

Claiming the cause, negotiating the image: Young undergraduate women's reception of digital feminist messages

Talebi sahiplenmek, imgeyi müzakere etmek: Genç üniversiteli kadınların dijital feminist mesajları alımlaması

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Abstract

This study asks how young undergraduate women make sense of digital feminist messages. The Instagram account of the We Will Stop Femicides Platform was used as an elicitation case: ten women followed the account for a week and were then interviewed, and the material was analysed through reflexive thematic analysis. Reception, the findings suggest, works through negotiation. Participants firmly endorse the struggle against femicide and the demand for equality, yet keep their distance from the public image, the language and the perceived political alignment of feminism. Digital content sustains anger and solidarity that participants already carry and keeps their awareness alive, but this intensity rarely moves beyond low-threshold participation. The study's conceptual contribution lies at the political level: several participants accept that the issue is political while remaining uneasy about the movement appearing partisan, a tension named here the paradox of perceived partisanship. Named by a participant and working through four referents (party contacts, the repertoire of action, the visibility of alliances and institutional support ties), the concept describes a demand for a political stance that appears identical with no party identity, and points to the difficulty of holding such a position in a polarised public sphere.

Keywords: Digital feminism, reception studies, femicide, feminist identity, Türkiye

Öz

Bu çalışma, genç üniversiteli kadınların dijital feminist mesajları nasıl alımladığını incelemektedir. Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu'nun Instagram hesabı uyarıcı vaka olarak kullanılmış; hesabı bir hafta boyunca inceleyen on kadın üniversite öğrencisiyle yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler yapılmış, veriler dönüşlü tematik analizle çözümlenmiştir. Bulgular alımlamanın ağırlıklı olarak müzakere yoluyla işlediğini göstermektedir. Katılımcılar kadın cinayetleriyle mücadele ve eşitlik talebini güçlü biçimde sahiplenirken feminizmin kamusal imgesine, diline ve politik görünümüne farklı düzeylerde mesafe koymaktadır. Dijital içerikler mevcut öfke ve dayanışma duygularını pekiştirmekte, farkındalığı canlı tutmaktadır. Bu yoğunluk çoğunlukla düşük eşikli katılımı kalmaktadır. Çalışmanın kavramsal önerisi politik düzeyde belirginleşmektedir: katılımcıların bir bölümü meselenin politik niteliğini kabul ederken hareketin partizan algılanmasından rahatsızlık duymakta, çalışma bu gerilimi partizan görünüm paradoksu olarak kavramsallaştırmaktadır. Adlandırması katılımcıya ait olan ve dört gönderge (parti temasları, eylem repertuarı, ittifak görünülüğü, kurumsal destek ilişkileri) üzerinden çalışan kavram, hiçbir parti kimliğiyle özdeş görünmeyen bir politiklık talebini tarif etmekte; kuttuplaşmış bir kamusal alanda böyle bir konunun ne ölçüde ulaşılabilir olduğunu tartışmaya açmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dijital feminizm, alımlama çalışmaları, kadın cinayetleri, feminist kimlik, Türkiye

Introduction

For a long time, the women's movement built its visibility in physical space. Marches, the monitoring of trials and networks of solidarity made claims audible. It was through these practices that naming violence as a social problem rather than a private misfortune was learned and taught. Over the past two decades that visibility has extended into digital space. Social media now serves as a public arena in which experiences of violence and harassment find a shared language and campaigns spread within hours (Munro, 2013; Mendes et al., 2018; Jouët, 2018). Visibility, however, guarantees nothing about change. The same spaces that keep anger alive can also confine participation to a like or a share (Baer, 2016; Morozov, 2011), and how far wide circulation seeps into everyday life remains an open question. It is here that this study's question arises: what does a digital feminist message become in the eyes of the person who encounters it?

The question carries particular weight in Türkiye. Violence against women persists while the legal ground remains contested. Law no. 6284 is in force (Law no. 6284, 2012). Türkiye's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention in 2021 (Presidential Decision, 2021) reopened the debate on protection, and the anti-equality rhetoric that rose during the process placed that debate on the same plane as anti-gender mobilisations across Europe (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017). Women's organisations took up the internet as an alternative medium at an early stage (Terkan, 2010); in the period after social media, campaigns, practices of public disclosure and networks of solidarity were reorganised in digital space (Babacan, 2014; Akan & Gürhan, 2020; Kızıl, 2021). In a polarised public sphere, the same screen sets content that makes violence visible alongside rhetoric opposed to equality.

National data show the digital side of the problem for young women in particular: over the preceding twelve months, digital violence emerged as the second most widespread form of violence after psychological violence, and the group most exposed to it, at 7.3%, was women aged 15 to 24

(TurkStat, 2025). Young women encounter both feminist content and violence itself in digital space. How a woman names what she has experienced and which source she finds trustworthy are therefore questions with a bearing beyond the screen.

A substantial strand of work on digital feminism in Türkiye has focused on the production and circulation of messages; discursive strategies, campaign forms and hashtag use have been examined closely (Çingiloğlu & Gökkaya, 2025; Alikılıç & Baş, 2019; Şener & Kotaman, 2023). Rather less attention has gone to the conditions under which such content is taken up and the points at which it meets resistance. Yet encoding alone does not determine a message's effect. The recipient decodes it from her own position, and it is in that decoding that the effect takes its final shape. This is why the study turns to the side of reception.

The research uses the Instagram account of the We Will Stop Femicides Platform (KCDP) as an elicitation case. The platform reports femicides on a regular basis, monitors court cases, and through its calls to action establishes continuity between digital visibility and struggle on the street (KCDP, n.d.-a). The field has many actors, and the selection carries no claim to representativeness. The central question is this: through which repertoires of meaning, emotions, negotiations of identity and political concerns do young undergraduate women read the digital feminist messages produced around violence against women, femicide and gender equality?

The argument developed on the basis of the findings is that reception works through negotiation: while the feminist claim is embraced, its public image, its language and its political appearance are negotiated. The most distinctive moment of that negotiation lies at the political level; some participants grant that the issue is political while remaining uneasy about the movement appearing partisan. The study conceptualises this tension as the paradox of perceived partisanship.

Framework

The research question also settles the theoretical choice. If meaning lay ready-made within the message, there would be little point in asking what digital feminist content becomes in the hands of those who encounter it. The founding premise of reception theory removes that convenience: meaning is remade at every encounter, within the recipient's social position, cultural repertoire and political instincts (Hall, 1980; Morley, 1986; Livingstone, 2004). The study follows this process along four axes: the remaking of meaning by the recipient, the affordances and risks of the setting in which this occurs, the cultural weight carried by the feminist label, and the divergence between the political and the partisan.

Encoding/Decoding and Negotiated Reception

Hall does not treat communication as a linear transfer. Media messages pass through moments of production, circulation and consumption, and meaning is rearticulated at each. A sender may lodge a preferred meaning in the message, but nothing guarantees that the recipient's reading will coincide with that intent. The gap between encoding and decoding turns the recipient into an active subject who reproduces meaning (Hall, 1980).

Hall (1980) orders this divergence through three reading positions. In the dominant-hegemonic reading the preferred meaning is largely accepted. In the oppositional reading the recipient grasps the preferred code but recodes the message within an alternative frame of reference. In the negotiated reading the general thrust of the message is adopted while its content is reinterpreted in light of local conditions and reservations. The analysis centres on the third position.

A familiar hazard of the model is that the three-fold scheme hardens into a mechanical measure that sorts participants into boxes. Morley's (1986) caution limits that hazard: social position shapes interpretation without determining the reading position on its own. Michelle (2007) draws a second

limit: a recipient's response to the ideological content of a text should not be conflated with her response to its form and mode of representation. Methodologically these two limits mean that reading positions are not fixed to persons but traced message by message and across modes of representation. The same participant may regard femicide as a wholly legitimate cause and still keep her distance from the language of the movement.

Hall's model was built with the television viewer in mind, and the position of the recipient online is a different one. The social media user sees content, selects, scrolls past, shares, stays silent, puts it back into circulation, and at times connects it to offline action. Watching, selecting, sharing and producing have become entangled practices in the digital era (Livingstone, 2004).

Digital Feminism and Affective Publics

Social media has opened up considerable room for feminist claims to circulate and for networks of solidarity to form; hashtag campaigns, trial announcements and practices of public disclosure have become staples of the digital feminist repertoire (Mendes, Ringrose & Keller, 2018, 2019; Jouët, 2018). #MeToo, and #SenDeAnlat in Türkiye, lifted experiences of harassment and violence out of the confines of individual stories (Dede Özdemir, 2015). The same spaces carry the risk of ridicule and sexist attack, and safety within them remains partial and subject to negotiation (Clark-Parsons, 2021; Baer, 2016). At one end of the debate stands the critique of slacktivism: digital participation may narrow into low-cost practices with little bearing on change (Morozov, 2011). This study takes the question posed by that critique seriously without adopting the verdict it reaches.

The key to the tension lies in emotion. For Papacharissi (2015), digital movements are also to be understood through the affective intensities they generate, and sharing, or merely following, produces soft forms of participation that bind a person to an issue. The value of the concept here is that it makes visible an effect that never converts into

transformation: keeping an issue from fading is itself a form of effect. Ahmed's (2004) notion of affective economies completes the picture: emotions circulate between objects and collectives, accruing value as they move and sticking to particular objects. As reports of femicide circulate, they carry anger, grief and solidarity along with information.

For young women in particular, the literature is instructive on two counts. Social media offers a means of acquiring feminist language (Keller, Mendes & Ringrose, 2018), while openly claiming a feminist identity can invite stigma in peer settings (Retallack, Ringrose & Lawrence, 2016). Young women therefore tend to take up feminism in selective and negotiated forms (Jackson, 2018).

Negotiating the Feminist Image

In Ahmed's (2004) account emotions stick to images as much as to causes, and the label "feminist" is itself an object on which negative feeling has accumulated. Banet-Weiser's (2018) concept of popular feminism describes the public economy of that accumulation: once visibility becomes a value in its own right, the forms of feminism that travel most easily and provoke least conflict come to the fore, while contentious claims that touch on structural inequality and male violence may be left at the margins of visibility. This economy shapes how appeals to inclusiveness and non-divisiveness are to be read: the wish to maximise reach can feed a tendency to withdraw politically contentious elements (Gill, 2016; Savolainen, Uitermark & Boy, 2022).

The postfeminist literature adds a second layer. Gill's (2007) notion of a postfeminist sensibility describes a setting in which feminism is visible yet reinterpreted through the language of individual choice and the market. For McRobbie (2009), postfeminist culture acknowledges feminism and, through that very act of acknowledgement, casts it as something already behind us. Scharff's (2012) interviews document how often young women in this climate reach for the formula "I'm not a feminist, but I believe in equal rights."

The pattern traced in this study intersects with that formula and then departs from it. The position

the formula presupposes rests on rejecting the label. What is at issue here is an intermediate position in which the demand for equality is preserved while distance is kept from its public representation. Muñoz's (1999) concept of disidentification names such a position: without wholly embracing or refusing the dominant narrative, the subject reworks the available form of representation from within. For naming the stigma the label carries, Ahmed's (2021) figure of the feminist killjoy is productive: the figure who problematises inequalities taken as ordinary and who, for that reason, spoils the mood. These concepts were produced in Western contexts, and as Dosekun (2015) warns, it is a mistake either to transport them free of context or to treat them as exclusively Western.

The Political and the Appearance of Partisanship

The fourth axis takes up how acceptance of an issue's political character and avoidance of a partisan appearance can sit together within a single account.

Social movements do not simply voice their claims; they frame them so as to be intelligible to different constituencies. A frame's effect depends as much on how far it resonates with the experiences and values of its audiences as on how it defines the problem (Benford & Snow, 2000). Extending a frame to wider constituencies may increase reach, but the same move risks eroding the specificity of the claim. The tension becomes sharper still in movements' relations with political parties. Heaney and Rojas (2015) show that where movement identity and partisan identity overlap, partisan attachment becomes a powerful determinant of participation. The mechanism observed in processes of participation raises a question for reception: may a movement's identification with a particular political camp lead, for those at a distance from that camp, to partisan signals coming into play ahead of the content of the message? Where this operates, how a movement is read is shaped not only by its actual ties to parties but by the symbols it uses, its repertoire of action and the alliances it forms.

In Türkiye this tension has been debated on two levels. The first is organisational autonomy: the feminist movement's search from the 1980s onward for a space independent of the state and of political parties acquired new tensions after the 1990s with institutionalisation and project-based ways of working (Coşar & Gençoğlu Onbaşı, 2008; Diner & Toktaş, 2010). While the transformation increased women's organisations' access to policy processes, it drew criticism for rendering the movement's political content technical (Bora & Günel, 2002; Suğur et al., 2022).

The second level is the question of whom the movement belongs to, and it has remained historically open. Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish women's organisations articulated women's claims in the same period, in different idioms and at times from opposing positions (Diner & Toktaş, 2010). As Sancar (2011) notes, at the centre of the debates of the 1990s stood the question of whether the movement should also be open to organisations that mobilise women in the service of national, religious or communal ends. The same work records a further observation: violence against women has been the field in which organisations from different traditions have in practice been able to come together. The expectation that the issue can be owned across a wide spectrum thus has a historical basis. That convergence, however, has occurred not as a durable ground but as an alignment contingent on political conditions.

Taken together, these two levels call for an analytic distinction between being political and appearing partisan. Accepting that an issue is political does not mean accepting that it be presented in a form identified with a particular political bloc, nor is a demand to avoid partisan appearance necessarily an avoidance of politics. In Eliasoph's (1998) study, the pushing of political matters into the background of public talk is bound up with rules of conversation produced in everyday interaction. The tension examined here has less to do with whether an issue is spoken about than with the public signs through which it is represented. To hold on to this distinction, the study names the phenomenon not depoliticisation but the paradox

of perceived partisanship: the demand to move away from signs that may be read as partisan, made in the name of greater inclusiveness, may also narrow the language that renders the political and structural causes of violence visible.

The paradox of perceived partisanship is proposed here, and it has no established use in the literature. Its relation to neighbouring concepts can be set out as follows. Benford and Snow's (2000) discussion of frame extension supplies the tension between a claim reaching wide constituencies and keeping its specificity, and the paradox can be read as the counterpart of that tension on the reception side. Heaney and Rojas (2015) examine the overlap of movement identity and partisan identity in terms of participation, while the question here concerns the effect of the same overlap on the side that receives the message. What sets the concept apart, and what separates it from the avoidance described above, is that acceptance of an issue's political character and the wish to move away from a partisan appearance are found together within a single account.

Method

Research Design and Case Selection

This is a qualitative study of how young undergraduate women make sense of the digital feminist messages they encounter around the Instagram account of the We Will Stop Femicides Platform (KCDP). The case was selected purposively as an information-rich example (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The field holds many actors and the selection carries no claim to representativeness.

What recommends KCDP for this question is the breadth of its repertoire. Since 2010 the platform has reported femicides on a regular basis, monitored court cases, and used its calls to action to connect digital visibility with struggle on the street (KCDP, n.d.-a). A single account thus brings all four axes of the study into view: data and news posts touch the level of meaning, reports of killings and trials the level of emotion, the language used about feminist identity the level of identity, and

calls to action and institutional contacts the political level.

Public recognisability weighed in the same direction. Because participants already knew of the platform, the interviews could be spent on how its content was read rather than on first impressions of an unfamiliar account.

The case functions here as an elicitation device, and the aim is to see what an encounter with a recognisable feminist actor brings to the surface about young women's understandings of the wider feminist public sphere.

The study does not set out to classify the platform's posts. It is built as a reception study that follows how such content is made sense of within young women's experience, emotions, identities and political positions. Following Michelle's (2007) caution that reception cannot be confined to the level of textual meaning, the interviews were opened out to include identity, emotion and everyday experience.

Participants

Ten young undergraduate women took part. They were recruited through purposive and snowball sampling from among university students who use social media, were willing to examine the KCDP account, and were prepared to take part in an interview on femicide, violence against women, feminism and digital activism. Prior familiarity with feminism, or any particular stance towards it, was not among the criteria for inclusion.

Participants' relationship with feminism was not measured beforehand. Putting an assessment of a participant's feminist position to her before the week of following would have turned that week into a test, and the study set out to follow the relationship formed without such an expectation. The relationship with the label was therefore read from the interview accounts and is reported in the final column of Table 1.

The rationale for the sample size is epistemological. Reflexive thematic analysis assesses adequacy not through mechanical saturation but through the focus of the research question, the

specificity of the sample and the analytic depth of the interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2019, 2021; Malterud et al., 2016). On these criteria, participants' direct engagement with the digital practices at issue and their capacity to articulate their interpretations in detail give the dataset sufficient information power.

To reduce the risk of re-identification, participants are coded P1–P10; institutional and city information is not specified, ages are given as ranges, and fields of study are grouped. Personal and institutional details in the quotations have been generalised in square brackets. All participants endorse the principle that women and men are equal in rights, before the law and in opportunity. They were not asked how familiar they were with KCDP beforehand, and P1's account makes clear that she had followed the platform before the study.

Table 1. Socio-demographic Characteristics of Participants

Participant	Field of study	Year	Age range	Relation to the feminist label
P1	Media and communication	4	21–23	Direct
P2	Language and literature	4	21–23	Negotiated
P3	Media and communication	4	21–23	Negotiated
P4	Language and literature	4	24–25	Direct
P5	Education and development	3	21–23	Negotiated
P6	Language and literature	4	24–25	Direct
P7	Social sciences	3	21–23	Negotiated
P8	Media and communication	4	24–25	Negotiated
P9	Language and translation	4	21–23	Direct
P10	Computing and technology	3	21–23	Direct

Note. The final column reflects how participants relate to the public meaning of the label, not whether they adopt it.

Data Collection

Once the ethics committee had issued its decision, participants were contacted on 30 June 2026. Those who agreed to take part were asked to follow KCDP's Instagram account for roughly a week (30 June – 6 July 2026), so that each could speak from the content that caught her own attention.

Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews held between 7 and 10 July 2026. Because participants and researchers were in different cities, the interviews took place online; they lasted 55 minutes on average and were transcribed verbatim.

The interview guide was derived from the research question. Questions addressed how participants assessed KCDP's posts, what emotions the content aroused and whether those emotions translated into action, how they related to feminist identity, how they viewed the movement's public image, and what criteria they applied when deciding whom to follow and trust online. The guide framed the field without determining what the themes would contain: the category of partisan appearance surfaced in a participant's own wording, in answer to a question about criteria of trust.

Interviews were conducted in Turkish. The quotations presented below were translated by the researchers, and the translations were checked against the originals by a second reader.

Data Analysis

The analysis followed reflexive thematic analysis, moving through familiarisation with the data, initial coding, the development and review of candidate themes, and their reinterpretation during writing (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2019). Coding was largely latent: alongside the manifest content of what participants said, the assumptions and evaluative criteria underlying their statements were brought into the analysis. The work proceeded abductively, moving back and forth between theoretical sensitivities and the accounts from the field.

The researchers engaged with the transcripts separately and then brought their interpretations into dialogue. Differences between the two readings were used to elaborate codes and refine the thematic interpretation rather than to establish agreement between coders; readings from different positions are treated as a resource that deepens the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2019). No software was used. Three main themes emerged, unevenly distributed across the sample; the introduction to each states in whose accounts it is most clearly traceable.

Table 2. Theoretical Axes, Themes and Sub-patterns

Axis	Theme	Sub-pattern	Referents
1. The remaking of meaning by the recipient (Hall; Morley; Michelle)	No theme of its own; a lens across all three themes	Acceptance, reservation and reinterpretation operating together within a single account	Whole sample
2. The affordances of the digital setting and affective publics (Papacharissi; Ahmed)	Emotional intensity and limited activism	Anger constructed as a political emotion to be sustained	P1, P3, P9
		Fear translated into an everyday practice of safety	P5
		Low-threshold participation Risk perception that prevents the move to the street	P2, P4, P10 P1, P8, P10
3. The cultural weight of the feminist label (Banet-Weiser; Gill; McRobbie; Muñoz)	Claiming the cause, negotiating the public image	The label kept and its content filled in	P4, P9, P10
		Self-scrutiny over living up to the label Distance between the label and its public image	P2 P3, P5, P8
		The "labelled" and the "real" feminist The cost of stigma in peer settings	P7 P10
4. The divergence between the political and the partisan (Benford & Snow; Heaney & Rojas; Eliasoph)	The paradox of perceived partisanship	Contacts at party level	P3
		The repertoire of action read as propaganda	P7
		The visibility of alliances Relations of institutional support	P9, P3 P3

The four axes set out in the theoretical framework entered the analysis as initial sensitivities. They determined which areas the interview guide would cover and gave the coding a sense of which statements were worth analytic attention. The first axis, the remaking of meaning by the recipient, worked as a lens across all three themes and produced no theme of its own. The second axis corresponds to the theme of emotional intensity, the third to the negotiation of the feminist image, and the fourth to perceived partisanship.

The relation between the fourth axis and its theme needs setting out, since the axis was defined before the analysis began. It was drawn from work on the overlap of movement identity and partisan identity and its effect on participation (Heaney & Rojas, 2015), and whether that mechanism had a counterpart on the reception side was left open. The name of the category came from the field: answering a question about criteria for following and trusting platforms, P3 used the word "partisanship" unprompted. The theme was developed by following that statement, and the category was widened when the same concern appeared in other accounts through different referents. Theoretical sensitivity settled where to look; the name and content of the category came from the data. Table 2 sets out the relations between axes, themes and sub-patterns.

Researcher Positionality and Reflexivity

Reflexive thematic analysis treats the researcher's interpretive position as constitutive of the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2019). Both researchers are women; one works in academic research, the other in social work practice, and both support gender equality while locating themselves at different points within feminist thought. The researcher who conducted the interviews belongs to the same generation as the participants. Neither has any organisational tie to KCDP.

Generational proximity may have made for an easier conversational footing, but it may equally have allowed shared experience to pass unexamined. Closeness to the issue carries the risk of

coding participants' distance from the public image of feminism as a shortcoming; against this, their statements were opened up without judgement, and accounts of distance were read as negotiation rather than repudiation.

Ethical Considerations

The study was reviewed at the meeting of the Üsküdar University Non-Interventional Research Ethics Committee held on 29 June 2026 (No. 06), and approval was granted by decision no. JUNE 2026-04 (ref. 61351342-2258). Participants were informed of the aim of the study and told that participation was voluntary and could be ended at any point. Recorded verbal consent was obtained: circulating written consent forms online would have meant accumulating identifying information in the research file, and given the sensitivity of the subject this route was chosen instead, with the approval of the ethics committee. Recordings were used for research purposes only and identifying information was anonymised. Because the subject touches on emotionally demanding ground, participants were told they need not answer any question they found uncomfortable. No systematic information about support and referral was offered at the end of the interviews, however; in interviews of this kind, planning a post-interview support protocol in advance would be the sounder course.

Limitations

The study was conducted around a single digital case and with a relatively homogeneous group: all participants are in their third or fourth year, and a substantial number study in fields concerned with media, language and representation. Combined with the tendency of snowball sampling to accumulate similar sensibilities, this concentration may have brought to the fore an interpretive repertoire attuned to questions of representation. That the readings cluster in a negotiated position may therefore owe something to the design itself, since working with a group closed to feminist messages from the outset would have been expected to

make oppositional readings more visible. Hall's scheme accordingly worked as a lens for bringing out the levels at which negotiation proceeds.

A week of following does not reproduce the incidental encounters of an ordinary feed, and it may have produced a more reflexive reception than usual. Since no record was kept of which posts participants came across, the findings cannot be attributed to the effect of particular content. Keeping no record was a deliberate choice; unguided browsing allowed participants to speak from their own patterns of attention.

Prior familiarity was not asked about systematically either. P1's own account makes clear that she had followed the platform before the study; for the others no such information exists. The effect on the theme of perceived partisanship appears limited: of the four accounts carrying it, three are those of P3, P7 and P9, while P1 enters it once, with a proposal in which she notices her own contradiction. Emotional intensity is another matter. Someone who had followed the account before may not respond as someone meeting it for the first time does, and the material cannot separate the two. The findings should be read here as a composite of a week's experience and participants' older digital experience. They are open not to statistical generalisation but to theoretical-analytic transfer (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Findings

This section presents three main themes. They stand at different distances from the case: the first consists of the more general accounts of feminism that the account prompted, while the second and third take in both KCDP's posts and the wider feminist public sphere.

How the reading positions operate within the material completes this picture. In none of the interviews was there a reading that recoded the core feminist frame built around the struggle against femicide and gender equality within an opposing frame of reference. In some accounts that frame is taken up almost without reservation, while the

same participants meet particular political contacts, repertoires of action and forms of alliance with reservation. Negotiated reading does not appear here as a fixed midpoint between a dominant and an oppositional pole. It works as a contradictory form of decoding in which acceptance, reservation and reinterpretation of different components of the message operate together within a single account. How this picture relates to the design of the sample was addressed in the method section. The study makes no claim about how widespread negotiated reception is, but analyses how negotiation works.

Claiming the Cause, Negotiating the Public Image

The theme runs across the whole sample and unfolds in most detail in the accounts of P2, P3, P7, P9 and P10.

Participants' relationship with feminism shows a firm sense of ownership: in none of the interviews was there any repudiation of femicide, violence or inequality as issues. Negotiation begins elsewhere: in what language, with what identity and through what public image is the cause represented?

P9 casts feminism in its plainest form as a demand for equality and defends that definition against the everyday disparagement aimed at the label:

"Feminism is something everybody should have because at its most basic it's equality. Nobody is above anybody else. Those men on social media going 'ugh, are you a feminist or what, feminazi' — I find that ridiculous... Even if we're not the same physically, in the way we're made, I believe we're equal before rights, law and justice." (P9)

The label is preserved here, and more than that, it is defended against the discourse that belittles it. P4 casts the same ownership as a matter of feeling:

"Because of the patriarchal order that's been set up in the country we're born into, I think there's a feminism that comes from inside all of us from a very young age... I don't think of it only as a way of

thinking. It's a feeling as well. I want to exist as a woman, as myself, in this world." (P4)

P10 ties feminism to a search for "a more equal, fairer society" that takes in children and older people as well. In all three accounts the label is preserved while its content is filled in with each participant's own emphasis.

The relationship with the public meaning of the label, however, comes in degrees. The first degree is self-scrutiny. P2 calls herself a feminist and frames that naming through a question of adequacy: she finds feminism "a very fine ideology" but is unsure whether she lives up to it. Being a feminist becomes a standard that requires her to ask whether she lives accordingly.

The second degree is the distance that opens between the label and its public image. P3 claims the demand for equality and rights yet still finds it hard to say "I am a feminist":

"Somehow, what any random person on the street understands when you say you're a feminist and what the feminist movement is are slightly different things, so I can't say I'm a feminist in that sense, but if we're talking about being equal before the law, about living equally... at the most basic level I'd say I'm part of that." (P3)

What is refused is something other than feminism's demand for equality: the meaning the label has acquired in public circulation. The distance is directed at representation. P8 establishes the same distance in more guarded terms. She notes that feminism "varies from person to person" and that "a lot of perception is being manufactured" around the concept, and while defining it as equality grounded in rights and freedoms, she does not call herself a feminist. P5 occupies a similar position, claiming the definition of feminism without using the label for herself.

At the third degree the distinction acquires an explicit name. P7 sets herself apart from the "feminist as labelled on social media or in one's circle":

"Feminism is misunderstood by our society... I don't see myself as the concept of the feminist that's labelled on social media or in your circle, but I define myself as a real feminist. For me feminism

is women being able to act as freely as men when it comes to rights and freedoms." (P7)

Two feminisms are set against each other: the "labelled" one carries the negative meanings society attaches to it, the "real" one is a rights-based demand for equality. P7 claims feminism by redefining it.

Participants themselves point to the social source of the pattern. P10 describes the cost the label carries in everyday relations:

"Sometimes girls in mixed groups are even reluctant to say they're feminists in front of the men... For men, being a feminist is something to look down on. And the girl thinks, if I take on this label I won't be chosen, I'll be looked down on." (P10)

In this account, moving away from the label ceases to be a private difference of opinion and becomes a positioning with relational and social costs. Participants firmly claim the demand for equality while keeping their distance from the public image that carries it, and the cost of the image is what grounds that distance.

Emotional Intensity and Limited Activism: "Keeping the Anger Alive"

Emotional intensity is evident across the whole sample, and the construction of anger as a political emotion that must be sustained is clearest in P1, P3 and P9. Limited activism can be traced in all participants.

News of violence, harassment and injustice produces an intensity in which anger, sadness, hopelessness, fear, hope and solidarity are mixed. P5 describes that intensity along the axis of fear and ties it to an everyday practice of safety:

"Mostly there's fear in me. It could happen to me too, that feeling of being on edge all the time. There was even a period when I carried pepper spray and so on with me... My anger is actually mixed with disappointment as well. Sometimes it comes from thinking, is nothing ever going to get better." (P5)

The repertoire of emotion is not confined to anger; fear and disappointment are part of the same intensity. The connection the participant draws suggests that fear she associates with repeated

exposure to such content can be translated into everyday precautions.

For the most part these emotions reinforce an existing sensibility. P1 puts the pattern most plainly:

"I mean, rather than changing my behaviour, I'd say it keeps my anger alive... I think I already carry that awareness. The more I see the posts, the angrier I get and it pushes me towards thinking 'we have to stop this'. I think if this anger is channelled in the right direction, physical actions on the street could be stronger." (P1)

Anger ceases to be a passing reaction and is constructed as a political emotion that must be sustained. The final sentence adds that the anger needs "channelling in the right direction": intensity remains a potential awaiting conversion.

P3 describes the same function in sharper terms:

"I filled up with a bit more hatred and I think that's a success... I hated a bit more and that's good, because after a while it comes down to keeping your anger alive. I think it helps to keep it alive." (P3)

The phrase "that's a success" defines the effect at the affective level; behavioural change is not invoked as a criterion. What the content does is keep the political discomfort she already holds from fading. Her choice of the word "hatred" is an emic naming, recorded here without treating the sustaining of anger and the settling in of a language of hatred as the same process.

Participants themselves draw the distinction between changing minds and bringing people together. P4 sets an explicit limit on the transformative power of digital content:

"I've never witnessed someone with a set opinion changing their mind. Mostly I've witnessed people who already hold feminist views, who care about women's rights, coming together at points like these. I can't really say it changes minds, but I can say it brings people together." (P4)

The effect nonetheless does not stop at emotional reinforcement. P6 says the content does not change her opinion but adds to it: "The algorithm already serves me the things I'm interested in... It

adds to my opinion, it gives me a new perspective." P9 says the content has sharpened her own eye and that she has begun to notice the everyday sexism of the men around her. For most participants digital feminist content reinforces an existing sensibility, and for some it is associated with limited shifts at the level of knowledge and perceptual awareness.

Organised and sustained activism does not accompany this intensity to the same degree. P2 says she is "generally just in the position of an onlooker". P4 says she does not comment and confines herself to stories and reposting. P10 signs petitions and complains that she cannot see the results, saying "I don't know if anything is changing". The pattern is clear: posting stories, reposting content, signing petitions, talking within one's immediate circle. These practices are far from passivity, nor can they be equated with organised and sustained collective action.

Participants frequently regard street activism as more effective. P3 puts this most sharply: "You don't become an activist with a keyboard, rights are claimed in the street... The reason social media activism exists is that things fall short in the field, that it's silenced, so one completes the other." P7 sets up a division of labour between the two: "At the first stage, to make people grasp how serious the matter is, I'd say the street. But to make it sustainable, social media."

What prevents the move to the street is mostly a perception of risk. P1 attributes this to the issue being one people in Türkiye are "made afraid of". P8 explains her distance through warnings from her family:

"I don't go to many, I go to the ones I really want to go to... There's [someone who worked in public security] in my family. He always tried to stop us joining that sort of thing. Don't do it, don't go, it isn't safe... Unfortunately not much that's positive comes from the other side towards the protesters either. There's mistrust on both sides." (P8)

P10 says she does not take part in actions off campus out of safety concerns. In the accounts of P1, P8 and P10 the street matters, while concerns about safety, fear of provocation and the prospect

of being judged make staying in digital space the preferred option.

The Paradox of Perceived Partisanship: Keeping the Political While Avoiding Partisanship

This theme does not extend across the whole sample. It is clearly traceable in the accounts of P1, P3, P7 and P9. These participants accept that femicide is political in character while feeling uneasy about the movement being identified with a particular party, ideological camp or contentious identity. The partisan coding of its public expression is seen as an obstacle to reaching wider constituencies.

The category was not proposed by the researchers. Answering a question about criteria for following and trusting platforms, P3 uses the word "partisanship" unprompted and ties the criterion to a decision about whether to follow:

"The organisations it gets support from, in terms of sponsorship, that matters to me... If an organisation I want to follow doesn't use a shared language when it comes to gender, then I pull back. And I think the same about their actions. When I think organisations are being provoked, in a party-related, partisanship sense especially. I'd say I keep away from those organisations." (P3)

The account matters in two respects. The word belongs to the participant. And the signal works as a filter applied in deciding whether an organisation is to be followed, not as a criticism that follows an assessment of content; the participant states the outcome of applying it as well. In the same answer, accuracy of information and the use of a shared language are cited as separate criteria; a partisan appearance is only one of them.

The category works through four referents in the material. The first is contacts at party level (P3), the second the coding of the repertoire of action as "political propaganda" (P7), the third the movement appearing alongside other social claims (P9, P3), and the fourth relations of institutional support (P3). All four serve the same function: each is read as a signal that narrows the claim that the issue belongs to everyone down to a particular political identity.

P3 elaborates her unease through KCDP's visit to a party leader:

"Then you look and there's a visit to [a party leader]. But this isn't his issue, it isn't only his issue. So are we visiting every party now, or none of them? None. Because this is a political matter, but what will win this matter isn't going to extremes... When you deliberately go against the larger section of society, you end up not seeing them either. There are so many people in that crowd who go through this. Who don't even know, who can't even go to the police..." (P3)

By saying "this is a political matter", the participant grants its political character, and she does not see the solution in contact with a party. The ground for her distance is not that the movement should be weakened. P3 defends that distance in order to include the women who "can't even go to the police".

P9 voices the same tension through the criticism of "looking like the movement of a single party":

"Posts in a shared language, without dividing people, would have a more positive effect. Everything is political, but this feminism and the feminist movement look as though they're the movement of a single party. I'd want it to come out of that identity too. Because plenty happens in the most conservative and the most secular family alike... because this has to do with basic humanity. The right to life is a basic right, that's all it is." (P9)

"Everything is political"; the political dimension is not refused. What overshadows the "basic humanity" of the issue is the movement appearing to belong to a single party. The emphasis on "the most conservative and the most secular family alike" shows that the desire for inclusiveness is fed by a concern to reach women across different sections of society.

In P7 the tension takes the form of a criticism that actions stray from their purpose: "You go there for femicide. Then political propaganda starts... I think it damages the purpose, and that for reasons like this they drive people away from platforms of this kind." In her mind there is a line between the political and the partisan.

P1 turns the paradox into a proposal, and sees her own contradiction in doing so:

"Yes, I think there's an obstacle in front of them politically too, but if it can't be done with the government, some kind of partnership could be formed with the opposition side... Fine, maybe this contradicts the business of parties' women's branches, what I've just said contradicts itself for instance, but I think for a more realistic step to be taken, contact has to be made at some point with those political connections as well." (P1)

The admission "what I've just said contradicts itself" raises the analytic value of the account: the participant does not observe the tension from outside but lives it. Nor can the pattern be reduced to simple inconsistency. Participants sense that femicide is bound up with legal and institutional mechanisms, and they also think the issue should not appear too partisan if it is to reach wider constituencies. The paradox is the collision of these two intuitions.

Another face of the concern has to do with whom the movement is open to. P4 points to divisions within the movement:

"Some people who think they're feminists have very different attitudes towards women who wear headscarves, for instance. Then I don't think that's a feminist movement... Our views may differ, we may not like each other, but if our cause is the same we should stand behind each other." (P4)

The account does not name a partisan appearance directly. It sets inclusiveness up as a criterion and says that where it goes unmet the movement fails to meet its own definition. P9's emphasis on "the most conservative and the most secular family alike" voices the same criterion from a different starting point. What the two share is the expectation that the issue not be attached to a particular experience of womanhood.

The most delicate extension of the tension arises over the movement appearing alongside other social claims, and the LGBTI+ movement in particular. The subtheme appears in two participants' accounts. In a sample of ten, two accounts carry no claim about a tendency, and the reason for recording them is that they show how the concern

operates at the level of alliances through two different lines of reasoning.

P9 builds a contradictory account:

"I'm absolutely not homophobic, but — there's always a but. Of course, those people want to be extra visible too, because they're suppressed every day in society... Instead of femicide the subject gets pulled elsewhere, because unfortunately that's how the language of the news works in the local media... Of course, I'm not saying their right to life, their freedom, is any less, but if it were all discussed in a calmer, more shared language..." (P9)

Reading the account as a straightforward exclusion falls short; the participant explicitly grants that LGBTI+ people are suppressed and that they have a right to life. Elsewhere the same participant speaks of the feminist movement being presented "as though it were only LGBTQ people's business" and says this makes people hold back. At the centre of the concern lies a perception about who owns the issue.

P3 arrives at the same conclusion by a different line of reasoning. She accepts that the claims are intertwined and defends separation on strategic grounds:

"When we march for the 8th of March, let's not go and chant LGBTQ slogans, say, or anything provocative... Let's separate them a bit — yes, I'm aware they're all intertwined and I agree with that too. But something falls short at this point precisely because they're all tangled together; someone who's come for women's rights thinks the other side is dominant, say, or someone who's come for the other side says 'there's a provocation here, something's going to happen to me as well'... In terms of appearance, that is, because I already know every woman has internalised this at the level of the issue." (P3)

The account does not reject the interconnect-edness of the claims. The objection is that claims appearing together in the same action give each side the impression that the other is dominant. The participant also names her own distinction: internalisation occurs at the level of the issue, while the problem arises "in terms of appearance". The two accounts meet at a common point and rest on two

different grounds: for P9 the problem is the movement being presented as one group's concern, for P3 it is the mistrust that claims appearing together produce. In both cases the desire to reach a wide public can turn into a tendency to limit, at the level of visibility, alliances seen as costly.

The paradox also has a projection onto KCDP specifically. P3 views the platform's starting point positively but says certain posts have affected the movement negatively in her eyes: "Normally I'd think this is a fine movement, but when I look at its posts there's a visit to a party leader, there are certain statements... These didn't seem right to me." P7's positive assessment is the other face of the same criterion: she finds the content "directed at the purpose" and "not straying from the target". Appreciation and criticism thus emerge as the same criterion applied to the platform from two different angles.

The same criterion also shapes what participants praise. P9's assessment of the platform's posts — "It's obvious what's being asked for, it isn't divisive, it embraces everyone" — reflects the ideal she constructs within the paradox: clarity, reach and the avoidance of division. Participants' assessments of KCDP thus remain within the terms of the tension traced throughout this theme, and their accounts continually spill over from the platform itself into wider debates about the feminist public sphere.

Discussion

The answer to the research question is this: in the hands of young undergraduate women, the digital feminist message turns into negotiation. Participants firmly embrace the struggle against femicide and the demand for equality while keeping their distance, at various levels, from the public image, the language and the political appearance of feminism. The discussion takes up this finding at three levels.

Beyond the Postfeminist Formula

Moving away from images of feminism as "man-hating", "extreme" or "misunderstood" cannot be equated with moving away from the demand for equality. Most participants are trying to redefine the public form of feminism precisely in order to protect that demand.

The pattern intersects with the classic formula of the postfeminist literature and then parts from it. Gill (2007), McRobbie (2009) and Scharff (2012) have documented how widespread distance from the feminist label is in contemporary gender culture. The formula "I'm not a feminist, but..." is too narrow for this material, and the position that emerges comes closer to "I claim the demand, but I keep my distance from its public representation." The distinction matters: in the first the label is refused, in the second it is claimed and redefined. P7's distinction between the "labelled" and the "real" feminist corresponds to the movement of re-working from within that Muñoz's (1999) concept of disidentification describes.

The literature has also shown that taking on a feminist identity carries the risk of stigma in peer settings (Retallack et al., 2016; Jackson, 2018), and P10's account confirms this: the label is coded alongside the risk of "not being chosen". What this study adds is a different axis of negotiation. At its centre lies not peer stigma at school but the concern about appearing partisan in a polarised public sphere. Ahmed's (2021) figure of the feminist killjoy names that climate, and participants' distance from the image can be read as an effort to manage its cost.

How stigma enters the negotiation is worth setting out. In P10's account the cost is relational and attaches directly to the label, and the strategy formed against it is to leave the label unused. In the concern about partisan appearance the cost attaches to the movement and its public representation, and the strategy addresses the form that representation takes. The two levels do not exclude one another and can operate together in the same participant; P10 holds back from the label while claiming the movement's demand.

The Level at Which Effect Is Measured

The phrase "keeping the anger alive" is the key to how this works: rather than persuading participants of something new, digital content sustains a sensibility they already hold and binds them emotionally to the issue. The finding coincides with Papacharissi's (2015) notion of affective publics.

The repertoire of emotion does not stop at anger. P5 describes the same intensity through fear and links a period of carrying pepper spray to the reports of violence she met on social media. The link is one the participant draws herself, and it carries no causal weight. What the account shows is that the affective work of digital content does not end at the screen. This is the point at which Ahmed's (2004) affective economies bear on conduct rather than on feeling alone: what moves between images and bodies settles into where a woman goes and what she carries with her. Fear becoming an object in a bag is the most concrete form that takes here.

Disappointment surfaces in the same account and attaches elsewhere. P5 describes the feeling mixed into her anger through the question of whether anything will ever get better, and P10, who signs petitions, says she does not know whether anything is changing. In both, the source of the feeling is the absence of a visible result.

The theoretical contribution lies in shifting the level at which effect is measured. The critique of slacktivism rightly draws attention to the risk that low-cost participation substitutes for action (Morozov, 2011). This study's participants, however, define effect at the affective level. In P3's assessment that she "hated a bit more and that's good", the platform's success is measured by its keeping her political discomfort from fading. The participant sets her own criterion of effectiveness, and that criterion diverges from an action-centred one. Sustaining anger and settling into a language of hatred are not the same process, and the second warrants examination in its own right. Comparable interview-based studies also point to an ambivalent form of reception (Caldeira et al., 2025). Rather

than treating digital feminist spaces as echo chambers, this research aligns with readings that see them as spaces where consensus and contradiction coexist (Bouvier, 2022).

Explaining limited activism by indifference runs against the material. Participants regard street action as more effective, while concerns about safety, fear of provocation and warnings from family constrain the move to physical action. Social media thus ceases to be an alternative to the street and becomes an intermediate space for a subject who sustains her sensibility but cannot enter public space. This unease has an institutional basis: studies of the feminist movement's relationship with the state in Türkiye show that organisations once treated as partners in reform were marginalised in later years and that anti-gender rhetoric gained ground (Altan-Olcay & Alnıaçık, 2025). Studies of young people's experience of digital activism show the counterpart of the same climate at the level of the medium: while these spaces produce solidarity across boundaries, they also provoke anti-feminist rhetoric and misogyny (Gedik, 2020). Participants' unease can therefore be read in relation to a climate in which the perceived cost of feminist visibility has risen.

Being Political Without Appearing Partisan

The third level is the study's most distinctive conceptual proposal. What is sought is a political stance that does not appear identical with any party identity.

The concept rests on firm empirical ground in two respects. The naming belongs to a participant: P3 uses the word "partisanship" unprompted, in answer to a question about criteria of trust. The category also rests on more than a single signal, working through the four referents set out in the findings. That P3 states in the same answer that she withdraws from following an organisation shows where the signal comes into play: a partisan appearance operates as a filter applied before the content is assessed. The question left open in the theoretical framework finds an answer in this account.

One objection bears directly on that ground. Since no record was kept of the posts participants saw, the concern might have grown out of a single encounter, a post about contact at party level for instance. Were that so, the pattern would be expected to remain within one account. It is voiced instead through four referents and by different participants (Table 2): P7 grounds her criticism in the general course of the actions she has attended, and P9 speaks of the movement's public image. This spread makes it difficult to tie the pattern to any single encounter.

Where the pattern stands in relation to its conceptual neighbours was set out in the theoretical framework, and the material bears that placement out. That P1 in the same breath proposes contact with political channels and says "what I've just said contradicts itself" indicates not avoidance but a tension. Participants themselves also draw the distinction. P3 states that internalisation takes place at the level of the issue and that the problem arises "in terms of appearance", and Michelle's (2007) proposed distinction between content and representation finds an emic counterpart in that phrase.

The analytic value of the paradox lies in showing how a feminist message is received in a polarised political climate. The demand has an intelligible logic of extension and a historical basis: violence against women has been the field in which women's organisations from different political traditions have in practice been able to come together (Sancar, 2011). Participants' sense that the issue should belong to everyone comes from the movement's own past.

The same demand also carries a structural risk. If femicide is bound up with legal and institutional protection, with the implementation of Law no. 6284 and with the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, then framing the problem as too far "outside politics", as a matter of common humanity, may render invisible the mechanisms that produce it. A second risk concerns the attainability of the position the demand points to. The coming together of organisations from different traditions has been an alignment contingent on political conditions rather than a durable ground, and KADEM's

retreat from its defence of the Istanbul Convention during that process is a recent instance (Kütük-Kuriş, 2022). In participants' accounts, meanwhile, positions close to the government and positions distant from it are alike read as partisan signals. No ground of the kind participants are looking for — one associated with no political position at all — appears in this picture. The position being sought is itself contingent on political circumstance.

The tension finds its theoretical counterpart in Banet-Weiser's (2018) discussion of the economy of visibility. Participants' call for a plainer, less divisive feminist language can be read as a local manifestation of that economy: on one side it helps the message travel, on the other it may lead to the withdrawal of claims that are contentious yet structurally necessary. Studies showing that visibility is unevenly distributed and that accommodating feminist positions come to the fore suggest that this selective circulation is a structural feature (Savolainen et al., 2022; Wang & Chang, 2023).

The most delicate extension of the paradox is the reservation about appearing alongside the LGBTI+ movement. Two accounts arrive at the same conclusion by different routes: for P9 the problem lies in the deterrent effect of the movement appearing to be one group's concern, for P3 in the mistrust that claims appearing together in the same action produce on both sides. Reducing this distance to personal prejudice is therefore inadequate. This does not remove the potentially exclusionary consequences of the position; it locates the reasoning through which that exclusion is made intelligible. The withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention took place in a context where objections to gender and to LGBTI+ rights featured prominently in public debate, and that climate has been linked to anti-gender mobilisations across Europe (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017). A descriptive study has also reported an increase in suspicious female deaths over the period surrounding the withdrawal, which points to the need to examine the possible material consequences of this changing policy environment (Önal & Marangoz, 2024). Some studies of young people's experience of digital feminism have suggested that an inclusive

feminism encompassing LGBTI+ claims is the dominant tendency among the younger generation (Peña-Fernández et al., 2023); the two accounts here run the other way, and the divergence suggests that the discourse of inclusiveness can be articulated in opposite directions in different political climates.

Two readings of the divergence are possible. One is contextual: which claims the discourse of inclusiveness opens onto may shift with the cost those claims carry in public debate, and the climate described above may have raised that cost. The other concerns generation, since the study by Peña-Fernández and colleagues was carried out in a different political climate. The material here tests neither, and the reason for recording it is that it is the only evidence of how the concern operates at the level of alliances.

Contribution and Limitations

The study offers a contribution from Türkiye to debates on digital feminism and postfeminism that have largely been produced in Western contexts. The concepts are rethought here within the weight of femicide, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention and the everyday costs of a feminist identity (Dosekun, 2015). One strand of the contribution concerns the division of labour in the literature. Work on digital feminism in Türkiye has concentrated substantially on the production side (Çingiloğlu & Gökkaya, 2025); this study approaches the same phenomenon from the side of reception and suggests that the visibility documented by production-focused studies does not necessarily entail straightforward endorsement on the reception side.

The elicitation case design aims to make the logic of a pattern legible and makes no claim about how widespread that pattern is (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The paradox of perceived partisanship rests on part of the sample, and the reservation concerning alliance with the LGBTI+ movement on two accounts. For young undergraduate women digital feminism is neither wholly transformative nor wholly without effect. It is received as a public

space that is supported, criticised, redefined and charged with function.

Conclusion

This study has examined how young undergraduate women receive digital feminist messages, taking the Instagram account of KCDP as an elicitation case. The central finding is that reception works through negotiation: participants embrace the feminist claim firmly while continually negotiating the identity, the language and the political appearance through which that claim is to become public.

The study's contributions gather in two findings that rest directly on participants' accounts. The first is the internal structure of negotiated reception: the divergence between the feminist claim and the feminist image takes the relationship with feminism out of the binary of "I am a feminist / I am not a feminist". The second is the paradox of perceived partisanship, which names the counterpart of that divergence at the political level and constitutes the study's most distinctive proposal. That acceptance of an issue's political character and the wish to move away from a partisan appearance can live within the same account points to a pattern different from those approaches that describe the avoidance of politics in everyday life. The concept is named by a participant, works through four referents, and rests on part of the sample, making no claim about prevalence.

The research is built on a single case and a relatively homogeneous sample, and the findings are open to theoretical-analytic transfer.

The same limitations map out further research. How the paradox of perceived partisanship operates across different contexts of age, education and geography could be examined comparatively. The reception of a platform organised against violence could be compared with that of other feminist actors or local women's associations, so as to distinguish which aspects of negotiated reading are specific to the platform. A further question left open here is what kind of actor users take such

platforms to be, and whether the functions they attribute to them bear on how support is sought.

A digital feminist message does not turn into ready-made meaning in the eyes of the person who encounters it. Young undergraduate women remake these messages each time, passing them through emotion, identity, safety and expectations of political distance. Indifference to the feminist claim is not what is at issue. That sensibility is continually tested through the public representation of feminism itself. Understanding the effect of digital feminism requires looking at how these messages are decoded in the life-worlds of young women.

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Informed Consent: Oral informed consent was obtained from all participants included in the study (Young undergraduate women).

Data Availability: The data are not publicly available due to Participants consented to the use of the interviews in this research only, and the accounts carry details that coding does not conceal, so that re-identification remains possible in a sample of ten. The material also records political opinions,

which Turkish data protection law treats as special-category personal data.

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