
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTFLOWS FROM HUNGARY, INFLOWS TO THE UK AS A TYPICAL EAST-WEST DIRECTION IN THE EU

*TİPİK BİR AB İÇİNDE DOĞU-BATI ROTASI OLARAK MACARİSTAN'DAN
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ABSTRACT

International migration outflows from Eastern and Central European countries increased since accession in 2004, but previously regular patterns, directions have changed in the last years. Western European countries labor markets experienced changes too, e. g. the unexpectedly low number of emigration to Germany last year. My aim is to interpret current international migration in the EU on the basis of economic and structural labor market differences and reveal that institutional circumstances and micro level became indispensable factor beside. The growing role of the UK for Eastern and Central European countries migrants can be interpreted by the earlier opened labor markets and the exceeding English language knowledge in these countries. In Hungary, the deficiency of the registration also causes problems for science and policy as migration reached more than fifteenth of the official number getting data from mirror statistics. For a better understanding, statistical data of migration outflows and inflows is analyzed side by side just like demographic and social composition of emigrants. The results clearly show how far new factors role has grown in emerging migration flows in an east-west direction within the EU.

Keywords: International Migration, Migration, Demography, International Affairs, Labor Markets, Economic Demography

ÖZET

Merkez ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinden gerçekleşen Uluslararası göç 2004 yılında AB'ye üyelikle birlikte artış göstermeye başlamıştır. Fakat, son yıllarda göçün gerçekleştiği rotalar ve önceki düzenli eylemler değişmiştir. Batı Avrupa ülkelerinin piyasaları da bu değişimi yaşamıştır. Örneğin geçen sene Almanya'ya beklenenin çok altında göç gerçekleşmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, AB içindeki mevcut uluslararası göçü ekonomik ve yapısal iş piyasası değişiklikleri üzerinden açıklamak ve yapısal koşulların ve mikro düzeyin vazgeçilmez bir faktör olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Birleşik Krallığın Merkez ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri göçmenleri için artan rolü daha önceden açılan iş piyasası ve artan İngilizce dil bilgisi olarak açıklanabilir. Macaristan'da, ayna istatistiklerinden edinilen veriye göre gerçek göç resmi rakamların onbeş katına ulaşmıştır ve kayıtların yetersizliği bilim ve siyasa için sorunların oluşturmaktadır. Daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için, içe ve dışa doğru gerçekleşen göçün istatistiki verisi göçmenlerin demografik ve sosyal dağılımları gibi ayrı ayrı analiz edilmiştir. Sonuçlar, AB içinde doğu-batı yönünde yeni ortaya çıkan

göç akımları üzerinde yeni faktörlerin rolü ne ölçüde etkili olduğunu net olarak ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Göç, Göç, Demografi, Uluslararası İlişkiler, İş Piyasaları, İktisadi Demografi

1. INTRODUCTION

Each European country has its own historical and economic circumstances of international migration. Considering structural differences in labor forces, altering economic growths we tend to interpret migrational flows in a neo-classical way. For Eastern European countries like Hungary the most important destination within the EU is less and less Germany yet but rather the United Kingdom, and for the UK's newest challenge in migration question is the inflow from Eastern Europe especially from Poland as Poles are the largest minority there since 2004, overtaking the Irish. To explain these changes I bring out primarily demographic data and economic interpretational frames but changes in migrational environment such as language knowledge or easier transport are also relevant.

2. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AS A GROWING ROLE OF UNDERSTANDING EMERGING MIGRATIONAL OUTFLOWS FROM HUNGARY

Until the last years the most important target country for contemporary migration outflows from Hungary was Germany. 70 percent of the annual 20-27 thousand emigrants arrived there. This process begun in the 1920's but got its main labor force character in the 1980's that time mostly in building industry with temporary or circular skilled workers. 2004 didn't change generally the roles of labor migration outflows from Hungary but numbers started to emerge since even not necessarily as a long time trend, and then newly opened labor markets' importance started to grow gradually. We can find evidence for this statement in the lower number of emigrants in Germany after 1st of May 2011 than expected. In 2004 labor market of Germany was still closed for Eastern-Europeans but for those really wanted to work there were enough experience, knowledge to do so. For migrants in the last two decades legal status seemed to be irrelevant repeating their movement again and again. (Vertovec 2004) In the end of 2011 German labor market researchers registered only 10 240 new immigrants from Hungary and 61 577 in total from Eastern European countries between 1st May 2011 and the end of the year. (Berufsausweis 2011) The number of immigrants were much lower than the expected 140 000, and all of these suggest that previous years closure were not very efficient. The high numbers of immigrants in the earlier years proof regulation's weakness. As official interpretation says new migrants has chosen rather Great-Britain partly because of their previous work experiences since 2004 partly because of their better English.

Table 1: Spoken languages in Hungary

	1980	1990	2001	2005
English	114 342	228 956	941 139	1 230 679
French	-	52 957	109 154	109 263
German	340 801	416 215	957 289	1 069 617
Russian	130 809	152 885	182 982	168 232
Spanish	-	7 139	22 293	29 614

Changes didn't influence the volume of migration outflows from Hungary before EU enlargement. (Hárs et. al. 2004) In the 2001 British census data there were 13 159 persons born in Hungary living in the United Kingdom but this number has grown up to 36 000 in 2010 and 41 000 in 2011 estimated by UK Statistical Office. Hungarian born people became the 29th from the 59th position in the participation rates order. Poles gives the highest part of foreigner labor force they are 619 000 of them in the UK at the end of 2011 almost double of the Irish participation rate.

Despite of the already leading interpretational and analytical frames such as labor markets' structural and frictional components other macro-economic viewpoints are also useful for understanding Hungarian migration flows. (Hárs 2008) Between May 2006 and May 2007 other countries opened their labor markets (i.e. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Italy) generating further increase; Spain became especially popular destination for Hungarian immigrants. In 2007, total outflow reached the 34 000 for that year calculated from only the relevant European Countries Statistics (Gödri 2009) and not counting other destinations like the United States which is a target country with 1 000 Hungarian immigrants annually. The increasing number of immigrants from Hungary doesn't cause important effects on EU labor markets: Hungarians gives only 4 percent of the immigrating labor force from EU-8 countries. Not very surprising Poles are the highest part of west-moving labor force (70 %) determining Western European countries emigrational policies too.

3. EMIGRATION TO THE UK FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

From the viewpoint of the UK the first to make about the recent migrants from the A8 countries (2004 enlargement) is that they are typically young, mostly Polish and are not necessarily committed to settlement. (Blanchflower et. al. 2007) As mentioned above, circular mobility depends on previous experiences and self-interests. The larger context to understand these numbers is still economic. The propensity to emigrate is influenced by the level of unemployment in the home country and the percentage of the working population in that country that have gone to the UK. Gilpin identifies a very clear relationship between these factors. (Gilpin et. al. 2006) The principal reason for

emigration is the belief that employment prospects are better and living standards higher in the host country. In other words, the largest numbers of migrants migrate from those countries where unemployment is high and relative incomes are low. Indeed, Lithuanians (with the highest unemployment and the lowest GDP per head) are the most likely to emigrate of all A8 citizens. (Coats 2008 p. 31)

Projections for migration mostly depend on different economic growth comparing source countries and the UK. The largest changes are to the projections for the stock and gross inflow of migrants from the A8 countries. It is relatively widespread across groups. The increasing UK unemployment results that the gross inflow of migrants from mostly involved source regions, such as Eastern Europe, decreases especially in the short term, slower economic growth in these countries doesn't compensate it. Most immediately, the rise in unemployment rate that will be associated with the downturn will be more muted than that projected. Given the age structure and participation rates of migrants, notably of A8 migrants, the reduction in number of migrants will lead to significant falls in the workforce in the UK – predicted by the Government. The recent rapid rise in the stock of A8 migrants makes it more difficult to forecast, as the stock has developed fewer ties with the UK than is the norm, and communities are less settled. We expect that they could be more sensitive to economic conditions both in the UK and in the rest of Europe. The UK Government reported the results of doubling the effect of changes in economic conditions on return migration. This alone would lead to a further 33 000 falls in the labor force by 2015, given the relatively high participation rates of A8 migrants. It would reduce the stock of migrants from all countries of 47 000 and the A8 migrant stock by 40 000 by 2015. (Projections 2009 p. 35-37)

We have fewer data on outflows than inflows despite its increasing relevance because of decreasing intention of migrants to settle down. In Western European countries in 2003 or thereabouts, Germany lost 500 000 emigrants. The number in the UK was 170 000. These two countries showed the greatest losses, no other country came just close to it. In Eastern Europe permanent emigration was dominant that time. Russia was the main source of emigration, 105 500 emigrants in 2002, followed by Ukraine with 88 800 emigrants in 2001. Losses anywhere else were relatively low. The combination of these in- and outflows resulted in a net gain in Western Europe in 2003 and nearest years of around 953 400 and a further 102 900 in CEE countries, giving a net overall gain of 1.05 million. Italy had the largest net gain of 380 400 in 2002, mostly as a result of regularization. The UK was in second place, with about 250 000, only Germany had a substantial net gain. Perhaps most significantly, however, all the Western European countries had net migration gains in the years after 2000. The situation is different in Eastern European countries. The only exception was the Czech Republic but, especially in Russia, net gains were modest. Three countries recorded net losses in their emigration data in 2003. The trend is quite similar in long term. In the first half of the 80's,

inflows of foreign population to Western Europe declined for a while, but since the middle of 80's there were net gains for most countries. From 1994 net gains have tended to fall again on the whole. In the period 1995-2003 in most countries fluctuations was observed in the annual rate of change of inflows and for most of them, rates of increase were higher in the early part of the period, notably in 1998-99. Those countries with data for 2003 show general declines comparing with numbers the year before. In some cases, (i.e. Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands), the most recent fall follows a longer term trend. In other cases the downturn around 2003 follows a period of steady increase, (i.e. Ireland, Spain, Switzerland and the UK). In a few cases the trend from the middle of the 90's has been normally flat, the latest year being one of small fluctuation (i.e. Finland and Luxembourg). The situation in Eastern Europe is more varied. There was an increase around 2003 in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Slovenia, but falls in Lithuania and Romania, while Croatia and Latvia show no discernible trend. (Salt 2005 p. 19)

These migrational patterns are not new. Like in the last centuries recent net migration trends show West-East distinction. In Western Europe, eight countries (i.e. UK, Austria, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland) had a universal upward trend in this period, only Denmark was moving in the opposite direction. Five other countries (i.e. Germany, Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg) showed fluctuations from year to year. Four Eastern European countries (i.e. Romania, Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia) had a relative net gain by virtue of a declining net loss. The Czech and Slovak Republics and Russia all had a declining positive trend. (Salt 2005 p. 20) In the Czech Republic because of the decreasing Slovak migrants, in Russia the former soviet countries population caused the positive net gains. The migration trend from East to West was dominant in a larger geographical context including the European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States. (Moldikova 2008) The main difference between the European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States was the strong integration processes within the EU with a usual circulation of labor force, goods and services common currency, common law and common policies for homogenizing living standards among EU and accessing countries. Russia is also an Asian-European transit country as far Ukraine is a transit country for those moving forward to the western countries. Among all of these economic reasons can be clearly observed. (Zaionchkovskaya 2009) The lack in the labor markets in Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan caused by a demographic crisis, is continuously supplying by migrants from Central Asian countries, who already promptly react to the opportunities. The situation is very similar in Hungary with an emerging participation of Chinese immigrants mostly with their motivation of moving forward to western countries. (Nyíri 2010)

In Western European countries in 2003 there were 10.07 million recorded foreign workers, 38 percent more than in 1995 with its 7.29 million. However,

this increase does not represent a large gain to the foreign workforce as it seems from this data. In some countries, like Ireland, Switzerland and the UK, there has been significant growth in stocks owing to the entry of new foreign workers. The volume of the increase registered is the result of amnesties for illegal workers in some countries, namely in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Indeed, it would appear that if these groups are ignored, over the last few years numbers of recorded foreign labor have changed little. In other countries stocks of recorded foreign labor decreased or remained relatively static. Germany, France, Italy and the UK contained 6.32 million, 62.8 per cent of the Western European total. Austria, Greece, Spain, the UK and Luxembourg recorded increases on the year before; Germany was broadly unchanged while foreign labor stocks in Switzerland fell. (Salt 2005 p. 23)

Estimates of the joining countries indicate that immigration to the UK increased from 49 000 in 2004, to 103 000 in 2007. Immigration then declined between 2007 and 2009. A8 emigration rose rapidly in the years immediately after accession. Emigration peaked at 67 000 in 2008, before declining in 2009. Net migration reached its highest level of 78 000 in 2007. Net migration estimates for A8 citizens then declined to 9000 in 2008. Total net-migration of A8 citizens was 353 000 between 2004 and 2010. Immigration of A8 citizens for work related reasons has grown between 2004 and 2007 decreased between 2007 and 2009 and increased again afterwards. Immigration for work related reasons reached 82 000 in 2007. Work related reasons include those with a definite job to go to and those looking for work. Migration for non-work related reasons also increased between 2004 and 2007, although this increase was not statistically significant. Non-work related reasons include those moving to accompany or join others in the UK, those going to study, and all other reasons stated. (Gillingham 2010 pp. 10-12) The number of citizens of the A8 countries immigrating long term to the UK in the year to September 2010 was 72 000. This number increased 60 percent of 45 000 in the year to September 2009. (Migration Statistics 2011) Before the enlargement of the EU in 2004 there was a negative attitude of migration from the CEE countries. 57 per cent of the UK population believed that immigrants were taking more out of the welfare system than they put in, while only 11 percent thought that immigrants were net contributors. (Dustman – Frattini – Halls 2010 p. 1) This is the only wave of the European Social Survey in which such a question was asked.

Around 3 000 contract workers and 40 000 temporary workers from CEE countries go to Germany each year under bilateral agreements. As workers from most CEE countries often no longer need a visa to travel to Western Europe for three months, movement to there is relatively easy, followed by overstay and undocumented work. It seems that much of this migration is to the newer immigration countries of the EU, notably Southern Europe and Ireland, and both Spain and Portugal entered into negotiations with selected CEE states to establish bilateral labor agreements to regulate the arrival of CEE workers.

However, most forms of labor migration from the CEE countries, including circular migration and petty trading are to other CEE countries rather than to Western Europe.

Table 2: Estimated population of CEE countries' nationals resident in the United Kingdom with highest proportions, by nationality, 2011

Country	Population in the UK
Poland	619 000
Lithuania	118 000
Romania	84 000
Slovakia	56 000
Latvia	55 000
Bulgaria	47 000
Hungary	41 000
Czech Republic	31 000
Russia	27 000
Ukraine	12 000

Source: Annual Population Survey (APS), Office for National Statistics, UK

Management of labor migration in some of these countries is taking a new turn; for example, the Czech Republic introduced a points system where migrants are selected according to their skills and qualifications. Since accession to the EU of ten CEE countries, most existing Western European states have instituted a transition period before allowing free movement of these nationals into their labor markets, the exceptions being the UK, Ireland and Denmark. The UK government decided to introduce a new Worker Registration Scheme for these workers which came into operation in the spring of 2004. During the period May-September there were 87 220 applications from individual workers, the vast majority of which (92.6 per cent) were approved. Poles were the largest national group, with over half the total, followed by Lithuanians and Slovaks. (Salt 2005 p. 24)

During 2004-2010, total net-migration of A8 citizens was 353 000; however recent statistics suggest a new increase in the level of net-migration of A8 citizens. The high rate of migration from the newly joined countries to the UK after 2004 was unexpected. Some of the analysis before the accession suggested much smaller migration flows. It was hard to interpret or analyze processes without correct data on migration from A8 countries to the UK before 2004 as far Registration Scheme didn't exist previously; the projections for immigration from the A8 countries to the UK after accession were based on a model whose parameters had to be estimated using data from other countries. Another reason for this mistake was that large-scale migration contrasts with the dynamics of previous EU accessions such as Spain and Portugal. In those cases, there were no significant migration movements. (Dustman et. al. 2003)

However, recent statistics suggest an increase in the level of net-migration of A8 citizens. Inflows of EU migrants were mainly flat for the 1991-

2003 period, averaging close to 61 000 migrant inflows per year. Including A8 citizens in the EU estimated in 2004, there was a significant growth in the estimated EU migration inflows to the UK and the average annual inflow for the period 2004-2010 was about 170 000 migrants. EU inflows account for close to 29% of total migration inflows, a share that has remained somewhat stable since 2005. A8 workers accounted for close to 12% of total (and 41% of EU) migration inflows to the UK in 2008, a share that has decreased since the 2007 peak. After the peak in 2007 when A8 inflows were about 112 000, the inflow of migrants from the A8 countries was decreasing until 2009. At the same time, outflows of A8 migrants have been increasing. Consequently A8 net-migration declined to only 16 000 migrants in 2009 but raised 49 000 in 2010. (Vargas-Silva 2011p. 4)

From a more fearful viewpoint 2004 caused a change hugely exceeded all estimates. In the middle of 2003, the Labour Force Survey counted 47 000 workers in the UK from the A8 countries, which represented less than 0.2 per cent of the UK workforce. For the reasons above, this is probably to have been an underestimate – this is very likely that have missed those working without permission. For 2004 the number had risen to 97 000, but this was still only 0.3 per cent of all workers. Numbers continued to rise rapidly until 2008, when they stood at 516 000 which was the 1.7 per cent of the workforce. Numbers stayed around 500 000 until the beginning of 2010, when they started to rise again, and the latest data shows 593 000 workers born in A8 countries as working in the UK in 2010 (2.0 per cent of all workers). For comparative purposes, the number of all non-UK workers rose from 2.59 million or 9.1 per cent of all workers in 2003, to 3.89 million workers 13.3 per cent of all workers in 2010. (Clark – Hardy 2011 p. 7)

Across Europe, patterns of foreign labor recruitment and use provide echoes of the 60's. Several examples demonstrate this, including the UK. Almost all registrations were for low skilled work. The largest group (16.3 %) were process operatives in factories, followed by kitchen and catering assistants (7.2 %), waiters or waitresses (6.5 %), packers (5.4 %) and cleaners or domestic staff and farm workers (5.1- 5.1 %). Thus the WRS is very much a route of entry for low-skilled workers – at least for those working for an employer since self-employed workers do not have to register. In 2011 April the transitional arrangements under which the Worker Registration Scheme were based expired after 7 years and WRS were closed. But for that period not all of those registering were newly entering workers. Only 55.3 percent arrived in the country after 1 May 2004. Thus, most were already in the UK, some of them for quite a long time. It is not obvious how many of these were working illegally but it is likely that many of them were. It would appear then that the registration has had only the effect of legalizing several thousand people. (Salt 2005 p. 25)

The demographic breakdown of A8 migrants in the UK identified through WRS is as follows: 82% were aged 18-34. However, within this bracket, the proportion of people aged 18-24 tends to swell during the summer months. The

male to female ratio over the period 2004-06 was 58:42. 7% of registered workers had dependents living with them. Among those who did have dependents, the average number was 1.3. The number of dependents as a proportion of the number of registered workers has increased from 6% in 2004 to 12% in 2006. In terms of the working conditions of A8 nationals: 97% were working full-time; 78% were earning between £4.50 and £5.99 per hour; 49% of the total was in permanent employment. However, this varied widely between sectors – for instance, agriculture and catering had a high proportion of temporary workers (69% and 77% respectively).

Most A8 migrants are young. Indeed, according to the WRS, the vast majority (82 %) are under the age of 35. The age profile also affects the inclination to settle down in the UK. Most people seem to plan a very short working period in the UK and then return to their home country. However, each time a worker revisits the UK they were required to re-register under the WRS until 2011. (Coats 2008 p. 40) Births to women born in A8 countries were making up an increasing percentage of all live births in the UK, however they constitute a small percentage of total live births. Births to A8 born mothers made up 0.3 per cent of all live births in the UK in 2001. This increased to 0.5 per cent in 2004. Following accession in 2004, births to A8 born women increased further and by 2009 made up 3.7 per cent of all live births in the UK. Although the number of births to A8 born women has increased in recent years, this is in line with an increase in the proportion of women of child-bearing age (15-44 years) living in the UK who were born in an A8 country. In 2004, an estimated 0.5 per cent of women of child-bearing age living in the UK were born in the A8 countries, compared with 2.3 per cent in 2009. Although live births to women born in A8 countries were increasing in this period, they constituted a small percentage of total live births in the UK. (Gillingham 2010 p. 24)

Greater human capital translates into better opportunities in the labor market and easier entry into the host society's economic mainstream. That, in part, is why migration of professionals is seldom seen as a problem in the host societies. On the contrary, flows composed of poorly-educated workers can have a more durable impact because of their initial ignorance of the host language and culture and the tendency, especially among migrants from rural origin, to adhere tightly to their customs. (Portes – Rumbaut 2006)

On the basis of the age at which individuals left full-time education, immigrants, especially new immigrants, generally appear to be more skilled than those born in the United Kingdom. (Saleheen – Shadforth 2006) 66 per cent of the UK-born population has completed secondary school while 17 per cent have a degree. A smaller part of recent migrants but not just A8 migrants, 52 percent, have a secondary school qualification but a much higher proportion (36 %) have degrees. We have empirical evidence indicating that limited language usage restrains migrant workers' to find jobs at their most productive level in the economy. (Koudela 2011a) This means over-qualified workers are competing with low skilled UK-born workers, which may lead to displacement as

well as the underutilization of migrants' skills. (Dickson et. al. 2008 p. 13) 31.5 per cent of A8 migrants reported language difficulties in finding or keeping a job – compared with 25 per cent of all migrants. (Clark – Drinkwater 2008)

Recent migrants are also more likely to be single than the native born. This differential became larger in the second period, especially for males since the percentage of recent male migrants who were married decreased by 6.6 percentage points. The later cohort of migrants is more steadily distributed across the UK. The percentage residing in London has fallen by over 10 percent, which is largely caused by different location patterns of A8 migrants. (Bauere - Densham - Millar - Salt 2007) We also have to mention that despite the decline of number of migrants moving to the UK for work number of students are still growing. The total number of A8 students in Higher Education in the UK has increased each year since accession. In recent years this increase is occurring at a slower rate than immediately after accession. There were about 17,000 students in Higher Education who were previously resident in an A8 country In the academic year 2008/09; this made up less than 1 percent of the total student numbers in the UK (0.7 per cent in 2008/09 compared to 0.2 per cent in 2004/05). (Gillingham 2010 p. 13)

As mentioned above A8 immigrants have higher level of education. Despite of this their average hourly wages are notably lower than those of natives. Their disadvantage is discernible across the whole wage distribution., along with Wages are measured at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution, and A8 immigrants' median wages are copiously lower than those of natives for sexes. While the median hourly wage was £6.81 for A8 immigrant men, it was £11.91 for native-born men in 2008. The gap between them was larger at the top of the wage distribution than at the bottom mostly because of less utilizing higher education among A8 workers. (Dustman – Frattini 2010 p. 10)

The UK is not alone in Western Europe in importing foreign workers to work in low skilled occupations. Germany's bilateral agreement with Poland brings in over a quarter of a million seasonal workers a year, mostly in agriculture. In Ireland the most rapid increases in work permit issues were in agriculture, hotels and catering. The Netherlands tells a similar story. In recent years the number of temporary work permits issued has risen, especially for agriculture, horticulture and a range of low-skilled service jobs such as drivers and hotel and catering workers. In Austria, agriculture and forestry and parts of the tourist sector have been increasing their foreign labor intake.

4. MIGRATION OUTFLOWS FROM HUNGARY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

From the late 80's Hungary was not only simply a receiving but also a transit country. Foreigners especially from neighborhood countries coming here sooner or later migrated further. At the very beginning of the 90's the number of

emigrating foreigners made up 25-30 percent of the number of immigrants, but from 1993 this rate constantly remained below 20 percent. From the turn of the millennium it even remained below 10. Despite mainly foreigners was leaving the country, also Hungarian nationals emigrated for a certain period, or even finally. Hungarian official statistics registered only a few hundred emigrants per year which was much behind the number of emigrating foreigners. (Gödri 2009 p. 119) This result derives from the shortcomings of the registration system and does not show even the volume of emigration. The young generations, mostly in their twenties and thirties, make up the majority also of emigrating foreigners and the emigrating native-born people. At the same time, the proportion of the sexes shows much higher proportion of men, as typical for migrating populations irrespectively of time or region. Men made up 60-70 percent almost every year. (Gödri 2010)

The deficiency of the Hungarian statistics of emigrations can be checked comparing the yearly number of emigrating Hungarian citizens with the total number of Hungarian immigrants appearing in the most affected Western European countries in a given year. This deficiency of the Hungarian statistics causes several problems in understanding and analyzing migration in scientific research. In several outcomes we can find this even in research hypotheses based on wrong data. Áron Kincses and Mária Rédei figure Hungary as a migrant receiving country in recent years despite all international results showing the opposite. (Kincses – Rédei 2009) But similar mistake can be found in other researches about net migration in Hungary. (Fox 2010) Hungarian policy had never taken into consideration migrational data so far deficiencies caused no problems either.

Table 3: Immigrants to different countries from Hungary (born) (thousand)

Target country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Germany	16,9	17,0	16,5	14,3	17,4	18,6	18,7	22,2	-	-	-
Austria	2,8	3,0	2,4	2,7	3,2	3,5	3,7	4,5	5,2	-	-
United Kingdom	2,3	3,2	1,3	2,0	4,1	1,1	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,6	0,8	1,3	2,1	1,4	1,0	0,9
Netherland	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,6	0,6	0,6	1,0	1,7	2,0	-
Sweden	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,5	0,8	1,0	0,9	0,8

In the larger part of the period before 2004 in question over 20 000 Hungarian nationals were registered as immigrants in the countries of Europe, which obviously is not the full number of emigrants (only its lower limit) since Hungarian citizens may have emigrated to other continents as well. The growth from 2004 indicates that the accession of Hungary to the European Union contributed to the increase of emigration, despite every suggestion based on the National Statistical Office data. (Hárs 2008) The primary target country

within Europe was Germany with over 70 per cent of all emigrants from Hungary on average. A much smaller but still significant group of emigrants went to Austria and in the past decade also to the United Kingdom, but we can see an increasing number of Hungarians also in Belgium since the early 90's (Rajabaly – Hermia 2005) and a growing number in Spain since 2007. Summing up the annual number of Hungarian emigrants on the basis of the statistics of the receiving countries it can be established that between 1994 and 2006 at least 300,000 Hungarian citizens left for various European countries. The number of those who have returned since then is not known but it can be assumed that the individuals who had themselves registered as immigrants abroad planned to stay there for a long time, if not for good. On January 1, 2008 Hungarian citizens in the countries of Europe numbered about 121 000, 60 200 of them lived in Germany and 19 300 in Austria. These figures do not contain those who gained citizenship in one of these countries in the meantime. (Gödri 2010 p. 120) Also excluded the number of emigrants to the US from Hungary: about thousand annually. (Koudela 2011b)

In case of the UK there is anxiety that there is a brain drain, whereby workers are being trained in their home countries resulting high costs for those governments, but their skills and talents are not being used in the domestic economy. This is often related to specific skills or sectors. In Hungary, for example, between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2005, 2.2 percent of all doctors applied for the diploma notification and this proportion was even bigger (seven to eight percent) among anesthetists, pulmonologists and plastic surgeons. (Clark – Hardy 2011 p. 19)

For understanding changing migration patterns we must consider that not only the numbers of emigrants in an East-West direction are rapidly increasing but also repeating and circular migration makes the more and more significant part of all international migration in the EU. With the emerging of cheap flights – lead to the fall of national company, Malév in 2011 – circulation became easier for those living in Eastern European countries. The first low-cost flight departed from Hungary in 2003 and the Ferihegy 1 Terminal was rebuilt in 2005 for these Airlines. As a direct result the numbers of passengers had grown with 46 % from 2004 to 2005 mostly because of the low-cost flights. It was deliberately mentioned at first despite of the enlargement of the EU in the same year. The latter had its obvious effects and had a great number of literature and analysis. The previous are less adverted even as a part of changed lifestyle in Hungary. The GDP per Capita increased from 4 412 USD to 12 850 USD from 1995 to 2010 in Hungary and the and even purchasing power standard (in Euros) has doubled in this period.

Another important aspect of the increasing East-West migration is about those have ever tries to work abroad. They have useful experience for themselves and for others. And those still working in a Western European country can help ones have intention to do so. The theory of transplanted networks seems to be more relevant overviewing the growing importance of

community sites, forums and so on in the last decade. My own interview based researches with Hungarians live in the UK shows a similar picture. (Koudela 2011a)

5. CONCLUSION

We can state that current migrational trends are influenced not only by structural labor market differences and economic powers any more. Migrants still contribute economic achievement as long as wage gaps remain large enough. More accurately traditional directions and trends keep on but are boosted by changed technical and social circumstances. Easier travelling, growing amount of experiences in foreign countries labor markets and regulations accumulated by circular migrants and allocated by networks help increasing international migration in an East-West direction. General direction is still maintained by macroeconomic differences, but individual decisions are more embedded into earlier experiences and globalization. We had no aim to predict migrational trends for the future not in Hungary or any other country but the question is still open despite all, and current data suggest that the question can't easily be answered.

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