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Arařtırma Makalesi**EVALUATING TERRORISM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WEBER'S ETHICS, ACTION AND AUTHORITY CONCEPTS****Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Erol BULUT**

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to decipher the fundamental relations between the superstructural features of terrorist organizations and Weber's concepts of politics, legitimacy, ethics and authority. In this context, it can be argued that terrorist organizations are more prone to Weber's ethic of conviction, value-rational (also affective/emotional) and charismatic authority. This position defines many features of terrorist organizations such as their perceptions of the world, forms of action and even organizational structure. For this reason, it is the aim of this study to contribute to better understanding of terrorist organizations in terms of their level of organization and structural functions and to better organization of political, economic, social and security measures in the struggle against terrorism.

Keywords: Max Weber, The Ethic of Conviction, The Ethic of Responsibility, Types of Authority, Types of Action, Terrorism.

WEBER'İN AHLAK, EYLEM VE OTORİTE KAVRAMLARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE TERÖRİZMİN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ**Öz**

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı terör örgütlerinin üst yapısal özellikleri ile Weber'in düşüncesindeki siyaset, meşruluk, ahlak ve otorite kavramları arasındaki temel ilişkileri deşifre etmektir. Bu kapsamda terör örgütlerinin Weber'in mutlak erekler ahlakı, değer-ussal (ayrıca duygusal) ve karizmatik otorite tiplerine daha yatkın konumlandığı söylenebilir. Bu konum terör örgütlerinin dünyaya bakış açılarından, eylem biçimlerine ve hatta örgütsel yapısına kadar birçok özelliğini belirlemektedir. Bu nedenle terör örgütlerinin örgütlenme düzeyi ve yapısal işleyişi bakımından daha iyi anlamlandırılmasına ve terörizmle mücadelede siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin daha iyi organize edilebilmesine katkı sağlamak çalışmanın amaçları arasında yer almaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Max Weber, Mutlak Erekler Ahlakı, Sorumluluk Ahlakı, Otorite Tipleri, Eylem Tipleri, Terörizm.

1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has three main components: political ideology, organizational structure and violence. Whether ideological (religion, race, right-wing or left-wing) or state terror, terrorism is fundamentally shaped around a political ideology and organizational structure is important in carrying out actions in a planned manner. Violence in terrorism is directed towards the

civilian population in order to create fear and panic in society. The main purpose of violence is to instill fear in society rather than eliminating a person or people. In this context, terrorism can be defined as acts of violence aimed at instilling fear and panic in the civilian population in an organized and planned way in order to realize political and ideological goals.

Understanding terrorism is, therefore, to understand the political ideology, organizational structure and forms of action of organizations. In this context, Weber's concepts of ethics, action and authority discussed in this paper can help understand terrorism. Weber's types of authority can help explain the organizational and hierarchical structure of terrorism, and the types of action and ethics can be useful in explaining how terrorist organizations use political ideology to recruit new members.

Studies on terrorism often refers to the concept of charismatic authority, which is one of the types of authority identified by Weber. However, as Hofman (2015) points out, those studies often merely state that the leaders of terrorist organizations are charismatic leaders, and leave it at that, without further elaboration. On the other hand, Couto (2010) draws attention to the relationship between political violence and Weber's types of ethics and seeks to understand the likelihood of ambition and responsibility in political actions, as discussed by Weber, leading to extreme events. Apart from Couto's analysis, Weber's types of ethics, action and authority has been not associated with terrorism in a holistic approach.

The aim of this study was to analyze Weber's types of ethics, action and authority from a holistic perspective and to associate them with terrorism. The main hypothesis of this study is that terrorist organizations are more prone to Weber's ethic of conviction, value-rational and charismatic authority.

2. WEBER'S CONCEPT OF POLITICS

Politics and violence are interconnected in Weber's theory of political power. According to Weber (2004: 132), state and politics cannot be sociologically defined in terms of their goals. We can only define the modern state and all political bodies in terms of concrete means, which are physical force and violence. The state and other political bodies are defined only in terms having the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. In other words, "the decisive means of politics is violence." (Weber, 2004: 189).

What Weber points out here is that the state upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. The state enforces this monopoly by authorizing its institutional bodies. On the other hand, institutional bodies, such as the military or the police force, have limited authority to use violence. Institutional bodies granted the right to use violence can

only do so to ensure social well-being and to maintain law and order. In the modern state, legal institutions serve the purpose of monitoring excessive use of force. Therefore, the use of violence exceeding the authority of any institutional body of the state and jeopardizing social well-being, corresponds to a situation that exceeds the link between state and violence in Weber's theory of political power.

In other words, violence exercised by the state is not defined as terror when it is justified by legal authority. On the other hand, it is regarded as terror and unjustified violence by groups that see legitimate authority as a means of cultural and social subjugation and destruction of legitimate opposition (Couto, 2010: 66).

2.1. Weber's Political Ethics

The fact that violence is a decisive force in politics also brings with it the danger of politics creating division in social integrity. In fact, according to Weber (2004: 191), “he who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and force as means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true.”

Undoubtedly, the decisive role of violence is not the only the source of antagonisms. The presence of violence increases the level of excess in political actions. The main sources of antagonisms are the qualities causing people to turn to political actions. Weber (2004: 181) lists passion, a sense of responsibility, and a sense of proportion as the three qualities a politician should possess. Here, passion refers to the commitment to a cause while the sense of responsibility refers to taking the responsibility for the cause. The sense of proportion, on the other hand, acts as a psychological factor that prevents the negative consequences of the politician's passion and sense of responsibility. In a sense, the politician must have the ability to maintain a balance between passion and equanimity.

In a sense, the lack of balance runs the risk of causing excess in political actions. Weber was concerned with understanding the possibility of passion and sense of responsibility causing extremism in political actions (Couto, 2010: 66). Doing this, he brought the relationship between politics and ethics up for discussion.

Weber (2004: 189) draws attention to the fact that an ethically good end in any ethical system may have ethically dangerous consequences in the future. An ethically good end always carries with it the possibility of justifying dangerous consequences.




Figure 1. Relationship between the Three Qualities of a Politician and Radical Politics and Legal Politics

According to Weber (2004: 188), there are two forms of ethics that are totally different from each other: "The ethic of conviction" and "the ethic of responsibility." These two types of ethics are also the sources of all forms of actions based on ethical reasons.

These forms of ethics can provide important clues to explain acts of terrorism and also enable us to make important advances in explaining the methods used to ethically justify acts of terrorism.

The main difference between the two types of ethics is based on the relationship between ends and consequences. The ethics of conviction focuses on whether or not an action is taken for ends, and those who act do not take responsibility for the consequences. The ethic of responsibility, on the other hand, must take into account foreseeable consequences, and those who act know that they are responsible for the consequences of their actions.

...There is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends — that is, in religious terms, "the Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord" — and the conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's actions (Weber, 2004: 188).

The ethic of conviction keeps the consequences out of its own actions and spares itself the responsibility for negative consequences. What is important for the ethic of conviction is just to act for ends that are set before any actions are taken. "If evil consequences flow from an action done out of pure conviction, this type of person holds the world, not the doer, responsible, or the stupidity of others, or the will of God who made them thus" (Weber, 2004: 188). The sole responsibility for the person acting on the basis of the ethic of conviction is his responsibility to act for good ends. For example, many terrorist organizations emphasize that

something must be done for good ends, such as justice, freedom and equality, and believe in the rightfulness of their actions, even though they result in the death of innocent people.

“The person who subscribes to the ethic of conviction feels 'responsible' only for ensuring that the flame of pure conviction (for example, the flame of protest against the injustice of the social order) is never extinguished. To kindle that flame again and again is the purpose of his actions...” (Weber, 2004: 189).



Figure 2. Ethics of Conviction and Responsibility

Weber (2004: 190) states that “...the ethics of conviction is bound to founder hopelessly on this problem of how the end is to sanctify the means” and “those who have been preaching 'love against force' one minute, for example, issue a call to force the next; they call for one last act of force to create the situation in which all violence will have been destroyed forever...” In other words, it is impossible to ethically determine which ends or objectives justify which means and to establish a balance between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction if any concession is made to the belief that any means is justified to reach pre-determined ends.

Weber emphasizes the need for a balance between these two forms of ethics in order for the politician to be socially useful (Yoldaş, 2007: 208; Yılmaz and Doğan, 2013: 889). The ethic of conviction enables the politician to get rid of passivity and act, while the ethic of responsibility enables him to take responsibility for his actions and thus consider social benefit.

What is significant and determines the success or failure in legal politics is not the politician's actions, but the consequences of his actions. It can, therefore, be stated that the ethic of responsibility takes precedence over the ethic of conviction in legal politics (Yılmaz and Doğan, 2013: 888).

2.2. Relationship between Types of Ethics and Terrorism

The ethic of conviction, which Weber describes as irrational, is the ideological basis of terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations refrain from claiming responsibility for their actions. What is important for terrorist organizations is to act in the name of so-called ends

(just world, equal, fraternity of peoples, cultural rights, etc.). The only thing that determines being an ethical individual is whether or not one acts for those ends.

For example, The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) puts the responsibility for its actions that cause the deaths of civilians on the shoulders of the Republic of Turkey instead of assuming that responsibility. The PKK justifies its acts of violence by adopting the thesis that if the state had been genuinely committed to the process of democratic initiative, the civilians would not have been dead, and it goes even further and puts the responsibility on the dead civilians. In this context, dead civilians are responsible for their own deaths because they had no incentive to change the existing order.

Other terrorist organizations also tend to avoid such responsibility. For example, Al Qaeda took no responsibility for the civilians who died in the 9/11 attacks. Similar to the PKK, it held the USA (United States of America) and the dead civilians responsible for the attacks. The USA was held responsible for the imperialist policies it has been implementing in the Middle East while civilians were accused of being the auxiliaries and assistants of the imperialist system.

It is very difficult for Weber's ethic of responsibility to find its place in the rationale of terrorist organizations. As we have pointed out before, Weber gives the ethic of responsibility precedence for the absence of extremism in legal politics. The lack of the ethic of conviction may lead to the emergence of passive politicians. However, what really matters is the problem of political corruption caused by the lack of the ethic of responsibility. Terrorism can be thought of as a kind of corrupt or radicalized politics. It would, therefore, not be wrong to state that terrorist organizations lack the ethic of responsibility.

The ethic of responsibility allows political action, and thus violence, in the context of Weber's definition of politics, to remain within the limits of guarding the well-being of society and regulates the actions of executors. Therefore, political actions lacking in the ethic of responsibility run the risk of turning into radicalized acts of violence. In this context, actions designed for political ends and independence of organizations from the ethic of responsibility bring those actions closer to terrorism.

In short, terrorist organizations are closer to the ethic of conviction than to the ethic of responsibility, which is one of the main elements that enable terrorist organizations to exist. Getting rid of the sense of responsibility is a mechanism preventing the members of terrorist organizations from questioning their actions. Failure to question the righteousness or justifiability of actions is an essential element for organizational continuity.

3. TYPES OF SOCIAL ACTION IN WEBER'S SOCIOLOGY

Weber distinguishes four major types of social action (Weber, 2012a: 132-133):

1. Goal-rational Action: Social action can be determined by the expectations of surrounding objects and other people's behavior. These expectations are instrumental for the achievement of the actor's goals, which are rationally followed and calculated.
2. Value-rational Action: Independent of expectations of achievement, it is determined by a conscious belief in the value of ethics, aesthetics, religion or any other form of behavior.
3. Affective Action: It is determined by the actor's specific emotions and state of feeling.
4. Traditional Action: It is determined by custom and established practices.

Of these four types of action, value-rational action and affective action are of particular importance for the subject matter at hand as they are connected with the ethic of conviction. First, it should be noted that value-rational action and affective action are different from each other. Value-rational requires conscious planning of values guiding the action and the continuation of the action's course consistent with the values. Affective action, on the other hand, places such emotions as revenge, piety and sensual pleasure to forefront. Both types of action derive their meaning not from fulfilling an end but from being executed for themselves (Weber, 2012a: 133), which brings the ethic of conviction to mind. In the ethic of conviction, the action itself is the key regardless of the end, which is also a common feature of these two types of action.

Goal-rational action, unlike those two actions, has a rational structure in which ends, means and secondary consequences are taken into account and planned for action. Traditions and emotions do not play a role in the planning of action. There can be a wide variety of relationships between goal-rational action and value rational action. For example, choosing between alternative ends and consequences can be rational. However, value-rational action is always irrational and "the more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more "irrational" in this sense the corresponding action is. For, the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its own sake... the less is he influenced by considerations of the consequences of his action." (Weber, 2012a: 134).

3.1. Relationship Between the Types of Action and Forms of Ethics

There are similarities between Weber's typology of action and ethical distinction. Though the types of action and forms of ethics do not overlap, it can be stated that certain types of action correspond to certain forms of ethics. In other words, it is not claimed that

goal-rational action cannot be based on the ethic of conviction or that value-rational action cannot be executed within the framework of the ethic of responsibility. Besides, Weber assessed all forms of action encountered in everyday life while performing the typology of action. This study is designed on the basis of political actions in the field of terrorism and legal politics. According to this, it can be stated that the ethic of conviction has a value-rational action and affective action orientation while the ethic of responsibility has a goal-rational and traditional action orientation. The underlying reason for the argument that the ethic of conviction has a value-rational action and affective action orientation is that the ethic of conviction emphasizes action that is valued in itself rather than its consequences.




Figure 3. Types of Action

3.2. Relationship between the Types of Action and Terrorism

Value-rational action and affective action and the ethics of conviction play a more important role in shaping the types of actions of terrorist organizations. As we have stated before, terrorist organizations base their actions, especially suicide attacks, on their political ideologies. It is more important for terrorists to execute action than to win or lose the war. Causing fear and panic in society, terrorists give the message that even if the war is not yet won, they will continue to take action to that end. What is often neglected is the fact that the actions of a terrorist organization might be questioned by its supporters and the organization itself might even face a stronger challenge.

For example, despite the fact that the 1978 Spanish Constitution recognized many socio-cultural rights and autonomy of the Basque Country, ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or

Basque Fatherland and Liberty) continued to carry out terrorist attacks. Even after the enactment of the Constitution, the state sought many ways to negotiate with ETA, but to no avail. The 1978-80 period was the bloodiest years of ETA (Barros et al., 2009: 288). The kidnapping and murder of Miguel Angel Blanco in 1997 by ETA triggered a nationwide reaction, and mass protests were held all over Spain (Özçer, 2006: 334). The nationwide reaction as well as the growing pressure of the neighboring countries such as France spelled the end of ETA. This example demonstrates that acts of terrorism are more likely to be value-rational actions than goal-rational actions.

Rational choice theories are based on the premise that acts of terrorism are chosen by terrorist organizations as the shortest or the only way to reach their goals (Gurr, 2006: 85; McAllister and Schmid, 2011: 221-222). Undoubtedly, the lack of opportunity for participation in legal politics and dilatory nature of political development are two of the reasons for the emergence of terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1981: 383-385). Historical evidence, however, shows that, in a rational sense, terrorist organizations' realization of their objectives through violence often takes longer than the realization of those objectives in the legal field, and that resorting to violence sometimes even removes the objectives altogether. For example, the PKK has been waging a war against Turkey for 40 years. It is argued that the prohibition of Kurdish associations and political parties before the 1980s is an important reason for the emergence of the PKK. However, the validity of the assertion that the PKK has chosen the path of violence for a faster outcome can be questioned through the claims of rational choice theories. It should not be overlooked that if the PKK chose to fight for cultural and political rights in the legal arena without resorting to violence, it might achieve its objectives faster. The PKK's terrorism has not ceased despite the fact that many cultural and political rights have been granted during the democratic initiative process since the beginning of the 2000s. I, therefore, assert that, contrary to rational choice theories, terrorist organizations, after their establishment, do not perform their actions based on rational choice.

Another reality is that terrorist organizations need to constantly motivate their members in order to ensure their own continuation. They cannot remain passive for too long, and therefore, it becomes inevitable that they carry out actions that lead them into a dead end. Such actions may be considered goal-rational actions specifically designed by leaders of terrorist organizations. They are, however, essentially more of value actions for members of terrorist organizations who consider the execution of the actions to be valued in themselves. Suicide attacks are a good example of this. A suicide attacker resorts to violence for a value such as becoming a martyr. However, when considering the goal-rational type of action, the

secondary negative consequences of carrying out a suicide attack, that is, losing his/her own life and the death of innocent people, should also be taken into account.

Affective actions and activities of terrorist organizations have something in common. Many acts of terrorism are carried out to reduce the anger and revenge which terrorist organizations have against their "enemies." Weber (2004: 194) states that a leader needs followers, that is, "a human machine," the functioning of which determines the success of the leader. Therefore, for a well-functioning machine, the leader must offer his followers physical rewards such as spoils, victory and plunder, and psychological rewards such as vengeance, hatred and revenge.

Terrorist organizations fulfil what Weber refers to as psychological needs by categorizing the world into "us" and "them." Many actions are built on the hatred and anger felt towards the "other," which ensures the commitment of the members and the continuity of the organization. In addition, the use of greater psychological elements such as martyrdom proves that terrorist acts are mostly emotionally charged actions.

4. WEBER'S CONCEPTS OF POWER AND AUTHORITY

Weber distinguishes the concepts of power and authority from the perspective of the actions of the actor and compliance of others to them. In this context, power is defined as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" while domination (authority) is defined as "the chance of commands being obeyed by a specifiable group of people" (Weber, 2012a: 163). Authority does not simply rest on exercising power on people. Obedience may be due to rationally calculated personal, political and economic interests, habits, traditions or emotional ties. However, despite such causal differences, domination implies "an interest in obedience" (Weber, 2012a, 331).

Domination requires the presence of a successful person who first issues commands. It is very uncommon to find that this person is not associated with at least one of administrative staff or corporate groups (Weber, 2012a, 164). Therefore, the existence of a group of people who comply with the authority, whether based on rational, traditional or charismatic grounds, is imperative. This greatly obliges the authority to be associated with a corporate group or administrative staff.

Weber also addresses the concept of discipline based on the concept of domination. He defines discipline as "the probability that by virtue of habituation a command will receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, on the part of a given group of persons" and adds that "the concept of discipline includes the habituation characteristic of

uncritical and unresisting mass obedience (Weber, 2012a, 163-164). In particular, the concept of obedience in terrorist organizations is closely related to the concept of discipline.

4.1. Types of Authority

As stated above, the main factor distinguishing authority from power is the voluntary obedience of a person or a group of persons to the commands issued by a person exercising authority. Weber notes that this obedience or devotion is not the basic criterion for determining the types of authority. "Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest. Or people may submit from individual weakness and helplessness..." What is important is the fact that the particular claim to legitimacy is treated as valid and "this fact confirms the position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of its exercise" (Weber, 2012a, 333).

According to Weber (2012a: 334-335), there are three types of legitimate authority:

1. Legal authority based on the belief that legalized rules exist and that the person elevated to authority has the right to issue commands according to those rules
2. Traditional authority based on a belief in ancient traditions and in the legitimacy of domination exercised by the person in authority through those traditions
3. Charismatic authority based on devotion to the sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of a single person and the order he creates.

4.1.1. Legal Authority

In the case of legal authority, the leader and his or her authority is recognized due to a legally established impersonal order. The person who obeys authority believes, as a member of the organization, in the legitimacy of the order and of those in power (Weber, 2012a,337). In other words, the person does not obey the authority of a person as an individual, but rather obeys the organization that has the authority to issue orders by law. Legal authority in modern bureaucratic society consists of supervisors who have the authority to order by law and officers who are obliged to comply with this order as a member of the bureaucratic society. The authority of supervisors is also limited by law.

4.1.2. Traditional Authority

In the case of traditional authority, obedience is shown to a person who occupies a traditionally sanctioned position of authority and is bounded by tradition (Weber, 2012a, 335). The person who is obeyed is not a supervisor but a chief. Chiefs are appointed within the framework of traditional rules and their traditional authority makes obedience to them a

duty. Those who obey are not officials but servants and “those subject to authority are not members of an association, but are either his traditional comrades or his subjects.” Therefore, personal loyalty to the chief plays an important role in the relationship between the chief and his “subjects.” His commands are legitimized in terms of “traditions” and “his free personal decision” (Weber, 2012a, 346). Of course, this authority is not equivalent to the discretionary power exercised by administrative authorities. “Rules that, in fact, are innovations can be legitimized only by the taxing claim that they have been ‘valid of yore,’ but have only recently been recognized by means of ‘wisdom’” (Weber, 2012a, 347).

4.1.3. Charismatic Authority

The question of how leaders of terrorist organizations develop the qualities of leadership is an important problem frequently addressed by studies on terrorism. Given Weber’s three types of authority, it can be stated that leaders of terrorist organizations are not recognized by legal authority. Traditional authority shapes the post-maturation stage of terrorist organizations. It can therefore be stated that charismatic authority is the form of authority that powers the leaders of terrorist organizations. Studies on terrorism with reference to Weber often address the concept of charismatic authority. To what extent can Weber's concept of charismatic authority actually explain the leaders of terrorist organizations?

According to Weber (2012a, 362), “the term ‘charisma’ will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.” However, what really happens here is that these qualities are assigned to him by those who submit to his authority. In other words, “It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma.” (Weber, 2012a, 362).

Undoubtedly, the charismatic leader should remind those who submit to his authority of those qualities in order to be able to maintain his authority. This can only be accomplished by achievements that he has enabled the organization to attain and benefits that he has provided to the members of the organization. Thus, as Weber (2012a, 363) states, the leader loses his charisma if he cannot legitimize his authority through achievements and benefits.

One of the important characteristics distinguishing charismatic authority from traditional and legal authority is its leadership position. In the case of legal authority, a leader is a superior whose commands are obeyed owing to the legally established impersonal order while in the case of traditional authority, a leader is a chief whose commands are obeyed owing to traditions as well as his traditionally sanctioned position of authority. However, in

the case of charismatic authority, a leader is obeyed due to his leadership qualifications and exemplary qualities (Weber, 2012a, 335).

In the case of charismatic authority, there are no established administrative organs, and followers develop a communal relationship (Weber, 2012a, 364). Therefore, the administrative staff of a charismatic leader does not consist of officials but of group members based on their charismatic qualities. There is no appointment, promotion, career or hierarchy. The intervention of the charismatic leader only applies to cases where where he feels lack of charismatic qualities within the framework of certain duties. Therefore, such groups are defined as "charismatic communities" (Weber, 2012a, 363).

Charismatic authority is against legal and traditional authorities because charismatic authority is "irrational in the sense that it is alien to all rules" and, having a revolutionary structure, it rejects the past (Weber, 2012a, 364).

In the case of charismatic authority, although economic benefit is despised and rejected in general, it often remains as an ideal. The charismatic leader does not always waive economic gain and is in search of spoils with his followers. What is despised is actually the attainment of a regular income. Voluntary support such as donations, bribery, servicing fees and gift-giving, as well as forcible income such as looting and extortion are necessary tools for meeting the needs (Weber, 2012a, 365).

Charismatic authority, on the other hand, always has to change. "Charismatic authority cannot remain static, and it must transform into either traditional or rational authority, or a combination of both." The main reasons for the transformation are "the ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community" and "the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples or other followers of the charismatic leader in continuing their relationship." These material interests that motivate the transformation of charismatic authority usually become clear with the debate over who will replace the leader once he loses his charisma (Weber, 2012a, 366-367).

Lastly, "charismatic domination is by no means limited to primitive stages of development, and the three basic types of domination cannot be placed into a simple evolutionary line: they in fact appear together in the most diverse combinations" (Weber, 2012b, 497). Figure 4 shows a simple structure for the combination of the three authority types.



Figure 4. Combination of Types of Authority

4.2. Relationship between Types of Authority and Terrorism

Weber states that the three types of authority exist in very rare times or in pure cases. He also adds that pure forms of certain types of authority are more dominant in some certain structures. Thus, pure types help us to understand which classification is closer to the current situation (Weber, 1978: 263-264). In this context, pure types will help us compare terrorist organizations with authority types, identify the predominant type of authority in terrorist organizations, and analyze their structure better.

My aim in this regard is to show that terrorist organizations are defined around charismatic authority rather than other types of authority. Charismatic leaders are one of the most significant factors determining the existence of terrorist organizations.

Hofmann (2015) criticizes the lack of studies on charismatic authority in relation to terrorism and presents 14 indicators to measure the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups. The first three indicators are (1) conditions that lead to charismatic authority, (2) social structure and management of charismatic authority and (3) conditions and motivations that lead to the bureaucratization or routinization of charismatic authority that transforms it into traditional or legal forms. Indicators 1 and 2 refer to situational and contextual conditions that a charismatic leader should follow. Indicators from 3 to 8 address various dynamics and mechanisms that emerge during the social construction and management of the charismatic bond between leaders and their followers. The remaining indicators deal with conditions that lead to the routinization of charismatic authority and practices which charismatic leaders use to combat intolerable attempts at weakening their authority.

Hofmann works on the assumption that terrorist organizations are not always defined around charismatic authority and leader. Undoubtedly, charismatic authority does not always lead to the emergence of terrorist organizations, and terrorist organizations are not always

defined around charismatic authority. However, in terms of susceptibility, terrorism is a form of organization that is more prone to charismatic authority and leadership.

Dawson (2010: 10-15) states that there are three key factors that lead new religious movements (NRM) to radicalization and violence. These factors are (1) apocalyptic or world-rejecting beliefs, (2) extraordinarily strong psychological and emotional investments in charismatic leadership and (3) establishment of symbolic and physical barriers between the members of NRMs and the rest of society. Dawson (2010: 10-15) adds that the lack of any one of these three factors or a simple combination of all three of them does not necessarily result in violence. Dawson also states that acts of violence are carried out by such organizations only as a result of the guidance and direction of charismatic leaders. According to him, new religions form around charismatic leaders and their destiny is defined by unpredictable behavior of their leaders or excess of the authority which they claim. Although charismatic authority is not inherently dangerous, charismatic bond between charismatic leaders and their followers is more susceptible to degeneration.

Similarly, Kimhi and Even (2005: 314) examined religion-based terrorism and stated that the two preconditions that promote terrorism are charismatic leadership and religious interpretations that encourage terrorism. Nassra (2006: 31) emphasizes that the charismatic leader is a key element in understanding the concept of martyrdom.

The presence of charismatic leaders is not merely a feature of religious-based terrorist organizations. Many nationalist terrorist organizations are defined around similar leadership features. Gupta (2006: 35) and Post (2006: 22) state that the nationalist PKK and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have this kind of organization.

It is no surprise that charismatic leaders of terrorist organizations are mentioned more often than are terrorist organizations themselves (Bovenkerk and Chakra, 2004: 10) because charismatic ideological leaders, who turn their widespread distress and frustration into a political agenda for armed struggle, are a decisive factor behind the emergence of terrorist movements (Psychological, Political, Economic, Religious and Cultural (Root) Causes of Terrorism, According to Scholars Gathered at the Club de Madrid Conference (2005), 2011: 273). Thus, one of the things that weakens a terrorist movement is the arrest, death or loss of its charismatic leader (Marsden and Schmid, 2011: 181).

As stated earlier, Weber emphasizes that charismatic authority does not possess hierarchical features that are present in legal authority, which might be seen as contrary to the idea that terrorism is an organizational structure. For example, Moghadam (2006: 28) states that terrorist organizations are structured as hierarchies with clear distinctions between leaders,

followers and those who assume intermediate roles. However, Weber's emphasis on the absence of hierarchical features does not mean that there are no leaders and structures below them, but it means that charismatic features are more important than hierarchical structures in appointments. Leaders are rather elements that inspire their organizations and assure their existence. In fact, as Jenkins (2002: 25) states, leaders of terrorist organizations do not always possess complete control, and often have difficulty keeping a tight rein on their followers.

This is even more common today as terrorism has also changed in a compatible manner with the post-modern structure. As Hoffman (2006: 39) notes, the structure of terrorism has evolved from a hierarchical and pyramidal one to a looser, flatter and more linear one. Though there are those who hold positions of leadership in new terrorist organizations, their role is mostly symbolic, inspiring and motivating rather than direct commanding and controlling.

However, it does not mean that the position of the leader is questioned or that members act completely independent of him or her. It only points to the existence of a more flexible structure. The complete disappearance of the organizational structure would mean the ceasing of the existence of the terrorist organization.

Therefore, the fact that charismatic leaders are either inspirational or have a motivating role in the organization structure and that members of terrorist organizations have the opportunity to act more autonomously does not mean that terrorist organizations do not have leaders. All in all, leaders are still the guarantors of the existence of terrorist organizations. In fact, Post (2006: 22) addresses the role played by charismatic leaders in devastating suicide attacks carried out by nationalist organizations such as the PKK and the LTTE. This type of suicide attacks is important as they show that followers accept their leaders' views without criticism and follow their instructions without questioning them. This shows the influence that charismatic leaders have in terrorist organizations.

In addition, Weber's assertion that charismatic authority based on revolutionary ideology is against traditional and legal authorities is a common feature in terrorist organizations. For example, the PKK did not only target the Republic of Turkey, which is the legal authority, but also used coercive force against the Kurdish tribes, in the early years of the organization. The PKK's detained leader, Öcalan (1993: 131) sees those tribes as collaborators aiming to protect their own reactionary and feudal interests. This shows the susceptibility of terrorist organizations to charismatic authority.

Lastly, it can be stated that leaders of terrorist organizations (charismatic communities) tend to be mostly old charismatic leaders of middle and upper class backgrounds (Moghadam, 2006: 86-87).

5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEBER'S CONCEPTS OF POLITICS, ETHICS AND AUTHORITY, AND TERRORISM

Addressing terrorism from the perspective of Weber's concepts of ethics, actions and types of authority, we can state that terrorist organizations tend to be based on the ethic of conviction, value-rational action and charismatic authority.

On the other hand, the field of legal politics in modern societies is built upon the ethic of responsibility, goal-rational action and legal authority. It should, however, be noted that the the ethic of conviction, value-rational action and charismatic authority can also be present in the field of legal politics.




Figure 5. Distinction between Terrorism and Legal Politics within the Context of Ethics, Action and Authority

Though the ethic of conviction, value-rational action and charismatic authority are observed in the field of legal politics, it is very difficult to observe the presence of the ethic of responsibility, goal-rational action and legal authority in terrorism. It can also be argued that there are gradational differences between these three types.

The ethic of responsibility is the hardest to observe in terrorist organizations because, as we have stated before, taking responsibility is a threat to the existence of terrorist organizations and to their ideological positions.

Legal authority is also hard to observe in terrorist organizations. The basic features of legal authority include a bureaucratic structure, processes of assignment, promotion and deposition in a hierarchical structure and leadership election. However, we cannot talk about the existence of a bureaucratic structure in terrorist organizations. Besides, although terrorist organizations possess a hierarchical structure, it is different from the hierarchical structure of the state's military organization. The hierarchical structure of terrorist organizations is very flexible and based completely on personal qualities. Though some terrorist organizations hold

elections, they are far from encompassing the free choice of members. Charismatic features of the leader are at play here, as in the hierarchical structure.

Though goal-rational action is difficult to observe in terrorist organizations, it is easier to observe than the ethic of responsibility and legal authority. Terrorist organizations sometimes carry out actions for which ends, means and secondary consequences are considered. This is, however, quite limited.

6. CONCLUSION

Many studies from various disciplines examine and discuss the causes and consequences of terrorism, and organizational structure of terrorist organizations. This study sociologically addressed the issue of terrorism from the perspective of Weber's concepts of ethics, action and types of authority. We can deduct from the analysis that terrorist organizations tend to be based on the ethic of conviction, value-rational action and charismatic authority.

This position of terrorism as an organizational structure also determines terrorist organizations' attitudes towards action and global happenings. The ethic of conviction and value-rational action allow terrorist organizations to have a more flexible position in an operational sense and to insulate themselves from criticism. They also prevent terrorist organizations' political ideologies from being harmed, which enables them to recruit new members even in the face of adversity. However, they can also be a threat to the existence of terrorist organizations in the long run, especially when previously indifferent groups in the international arena start to raise concerns and question the existence and activities of those terrorist organizations.

Terrorist organizations, owing to the presence of charismatic authority, are able to stay out of the rigid bureaucratic structure of legal authority, which improves their ability to recruit new members and carry out acts of terrorism all over the world. The flexible and diffused structure of terrorist organizations allows their members to operate relatively autonomously through a network of small subgroups without a single headquarters. This plays a key role in the rise of modern terrorism.

In conclusion, it is not always possible to use rational choice theories to explain the organizational structure and operational level of terrorist organizations. Especially in modern terrorism, irrationality and flexibility result in the globalization of terrorist organizations. This may be somewhat related to the debates on postmodernism. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to take this flexible and irrational structure into account in the fight against terrorism. This is a world that has found its existence beyond rationality.

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