

REASONS FOR THE NEGLECTED KHOJALY GENOCIDE IN THE NEGLECTED NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

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Abstract: *If “more than 600 people were killed” intentionally by one group of people on February 26, 1992 in Khojaly, Azerbaijan, why is it that the dominant member states of the international community—specifically the European Union (EU), the Organization of Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—have not accepted that the massacre was genocide, while only three states, Mexico, Pakistan and Colombia, have already recognized it as such (“Pakistani Senate Recognizes” 2012)? Global powers do not recognize the case as genocide, not because the killings were not committed at a level of genocide, but because of two key factors: first, confirmation of the occurrence of the genocide does not benefit their international political and economic interests and second, recognition does not benefit their internal political interests (defined by interest groups). This research paper develops an existing argument of the primacy of the theory of Realpolitik in light of neglected human rights issues, in this case the Khojaly massacre. The paper builds on the main theory of the clash between human rights and realism and then outlines the shortcomings of the limited literature on the Khojaly massacre. The paper focuses on nine countries that have played an important role in the discussion of the recognition of the massacre (U.S., Russia, France, Germany, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, Mexico, and UK), and observes their current approach to the issue through expert opinion and data that strongly yields evidence for the realist approach of certain countries in discussing the Khojaly massacre.*

Keywords: *Hodjaly, Massacre, Genocide, Nagorno-Karabakh, Realism, Human Rights.*

İHMAL EDİLMİŞ DAĞLIK-KARABAĞ ANLAŞMAZLIĞINDA, HOCALI SOYKIRIMI'NIN İHMAL EDİLMESİNİN NEDENLERİ

Öz: Eğer, 26 Şubat 1992 tarihinde Hocalı, Azerbaycan'da 600'den fazla insan kasıtlı olarak bir grup tarafından öldürüldü ise; neden uluslararası camianın baskın üye ülkeleri [özellikle de Avrupa Birliği (AB), Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı (AGİT), ve Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi (BMGK)] katliamın soykırım olduğunu kabul etmedi de; Meksika, Pakistan ve Kolombiya bu şekilde tanıdı? Küresel güçler, cürümün soykırım düzeyinde işlenmemesinden değil, iki anahtar sebep ile vakayı soykırım olarak tanımamaktadırlar. Bunların birincisi, olayların soykırım olarak teyit edilmesinin uluslar arası siyasi ve ekonomik çıkarlarına yararı olmaması; ikincisi ise, ikrarın iç siyasi çıkarlara (çıkar gruplarınca tanımlanan) fayda sağlamamasıdır. Bu çalışma, var olan Realpolitik teorisinin önceliği savını, ihmal edilmiş İnsan Hakları meselelerinin ışığında (Bu hususta Hocalı Katliamı), geliştirmektedir. Çalışma insan hakları ve realizm arasındaki çarpışma teorisine dayanmaktadır ve Hocalı Katliamı üzerine yazın sınırlılığının eksikliğini özetlemektedir. Çalışma, katliamın tanınmasında önemli rol oynayan dokuz ülkeye odaklanır (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Rusya, Fransa, Almanya, Türkiye, İsrail, Pakistan, Meksika ve Birleşik Krallık), ve bu ülkelerin meseleye şimdiki yaklaşımlarını; Hocalı Katliamını tartışırken belirli ülkelerin realist yaklaşımına güçlü kanıtlar sağlayan uzman görüşü ve veriler ışığında gözlemler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Hocalı, Katliam, Soykırım, Dağlık Karabağ, Realizm, İnsan Hakları.*

Background

1. Historical Overview

After gaining their independence in 1991, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated. Because they had “retain[ed] their old borders,” Nagorno-Karabakh remained part of Azerbaijan. Aware that any claim on Karabakh would risk its international standing, Armenia recognized it as an “independent” state.¹ This led to war, in which the Armenians

¹ Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003), p.161.

attacked the town of Khojaly² On 25-26 February, the Armenians along with the Soviet 366th Regiment surrounded the town. With “only one exit [open] out of Khojaly,” the civilians in an attempt to escape “emerged onto” the Armenian village of Nakhichevanik, where they were shot.³ The statement by Serzh Sarkisian, the Armenian military leader, that the Armenians were “able to break” the Azerbaijani stereotype that “the Armenians...could not raise their hand against the civilian population” made the massacre appear as an intentional act of killing.

2. International Stance

It is vital to understand the role of the nine countries observed in the Khojaly massacre before analyzing the reasons behind their approach to the issue.

USA—The “commercial interests [of the U.S.] in the region” shape its interest in having “a favorable business investment climate rather than” resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh” conflict.⁴ It signed the “Bilateral Investment Treaty with Azerbaijan,” which specifies that it would aid Azerbaijan “to develop its economy” through “conditions more favorable to U.S. private investment”.⁵

Russia—Russia has continuously sought “military presence,” as well as a part in the “oil and natural gas concessions in Azerbaijan”.⁶ As a “regional power,” it “kept Turkish ambitions in check”.⁷ Armenia has been its “reliable ally” in the Caucasus.⁸

France—Initially, France participated ‘without any knowledge in the region, the core of the conflict, without any tools of pressure on the parties’.⁹ It now is mostly interested in creating energy agreements with Azerbaijan.¹⁰

2 Ibid. pp. 169-170.

3 Ibid. p. 170

4 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994) p. 31.

5 William J. Clinton, 2002. “Letter of Transmittal” *Investment Treaty With Azerbaijan* (Washington : U.S. G.P.O, 2000) p. 2.

6 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. pp. 31-32.

7 Ibid. p. 32.

8 Ibid. p. 31.

9 Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003), p. 229.

10 Svantee Cornell, *Azerbaijan Since Independence*. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2011), p. 15.

Turkey—Turkey has supported Azerbaijan and recognizes “Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory”.¹¹ The Armenians have tried to improve relations with Turkey¹², primarily because the reopening of “the closed borders” would reduce “transport costs between Armenia and Turkey...by between a third and a half”.¹³

UK—UK has had “interests in oil equipment, communications and agriculture, and they are poised for further investment in banking and insurance” in Azerbaijan.¹⁴

Germany—The Republic has acted mainly through the EU and seeks energy supply from Azerbaijan.¹⁵

Israel—Azerbaijan had been an area of asylum for Jews during World War II, for which the Israelis have been very grateful.¹⁶ There has been an escalation in the trade relations between the two, as Azerbaijan recently purchased 1.6\$ billion worth of military goods from Israel. Azerbaijan supplies 30% of Israel’s energy.¹⁷

Mexico—Mexico is one of the three countries that has recognized the Khojaly massacre as genocide. It has interests in improving trade relations with Azerbaijan.¹⁸

Pakistan—Pakistan is also one of the three countries that has recognized the Khojaly massacre as genocide and has not recognized Armenia.¹⁹

11 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994) p. 33.

12 Ibid p. 33.

13 Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003) p. 277.

14 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994) p. 35.

15 Federal Foreign Office, “Azerbaijan” *Auswaertiges*, 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/Aserbajdschan_node.html. Last Accessed: February 2012.

16 “Researchers of Holocaust Visit Exhibition Devoted to Khojaly Genocide.” *Contact*, February 24 2012, <http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/Politics/02242287en.html>, Last Accessed: February 27, 2012.

17 Sheera Frenkel, “Israel’s New Ties to Azerbaijan” *The Miami Herald*, April 26 2012, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/04/26/2768826/israels-new-ties-to-azerbaijan.html>, Last Accessed: February 17, 2012.

18 “Azerbaijan, Mexico to Boost Energy Cooperation” *New Europe*, November 15, 2009, <http://www.neurope.eu/article/azerbaijan-mexico-boost-cooperation>, Accessed March 10 , 2012.

19 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Pakistan Worldview: Report-21: Visit to Azerbaijan* (December 2008), http://www.foreignaffairscommittee.org/includes/content_files/Report%2021%20-

Conceptual Framework

The seeming appropriateness of the definition of “genocide” (provided by the Convention of Genocide) to the case of Khojaly is what initiated my questioning of why the massacre—the “killing [of] a number of usually helpless...human beings under circumstances of atrocity”²⁰ — has not been officially recognized as genocide. Genocide is “any...act... committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (Convention on Genocide). These “acts” include: “killing members of the group”; “causing serious ...harm to...the group”; intentionally “inflicting on the group conditions of life...to bring about its physical destruction”; prescribing “measures...to prevent births within the group”; and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Convention on Genocide). Since the Convention states “any of the following acts,” the killing of 613 people, instructed by the Armenian government²¹, appears to at least apply to the first condition, making this massacre (as defined by Merriam-Webster) an act of genocide.

The clash between human rights and realism further contributed to my questioning of the reasons behind the lack of attention attributed to the case of the massacre in the international community. (As noted in the introduction, the international community refers to the member states of the EU, OSCE, and the UNSC—bodies that have been active in addressing the issue.) In *Diplomacy of Conscience*, Ann Marie Clark discusses this clash, conveying “human rights norms as challenges to sovereignty”²². If as Clark notes “the legal force of human rights claims...has grown”²³, why is it that only three states have recognized the Khojaly massacre? Thus, the state seems to remain dominant, as explained by the theory of political realism—a theory that “consider(s) the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests” and view “the relevance of ethical norms to” state relations with “skepticism”.²⁴

²⁰ Visit%20to%20Azerbaijan.pdf, Last Accessed April 3, 2012.

²⁰ “Massacre,” *Merriam-Webster*, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/massacre?show=0>, Last Accessed March 14, 2012.

²¹ Besir Mustafayev, “Ermeni Devlet Terörünün Eseri: 26 Subat 1992 Hocalı Soykırımı Üzerine,” *KaradenizArastirmalari* 29, trans. JeylanMammadova (2011). <http://search.proquest.com/docview/865320136?accountid=12605>, Last Accessed February 17, 2012, pp. 23-41.

²² Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) p. 22.

²³ *Ibid.* p. 23.

²⁴ Julian W. Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University, 2010) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/>, Last Accessed 17 Feb. 2012.

Clark challenges this theory through the case of the success of Amnesty International in “elicit[ing] expectations of governmental accountability”.²⁵ The notion that states are influenced by international norms and institutions “because of a sense of obligation” further counters the theory behind the primacy of states.²⁶ However, still bearing in mind that multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN) are run by states, Dani Rodrik’s argument on the dominance of the nation-state in an age of globalization appears more convincing (especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, in which it was states and not global institutions that carried the responsibility to deal with the issue). He indicates that “economic, social, and political activity remains clustered on the basis of... needs...that vary around the globe.” For him, “solutions” to “challenges” still remain in the nation-state.²⁷

Thus, “international recognition” of those who “seek to conceal their crimes” is “difficult,” as diplomats are constrained by “*Realpolitik* strategies that place a higher value on protecting national security than on” human rights.²⁸ While all differ in the degree of violence conducted, why is it that international “diplomacy” failed in East Timor and Rwanda? Alvarez answers, saying that “since most states practice variants of *Realpolitik*, a policy that values...self-interest through the pursuit of power, individual states may be [unsuitable] agents for genocide identification”.²⁹ Hence, it appears that the state, although challenged by human rights norms, still remains dominant. Human rights norms, established in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights³⁰ are too new to have a strong effect on the nation-state—a product of the French Revolution”.³¹ This may mean that it is the lack of the state interest in the Khojaly massacre that has resulted in the few official recognitions of it as genocide.

What then influences the nation-states’ interests? Some like Thomas Amboriso and Eric M. Uslaner claim that “ethnic interest groups” (in the U.S.) influence American foreign policy. These groups (in the U.S.)

25 Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*, p. 17.

26 Ibid. p. 30.

27 Dani Rodrik, “The Nation-State Reborn,” *Project Syndicate*, (2012) <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rodrik67/English>, Last Accessed February 17, 2012.

28 Alex Alvarez, Governments, *Citizens and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) p. 137.

29 Ibid. p. 142.

30 Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*, p. 11.

31 Dani Rodrik, “The Nation-State Reborn,” *Project Syndicate*.

will be evaluated as “political organizations established along cultural, ethnic, religious or racial lines which seek to directly and indirectly influence American foreign policy in support of their homeland and/or ethnic kin abroad”.³²

Others, such as Robert Dalziel and Takayuki Yoshioka, agree that interest and pressure groups influence policymaking; these groups will be evaluated (in areas specified in the introduction) as “often voluntary organizations representing the views of individuals that share some political, social or other goals”.³³ “Lobbying” is what “interest groups” do “to influence public policy”.³⁴

As active actors, diasporas—“people with a common origin who reside...outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland”—also have an impact on their hostland’s foreign policy.³⁵ Barth and Shain explore the “aspects affecting the efficiency of diasporic influence” through factors of “degree of motivation,” nature of homeland and hostland, as well as the “strength [of] relations between the hostland and homeland”—concepts that are difficult to quantitatively measure. Therefore, this study identifies diaspora organizations (any advocacy groups that are organized by one diaspora), population, and political parties (that support the cause of or are led by a diaspora) as measures of the diaspora’s impact on the hostland’s foreign policy. Besides such internal political influences, the states’ economic interests will also be evaluated through their total trade (exports and imports) with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Because Azerbaijan has oil and natural gas, any country’s economic activity in Azerbaijan will impact that country’s approach towards the massacre.

This study will also examine the role of media (newspapers) in addressing the issue. While newspapers provide information appealing to the public opinion, if popular and credible, they will also address important issues in foreign affairs.

32 Thomas Ambrosio, “Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups,” *Review of International Affairs* 2 (1), 2002, pp. 24-45, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/60474963?accountid=12605>, p. 26.

33 Robert Dalziel, “Interest and Pressure Groups,” *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, edited by Anheier K. Helmut and Toepler Stefan. Springer Science and Business Media, LLC, 2010. Last Accessed February 17, 2012. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/p8261g22480k2h4m/fulltext.html>, . Last Accessed: February 17, 2012, p. 1.

34 Yoshioka Takayuki, “Lobbying” *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, edited by Helmut K. Anheier and Stefan Toepler (Springer Science and Business Media, LLC, 2010) Last Accessed: February 17, 2012, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/g99275524517601g/fulltext.html> p.1.

35 Aharon Barth and Shain Yossi, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory” *International Organization*, Volume 57, Issue 03, pp 449-479 (The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press, July 24 2003) Last Accessed: March 25, 2012, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573015>, pp. 452-453.

IV. Literature Review

Mustafayev Besir presents a historical account of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in his “Armenian State’s Work of Terror: On the 26 February 1992 Khojaly Genocide.” He highlights the relationship between the Armenians and the West by noting that “using their religion...the Armenians have always... pulled the West to their side... and always sided with the strong”.³⁶ For him, they took advantage of any opportunity they found in the West (U.S. and Western Europe), as they “did with the Byzantines, Iranians and the Ottomans”.³⁷

Furthermore, he emphasizes that despite the decisions of the Council of European Union (CEU) and the UNSC, Armenians continue to occupy the Karabagh territory.³⁸ However, while he notes that “the countries defending international law... [and] having criticized Turkey for the [Armenian] genocide...have...ignored the [Turk-Azeri] genocide”³⁹, he does not stress the lack of decisions by the CEU and the UNSC on the Khojaly massacre. Also, while he suggests that “those who are responsible” for the killings in Khojaly should be prosecuted through international law to make the other states become aware of the massacre⁴⁰, he does not specify what “international law” is and by whom it should be enforced.

In another piece, the “Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups,” Thomas Ambrosio highlights the “role of ethnic interest groups in the foreign policy process”.⁴¹ He stresses that Armenian lobbyists were the cause of Congress’s support “for the...annexation of...15[%]...of Azerbaijani territory,” contrary to” official US policy” that supports the” territorial integrity of all Soviet successor states”.⁴² Ambrosio notes that the “American-Armenian lobby” is fortunate, as no one really knew the issues that they were promoting in the 1990s.

36 Besir Mustafayev, “Ermeni Devlet Terörünün Eseri: 26 Subat 1992 Hocalı Soykırımı Üzerine,” p. 2.

37 Ibid. pp. 2-3.

38 Ibid. p. 13.

39 Ibid. p. 16.

40 Ibid. p. 16.

41 Ibid. p. 25.

42 Thomas Ambrosio, “Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups” p. 25.

He further stresses that Azerbaijani lobbying “only [began] in 1993,” and “grew once... [Azerbaijan’s] oil exports and...[its] alliance with some pro-Israeli lobbies” garnered U.S. interest⁴³, indicating the link between U.S. interests and its foreign policy. Still for the most part of the early 1990s, the U.S. supported Armenia due to the “perceptions of Azerbaijan promoted by the Armenian-American” lobbyists,”⁴⁴

However, while Ambrosio prefers to maintain a diplomatic stance⁴⁵, he does not do so as he points to the Armenian takeover of Khojaly, Shusha, and Lachin and their one-sided report on the abuses the Armenians faced.⁴⁶ Noting the “defeat” of the Wilson Amendment, which would have allowed the Clinton Administration to provide more aid to the Azerbaijanis, Ambrosio conveys the “greater importance” of holding “a tough stance against Azerbaijan” over providing aid to “the one million Azeri refugees”.⁴⁷

Evgeny Finkel’s “In Search of Lost Genocide: Historical Policy and International Politics in Post-1989 Eastern Europe” introduces a new notion “discuss[ing] the tendency of many post-communist states to present their past sufferings as genocides”⁴⁸ in four cases, including the Khojaly massacre.⁴⁹ He exemplifies the “commemoration day,” 31 March, on which events are arranged for “the highest state officials” to “attend,” as an occasion that has gathered much attention.⁵⁰ Although, he discusses the support provided by the “Turkish Diaspora and the Turkish state” as well as the growing attention to the massacre in the Capitol Hill and in Israel,⁵¹ he presents these advancements as part of a “genocide narrative”.⁵²

While Finkel states that his article does not aim “to determine whether the killings” were committed at the level of genocide⁵³, he presents the Khojaly massacre as a case of “post-Soviet historical narrative

43 Ibid. p. 30.

44 Ibid. p. 33.

45 Ibid. p. 37.

46 Ibid. p. 38.

47 Ibid. p. 39.

48 Ibid. p. 51.

49 Ibid. p. 57.

50 Evgeny Finkel, “In Search of Lost Genocide: Historical Policy and International Politics in Post-1989 Eastern Europe,” *Global Society* 24 (1), pp. 51-70. 2010, doi:10.1080/13600820903432027, p. 58.

51 Ibid. p. 59.

52 Ibid. p. 60.

53 Ibid. p. 52.

construction”⁵⁴, which correlates with his definition of “historical mythmaking” or “historical policy”—reviving “public discourse about the past by means of different forms of institutionalizing it” for purposes, such as “state-building”.⁵⁵ Hence, he implies that the claims of genocide are not authentic. The comparison of the Khojaly to the claims of genocide in other areas of Eastern and Central Europe ignores the reasons (such as Armenian-American lobbyist activities) to the Azerbaijani struggle in promoting its cause. He also ignores whether or not the international community identifies the “narratives” as genocides.

In *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, Svante E. Cornell provides a detailed account of Azerbaijan since its independence from USSR. He observes the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in light of the foreign (primarily Western and Middle Eastern) involvement in Azerbaijan. He highlights the failure of the international community to resolve the the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (hence, also the Khojaly massacre). Cornell questions the efficiency of the Minsk Group (whose co-chairs are France, U.S. and Russia) in dealing with the issue by emphasizing that the Group is where diplomats (even though they do not) have to make decisions apart from their political leadership. He also notes Azerbaijan’s “sensitiv[ity] to political changes in Russia, Turkey, Iran, and...the United States”.⁵⁶ He further underscores Turkey’s failure to “achieve its full potential for a strong Turkish presence in Azerbaijan”⁵⁷, pointing to Turkey’s fear that the Armenian lobby in the U.S. could cause Congress to “ban...military aid to” it.⁵⁸ Cornell justifies this fear by noting Section 907a that banned “all government...assistance by the United States to Azerbaijan” until the Azerbaijani government “cease[d] all...offensive uses” against the Armenians⁵⁹⁻⁶⁰. The strength of Armenian lobbies is further shown with the ignorance of Senator John F. Kerry (who drafted the act) about the conflict⁶¹. Essentially, the West (U.S. and Western Europe) had failed as it also continued “development cooperation,” focusing on everything but the conflict⁶².

54 Ibid. p. 57.

55 Ibid. p. 53.

56 Svantee Cornell, *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, p. 172.

57 Ibid. p. 172.

58 Ibid. p. 370.

59 Ibid. p. 405.

60 Ibid. p. 370.

61 Ibid. p. 406.

62 Ibid. p. 196.

Overall Cornell does an excellent job in conveying the interests of great powers in Azerbaijan. However, he addressed everything about Azerbaijan, but the Khojaly massacre—a vital part of Azerbaijani history. Although he discusses the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he fails to mention a key event that very much shapes Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy.

As shown, the shortcomings of the literature on this topic convey the lack of research exploring the direct link between states' interests and their obligation to the international community. Most literature focuses on failed diplomacy in dealing with state violations of human rights. Also, due to the recent occurrence of the massacre, the literature on this topic is still very limited.

Research Methodology—

I employed mixed methods (a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods). I relied on available data and unstructured interviews for my qualitative methods, and used descriptive statistics for my quantitative data. This research paper focuses on Russia, U.S., France, UK, and Germany—the key countries that have the power to influence the views of other states in the international community regarding this issue. It also examines the roles of Mexico and Pakistan (to see why they accepted the Khojaly massacre as genocide) as well as Israel, whose trade relations with Azerbaijan have recently escalated. (Colombia is not included as it recognized the massacre recently, leaving no time for careful analysis.)

I conducted unstructured interviews with two diplomats from the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Together they were expected to provide a diplomatic and a legal view of the issue. These diplomats have served in Europe and in the Middle East and thus have a thorough understanding of the different approaches of the designated countries to the issue. (For security purposes the names of the two diplomats are not provided.)

To balance the Azerbaijani interviewees, I also interviewed five professors specializing in different aspects of international relations, including Russian and Eurasian Studies, Politics, International Security and Human Rights, and Mexican History. (Again, the names of the professors are not provided for security purposes). Each professor was

expected to provide an objective view that may be lacking in the information provided by the other interviewees. The seven interviewees were each asked to describe the role of the countries observed in the Khojaly massacre.

Unfortunately, I did not have access to Armenian sources, as their embassy officials are very sensitive to any discussion of the topic. Existing interviews proved to also be insufficient as they primarily focus on Armenian officials and academics rejecting the massacre.

After conducting all of the interviews, responses were categorized into overlapping subjects of discussion. For each of the countries observed there were three to four categories that were most widely addressed in all of the interviews. These categories were then reorganized into broader categories, such as economic, religious and other factors shaping the state approach to the issue (Table 1). The fact that all of the interviewees have knowledge of the issue, but have a different vocational focus, adds validity to the identified categories.

For descriptive statistics, data was compiled regarding the Azerbaijani and Armenian diaspora activity in the countries observed. Data regarding the current number of main diaspora organizations, political parties, and population were collected to analyze the impact of each diaspora on the designated countries. "Diaspora organizations" were chosen according to their significance, which was identified by whether they supported either diaspora. (Because Azerbaijani and Armenian organizations are commonly opposed to one another, the activities of one strive to inhibit the activities of the other). All of the organizations identified themselves either Azerbaijani or Armenian, and transnational organizations were not included.

To measure the importance of the case in the media, newspapers were chosen from a list provided by "4 International Media and Newspapers" on the 200 most popular world newspapers. This source ranks the newspapers through data from an algorithm of three "independent web metrics".⁶³ The newspapers selected have an English version, to ensure that they are accessible to an audience beyond their local one. Lexis-Nexis was used to find how many times the Khojaly massacre was covered in "all news" from the years of 1990-2012. Such would show how many times the massacre was addressed and indicate any existing trend.

63 "About Us," *4IMN (4 International Media & Newspapers)*, 2012, <http://www.4imn.com/menu/about.htm#ranking>, Last Accessed: March 20, 2012.

Data were also collected on the total trade (exports and imports) of each country with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Different sources had to be used, as all of the data could not be provided by one source. However, for accuracy, sources containing data for the same years were compared and if the difference was none or negligible, only then were the new data sources used. Then the mean of all of the total trade was calculated and ranked. (Because data for trade in 1997-2010 was not available for all of the countries, to ensure consistency the mean was calculated only for the years of 2008-2010 (Appendix II).

Finally, using all of the descriptive statistics, a scale was created to measure the involvement of each country in the issue and its economic relationship with Azerbaijan. If the economic interest was 50% or higher than any of the other factors accounting for the overall involvement of the country in the issue, then it was assumed that there is little interest in the massacre. (Because there is no information on the specific investment of each country in the Khojaly massacre, the “economic interest” was measured by the country’s total trade with Azerbaijan as the percentage of its overall involvement in the issue.) The overall involvement was determined by other factors: the resolutions passed (state, local, country), total trade with Azerbaijan, military interests in Azerbaijan, media coverage (data used from the top newspapers) and finally recognition of the issue by individuals in the political realm of each country (collected through news articles in the “all news” search of Lexis-Nexis).

Findings:

Qualitative: The interviews show a strict emphasis on economic and political factors (measured by the impact of the Armenian lobby, regional dominance/influence, and fear of another power) (Table 1). In all of the interviews, interest in Azerbaijani oil and natural gas was mentioned for every country and by at least 50% of the interviewees. For eight of the nine countries, 83.33% of the interviewees or higher discussed the countries’ interest in Azerbaijani oil and natural gas. Moreover, the impact of the Armenian lobby appears strongest in the U.S. and France and somewhat in Turkey, conveying the strength of the Armenian lobby in those areas. Religion was a factor discussed (for five of the nine countries observed), but there was no agreement as to where it would have a strong influence. There appears to be an emphasis on the “past” for Russia and Pakistan. (Russia was treated as the ally of Armenia, whereas Pakistan was treated as the ally of Azerbaijan).

Table 1: Responses (by % of Interviewees) Arranged Into Categories

Factors	Religion	Economic Interest (Oil and	Impact of AR Lobby	Past	Regional Influence	Fear Larger Power	Military	Human Rights
Countries								
USA	33.33%	100%	100%	33.33%	50%	0	0%	14.27%
UK	0	100%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	50%	83.33%		0	0	50%	0
Russia	50.00%	100%	50%	83.33%	100%	0	50%	0
France	33.33%	83.33%	83.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Turkey	14.27%	83.33%	50%	50%	83.33%	33.30%	0.00%	0.00%
Germany	0	100%	0	33.33%	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	16.66%	83.33%	0	83.33%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Mexico	0	100%	0	0	0	0		14.27%

However, there also appears to be no consensus on the factors of military, human rights, or fear of larger powers. Moreover, while most of the emphasis is on economic and internal political influence (lobby groups), external political factors, such as the past allegiances, as well as fear of a stronger power, show the importance of the political interests of these countries.

Quantitative:

Table 2: Diasporic Influence (See Appendix I for details on measurement) All in Single Units

Column 1	AZ MD Orgs.	AR MD Orgs.	AZ P. P.	AR P. P.	AR P	AZ P
UK	6	13	0	0	15-20,000	70,000
Germany	30	40	0	0	40000	300,000
France	6	500	0	0	450-500,000	70,000
US	20	29	0	3	1,200,000	1,000,000
Russia	10	*	0	0	1182388	603070
Turkey	21	35	0	0.5	82,000	3,000,000
Mexico	0	0	0	0	400	26,000
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	350,000
Israel	1	5	0	0	13000	-


As shown in Table 2, Armenian diaspora organizations (AR MD Orgs.) heavily outnumber Azerbaijani organizations (AZ MD Orgs.) in all of the countries. The difference is largest for France, where Armenian diaspora organizations outnumber the Azerbaijani organizations by a ratio of 250: 3. As for the population, the Armenian diaspora is mostly dominant in France, U.S. Russia, and Israel. Likewise, the Azerbaijani population is comparatively larger in the UK, Germany, Turkey, Mexico, and Pakistan. This corresponds to the current political relations between Azerbaijan (AZ P) and the four countries in which its population is larger than the Armenian population (AR P). However, even though Armenia has a smaller population than that of Azerbaijan in Turkey, the direct support for its diaspora by a political party⁶⁴ in Turkey is indicative of stronger political activity by the Armenian diaspora. Likewise, the three Armenian political parties in the U.S. provide the Armenian diaspora with a strong and accessible political platform.

With a stronger Armenian political presence in the U.S. and in Turkey, it would be difficult to pass any parliamentary resolutions on the Khojaly massacre. Likewise, with the stronger Armenian lobby presence in France, it seems almost impossible to address the Khojaly massacre at a political level. In Pakistan and Mexico, where the Armenian presence is smaller (in population), stronger political activity regarding the Khojaly massacre is possible without much Armenian protest. UK, Germany, and Israel appear to be less influenced by either diaspora.

Furthermore, the Khojaly Massacre has been increasingly addressed by world newspapers within the past seven years. As shown in Figure 3, before 2008 the issue was addressed minimally. This could correspond to the increasing interest in Azerbaijani oil and natural gas supplies particularly in the past five years (see appendix 1).

64 Vercihan Zifioglu, "Forgotten Community Seeks to Join Elections With New Party" *Hürriyet Daily News*, May 5, 2011, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=a-forgotten-community-seeks-to-join-elections-with-a-new-party-2011-05-16>, Last Accessed: April 2, 2012.


Figure 3: How Many Times the Khojaly Massacre Addressed in World Newspapers (1992-2012)



Source: Data compiled from AllNews.“Khojaly” LexisNexis.
[http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?](http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/)

Turkey’s *Hurriyet* addressed the massacre the most; Russian *Kommersant* and U.S.’ *The New York Times* were the second and third newspapers in addressing the massacre the most. All of the other newspapers (shown in Figure 4) hardly addressed the issue, conveying a lack of importance placed on the topic in the political agenda of the corresponding country. Moreover, the English editions of the newspapers didn’t address the issue at all (except *Hurriyet Daily News*), meaning that the issue wasn’t important enough to be shared with an international audience.

Figure 4: Number of Times Khojaly Was Addressed in the World’s Most Popular Ranked Newspapers (since 1992)



As shown in Figure 5, Azerbaijan’s major trading partner is the U.S., whereas Armenia’s major trading partner is Russia. The U.S. (the fourth largest trading partner of Armenia), does not have high trade attachments to Armenia, as it does to Azerbaijan. However, the trade relations of Armenia with Russia convey the openness of the Armenian economy to Russian trade (which is much less welcome in Azerbaijan)⁶⁵. Azerbaijan

65 Svantee Comell, *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, pp. 349-353.

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has the smallest trade with Turkey, while Turkey ranks as the third largest trading partner of Armenia. This could explain the reluctance of Turkey to officially recognize the Khojaly massacre, and the continuous desire of the Armenians to maintain and improve relations with Turkey. Germany in terms of (trade relations) appears to be a neutral party, as it ranks second for both. Pakistan’s trade relations with Azerbaijan (which are much higher than with Armenia) imply another factor of its support for Azerbaijan in the larger Karabakh conflict.

Table 5: Trade Relations in thous. USD (Ranked From Smallest to Largest)

AZERBAIJAN			ARMENIA	
Country	Mean	(thous. USD)	Country	Mean (thous. USD)
Turkey	4902.48		Pakistan	3819.8
Russia	5019.74667		Mexico	4706.83333
UK	961271.463		Israel	20777.6667
Israel	1129643.44		UK	51996.7333
Mexico	1888909.65		France	100453.133
France	2167945.65		USA	217611.633
Pakistan	2269046.99		Turkey	220185.667
Germany	2829274.68		Germany	357756.667
USA	2999685.96		Russia	984931.6

Finally a scale was created to measure each country’s involvement in the issue, including each country’s economic involvement in Azerbaijan (Figure 6). For most of the countries, economic interest in Azerbaijan surpasses any of the other factors accounting for their overall involvement in the issue. Some 26.47% of the U.S. involvement is economic interest and about 43% is accounted for by the resolutions passed. The rest of the involvement in the issue comprises of media and individual statements of recognition. (This is a relatively balanced involvement in the issue.) Some 50% of UK’s involvement is solely economic and the rest of its involvement in the issue is through the media. About 58.33% of Israeli involvement is economic and therefore, having little to do with the issue itself. 50% of Russian and 54.54% of France’s involvement is economic and the rest of the involvement in the issue is based on media coverage. Turkey is the most balanced between the five indicators with no primacy in either of the categories (22.22% of its involvement is economic). Mexico’s and Pakistan’s involvement is mostly based on the resolutions they passed (as their economic interest is less than 20%).

Figure 6: Scale on Each Country's Involvement in Khojaly in %

Country2	Economic Interest (Total Trade)	Military	Recognition	Media	Resolution
USA	26.47%	5.88%	5.88%	8.82%	52.94%
UK	50%	16.66%		33.33%	
Israel	58.33%	33.33%		8.33%	
Russia	50.00%	10%		40%	
France	54.54%	0		18.18%	
Turkey	22.22%	27.77%	22.22%	27.78%	
Germany	72.72%	18.18%		9.09%	
Mexico	9.09%	0		9.09%	54.55%
Pakistan	15.38%	30.77%		7.69%	46.15%

Moreover, because involvement in the issue is still small (see appendix I), it could be concluded that UK, Israel, Russia, France, and Germany are involved due to economic reasons (meaning more interested in Azerbaijan's resources than in resolving the current conflict). Although the U.S. has a more balanced involvement in the issue, it is important to note that resolutions passed were at state level, which is not likely to influence America's national stance on the issue. Also, although Mexico's and Pakistan's involvement is based on the resolutions they have passed, it is important to bear in mind that each has indicated interest in establishing an economic partnership with Azerbaijan⁶⁶. Only Turkey appears to be the country upholding a balance between the economic, political, and other factors accounting for its involvement. However, Turkey is still more interested in improving economic relations with Armenia than officially recognizing the issue, as its trade costs would markedly decrease if it does so.⁶⁷

Conclusion

As shown by the interviews conducted and the data collected, most of the countries observed have not increasingly addressed the issue, as trade and internal political interest groups are of primary interest to them. Figure 1 and 6 show a very futile overall involvement in the issue (except by Mexico and Pakistan, countries that have officially recognized the massacre). The findings of this research are applicable not only to the case of the Khojaly massacre, but also to other neglected human rights issues whether those that have already experienced failed diplomacy, such as the conflicts in East Timor, Bosnia, and Rwanda or

66 "Pakistan and Azerbaijan to strengthen economic ties" *New Europe*, August 17, 2011, <http://www.neweurope.eu/article/pakistan-and-azerbaijan-strengthen-economic-ties>, Last Accessed: March 3, 2012.

67 Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*, p. 277.

those that are currently experiencing it, such as in Syria. Resolving this issue and the like is thus, essential for understanding and preventing similar conflicts. In order to resolve issues dealing with genocide, the approach of the international community to cases of genocide must first be observed, as it is unlikely (in the case of the Khojaly massacre) that the Azerbaijani nation will ever accept a resolution of the conflict without first addressing the massacre it underwent. Moreover, by observing the approach of key countries (France, Germany, UK, USA, and Russia) in the international community (UNSC, OSCE, and EU) as well as those that are influenced (Turkey and Israel) and that are not influenced (Pakistan and Mexico) by that international community, this research paper sheds light on the role of international bodies (UN, OSCE, and EU) in human rights issues. Further considering that the Armenians were backed by Russian forces in committing such killings⁶⁸, this case resembles a situation where the perpetrators are supported by a global power. What is then the practicality of The Hague and Geneva Conventions as well as of the International Criminal Court if atrocities are not analyzed within a legal context? Ideally, war criminals should be brought to trial when needed and not just when a global power decides it is in its interest to do so, but state interest appears to be an inevitable obstacle at least for the time being. As this study shows, our world is in need of institutions that are not solely based on states, as state interests always outweigh other factors in human rights violations.

68 Besir Mustafayev, "Ermeni Devlet Terörünün Eseri: 26 Subat 1992 Hocalı Soykırımı Üzerine" p. 16.

Appendix 1-Scale of Involvement in Khojaly massacre in Relation to Economic Interest in Azerbaijan

SCALE	Economic	Military	Recognition (statements)	Media	Resolution
USA 34	9	2	Maryland, North Carolina 2	3	Massachusetts, Georgia, Maine, New Jersey, Texas, California=18
UK 6	3	1		2	
Israel 12	7	4		1	
Russia 10	5	1		4	
France 11	6	0		2	
Turkey 18	4	5	4	5	
Germany 11	8	2		1	
Mexico 11	1	0		1	resolution 6
Pakistan 13	2	4		1	resolution 6

Sources: NEWS 2012, ADPRA 2012, TREND 2012, NEWS 2012, NEWS 2012, APA 2012, Today 2012, AZTV 2012, Pakistani Senate 2012

*Economic Interest was ranked by the mean of the total trade of each country for 2008-2010 on a scale of 1-9 (based on Table 5)

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*Military Interest was ranked on a scale of 1-5:

0-No support/No explicit support found

1-Discussion of military aid and stronger cooperation

2-Military cooperation (aid, naval programs, etc.)

3-Civil-military cooperation

4-Military defense cooperation (technology provisions)

5-Guarantor-treaties

6-Full statement that in case of war (Karabakh will support Azerbaijan)

(Russia was given a 1 as there is discussion of increasing cooperation and cooperation whose details are unknown.)

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*Recognition statements (noting the occurrence of the massacre in its commemoration) were ranked on a scale of 1-5

1-statement by statesman or congressman

2-leading political figures encouraging the state to commemorate the event

3-leading political figures encouraging the state to make a public statement regarding the massacre

4-leading political party makes a public statement of recognition

5-leading political party makes an official statement of recognition

*Media is ranked on a scale of 1-5 based on the chart (based on the following Table)

Column1	Original Language
USA: The New York Times	7
UK: The Guardian	4
Ynet News	0
Russia: Kommersant	14
France: Le Monde	3
Turkey: Hurriyet	216
Germany: Bild	0
Mexico: El Universal	0
Pakistan: Dawn	1

Sources: The New York times 2012, The Guardian 2012, YNET, Kommersant, Le Monde 2012, Hurriyet, Bild, El Universal, DawnNEWS

Note: Number that are close to each other like 0 and 1 for Germany and Pakistan and like 3 and 4 for France and the UK, the same rankings were given. (A scale of 1-5 was used to simplify and not exaggerate the impact of the media when evaluating the total involvement of each country).

1-(0-1)

2-(3-4)

3-(5-7)

4-(8-16)

5-(above)

Jeylan MAMMADOVA

*Resolution passed (1-6)

1-written statement of commemoration

2-written statement by a party of recognition

3-written statement by state/locals of recognition

4-working paper on parliamentary recognition in discussion

5-woking paper on parliamentary on conditional recognition passed

6-written statement of parliamentary recognition

Appendix 2-Data collected for trade with Armenia and Azerbaijan in thsd. USD

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Armenia [bisd. USD]	Annual 1996	Annual 1997	Annual 1998	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Means of Trade (2008- 2010)
USA Export	4366.1	7110	11566.9	16008.4	37861.1	52268.2	46238.3	56105.2	70646.2	62219.1	65055.7	51400.3	52831.1	66961	82710.6	
USA Import	103564.5	116086.6	96301.2	85669.3	102675.1	84152.7	52722	111248	88948.8	111310.6	106271.3	144995.7	218755.4	120760.8	110816	
Total Trade	107930.6	123196.6	107868.1	101677.7	140536.2	136420.9	98960.3	167353.2	159595	173529.7	171327	196396	271586.5	187721.8	193526.6	217611.6333
France Export	420.8	42.4	66.2	520.9	466.3	748.4	1123.6	1932.3	1835	2015.3	4128	9427.2	10595.3	5662.9	7485.6	
France Import	12021.1	19460.7	27413.5	12339.8	17558.7	12047.8	12195.8	15455.4	18818.5	47421.5	71070.2	150217.2	127369.6	73539.4	76706.6	
Total Trade	12441.9	19503.1	27479.7	12860.7	18025	12796.2	13319.4	17387.7	20653.5	49436.8	75198.2	159644.4	137964.9	79202.3	84192.2	100453.1333
Germany Export	3682.6	9281.6	9303.1	10200.8	12917.9	11122.3	28164.1	44419.2	83179.6	152108	148027.8	169676.9	183710.5	114963.2	132616.3	
Germany Import	17365.2	26222.2	34037	34244.2	36486.9	33962	42860.8	43761.5	79166.5	141355.8	145334.5	221144.6	255221.9	176046	210712.1	
Total Trade	21047.8	35503.8	43340.1	44445	49404.8	45084.3	71024.9	88180.7	162346.1	293463.8	293362.3	390821.5	438932.4	291009.2	343328.4	357756.6667
UK Export	3198.7	1160.9	8097.8	9443.9	10099.2	20115.5	51091	42566.7	1193.5	419.3	7618.4	2794.6	40840.9	1753.9	382.6	
UK Import	7105.7	10450.5	69136	67031.3	59480.7	91225.2	28239.5	83261.1	11181.5	11279	22117.5	42253.4	44841	30366.4	37805.4	
Total Trade	10304.4	11611.4	77233.8	76475.2	69579.9	111340.7	79330.5	125827.8	12375	11698.3	29735.9	45048	85681.9	32120.3	38188	51996.73333

Sources: WisefTrade, Armstat.

Armenia (USD)	Annual 1996	Annual 1997	Annual 1998	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Mean Trade (2008-2010)
Mexico Export												16.4	0.1	0.1	71.3	
Mexico Import												1240.3	2940.4	3697.3	7411.3	
Total Trade												1256.7	2940.5	3697.4	7482.6	4706.833333
Pakistan Export						105.8						3.2	203.4	94.8	412.5	
Pakistan Import						753.5						5620.5	3823	2792.3	4133.4	
Total Trade												5623.7	4026.4	2887.1	4545.9	3819.8
Russia Export	96141	62898.5	39986.3	33855.5	44559.9	60501.3	64634	94418.2	77897.7	119004.2	121155.6	201542.5	208174.9	107426.3	160507.8	
Russia Import	125497.2	215862.1	191403.2	149877.7	137157.5	173648	192897.6	203374.1	159687.2	242632.4	304170.8	720440.4	851172.5	792241.6	835271.7	
Total Trade	221638.2	278760.6	231389.5	183733.2	181717.4	234149.3	257531.6	297792.3	237584.9	361636.6	425326.4	921982.9	1059347.4	899667.9	95779.5	984931.6
Turkey Export	6031.2	7152.7	2987.5	1128.5	1527.9	1130	1435.8	1154.7	2021.2	2473.4	2370.5	3033	1850.9	1197.5	1291.3	
Turkey Import	6254.5	38395.6	56779.8	40152.2	40462.4	33755.9	38232	36731.8	44804.7	66928	95422.9	130631.3	268187.3	177648.8	210381.2	
Total Trade	12285.7	45548.3	59767.3	41280.7	41990.3	34885.9	39667.8	37886.5	46825.9	69401.4	97793.4	133664.3	270038.2	178846.3	211672.5	220185.6667
Israel Export					17300	33390.8	87713.2	142347.4	98356	112240.6	87447.6	26432.6	4957.9	406.2	4211.3	
Israel Import					19578.1	27593.2	82695.5	123660.4	98416.9	103796.9	87776.9	34755	28242.1	10471.3	14044.2	
Total Trade					36678.1	60984	170408.7	266007.8	196772.9	216037.5	175224.5	61187.6	33200	10877.5	18255.5	20777.66667

Sources: WiserTrade, Armstat, Census with Armenia, NSS RA

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Azerbaijan (USD, USD)	Annual 1997	Annual 1998	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Means of Trade (2006-2010)
USA	122.826,00	210.301,00	55.008,00	64.543,00	69.641,00	119.782,00	158.792,00	132.463,00	231.094,00	177.608,00	239.101,00	185.237,00	252.628,00		
USA Export	62.286,00	210.301,00				0	0							252.628,00	
USA Import	5600	20900	26200	20600	34400	9500	38100	45400000	716.100,00	1.887.400,00	4.360.907,68	1.972.636,44	1.988.547,74		
Total Trade	67.886,00	231.201,00	81.208,00	85.143,00	104.041,00	129.282,00	196.892,00	45.532.463,00	947.194,00	2.065.008,00	4.600.008,68	2.157.873,44	2.241.175,77	2.999.685,96	
France	37,446,75	28,064,56	32,673,76	173,583,02	105,813,13	55,871,48	96,872,13	180,871,33	58,867,84	148,125,12	222,576,84	145,770,08	138,537,61		
France Export	5	173,583,02			105,813,13										
France Import	1,130,66	121,098,91	86,003,00	2,1	148,791,40	168,838,51	109,484,81	492,141,90	1,130,552,68	2,275,763,29	2,372,256,74	1,787,438,51	1,637,257,09		
Total Trade	38,577,41	201,647,58	118,676,76	201,647,58	254,604,53	224,710,06	206,356,94	673,013,23	1,189,420,52	2,423,888,41	2,794,833,58	1,933,208,67	1,775,794,70	2,167,945,65	
Germany	109,001,72	81,864,75	69,970,87	80,951,56	122,019,85	211,473,38	290,326,04	544,177,86	609,130,83	608,784,63	774,930,21	600,650,77	970,329,84		
Germany Export	12,785,27	224,787,55													
Germany Import	121,786,99	306,652,50	252,959,75	326,598,07	394,058,14	432,914,12	501,101,29	396,747,30	784,628,51	1,473,970,23	2,756,921,58	1,672,710,06	1,712,281,57		
Total Trade	121,786,99	306,652,50	252,959,75	326,598,07	394,058,14	432,914,12	501,101,29	396,747,30	784,628,51	1,473,970,23	2,756,921,58	1,672,710,06	1,712,281,57		
UK	92,731,34	53,691,00	44,972,90	52,678,28	84,090,00	224,769,61	470,318,57	374,087,69	870,975,31	481,181,56	565,479,36	429,210,44	669,071,69		
UK Export	8,112,29	18,432,96	9,421,62	7,295,89	14,065,87	23,596,21	20,345,45	70,278,90	611,515,10	622,597,47	456,493,68	656,220,22	127,339,00		
UK Import	100,843,63	72,123,96	54,394,52	59,974,17	98,155,87	248,365,88	490,664,02	444,366,59	1,482,490,41	1,103,779,09	1,021,973,04	1,065,430,66	796,410,69	961,271,46	
Total Trade															
Russia															
Russia Export															
Russia Import															
Total Trade															
														1888909,653	
														1918389,1	

	Annual 1997	Annual 1998	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Means of Trade (2008-2010)
Azerbaijan (USD)															
Israel Export												3605829.6	1236197.29	1744821.9	
Israel Import												80049.48	80876.78	59365.91	
Total Trade												3685879.08	1317074.07	1804187.81	2269046.987
Pakistan Export												24.81	140	85.46	
Pakistan Import												6317.78	5947.78	2543.41	
Total Trade												6342.59	6087.78	2628.87	5019.746667
Mexico Export												4.64	21.24	94.9	
Mexico Import												1320.42	10336.5	2929.74	
Total Trade												1325.06	10357.74	3024.64	4902.48
Turkey Export												626157.2	107587.65	170893.74	
Turkey Total Import												807121.29	905980	771190.45	
Total Trade												1433278.49	1013567.65	942084.19	1129643.443

Sources: WISER Trade, Census with Azerbaijan, Devlet Gonnuk Komitesi

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