

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE AND ITS RELATION TO STATE AND NEO-LIBERAL POLICIES IN TURKEY: A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MODEL

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Abstract: In recent years, there have been references to the "Islamic resurgence" in the Middle East. And Turkey, as Middle Eastern country, has no exception. Islam has begun to occupy an important place in political debates in Turkey. The aim of this paper is to make a critical assessment on general academic discourse dominating the studies on state religion relation in Turkey. It will be argument of this paper that, first, one reason of this resurgence is state policies. In other words, contrary to being in conflict with religious, state politically support the rising of religious resurgence. Hence, there is no conflict between the state and religion but confrontation especially since 1980s. And secondly, it will be discussed that there has been conscious ignorance of the relation between the resurgence of religious policies and neo-liberal structural adjustment economic policy launches since 1980s. And lastly the international dynamics of Middle East and the role of the USA on the rise of political Islam not mentioned in these studies will be taken into consideration. In doing such a critical assessment on studies dealing with the resurgence of religious and political Islam in Turkey, I will try to propose a new methodology, which approaches the religion as an ideology of new rising social classes emerging after the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies in Turkey.

Keywords: Islamic, state-religion relationship, modernization theory, neo-liberalism, social classes

Özet: Son yıllarda Ortadoğu'da siyasal İslam'ın yükselişi gözle görülür bir olgu haline almıştır ve Türkiye de bu çerçevede istisna oluşturmamaktadır. Öte yandan sosyal ve siyasal bilimler alanında bu yükselişe paralel olarak siyasal İslam ve dinin toplumsal rolü üzerine çalışmalarda belirgin bir artış gözlenmektedir. Bu çalışmada, özellikle Türkiye'de siyasal İslam'ın yükselişi üzerine çalışmalarda gözlenen yaygın argümanlar üzerine eleştirel bir değerlendirme amaçlanmaktadır. Türkiye'de siyasal İslam üzerine yapılan çalışmalarda göze çarpan belirgin ortak görüş, bu yükselişi özellikle devlet-din ikiliği(çatışması) üzerinden açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, büyük oranda modernleşme kuramından etkilenen bu yaklaşımın aksine, devlet ile din arasında bir çatışmadan çok bir ilişkisellik olduğu, özellikle 1980 sonrası uygulanan neoliberal iktisat politikalarına referansla açıklanmaya çalışılacak. Bunu takiben söz konusu

arařtırmaların bu yükseliři salt içsel bir sorun olarak görüp, dıřsal dinamikleri fazla dikkate almadığı üzerinde durulacak. Bunu yaparken, Türkiye'de siyasal İslam'ın yükseliřini anlamada anahtar olabilecek alternatif bir yöntem önerilecek; dinin yükseliři, 1980 sonrası yeni ortaya çıkan ya da biçim deęiřtiren toplumsal belirli toplumsal sınıfların ideolojisi olma bağlamında ele alınacak.

Anahtar Sözcükler: İslamcı yükseliř, din-devlet iliřkisi, modernleşme kuramı, neo-liberalizm, toplumsal sınıflar.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there have been references made to an "Islamic resurgence" in the Middle East. And Turkey, as a Middle Eastern country, has no exception. Islam has begun to occupy an important place in political debates in Turkey. However, Turkey has a special place with reference to politics and religion relation compared to the most of the Middle Eastern countries. Since the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923, secularism emerged as one of the key principles of the state and the position of religion has been redefined. Within this context, the state has played an important role. The religious expression came under increasing control and supervision of the state in Turkey since 1923.

Resurgence in religious consciousness and activity became evident in the 1980s. This increased visibility of Islam as a political phenomenon has prompted many social scientists to study the different aspects of what they consider as an ideological current: "The Reislamization of Turkey"¹. While the question formulated in most of these studies focused on whether Islam poses a political threat to the survival of the modern secularist Turkish state, some of them have been discussing how religion has been plasticized by the broad mass of the Turkish people.

The aim of this paper is to make a critical assessment on general academic discourse dominating the studies on state-religion relation in Turkey. Indeed, the institutional transformation of religion has become the subject matter of a whole body of literature on political change in the era post-military coup of 1980 in Turkey. After a brief overview on how relevant literature problematizes the rise of political Islam and relation between state and religion, I will try to discuss basic assumptions of these dominant approaches. And, in the light of this discussion, I will propose a new model for explaining and understanding the resurgence of political Islam in Turkey. Under this new model I will insist on three dimensions of the resurgence of religion. First, I will try to show that one reason of this resurgence is state policies. In other words, contrary to being in conflict with religious, state politically support the rising of religious resurgence. And secondly, it will be discussed that there has been a conscious negligence of the relation between the resurgence of religious policies and neo-liberal structural adjustment economic policy launches since

¹ Although the current studies on religion and state derived their methodological assumptions from most modern political theory in general and identity politics in particular, the history of tendency to explaining politics and social relations with reference to religion can be dated back to 1960s. For example one of the leading figure of this approach is Şerif Mardin and his popular article, "Center Periphery Relation: a Key to Turkish Politics?" in *Daedalus*, Winter 1972. For more popular and recent studies, see also, (Çarkoęu and Toprak: 2000), (Göle: 2000), (Sarıbay and Keyman: 2004) and (Vergin, 2000).

1980s. And lastly the international dynamics of Middle East and the role of the USA on the rise of political Islam not mentioned in these studies will be taken into consideration.

2. THEMATIC OVERVIEW OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE ROLE OF RELIGION

One constant theme of discussions on religion has been the conflict between secular state and religious organizations. In most of the studies on state and religion relation in Turkey, it is generally accepted that neither modern manifestation of Islam, nor republican secularism, nor the relation of religious institutions to the Turkish state, can be understood without reference to Ottoman rule (Mardin, 1972).

Several scholars have pointed out how the Ottoman centralization of power impeded the horizontal integration of society. Ottoman Islamic culture has been analyzed as person-based model of society. In such societies, Islam is said to play a social cement role². It is stated that paradoxically as the role of religious as “social cement” grew, Islam became politicized and ideologized; at the same time with the secularization of the functions of the state, and religion became both more specialized and more important at the personal and family level.

The methodologies of these approaches pave the ground for a political project in which the state and civil-society are put in an external and conflictual relationship in which democratic developments and civil-society as such are identified. Center and periphery model of development/modernization school formulated in 1960s is used as a key concept in explaining Turkish politics-religion relation. It is stated that multiple confrontations between center and periphery taking place in the process of centralization and the results of these confrontations played a significant role in the formation of different political structures and cultures (religion).

It is also stated that throughout the Ottoman-Turkish history, elite groups have exhibited the common feature of prevailing state over religion. It is thus accepted for instance by Şerif Mardin (1991: 283-243) that the secular civil-military coalition at the “center” of Turkish politics would continue to keep out “the religious contingent of the periphery”. Here, it is also insisted that, the modernization process provided the conditions for the estrangement of the periphery from the center and it is seen that the peripheral forces at an increasing rate defined themselves with religious rituals and identities. A well-trained bureaucratic center that did not look warmly at compromise was emerging on the other side.

In most of the studies on resurgence of religious ideology, there is a methodological dominance of modernization school and its post-modernist version³. It is believed that Turkish political culture is shaped by religious values in persistence. Several scholars have

2 It may be said that the founding father of this thesis is Şerif Mardin (Mardin:1986). For new version of this thesis see also, (Sarıbay:2004), (Keyman and Sarıbay: 2000).

3 Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çarkoğlu (2000) *Türkiye’de Din Toplum ve Siyaset* TESEV yayınları, İstanbul; Nilüfer Göle (2000) *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri*, Metis, İstanbul; Keyman, Fuat (2000) “Globalleşme Söylemleri ve Kimlik Talepleri: Türban Sorununu Anlamak”, Keyman Fuat ve Sarıbay Ali Yaşar (eds), *Global Yerel Ekseninde Türkiye*, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul.

argued that republican secularism as a dominant ideology could not replace the multi-level appeal of Islam in Turkey (Mardin, 2002).

Another characteristic of these studies is that the dominance of religion in daily life and political sphere is considered as cultural phenomena. In other words, these studies are culturally oriented. Another point is that it is supposed that there is a dualistic relation between the state and religious sphere in the context of Turkey.

3. REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE ON ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

It will not be wrong to state that there is a domination of modernization discourse about the resurgence of Islamic movement and relation with the state in Turkey. Modernization theory methodologically depends on the structural functionalist approach. Structural functionalism seeks to reduce the diverse spectrum of social relations to cultural causes. This tendency, played a dominant role in the formation of modernization theory and the "cluster of absences" long noted by development specialists. Tradition and modernity were counterpoised, and it was axiomatic for modernization theorists to view tradition as the main culprit standing in the way of "progress."

Furthermore, by employing an ethnocentric and teleological definition of modernity, such scholars essentially claim that Muslim societies are inherently traditional. Turkish scholars, no doubt, has been influenced by the affinities of this approach with the Kemalist state ideology of Comtean positivism, have internalized.⁴ Turkish scholars, as well as a number of Western scholars, have tended to treat the Islamic movement as a reactionary force fighting a vain rearguard action against the processes of westernization and secularization.

Modernization theory dominated the social science research in Turkey, and explicit assumptions about old versus new, tradition versus modernity, religion versus secularism, the inexorable march toward Westernization, and sociopolitical reactions being religious fanaticism fed these studies. They presented the establishment of the Republican regime as the inevitable "emergence of modern Turkey" and depicted its founding Kemalist ideology as the fulfillment of destiny for the modernizing forces.

Modernization theory tends to explain human conduct in terms of simplistic dichotomies, modern and traditional, while ignoring the causal mechanisms that influence the evolution of Islamic movements, economic expansion, popular imagination, and social change. Turkish social scientists, not only talk about politicization of religion, but writing on state-society relations in general, apply this duality model almost in all spheres of society and have long talked about a dominant center and weak periphery, elites and popular dichotomy, state and civil society dualism, dating back to the Ottoman period. In this conception of the coercive state with centuries of a bureaucratic tradition behind it, the center is perennially suspicious of civil society, which it tries to co-opt, control or suppress. This strong state does not allow the formation of a societal consensus which might emerge if organized societal forces were permitted to decouple from an authoritarian center and, in their attempt to gain autonomy from it, eventually agree on the fundamentals of civil rights and pluralist reconstruction of power relationship (Toprak, 1996; 89).

4 See, (Parla:1989) and (Köker:1990)

According to Sunar and Toprak (1983; 427-427), for example, the cleavage between the cultures of the center and the periphery existed since the Ottoman Empire widened during the early republican period. In their explanation they argue that “the tension between Ottoman center and the periphery had been partly reduced by the linkage function served by Islam. When this major connection with the periphery was weakened by the state, the tension was exacerbated and the periphery greatly increased.

In sum, modernization theory dominated the social science research in Turkey, and explicit assumptions about old versus new, tradition versus modernity, religion versus secularism. It is stated that a major obstacle to the development of civil society in Turkey is an overpowering bureaucracy which leaves little room for individual initiative and collective pursuit of interests within autonomous domains, free from state interferences (Toprak, 1996). And it is interpreted that secularism in Turkey was originally designed and interpreted as state control over religion, not a separation of the two spheres. This control was exercised through authoritarian politics during the one party period. (Toprak 1996 :107).

One of the main conclusion upon which almost all of these studies have agreement is that neither the rise of Islam, nor the secularism, nor the relation of religious institutions to the state can be understood without reference to their Ottoman roots. Mardin (1989:11) points that Ottoman Islamic culture was based on a model of society as person-based and personalized social relations. According to him, with the breakdown in the nineteenth century of traditional Ottoman social structure, there were no political institutions , no central ideology or value system to bridge the gulf between the elites (center) and the ordinary people (periphery). And religion and Islamic ideology could fill this gap (Mardin, 1977 : 284).

These writers all focused on the history of ideas and religion as a cultural entity. They treated the state as a structural instance staying above and outside the society. In this sense, the role of religion in Turkey and Muslim societies in general is explained in accordance with the tension between state-religion dichotomies. One of the main weaknesses of these studies is their cultural deterministic and state-centered understanding of social relation and the other is the neglect ion of production relations, so that they can pay more attention to ideas rather than material life of human being.

4. DISCOURSES ON THE RESURGENCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

The Islamist movement has firmly carved a space for itself in Turkish society since 1980s. It now has counter elite with a counter-culture which stands in sharp contrast to its previous marginality. The Islamists are in political power positions within mass political parties of the center-right which is represented in the National Assembly and controls several municipalities. They have taken jobs within the state bureaucracies, thanks to the patronage networks of politicians sympathetic to the movement and the “tarikats” (religious sects and brotherhoods). They control a major portion of the media, including several newspapers and radio and television channels. They produce an intelligentsia widely read and respected. They organized part of the work force within one of the confederations of labor and have established financial corporations in the form of Islamic banks.

In all these discussions, there is a common agreement on the resurgence of political Islamism or politicization of religion of Islam. However, like approaches on the role of

religion in Turkey, it is easy to observe a monolithic tendency of the studies dealing with the reason of resurgence of political Islam. As we will see, there is also a dominance of culturally oriented methodology of these approaches.

One of the most accepted approaches presents Islamic movements as a reaction against corrupt state elite that is the corruption of center. In other words, it is stated that the rise of Islamic movement mentions the success of religion as a cultural cement of society against secularism. They argue that Islamic resurgence in Turkey appears to be as a response to supposedly “uneven and badly managed” growth led by the secular elite. Those on the margins of society are more likely to be recruited into these religious-political movements, which express through religious idioms their goal of achieving social transformation. For example Mardin (1991:37-77) argues that one of the structure and philosophy behind Turkey's derive for secularization strongly depends on state control over the religion.

On the other hand, the thesis, which magnify the role of state in explaining the process of secularization, revert into its opposition in explaining rise of political Islam. It is argued that in the process of Islamization, the state plays the most important role. Ahmad (2007:3), for instance, in his analysis on resurgence of political Islam in Middle East, states that “these countries are not Islamic because their legal structures, social norms, the predominant educational system, popular culture etc., are manifestly un-Islamic. Hence the process of Islamization; they are Muslim but they are to be made Islamic”. And he adds that in countries like Turkey and Egypt, there is a state-led Islamization.

This thesis of state-led Islamization is a commonly accepted way of explanation among Turkish scholars who deal with the resurgence of Islam in Turkey. For instance, Ayata (1996:40) examines the recent rise of political Islam in Turkey in terms of a complex interplay between four major processes: the policies of the parties on the center right toward religion; state-sponsored religious activities and the consolidation of establishment Islam; the impact of Sufi tarikats and communities; and the growing organizational strength, ideological appeal, and electoral base of the Islamist Welfare Party. Except for direct military rules, the government has been in the hands of center right parties since 1950. For almost fifty years, these parties significantly modified the relationship between religion, politics and society from the way it had been during the single party regime.

Ayata (1996: 41) states that the state has used a middle-range way. In other words, on the one hand, the state tried to increase the religiosity of people through the policies, on the other hand, the state continued to oppose religious movements by 1) arresting fundamentalist leaders, 2) banning fundamentalist organizations, 3) attempting to impose state control over Koranic schools (*Kuran kursu*) and 4) dictating the content of all sermons delivered by mosque personnel.

However, in spite of this moderate way used by state, the hallmark of the changes that occurred after 1983 was the unprecedented level of penetration of state institutions by neo-traditionalist Islamic groups. Many official departments became vehicles of fundamentalist ideas and interests. In some ministries, the personnel departments fell into the hands of fundamentalist networks, which used the opportunity to draw upon the graduates of İmam-Hatip schools (Ayata, 1993, 64).

Consequently, what is mentioned in the studies on the reason of the rise of Islam is that “the most important determinant of the political role of Islam and its relevance to politics throughout the republic” has been the Turkish state (Cizre- Sakallıoğlu 1996: 231). As Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1996: 231) argued, historically speaking, “without changing its basic stance, the Turkish state adopted a double discourse: On the one hand establishing a rigid

segregation between Islam and the political realm; on the other, accommodating and incorporating Islamic politics into the system in various ways.”

According to this state-led explanation model, Turkish secularism against this background was not about the separation of state and religion, but about submission of religion to the reason of the state, promotion of an acceptable ‘state Islam’, and the judgment of nonconforming Muslims as potential threats to the ‘secular’ regime. One might also argue that Islamists, from intellectuals to sheikhs, see the state as a transcendental and abstract entity and regard it as a protector of the Islamic community and values in spite of its secular nature.

The second strand of the reasons of the rise of political Islam is about the ideological role of religion. Scholars who adopt this line of argument treat Islam as an ideological weapon against leftist political movements. For instance, Ahmad (2007:25) states that the west helped Islamism flourish by recruiting it as a force against “leftist movements”, which encompassed not only the broadly-based socialist movements that had arisen among the peoples in 1970s, but also any movements which subscribed to economic nationalism against western corporate capital .

In Turkey some scholars date back this ideological role of state the period of the emergence of republic. “During the single party period, the state strictly controlled the religion. Officials recognized the potential of religion as a legitimizing force for their policies. Lastly, they saw religion as an important instrument in the struggle against anarchy and terror and religion was increasingly invoked by the center right parties as a means of social and political control and a way to impede communism” (Ayata, 1996 : 41).

The case of contemporary Turkey; where the ruling Islamist party which governs with comfortable majority initially grew in the milieu of small capitalist of the regional towns, especially towns on the eastern region, who were angry with dominance of Istanbul-based capital but are now strong enough even in Istanbul itself to challenge that earlier hegemony most profoundly (Ahmad: 31-32).

The third strand presents the resurgence of Islam as a reaction to the socioeconomic outcome of the modernization process. According to this way of explanation, people who are on the margins of society are more likely to be recruited into these religious-political movements, which express through religious idioms their goal of achieving social transformation. For instance, Atasoy (2007: 121) states that the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, supported by both prosperous and disadvantaged segment of society. Due to his broad electoral base, AKP has been able to draw on mass dissatisfaction with neoliberalism .

Here, what is observed is that we come cross another kind of determinism that is vulgar economism. In this context, the rise of religious politics is tried to be explained by attributing class-based ties. According to this mode of explanation, Islamist entrepreneurs mobilize religious symbols and metaphors to gain access to economic goods, security for the individual, and a harmonious communal identity. Such movements utilize Islam as a populist ideology aimed at mobilizing society in the name of tradition and authenticity. Some scholars who study Islamic movements argue that religion is dynamic because it provides a set of mobilizing symbols, a formal structure to organize people, and a leadership network to defect and ultimately to penetrate the state. Scholars who adopt this line of argument treat Islam as the cement that binds together blocs of historically opposed forces. In addition to this economically deterministic understanding, some scholar sees Islamism in Turkey as basically an urban movement empowered by a strong middle class

and its identity politics (Göle, 2006:7). Nevertheless, this view fails to explain why diverse competing groups tend to coalesce around Islamic symbols and idioms.

Despite these particularistic approaches, there are attempts trying to explain the rise of Islamism by the cultural factors, economic structures and political institutions in which they operate. For instance, Çınar and Duran (2008:19) state that the rise of contemporary Islamism as an essentially opposition movement is linked to a number of factors such as the failure of modernizing regimes to deliver on their promises and to provide their citizens with a worldview; the Arab-Israeli war; uneven globalization; increasing post-modernization of daily life; post-modern criticisms that undermine the intellectual bases of Westernization. However despite the fact that this approach seems to stand aside the particularistic explanation, it falls into the culturally deterministic trap.

In other words, this kind of analysis not only bears certain similarities with modernization approach but also remains at the level of manifestation since it takes the immediate causes of the rise of political Islam as explanation. One thing, however, is certain: in each approach the Islamic resurgence has been explained with reference to the crisis of modernity. And, at last instance each approach has been accompanied with culturally deterministic logic. The basic difference between these approaches is that, while the former strictly focuses on the internal dynamics of social structure; for instance the tension between state and religion, duality between central and peripheral culture, the latter is urgent about the tension between external dynamics. Here it will be not wrong to say that one of the implicit arguments lying behind the arguments of latter one strictly inspired from the discourses of the clash of civilization.

The last approach is called as constructivism assuming that any society is a human construction and subject to multiple interpretations and influences. In this line of thinking, states, nations, and religions are considered as construction. This approach illustrates the unending tension between human understanding and multiple, yet conditioned constructions of reality. And they state that individual actions are neither caused by social structure nor the outcome of individual choices. Yavuz (2003; 21) explains constructivist approach as an approach focusing on the relationships between the individual and society (or between agency and structures), to clarify and/or make understandable how social structures (e.g., Islamic frames of reference that inform rules and practices) are constituted in the individual (internalizing the external through socialization). In another words, constructivism strictly focuses on the way how individuals build social structure through objectification of political and cultural consciousness (externalizing the internal).

Yavuz (2003), according to this constructivist methodology argues that Islamic movements have developed four sets of strategies in relation to changing circumstances and these strategies gradually became four competing visions about the role of religion in Turkish society. He states that:

“These social strategies chronologically are: a spiritual ethical Islamic movement, which seeks to treat faith as a source of norms and mores for creating a common moral language by rearticulating communal identity (1925–1950); a cultural Islamic movement, which perceives Islam as a form of civilization and seeks to influence cultural and social identities in this respect (1950–1970); a political Islamic movement, which seeks to attain political power either to improve the economic position of a segment of society or transform itself through the institutions of the state (1970–present); and a socioeconomic Islamic movement, which stresses the role of the market, associations, and the public sphere as a way of transforming society (1983–present).” (Yavuz, 2003:22)

In this analysis what is common to the former analysis is that it explores the rise of Islam in the context of the interactions between the state and society (social construction). The main weakness of this line of explanations lies in their treatment of social structure only in the cultural sense or sees the Islamic resurgence as a phenomenon of infrastructural level. They treat the state as political form and religion as an institution distinct from economic relations.

5. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEW METHOD ON RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE

Among the many recent studies on resurgence of political Islam in Turkey, few have discussed the historical and material bases of this development. Those seeking to explain the apparent revival of Islam in Turkey, generally focus on the role of Islam in a cultural context. Here, the question most often asked has been whether the rise of political Islam poses a political threat to the survival of the modern secular Turkish state. In this regard, most of these studies are abstract and speculative and what is missing is the question of what the relation between the rise of Islam and neo-liberal policies has been since 1980s.

Contrary to the dominant structural functionalist tendency, I suggests that a return to classical Marxist ideas on the relation between class, capital and state and ideology, in a global context offers a more productive approach for mapping recent political -resurgence of political Islam- and economic change. I will argue that most approaches fail adequately to theorize the relationship between states and civil society -market- insofar as they see states and markets as isolated, fragmented aspects of social reality existing in a purely external and contingent manner.

The market is not only a sphere of opportunity, freedom and choice, but as a compulsion, a necessity, and a social discipline, capable of subjecting all human activities and relationships to its requirements. And religion as an ideology plays a paramount role. The market has created new instruments of power to be manipulated not only by multinational capital but by advanced capitalist states, which can act to impose draconian discipline on other economies while often sheltering their own domestic capital. Coercion has been not just a disorder of civil society, but one of its constitutive principles. For that reason, the coercive functions of the state have been occupied with the enforcement of ideological domination in civil society.

It is true that in a capitalist society, with the separation of political and economic spheres or state and civil society, coercive public power is centralized and concentrated to a degree than ever before, but this simply means that one of the principles of coercion by the state is to sustain private power in a civil society. Religion, in this context, is serviced to sustainability of private power in capitalist production relations. In doing this, the illusory tension between state and religion must be fetishized for the legitimization of real power relations.

Capitalism is uniquely indifferent to the social identities of the people it exploits. Capitalist exploitation is not inextricably linked with extra economic juridical or political identities, inequalities or differences. On the other hand, capitalism is very flexible in its ability to make use of, as well as to discard, particular social oppression. The problem, in the context of "religious identity", is that it is to co-opt whatever extra-economic oppressions are historically and culturally available in any given settings. Such cultural legacies, like religion, for example, promote the ideological hegemony of capitalism by

disguising its inherent tendency to create “underclasses”. When the least privileged sectors of the working class coincide with extra-economic identities like Islam, it may appear that the blame for the existence of these sectors lies with causes other than the necessary logic of the capitalist system.

Here, this does not mean that the relation between capitalism and extra-economic identities is a matter of capitalist conspiracy to deceive. One of the reasons of the success and resurgence of religious and racism is partly because they can actually work to the advantage of a certain sectors of the working class in the competitive conditions of the labor market. In Turkey, the case of “Anatolian Tigers” is a good example of this reality for instance. The point is that if capital derives advantages from political Islam and racism, it is not because of the structural tendency in capitalism toward cultural inequalities, but on the contrary because they disguise the structural realities of the capitalist system and because they divide the working class.

One of the other weaknesses of structural functionalist approach is that, the state is taken as a basic and largely unquestioned category. Once, the state’s existence is taken for granted before any discussions -relationship between state and religious movements- the dualistic analysis stating the state outside of the society will be unavoidable. In understanding of resurgence of political Islam, however, it is necessary to expose the relation between the state and capital in a global manner.

The relation between the national states to capital is a relation of a nationally fixed state to a global mobile capital. This gives rise to analysis of political development in terms of conflict between capital fractions (textile capital versus chemical capital, say, banking capital versus industrial capital). The tension between Turkish Industrialist and Businessman's Association (TUSIAD) representing secularly oriented big business interests and Independent Industrialists and Businessman's Associations (MUSIAD) representing both large and smaller size Muslim business interests.

Each of these fractions of capital made an alliance with each other in the reign of import substituted industrialization policies which has been launched in 1960s and 1970s. The political form of this alliance can be named as solidarity in which state is placed at the center. And ideological cement of this political form was nationalism. It may be said that the corporatist solidarity between these two main fractions of capital which was constituted during the consolidation of neoliberal policies in 1980s collapsed. And new emerging contradictions represent themselves in the form of religious political fractions..

The shift in relation between the national state and the global capital, together with the collapse of solidarity between different fractions of capital, means a significant change in the global forms of capitalist domination. This is an important point, which is external dynamics of the resurgence of Islam that structural functionalist school undervalues. There is a shift in state power to the world level – the level at which monetary terrorism operates hands in hand with conservative democracy flourished with Islamic colors.

Hence, the decay of the essentialist and dogmatic aspects of Turkish Islamism, represented by Justice and Development Party which is in power and the rise in its pragmatic aspect together with new discourse on conservative democracy should be understood in this manner. More importantly, the roots of this “second phase of Islamism,” in which a new generation of Islamists has started to follow an Islamic cultural program by dropping their “anti-systemic stand” and “rigid ideological corpus” can be traced back to a series of transformations in Turkish Islamism in the 1990s and clearly be related with globalization. In the early 1990s, Turkish Islamists started to redefine and reframe their religious demands and ideals in terms of a universal vocabulary on human

rights and liberties. A significant factor in this transformation was the expectations and needs of the newly rising Anatolian bourgeoisie and their economic interests directly related to the global markets.

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