5%)	7 389 (39.5%)	7 239 (39.6%)
(3)	Unemployed [=(1)-(2)]	1 590	1 530	2 139
(4)	Underemployed	1 217	1 383	1 904
(5)	Rate of unemployment	8.0 %	7.6%	10.5 %
(6)	Rate of underemployment	6.4 %	6.8 %	9.3 %
の	Total rate of unemployment		14.4 %	19.8 %
	[=(5)+(6)]	14.4 %		
So	urce : State Planning Organiza Plan, 1996-2000, p. 43, a : estimate		th Five-Year Deve	Hopment

Table 2. Developments in Internal Labour Market

iv. In 1994, the total rate of unemployment (rate of unemployed or "open" unemployed+underemployed) increased drastically, nearly approaching to 20 per cent. The obvious reason for this unfavourable development is, the sharp decline in GDP in the first two quarters of 1994, as mentioned above. Although it has not been documented as yet, there are signs of relief in unemployment, in parallel to the recovery in GDP, in 1995.

Comparing with rural areas, unemployment is more pronounced in cities, and even more so for the high school or university graduates, which exceeds 30 per cent.

Looked from a regional approach, unemplyoment seems to have concentrated in certain areas of the Eastern, South Eastern, Black Sea and Central parts of Anatolia.

In spite of the serious efforts to this end, there is not as yet unemployment insurance. On the other hand, social expenditure level (including health care) is estimated at modest levels of 7% to 7,5 per cent of GNP.

1000 persons of age 15 and more

There is limited statictical data on the 'functional' and 'size distribution' of national income, but based on the 1987 SPO survey, the Lorenz curve of size distribution of income shows a rather low Gini-coefficient of $0,44^4$.

II. Annual Flow of Workers

The annual flow of Turkish workers abroad seems to have stabilized around 60 000, since 1992^{*}. The number of total workers sent abroad by the Turkish Employment Office (TEO) in 1994, was 61 145, which is only 3.4 per cent lower than the 1993 figure. (It should be mentioned that these are the only exact figures appearing in this report, as even those, who found jobs abroad on their own initiatives must be registered with the TEO).

The annual total presented in Table 3, however, consists of two different groups of migrant workers: the traditional 'western-type migrants' and the 'project-tied ones'. The former group, covering the workers sent to the EU+ EFTA countries-known as the European Economic Area (EEA)- accounts for only 3.5 per cent of annual placements, whereas those destined for the CIS and the Northern Africa and the Gulf countries 92.9 per cent.^{**} Workers officially sent to the OECD countries on the other hand, account for only 3.63 per cent of the total- see Annexed Table A1.

- * 47 700 in 1990, 53 020 in 1991, 60 000 in 1992 and 63 224 in 1993.
- ** Based on the data, presented in Table 4.

^{4.} ILO, p.12.

Host Countries	Male	Female	Total	Share in te Total
CIS	41 827	10	41 837	68.42 %
Saudi Arabia	13 050		13 050	21.32 %
Germany	2 027	5	2 032	3.32 %
Libya	1 869	· -	1 869 ·	3.05 %
Australia	59	80	139	0.23 %
N. Cyprus	63	-	63	0.10 %
Kuwait	57	<u></u> 1	58	0.09 %
France	15	2	17	0.03 %
Switzerland	13	_	13	0.02 %
Netherlands	6	6	12	0.02 %
Austria	8	2	10	0.02 %
Jordan	. 5	_	5	0.02 %
U.Arab Emirates	2	_	2	· .
Belgium	1		1	
Others	1 882	155	2 037	3.33 %
TOTAL	60 884	261	61 145	99.96 %a

Table 3. Annual Flow of Turkish Migrants in 1994 Distribution by Host Countries and by Sex

Source : Compiled from the unpublished data provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, General Directorate of Services for Turkish Workers Abroad.

a: The total does not add up to 100.00 because of rounding.

Table 4 is prepared to show the distribution of annual flows by main economic blocks, where the sharp decrease in the relative share of the Northern Africa and the Middle-East Countries (especially of the Saudi Arabia) in favour of the CIS is striking. the same tendency can be traced in Table 7, where it is shown that nearly the half of the workers sent abroad by the TEO during the first five months of 1995 were bound for the CIS.

When the revelant figures are scrutinized, it will be realised that, CIS'becoming by far the main host block is not due to a drastic increase in the number of Turkish workers it received, but more owing to the declining demand of Saudi Arabia. As to the

continuity of project-tied workers in the near-future, the Saudi case might be of great concern. It cannot, of course, be argued that, the restructuring efforts have already come to an end, in this country.

Economic Blocks	1993	1994
EU + EFTA	3.6	3.5
Nort African & Middle-East Countries	61.0	24.5
Australia	0.3	0.2
NAFTA	0.2	_
CIS	33.9	68.4
Others	1.0	3.4

Table 4. Annual I	Flows by Main	Economic Blocks
(1993-1994	4) (percentage	distribution)

But, it is a fact that the pace of the demand for Turkish contractors and sub-contractors and the derived-demand for Turkish workers has slowed down. This hypothesis can easily be proven by referring to the accumulated number of the would-be project-tied migrant-workers, who have been registered with the TEO and have been waiting to proceed in the waiting list-see Table 5.

Table 5. The Accumulated Total of Potential Turkish Migrant-workers (as of May '95)

	Male	Female	<u>Total</u>
qualified	519 541	4 194	523 735
unqualified	180 618	2 057	182 675
Total	700 159	6 251	706 410
Sourse : TEO			

Judging by the total, exceeding 700 thousand in the waiting list for employment opportnities abroad, it seems that the low number of workers sent to Saudi Arabia, is a matter of low demand rather than the supply of eager-to-migrate workers. In this regard, the continuity of the presently soaring market of the CIS should also ve questioned in terms of development in the foreseeable future. An urgent need, in this regard, is to conclude social security

agreements with CIS, as well as with Russian Federation and the countries of Asia Minor. The dominance of project-tied migration can be traced in Table 6, showing the placements carried on during the first five months of 1994 and 1995, respectively, In early-1995, temporary migration to the CIS still leads, though somewhat declined in percentage, compared with the same period of 1994.

Table 6. Annual Flows by Main Host Countries (Jan-May '94 vs. Jan-May '95)

	19 9 4		1995	
Countries	Jan-May	Share in Total	Jan-May	Share in Total
CIS	12.553	60.9 %	- 13 500	48.8 %
S.Arabia	4.983	24.2 %	9 915	35.9 %
Israel	19	01 %	1 198	14.3 %
Libya	894	4.3 %	695	2.5 %
SUB-TOTAL	18 449	89.5 %	25 308	91.5 %
Germany	818	3.9 %	776	2.8 %
Other 50 countries	1 319	6.6 %	1 578	5.7 %
TOTAL	20 586	100.0 %	27 662	100.0 %

Jan-May 1995 figures, reflect an extremely lopsided breakdown of migrant workers between project-oriented migration and traditional western-type one. Including a humble share of 2.5 per cent of Israel as a newcomer, project-tied or 'contract-migrants' account for 91.5 per cent of all placements during Jan-May 1995; and excluding the leading traditional host country's -Germanyminor share of 2.8 per cent, 5.7 per cent or 1 578 workers have been dispersed into some 50 countries all over the world.

In short, Turkish migration turned out to be dominated by the external activities of Turkish and some foreign contracting firms, mostly engaged in construction. The main result of this development can be summarized as follows:

i. The dominance of male workers. The rates of female participation for 1994 and for Jan-May 1995 are 0.42 per cent and 0.35 per cent, respectively.

- ii. The new migrants are more qualified. Of the 27 662 workers sent abroad during Jan-May 1995, 62.6 per cent were qualified and highly-qualified, mostly in construction work, including such professionals as architects and civil engineers⁵.
- iii. Wages are low. By western standarts wages are low, especially when the unfavourable climatic conditions prevailing in the host countries are taken into accocunt, but the propensity to save is extremely high.
- iv. Average length of stay is short. Unless the contract is extended or renewed or a new contract is signed by a new firm, a typyical 'target worker' returns home. The average length of stay is 2-3 years. Self-employed workers are rare.

III. The Problem of Turkish Asylum-Seekers and Refugees

In order to give a realistic picture of annual flows of workersand the stock of Turkish population abroad, it should be emphasized that the above-presented figures suffer from two shortcomings: they do not include the illegal migrants and the pseudo-asylum seekers or refugees, who in fact are in search of employment abroad. The number of illegal migrants is just a matter of guesswork and Turkish government has not the possibility of preventing it. But, the potential host countries have the visa requirements as well as the possibility of checking the pseudo-tourists at border posts.

Neither is it possible for the Turkish authorities to identify the potential asylum-seekers, among those persons leaving Turkey, temporarily. However, it is argued that, from 1988 to 1992, more than 10 per cent of over 2 million aylum-seekers in Europe came from Turkey⁶. Following the people from the former Yugoslavia and Romania, Turkish nationals formed the third largest group of asylum applicants in Europe. And, nearly 5 million voluntary economic immigrants came to Europe in the same period⁷. If this

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^{5.} TEO.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The State of World's Refugees, Geneva, 1993.

Ahmet İçduygu, Refugee pressure versus immigration in Europe: the perspective from a sending country- The Turkish Case, paper presented at the 3 rd European Population Conference, Milan, 4-8 Sept. 1995, p.2.

figure of 200 000 Turkish nationals, as argued by the UNHCR were relistic, then, the above figures of the offical outflow of Turkish workers to Europe would reflect only a negligible portion of the real arrivals, as the total number of Turkish workers sent to European countries by the TEO, in the same period, is even smaller than 4 thousand⁸. However, the data published by the German authorities seem to confirm the above argument -see Table 7, where the number of Turks asked asylum from Germany and the number of workers, officially sent to this country are shown.

	(1)	(2)
Years	Asylum seekers	Official placements
988	14 873	85
.989	20 020	51
990	20 082	62
991	23 877	49
1992	28 327	1 685
Sub-Total	107 179	1 932
993	19 104	1 999
1994	19 118	2 032
TOTAL	145 401	5 963

Table 7. Number of Turks seeking asylum in Germany vs. offic	ial
flows from Turkey	

Table 7, not only reflects the dimensions of the annual magnitudes of asylum seekers, but also shows the relative

insignificance of annual documented arrivals in Germany. (The ratio of the number of official arrivals as worker to the number of asylum-seekers, for the 1988-1994 period is as low as 4.1 per cent)

It is unfortunately not possible to find the exact figures of Turkish asylum-seekers in Europe on a yearly basis, though, Dr. Içduygu's estimations based on vrious reports of UNHCR, OECD and EUROSTAT, presented below are highly reliable-see Table 8.

 The exact figures published by the TEO are as follows: Germany 1 932 + Austria 1 153 + Switzerland 348 + Netherlands 114 + France 81 + Belgium 30 => 3 658, for the period 1988-92.

8 200 11 700 1 900	6.4 17.5 4.3
1 900	- .
	4.3
59 300	22.1
122 000	12.8
1 200	1.0
700	2.3
3 900	2.3
16 800	10.3
6 300	5.0
232 900	average 11.2
	1 200 700 3 900 16 800 6 300

Table 8	Turkish	Asylum-S	leekers in	Eume	(1983-91)
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It is believed that three in every five Turkish nationals entering Europe was a person seeking asylum, in the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, information on the breakdown of the asylum-seekers' fate is lacking and further research is required to find division among those, who were given refugee status, repetriated or resettled in a third contury.

In addition Turkey's becoming a source of asylum-seekers in Europe, she also presents a case as a transit zone⁹ where many asylum-seekers, originating from Middle-East, Asia and Africa, have their applications to be considered for getting refugee status and resettling in Europe.

IV. Stock of Turkish Nationals and Workers Abroad

Turkish asylum seekers and refugees apart, the annual outflow of Turkish workers seems to have stagnated around 60 to 65

 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines transit migration as migratory movements to one or more countries with the intention to migrate to yet another country of final destination. See, UNHCR, Regional Bureau for Europe, European Series, Vol. 1, No 2, July 1995, p.12.

thousand. Movement of dependent family members across the border do not add up to a considerable size. Therefore, it might, at first glance, be thought that, the significance of Turkish migration has been losing momentum over the years. However, that reasoning cannot be justified, as the **stock** of Turkish nationals has been increasing. The rate of growth of the number of Turks living abroad, can best be shown by means of an index.

Table 8. Index of Turkish Citizens inWestern Countries 1990 = 100

Years	Index
1991	112.5
1992	112.9
1993	121.4
1994	130.1
1995 vu	131.3
Source: Based on the fig	gures in Table 9, Colmun (2)

Taking 1990 as the **base year**, it can be realised that, the number of Turkish citizens abroad increased 31.3 per cent from 1990 to July 1995 - Table 8- by climbing to 3 336 242- see Table 9, Column 1.

Although spread over more than 50 countries, the present Turkish community abroad is slightly less than the population of Ireland -i.e.3.7. million- and of New Zealand -3.4 million- and 8.6 times of that of Luxemburg.

Table 9 reflects the consderable size of Turkish community as well as Turkish workers, living abroad. As of July 1995, the number of Turks abroad is equal to 5.33 per cent of Turkey's mid-1995 *resident* or *de facto* population^{*}. Migrant workers, on the other hand, are equal to 6.5 per cent of Turkey's domestic labour force. (It should be noted that, only workers and employees are

Since 1935 censuses are held in Turkey every five year, and only the persons who reside in Turkey on the census day are counted. Therefore, Turkish citizens living abroad are, in principle, not included in the total figure of column (1) of Table 9, unless they happen to be in Turkey on the day of census.

included in column (5) of Table 9, but not the independent workers and the employers.)

1) 71 000 36 957	Abroad (2) 948 531	$\frac{(2)/(1)}{(3)}$	Force ^d (4)	(5)	(4)/(2)	(5)/(4)
71 000			(4)	(5)		
	948 531	2.40.01			(6)	(7)
36 957		2.49 %	14 670 000	735 363	TI 5	5.0
	2 018 602	4.50 %	17 842 451	888 290	44.0	4.9
73 035	2 539 677	4.49 %	19 954 000	1 149 466	45.3	5.7
26 000	2 857 696	4.98 %	19 967 000	1 250 964	43.7	6.3
84 000	2 869 060	5.14 %	20 196 000	1 313 014	45.7	6.5
69 000	3 083 889	5.15 %	20 232 000	1 329 166	42.7	6.5
83 000	3 304 204	5.40 %	20 424 000	1 331 019	40.3	6.5
26 000	3 336 242	5.33 %	n.a.	1 330 654	39.9	
suses, the t Y. Gök omy, İş	e others, mid dere, Migrat Bankası Pu	year estim ion to Fore blications,	ates, calculate ign Countries Ankara 1979	d as of 1st of and Its Effo 9, p.49, Ta	of July. ects on ' ble 11.	Furkisl 16 (in
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Ankara Branch publications, p. 32-33, table 2. d : State Planning Organization (SPO) : Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000), p.43, Table 43, Official Gazette 25 July 1995 (in Turkish).

e : Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

Concerning the Turkish community abroad, two main trends could be discerned:

i. The Turkish population abroad has been increasing.

The main reasons, accounting for the 31.3 per cent increase in the Turkish population abroad (from 1990 to 1995 vii) -See Table 8- can be summarized as follows:

- Firstly, the big difference between the births and deaths, occuring abroad, is obviously a positive factor, contributing to the increase of the Turkish community abroad.

The figures, concerning the incidence of births and deaths are not exhaustive, as they cover only the cases that are reported to Turkish consulates in the European countries. However, the birth rate-calculated by dividing the total Turkish population living in the 10 countries above, i.e. 2 293 586- by the total of births, i.e. 69 141 - gives a highly realistic rate of %0 23.6, which is very close to the crude birth rate calculated for Turkey for the year 1994 : %0 22.8¹⁰. But, the death rate of %0 1.93 - %0 6.6 in Turkey - Seems to be excessively low^{*}. At any rate, the difference between the total births and deaths - 63 501 - is a big contribution to the growth in migrant population abroad.

- Family reunion might be another factor, though losing momentum through the years.

- The positive effect of the annual flow of workers accruing to the 10 countries presented in Table 10, will no doubt be outweighted by the returnees from those countries. The number of fresh workers who arrived in these countries is only 2 224, whereas a very modest rate of return such as 2 per cent will more than offset the positive effect of the newcomers.

- The increasing number of naturalized Turks will definitely diminish the number of Turkish population, though at a minor extent. Dual-nationality, will not affect the number of Turks, as those having dual - nationality will be taken into account, as before.

	В	D	B-D		В	D	B-D
Australia	563	52	511	Germany	45 989	2 801	43 188
Austria	4 287	172	4 1 1 5	Netherlands	4 541	1 868	2 673
Belgium	2 734	143	2 591	Sweden	337	120	217
Denmark	1 096	40	1 056	Switzerland	2 049	103	1 946
France	6 736	288	6 448	UK ^a	809	53	756
				TOTAL	69 141	5 640	63 501

Table 10. Annual	Births and D	eaths-selected	host countries	(1994)
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10. SPO, p.29-30.

 In addition to the fact that migrant population is relatively younger than Turkish population, those who have retired and suffering from serious illnesses might have gone or taken to Turkey.

As a conclusion, it might be argued that, the wide difference between the birth and the death rate -i.e. the natural rate of growthis the main factor, contributing to the increase of the Turkish population abroad. Table 11 is prepared in order to compare the perspective rates of population growth in Turkey and among the Turkish community living in the 10 western countries.

<u>Years</u>	In Turkey (1)	Turkish citizens in Western countries (2)
1991	101,5	112.5
1992	103,7	112.9
1993	106,0	121.4
1995	108,3	130.1
1995 vii	110,7	131.3

Table 11. Population Growth Index (1990 = 100)

Judging by the index numbers, it is obvious that the Turkish citizens resident in western countries have a big potential to grow in number. In fact, from 1990 to 1995 vii they have increased over 30 per cent, compared with the 10.7 per cent increase in their homeland.

Population growth projections extending up to 2030 are made by the **Zentrum für Türkeistudien**. According to the findings of this research, the Turkish population in Germany will be 2 116 981 in 2000 and 3 117 881 in 2030, on the assumption that there will be no more Turkish migration to Germany; and it will be 2 139 834 in 2000 and 3 238 566 in 2030, if further migration is allowed for¹¹.

ii. The share of workers within the total nationals has been declining, since 1992.

The total number of Turkish population resident abroad increased 7.1 per cent in 1994 over 1993, while the same rate had

Zentrum f
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ürkeistudien, Turks in Germany in 2000s, April 1995, Önel Publications, p.35-37 (in Turkish).

only been 1.0 per cent for the migrant workers^{*}. The same phenomenon can be traced through the declining percentages in Column (6) of Table 9, where the proportion of workers within the total nationals are shown.

When project-tied or 'building site" migration -as G. Simon calls it- is excluded, the tendency becomes more pronounced. The population stock, for example, in Germany increased at a rate of 57 % from 1974 to 1990, whereas the rate of increase in the stock of workers for the same period was only 9 $\%^{12}$.

Western migration, which began as a manpower movement till the mid-70s, turned out to be a population movement, the underlying reasons being,

- owing to family reunion, the rising share of females and children, whose labour participation rate is lower than males;

- The increasing number of students of working age;

- The increasing number of early-retired workers, residing in the host country.

All this factors caused labour participation rates to drop drastically on the one hand, and the dependency ratios to rise on the other. In fact, the ratio, which was 1.29 in 1973, climbed to 2.48 in 1994 and to 2.50 as of July 1995^{**} .

Another reason to the same effect was the proliferation of self-employed persons and employers, who were, in most of the cases, ex-migrant workers. It should be noted that such persons are not included in column (5) of Table 9, though they are within the totals of column (2).

Contrasting to decrasing significance of annual flows, the stock of Turkish citizens and workers abroad is becoming more and more important, simply because of its increasing size. Table 12 presents the breakdown of Turkish citizens and the part of it representing the workers by host countries.

It should, however, be stressed at the beginning that, the figures in Table 12 are not reliable enough, owing to various reasons:

Calculations are based on Table 9, columns (2) and (6).

^{12.} Tuncer Bulutay, Employment, unemployment and wages in turkey, International Labour Office-State Institute of Statistics publications, Ankara 1995, p. 137.

^{**} Calculations are based on Table 9, columns (2) and (5).

- i. The figures cover those having a valid Turkish passport and have registered with the police of the host country. Therefore, the illegal or undocumented migrants; asylum-seekers and refugees; those, who were renunciated from Turkish nationality are not included. However, it is obvious that, those having dual-nationality will pose no problem and be included.
- ii. The figures for a few countries such as Austria and Germany are old-dated; whereas it is just a guesswork for some others. Some figures are based on the records of the host countries.
- iii. Addition of some countries USA and Canada in Table 12
 for the first time, unavailability of data for some countries makes the interpretation of the figures difficult, if not meaningless.
- iv. Owing to the difficulty in identifying, self -employed or independent workers as well as employers are, of course, included in the total Turkish nationals, but are not and cannot be included in the figure of "workers", as they are not "employees". Therefore, they are treated as if they were economically inactive. What is needed is to form a new group in table 12 for such persons, under the heading "independent workers and employers".

Many of the problems enumarated above, originate from the inadequate overseas organization and personnel of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and especially its General Directorate of Services for Workers Abroad. Excluding the Permanent Representatives by the UN, Geneva Office and by the European Union, there are only 13 Counselers ad 26 Attaches of Labour and Social Security, established in only 15 countries^{*}. In countries, where such offices do not exist, Turkish consulates and embassies are to collect data on Turkish population abroad.

Table 12, though informative, seems to be too detailed to trace the main trends and to reflect the sharp distinction between the western-type migration and project-tied migration. Table 13, where host countries are aggregated according to main economic blocs gives a better idea on these points.

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UK, Germany France, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Turkish Rep. of N. Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and Australia.

	(1)	(2)
Countries N	Number of Total Nationals	Number Of Workers
Germany	1 918 395 ^a	763 697
France	268 000	102 99
Netherhands	264 763	84 500
Belgium	88 269	23 488 ^a
UK	37 302	15 746
Denmark	34 658	13 412ª
Italy	15 000	5 000
Spain	843	500
EU TOTAL	2 627 230	1 009 243
Austria	150 000 ^b	54 058
Switzerland	77 111	37 640
Sweden	35 713	15 052
Norway	10 000	6 000
Finland	1 800	1 400
EFTA TOTAL	274 624	114 150
EEA TOTAL	2 901 854	1 123 393
Saudi Arabia	130 000	120 000
Libya	6 236	5 802
Jordan	1 591	200
Kuwait	3 500	3 300
Northern Cyprus	ц.а.	6 308
MIDDLE EAST &	·	
NORTHERN AFRICA TOT	AL 141 327	135 610
USA	135 000	n.a.
Canada	35 000	n.a.
CIS	40 000	40 000
Australia	49 375	31 000
Others	1 648	1 016
Overall TOTAL	3 304 204	1 331 019
Source : Complied from the Services for Worker	unpublished data provided by s Abroad.	the General Directorate
a : end-1993 figures.		
b: end-1992 estimate.		

Table 12. Distribution of Turkish Nationals and Workers	Abroad
by Host Countries (as of end-1994)	

*: unemployed workers are included.
**: as Austria, Sweden and Finland's memberships came into force on 1 Jan. 1995, they were still members of EFTA, as of end-1994.

	Nationals	Workers	
EU	79.5	75.9	
EFTA	8.3	8.6	
TOTAL EEA	87.8	84.5	
NAFTA	5.2	п.а.	
CIS	1.2	3.0	
Australia	1.5	2.3	
Middle East & N. Africa	4.3	10.2	

Table 13. Turkish Nationals	s and Workers Abroad
 (percentage distribution l 	by economic blocs)

Distribution of Turkish workers and the whole Turkish citizens abroad according to main conomic blocks, shows clearly that Turkish migration is westernly-oriented, with 87.8 per cent of Turkish people abroad being established in the EEA. The shares of Arab countries and the CIS is of marginal importance. The shares of the OECD countries in Turkish workers and in the whole population abroad are 86.7 per cent and 94.4 per cent, respectively -see Annexed Table A2.

After the 1973 recruitment halt has resulted in an 'emigration crisis' for Turkey, she tried to find new outlets for her surplus manpower. However, the Middle East oil-producing countries as well as the CIS could not provide a replacement market for labour, previously directed towards Western Europe¹³.

V. Unemployment Abroad

It is a well-documented fact that minorities always suffer from unemployment more than native population. Foreign workers in this regard, is not an exception. But, the increasing rate of unemployment among Turkish workers exceeding that of prevailing among the foreign workers as a whole, has been a great concern, during recent years.

^{13.} Sarah Collinson, Europe and International Migration, Pinter Publishers, London 1994, p.77.

Based on the scanty data, Table 14 shows the unemployment situation of Turkish Workers abroad in a comparative setting.

Table 14. Unemployed 1	Furkish Workers .	Abroad-selected countries			
(as of end-1994)					

Host	Jnemployment rate in Host	Unemployment rate among	Unemployed	Turkish Workers
Countries	Country (%)	foreign workers	%	absolute numbers
Germany (Nov.)	8.2	17.5	19.3 (19.2)	148 044
France (Oct.)	12.6	n.a.	28.5 (26.4)	29 390
Netherlands (Oct	.) 7.6	n.a.	48.0 (38.8)	40 573
Austria (Oct.)	6.1	8.0	12.9 (12.3)	6 972
Belgium (Oct.)	14.0	n.a.	45.0 (46.0)	10 587
Sweden (Nov.)	7.2	n.a.	13.4 (27.8)	2 020
Denmark (Oct.)	11.4	34.1	55.6 (57.7)	7 461
		average	23.2 (22.3)	TOTAL 245 047
				(237.124) ^b
	ish Ministry of Economist. De	Labour. c. 17-23 1994, p.98	B .	

b : Figure for 1993

Unemployment among Turkish workers abroad is widespread, especially among the traditional host countries of the EU. Concerning the contract-workers in the CIS and in the Gulf countries, on the other hand, no case of unemployment has so far been reported. As of end-1994, out of 1 057 107 Turkish workers, resident in 7 EU countries, 245 047 (or 23.2 per cent) were unemployed. In view of the fact that, the EU economies, which had contracted some 0.3 per cent in 1993, enjoyed a 2.5 per cent expansion in 1994, the slightly increased rate of unemployment for Turkish workers between 1993 and 1994 seems rather surprising and needs explanation.

i. The Turkish labour force abroad has been ageing. Considering the ban on new workers coming from Turkey, even the late-comers, i.e. those who migrated in the early 70s, though still in the working age, are not young enough and keen on learning new skills, required by new technologies. Besides, when the shorter life expectancy for Turkish people - 63 and 65 for men and women,

respectively - is taken into account, a considerable portion of them might have exceeded their working age. The children of them and/or the grand-children of the pioneering migrants, on the other hand, though have no language barrier, are not, on the whole, well educated and qualified as the host country citizens of the same age.

- ii. In case of becoming a registered unemployed, trying to prolong the period supported by unemployment insurance and social aid (if any) through the loopholes of the provisions of the relevant legislation, might be another reason for widespread unemployment among Turkish workers. Although it is not normally allowed to take up any jobs during such periods, for a Turkish workers it might be possible to work at the family business or at a part-time job at one of the hundreds of Turkish enterprises or associations.
- iii. From a theoretical point of view at least, one might speculate on the possibility of an application of First in First out (FIFO) principle, when an employer had to lay off some workers on justifiable economic grounds. Compared with the newly recruited manpower from North African countries, Turkish workers are fully informed about their rights and therefore are more demanding, if not militant. Therefore, one might be inclined to think that, during recessions they might be the first candidates to be laid off.

VI. Return Movements

The rate of propensity to return of the migrant population abroad has been declining during recent years. Not only the migrant-workers, but also retired migrants, self-employed persons want to settle down in host countries. Therefore, it is not just the continuous postponement of the date to return, but a decision not to return in the foreseeable future, the underlying results of which can be summarized as follows:

- i. In terms of social integration, the second ad the third generations are in a relatively better situation and are fluent with the language of the host country.
- ii. The elderly migrants in need of permanent medical care, think that, the facilities are better in host countries.

- iii. The proliferating number of artisans, tradesmen and employers are economically integrated¹⁴.
- iv. Family reunion abroad has already been established.
- v. The performance of Turkish economy does not seem promising.
- vi. Reintegration of the second and third generations in Turkey is difficult.

Measures taken by some of the host countries have not been as effective as envisaged. For example, according to the findings of a survey made by the Zentrum für Türkeistudien in Germany in 1991, out of 600 returnees, only 10.5 per cent has benefitted from return incentives. 78.8 per cent was not well-informed about them¹⁵. It might be of interest to note that, the 54.3 per cent of returnees evaluate their decision to return as a right one¹⁶.

Finally, in order to give an idea concerning the rate of return, the situation of some host countries in this regard is presented below:

- Netherlands : In 1992, 1 946 persons, in 1993, 1 842 persons and in 1994, 1 732 persons returned back. When, for example, the 1994 figure is divided by the total Turkish population resident in the Netherlands, i.e.264 763, we get as low a ratio as 0.65 per cent. The same rate was 1.27 per cent in 1991¹⁷.
- Belgium : Returnees from this country was 1 738 in 1990, 2 079 in 1991, 2 155 in 1992 and 1 945 in 1993. Calculated by the same method, the rate to return for 1993 is 2.28 per cent.

Sweden : The number of returnees in only 160 in 1994, which give a very low rate of return-0.45 per cent.

- 14. SPO, Yurtdışı İşgücü Piyasası (Turkish Labour market Abroad) Ad hoc Committee Report. Ankara 1994, p.51.
- 15. Centre for Turkish Studies (ed.) (Jan. 1993) p.57.

16. Ibid. p.61, Table 37.

17. See, Sopemi 1994, Turkey, p.18.

France

: It is not possible to have exact figures for this country, as the owners of a ten-years *carte de résident* are allowed to reside in other countries for 3 years. Therefore, it is probable that they could resume working in France by again

VII. Naturalization and Dual-nationality

For at least three decades, Turks resident abroad have been very keen on preserving their nationality, even at the expense of some advantages in the host country. However, during recent years, owing to some reasons there has been a drastic change of mind:

- i. In view of widespread unemployment and the lack of social security, they wanted to share the benefits of the welfare states, for which they have been working for decades.
- ii. For a limited number of host countries and for a temporary period, through roundabout ways, having dual-nationality had been possible. This status was the first-best solution, as they could reap the advantages of becoming a national of the host country, without losing Turkish nationality.
- iii. After having realised that they have settled down in host countries, they began to demand the right of political participation and have a say in the decision-making mechanism of the host countries by acquisition of the right of election and to be elected.
- iv. The most important reason was the 1995 amendment made in the Turkish Law of Nationality of 1964 (PL 403), which gurantees the right of election and to be elected, the property rights as well as the right of succession of the ex-Turkish nationals, who acquired the nationality of another state^{*}.

^{*} This amendment made in Article 29, created a kind of "special foreign nationality" for the ex-Turkish nationals. For example, according to the Turkish Law of Nationality, foreigners are not allowed to own land and real-estate in villages. But, the ex-Turkish nationals acquired rights were guaranteed, that is, they could own the properties they had in villages, prior to their renunciation. They are also allowed to buy new ones. Moreover, when entering Turkey and leaving it, they will enjoy the same status with other Turkish nationals. Thus, two different types of foreign nationality were created. This is a problem, open to criticism, in terms of the general principles of international private law.

A sketchy list of the number of naturalized Turks, based on the available data in Turkey is presented below:

	* 1			
Netherlands	: 1946 -1989	11 277	1993	18 001
	1 99 0	1 952	1994	17 022
	1991	6 105	•	
	1992	11 520	TOTAL	65 877
Belgium	: The number of 1994, added up			ll March
Australia	: In the period (were naturalized		0.06.94 1 7	28 Turks
Austria	: The most rece exhaustive, as Vienna, Salz districts only.	s it covers	the case	s within
Sweden	: 1984 - 1992	10 244		
	1993	1 569		

1994	4 201
TOTAL	16 014

France

: From the beginning of immigration of the Turks, until end-1990, 14 773 Turkish nationals (of which 7 104 were females) acquired French nationality.

	up to	1 990	14 773
		1991	1 124
	· .	1992	1 296
		1 993	1 515
		TOTAL	18 708
Denmark	: 1984	-1989	1 326
:		1990	107
		1991	376
	•	1992	502
		1993	560
-		TOTAL	2 871

Hosting 58 per cent of the Turkish community abroad, German case deserves a closer look. The big rise that has began in the numbers reflects the increasing tendency for naturalization among the Turkish population in Germany, as well as the amendments made in the German Law of Nationality, which have facilitated naturalization-see Table 15.

		•	•
Number of Turks having dual nationality	Number of naturalized Turks	Total	a
109	421	530	•
297	271	568	580
412	434	846	853
576	466	1 042	1 053
764	539	1 303	1 310
770	707	1 477	1 492
646	529	1 175	1 184
675	550	1 225	1 243
968	729	1 697	1 713
1 043	973	2 016	2 034
2 366	1 136	3 502	3 529
	7 337	7 337	7 377
	12915	12 915	
8 626	27 007	35 633	
The possibility of relevant legislation The figures of the Turkeistudien (199 difference betwee	having dual-nationality has been prevented. Federal Bureaux of S 35) p.16, Table 4. This on the figures provided	through the loc statistics, cited is column is prepar	pholes of the Dentrum für ed to show the
	having dual nationality 109 297 412 576 764 770 646 675 968 1 043 2 366 1 043 2 366 2 366 2 366 2 Compiled from the The possibility of relevant legislation 2 The figures of the Turkeistudien (19) difference betwee	having dual nationalitynaturalized Turks1094212972714124345764667645397707076465296755509687291 0439732 3661 1367 337129158 62627 007:Compiled from the records of the Turkish The possibility of having dual-nationality relevant legislation has been prevented.:The figures of the Federal Bureaux of S Turkeistudien (1995) p.16, Table 4. This of difference between the figures provided	having dual naturalized Turks Total 109 421 530 297 271 568 412 434 846 576 466 1 042 764 539 1 303 770 707 1 477 646 529 1 175 675 550 1 225 968 729 1 697 1 043 973 2 016 2 366 1 136 3 502 7 337 7 337 12915 8 626 27 007 35 633 : Compiled from the records of the Turkish Chief Consulate The possibility of having dual-nationality through the loop

Table 15. Naturalizations and Dual-nationality in Germany

From 1981 to 1993, a total of 27 007 Turks acquired German nationality and 8 626 of them preserve Turkish nationality as well. But, when compared to the number of 1993 Turkish population in Germany, it gives a very small percentage, i.e. 1.4 per cent.

The rates are even smaller in other host countries. Several reasons account for this unfavourable situation. The host countries

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do not went to be immigration countries-although they have already been so. Therefore, they made naturalization hard to obtain. There are lengthy periods for application, extending from five to twelve years. Moreover, applicants are required to fulfill such conditions as good conduct, sufficient knowledge of the host country's language, sufficient means of subsistence, to pay taxes in good time, decent housing and be integrated social environment¹⁸.

As for the Turks, considering naturalization, they are reluctant to lose their own nationality. Therefore, they prefer dual-nationality. Although dual-natonality is not explicitly mentioned in the Turkish Law of Nationality, there is no any provision rejecting it either. But, the legislation of many host countries requires the renunciation of a foreigner his or her own nationality as a pre-condition of granting its own*. Therefore, a Turkish national, willing to acquire the nationality of the host country, must request permission for renunciation from the competent Turkish authorities. This is a time-consuming procedure. Moreover, until recently they were afraid of losing their property rights and the right of succession. However, in view of the recent amendment in the Turkish Law of Nationality, as mentioned above, such fears are groundless. For that reason as well as the amendments made in the German Law of Nationality, which facilitate the acquisition of German nationality, it is anticipated that the rate of naturalization will increase in the years to come. However, in order to get the permission of renunciation, the requirement of the completion of the military service for the male applicants had been a barrier, on the part of Turkey, till 1995 Autumn.

VII. Workers' Remittances

One of the dual objectives envisaged by exporting manpower to western countries was to earn hard currencies, the other being to mitigate unemployment. In fact, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis was on maximizing the outflow of workers and the consequent inflow of much needed foreign exchange and nothing else had such high priority. Rinus Pennix even went on to argue in

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Moreover, the depreciation of Turkish Lira vis-à-vis the DM and the Dollar, during the last months of 1995, will exert a favourable effect on the WR. as ceteris par

Center for Turkish Studies / Zentrum für Türkei Studien (ed.): Migration 18 Movements from Turkey to the European Community, Brussels, Jan. 1993 (in English) p.82-83.

Nevertheless, Belgium, France, the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Italy accept dual-nationality.

1982 "...the effort of the national government is mainly directed to one aim: to attract as much hard currency from Turkish migrants in Europe as possible.¹⁹"

Things have changed in Turkey since then. After the famous 4 January Decisions, the degree of openness of Turkish economy showed a drastic increase, and both imports and exports climbed to unprecedented heights. As a consequence, the relative significance of workers' remittances (WR) has declined. However, it should not be forgotten that, Turkish migrants abroad were not late to respond personel Premier Ciller's request to to open "super foreign-exchange accounts" with premium interest rates, at a time of crisis when Turkey's international reserves were depleting.

Table 16. Workers' Remittances (1992-94) (million \$)

	1992	1993	1994
WR (1)	3 008	2 919	2 627
Exports (2)	14 891	-15 610	18 390
Imports (3)	-23 082	-29 772	-22 606
Trade Deficit (4)	-8 191	-14 162	-4 216
(1)/(4)	36.7 %	20.6 %	62.3 %
(1)/(3)	13.0 %	9.8 %	11.6 %

Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Annual Report 1993, p. 194; Annual Report 1994, p. 192.

Annual remittances, after surpassing \$ 3 billion in 1989, seemed to stabilize, though began to decline slightly since 1992 -see Annexed Table B and Table 16 above. It is likely that annual total for 1995 will exceed the 1994 figure, and perhaps the \$ 3 billion. In fact, the Jan-July '95 sub-total has already exceeded the sub-total of 1994, for the same preiod- \$ 2 031 and \$ 1 651 million respectively²⁰.

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a .)

750 These, relatively high interest bearing accounts can either be opened at certain commercial banks in Turkey or at the Turkish opened at certain commercial banks in Dresdner Bank Scheme' is very

^{19.} Sarah Collinson, Europe and International Migration, Printer Publishers, London 1994, p.66.

^{20.} Turkish Central Bank, Foreign relations department, op. cit, p. 14, Table 7.

Moreover, the depreciation of Turkish Lira vis-à-vis the DM and the Dollar, during the last months of 1995, will exert a favourable effect on the WR, as, *ceteris paribus*, the inflow of them is indexed to the foreign-exchange rate in Turkey.

WR have covered the 58.2 per cent, of the foreign trade deficits, on the average, during the period extending from 1964 to 1994. But, beginning from 1990 onwards, the percentage declined sharply, as the deficits incereased-see Annexed Table B. In this regard, 1994 seems to be an exception, while the WR covered 62.3 % of that year's deficit. In this regard, it should be pointed out that, the role and significance of a more or less constant amount of WR -around \$3 billion- might be deceptive. The smaller the deficit, as in 1994, the percentage of it covered by the WR will be higher, regardless of the sizes of imports and exports, and vice versa. In 1994, for example, though the percentage is as high as 62.3 -see Table 16- WR as a whole covers only 11.6 per cent of import.

But WR should be conceived in a broader context. It should cover the pensions of the retired ex-workers as well as invalidity benefits and survivors' benefits, when these are remitted to Turkey. Finally, a certain percentage of foreign exchange deposit accounts opened by the Turkish migrants abroad might be accepted as WR in the broader sense of it, as they are payable either in foreign exchange or in Turkish Lira.

	end-1994	July	1995
I. In commercial banks	2.44	43	2 563
(all non-resident)*			
II. In Central Bank	9 22	25	11 303
A. non-residents	9 131	11 147	
-Short term	823	980	
-medium & long-term	8 308	10 167	
B. Residents	94	156	
- Short term	11	31	
- medium & long-term	83	135	
III. Commercial Banks &			
Central Bank	11 60	58	13 863

Table 17. Foreign Exchange Deposit Accounts (million \$)

These, relatively high interest bearing accounts can either be opened at certain commercial banks in Turkey or at the Turkish Central Bank. The latter, known as 'Dresdner Bank Scheme' is very convenient, as the sums deposited at certain banks abroad will be transferred to Turkish Central Bank.

Conceived in a broad or narrow coverage, WR have been declining. In spite of the growing numbers of bread-winners abroad, whether as workers or self-employed persons, employers or even as pensioners, remittances channelling to Turkey do not increase. The sharp decrease of the tendency to return, increasing numbers of naturalization, establishing family reunion abroad, to open up small to large-scale businesses and to invest abroad, developments in social integration are the main factors resulting in diminishing the propensity to remit money to homeland. Therefore, the volume as well as the effects of WR on Turkish economy will gradually fade away.

IX. Turkey as an Immigration Country -the issue of asylum-seekers and refugees

The Ottoman Empire had been very tolerant and sensitive towards those seeking for a safe haven on various grounds, without discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims. She maintained a more or less "Open door policy" for those, who where expelled from their homeland or had been under compulsion for political or religious reasons. However, in this report the brief history of asylum seekers and refugees will be focused on the developments, after the establihsment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

In the period 1923-60, a total of 308 636 families (or 1 203 936 persons) took shelter in Turkey as immigrants or asylum seekers, a great majority of which under the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, concerning the exchange of ethnic minorities, and owing to the Second World War (see Annexed Table C)²¹.

During and after the Secod World War, some 91 000 asylum seekers came to Turkey, though a great majority of them-roughly 67 000-left Turkey when the turbulance came to an end.

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
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^{21.} Muhteşem KAYNAK (ed.) : The Iraqi Aslum Seekers and Türkiye (1988-1991) TANMAK Publications, Ankara 1992 (in English) p.17-18.

In the period 1945-1960, more than 15 000 immigrants arrived Turkey, mostly comprising of Greeks and Bulgarians, even of some 700 war prisoners released from the war camps²².

The big exodus from Bulgaria, which began in mid-1988 and involved more than 300 thousand ethnic Turks as well as those coming from the former Yugoslavia and from Romania and from the former USSR had been summarized in Soperni Report, Turkey 1992 (esp. pp. 14-17); 1993 (pp.21-22). In the present Report, therefore, special emphasis will be given to the problems of the asylum seekers of Iraqi origin.

Although the influx of people from Iraq has been an important event, the real picture of Turkey in the terms of the circulation of people for various reasons is more complex than it seems. As a "country of region" amidst hot wars, and as a bridge between the problematic Middle-East and the welfare states of Europe, it constitutes an interesting case. Turkey, suffering from a strong migration pressure, began to be exposed to immigration pressure as



 KAYNAK (ed.): cited from Cevat GERAY, The settlements of immigrants from and towards Turkey (1923-1961) A.Ü.S.B.F., Institute of Finance publications, Ankara 1962.

well, especially since 1980s, when the immigration countries of Europe began to take restrictive measures to limit immigration. This highly complicated situation can best be understood by means of a flow-chart.

Turkey has a dual role, as a country of emigration and a country of immigration. Looked as a country of emigration, migratory flows of Turkish nationals as legal migrants (1) to Europe, North Africa, Middle East, Australia, CIS and to North America has already been discussed-see Ch.I. Illegal Turkish migrants (2) and asylum seekers (3), as also mentioned before, are destined for Europe. But, it is not so easy to differentiate between (3) and (2), as many Turkish asylum seekers were not "forced political refugees" but "illegal economic migrants" searching employment.

Foreign workers in Turkey (1) & (2)

As for Turkey's role as an immigration country, it should be emphasized that, excluding the professionals who have a previously concluded job contract, there has been no legal workers coming to Turkey. Normally, those originating from Romania and CIS, arrive in Turkey as pseudo-tourists and take up jobs when the opportunity rises. (This is why they are not classified under group (1) but (2) in the chart above.) According to the relevant legislation, foreigners are allowed to stay and work in Turkey, provided that they have jobs or financial means to support themselves. Foreign workers are required to register at the local police station, and in case they are employed, their employers should register them at the local branch of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

But, the legislation concerning the employment of foreigners as workers or employees as well as independent suppliers of service is sporadic and complicated. Therefore, it has been impossible to overcome the problems of rising number of foreign workers. As work permits are granted by various institutions, the labour market of foreigners cannot properly be controlled²³. For that reason they are mostly engaged in construction sector and show-business in the underground economy; and by definition their number is unknown.

^{23.} Seventh Five Year Plan (1996-2000) p.46.

Asylum-seekers and refugees in Turkey (3)

Persons who run away to another country to get protection they cannot have at home become **asylum-seekers**. If their request for asylum is formally accepted by the host government, they become **refugees**; Turkey, with her long borders with neighbouring states which do not have democratic governments, has been a safe haven in the past ten years. There have been three large group of asylum-seekers who came to Turkey: Iraqis, Bulgarians of Turkish origin and some 25 000 Bosnians in 1992 and all these groups were hosted in Turkey²⁴.

At this point, an important distinction concerning the origins of asylum-seekers should be made. Turkey only recognizes as formal **refugees**, persons who flee from countries in Europe and fulfill the criteria to be a refugee. Although one of parties of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Turkey has put a reserve justifying her geographical limitation in this regard. However, asylum-seekers from other countries- as in the cases of Iraqis and Iranians- are allowed to stay temporarily in Turkey, provided that Turkish authorities believe they have a good reason. Only those persons who present a credible claim for asylum under refugee criteria and who are unable, due to their fear, and unwilling to seek protection from their country will be granted **temporary asylum** in Turkey. Table 18, based on various reports of UNCHR, presents the approximate figures of asylum-seekers in Turkey.

24. Barry D. Rigby "The UNHCR and Private Sector Response to Refugee Problems", April 1995 (unpublished speech) p.1.

Year	Total	from Iran-Iraq	from other countries
		(1)	(2)
1983	1 150	800	350
1984	2 100	2 000	100
1985	3 550	3 500	50
1986	3 950	3 900	50
1987	6 500	6 400	100
1988	56 600	56 500	100
1989	. 3 300	3 000	300
1990	2 550	2 100	450
1 991	9 100	9 000	100
1992	3 800	3 600	200
1993	3 300	3 100	200
1994	2 700	2 600	100
TOTAL	98 600	96 500	2 100

Table 18. Number of Asylum-seekers in Turkey by Country of Origin (1983 - 94)

It is estimated by Içduygu that, in addition to the figures in the Table, there have been some 1.5 million Iranians who arrived in Turkey within the 12 years in question and another 600 thousand Iraqis during 1990-91. When these are taken into account, the total of column (1) exceeds 2 million. It should be noted that those covered in column (2) are not necessarily of European origin, as the available data does not allow to make such a distinction.

Owing to the high number of asylum-seekers entering Turkey, originating from several non-European countries, the task of deciding which of them meet the refugee criteria, has for many years been carried out by the UNHCR. However, by a new regulation, issued on 30 November 1994, the Government of Turkey decided to take over the main decision-making. Therefore, the non-European asylum-seekers, who entered into Turkey legally or illegaly, should submit their claim within five days to the nearest governorship, whereas they used to approach the UNHCR's Branch Office in Ankara before the new regulation.

Transit-migrants and resettlers (4) (5)

Since the mid-1980s, Turkey had to assume a new role, by acting as a transit country, where many asylum-seekers, mostly from the Middle-East, Asia and Africa began to submit their applications to be considered for getting refugee status and resettling in Europe or in North America. In fact, the unfavourable developments in the countries embracing Turkey, made it vulnerable for transit-migrants as well as refugee movements²⁵. According to the findings of a survey, made in Turkey in 1988, 26 000 among 27 000 interviewed Iraqi refugees had the intention of being resettled in the developed regions of the world, Europe being the first-best preference²⁶.

But, the 1995 survey carried out by IOM shows that the *ex* ante expectations of the potential resettlers were not realised, as 71 per cent of transit-migrants in Turkey, who previously had attempted to leave Turkey were not successful. But, 92 per cent were still planning to leave Turkey²⁷. The findings of this survey, reflect the new attitude of western countries towards the problem of refugees. They would prefer them to stay in Turkey as refugees, rather than to accept. This is another example of the excessive immigration pressure on Turkey.

The Ankara Branch Office of the UNHCR has been dealing with the resettling problems of non-European refugees. Concerning the resettlement status, as of September 1995, there are 1 462 cases (involving 3 329 persons of which the majority are Iraqis and Iranians) on its table. In 294 cases, involving 641 persons, the resettlement status has already been given. The next step will of course be to seek for developed countries that are going to accept them as refugees²⁸.

Appendix 1 A Brief Story of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers

The asylum-seekers from Iraq came in three waves. Firstly, after the Halapje massacre, beginning from end-August 1988,

^{25.} İçduygu, op cit, p.5.

^{26.} Kaynak (ed.) op cit, p.53-54.

IOM (International Organization for Migration). (1995) Transit Migration in Turkey, Budapest: IOM, Migration Information Programme (forthcoming) cited in Içduygu, op cit, p.5.

^{28.} Based on the data provided by the Ankara Branch Office of the UNHCR.

thousands of Northern Iraqis left their homes and crossed the Turkish border in a week. Some of them intended to enter Iran. The asylum seekers were helped by the Turkish Government-on humanitarian grounds- by establishing temporary camps and hospitals. After the announcement of the general amnesty of 6 September, the great majority of them left Turkey, though some destined for Iran. Still, as of end-October 1991, there were some 20 thousand asylum-seekers. It should be pointed out that, only 1 018 of them were accepted by the Western countries as refugees.

The second wave of asylum seekers came to Turkey, between 2 August 1990 and 17 January 1991, during the Gulf War. It consisted mainly of foreign employees, workers and technians, in search of a safe haven via Jordan and Turkey. Totalling to 62 992, they represented 65 different nationalities, including 4778 Turks, and of some Iraqi soldiers and civilians who were tired and frightened by the War. The third and the last wave came, after the cease-fire, upon the chaotic situation in Iraq. Being anti-Saddam, they arrived Turkey by crossing rivers and mountains. Approaching half a million in number, they were in need of immediate help. Turkey, already involved in the problems of more than 300 thousand Bulgarian Turks, had to demand aid from the UN Security Council²⁹.

Q04111100, 177		
Germany	2 032	
Austria	10	
Belgium	• 1	
France	17	
Netherlands	12	
Switzerland	13	
Australia	139	
OECD TOTAL	2 224	
Others	58 921	
TOTAL	61 145	_
Source : Turkish Employment Office		

Annexed Table A1. annual Flow of Turkish Workers to OECD Countries, 1994

29. Kaynak, op cit, p. 23-28.

Country	Workers	Total nationals
Germany	763 697	1 918 395 ^b
France	102 900	268 000
Netherlands	84 500	264 763
Austria	54 058 ^a	150 000 ^a
Belgium	23 488 ^b	88 269
Sweden	15 052	35 713
UK	15 746	37 302
Denmark	13 412 ^b	34 658
Italy	5 000	15 000
Finland	1 400	1 800
Spain	500	843
Switzerland	37 640	77 111
Norway	6 000	10 000
USA	n.a.	135 000
Canada	n.a.	35 000
Australia	31 000	49 375
OECD TOTAL	1 154 393	3 121 229
Others	176 626	182 975
TOTAL	1 331 019	3 304 204
Source : Compiled from the and Social Securit a : end-93 figures	e unpublished data pro y, General Directorate	ovided by the Ministry of Services for Worker

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A2. Stock of Turkish Workers and Turkish Population in OECD Countries (as of end-1994)

				(1904-94) (1111	ποπ φ)
		_		Balance of Trade	
Year	Remittances	Imports	Exports	Deficit	112 1 1 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)/(4)
1964	9 -	-537	411	-126	- 7,1
1965	70	-572	464	-108	64,8
1 966	115	-718	490	-228	50,4
1967	93	-685	523	-162	57,4
1968	1 07	-764	496	-268	39,9
1969	141	-801	537	-264	53,4
1970	273	-948	588	-360	75,8
1971	471	-1 171	677	-494	95,3
1972	740	-1 563	885	-678	109,1
1973	1 183	-2 086	1 317	-769	153,8
1974	1 426	-3 777	1 532	-2 245	68,5
1975	1 313	-4 739	1 401	-3 338	39,3
1976	983	-5 128	1 960	-3 168	31,0
1977	982	-5 796	1 753	-4 043	24,3
1978	983	-4 599	2 288	-2 311	42,5
1979	1 694	-5 069	2 261	-2 808	60,3
1980	2 071	-7 909	2 910	-4 999	41,4
1981	2 490	-8 933	4 703	-4 230	58,8
1982	2 140	-8 518*	5 890	-2 628	81,4
1983	1 513	-8 895	5 905	-2 990	50,6
1984	1 807	-10 331	7 389	-2 942	61,4
1985	1 714	-11 230	8 255	-2 975	57,6
1986	1 634	-10 664	7 583	-3 081	53,0
1987	2 021	-13 551	10 322	-3 229	62,3
1988	1 776	-13 706	11 929	-1 777	99,9
» 1 989	3 040	-15 999	11 780	-4 219	72,1
1990	3 246	-22 581	13 626	-8 955	36,2
1991	2 819	-20 998	13 672	-7 326	38,5
1992	3 008	-23 082	14 891	-8 191	36,7
1993	2 919	-29 772	15 610	-14 162	20,6
1994	2 627	-22 606	18 390	-4 216	62,3
TOTAL	45 408			Avera	ge 58.2
Source :					
p. 194, Annual report 1994, p. 192, Table 48. * Beginning from 1982 onwards, imports data changed from cif to fob					

Annexed Table B Remittances vs. Balance of Trade Deficits (1964-94) (million \$)

Beginning from 1982 onwards, imports data changed from cif to fob.

1.111

Years	Persons	Years	Persons
1923	196 420	1943	3 442
1924	208 886	1944	2 608
1925	39 634	1945	2 792
1926	32 852	1946	3 741
1927	27 172	1947	4 365
1928	40 570	1948	7 245
1929	19 133	1949	3,450
1930	13 694	1950	52 185
1931	11 648	1951	102 240
1932	11 603	1952	1 202
1933	25 656	1953	3 309
1934	34 057	1954	12 062
1935	50 719	1955	20 076
1936	33 074	1956	35 369
1937	26 752	1957	32 680
1938	29 678	1958	32 539
1 959	20 612	1959	20 612
1940	13 318	1960	14 722
1941	7 264		
1942	5 709		
		TOTAL	1 203 93

Annexed Table C	
The Asylum Seekers and Exchanged Population in Tur	key
(1923-60)	•

SUMMARY

Since the January'94 crisis, the Turkish economy has maintaned her "stop-go" pattern of development with successive short periods of low and high growth rates. In contrast to serious decline in the GNP during the first two quarters of 1994, a 6.2 per cent growth rate was recorded, for the same period in 1995. But, the favourable developments attained in the price levels and in the balance of payments began to deteriorate towards the end of '95.

The combined rate of unemployment and underemployment is estimated at 19.8 per cent.

Annual flow of workers abroad seems to have stabilized around 60 000-61 145 for 1994. More than 90 per cent of fresh migrants were of project-tied or "building-site" type, destined for the CIS and the Middle-East countries. Although, traditional western-type migration might seem to have lost its relative significance, it will be realized that migratory pressure is still high, when the high volume of the illegal migrants and the pseudoasylum seekers channelled to Western Europe are taken into account. the UNCHR estimated that in the period 1988-92, more than 10 per cent of the asylum-seekers in Europe had come from Turkey.

Contrasting to decreasing importance of official annual flows, the stock of Turkish population resident abroad has been increasing. Taking 1990 as the base year, the index number has increased to 131.1 as of July 1995, the main factors being the high rate of births, family reunion abroad, the negligible rate of return and the influx of undocumented migrants. The number of workers, on the other hand, lagged behind the increase in total population. However, the proliferating number of self-employed workers and employers, which are not included in the figure of workers, should also be taken into account.

As of end-'94, 87.8 per cent of migrant-workers and 84.5 per cent of total population were resident in the European Economic Area, the same rates for the OECD countries being 86.7 per cent and 94.4 per cent, respectively.

Unemployment among Turkish workers are more widespread than other foreign workers, especially in the traditional host countries. According to the available figures for end-'94, in 7 OECD countries, nearly 250 000 Turkish workers, which account for 23.2 per cent of the total were unemployed. Unemployment in CIS and in the Middle-East countries is by nature of project-tied migration, is non-existent.

In spite of the rejection of dual-nationality by Germans, there has been considerable increase in the number f naturalized Turks. The 1995 amendment in the Turkish Law of Nationality, which

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guaranteed the acquired rights of ex-Turkish nationals, encouraged the existing tendencies for naturalization.

Workers' annual remittances seem to have stabilized around \$3 billion since 1990, though \$2.6 for 1995. But, in view of the much higher degree of openness of Turkish economy, compared to 1960s and 1970s, their relative contribution as a credit item has declined to a great extent.

Mainly owing to the unfavourable political developments in the neighbouring countries such as Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Iran, coupled with the restrictive policies of Western countries on immigration, Turkey has been under an excessive pressure of influx of asylum-seekers and refugees as well as illegal migrant-workers. Moreover, since mid-1980s, Turkey began to be a transit country, where many asylum seekers, from the Middle-East and from the more distant countries of Asia and Africa began to submit their applications to be considered for being resettled in the developed countries. Although a party to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Turkey has put a reserve which allows her not to recognize the non-European refugees. Still, she has been doing her best to host the asylum-seekers of non-European origin, on humanitarian grounds. It seems that, because of her geographical location, immigration pressure on Turkey will continue in the near-future, so long as the Western countries carry on with their restrictive policies on immigration.